No More Learning

Let me be permitted to adduce the example
of my father, since it is directly applicable
to the point in question. It has been often
repeated, that M. Necker was ignorant of
human nature, because on many occasions
he refused to avail himself of means of cor-
ruption or violence, the advantages of which
were believed to be certain. I may venture
to say, that nobody can read the works of
M. Necker, entitled, "The History of the
<< French Revolution," --" The Executive
"Power in great Governments," &c. without
finding in them enlightened views of the hu-
man heart; and I shall not be contradicted
by any of those who have lived in intimacy
with M. Necker, when I assert, that, not-
withstanding his admirable goodness of dis-
position, he had to guard himself against
a too lively tailent for ridicule, and rather
a severe mode of estimating mediocrity
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? OF THE MORAL SYSTEM, &C. 193
of mind and soul: what he has written
upon the "Happiness of Fools" appears to
me enough to prove it. In a word, as, in
addition to all these qualities, he was emi-
nently a man of wit, nobody surpassed him
in the delicate and profound knowledge of
those with whom he was connected; but he
was determined, by a decision of his con-
science, never to shrink from any conse-
quences whatever, which might result from
an obedience to the commands of duty. We
may judge differently concerning the events
of the French Revolution; but I believe it to
be impossible for an impartial observer to
deny that such a principle, generally adopted,
would have saved France from the misfor-
tunes under which she has groaned, and from,
what is still worse, the example which she
has displayed.
During the most fatal epochs of the reign
of terror, many honest men accepted offices
in the administration, and even in the cri-
minal tribunals, either to do good, or to dimi-
nish the evil which was committed in them;
and all defended themselves by a mode of
reasoning very generally received--that they
prevented a villain from occupying the place
they filled, and thus rendered service to the
vol. in. o
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? 194 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
oppressed. To allow ourselves the use of
bad means for an end which we believe to be
good, is a maxim of conduct singularly vi-
cious in its principle. Men know nothing of
the future, nothing of themselves with re-
spect to the morrow; in every circumstance,
and at every moment, duty is imperative,
and the calculations of wisdom, as to conse-
quences which it may foresee, ought to be
of no account in the estimate of duty. --
What right have those who were the instru-
ments of a seditious authority to keep the
title of honest men, because they committed
unjust actions in a gentle manner? Rude-
ness in the execution of injustice would have
been much better, for the difficulty of sup-
porting it would have increased; and the
most mischievous of all alliances is that of a
sanguinary decree and a polite executioner.
The benevolence we may exercise in de-
tail is no compensation for the evil which we
cause by lending the support of our names to
the party that uses them. We ought to pro-
fess the worship of virtue upon earth, in
order that not only our contemporaries, but
our posterity, may feel its influence. The
ascendency of a brave example endures many
years after the objects of a transitory charity
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? OF THE MORAL SYSTEM, &C. 195
have ceased to exist. The most important
lesson that we can inculcate into man in this
world, and particularly with relation to pub-
lic affairs, is, not . to compromise duty for any
consideration. ?
"When we set about bargaining with cir-
M cumstances, all is lost; for there is nobody
"who cannot plead this excuse. One has a
"wife, childre n, or nephews, who are in need
M of fortunes; others want active employ-
"ment; or allege I know not what virtuous
"pretexts, which all lead to the necessity of
"their having a place, to which money and
"power are attached. Are we not weary of
"these subterfuges, of which the Revolution
"furnished incessant examples? We met
"none but persons who complained of
"having been forced to quit the repose they
"preferred to every thing--that domestic life
"into which they were impatient to return;
"and we were well aware, that these very
"persons had employed their days and nights
"in praying that they might be obliged to
"devote their days and nights to public
"affairs, which could have entirely dispensed
"with their services
* This is the passage which gave the greatest offenck to th<<
Literary Police.
O2
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? 196 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
The ancient lawgivers made it a duty for
the citizens to be concerned in political in-
terests. The Christian religion ought to in-
spire a disposition of entirely another nature;
that of obeying authority, but of keeping
ourselves detached from the affairs of state,
when they may compromise our conscience.
The difference which exists between the an-
cient and modern governments explains this
opposite manner of considering the relations
of men towards their country.
The political science of the ancients was
intimately united with their religion and
morals; the social state Avas a body full of
life. Every individual considered himself as
one of its members. The smallness of states,
the number of slaves, which still further
contracted that of the citizens, all made it a
duty to act for a country which had need of
every one of its children. Magistrates, war-
riors, artists, philosophers, almost the gods
themselves, mingled together upon the pub-
lic arena; and the same men by turns gained
a battle, exhibited a masterpiece of art, gave
laws to their country, or endeavoured to dis-
cover the laws of the universe.
If we make an exception of the very small
number of free governments, the greatness
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? OF THE MORAL SYSTEM, &C. 197
of modern states, and the concentration of
monarchical power, have rendered politics
entirely negative, if we may so express our-
selves. The business is, to prevent one per-
son from annoying another ; and government
is charged with the high 3ort of police, which
permits every one to enjoy the advantages of
peace and social order, while he purchases
this security by reasonable sacrifices. The
divine Lawgiver of mankind, therefore, en-
joined that morality which was most adapted
to the situation of the world under the Roman
empire, when he laid down as a law the pay-
ment of tributes, and submission to govern-
ment in all that duty does not forbid; but
he also recommended a life of privacy in the
strongest manner.
Men who are ever desirous of theorizing
their peculiar inclinations, adroitly confound
ancient and Christian morals. It is neces-
sary, they say (like the ancients), to serve
our country, and to be useful citizens in the
state; it is necessary, they say (like the
Christians), to submit ourselves to power
established by the will of God. It is thus
that a mixture of the system of quietness
with that of action produces a double im-
morality; when, taken singly, they bad
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? 198 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
both claims to respect. The activity of the
Greek and Roman citizens, such as it could
be exercised in a republic, was a noble virtue.
The force of Christian quietness is also a
virtue, and one of great power; for Chris-
tianity, which is accused of weakness, is in-
vincible in its own spirit, that is to say, in
the energy of refusal. But the tricking self-
ishness of ambitious men teaches them the
art of combining opposite arguments; so
that they can meddle with every thing like
Pagans, and submit to every thing like
Christians.
"The universe, my friend, regards not thee,"
is, however, what we may say to all the
universe, phenomena excepted. It would
be a truly ridiculous vanity to assign as a
motive for political activity in all cases, the
pretext of that service which we may render
our country, This sort of usefulness is hardly
ever more than a pompous name, which
covers personal interest.
The art of sophists has always been to
oppose one duty to another. We inces-
santly imagine circumstances in which this
frightful perplexity may exist. The greater
part of dramatic fictions are founded upon it.
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? Of THE MORAL SYSTEM, &C. 199
Yet real life is more simple; we there fre-
quently see virtues opposed to interests - but
perhaps it is true, that no honest man could
ever doubt, on any occasion, what his duty
enjoined. The voice of conscience is so
delicate, that it is easy to stifle it; but
it is so clear, that it is impossible to mis-
take it:
A known maxim contains, under a simple
form, all the theory of morals. "Do what
"you ought, happen what will. " When we
decide, on the contrary, that the probity of
a public man consists in sacrificing every
thing to the temporal advantages of his
nation, then many occasions may be found,
in which we may become immoral by our
morality. This sophism is as contradictory
in its substance as in its form: this would be
to treat virtue as a ^conjectural science,
and as entirely submitted to circumstances
in its application. May God guard the hu-
man heart from such a responsibility! the
light of our understanding is too uncertain,
to enable us to judge of the moment when
the eternal laws of duty may be suspended;
or, rather, this moment does not exist.
If it was once generally acknowledged,
that national interest itself ought to be
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? 200 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
subordinate to those nobler thoughts which
constitute virtue, how would the conscien-
tious man be at his ease! how would every
thing in politics appear clear to him, when,
before, a continual hesitation made him
tremble at every step! It is this very hesi-.
tation which has caused honest men to be
thought incapable of state-affairs; they have
been accused of pusillanimity, of weakness,
of fear; and, on the contrary, those who
have carelessly sacrificed the weak to the
powerful, and their scruples to their interests,
have been called men of an energetic nature.
It is, however, an easy energy which tends
to our own advantage; or, at least, to that
of the ruling faction; for every thing that
is done according to the sense of the multi-
tude invariably partakes of weakness, let it
appear ever so violent.
The race of men, with a loud voice,
demand the sacrifice of every thing to their
interest; and finish by compromising this
interest from the very wish for such a sacri-
fice: but it should now be inculcated into
them, that their happiness itself, which has
been made so general a pretext, is not
sacred, excepting in its compatibility with
morals; for, without morals, of what conse-
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? OF THE MORAL SYSTEM, &C. 201
quence would the whole body be to each
individual? When once we have said that
morals ought to be sacrificed to national in-
terest, we are very liable to contract the
sense of the word Nation from day to day,
and to make it signify at first our own par-
tisans, then our friends, and then our fa-
mily; which is but a decent synonyme for
ourselves.
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? 202 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
CHAPTER XIV.
Of the Principle of Morals in the new
German Philosophy.
The ideal philosophy has a tendency, from
its very nature, to refute the moral system,
founded upon individual or national interest:
it does not allow temporal happiness to be
the end of our existence; and, referring
every thing to the life of the soul, it is to the
exercise of the will, and of virtue, that it at-
taches our thoughts and actions. The works
which Kant has written upon morals have
a reputation at least equal to those which he
has composed upon metaphysics.
Two distinct inclinations, he says, appear
manifest in man: personal interest, which
he derives from the attraction of his sensa-
tions; and universal justice, which arises
from his relations to the human race, and to
the Divinity: between these two impulses .
Conscience decides; she resembles Minerva,
who made the balance incline, when the
votes were equal in the Areopagus. Have
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? OF IHK PRINCIPLE OP MORALS. 203
not the most opposite opinions facts for their
support? Would not "the for" and "the
"against" be equally true, if Conscience did
not carry with her the supreme certainty?
Man, who is placed between visible and
almost equal arguments, which direct the
circumstances of his life in favour of good
or evil; man has received from Heaven the
sentiment of duty, to decide his choice.
Kant endeavours to demonstrate that this
sentiment is the necessary condition of our
moral being; the truth which precedes all
those, the knowledge of which is acquired
by life. Can it be denied that conscience
has more dignity, when we believe it to be
an innate power, than when we consider it
in the light of a faculty acquired, like all
others, by experience and habit? And it is
in this point, especially, that the ideal me-
taphysics exert a great influence over the
moral conduct of man: they attribute the
same primitive force to the notion of duty as
to that of space and time; and, considering
them both as inherent in our nature, they
admit no more doubt of one than of the
other.
All our esteem for ourselves and for others
ought to be founded on the relations which
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? 204 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
exist between our actions and the law of duty;
this law depends, in no case, on the desire
of happiness; on the contrary, it is often
summoned to combat that desire. Kant goes
still farther; he affirms, that the first effect
of the power of virtue is to cause a noble
pain by the sacrifices which it demands.
The destination of man upon this earth is
not happiness, but. the advance towards
moral perfection. It is in vain that, by a
childish play of words, this improvement is
called happiness; we clearly feel the dif-
ference between enjoyments and sacrifices;
arid if language was to adopt the same terms
for such discordant ideas, our natural judg-
ment would reject the deception.
It has been often said, that human nature
had a tendency towards happiness: this is
its involuntary iastinct; but the instinct of
reflection is virtue. By giving man very little
influence over his own happiness, and means
of improvement without number, the in-
tention of the Creator was surely not to
make the object of our lives an almost unat-
tainable end. Devote all your powers to
the attainment of happiness; control your
character, if you can, to such a degree as
not to feel those wandering desires, which,
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? OP THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALS. 205
nothing can satisfy; and, in spite of all these
wise arrangements of self-love, you will be
afflicted with disorders, you will be ruined,
you will be imprisoned, and all the edifice
of your selfish cares will be overturned.
It may be replied to this--" I will be so
"circumspect, that I will not have any ene-
"mies. " Let it be so; you will not have
to reproach yourself with any acts of gene-
rous imprudence; but sometimes we have
seen the least courageous among the perse-
cuted.
"I will manage my fortune so well,
44 that I will preserve it. "--I believe it;--but
there are universal disasters, which do not
spare even those- whose principle has been
never to expose themselves for others; and
illness, and accidents of every kind, dispose
of our condition in spite of ourselves. How
then should happiness be the end of our
moral liberty in this short life; happiness,
which chance, suffering, old age, and death,
put out of our power? The case is not the
same with moral improvement; every day,
every hour, every minute, may contribute
to it; all fortunate and unfortunate events
equally assist it; and this work depends en-
tirely on ourselves, whatever may be our
situation upon earth. . .
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? 206 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
The moral system of Kant and Fichte i9
very analogous to that of the Stoics; but the
Stoics allowed more to the ascendency of
natural qualities; the Roman pride is disco-
verable in their manner of estimating man-
kind. The disciples of Kant believe in the
necessary and continual action of the mil
against evil inclinations. They tolerate no
exceptions in our obedience to duty, and re-
ject all excuses which can act as motives to
such exceptions.
The theory of Kant concerning veracity is
an example of this; he rightly considers it as
the basis of all morality. When the Son of
God called himself the Logos, or the Word,
perhaps he wished to do honour to that ad-
mirable faculty in language of revealing
what we think. Kant has carried his respect
for truth so far, as not to permit a violation
of it, evert if a villain came and demanded,
whether yow friend, whom he pursued,
was hidden. in your house. He pretends,.
that we ought never to allow ourselves, in
any partieulas instance, to do that which
would be inadmissible as a general law ; but,
on this occasion, he forgets that we may
make a general law of not sacrificing truth,
excepting to another virtue; for, as soon as
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? OF THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALS. 207
personal interest is removed from a question,
we need not fear sophisms, and conscience
pronounces with equity upon all things.
The theory of Kant in morals is severe*
and sometimes dry; for it excludes sensibi-
lity. He regards it as a reflex act of sensa-
tion, and as certain to lead to passiotra in
which there is always a mixture of selfish-
ness; it is on this account that he does flot
admit sensibility for a. guide, and that he
places morals under the safeguard of un-
changeable principles. There is nothing more
severe than this doctrine; but there is a severity
which softens us, even when it treats the im-
pulses of the heart as objects of suspicion, ami
endeavours to banish them all: however ri-
gorous a moralist may be, when he addresses
our conscience* he is sure to touch us. He
who sajs to man--Find every thing in your-
self--always raises up in the soul some noble
object, which is connected with that very
sensibility whose sacrifice it demands. In
studying the philosophy of Kant, we must
distinguish sentiment from sensibility; he
admits the former as the judge of philoso-
phical truth; he considers the latter as pro-
perly subject to the conscience. Sentiment
and conscience are terms employed almost
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? 208 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
as synonymes in his writings; but sensibility
approaches much nearer to the sphere of
emotions, and consequently to that of the
passions, which they originate.
We cannot grow weary of admiring those
writings of Kant, in which the supreme law
of duty is held up as sacred: what genuine
warmth, what animated eloquence, upon a
subject, where the only ordinary endeavour
is restraint! We feel penetrated with a
profound respect for the austerity of an aged
philosopher, constantly submitted to the in-
visible power of virtue, which has no em-
pire but that of conscience, no arms but those
of remorse; no treasures to distribute but
the inward enjoyments of the soul; the hope
of which cannot be offered as a motive for
their attainment, because they are incom-
prehensible until they are experienced.
Among the German philosophers, some
men of virtue, not inferior to Kant, and
who approach nearer to religion in their in-
clinations, have attributed the origin of the
moral law to religious sentiment. This
sentiment cannot be of the nature of those
which may grow into passions. Seneca has
depicted its calmness and profundity, by
saying, "In the bosom of the virtuous man I
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? t)f THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALS. 209
xt know not what God, but a God has ha-
"bitation. "
Kant pretended, that it was to impair the
disinterested purity of morals, to present
the perspective of a future life, as the end
of our actions: man3' German writers have
completely refuted him on this point. In
effect, the immortality of heaven has no
relation to the rewards and punishments, of
which we form an idea on this earth. The
sentiment which makes Us aspire to immor-
tality is as disinterested as that which makes
us find our happiness in devoting ourselves
to the happiness of others; for the first
offering to religious felicity is the sacrifice of
self; and it is thus necessarily removed from
every species of selfishness. Whatever we
may attempt, we must return to the ac-
knowledgment, that religion is the true
foundation of morality; it is that sensible
and real object within us, which can alone
divert our attention from external objects.
If piety did not excite sublime emotions, who
would sacrifice even sensual pleasures, how-
ever vulgar they might be, to the cold dignity
of reason? We must begin the internal
history of man with religion, or with sensa-
tion; for there is nothing animated besides.
VOL. III. p
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? 810 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
The moral system, founded upon personal in-
terest, would be as evident as a mathematical
truth, were it not for its exercising more
control over the passions which overturn all
calculations: nothing but a sentiment can
triumph over a sentiment; the violence of
nature can only be conquered by its exalta-
tion. Reasoning, in such a case, is like the
schoolmaster in Fontaine; nobody listens to
him, and all the world is crying out for help.
Jacobi, as 1 shall show in the analysis of
his works, has opposed the arguments which
Kant uses, in order to avoid the admission
of religious sentiment as the basis of mora-
lity. He believes, on the contrary, that the
Divinity reveals himself to every man in
particular, as he revealed himself to the
human race, when prayers and works have
prepared the heart to comprehend liim.
Another philosopher asserts, that immorta-
lity already commences upon this earth, for
him who desires and feels in himself the
taste for eternal things: another affirms,
that nature forces man to understand the
will of God; and that there is in the uni-
verse a groaning and imprisoned voice,
which invites us to deliver the world and
ourselves, by combating the principle of evil,
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? OF -THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALS. 211
under all its fatal appearances. These dif-
ferent systems are influenced by the imagina-
tion of each writer, and are adopted by those
who sympathize with him; but the general
direction of these opinions is ever the same:
to free the soul from the influence of external
objects; to place the empire of ourselves
within us; and to make duty the law of this
empire, and its hope another life,
Without doubt, the true Christians have
taught the same doctrine at all periods; but
what distinguishes the new German school,
is their uniting to all these sentiments,
which they suppose to be equally inherited
by the simple and ignorant, the highest
philosophy and the most precise species of
knowledge. The aera of pride had arrived,
in which we were told, that reason and the
sciences destroyed all the prospects of ima-
gination, all the terrors of conscience, every
belief of the heart; and we blushed for the
half of our nature which was declared weak
and almost foolish. But men have made their
appearance, who, by dint of thinking, have
found out the theory of all natural impres-
sions; and, far from wishing to stifle them,
they have discovered to us the noble source
from which they spring. The German mo-
p2
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? 212 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
ralists have raised up sentiment and enthu-
siasm from the contempt of a tyrannical
species of reason, which counted as gain
only what is destroyed, and placed man and
nature on the bed of Procrustes, that every
part of them might be cut off, which the
philosophy of materialism could not under-
stand.
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? OF SCIENTIFIC MORALITY. 213
CHAPTER XV.
Of scientific Morality.
Since the taste for the exact sciences has
taken hold of men's minds, they have wished
to prove every thing by demonstration ; and
the calculation of probabilities allowing them
to reduce even what is uncertain to rules,
they have flattered themselves that they
could resolve mathematically all the difficul-
ties offered by the nicest questions; and ex-
tend the dominion of algebra over the uni-
verse. Some philosophers, in Germany, have
also pretended to give to morality the ad-
vantages of a science rigorously proved in its
principles as well as in its consequences, and
not admitting either of objection or exception,
if the first basis of it be adopted. Kant
and Fichte have attempted this metaphysical
labour, and Schleiermacher, the translator
of Plato, and the author of several religious
treatises, of which we shall speak in the
next section, has published a very deep book,
on the examination of different systems of
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? 214 **hil6sophy and morals.
morality considered as a science. He wished
to find out one, all the reasoning^ of which
should be perfectly linked together, in which
the principle should involve all the conse-
quences, and every consequence reproduce
the principle; but* at present, it does not
appear that this object is attainable.
The ancients also were desirous of making
a science of morality, but they included in
that science laws and government: in fact,
it is impossible to determine beforehand all
the duties of life, when we do not know
what may be required by the laws and man*
ners of the country in whidh we are placed;
it is in this point of view that Plato has
imagined his republic. Man altogether is,
in that work, considered in relation to re-
ligion, to politics* and to morality; but> as
that republic could not exist, one cannot
conceive how, in the midst of the abuses of
human society, a code of morality, such as
that would be, could supply the habitual
interpretation of conscience. Philosophers
aim at the Scientific form in all things; one
should say, they flatter themselves that
they shall thus chain down the future, and
Withdraw themselves entirely from the yoke
of circumstances: but what free* us from
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? OF SCIENTIFIC MOBALITY. 215
them, is, the soul; the sincerity of our in-
ward love of virtue. The science of morality
can no more teach us to be honest men, in all
the magnificence of that expression, than
geometry to draw, or literary rules to invent.
Kant, who had admitted the necessity of
sentiment in metaphysical truths, was will-
ing to dispense with it in morality, and he
was never able to establish incontestably
more than this one great fact of the human
heart, that morality has duty, and not in-
terest, for its basis; but to understand duty,
conscience and religion must be our teachers.
Kant, in separating religion from the motives
of morality, could only see in conscience a
judge, and not a divine voice, and therefore
he has been incessantly presenting to that
judge points of difficulty; the solutions of
them which he has given, and which he
thought evident, have been attacked in a
thousand ways; for it is by sentiment alone
that we ever arrive at unanimity of opinion
amongst men.
Some German philosophers, perceiving
the impossibility of reducing into law all the
affections of which our nature is composed,
and of making a science, as it were, of all
the emotions of the heart, have contented
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? 216 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
themselves with affirming, that morality con-
sists in a feeling of harmony within ourselves-
Undoubtedly, when we feel no remorse,.
it is probable we are not criminal; and even
when we may have committed what are
faults according to the opinions of others,
if we have done our duty according to our
own opinion, we are not guilty; but we
must nevertheless be cautious in relying
on this self-satisfaclion, which ought, it
should seem, to be the best proof of virtue.
There are men who have brought themselves
to take their own pride for conscience;
fanaticism, in others, is a disinterested me-
dium, which justifies every thing in their
eyes; and in some characters, the habit of
committing crimes gives a kind of strength,
which frees them from repentance, at least
as long as they are untouched by misfor-
tune. *
It does not follow from this impossibility
of discovering a science in morality, or any
universal signs, by which to know whether
its precepts are observed, that there are not
some positive duties which may serve as our
guides; but as there are in the destiny of
man both necessity and liberty, so, in his.
conduct, there ought to be inspiration and,
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? OV SCIENTIFIC MORALITY. 217
method. Nothing that belongs to virtue can
be either altogether arbitrary, or altogether
fixed: thus, it is one of the miracles of reli-
gion, that it unites, in the same degree, the
exultation of love and submission to the law;
thus the heart of man is at once satisfied and
directed.
I shall not here give an account of all the
systems of scientific morality which have
been published in Germany; there are some
of them so refined, that, although treating of
our own nature, one does not know on what
to rest for the conception of them. The
French philosophers have rendered morality
singularly dry, by referring every thing to
self-interest. Some German metaphysicians
have arrived at the same result, by never-
theless building all their doctrines on sacri-
fices. Neither systems of materialism, nor
those of abstraction, can give a complete
idea of virtue.
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? 218 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
CHAPTER XVI.
Jacobi.
It vrould be difficult in any country to meet
with a man of letters of a more distinguished
nature than Jacobi: with every advantage of
person and fortune, he devoted himself, from
his youth, during forty years, to meditation.
Philosophy is ordinarily a consolation or an
asylum; but he who makes choice of it when
circumstances concur to promise him great
success in the world, is the more worthy of
respect. Led by his character to acknow-
ledge the power of sentiment, Jacobi bu-
sied himself with abstract ideas, principally
to show their insufficiency. His writings on
metaphysics are much esteemed in Germany;
yet it is chiefly as a great moralist that his
reputation is universal.
He was the first who attacked morality
founded on interest; and, by assigning as
the principle of his own system, religious
sentiment considered philosophically, he has
created a doctrine distinct from that of Kant,
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? JACOBI.
219
who refers every thing to the inflexible law
of duty, and from that of the new metaphy-
sicians, who aim, as I have just said, at
applying the strictness of science to the
theory of virtue.
Schiller, in an epigram against Kant's
system of morality, says, " I take pleasure
"in serving my friends; it is agreeable to
"me to perform my duty; that makes me
"uneasy, for then I am not virtuous/' This
pleasantry carries with it a deep sense; for,
although happiness ought never to be our
object in fulfilling our duty, yet the inward
satisfaction which it affords us is precisely
what may be called the beatitude of virtue.
This word Beatitude has lost something of
its dignity: it must, however, be recurred to,
for it is necessary to express that kind of
impression which makes us sacrifice hap-
piness, or at least pleasure, to a gentler and
a purer state of mind.