No More Learning

The profits of the Coromandel gouvernement, which in the years 1684
and 1685 appeared in the Company's books as exceeding 1,200,000
guilders, fell to 445,000 guilders in 1686 and 82,000 in 1687. 1 Nor
was the high water mark of the years before Aurangzib's conquest of
Golconda ever reached again. Towards the middle of the eighteenth
century. there was an improvement, but it was not maintained, and
the figures generally moved between 200,000 and 400,000 guilders
profit, which indeed still made a good showing in the Company's
books when, as will be shown in a subsequent paragraph, so many of
its establishments were worked at a loss.
In the days before the amalgamation of the companies, two
a
1 Kierk de Reus, Geschichtlicher Ueberblick der Niederl. Ostindischen
Compagnie, VRTD, Beilage IX.


## p. 39 (#67) ##############################################

GUJARAT
89
Zeeland merchants, as has been briefly mentioned above, had tried to
open up relations with the ports on the west coast of India, but had
been hanged by the Portuguese at Goa. Their reports on Gujarat,
however, had been most sanguine, and the United Company was
anxious to follow up their pioneer work and secure Gujarat cottons
for the markets of the Moluccas and the west coast of Sumatra and
Jambi as well as for Europe. In 1604, and again in 1605, the admiral
commanding the annual fleet was instructed to detach two ships to
Surat; whether the order was carried out in 1604 does not appear; in
the following year, at any rate, it was set aside because reports of an
impending attack by the Portuguese made a concentration of all
forces in the Archipelago seem imperatively necessary. A Dutch
merchant was at Surat in 1606 and 1607, but, wrought upon by
nervous fears that the Portuguese were succeeding in setting against
him the mind of the Khankhanan, Jahangir's representative at
Burhanpur, he committed suicide. The English soon were more
successful, and, stimulated by their example, and urged moreover by
the shahbandar of Surat, the Dutch governor of Coromandel in May,
1615, sent one of his officials, Gilles van Ravesteyn, to Surat, where
he arrived after a six weeks' journey on horseback. Van Ravesteyn,
who went to Burhanpur in the company of Sir Thomas Roe, on his
return advised against the establishment of a factory. Political con-
ditions in the Moghul Empire did not seem to him to promise security
to foreign traders; in any case a farman signed by the Great Moghul
himself would be required and would be very difficult to obtain.
Coen, however, who in the capacity of director-general of trade at
Bantam was already the leading spirit among the authorities in the
East, considered the cottons of Gujarat indispensable for the Molucca
trade, the more so as the factory at Achin, where they could be
obtained, if at much higher prices, was exposed to intolerable vexa-
tions and had soon to be withdrawn. Even before Van Ravesteyn's
report had been received, therefore, Coen had dispatched a yacht
under Pieter van den Broecke to Gujarat. After touching at Mokha,
which became the usual practice, as cash useful for the purchases to
be made at Surat could be obtained there, Van den Broecke arrived
at Surat in August, 1616, and asked permission to establish a factory.
Sir Thomas Roe did what he could to excite the Great Moghul's
suspicions against the newcomers, but the Surat merchants feared
that in case of a refusal the Dutch might attack their shipping, and
the governor of the town gave a provisional permission. The next
year two senior merchants, Van Ravesteyn and Adriaan Goeree, were
left in charge of the Surat factory, and they had to struggle througn
some very difficult years. Van Ravesteyn succeeded, to the morti-
fication of Sir Thomas Roe, in negotiating, not it is true with Jahangir
himself, but with his son Prince Khurram. a satisfactory treaty of
1
1 Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe (ed. 1926), pp. 202 sqq.


## p. 40 (#68) ##############################################

40
THE DUTCH IN INDIA
commerce (1618), but all his and his colleague's efforts were in vain
since no ships appeared to carry away their indigo and cottons. Van
den Broecke, sent from Bantam for the third time in December, 1618,
was immediately recalled on account of the outbreak of the war with
the English, which necessitated the concentration of all available
forces in the Archipelago. The two factors at Surat were driven
almost to distraction by their false position until at last, in October,
1620, Van den Broecke, after having called at Aden, arrived at Surat.
Coen had appointed him director of both Mokha and Surat, and he
took up his residence at the latter place. A number of the Company's
other servants arrived overland from Masulipatam later in the year,
and factories could then be organised in the inland towns, explored
during the preceding years, Broach, Cambay, Ahmadabad, Agra, and
Burhanpur, where indigo and textiles of various kinds were to be had.
A more prosperous time now began for the settlement. There was
a dangerous conflict in 1622 with the Gujarat authorities, especially
with Asaf Khan, Prince Khurram's powerful father-in-law, over the
activities of a Dutch ship which had sailed along the Arabian and
Persian coast, seizing native craft belonging to Portuguese ports, and
had confiscated property belonging-or so it was alleged to that
dignitary. The factor at Cambay, who was within the reach of Asaf
Khan's resentment, nevertheless took a high tone and threatened
Coen's vengeance in a way eloquent of the self-confidence engend-
ered by the events of 1619. He was, however, arrested and sent to
Agra, and Van den Broecke had to pay an indemnity before the
Cambay factory could be recovered. Incidents like these were typical
of trade in a strong but despotic empire like the Moghul's, and did not
prevent the Gujarat factories from producing larger and larger profits.
Coen was impatient with Van den Broecke for sending him indigo,
when he wanted textiles. In course of time, however, the indigo trade
came to be as important as the trade in cottons. In 1624 the first ship
sailed from Surat direct for Holland; its cargo consisted mainly of
indigo. In those years three or four ships were sent annually from
Batavia to trade with Gujarat and Arabia. The English Company,
which, after its defeat in Java, was beginning to develop Gujarat as
the centre of its eastern system, was still somewhat ahead of its rival
here. But the advantages of the Dutch which have been mentioned
in connection with their Coromandel trade told in Gujarat as well,
and the directorate of Surat-the factories farther to the west were
soon formed into a separate directorate-came to be one of the most
profitable of all the establishments the Dutch Company possessed.
In 1627 the governor of Coromandel sent some of his subordinates
to found a trading establishment in Bengal. At first the new post was
kept within the jurisdiction of the Coromandel gouvernement, but
1 Colenbrander, Jan Pieterszoon Coen, m, 184.


## p. 41 (#69) ##############################################

BENGAL AND CEYLON
41
distance and its growing importance caused the government at
Batavia in 1655 to give it a separate organisation as the Directorate
of Bengal. Pippli, the first place where the Dutch had established
themselves, was soon abandoned for Balasore. When in 1653 a firm
.
footing was obtained at Chinsura up the Hugli river, Balasore was
retained only for the convenience of the ships. Chinsura, Kasimbazar
and Patna, however, became the centres of an exceedingly prosperous
and profitable trade. Although the Dutch in Bengal never attained
to the position of independence which they enjoyed in the Carnatic,
they were given considerable liberties by the nawab of Bengal, from
whom they held the villages of Chinsura and Bernagore in “perpetual
fief”, with wide jurisdiction even over natives. They were allowed to
construct a fortress at Chinsura, called Fort Gustavus, which at any
rate safeguarded them against any sudden attack by native forces.
They were always exposed, nevertheless, to the exactions of native
authorities, but the profits of the Bengal trade enabled them to suffer
many losses and to pay many bribes with equanimity.
The articles of export were textiles and silk, saltpetre, rice, and
particularly, opium. The opium, which was sent to Java and China,
yielded enormous profits. Even when in the eighteenth century the
Company's position in Bengal had become precarious, the establish-
ments there continued to be among the most profitable in all the
Company's domain. .
Ceylon had attracted the Dutch from the early days of their
colonial enterprise.
In 1602 Joris van Spilbergh, in command of three ships owned by
Balthazar de Moucheron, called at Batticaloa, which was not occupied
by the Portuguese, and travelled up to Kandi. Before the year was
out, another three ships (detached from the first of the United Com-
pany's fleets) appeared at Batticaloa, and their commander, Sebald
de Weert, followed Spilbergh's example and visited the “emperor”.
"Dom João" was eager to enlist the help of the Dutch against the
Portuguese, and De Weert arranged with him to go to Achin for
reinforcements with which to blockade Galle by sea while the Sin-
halese attacked it by land. On 25 April, 1603, De Weert was back at
Batticaloa with a fleet of seven ships, but before the expedition against
Galle could be undertaken, a quarrel arose, and the Dutch commander
was slain with a number of his companions.
This misfortune naturally had a discouraging effect on the Dutch
Company, and for many years to come it devoted its energies to the
strengthening of its position in the Malay Archipelago. Ports on the
Coromandel Coast and Gujarat were a necessary corollary to the
enjoyment of the monopoly of the Molucca trade, but the building
up of a new monopoly in Ceylon could wait. Relations were not
broken off altogether. When the Dutch had founded a factory at


## p. 42 (#70) ##############################################

42
THE DUTCH IN INDIA,
Devenampatnam in 1608, the new king (Dom João had died in 1604)
sued for their help again, and in 1610, and again in 1612, treaties were
concluded. The man who had negotiated the latter treaty, de
Boschhouwer, rose into high favour with the king and left Ceylon in
1615 full of zeal for the plan of an immediate attack on the Portuguese
in the island. Both in Java and in Holland, however, he found the
authorities immersed in their cares for the Moluccas. At last he
persuaded the Danish Government to fit out an expedition to Ceylon,
but he himself died on the way out, and without him the Danes
achieved nothing at Batticaloa.
The Portuguese now woke up to the danger threatening their
position, and closed the ring round the king of Kandi by occupying
and fortifying both Trinkomali and Batticaloa. An attempt to take
Kandi, however, failed disastrously.
.
Soon afterwards (1632), the throne of Kandi was occupied by an
energetic young ruler, Raja Sinha, who resumed the policy of setting
the Dutch against his arch-enemies the Portuguese. On 9 September,
1636, he wrote a letter to the Dutch Governor of the Coromandel
Coast at Pulicat-it took his envoy six months to elude the watch-
fulness of the Portuguese and deliver the letter-in which he asked
for a fleet of five vessels to blockade the Portuguese fortresses while
he attacked them from the land side; he promised the Dutch leave
to build a fortress of their own and the repayment of all the expenses
of the expedition.
These proposals now found ready acceptance. The Company,
securely established in the Archipelago, was thinking of expansion,
and under the energetic leadership of the governor-general Van
Diemen a determined attempt was being made to break down the
Portuguese Empire. The main effort was directed against Malacca,
but at the same time Goa, the nerve-centre of the Portuguese system,
was paralysed by an annual blockade (this policy had been started
in 1636), and the Dutch felt strong enough to try and wrest from the
Portuguese the places which provided the valuable pepper and
cinnamon, on the west coast of India and in Ceylon.
In January, 1638, the admiral of the fleet before Goa, Westerwolt,
detached two yachts under the command of Coster to begin the siege
of Batticaloa. When the south-west monsoon necessitated the break. .
up of the blockade, he himself appeared on 10 May with four ships
and landed 300 men; Batticaloa surrendered after a bombardment
without awaiting a storm.
The only importance of Batticaloa lay in that it established com-
munications with the independent ruler of the interior. Westerwolt
at once obtained Raja Sinha's consent to a new treaty prepared
beforehand and which assured enormous advantages to the Company.
By it the Company promised to supply the troops and ships required
for the expulsion of the Portuguese from the island; the king was to


## p. 43 (#71) ##############################################

CONQUEST OF CEYLON
43
make good all expenses thus incurred by deliveries of cinnamon,
pepper, etc. ; the Dutch were moreover to have complete freedom of
commerce in the island to the exclusion of all other European nations.
Clearly the king thought hardly any price too high that would help
him to re-establish his authority over the coastal towns. By the third
clause of the treaty, as Westerwolt sent it to Batavia, however, the
king, on top of all this, consented that the Dutch should garrison the
fortresses captured from the Portuguese. One wonders why he should
have thought it worth while to pay the Dutch so heavily merely
to step into his enemies' place. But the mystery is solved when the
Dutch copy of the treaty is compared with the Portuguese translation
handed to Raja Sinha: in the only version known to the ruler of
Kandi the clause in question contains an addition making the gar-
risoning of the fortresses by the Dutch dependent on his approval.
The deception remained undetected for some time, as the king,
pleased with his allies and conscious of his impotence against the
Portuguese, made no objection to the Dutch retaining Batticaloa.
When Westerwolt on 4 June, 1638, departed for Batavia, he left
Coster behind him as governor of the town.
At about the same time another disaster befell the Portuguese, a
fieet with reinforcements from Goa for Colombo being shipwrecked.
Coster urged the authorities at Batavia to strike while the iron was
hot, and the governor-general and council themselves wrote to the
directors at home (22 December, 1638) that if they would only send
some extra ships and troops, the time had come “to help the Portu-
guese out of India": the Malabar Coast with its rich trade, Ceylon
and Malacca, all seemed within the grasp of the Company.
But quarrels with Raja Sinha supervened, and nothing was
achieved in 1639 except the capture of Trinkomali, useless for the
cinnamon trade, and the special effort which the Company made
towards the end of that year, sending out a fleet of twenty-eight ships
in order to blockade Goa and attack Ceylon simultaneously, still did
not enable them to capture Colombo. But the command of the sea
enabled the Dutch to attack the enemy where he was weakest. In
order to provide for the defence of their capital, the Portuguese had
reduced the garrison of Negombo, and on 9 February, 1640, that town
was taken by the combined Dutch and Sinhalese forces. The first
breach had been made in the strong places protecting the cinnamon
country, but the immediate result was a quarrel between the allies
over the right to occupy the captured town, and the discrepancy
between the two versions of the treaty of 1638 now came to light.
Raja Sinha's indignation can easily be understood, but the Portu-
guese were still the more formidable intruders, and Coster succeeded
in bringing about a reconciliation on the basis of a compromise which
assured to his masters the reality of power. Trinkomali and Batticaloa
were to be surrendered to Raja Sinha in return for ten elephants and
1000 bahars of cinnamon; after the Portuguese had been driven out


## p. 44 (#72) ##############################################

THE DUTCH IN INDIA
of Ceylon altogether, the Dutch were to be allowed to retain one
fortress; they might, however, hold all they took as a pledge till their
expenses had been paid; Colombo was in any case to be dismantled.
This treaty was to take the place of the third clause of the treaty of
1638, which was reconfirmed as far as its other provisions went. Im-
mediately after the conclusion of this arrangement, Coster sailed
southward and laid siege to Galle, which after hard fighting was taken
on 13 March, 1640. No Sinhalese troops took part in the siege.
The Dutch how held two ports in the cinnamon area and expected
to have a good share in the trade. But Raja Sinha, although Trinko-
mali, was given up to him in April when he paid the stipulated price
of ten elephants, still suspected the intentions of his allies with regard
to the captured fortresses. Thanks to their exertions, he now controlled
part of the cinnamon fields, but he never delivered the quantities
which the Dutch claimed under the treaty, preferring to deal with
Arab merchants in spite of its provisions. Coster, who went from
Galle to Kandi to remonstrate with the king, was murdered by his
Sinhalese escort on his way back (August, 1640). Shortly afterwards
the Portuguese were enabled by reinforcements from Goa, where an
energetic new viceroy, d'Aveiras, had taken up the government, to
make a determined attempt to retake Negombo, and although Galle,
where Thijssen had assumed the command after Coster's death, held
out, its position was difficult. The Portuguese now dominated all the
surrounding area with their troops, and not only was no cinnamon to
be obtained, but the town had to be provisioned from Pulicat.
The news of these events aroused the more disappointment at
Batavia as developments had taken place in Europe which threatened
to interfere with the Company's schemes of conquest. A rebellion
A
against Spanish rule had for some time been brewing in Portugal; in
November, 1640, the Duke of Braganza was proclaimed king. Portu-
gal's colonial possessions had for forty years been fair game for the
Dutch East India Company, because Portugal was part of the Spanish
Empire, with which the states-general still continued at war. Now
that Portugal had freed herself and had become Spain's enemy, peace
between Holland and Portugal seemed inevitable. In fact negotiations
with that object were begun at the Hague in April 1641," and the
Batavia government felt that no time was to be lost. The siege of
Malacca, which had been taken in January, 1641, had exacted a high
toll of life, and the forces at their disposal were small. Yet in
September, 1641, they again, as in 1639, sent out a fleet capable of
blockading Goa and attacking Ceylon simultaneously, but nothing
was achieved, although the negotiators in Europe had taken care to
allow as much latitude of time to the Company's arms as decency
would permit. On 14 February, 1642, news was received at Batavia of
1 Prestage, The Diplomatic Relations of Portugal with France, England,
and Holland from 1640 to 1668, p. 175.


## p. 45 (#73) ##############################################

THE TEN YEARS' TRUCE
45
1
a ten-year truce signed at the Hague on 12 June, 1641; but it was only
to come into force in the East a full year after the king of Portugal's
ratification arrived at the Hague. War could go on, therefore, in
spite of the attempts of the Goa government to arrange an immediate
armistice. The ratification was not passed by the king of Portugal
until 18 November, and news of this was only received at Batavia on
2 October, 1642. The delay had not been of any use to the Company.
The Portuguese still kept Galle practically invested on the land side,
and the Dutch had no access at all to the cinnamon fields. But the
resources of the Company's diplomacy were not yet exhausted. A
difference of interpretation as between Goa and Batavia of one
important article of the truce arranged in Europe was used as a
pretext to continue the war. It must be said that the Dutch inter-
pretation seems the correct one, and that the Portuguese viceroy's
attitude was most unyielding. The successes of the last two years in
Ceylon had inspired the Portuguese with a new confidence.
The article in question, the twelfth of the treaty of truce,'
arranged the affairs between the two nations on the basis of uti
possidetis, with the proviso, however, that the lati campi, the country-
side, between fortresses belonging to the contracting parties, were to
be divided by the authorities on the spot in accordance with their
dependence on these fortresses. Basing themselves on this article, the
Dutch demanded that the Portuguese should evacuate the districts of
Matturai and Saffragam, parts of the cinnamon country which had
always been considered as falling within the jurisdiction of Galle. The
Dutch Commissioner, appearing at Goa, which in spite of Portuguese
protests was still being blockaded, on 1 April, 1643, proposed a pro-
visional division of the cinnamon lands until the governments in
Europe had settled the matter. When this was rejected, war was
resumed.
It was not waged by the Dutch only to compel the Portuguese to
accept their interpretation of the twelfth article of the truce. There
still was a state of war between the Portuguese and Raja Sinha; the
viceroy did not recognise the king's authority, in spite of the third
article of the truce, which included all Indian rulers allied to either
of the contracting parties. In Ceylon, therefore, the Dutch pretended
to act on the king's behalf, which meant that they claimed to be
free to extend their conquests. Reinforcements from home made it
possible for the Batavia government to act with vigour. While in the
autumn of 1643 the usual fleet sailed to blockade Goa, a second fleet
of nine ships, manned by 1550 men and under the command of Caron,
made straight for Ceylon. After a battle under the walls of Negombo,
in which the Portuguese were entirely routed, the Dutch penetrated
into the town in the wake of the flying army, and became masters of
1. Dumont, Corps Universel Diplomatique, vi. 214.


## p. 46 (#74) ##############################################

46
THE DUTCH IN INDIA
Negombo once more (January, 1644). Without heeding Raja Sinha's
requests that the town should be given up to him, the Dutch strongly
fortified it.
The viceroy at Goa, regretting his uricompromising rejection of
the offers made him the year before, now wrote to Batavia that he
was willing to accept them. But the Dutch were no longer content
with the cinnamon country near Galle, they also claimed Negombo
with the surrounding area. They claimed it on behalf of Raja Sinha,
to whom, however, they did not dream of surrendering it. Yet when
in the autumn of 1644 the Batavia government once more sent a large
fleet to blockade Goa, its commander, Joan Maetsuycker, was em-
powered to negotiate. The Seventeen, primed by the states-general,
had been remonstrating with their servants in the Indies about the
high-handed war in which they had made war on the Portuguese all
over the Indian Ocean on account of some cinnamon fields in Ceylon,
and it really was a relief to the Batavia authorities when Maetsuycker
succeeded in obtaining from the viceroy a treaty (10 November, 1644),
by which both Galle and Negombo were ceded with the cinnamon
lands divided at equal distances between those places and Colombo.
The viceroy, however, only gave up Negombo under protest, and a
treaty made between the home governments on 27 March, 1645, in
ignorance of what had been done in the East, could still be interpreted
by each party to suit its own interests.
At the same time, Negombo was the cause of serious trouble with
Raja Sinha, whose men were ravaging the cinnarnon lạnds in which
the Dutch hoped to recoup themselves for their expenditure. The
governor of Galle, Thijssen, rashly declared war on the king in May,
1645, and was at once recalled, but before Maetsuycker, who became
his successor, could restore peace, a, military disaster occurred; a
Dutch encampment was surrounded, the troops sent to relieve it cut
to pieces, and the king returned to Kandi with 400 prisoners (May,
1646). In the negotiations which now dragged on for years, Raja
Sinha held a trump card, his prisoners. At last, in 1649, the Dutch
consented to a treaty which restored ihe alliance of 1638, but on
somewhat less favourable conditions; not even the monopoly of the
cinnamon trade was to remain to them once Raja Sinha had paid
off his debts, no doubt a somewhat unlikely contingency. In any
case, the old scheme for the expulsion of the Portuguese was again
being discussed between the king and the Dutch.
While the Portuguese claims to Negombo were still a matter of
negotiation with Maetsuycker, news had arrived, in the summer of
1646, of the rebellion against Dutch rule that had broken out in
Brazil. This settled the matter of Negombo; it served as a sufficient
pretext for its indefinite retention by the Dutch. Relations between
the Dutch Republic and Portugal were greatly strained and the East
India Company's pretensions now had the support of the states-
general. Quite apart from the narrow issue of Negombo, it was clear


## p. 47 (#75) ##############################################

RENEWAL OF WAR
47
that the peace between the two countries was precarious. When the
ten years' truce ran out in 1652, the Company's servants in the East
were apprised that they were again to make war on the Portuguese.
During the next period, the affairs of the Dutch West India Company
kept the war between the Dutch Republic and Portugal alive, and
while the Portuguese were successful in Brazil, and could not make
peace on account of that very success, they lost nearly all they had
left in India, and the schemes of conquest of the Dutch East India
Company, which had been interrupted in 1642, were now to a large
extent realised.
It was not until 1655 that a serious effort was inade. At the urgent
requests of the Batavia government, larger quantities of ships and
men had been sent from home: 13,500 men during the three years from
1653 to 1655. On 14 August, 1655, twelve ships, with 1200 soldiers
on board, left Batavia with orders to attack Colombo; Gerard Hulft,
director-general of India, was the commander. Towards the end of
September Colombo was invested. It was kept closely blockaded
both by land and by sea, and non-combatants trying to escape were
driven back. Famine and disease raged as the months wore on, and
still the Portuguese held out, hoping for relief from Goa. Early in
April a fleet of twenty-two small vessels trying to carry troops and
provisions to Colombo was scattered off Quilon by a single Dutch
ship. At last, on 7 May, after reinforcements had arrived from Batavia,
the town was stormed, and the north-east bastion captured. On 12
May Colombo capitulated, which did not save it from being sacked
by the Dutch soldiers.
Colombo was at once garriscned and the ruined fortifications
rebuilt by the Dutch. Raja Sinha had not taken a very active part
in the siege. His army had most of the time been encamped near
Raygamwatte. Yet his help had been useful in the provisioning of
the Dutch troops, and his relations with Hulft had been most cordial.
The maharaja bravely kept up the fiction of the Dutch being merely
the humble auxiliaries of his august and all-powerful person. Of
Hulft he spoke as “my Director-General”, and of the Dutch army
as “my army". 1 Hulft was killed during the siege, on 10 April, 1656,
and with Adriaan van der Meyden, who took his place, Raja Sinha's
relations soon grew less agreeable. When the capitulation of Colombo
was concluded, in his name and the Company's, but without his even
being consulted, and when it became clear that the Dutch had no
intention of giving up their conquest to him, the king's attitude
became frankly hostile. He closed the mountain passes and forbade
the delivery of cattle and other provisions to the Dutch. He tartly
reproached the Company with faithlessness. In November Van der
Meyden made an end of pretences. A little army was sent against the
camp at Raygamwatte. Raja Sinhą did not wait for it, but broke
1 Aalbers, Rijklof van Goens, p. 53, note 4.


## p. 48 (#76) ##############################################

48
THE DUTCH IN INDIA
camp hastily and retired to his mountains. It was to be feared that
he might be reconciled with the Portuguese, who were still in pos-
session of two strong places on the north of Ceylon, Manar and
Jaffnapatam, and held Tuticorin and Negapatam on the mainland.
The Dutch could not feel safe in the possession of the cinnamon lands,
therefore, until they had expelled the Portuguese from those last
strongholds and "cleaned up that whole corner”. 1
In September, 1657, Rijcklof van Goens, an Extraordinary
Member of the Council of India, who had already served the Company
in many capacities and in many lands with striking success, was in-
structed to effect this. Having expelled the Portuguese from the open
town of Tuticorin, Van Goens dispatched a mission to the thever, the
nayak's vassal, and to the nayak of Madura himself, and continued
on his way. On 19 February, the fleet crossed from the island of
Rammanakoil along Adam's Bridge to Manar, where a number of
Portuguese vessels with great obstinacy tried to prevent a landing.
When it was nevertheless effected, on the 22nd, the fortress surren-
dered at once, most of the garrison having hurriedly evacuated it and
made for Jaffnapatam. Thither, Van Goens, with 850 men, followed
overland; 200 more soldiers, brought from Colombo, joined him
before the town. On 9 March the Dutch troops fought their way into
the town, the Portuguese retiring into the citadel, which as Van Goens
put it, “deserved that name more than any one I ever saw in India”.
The Portuguese garrison numbered about 1000, and in addition there
were 700 or 800 native soldiers. But some thousands of refugees from
the town created confusion and accelerated the consumption of
provisions. After having captured (26 April) the fortress on the islet
of Kays in the mouth of the channel between Ouratura (afterwards
Leyden) and Caradiva (afterwards Amsterdam), Van Goens could
use the cannon of the fleet which was now assembling before Jaffna-
patam, and ten batteries were constructed round the fort. Famine
and disease, however, were the most potent weapons of the besieger,
and at last, when all hope of relief from Goa had vanished, the
Portuguese commander capitulated (23 June, 1658).
As soon as the difficult problem of the great number of prisoners
and of the occupation of the fort was settled, Van Goens sailed for
Negapatam. The garrison of 367 men was too small to hold that large
fortified town, and capitulated at once.
Negapatam at first remained
under the governor of Ceylon, but, as has already been stated, in
1689 the Dutch made it the seat of their administration on the
Coromandel Coast. Portuguese power was definitely broken in the
whole of Southern India. The only remaining task was to expel them
from the Malabar Coast, and this, too, was a few years later under-
taken by Van Goens.
1 Instruction for Van Goens, 5 September, 1657, ap. Aalbers, Rijklof van
Goens, p. 66.


## p. 49 (#77) ##############################################

MALABAR CONQUESTS
49
The Malabar Coast was the region on the mainland of India where
the Portuguese had struck root most deeply. The small rulers between
whom the country was divided had been unable to prevent the
intruders from acquiring large political powers, which they used in
ihe first place to secure for themselves the exclusive trade in the only
important export of the region, pepper. In a number of towns there
were considerable settlements of Portuguese, and Roman Catholicism
had made many converts.
The Dutch, although they had never found time to obtain a firm
footing on the Malabar Coast, had been repeatedly in communication
with rulers unfriendly to the Portuguese in that region, particularly
with the most powerful of the Malabar princes, the Zamorin of Calicut.
In September, 1604, Admiral Steven Van der Haghen had concluded
a treaty with the Zamorin 1 but, as we know, all available forces were
needed for the establishment of Dutch power in the Archipelago in
those early days. The piece-goods trade of the Coromandel Ccast
was moreover thought to be of greater importance than the pepper
trade of Malabar, pepper being obtained in sufficient quantities at
Bantam and at Achin. And so, although other fleets stopped at
Calicut, and Van der Haghen's treaty was renewed, and once (1610)
merchants were sent from Tirupapuliyur to conclude a fresh treatv
of friendship and commerce, all these arrangements remained a dead
letter, and in the days of Van Goens the only Dutch port on the west
coast of India was Vengurla to the north of Goa. Here in 1637, when
the policy of annually blockading the Portuguese capital had just
been adopted, the Dutch had built a fort which served as a point
d'appui for the blockading fleets and as a post of observation during
the months when they were not there. The Malabar Coast proper
was still controlled effectively by the Portuguese fortresses.
For some time after the conquest of Negapatam, the war with the
Portuguese was carried on less energetically. The Company, exhausted
by its effort, tried to obtain assistance from the states-general. But in
1661, although little assistance was forthcoming, it was decided to
make a fresh effort to drive the Portuguese from the coast. The
states were at last making up their minds to waive their claims to
Brazil, and the Company was anxious to complete this new conquest
before peace came to upset its schemes.
In October 1661, a Dutch fleet of twenty-three sail, large and
small, appeared under the command of Van Goens off Quilon. The
town was taken after a fight with the Nairs, who here as elsewhere
took the side of the Portuguese. A garrison was left behind, and the
fleet sailed northward to Kranganur, which Van Goens desired to
occupy before attacking the principal stronghold of the Portuguese
1 De Jonge, Opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag in Oost-Indie, ji (1865)
204.
4


## p. 50 (#78) ##############################################

50
THE DUTCH IN INDIA
at Cochin. Kranganur, which cffered an unexpectedly vigorous
resistance, was taken by assault on 15 January, 1662, and now the
Dutch making themselves masters of the island of Vypin, on which
they built the fortress Nieuw Orarje, opened the attack on Cochin.
The kings of Cochin had for a long time leant on the support of the
Portuguese against their enemy the Zamorin of Calicut, and so again
the Nairs had to be driven off, and the queen of Cochin to be made
prisoner, before the Portuguese town of Cochin could be besieged. The
difficulties of the marshy ground, however, were considerable. The
army, weakened already by the garrisons left at Quilon, Kranganur
and Nieuw Oranje, was further weakened by illness. The commander
decided to raise the siege, and in the dead of night the 1400 men were
successfully embarked before the Portuguese knew what was hap-
pening. The delay almost proved fatal. On August, 1661, the treaty
of peace between Holland and Portugal had actually been signed. It
laid down that hostilities were to cease in Europe two months after
signature and elsewhere on publication; each side to retain what it
then possessed. Had this treaty been ratified at once, the Dutch
East India Company would have been baulked of Cochin. But
Portugal's new ally, Charles II, was unwilling to share with the
Dutch in the remaining Portuguese possessions trading facilities which
had hitherto been reserved to the English, and the Portuguese
government was too dependent on English help not to seek in
alteration of the terms. The Dutch East India Company possessed
influence enough in the states-general to take advantage of these new
negotiations, and so it was not until 14 December, 1662, that instru-
ments of ratification were exchanged at the Hague, and only several
months later was the treaty proclaimed-in Holland in April, in
Portugal not before May.
Meanwhile in September, 1662 a large fleet had sailed from
Batavia to attack Cochin. In November the siege was renewed. The
town was subjected to a furious bombardment, but, fearing that peace
might save it, the governor-general and his council had empowered
the commander to offer unusually favourable conditions, particularly
freedom of exercise for the Catholic religion. Only after repeated
assaults nad carried the Dutch into part of the town, were these
conditions accepted (January, 1663), and Van Goens made his trium-
phant entry. The subjection of the king of Porakad and the capture
of Kannanur completed the conquest of the Malabar Coast. In vain
the Portuguese protested in Europe that Cochin and Kannanur,
having been taken after the peace, ought to be restored. After pro-
tracted negotiations a settlement was arrived at in July, 1669. The
Dutch promised to restore the two places on payment by Portugal
of certain debts and of the costs incurred by the conquest and forti-
fication of the two towns. As the sums in question far exceeded
Portugal's financial capacity, the Company remained in possession.
The Malabar Coast, Kanara and Vengurla were organised as a


## p. 51 (#79) ##############################################

MALABAR AND CEYLON
51
separate administrative unit under a commandeur residing at Cochin.
The title of commandeur, which was also borne by the chief officials
at Galle and Jaffnapatam, who were subordinate to the governor of
Ceylon, was not a very high one. The commandeur ranked after the
director. In fact, the Malabar Coast never gave the Company all
that had been expected. The position here was quite different from
that in other establishments on the mainland of India, where the
Company traded in open competition with European and native
merchants. What had tempted it to conquer the Malabar Coast was
the prospect of a monopoly in the pepper trade; and in the eyes of
those who guided the Company's destinies, only a monopoly based
on contracts at low prices with the native rulers could compensate
the high cost of a political establishment. The first task of the com-
mandeurs, therefore, was to make the pepper monopoly a reality, but
this task proved more arduous than had been anticipated. English,
Portuguese, and Gujarat competition enabled the native rulers to
avoid dealing only on Dutch terms. It was impossible to prevent
smuggling by way of Calicut and of the mountains. Towards the end
of the Company's rule, however, the financial position was more
satisfactory in this region. ?
The Zamorin had preserved his independence, and relations with
him were frequently strained. In 1717 there was a war, after which
.
the Company attained greater influence over that potentate. But
Hyder Ali, who conquered the Zamorin's lands half a century later,
was a far more dangerous neighbour, and under Tipu, his son, the
Company was, very much against its inclination, drawn into the
quarrels between that ruler and the English.
In Ceylon, as on the Malabar Coast, the Dutch had merely stepped
into the position of the Portuguese. They held the coastal towns and
controlled most of the cinnamon fields and of the regions where
elephants were found. But the "emperor of Ceylon" still resided at
Kandi, in undisputed possession of the mountainous interior, and the
nobles and headmen of the plains, particularly of the south, never
quite renounced their allegiance to him. The ancient organisation of
society, under disawas and mudaliyars, was retained, and Dutch rule
rested on a native officialdom, open to many influences of race and
religion over which they had no control. It was the policy of the
Dutch to maintain friendly relations with the court of Kandi, because
whenever there was tension the king could stir up trouble for them
among the Chalias, the cinnamon-peelers, or among the Sinhalese
3
1 Selections from the Records of the Madras Government: Dutch Records,
No. 11 (1910), Memoir of Commandeur Caspar de Jong, 1761.
2 Dutch Records, No. 2 (1908), Memoir written in the year 1781 by Adriaan
Moens, p. 130.
8 Dutch Records, No. 8 (1910), Diary kept during the expedition against
the Zamorin, 4th Dec. 1716-25th April, 1717.


## p. 52 (#80) ##############################################

52
THE DUTCH IN INDIA
nobles and officials. Not only Raja Sinha, who lived until 1687, but
his successors as well, still claimed Colombo, and the Dutch, anxious
above all to be left in peace so that the cinnamon might be safely
collected, humoured their pretensions by paying them excessive
honours and posing as their humble allies bound to aid them against
the attacks of foreign powers. During Raja Sinha's lifetime this did
not prevent frequent trouble, the king sometimes attacking Dutch
posts and extending the cinnamon area directly under his control.
Cinnamon-peeling was repeatedly prevented and the export of areca-
nuts, the most important product of the king's own dominions, pro-
hibited. Better relations prevailed under his immediate successors,
although the Dutch maintained their pretension to keep the trade
with the outside world completely in their own hands, and in 1707,
in order the better to prevent smuggling, closed all ports except
Colombo, Galle and Jaffnapatam. By placing ships at the disposal of
the court for intercourse with Pegu, whence came Buddhist priests,
and with Madura, whence the kings generally obtained their wives,
the Company strove to make its control of overseas relations less
galling. The kings of the Dravidian dynasty, however, who came
to the throne in 1739 with Hanguraketa, and under whom all power
at court was in the hands of nayaks from the mainland, were not so
easily pacified. At the same time the Company's governors became
more and more impatient of the humiliating conditions of their
position in Ceylon. Particularly they disliked the annual embassy
to the king's court, in order to secure with abject genuflections the
right to collect the cinnamon-bark in the area under the king's
sovereignty.
But the relations with Kandi did not constitute the only difficulty
with which Dutch rule had to contend. Wide regions with popula-
tions of varying national and religious traditions and complicated
social structures were brought under direct Dutch control. “At the
time of the conquest, material misery, after Portuguese misrule and
protracted war, was the most pressing problem. The Dutch imported
slaves from Southern India to restore irrigation works and cultivate
the rice fields. They encouraged new crops, like cotton and indigo.
They did their best to reduce the chaos which reigned in land tenure.
In the Sinhalese country Maetsuycker's Batavia Statutes, a codifi-
cation of the Company's laws, were introduced, but experienced
Sinhalese were always members of the Landraads in order to see that
the ancient customs of the country were observed. In the north,
Tamil law, codified under Dutch auspices in 1707, was taken as the
basis for legal decisions so long as it appeared consonant with reason,
all deficiencies being supplied from Dutch law. The administration
of justice left, however, a great deal to be desired. The governors
never ceased complaining about the scarcity of officials with sufficient
legal training and at the same time conversant with the conditions
of the country.


## p. 53 (#81) ##############################################

RELIGIOUS POLICY
63
On the whole, circumstances were not such as to favour the growth
of a vigorous public spirit among the officials. The society in which
they lived at Colombo and in the other coastal towns remained
permeated with Portuguese influences. The same was true, to a greater
or lesser extent, for all the places on the mainland of India and in the
Malay Archipelago from which the Dutch had ousted the Portuguese,
and it is to be explained by two characteristics of Portuguese colonisa-
tion, their marriages with the natives and their successful propagation
of Catholicism. Under Dutch rule ministers of the Dutch Reformed
Church at once took charge of the communities of Christians formed
by the Portuguese ecclesiastics, but far into the eighteenth century
complaints were frequent that the attachment of native Christians,
then numbered in hundreds of thousands, to Protestantism, and even
to Christianity, was purely nominal. The later historian owes a very
real debt to some of the Dutch Reformed ministers. We mention only
Philipus Baldaeus, whose description of Ceylon and the Malabar
Coast was published in 1672, François Valentyn, whose encyclopaedic
work on the possessions of the Company appeared from 1724 to 1726,
Abraham Rogerius, probably the best scholar of them all, who was
at Pulicat from 1631 to 1641, and whose Gentilismus Reseratus
was described by A. C. Burnell in 1898 as “still, perhaps, the most
complete account of South Indian Hinduism, though by far the
earliest". The principal author, too, of the famous botanical work
Hortus Malabaricus, which under the patronage of Van Reede tot
Drakensteyn appeared in 1678 and following years, was a minister of
the church—Johannes Casearius. But the Dutch predikants had little
of the missionary zeal which distinguished the Roman Catholic priests,
and they made far less impression on the native populations in whose
midst they lived. In Ceylon, seminaries for the training of native
missionaries were founded in 1690, but until the governorship of
Baron van Imhoff, 1737-40, when only one at Colombo survived,
they led a precarious existence. Afterwards half-caste Malabar and
Sinhalese pupils regularly passed from the Colombo seminary to
Holland, and, after a course of theology at the universities of Utrecht
or Leyden, returned to their native land fully qualified ministers of
the Dutch Reformed Church. Their influence was never very deep
however, and in spite of all repressive measures--no doubt greatly
relaxed during the second half of the eighteenth century-Catholicism
continued to show much vitality. Portuguese remained the language
of the slave population and this, added to the deplorable failure to
provide good education for them, had unfortunate effects on the
children of the officials, who frequently entered the Company's
service when they grew up. The number of Dutch free burghers who
settled in Ceylon was never very great. There was, in short, no healthy
1 Van Troostenburg de Bruyn, De Hervormde Kerk in Nederl. Oost-Indie
onder de 0. I. Compagnie, pp. 574 sqq.


## p. 54 (#82) ##############################################

54
THE DUTCH. IN INDIA
public opinion to restrain corruption and loose living among the
official class, and the efforts of several able and energetic governors
to improve this state of affairs had little effect.
Nor could the Company's general policy be called inspiring. While
conflicts with the native powers were anxiously avoided and the
armed forces in the island lost all martial spirit, and fortresses were
allowed to fall into ruin, the underpaid officials were everywhere
urged to increase the financial profits. It was particularly private
trading in areca-nuts with which they enriched themselves at the
Company's expense, but the abuses which a reforming governor at
the beginning of the eighteenth century (Hendrik Becker) discovered
and tried to stamp out were of many other kinds besides.
'It so happened that not long after Becker's governorship there
were two governors in succession against whom the central autho-
rities were constrained to take extreme measures. The first was Pieter
Vuyst, a man born in the East, and who behaved like the worst type
of eastern tyrant. In 1732 he was arrested by a commissioner, specially
sent over from Holland by the Seventeen, and, having been found
guilty of the most revolting abuse of power, he was executed at
Batavia. The commissioner, who became governor in his stead, Pieter
Versluys, reduced the people to despair by speculating in rice. Again
the home authorities interfered. A new governor was sent out, who
had Versluys arrested and sent to Batavia, where after long delays
he escaped with a fine. The misconduct of these men shook Dutch
authority in the island. At the same time the cinnamon-peelers
complained of undue exactions imposed on them, while agrarian
unrest was rife in the Sinhalese districts. So in 1736 a very serious
rebellion broke out in the cinnamon region, soon spreading over the
whole south and south-west of the island, and secretly encouraged by
the king of Kandi. The Dutch suffered some serious reverses and the
situation might have taken a disastrous turn, had not in 1737 a
vigorous governor appeared on the scene, Baron van Imhoff, who
soon restored order.
The events of 1736 were a foretaste of the much more serious war
that broke out in 1760, under the governorship of Jan Schreuder.
It began with a rebellion in the district of Colombo, in which the
Chalias, supported by the maharaja, soon joined. In 1761, the
maharaja, who was especially aggrieved by the refusal of the Dutch
to allow him freedom of trade from his last remaining ports of Chilaw
and Puttalam, openly took the part of the rebels, and the deteriora-
tion of the Company's military forces soon became evident. The forts
of Matara, Kalutara and Hanwella were captured by the Sinhalese,
and although they could not long maintain their position in the plains,
the Dutch were very greatly alarmed. The governor-general at
Batavia tried to pacify the king by sending him a letter couched in
1 Van Kampen, Geschiedenis der Nederlanders buiten Europa (1832), II, 19.


## p. 55 (#83) ##############################################

TREATY WITH KANDI
65
flattering terms and transmitted with the greatest ceremony. Fear
of the English, from whom the Dutch had just suffered a severe
humiliation on the Hugli and who were known to be in communi-
cation with the king, no doubt contributed to inspire this policy. When
it failed, nothing remained but to make a military effort, and the
suspicion of English intentions now served to drive home the necessity
of carrying it through to a definite conclusion. A new governor, Van
Eck, repeatedly attempted to invade the mountain kingdom. Troops
were collected in Malabar, Coromandel and Java. In 1765, Van Eck
succeeded in penetrating to the capital, which was plundered dis-
gracefully. Van Eck died soon afterwards. The garrison of 1800 men
left behind at Kandi could not maintain itself owing to lack of
provisions. Its withdrawal became a disaster. In spite of this, such
was the distress of the Sinhalese that, while the new governor, Iman
Willem Falck, a young man of great ability, was making vigorous
preparations for a new invasion, the king opened negotiations. On
14 February, 1766, a treaty was signed which restored peace and
placed the relations between the Dutch and the king on a more
satisfactory basis than that afforded by the treaties of 1638 and 1640.
The Dutch Company's absolute sovereignty over the regions which
they had held before the war was recognised. In addition, the
,
sovereignty over a strip of land four miles in width from the sea coast
round the whole of the island was expressly ceded to the Dutch, who
had. occupied Chilaw and Puttalam early in the war. For the rest
the king's sovereignty was recognised, but he lost the power to permit
or forbid the Company's trading in such produce of his dominions as
experience had shown to be indispensable or profitable. The degrading
ceremonies attending the annual embassy to the court were abolished.
Finally, while the Company pledged itself to protect his dominions
from all external aggression, he promised not to enter into any treaty
with any European or Indian power, and to deliver up all Europeans
coming within his territory.
The Dutch could congratulate themselves that the treaty of 1766
had consolidated their position in Ceylon. Falck, moreover, proved
one of the best governors the island had ever known. Much was done
during his term of office to improve the administration and to in-
crease the economic prosperity of the people. But meanwhile the rise
of English power constituted a menace against which nothing availed.
In 1781, the king of Kandi appeared to be unwilling to support the
English in their enterprise against Dutch rule on the island. In 1796,
his aloofness no longer mattered: Dutch power, as we shall see,
collapsed at the first touch.
In the seventeenth century, the Dutch Company's position in
India rested on sea-power. While the English made of Surat, where
they were dependent on friendly relations with the Moghul, the
centre of their Indian system and obtained a footing at Goa itself by
an amicable arrangement with the Portuguese, the Dutch broke down


## p. 56 (#84) ##############################################

66
THE DUTCH IN INDIA
1
the Portuguese monopoly by the open and persistent use of force,
capturing their ships and supplanting them as the actual rulers of one
stronghold after another. Even in their relations with the Moghul they
occasionally brought their naval superiority into play. So conscious
were they of their naval supremacy that in 1652 the outbreak of war
with both England and Portugal was welcomed at Batavia as likely
to turn to the Company's advantage. The advantage, as against
England at any rate, was confined to the occasional capture of prizes.
The factories of the English Company were protected by the Moghul's
peace. In the third Anglo-Dutch War (1672-4) communications
between Surat and the new English settlement of Bombay were
constantly threatened, and three home-bound English ships were
captured in the Bay of Bengal. France was England's ally in that
war, and in 1671 Louis XIV had already dispatched to India a fleet
of twelve sail under the command of Admiral de la Haye. Even
before war had been declared in Europe, the French occupied some
abandoned forts in the bay of Trinkomali, Van Goens, who was then
governor of Ceylon, without losing time, collected such ships as were
available and attacked the intruders. Soon reinforcements arrived
from Batavia, and de la Haye was forced to leave Ceylon with the loss
uf several of his ships. With the remainder he sailed for St Thomé
and captured that town. Van Goens was soon on the spot and
blockaded the town from the sea side, while the king of Golconda, its
rightful sovereign, invested it by land. The English and the French
were too jealous of each other to co-operate, and an English fleet
of ten sail allowed itself to be beaten separately off Petapoli. About
a year afterwards, 6 September, 1674, de la Haye capitulated. He had
lost all his ships, and the 900 men left to him out of the 2000 with
whom he had started, were transported to Europe in Dutch vessels.
While the naval power of the Dutch was the despair of their
rivals, they themselves often were inclined to envy the English, who
were able to carry on their trade without incurring the vast expenses
for the upkeep of any navy and of fortresses and garrisons which
burdened the budget of the Dutch Company. The recollection that it
was the Dutch attacks on the Spanish-Portuguese monopoly which
had opened the Indian trade to their rivals as well as to themselves
added bitterness to these feelings. In fact, the settlements where they
had not taken up the responsibilities of sovereignty were by far the
most profitable in the eyes of the Company, which never learnt to
separate its purely trading accounts from its political budgets. In the
years 1683-1757, therefore, the only period for which these figures are
4
1 Aalbers, Rijklof van Goens, p. 81.
2 De Jonge, Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsch zeewezen, 1. 768.
3 Shafaat Ahmed Khan, Sources for the History of British India in the
Seventeenth Century, pp. 245-6.


## p. 57 (#85) ##############################################

FINANCE AND ORGANISATION
67
3
available, Surat, Bengal and Coromandel figure in the Company's
books with annual profits of hundreds of thousands of guilders each,
although Bengal, after 1720, very frequently shows a loss. Ceylon
and Malabar on the other hand constantly showed heavy losses,
although we know from other sources that Malabar ceased to be
"a bad post" towards the end of the eighteenth century. In these
figures profit and loss made by commercial transactions are lumped
together with the yield of taxation and tributes and the expenses of
administration, and no account is taken of profits made in Holland
by the sale of merchandise,
All through the eighteenth century the Company's commitments
as a sovereign power increased: garrisons became more numerous,
the expenses of administration grew. As a result, although its trade
continued to prosper, the Company's finances became more and more
involved. Something like 50 per cent. profit was regularly made on
the Company's turnover even as late as the seventies of the eighteenth
century, very largely owing to the enormously profitable trade of
Surat, Bengal and Ceylon. At the same time the general balance-
sheet showed a steady decline. In 1700 there were still 21,000,000
guilders on the credit side; in 1724 the zero point was passed, and
the deficit grew uninterruptedly until in the eighties of the eighteenth
century it surpassed 100,000,000 guilders.
Obviously the Company's system suffered from graye defects.
Great as it had been as an empire-builder, able as it still was as a
merchant, it failed as a colonial ruler. Its strict adherence, against the
advice of all its ablest governors-general, to the policy of commercial
monopoly was perhaps its gravest mistake. The settlement of “free
burghers," which might have brought in its train a much more inten-
sive economic development of countries like the Malay Archipelago
and Ceylon, was consistently discouraged by the directors at home.
Another defect, and one which more nearly concerns the Company's
possessions in India, was the severe subordination of the whole of its
system to the administrative and commercial centre at Batavia.
Ceylon was the only place whence direct communications with
Holland were more or less regularly conducted, and its governors
were allowed to correspond with the Seventeen, while the chiefs of
all other settlements could only correspond with the governor-general
and his council. One unfortunate result of the distance of the central
authority was the prevalence of corruption. No posts in the Com-
pany's employ were considered so lucrative as those in what were
called “the Western Quarters”.