Now a
lightsome
body reveals itself and other things.
Summa Theologica
Reply to Objection 3: This argument would prove if the glorified body
were unable even without movement to share the Divine goodness much
more perfectly than the heavenly bodies, which is untrue. Hence
glorified bodies will be moved, not in order to gain a perfect
participation in the Divine goodness (since they have this through
glory), but in order to show the soul's power. On the other hand, the
movement of the heavenly bodies could not show their power, except the
power they have in moving lower bodies to generation and corruption,
which is not becoming to that state. Hence the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 4: Local movement takes nothing away from the
stability of the soul that is established in God, since it does not
affect that which is intrinsic to a thing, as stated above (ad 1).
Reply to Objection 5: The fitting place assigned to each glorified body
according to the degree of its dignity belongs to the accidental
reward. Nor does it follow that this reward is diminished whenever the
body is outside its place; because that place pertains to reward, not
as actually containing the body located therein (since nothing flows
therefrom into the glorified body, but rather does it receive splendor
therefrom), but as being due to merits. Wherefore, though out of that
place, they will still continue to rejoice in it.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the movement of the saints will be instantaneous?
Objection 1: It would seem that movement of the saints will be
instantaneous. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii, 30) that "wherever
the spirit listeth there will the body be. " Now the movement of the
will, whereby the spirit wishes to be anywhere, is instantaneous.
Therefore the body's movement will be instantaneous.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (Phys. iv, 8) proves that there
is no movement through a vacuum, because it would follow that something
moves instantaneously, since a vacuum offers no resistance whatever to
a thing that is in motion, whereas the plenum offers resistance; and so
there would be no proportion between the velocity of movement in a
vacuum and that of movement in a plenum, since the ratio of movements
in point of velocity is as the ratio of the resistance offered by the
medium. Now the velocities of any two movements that take place in time
must needs be proportional, since any one space of time is proportional
to any other. But in like manner no full place can resist a glorified
body since this can be in the same place with another body, no matter
how this may occur; even as neither can a vacuum resist a body.
Therefore if it moves at all, it moves instantaneously.
Objection 3: Further, the power of a glorified soul surpasses the power
of a non-glorified soul, out of all proportion so to speak. Now the
non-glorified soul moves the body in time. Therefore the glorified soul
moves the body instantaneously.
Objection 4: Further, whatever is moved equally soon to what is near
and what is distant, is moved instantaneously. Now such is the movement
of a glorified body, for however distant the space to which it is
moved, the time it takes to be moved is imperceptible: wherefore
Augustine says (QQ. De Resurrectione, Ep. cii, qu. 1) that "the
glorified body reaches equally soon to any distance, like the sun's
ray. " Therefore the glorified body is moved instantaneously.
Objection 5: Further, whatever is in motion is moved either in time or
in an instant. Now after the resurrection the glorified body will not
be moved in time, since time will not be then according to Apoc. 10:6.
Therefore this movement will be instantaneous.
On the contrary, In local movement space. movement and time are equally
divisible, as is demonstrated in Phys. vi, 4. Now the space traversed
by a glorified body in motion is divisible. Therefore both the movement
and the time are divisible. But an instant is indivisible. Therefore
this movement will not be instantaneous.
Further, a thing cannot be at the same time wholly in one place and
partly in another place, since it would follow that the remaining part
is in two places at the same time, which is impossible. But whatever is
in motion is partly in a term "wherefrom" and partly in a term
"whereto," as is proved in Phys. vi, 6: while whatever has been in
motion is wholly in the term whereto the movement is directed; and it
is impossible at the same time for it to be moved and to have been
moved. Now that which is moved instantaneously is being moved and has
been moved at the same time. Therefore the local movement of a
glorified body cannot be instantaneous.
I answer that, Opinion is much divided on this point. For some say that
a glorified body passes from one place to another without passing
through the interval, just as the will passes from one place to another
without passing through the interval, and that consequently it is
possible for the movement of a glorified body like that of the will to
be instantaneous. But this will not hold: because the glorified body
will never attain to the dignity of the spiritual nature, just as it
will never cease to be a body. Moreover, when the will is said to move
from one place to another, it is not essentially transferred from place
to place, because in neither place is it contained essentially, but it
is directed to one place after being directed by the intention to
another: and in this sense it is said to move from one place to
another.
Hence others [*Alexander of Hales, Sum. Th. III, Q[23], mem. 3] say
that it is a property of the nature of a glorified body, since it is a
body, to pass through the interval and consequently to be moved in
time, but that by the power of glory, which raises it to a certain
infinitude above the power of nature, it is possible for it not to pass
through the interval, and consequently to be moved instantaneously. But
this is impossible since it implies a contradiction: which is proved as
follows. Suppose a body which we will call Z to be in motion from A to
B. It is clear that Z, as long as it is wholly in A is not in motion;
and in like manner when it is wholly in B, because then the movement is
past. Therefore if it is at any time in motion it must needs be neither
wholly in A nor wholly in B. Therefore while it is in motion, it is
either nowhere, or partly in A, and partly in B, or wholly in some
other intervening place, say C, or partly in A and C and partly in C
and B. But it is impossible for it to be nowhere, for then there would
be a dimensive quantity without a place, which is impossible. Nor again
is it possible for it to be partly in A and partly in B without being
in some way in the intervening space. for since B is a place distant
from A, it would follow that in the intervening space the part of Z
which is in B is not continuous with the part which is in A. Therefore
it follows that it is either wholly in C, or partly in C, and partly in
some other place that intervenes between C and A, say D, and so forth.
Therefore it follows that Z does not pass form A to B unless first of
all it be in all the intervening places: unless we suppose that it
passes from A to B without ever being moved, which implies a
contradiction, because the very succession of places is local movement.
The same applies to any change whatever having two opposite terms, each
of which is a positive entity, but not to those changes which have only
one positive term, the other being a pure privation, since between
affirmation and negation or privation there is no fixed distance:
wherefore that which is in the negation may be nearer to or more remote
from affirmation, and conversely, by reason of something that causes
either of them or disposes thereto: so that while that which is moved
is wholly under a negation it is changed into affirmation, and "vice
versa"; wherefore in such things "to be changing precedes to be
changed," as is proved in Phys. vi, 5. Nor is there any comparison with
the movement of an angel, because being in a place is predicated
equivocally of a body and an angel. Hence it is clear that it is
altogether impossible for a body to pass from one place to another,
unless it pass through every interval.
Wherefore others grant this, and yet they maintain that the glorified
body is moved instantaneously. But it follows from this that a
glorified body is at the same instant in two or more places together,
namely in the ultimate term, and in all the intervening places, which
is impossible.
To this, however, they reply that, although it is the same instant
really, it is not the same logically, like a point at which different
lines terminate. But this is not enough, because an instant measures
the instantaneous, according to its reality and not according to our
way of considering it. Wherefore an instant through being considered in
a different way is not rendered capable of measuring things that are
not simultaneous in time, just as a point through being considered in a
different way does not make it possible for one point of place to
contain things that are locally distant from one another.
Hence others with greater probability hold that a glorified body moves
in time, but that this time is so short as to be imperceptible; and
that nevertheless one glorified body can pass through the same space in
less time than another, because there is no limit to the divisibility
of time, no matter how short a space we may take.
Reply to Objection 1: That which is little lacking is as it were not
lacking at all (Phys. ii, 5); wherefore we say: "I do so and so at
once," when it is to be done after a short time. It is in this sense
that Augustine speaks when he says that "wheresoever the will shall be,
there shall the body be forthwith. " Or we may say that in the blessed
there will never be an inordinate will: so that they never will wish
their body to be instantaneously where it cannot be, and consequently
whatever instant the will shall choose, at that same instant the body
will be in whatever place the will shall determine.
Reply to Objection 2: Some have demurred to this proposition of the
Philosopher's, as the Commentator thereon observes. They say that the
ratio of one whole movement to another whole movement is not
necessarily as the ratio of one resisting medium to another resisting
medium, but that the ratio of the intervening mediums gives us the
ratio of retardations attending the movements on account of the
resistance of the medium. For every movement has a certain fixed speed,
either fast or slow, through the mover overcoming the movable, although
there be no resistance on the part of the medium; as evidenced in
heavenly bodies, which have nothing to hinder their movement; and yet
they do not move instantaneously, but in a fixed time proportionate to
the power of the mover in comparison with the movable. Consequently it
is clear that even if we suppose something to move in a vacuum, it does
not follow that it moves instantaneously, but that nothing is added to
the time which that movement requires in the aforesaid proportion of
the mover to the movable, because the movement is not retarded.
But this reply, as the Commentator observes, proceeds from an error in
the imagination; for it is imagined that the retardation resulting from
the resistance of the medium is a part of movement added to the natural
movement, the quantity of which is in proportion to the mover in
comparison with the movable, as when one line is added to another: for
the proportion of one total to the other is not the same as the
proportion of the lines to which an addition has been made. [*The same
applies to mathematical quantities: for instance the ratio 2 + 1 to 4 +
1 is not as 2 to 4. ] And so there would not be the same proportion
between one whole sensible movement and another, as between the
retardations resulting from the resistance of the medium. This is an
error of the imagination, because each part of a movement has as much
speed as the whole movement: whereas not every part of a line has as
much of the dimensive quantity as the whole line has. Hence any
retardation or acceleration affecting the movement affects each of its
parts, which is not the case with lines: and consequently the
retardation that comes to a movement is not another part of the
movement, whereas in the case of the lines that which is added is a
part of the total line.
Consequently, in order to understand the Philosopher's argument, as the
Commentator explains, we must take the whole as being one, that is we
must take not only the resistance of the movable to the moving power,
but also the resistance of the medium through which the movement takes
place, and again the resistance of anything else, so that we take the
amount of retardation in the whole movement as being proportionate to
the moving power in comparison with the resisting movable, no matter in
what way it resist, whether by itself or by reason of something
extrinsic. For the movable must needs always resist the mover somewhat,
since mover and moved, agent and patient, as such, are opposed to one
another. Now sometimes it is to be observed that the moved resists the
mover by itself, either because it has a force inclining it to a
contrary movement, as appears in violent movements, or at least because
it has a place contrary to the place which is in the intention of the
mover; and such like resistance even heavenly bodies offer their
movers. Sometimes the movable resists the power of the mover, by reason
only of something else and not by itself. This is seen in the natural
movement of heavy and light things, because by their very form they are
inclined to such a movement: for the form is an impression of their
generator, which is the mover as regards heavy and light bodies. On the
part of matter we find no resistance, neither of a force inclining to a
contrary movement nor of a contrary place, since place is not due to
matter except in so far as the latter, being circumscribed by its
dimensions, is perfected by its natural form. Hence there can be no
resistance save on the part of the medium, and this resistance is
connatural to their movement. Sometimes again the resistance results
from both, as may be seen in the movements of animals.
Accordingly when in a movement there is no resistance save on the part
of the movable, as in the heavenly bodies, the time of the movement is
measured according to the proportion of the mover to the movable, and
the Philosopher's argument does not apply to these, since if there be
no medium at all their movement is still a movement in time. on the
other hand, in those movements where there is resistance on the part of
the medium only, the measure of time is taken only according to the
obstacle on the part of the medium, so that if the medium be removed
there will be no longer an obstacle; and so either it will move
instantaneously, or it will move in an equal time through a vacuum and
through a plenum, because granted that it moves in time through a
vacuum, that time will bear some proportion to the time in which it
moves through a plenum. Now it is possible to imagine another body more
subtle in the same proportion than the body which filled the space, and
then if this body fill some other equal space it will move in as little
time through that plenum as it did previously through a vacuum, since
by as much as the subtlety of the medium is increased by so much is the
length of time decreased, and the more subtle the medium the less it
resists. But in those other movements where resistance is offered by
both the movable and the medium, the quantity of time must be
proportionate to the power of the mover as compared with the resistance
of both movable and medium together. Hence granted that the medium be
taken away altogether, or that it cease to hinder, it does not follow
that the movement is instantaneous, but that the time is measured
according only to the resistance of the movable. Nor will there be any
inconsistency if it move in an equal time through a vacuum, and through
a space filled with the most subtle body imaginable, since the greater
the subtlety we ascribe to the medium the less is it naturally inclined
to retard the movement. Wherefore it is possible to imagine so great a
subtlety, as will naturally retard the movement less than does the
resistance of the movable, so that the resistance of the medium will
add no retardation to the movement.
It is therefore evident that although the medium offer no resistance to
the glorified bodies, in so far as it is possible for them to be in the
same place with another body, nevertheless their movement will not be
instantaneous, because the movable body itself will resist the motive
power from the very fact that it has a determinate place, as we have
said in reference to the heavenly bodies.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the power of a glorified soul surpasses
immeasurably the power of a non-glorified soul, it does not surpass it
infinitely, because both powers are finite: hence it does not follow
that it causes instantaneous movement. And even if its power were
simply infinite, it would not follow that it causes an instantaneous
movement, unless the resistance of the movable were overcome
altogether. Now although the resistance of the movable to the mover,
that results from opposition to such a movement by reason of its being
inclined to a contrary movement, can be altogether overcome by a mover
of infinite power, nevertheless the resistance it offers through
contrariety towards the place which the mover intends by the movement
cannot be overcome altogether except by depriving it of its being in
such and such a place or position. For just as white resists black by
reason of whiteness, and all the more according as whiteness is the
more distant from blackness, so a body resists a certain place through
having an opposite place and its resistance is all the greater,
according as the distance is greater. Now it is impossible to take away
from a body its being in some place or position, except one deprive it
of its corporeity, by reason of which it requires a place or position:
wherefore so long as it retains the nature of a body, it can nowise be
moved instantaneously, however greater be the motive power. Now the
glorified body will never lose its corporeity, and therefore it will
never be possible for it to be moved instantaneously.
Reply to Objection 4: In the words of Augustine, the speed is said to
be equal because the excess of one over the other is imperceptible,
just as the time taken by the whole movement is imperceptible.
Reply to Objection 5: Although after the resurrection the time which is
the measure of the heaven's movement will be no more, there will
nevertheless be time resulting from the before and after in any kind of
movement.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CLARITY OF THE BEATIFIED BODIES (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the clarity of the beatified bodies at the
resurrection. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there will be clarity in the glorified bodies?
(2) Whether this clarity will be visible to the non-glorified eye?
(3) Whether a glorified body will of necessity be seen by a
non-glorified body?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether clarity is becoming to the glorified body?
Objection 1: It would seem that clarity is unbecoming to the glorified
body. Because according to Avicenna (Natural. vi, 2), "every luminous
body consists of transparent parts. " But the parts of a glorified body
will not be transparent, since in some of them, such as flesh and
bones, earth is predominant. Therefore glorified bodies are not
lightsome.
Objection 2: Further, every lightsome body hides one that is behind it;
wherefore one luminary behind another is eclipsed, and a flame of fire
prevents one seeing what is behind it. But the glorified bodies will
not hide that which is within them, for as Gregory says on Job 28:17,
"Gold or crystal cannot equal it" (Moral. xviii, 48). "There," that is
in the heavenly country, "the grossness of the members will not hide
one's mind from another's eyes, and the very harmony of the body will
be evident to the bodily sight. " Therefore those bodies will not be
lightsome.
Objection 3: Further, light and color require a contrary disposition in
their subject, since "light is the extreme point of visibility in an
indeterminate body; color, in a determinate body" (De Sensu et Sensato
iii). But glorified bodies will have color, for as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xxii, 3), "the body's beauty is harmony of parts with a
certain charm of color": and it will be impossible for the glorified
bodies to lack beauty. Therefore the glorified bodies will not be
lightsome.
Objection 4: Further, if there be clarity in the glorified bodies, it
will need to be equal in all the parts of the body, just as all the
parts will be equally impassible, subtle and agile. But this is not
becoming, since one part has a greater disposition to clarity than
another, for instance the eye than the hand, the spirits [*"Animalem,"
as though it were derived from "animus"---the mind. Cf. [5096]FS,
Q[50], A[1],3m; [5097]FS, Q[52], A[1] ,3m] than the bones, the humors
than the flesh or nerves. Therefore it would seem unfitting for those
bodies to be lightsome.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 13:43): "The just shall shine as
the sun in the kingdom of their Father," and (Wis. 3:7): "The just
shall shine, and shall run to and fro like sparks among the reeds. "
Further, it is written (1 Cor. 15:43): "It is sown in dishonor, it
shall rise in glory," which refers to clarity, as evidenced by the
previous context where the glory of the rising bodies is compared to
the clarity of the stars. Therefore the bodies of the saints will be
lightsome.
I answer that, It is necessary to assert that after the resurrection
the bodies of the saints will be lightsome, on account of the authority
of Scripture which makes this promise. But the cause of this clarity is
ascribed by some to the fifth or heavenly essence, which will then
predominate in the human body. Since, however, this is absurd, as we
have often remarked ([5098]Q[84], A[1]), it is better to say that this
clarity will result from the overflow of the soul's glory into the
body. For whatever is received into anything is received not according
to the mode of the source whence it flows, but according to the mode of
the recipient. Wherefore clarity which in the soul is spiritual is
received into the body as corporeal. And consequently according to the
greater clarity of the soul by reason of its greater merit, so too will
the body differ in clarity, as the Apostle affirms (1 Cor. 15:41). Thus
in the glorified body the glory of the soul will be known, even as
through a crystal is known the color of a body contained in a crystal
vessel, as Gregory says on Job 28:17, "Gold or crystal cannot equal
it. "
Reply to Objection 1: Avicenna is speaking of a body that has clarity
through the nature of its component parts. It is not thus but rather by
merit of virtue that the glorified body will have clarity.
Reply to Objection 2: Gregory compares the glorified body to gold on
account of clarity, and to crystal on account of its transparency.
Wherefore seemingly we should say that they will be both transparent
and lightsome; for that a lightsome body be not transparent is owing to
the fact that the clarity of that body results from the density of the
lightsome parts, and density is opposed to transparency. Then, however,
clarity will result from another cause, as stated above: and the
density of the glorified body will not deprive it of transparency, as
neither does the density of a crystal deprive crystal.
Some, on the other hand, say that they are compared to crystal, not
because they are transparent, but on account of this likeness, for as
much as that which is enclosed in crystal is visible, so the glory of
the soul enclosed in the glorified body will not be hidden. But the
first explanation is better, because it safeguards better the dignity
of the glorified body, and is more consistent with the words of
Gregory.
Reply to Objection 3: The glory of the body will not destroy nature but
will perfect it. Wherefore the body will retain the color due to it by
reason of the nature of its component parts, but in addition to this it
will have clarity resulting from the soul's glory. Thus we see bodies
which have color by their nature aglow with the resplendence of the
sun, or from some other cause extrinsic or intrinsic.
Reply to Objection 4: Even as the clarity of glory will overflow from
the soul into the body according to the mode of the body, and is there
otherwise than in the soul, so again it will overflow into each part of
the soul according to the mode of that part. Hence it is not
unreasonable that the different parts should have clarity in different
ways, according as they are differently disposed thereto by their
nature. Nor is there any comparison with the other gifts of the body,
for the various parts of the body are not differently disposed in their
regard.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the clarity of the glorified body is visible to the non-glorified
eye?
Objection 1: It would seem that the clarity of the glorified body is
invisible to the non-glorified eye. For the visible object should be
proportionate to the sight. But a non-glorified eye is not
proportionate to see the clarity of glory, since this differs
generically from the clarity of nature. Therefore the clarity of the
glorified body will not be seen by a non-glorified eye.
Objection 2: Further, the clarity of the glorified body will be greater
than the clarity of the sun is now, since the clarity of the sun also
will then be greater than it is now, according to Is. 30:26, and the
clarity of the glorified body will be much greater still, for which
reason the sun and the entire world will receive greater clarity. Now a
non-glorified eye is unable to gaze on the very orb of the sun on
account of the greatness of its clarity. Therefore still less will it
be able to gaze on the clarity of a glorified body.
Objection 3: Further, a visible object that is opposite the eyes of the
seer must needs be seen, unless there be some lesion to the eye. But
the clarity of a glorified body that is opposite to non-glorified eyes
is not necessarily seen by them: which is evident in the case of the
disciples who saw our Lord's body after the resurrection, without
witnessing its clarity. Therefore this clarity will be invisible to a
non-glorified eye.
On the contrary, A gloss on Phil. 3:21, "Made like to the body of His
glory," says: "It will be like the clarity which He had in the
Transfiguration. " Now this clarity was seen by the non-glorified eyes
of the disciples. Therefore the clarity of the glorified body will be
visible to non-glorified eyes also.
Further, the wicked will be tortured in the judgment by seeing the
glory of the just, according to Wis. 5:2. But they would not fully see
their glory unless they gazed on their clarity. Therefore, etc.
I answer that, Some have asserted that the clarity of the glorified
body will not be visible to the non-glorified eye, except by a miracle.
But this is impossible, unless this clarity were so named equivocally,
because light by its essence has a natural tendency to move the sight,
and sight by its essence has a natural tendency to perceive light, even
as the true is in relation to the intellect, and the good to the
appetite. Wherefore if there were a sight altogether incapable of
perceiving a light, either this sight is so named equivocally, or else
this light is. This cannot be said in the point at issue, because then
nothing would be made known to us when we are told that the glorified
bodies will be lightsome: even so a person who says that a dog [*The
dog star] is in the heavens conveys no knowledge to one who knows no
other dog than the animal. Hence we must say that the clarity of a
glorified body is naturally visible to the non-glorified eye.
Reply to Objection 1: The clarity of glory will differ generically from
the clarity of nature, as to its cause, but not as to its species.
Hence just as the clarity of nature is, by reason of its species,
proportionate to the sight, so too will the clarity of glory be.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as a glorified body is not passible to a
passion of nature but only to a passion of the soul [*Cf. Q[82], A[1]],
so in virtue of its property of glory it acts only by the action of the
soul. Now intense clarity does not disturb the sight, in so far as it
acts by the action of the soul, for thus it rather gives delight, but
it disturbs it in so far as it acts by the action of nature by heating
and destroying the organ of sight, and by scattering the spirits*
asunder. [*"Animalem," as though it were derived from "animus"---the
mind. Cf. [5099]FS, Q[50], A[1] ,3m; [5100]FS, Q[52], A[1],3m. ] Hence,
though the clarity of a glorified body surpasses the clarity of the
sun, it does not by its nature disturb the sight but soothes it:
wherefore this clarity is compared to the jasper-stone (Apoc. 21:11).
Reply to Objection 3: The clarity of the glorified body results from
the merit of the will and therefore will be subject to the will, so as
to be seen or not seen according to its command. Therefore it will be
in the power of the glorified body to show forth its clarity or to hide
it: and this was the opinion of Praepositivus.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a glorified body will be necessarily seen by a non-glorified body?
Objection 1: It would seem that a glorified body will be necessarily
seen by a non-glorified body. For the glorified bodies will be
lightsome.
Now a lightsome body reveals itself and other things.
Therefore the glorified bodies will be seen of necessity.
Objection 2: Further, every body which hides other bodies that are
behind it is necessarily perceived by the sight, from the very fact
that the other things behind it are hidden. Now the glorified body will
hide other bodies that are behind it from being seen, because it will
be a colored body. Therefore it will be seen of necessity.
Objection 3: Further, just as quantity is something in a body, so is
the quality whereby a body is seen. Now quantity will not be subject to
the will, so that the glorified body be able to be of greater or
smaller quantity. Therefore neither will the quality of visibility be
subject to the will, so that a body be able not to be seen.
On the contrary, our body will be glorified in being made like to the
body of Christ after the resurrection. Now after the resurrection
Christ's body was not necessarily seen; in fact it vanished from the
sight of the disciples at Emmaus (Lk. 24:31). Therefore neither will
the glorified body be necessarily seen.
Further, there the body will be in complete obedience to the will.
Therefore as the soul lists the body will be visible or invisible.
I answer that, A visible object is seen, inasmuch as it acts on the
sight. Now there is no change in a thing through its acting or not
acting on an external object. Wherefore a glorified body may be seen or
not seen without any property pertaining to its perfection being
changed. Consequently it will be in the power of a glorified soul for
its body to be seen or not seen, even as any other action of the body
will be in the soul's power; else the glorified body would not be a
perfectly obedient instrument of its principal agent.
Reply to Objection 1: This clarity will be obedient to the glorified
body so that this will be able to show it or hide it.
Reply to Objection 2: A body's color does not prevent its being
transparent except in so far as it affects the sight, because the sight
cannot be affected by two colors at the same time, so as to perceive
them both perfectly. But the color of the glorified body will be
completely in the power of the soul, so that it can thereby act or not
act on the sight. Hence it will be in its power to hide or not to hide
a body that is behind it.
Reply to Objection 3: Quantity is inherent to the glorified body
itself, nor would it be possible for the quantity to be altered at the
soul's bidding without the glorified body suffering some alteration
incompatible with its impassibility. Hence there is no comparison
between quantity and visibility, because even this quality whereby it
is visible cannot be removed at the soul's bidding, but the action of
that quality will be suspended, and thus the body will be hidden at the
soul's command.
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OF THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE BODIES OF THE DAMNED WILL RISE AGAIN (THREE
ARTICLES)
We must next consider the conditions in which the bodies of the damned
will rise again. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the bodies of the damned will rise again with their
deformities?
(2) Whether their bodies will be corruptible?
(3) Whether they will be impassible?
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Whether the bodies of the damned will rise again with their deformities?
Objection 1: It would seem that the bodies of the damned will rise
again with their deformities. For that which was appointed as a
punishment for sin should not cease except the sin be forgiven. Now the
lack of limbs that results from mutilation, as well as all other bodily
deformities, are appointed as punishments for sin. Therefore these
deformities will not be taken away from the damned, seeing that they
will not have received the forgiveness of their sins.
Objection 2: Further, just as the saints will rise again to final
happiness, so the wicked will rise again to final unhappiness. Now when
the saints rise again nothing will be taken from them that can pertain
to their perfection, therefore nothing pertaining to the defect or
unhappiness of the wicked will be taken from them at the resurrection.
But such are their deformities. Therefore, etc.
Objection 3: Further, just as deformity is a defect of the passible
body, so is slowness of movement. Now slowness of movement will not be
taken from the bodies of the damned at the resurrection, since their
bodies will not be agile. Therefore for the same reason neither will
their deformity be taken away.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:52): "The dead shall rise
again incorruptible"; where a gloss says: "The dead, i. e. sinners, or
all the dead in general shall rise again incorruptible, i. e. without
the loss of any limbs. " Therefore the wicked will rise again without
their deformities.
Further, there will be nothing in the damned to lessen the sense of
pain. But sickness hinders the sense of pain by weakening the organ of
sense, and in like manner the lack of a limb would prevent pain from
affecting the whole body. Therefore the damned will rise again without
these defects.
I answer that, Deformity in the human body is of two kinds. One arises
from the lack of a limb: thus we say that a mutilated person is
deformed, because he lacks due proportion of the parts to the whole.
Deformities of this kind, without any doubt, will not be in the bodies
of the damned, since all bodies of both wicked and good will rise again
whole. Another deformity arises from the undue disposition of the
parts, by reason of undue quantity, quality, or place---which deformity
is, moreover, incompatible with due proportion of parts to whole.
Concerning these deformities and like defects such as fevers and
similar ailments which sometimes result in deformity, Augustine
remained undecided and doubtful (Enchiridion xcii) as the Master
remarks (Sent. iv, D, 44). Among modern masters, however, there are two
opinions on this point. For some say that such like deformities and
defects will remain in the bodies of the damned, because they consider
that those who are damned are sentenced to utmost unhappiness wherefrom
no affliction should be rebated. But this would seem unreasonable. For
in the restoration of the rising body we look to its natural perfection
rather than to its previous condition: wherefore those who die under
perfect age will rise again in the stature of youth, as stated above
([5101]Q[81], A[1]). Consequently those who had natural defects in the
body, or deformities resulting therefrom, will be restored without
those defects or deformities at the resurrection, unless the demerit of
sin prevent; and so if a person rise again with such defects and
deformities, this will be for his punishment. Now the mode of
punishment is according to the measure of guilt. And a sinner who is
about to be damned may be burdened with less grievous sins and yet have
deformities and defects which one who is about to be damned has not,
while burdened with more grievous sins. Wherefore if he who had
deformities in this life rise again with them, while the other who had
them not in this life, and therefore, as is clear, will rise again
without them, though deserving of greater punishment, the mode of the
punishment would not correspond to the amount of guilt; in fact it
would seem that a man is more punished on account of the pains which he
suffered in this world; which is absurd.
Hence others say with more reason, that He Who fashioned nature will
wholly restore the body's nature at the resurrection. Wherefore
whatever defect or deformity was in the body through corruption, or
weakness of nature or of natural principles (for instance fever,
purblindness, and so forth) will be entirely done away at the
resurrection: whereas those defects in the human body which are the
natural result of its natural principles, such as heaviness,
passibility, and the like, will be in the bodies of the damned, while
they will be removed from the bodies of the elect by the glory of the
resurrection.
Reply to Objection 1: Since in every tribunal punishment is inflicted
according to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, the punishments which in
this temporal life are inflicted for some particular sin are themselves
temporal, and extend not beyond the term of this life. Hence although
the damned are not pardoned their sins, it does not follow that there
they will undergo the same punishments as they have in this world: but
the Divine justice demands that there they shall suffer more severe
punishment for eternity.
Reply to Objection 2: There is no parity between the good and the
wicked, because a thing can be altogether good, but not altogether
evil. Hence the final happiness of the saints requires that they should
be altogether exempt from all evil; whereas the final unhappiness of
the wicked will not exclude all good, because "if a thing be wholly
evil it destroys itself," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5). Hence
it is necessary for the good of their nature to underlie the
unhappiness of the damned, which good is the work of their perfect
Creator, Who will restore that same nature to the perfection of its
species.
Reply to Objection 3: Slowness of movement is one of those defects
which are the natural result of the principles of the human body; but
deformity is not, and consequently the comparison fails.
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Whether the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible?
Objection 1: It would seem that the bodies of the damned will be
corruptible. For everything composed of contraries must necessarily be
corruptible. Now the bodies of the damned will be composed of the
contraries whereof they are composed even now, else they would not be
the same, neither specifically nor, in consequence, numerically.
Therefore they will be corruptible.
Objection 2: Further, if the bodies of the damned will not be
corruptible, this will be due either to nature, or to grace, or to
glory. But it will not be by nature, since they will be of the same
nature as now; nor will it be by grace or glory, since they will lack
these things altogether. Therefore they will be corruptible.
Objection 3: Further, it would seem inconsistent to withdraw the
greatest of punishments from those who are in the highest degree of
unhappiness. Now death is the greatest of punishments, as the
Philosopher declares (Ethic. iii, 6). Therefore death should not be
withdrawn from the damned, since they are in the highest degree of
unhappiness. Therefore their bodies will be corruptible.
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 9:6): "In those days men shall
seek death, and shall not find it, and they shall desire to die, and
death shall fly from them. "
Further, the damned will be punished with an everlasting punishment
both in soul and body (Mat. 25:46): "These shall go into everlasting
punishment. " But this would not be possible if their bodies were
corruptible. Therefore their bodies will be incorruptible.
I answer that, Since in every movement there must needs be a principle
of movement, movement or change may be withdrawn from a movable in two
ways: first through absence of a principle of movement, secondly
through an obstacle to the principle of movement. Now corruption is a
kind of change: and consequently a body which is corruptible on account
of the nature of its principles may be rendered incorruptible in two
ways. First by the total removal of the principle which leads to
corruption, and in this way the bodies of the damned will be
incorruptible. For since the heaven is the first principle of
alteration in virtue of its local movement, and all other secondary
agents act in virtue thereof and as though moved thereby, it follows
that at the cessation of the heavenly movement there is no longer any
agent that can change the body by altering it from its natural
property. Wherefore after the resurrection, and the cessation of the
heavenly movement, there will be no quality capable of altering the
human body from its natural quality. Now corruption, like generation,
is the term of alteration. Hence the bodies of the damned will be
incorruptible, and this will serve the purpose of Divine justice, since
living for ever they will be punished for ever. This is in keeping with
the demands of Divine justice, as we shall state further on
[5102](A[3]), even as now the corruptibility of bodies serves the
purpose of Divine providence, by which through the corruption of one
thing another is generated.
Secondly, this happens through the principle of corruption being
hindered, and in this way the body of Adam was incorruptible, because
the conflicting qualities that exist in man's body were withheld by the
grace of innocence from conducing to the body's dissolution: and much
more will they be withheld in the glorified bodies, which will be
wholly subject to the spirit. Thus after the general resurrection the
two aforesaid modes of incorruptibility will be united together in the
bodies of the blessed.
Reply to Objection 1: The contraries of which bodies are composed are
conducive to corruption as secondary principles. For the first active
principle thereof is the heavenly movement: wherefore given the
movement of the heaven, it is necessary for a body composed of
contraries to be corrupted unless some more powerful cause prevent it:
whereas if the heavenly movement be withdrawn, the contraries of which
a body is composed do not suffice to cause corruption, even in
accordance with nature, as explained above. But the philosophers were
ignorant of a cessation in the heavenly movement; and consequently they
held that a body composed of contraries is without fail corrupted in
accordance with nature.
Reply to Objection 2: This incorruptibility will result from nature,
not as though there were some principle of incorruption in the bodies
of the damned, but on account of the cessation of the active principle
of corruption, as shown above.
Reply to Objection 3: Although death is simply the greatest of
punishments, yet nothing prevents death conducing, in a certain
respect, to a cessation of punishments; and consequently the removal of
death may contribute to the increase of punishment. For as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), "Life is pleasant to all, for all
desire to be . . . But we must not apply this to a wicked or corrupt
life, nor one passed in sorrow. " Accordingly just as life is simply
pleasant, but not the life that is passed in sorrows, so too death,
which is the privation of life, is painful simply, and the greatest of
punishments, inasmuch as it deprives one of the primary good, namely
being, with which other things are withdrawn. But in so far as it
deprives one of a wicked life, and of such as is passed in sorrow, it
is a remedy for pains, since it puts an end to them. and consequently
the withdrawal of death leads to the increase of punishments by making
them everlasting. If however we say that death is penal by reason of
the bodily pain which the dying feel, without doubt the damned will
continue to feel a far greater pain: wherefore they are said to be in
"everlasting death," according to the Psalm (48:15): "Death shall feed
upon them. "
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Whether the bodies of the damned will be impassible?
Objection 1: It would seem that the bodies of the damned will be
impassible. For, according to the Philosopher (Topic. vi), "increase of
passion results in loss of substance. " Now "if a finite thing be
continually lessened, it must needs at length be done away" (Phys. i,
4). Therefore if the bodies of the damned will be passible, and will be
ever suffering, they will at length be done away and corrupted: and
this has been shown to be false [5103](A[2]). Therefore they will be
impassible.
Objection 2: Further, every agent likens the patient to itself. If then
the bodies of the damned are passive to the fire the fire will liken
them to itself. Now fire does not consume bodies except in so far as in
likening them to itself it disintegrates them. Therefore if the bodies
of the damned will be passible they will at length be consumed by the
fire, and thus the same conclusion follows as before.
Objection 3: Further, those animals, for instance the salamander, which
are said to remain living in fire without being destroyed, are not
distressed by the fire: because an animal is not distressed by bodily
pain, unless the body in some way is hurt thereby. If therefore the
bodies of the damned can, like the aforesaid animals, remain in the
fire without being corrupted, as Augustine asserts (De Civ. Dei xxi,
2,4), it would seem that they will suffer no distress there: which
would not be the case unless their bodies were impassible. Therefore,
etc.
Objection 4: Further, if the bodies of the damned be passible, the pain
resulting from their suffering, seemingly, will surpass all present
bodily pain, even as the joy of the saints will surpass all present
joy. Now in this life it sometimes happens that the soul is severed
from the body through excess of pain. Much more therefore if those
bodies will be passible, the souls will be separate from the bodies
through excess of pain, and thus those bodies will be corrupted: which
is false. Therefore those bodies will be impassible.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:52): "And we shall be
changed": and a gloss says: "We---the good alone---will be changed with
the unchangeableness and impassibility of glory. "
Further, even as the body co-operates with the soul in merit, so does
it co-operate in sin. Now on account of the former co-operation not
only the soul but also the body will be rewarded after the
resurrection. Therefore in like manner the bodies of the damned will be
punished; which would not be the case were they impassible. Therefore
they will be passible.
I answer that, The principal cause of the bodies of the damned not
being consumed by fire will be the Divine justice by which their bodies
will be consigned to everlasting punishment. Now the Divine justice is
served also by the natural disposition, whether on the part of the
passive body or on the part of the active causes; for since passiveness
is a kind of receptiveness, there are two kinds of passion,
corresponding to two ways in which one thing is receptive of another.
For a form may be received into a subject materially according to its
natural being, just as the air receives heat from fire materially; and
corresponding to this manner of reception there is a kind of passion
which we call "passion of nature. " In another way one thing is received
into another spiritually by way of an "intention," just as the likeness
of whiteness is received into the air and in the pupil: this reception
is like that whereby the soul receives the likeness of things:
wherefore corresponding to this mode of reception is another mode of
passion which we call "passion of the soul. " Since therefore after the
resurrection and the cessation of the heavenly movement it will be
impossible for a body to be altered by its natural quality, as stated
above [5104](A[2]), it will not be possible for any body to be passive
with a passion of nature. Consequently as regards this mode of passion
the bodies of the damned will be impassible even as they will be
incorruptible. Yet after the heaven has ceased to move, there will
still remain the passion which is after the manner of the soul, since
the air will both receive light from the sun, and will convey the
variety of colors to the sight. Wherefore in respect of this mode of
passion the bodies of the damned will be passible. But the glorified
bodies, albeit they receive something, and are in a manner patient to
sensation, will nevertheless not be passive, since they will receive
nothing to distress or hurt them, as will the bodies of the damned,
which for this reason are said to be passible.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of the passion
whereby the patient is changed from its natural disposition. But this
kind of passion will not be in the bodies of the damned, as stated
above.
Reply to Objection 2: The likeness of the agent is in the patient in
two ways. First, in the same way as in the agent, and thus it is in all
univocal agents, for instance a thing that is hot makes another thing
hot, and fire generates fire. Secondly, otherwise than in the agent,
and thus it is in all equivocal agents. In these it happens sometimes
that a form which is in the agent spiritually is received into the
patient materially: thus the form of the house built by the craftsman
is materially in itself, but spiritually in the mind of the craftsman.
On the other hand, sometimes it is in the agent materially, but is
received into the patient spiritually: thus whiteness is materially on
the wall wherein it is received, whereas it is spiritually in the pupil
and in the transferring medium. And so it is in the case at issue,
because the species which is in the fire materially is received
spiritually into the bodies of the damned; thus it is that the fire
will assimilate the bodies of the damned to itself, without consuming
them withal.
Reply to Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (De Prop. Element. ),
"no animal can live in fire. " Galen also (De simp. medic. ) says "that
there is no body which at length is not consumed by fire"; although
sometimes certain bodies may remain in fire without hurt, such as
ebony. The instance of the salamander is not altogether apposite, since
it cannot remain in the fire without being at last consumed, as do the
bodies of the damned in hell. Nor does it follow that because the
bodies of the damned suffer no corruption from the fire, they therefore
are not tormented by the fire, because the sensible object has a
natural aptitude to please or displease the senses, not only as regards
its natural action of stimulating or injuring the organ, but also as
regards its spiritual action: since when the sensible object is duly
proportionate to the sense, it pleases, whereas the contrary is the
result when it is in excess or defect. Hence subdued colors and
harmonious sounds are pleasing, whereas discordant sounds displease the
hearing.
Reply to Objection 4: Pain does not sever the soul from the body, in so
far as it is confined to a power of the soul which feels the pain, but
in so far as the passion of the soul leads to the body being changed
from its natural disposition. Thus it is that we see that through anger
the body becomes heated, and through fear, chilled: whereas after the
resurrection it will be impossible for the body to be changed from its
natural disposition, as stated above [5105](A[2]). Consequently,
however great the pain will be, it will not sever the body from the
soul.
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TREATISE ON THE LAST THINGS (QQ[86]-99)
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OF THE KNOWLEDGE WHICH, AFTER RISING AGAIN, MEN WILL HAVE AT THE JUDGMENT
CONCERNING MERITS AND DEMERITS (THREE ARTICLES)
In the next place we must treat of those things which follow the
resurrection. The first of these to be considered will be the
knowledge, which after rising again, men will have at the judgment,
concerning merits and demerits; the second will be the general judgment
itself, as also the time and place at which it will be; thirdly we
shall consider who will judge and who will be judged; fourthly we shall
treat of the form wherein the judge will come to judge; and fifthly we
shall consider what will be after the judgment, the state of the world
and of those who will have risen again.
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether at the judgment every man will know all his sins?
(2) Whether every one will be able to read all that is on another's
conscience?
(3) Whether one will be able at one glance to see all merits and
demerits?
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Whether after the resurrection every one will know what sins he has
committed?
Objection 1: It seems that after the resurrection everyone will not be
able to know all the sins he has committed. For whatever we know,
either we receive it anew through the senses, or we draw it from the
treasure house of the memory. Now after the resurrection men will be
unable to perceive their sins by means of sense, because they will be
things of the past, while sense perceives only the present: and many
sins will have escaped the sinner's memory, and he will be unable to
recall them from the treasure house of his memory. Therefore after
rising again one will not be cognizant of all the sins one has
committed.
Objection 2: Further, it is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43), that
"there are certain books of the conscience, wherein each one's merits
are inscribed. " Now one cannot read a thing in a book, unless it be
marked down in the book: and sin leaves its mark upon the conscience
according to a gloss of Origen on Rom. 2:15, "Their conscience bearing
witness," etc. which mark, seemingly, is nothing else than the guilt or
stain. Since then in many persons the guilt or stain of many sins is
blotted out by grace, it would seem that one cannot read in one's
conscience all the sins one has committed: and thus the same conclusion
follows as before.
Objection 3: Further, the greater the cause the greater the effect. Now
the cause which makes us grieve for the sins which we recall to memory
is charity. Since then charity is perfect in the saints after the
resurrection, they will grieve exceedingly for their sins, if they
recall them to memory: yet this is impossible, seeing that according to
Apoc. 21:4, "Sorrow and mourning shall flee away from them. " [*The
quotation is from Is. 35:10. The text of the Apocalypse has: "Nor
mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow shall be any more. "] Therefore they
will not recall their own sins to memory.
Objection 4: Further, at the resurrection the damned will be to the
good they once did as the blessed to the sins they once committed. Now
seemingly the damned after rising again will have no knowledge of the
good they once did, since this would alleviate their pain considerably.
Neither therefore will the blessed have any knowledge of the sins they
had committed.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx) that "a kind of Divine
energy will come to our aid, so that we shall recall all of our sins to
mind. "
Further, as human judgment is to external evidence, so is the Divine
judgment to the witness of the conscience, according to 1 Kings 16:7,
"Man seeth those things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart.
