No More Learning

53b. Those which arise through hearing, through reflection,
etc
The dharmas "acquired through effort" are the opposite of the "innate" dharmas. These former dharmas are qualities (guna) proceed- ing from hearing {sruta)y that is, from the Word of the Buddha, from reflection (cintd), and from meditation (bhdvand).
Since they are acquired through effort, they are the similar cause of greater or of equal, but not of lesser, good
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The dharmas of hearing in Kamadhatu are similar causes of the dharmas of hearing and reflection in Kamadhatu; but not of the dharmas of meditation, because these dharmas do not exist in Kamadhatu, and because a dharma is a similar cause of dharmas of the same sphere of existence.
The dharmas of hearing in Rupadhatu are similar causes of the dharmas of hearing and meditation in Rupadhatu; but not of the dharmas of reflection, because these dharmas do not exist in this sphere of existence: in Rupadhatu, as soon as one begins to reflect, one immediately enters into absorption (samddhi).
The dharmas of meditation in Rupadhatu are similar causes of the dharmas of meditation in Rupadhatu, but not of the dharmas of hearing in Rupadhatu, because these are less good.
The dharmas of meditation in Arupyadhatu are the similar causes of the dharmas of meditation in Arupyadhatu. The dharmas of hearing and of reflection do not exist in this sphere of existence.
Furthermore, one must consider that the dharmas acquired through effort are of nine classes: weak-weak, medium-weak, etc. The weak-weak are the similar causes of dharmas of nine classes; the medium-weak, of dharmas of eight classes, with the exception of the weak-weak; and thus following.
The nine classes of the "innate" good dharmas are similar cause of one another. The same holds for the defiled dharmas.
The undefiled-neutral dharmas are of four categories (ii. 72), the following being "better" than the preceding: dharmas arisen from retribution (vipakaja, i. 37); dharmas relative to lying down, to sitting attitudes, etc. ; dharmas relative to professional work; and the mind that can create fictive beings {nirmanacitta, vii. 48). These four categories are, respectively, the similar cause of four, three, two, and one category.
Furthermore, as a mind capable of creating fictive beings of the sphere of Kamadhatu can be the result of each of the Four Dhyanas {Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 89al2), there is reason to establish here the same distinctions: the minds capable of creating fiaive beings constitute four classes, and are, according to their class, similar causes of four, three,
? two, or one mind capable of creating fictive beings. In fact, since it is a result of a higher Dhyana, the mind capable of creating fictive beings is not the similar cause of a mind capable of creating fictive beings which is the result of a lower Dhyana: from one similar cause (a mind capable of creating fictive beings) realized with the greatest effort, there cannot proceed a dharma less good, realized with less effort.
***
Once these principles have been established, the following ques-
356 tions are stated and resolved:
1. Is there a pure dharma, already arisen, which is not the cause of a pure dharma not destined to arise?
Yes. Duhkhe dharmajndna already arisen is a cause of duhkhe dharmajndnaksdntis not destined to arise. Furthermore, a better good is not the cause of lesser good.
2. Is there, in a series, a pure dharma, previously acquired (of which one has first obtained the prapti), which is not the cause of a pure dharma arisen later?
Yes. Future duhkhe dharmajnanaksdnti [whose possession (prdpti) has been obtained in the first moment of the Path] are not the cause of duhkhe dharmajndna already arisen. This is because a result cannot be anterior to its cause, and because a future dharma is not a similar cause.
3. Is there a pure dharma, arisen previously, which is not the cause of a pure dharma arisen later?
Yes. The best is not the cause of less good. For example, when one realizes an inferior result after having fallen from a superior result, the superior result was not the cause of this inferior result. Furthermore, possession of duhkhe dharmajndna which has previously arisen is not a cause of the possession of the dharmajndnaksdnti which will arise in the following moments {duhkhe'nvayajndnaksdntiksane, etc. ), because these new possessions are less good
***
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Chapter Two
53c-d. The mind and its mental states are only samprayuk- 357
takahetu, causes through association.
Mind and mental states are samprayuktakahetu.
Is this to say that minds and mental states, arisen at different moments and in different series, are among themselves samprayuk- takahetu}
No.
Would you then say that the mind and mental states of the same aspect, that is, having the same aspect of blue, etc. , and of the same object (ekMambana), that is, having for their object the same blue, etc, are samprayuktakahetu}
No. This definition gives rise to the same criticism: minds and mental states of different time periods and of different series can have the same aspect and the same object.
Would you say that the mind and mental states of the same aspect and the same object, can be, furthermore, of the same time period?
This still does not suffice: for many persons can see a new moon at one and the same time.
Consequently, the author adds
53d. Which has the same support.
The mind and mental states which have the same support are,
among themselves, samprayuktakahetu. 358
"Same" signifies single or undivided.
For example, a given moment (ksana) of the organ of sight is the support 1) of a visual consciousness, and 2) of the sensation {vedana) and the other mental states which are associated with this conscious- ness. And the same for the other organs until manas: a certain moment of the mental organ {manas) is the support of a mental consciousness and of the mental states associated with this consciousness.
Whatever is samprayuktakahetu is also sahabhilhetu. What is the 359
difference between these two causes?
Some dharmas are called sahabhuhetu because they are mutually
the results of one another. As companions in a caravan travel thanks to
? the support that they give one another, in this same way the mind is the result of mental states, and the mental states are the result of the mind
Some dharmas are called samprayuktakahetu, mutual cause through association, because they function identically, that is, because there is among them the five similarities or identities defined above ii. 34. The travel of the companions in a caravan is assured by the mutual support that they give one another; furthermore, they use the same food, the same drinks, etc In this same way, the mind and its mental states use the same support, have the same aspect, etc: if one of these five identities is missing, they no longer function in the same way and are not associated
**#
54a-b. Former universals are sarvatragahetu or universal causes of the defiled dharmas of their own stage.
Universals, which we shall study in the Chapter on the Defile- ments (v. 12), arisen previously, that is, of the past or present, and belonging to a certain stage (bhumi), are the universal cause of later defiled dharmas, of the same stage, which are defiled by nature, either through association or through their origin (iv. 9c).
Universals are only the cause of defiled dharmas\ they are the cause
of defiled dharmas in their own category and in other categories
(nikaya, ii. 52b): it is through their power that there arises, with their 36
following, defilements belonging to categories different from them. ?
561 They then constitute a cause different from sabhagahetu
Then would the defiled dharmas of an Aryan (rdga or lust, etc) have the universals for their cause? Yet the Aryan has abandoned all universals, for these are abandoned by Seeing the Truths.
The Vaibhasikas of Ka? mir admit that all defiled dharmas have the dharmas abandoned through Seeing the Truths for their cause. For the
562
Prakaranapdda expresses itself in these terms: "What dharmas have
for a cause the dharmas abandoned through Seeing the Truths? Defiled
565
dharmas and the retribution of the dharmas abandoned through
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Seeing the Truths.
"What dharmas have for a cause neutral (avyakrta) [dharmas]}
m
Neutral conditioned dharmas
"Is there a duhkhasatya which has for its cause a belief in self
and bad dharmas.
(satkayadrsti) and which is not in turn the cause of a belief in self? . . . "
and the rest to: "with the exception of the arising-old age-duration-
365
impermanence of the belief in a future self and its following, and of
1 all other defiled duhkhasatya!
[Objection:] If some bad dharmas have for their causes not only
some bad dharmas but some neutral dharmas as well, how should one
explain this bhasyam of the Prajnapti^ "Is there a bad dharma which
has only a bad dharma for its cause? Yes; the first defiled volition 367
(cetana) that an Aryan produces upon falling from detachment. " [Answer:] The neutral dharmas, which are abandoned through
Seeing the Truths, are the cause (i. e. , sarvatragahetu) of this bad volition. If the Prajnapti does not mention it, it is because it intends to name only the causes that have not been abandoned.
***
54c-d. Bad dharmas and impure good dharmas are retributive 368
causes.
1. Bad dharmas--which are all impure--and impure good dharmas are only retributive causes, because their nature is to ripen.
Neutral dharmas are not retributive causes, because they are weak: as rotten seeds, even though moistened, do not grow.
Pure dharmas are not retributive causes because they are not 369
moistened through desire (trsnd): as intact seeds, not moistened, do not grow.
Furthermore, pure dharmas are not bound to any sphere of existence: thus to which sphere could the result of retribution that they would produce belong?
The dharmas that are neither neutral nor pure possess the two qualities necessary for retribution, the proper force, and the moisten-
? ing of thirst, the same as intact and moistened seeds.
2. [Objection:] What is the meaning of the expression vipdkahetu!
You have a choice between two interpretations of this compound: vipdkahetu signifies either "cause of vipaka* or "cause which is vipaka! *
In the first case, the suffix a (ghan) marks the state (bhdva): the vipaka (-vipakti) is the result of the operation indicated by the root vi-pac.
In the second case, the suffix a marks the operation (karman): the vipaka is that which become ripe (vipacyate), that is to say, the action arrives at the moment when it gives forth a result.
To which of these two interpretations do you hold? If you accept the first, how would you justify the text (Jndnaprasthdna, TD 26, p. 974a26), "The eye arises from vipdkaT If you accept the second, how would you justify the expression, "vipaka of action? "
[Answer:] We have shown (i. 37) that both explanations of the word vipaka are correct. When one examines results, one must understand the word vipaka according to the first explanation; the meaning is result of retribution. The text, "The eye arises from vipaka* should be understood as "The eye arises from the cause of vipdka?
3. What is the meaning of the compound vi-pakal
The prefix vi indicates difference. Vipaka is a pdka or result
37 dissimilar from its cause. ?
How is that?
In Kamadhatu, 1) a retributive cause (vipdkahetu) consisting of only one skandha can produce a single result: possession (prdpti, ii. 36b) with its characteristics (laksanas, ii. 45c); 2) a retributive cause consisting of two skandhas can produce a single result: bodily and vocal action with its characteristics; 3) a retributive cause consisting of four skandhas can produce a single result: the mind and its mental states, good and bad, with their laksanas.
In Rupadhatu, 1) a retributive cause consisting of a single skandha can produce a single result: possession with its characteristics, that is, asamjnisamapatti (ii. 42a) with its characteristics; 2) a retributive cause consisting of two skandhas can produce a single result: vijnapti (iv. 2)
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of the First Dhy3na with its characteristics; 3) a retributive cause consisting of four skandhas can produce a single result: a good mind, not of absorption (for the mind of absorption always consists of rupa and discipline, iv. 13, and is thus five skandhas), with its characteristics; 4) a retributive cause consisting of five skandhas can produce a single result: the mind of absorption with its characteristics.
In Arupyadhatu, 1) a retributive cause consisting of a single skandha can produce a single result: possession, nirodhasamdpatti (ii. 43), with their respective characteristics; 2) a retributive cause consisting of four skandhas can produce a single result: the mind and its mental states with their characteristics.
4. There is action the retribution of which is included in a single
dyatana, in a single dharmayatana (i. 15): action that has for its 371
retribution the vital organ (jivitendriya, ii. 45a).
In fact, action that has the vital organ for its retribution necessarily
has the vital organ and its characteristics (ii. 45c) for its retribution; both form part of the dharmayatana.
Action that has the mental organ (rnanas) for its retribution necessarily has two ayatanas for its retribution, namely the mana- dyatana (i. l6b) and the dharmayatana (which embraces sensations, etc. , and the characteristics which necessarily accompany the mental organ).
Action that has tangible things (sprastavydyatana, i. lOd) for its retribution necessarily has two ayatanas for its retribution, namely the tangible things and the dharmayatana (which includes the character- istics of tangible things).
Action that has the organ of touch (kdydyatana, i. 9a) for its retribution necessarily has three ayatanas for its retribution, the organ of touch, tangibles (namely the four primary elements that support the organ of touch), and the dharmayatana (which includes its character- istics).
In the same way, action which has either physical matter (rupdyatana), odors (gandhdyatana), or taste {rasdyatana) for its retribution, necessarily has three ayatanas for its retribution: tangible things and the dharmayatana as above, plus, according to the cause, the
? dyatana of physical matter, odor, or taste.
Aaion which has either the eye, the ear, the nose, or the tongue for
its retribution, necessarily has four dyatanas for its retribution: 1) one of the four organs, 2) the organ of touch, 3) tangible things, and 4) the dharmdyatana.
An aaion can have five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, or eleven 372
dyatanas for its retribution.
Action, in fact, is of two types: of varied result and of non-varied
result. The same holds for seeds: lotus, pomegranate, fig, millet, corn, etc.
5. The retribution of an aaion can belong to a single time period or
373 374
to three time periods; but the reverse is not true, for a result
cannot be inferior to its cause. The retribution from an aaion lasting an instant can last numerous instants; but the reverse is not true, for the same reason (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 98a7).
Retribution is not simultaneous to the aaion which produces it, for a retributive result is not experienced at the moment when the aaion is accomplished Retribution does not immediately follow an aaion, for it is the immediately antecedent condition (samanantarapratyaya, ii. 63b) that attracts the moment that immediately follows the aaion: in faa, the retributive cause depends on the development of the series for the realization of its result.
***
To which time period should a dharma belong in order that it might be each of these six causes? We have implicitely stated this rule, but we have not yet taught it in the Karika:
55a-b. Sarvatragahetu and sabhdgahetu are of two time periods; 375
three causes are of three time periods.
A past and present dharma can be sarvatraga and sabhdgahetu (ii. 52b). Past, present, and future dharmas can be samprayuktaka, sahabhu, and vipdkahetu. The Karika does not speak of kdranahetu (ii. 50a)): the conditioned dharmas of the three time periods are
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karanahetu\ the unconditioned dharmas are outside of time. ***
Which causes correspond to which results? By reason of which results are they recognized as causes?
376 55c-d. Conditioned things and disconneaion are results.
The Mulasastra says, "What dharmas are results? Conditioned
377 things and pratisamkhyanirodha. "
[Objection:] If the unconditioned is a result, it should have a cause, from which cause one could say that it is the result. Furthermore, since you maintain that it is a cause {kdranahetu, ii. 50a), it should have a result, from which result one could say that it is a cause.
Only conditioned things, [the Sarvastivadins answer,] have cause and result.
378 55d. The unconditioned has neither cause nor result.
For we cannot attribute to it any of the six causes, nor any of the five results.
i. 1. Why not admit that the part of the Path which is called
m
anantaryamarga is the kdranahetu of the result of disconneaion
(visamyogaphala, ii. 57d)?
We have seen that kdranahetu is a cause that does not create any
obstacles to arising; but disconneaion, being unconditioned, does not arise. Thus one cannot attribute a kdrannahetu to it.
2. Then how is disconneaion a result? Of what is it the result?
It is the result of the Path, for it is obtained due to the force of the Path (vi. 51): in other words, it is through the Path that an ascetic obtains possession (prdpti, ii. 36c-d) of disconneaion.
3. Hence it is the obtaining or the possession of disconnection which is the result of the Path, and not disconneaion itself: for the Path is efficacious with regard to the obtaining of disconneaion, but not with regard to disconneaion.
Wrong! The efficacy of the Path possesses diversity with regard to
? both obtaining and disconnection.
The Path produces obtaining; the Path causes one to obtain
disconnection. Hence, although the Path is not the cause of disconnec- tion {-prastisarhkhyanirodha)y one can say that it is the result of the
380
Path.
4. Since no unconditioned thing has adhipatiphala (ii. 58d), how
can one define it as karanahetul
Any unconditioned thing is karanahetu, for it does not create an
obstacle to the arising of any dharma', but it does not have any result, for, being outside of time, it can neither project nor produce a result (ii. 59a-b).
[5. The Sautrantikas deny that] an unconditioned thing is a cause. In fact, the Sutra does not say that a cause can be unconditioned; it says that a cause is only conditioned, "All the hetus, all the pratyayas which have for a result the production of physical matter . . . of the
381
consciousiness, are also impermanent.
Produced by impermanent
hetus and pratyayas> how can physical matter . . . and consciousness be permanent? "
[The Sarvastivadins answer:] If a permanent thing, that is, an unconditioned thing is not a cause, it will not be "an object as condition" {atambanapratyaya, ii. 63) of the conciousness that it refers to.
[The Sautrantikas:] The Sutra declares that the hetus and the pratyayas which are capable of producing are impermanent. Itcloes not say that all conditions (pratyayas) of the consciousness are imperma- nent. An unconditioned thing could then be "an object as condition" of the consciousness; for "an object as condition" is not itself productive.
[The Sarvastivadins:] The Sutra says that productive causes are impermanent: hence the Sutra does not deny that an unconditioned thing is kdranahetu, that is, "a cause that does not create an obstacle. "
[The Sautrantikas:] The Sutra admits the existence of "an object as a condition" (ii. 61c); but it does not speak of a karanahetu, "a cause that does not create an obstacle. " It is not proven that an uncondi- tioned thing is a cause.
[The Sarvastivadins:] In fact, the Sutra does not say that that
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which does not create an obstacle is a cause; but it does not contradict this. Many Sfctras have disappeared How can you be sure that some Sutra does not attribute the quality of kdranahetu to unconditioned things?
***
[ii. The Sautrantikas:] What is the dharma that is called visamyoga or disconnection?
[The Sarvastivadins: The Mulasastra (Jndnaprasthdna, TD 26, p. 923b6) says that] disconnection is pratisarhkhyanirodha (ii. 57d).
[The Sautrantikas:] When I asked you (i. 6) what pratisamkhya- nirodha is, you answered, "It is disconnection;" I asked you what disconnection is, and you answered, "It is pratisarhkhyanirodha^ The two answers are circular and do not explain the nature of the dharma, the unconditioned, to which they refer. You owe us another explanation.
[The Sarvastivadins:] This dharma, in its nature, is real, but indescribable; only the Aryans "realize" it internally, each for himself. It is only possible to indicate its general characteristics, by saying that there is a real entity (dravya), distinct from others, which is good and eternal, and which receives the name of pratisarhkhyanirodha, and which is also called disconnection or visamyoga.
***
iii. The Sautrantikas affirm that the three types of unconditioned
things (i. 5b) are not real. The three dharmas that it refers to are not 382
distinct and real entities like color, sensation, etc.
1. What is called "space" (dkdsa) is solely the absence of any
tangible thing, that is, the absence of a resistant body. Persons say, in their obscurity, that there is space when they do not encounter any obstacle.
2. What is called pratisarhkhyanirodha or Nirvana is--when both the defilements already produced and the existence already produced
? are destroyed--the absence of any other defilements or any other
existence, and that by reason of the force of the consciousness 383
(pratisamkhyd-prajnd).
3. When, independent of the force of consciousness (pratisamkhyd)
and by reason of the mere absence of causes there is an absence of arising dharmas, this is what is called apratisamkhyanirodha. For example, when premature death interrupts existence (nikdyasabhdga, ii. 10,14), there is apratisamkhyanirodha of the dharmas which would have arisen in the course of this existence if it had continued
384
4. According to another school, pratisamkhyanirodha is the
future non-arising of the defilements by reason of consciousness (prajnd); apratisamkhyanirodha is the future non-arising of suffering, that is, of existence, by reason of the disappearance of the defilements, and not directly by reason of consciousness. (The first would then be sopadhisesa nirvdnadhdtu, and the second would be nirupadhisesa nirvdanadhdtu).
But, [the Sautrantikas remark,] the future non-arising of suffering supposes consciousness (pratisamkhyd)',it is then included within pratisamkhyanirodha.
***
385
5. Another School defines apratisamkhyanirodha as "later non-
existence of the dharmas which have arisen" by virtue of their 386
spontaneous destruction.
In this hypothesis, apratisamkhyanirodha would not be eternal,
since it is non-existent as long as the dharma as cause (i. e. , the defilement) has not perished.
But does not pratisamkhyanirodha have a certain consciousness, the pratisamkhya, for its antecedent? Consequently it too would not be eternal, for, if its antecedent were absent, its consequence would also be absent.
You cannot say that pratisamkhyanirodha is not eternal because its antecedent is pratisamkhyd: in faa, it does not have pratisamkhyd for its antecedent. One cannot say that pratisamkhyd is earlier, or that the
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"non-arising of the non-arisen dharmas' is later. Let us explain. Non- arising always exists in and of itself. If pratisamkhyd is absent, the dharmas would arise; but if pratisamkhyd arises, the dharmas would absolutely not arise. The efficacy of pratisamkhyd with regard to their non-arising consists in this: 1) that before pratisamkhyd, there is no obstacle to their arising; 2) but given pratisamkhyd, the dharmas, the arising of which has not been previously hindered, do not arise.
***
[iv. The Sarvastivadins refute the Sautrantikas. ] If Nirvana is simply non-arising {anutpdda), how does one explain the Sutra (Samyuktagama, TD 2, p. 182bl5) which says, "The cultivation of the five faculties,--faith, etc. ,--has for its result the abandoning of past,
387
present, and future suffering"?
other than Nirvana, and there can only be non-arising of a future dharma, not of a past or present dharma.
[1. The Sautrantikas:] This Sutra does not contradict our definition
of Nirvana. In fact, "the abandoning of past and present suffering"
means the abandoning of the defilements bearing past and present
In fact, this abandoning is nothing
suffering. Our interpretation is justified by another text (Samyukta, m
TD 2, p. l9a8? ) which says, "Abandon desire (chandardga ) relative
to rupa, to sensation . . . and to consciousness. When desire is
abandoned, rupa, . . . and consciousness will be abandoned and
389
comprehended by you. "
understand "the abandoning of past and present suffering" of which the Sutra speaks when it speaks of the faculties.
If one adopts another reading of this Sutra on the faculties, to wit, "The cultivation of the faculties . . . has for its result the abandoning of past, present, and future defilements," the explanation is the same.
Or rather, past defilement is the defilement of a previous existence; present defilement is the defilement of the present exis- tence; these do not refer to the defilement of a given past or present moment. The same for the eighteen trsnavicaritas (Anguttara, ii. 212) or "modes of thirst": the modes (vicaritas) that are related to a past
It is in this manner that we should
? existence are called past modes, those that are related to a present existence are called present modes, and those that are related to a future existence are called future modes.
Past defilements and present defilements place in the present series seeds that bring forth the arising of future defilement: when these seeds are abandoned, past and present defilement is abandoned: in the same way as one says that an action is exhausted when its retribution is exhausted.
The "abandoning" of future suffering and future defilement is the fact that they absolutely do not arise, given the absence of seeds.
How does one otherwise understand the abandoning of past or present suffering? There is no good reason to make an effort to destroy that which has perished or that which is perishing.
[2. The Sarvastivadins:] If unconditioned things do not exist, how
can the Sutra say "Detachment (viraga) is the best of all conditioned
be the best among the dharmas which do not exist? ?
[The Sautrantikas:] We do not say that unconditioned things do not exist. They exist in fact in the manner in which we say that they exist. Let us explain. Before sound is produced, we say "There is non-existence (of sound) prior to the sound;" after the sound has perished, we say "There is non-existence (of sound) after the sound,"
391
and unconditioned dharmas? " How can a dharma which does not exist 39
and yet it had not been proven that non-existence exists: holds for unconditioned things.
the same
Although it is non-existent, one unconditioned thing merits being praised, namely detachement (viraga), the absolute future non- existence of any wrong. This non-existent thing is the most distin- guished of all non-existent things. The Sutra praises it by saying that it
is the best, so that believers shall conceive joy and affection with regard to it.
[3. The Sarvastivadins:] If pratisarhkhyanirodha or Nirvana is non-existent, how can it be one of the Truths. How can it be the Third Noble Truth?
What should we understand by "Noble Truth" or arayasatya? Without doubt the sense of satya (Truth) is "not incorrect. " The
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Aryans see that which exists and that which does not exist in a not incorrect manner: in that which is suffering, they see only suffering, and in the non-existence of suffering, they see the non-existence of suffering. What contradiction do you find between the non-existence of suffering and pratisamkhydnirodha being a Truth?
And this non-existence is the Third Truth, because the Aryans see it and proclaim it immediately after the Second Truth.
[4. The Sarvastivadins:] But if unconditioned things are non- existent, the consciousness that has space and the two extinctions for Its object would have a non-thing for its object.
We do not see any inconvenience in this, as we shall explain in the discussion on the past and future (v. 25).
[5. The Sarvastivadins:] What harm do you see in maintaining that unconditioned things really exist? What advantage do you see in this?
This advantage that the Vaibhasika doctrine is found to be safegarded.
May the gods be charged with defending this doctrine, if they judge that it is possible! But to maintain the existence of unconditioned things in and of themselves is to affirm a non-existent thing to be real. In fact, unconditioned things are not known through direct perception (pratyaksa), as is the case for physical matter, sensation, etc. ; and they are not known through inference (anumdna), by reason of their activity, as is the case for the sense organs.
6. Furthermore, if nirodha or extinction is a thing in and of itself, how do you justify the genitive, duhkhasya nirodhah, "the extinaion of suffering," as the extinction of the defilement, or the extinaion of the object of defilement? In our system,, the extinction of a thing is simply the non-existence of this thing. "Extinaion of suffering" means that "suffering will not exist any more. " But we cannot conceive of any cause and effea relationship, of any effect and cause relationship, of a relationship of the whole to the part, etc. , between the things, that is to say, the defilements, and its extinction conceived of as an entity in itself, which would justify the genitive.
We affirm, [answer the Sarvastivadins,] that extinaion is a thing in and 6f itself. Yet we can specify extinaion as being in a relationship
? with such things (extinction of lust, etc. ), for one takes possession (prapti, ii. 37b) of extinction at the moment when one cuts off the possession of a certain thing.
But, we would answer, what is it that determines or specifies the
392 taking of possession of extinction?
[7. The Sarvastivadins:] The Sutra speaks of the Bhiksu who has
393
obtained Nirvana in this life. If Nirvana is non-existence, how could
he obtain it?
[The Sautrantikas:] The Bhiksu, through the possession of the
adverse force of the antidote, that is, through the possession of the Path, has obtained a personality (asraya) contrary to the defilements, and contrary to a new existence. This is why the Sutra says that he has obtained Nirvana.
8. Moreover we have a text that shows that Nirvana is pure
394
non-existence. The Sutra {Samyukta, TD 2, p. 88a7)
complete abandoning, the purification, the exhausting, the detach- ment, the extinction, the abatement, the definitive passing away of this suffering; and the non-rebirth, the non-grasping, the non-appearance of another suffering--this is calm, this is excellent, namely the rejection of all upadhi, the exhausting of thirst, detachment, extinction, Nirvana/'
[The Sarvastivadins:] When the Sutra says that Nirvana is the
non-appearance of a new suffering, the Sutra means that there is no
395 appearance of suffering in Nirvana.
[The Sautrantikas:] I do not see that the locative "in Nirvana" has
any force to establish that Nirvana is a thing. In what sense do you
understand the locative asmin? If this means asmin sati, "if Nirvana
exists, there is no appearance of suffering," then suffering would never
appear, since Nirvana is eternal. If this means asmin prapta, "if
Nirvana has been obtained," you would have to admit that future
suffering will not appear while the Path--by virtue of which you
suppose that Nirvana is obtained--either is, or rather has been
396 obtained.
9. Consequently the comparison of the Sutra is excellent, "The
397 deliverance of his mind is like the Nirvana of a flame. " That is to
The Indriyas 285
says, "The
? 286 Chapter Two
say, as the extinction of a flame is only the "passing away" of the flame and not a certain thing in and of itself, so too is the deliverance of the mind of the Blessed One.
[10. The Sautrantikas] are still warranted by the authority of the
Abhidharma wherein we read, "What are the avastuka dharmas} They 398
are the unconditioned things. " The term avastuka signifies "unreal," "without self-nature. "
[The Vaibhasikas do not accept this interpretation. ] The term
vastu, in fact, is used in five different meanings: 1. vastu in the sense of
a thing in and of itself, for example, "When one has obtained this
vastu (asubhd, vi. ll), one is in possession of the vastu* (Jndnapras-
thdna, TD 26, p. 1026cll; Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 985a22); 2. vastu in the
sense of any object of consciousness, for example "All the dharmas are
known through different knowledges, each knowing its own object"
(Prakarana, TD 26, p. 713c20); 3. vastu in the sense of "bond of
attachment," for example, "Is the person who is bound to a vastu
through the bond of affection, bound to this same vastu through the
bond of hostility? " (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 298b-c); 4. vastu in the sense of
cause, for example, "What are the dharmas possessing a cause? The 3
conditioned dharmas* (Prakarana, TD 26, p. 716a4); " 5. vastu in the
sense of "act of appropriating to oneself, for example, "vastu of fields,
vastu of a house, vastu of a shop, vastu of riches: abandoning the act of
appropriating these to himself, he renounces them" (Vibhdsd, TD 27, 400
p. 288b5).
The Vaibhasikas conclude: In the passage that concerns us, vastu
has the meaning of cause; avastuka signifies "that which has no cause. " Unconditioned things, although real, always lack activity, have no cause which produces them, and produce no effects.
***
We must explain what type of result proceeds from each type of cause.
56a. Retribution is the result of the last cause.
? The last cause is the retributive cause, vipdkahetu, because the retributive cause is named last in this list. The first result, vipdkaphala (iii. 57), is the result of this cause.
402 56b. The predominating result is the result of the first.
The first cause is kdranahetu or reason for being; the last result proceeds from it.
This result is called adhipaja, arisen from predominence, or adhipata, belonging to predominance, because it is the result of the predominating cause (adhipatiphala, ii. 58c-d). The kdranahetu is considered as playing the role of a master (adhipati).
But, we say, the quality of not creating an obstacle (andvarana- bhdvamdtravasthdna, ii. 50a) suffices to constitute kdranahetu. How can one regard it as a "predominating cause? "
Kdranahetu is either a "non-efficacious cause" and one then
regards it as predominant because it creates no obstacle; or an
"efficacious cause," and one then regards it as predominant because it
possesses mastery, a predominating and generating aaivity. For
example, the ten ayatanas (form and the organ of sight, etc. ) are
predominant with regard to the five sense consciousnesses; the
collective action of living beings is predominant with regard to the
403
physical world. The organ of hearing exercises an indirect pre-
dominence (ddhipatya) with regard to the visual consciousness, for, after having understood, a person experiences the desire to see. And thus following. (See ii. 50a).
56c-d. Outflowing is the result of the similar cause and the universal cause.
An outflowing result (nisyandaphala) proceeds from sabhagahetu (ii. 52) and from sarvatragahetu (ii. 54): for the result of these two causes is similar to its causes (ii. 57c; iv. 85).