He still believed the imperialist powers were intent on overthrowing the Soviet regime, however, and he seems to have viewed a Soviet Poland both as a barrier to imperialist
pressure
and as a bridge to Germany, which was still the main object of the Bolsheviks' revolutionary hopes.
Revolution and War_nodrm
1l conviction.
107 And since their acceptance of virtually all Bullitt's conditions had gained them nothing, it is hardly surprising that they saw this episode as additional evidence of imperialist hostility.
The final attempt to reach an accommodation with the Soviet regime dur- ing the first half of 1919 was the so-called Hoover-Nansen plan, whiclh linked Western relief aid to a ceasefire between the Red Army and the Whites. The proposal suffered the same dim fate as its predecessors. The
105 Wilson refused to meet with Bullitt upon the latter's return to Paris, and Lloyd George answered Bullitt's pleas by waving a copy of the conservative Daily Mail and saying, "As long as the British press is doing this kind of thing, how can you expect me to sensible abouR Russia? " Lloyd George later recalled, "Personally I would have dealt with the Soviets as the defacto government of Russia. So would President Wilson. But we both agreed that we could! not carry to that extent our colleagues at the [peace conference] nor the public opinion of our own countries which was frightened by Bolshevik violence and feared its spread. " See hls Truth about the Peace Treaties, 1:331; Debo, Survival and Consolidation, 50; Levin, Wilson and World Politi! Cs, 214-15; and Ullman, Britain and the Russian Civil War, 153-56.
106 The agreement called for a cease-fire and a joint pledge of noninterference in domestic politics but did not explain how either provision would be enforced. It also required an end! to Allied support for the Whites, which in effect meant abandoning the policy the Entente had followed for over a year.
107 The Bolshevik decision to accept Bullitt's proposals was clearly controversial; Zinoviev refused to speak with Bullitt, and Trotsky referred to the delegation as "eavesdroppers" sent "to assess whether we should hold firm or not. " Chicherin defended the compromise, warn- ing that a refusal would lead to renewed support for the Whites, and Lenin reminded several party gatherings that "our country alone cannot overthrow world imperialism. . . . We have to make concessions [to it]. " See Debo, Survival and Consolidation, 47-48; and McFadden, Al- ternative Paths, 228-30.
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French governen\ nt reluctantly endorsed it on April t6 but Kolchak and the emigre Political Committee protested that relief aid would merely prolong Bolshevik rule. 108 The Soviet government did not even learn of the proposal until May 4, and then responded by blaming food shortages in Russia on the civil war and the Allied blockade and pointing out that the political is- sues raised in the proposal could only be addressed by formal peace talks. By the time this message was received, however, reports of Kolchak's early
successes had reached Paris, and the Hoover-Nansen plan was quickly dropped. Like the Prinkipo proposal and the Bullitt mission, the speed with which this initiative was abandoned underscores the Entente's continued ambivalence about the proper approach to the new regime in Moscow. 109
The failure of accommodation highlights some of the obstacles to im- proving relations with a revolutionary government. The first problem was the sheer difficulty of negotiating with an unrecognized regime: the Soviets were not present at the peace conference, and unlike the Whites, they had no community of sympathizers in Paris to lobby on their behalf. Communi-
cation was hampered further by the Entente's fear that contacts with the Soviet regime might imply recognition (although this objection did not pre- vent them from sending military attaches and other representatives to work directly with the Whites). As a result, negotiations were conducted either via erratic radio broadcasts or through semiofficial emissaries such as Bul- litt. These constraints increased uncertainty and made detrimental misun- derstandings more likely. 110
Second, the opposition to accommodation was reinforced by anti-Bolshe- vik propaganda, much of it traceable to Russian exiles and the White forces themselves. Not only did the exiles' Political Committee in Paris enjoy close ties with the French government (which shared its anti-Bolshevik world- view}, but the conservative opposition that constrained Lloyd George was fueled in part by misleading or fic. titious reports from unreliable anti-Bol- shevik sources. m Thus, the general lack of information was exacerbated by "facts" that were politically inspired and predictably biased.
Third, accommodation was hampered by disagreements among the Allies as a whole and within the individual Allied governments. These divisions
108 On the origins and outcome of the Hoover-Nansen plan, see Levin, Wilson and World Politics, 217-18; Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and Versailles, 256-62; Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 1oo-102, 108-10<); and McFadden, Alternative Paths, chap. 10.
109 According to Ullman, the Allied commissioners did not receive the Soviet reply until May 14, because the French receiving station in the Eiffel Tower refused to relay the message. See Britain and the Russian Civil War, 160; and Foreign Relations, 1 9 1 9, Russia, 1 1 1-15, 351-54.
110 See Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and Versailles, 16o-61.
111 These reports, published in a British government white paper, contained accusations that the Bolsheviks had nationalized women and established "commissariats of free love," that they were using Chinese torturers, and that churches were being converted into broth- els. See Ullman, Britain and the Russian Civil War, 141-44, 173-77-
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were partly due to normal political rivalries but were enlarged by the per- sistent dearth of information. The consequence was a stalemate: the Whites received enough support to continue but not enough to win, and the Allies never followed up on the Soviets' favorable responses to their halfhearted\ proposals for detente. 112
Finally, the failure of accommodation reflected the basic truth that the Bol- sheviks were more interested in a settlement than the Allies were. No West- em leader wanted Russia to remain under Bolshevik control, and even those who opposed intervention were unwilling to pursue accommodation in the face of domestic opposition or reports of White successes. The result was a self-defeating mixture of confrontation and conciliation that simultaneously reinforced Soviet perceptions of threat and helped them strengthen their hold on power.
The Diplomacy ofIsolation
After the demise of the Hoover-Nansen plan, the Soviet government sus- pended its efforts at accommodation in favor of greater reliance on revolu- tionary propaganda. An international congress of socialist parties convened in Moscow in March, and the delegates responded to a fiery speech by an Austrian representative by voting to establish the Third Communist Inter- national, or Comintern. 113 The congress also called for colonial revolts
against the imperialist powers (a theme that the Bolsheviks repeated throughout the year}, and Foreign Minister Chicherin began propaganda broadcasts encouraging foreign workers to oppose intervention in Russia. 114
Soviet relliance on propaganda during this period was partly ideological in origin and partly a matter of necessity. The failure of the peace offensive confirmed Soviet beliefs about capitalist hostility and the inevitability of
112 As an Itallian delegate later . recalled: "We had to choose in Russia between two policies equally logical and defendable. The first is that of intervention; to go to Moscow if necessary and crush Bolshevism by force. The second consists in regarding Bolshevism as a govern- ment defacto, and to establish relations with it, if not cordial at least more or less normal. We did not know how to adopt either one or the other and we have suffered the worst conse- quences for pursuing both at the same time. Without going to war, we are in a state of war with Russia. " Quoted in Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 104.
113 The Austrian delegate, Karl Steinhardt, told the congress that "all eyes [in Europe) are turned toward revolutionary Russia. They are only waiting for her to give them the password to go into action. " Quoted in Melograni, Lenin and World Revolution, 56; and see also James W. Hulse, The Forming ofthe Communist International (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), 19-20; and Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:1 18-26.
114 As Chicherin described Soviet diplomacy during this period: "We write fewer notes to governments but more appeals to the working classes. " Two Years of Soviet Foreign Policy: the Relations of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic with Foreign Nations, from November 7, 1917, to November 7, 1919 (New York: Russian Soviet Government Bureau, 1920), 35? Also see Carr, BolshevikRevolution, 3:122-23, 235-36; and Degras, Soviet Documents, 1:15o-178.
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war, while evidence of unrest in the West sustained the hope that the spread of revolution would undermine the imperialist powers and provide Soviet Russia with new allies. As Lenin told the Eighth Party Congress in March 1919: "We are living not merely in a state, but in a system ofstates; and it is in- conceivable that the Soviet republic should continue to exist for a long pe- riod side by side with imperialist states. Ultimately one or the other must conquer. "115 Although a Communist uprising in Berlin was crushed in Janu- ary, the Bolsheviks were heartened by mutinies that forced the French expe- ditionary force to withdraw from the Ukraine and by the establishment of a Soviet republic in Hungary in March. Indeed, when a Soviet government was proclaimed in Bavaria in April, Lenin declared, "Our victory on an in- ternational scale is now completely secure. " The head of the Comintern, Gregor Zinoviev, echoed this assessment by predicting that within a year, one would begin to forget that there was ever a struggle over Communism in Europe. Lenin made a similar forecast two months later, saying that '. 'this July will be our last difficult July, and next July we shall greet the victory of
the international Soviet republic. "116 Although statements such as these were probably intended to bolster morale, they also reveal a continued faith in the inevitability of world revolution. As it happened, neither the Hun- garian nor Bavarian regime would last more than a few months, and an at- tempted Communist uprising in Vienna was to be crushed in June. 117 For the moment, however, these events reinforced the Soviets' faith in Europe's rev- olutionary potential and encouraged their continued efforts to promote it.
The Soviet government also believed that the threat of revolution might convince the Allies to abandon their support for the Whites. Chicherin's radio broadcasts were intended to hasten this process, and the British So- cialist Party's "Hands Off Russia" campaign in February 1919 and an abortive general strike later in the spring convinced Soviet leaders that rev- olutionary propaganda was an effective way to undermine public support for intervention. As Lenin told a British journalist early in the year, "En- gland may seem to you untouched, but the microbe is already there. "118 The
115 Quoted in Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:115 (emphasis in the original).
116 AsLenintoldtheComintemCongressinMarch,"Whenwehearhowquicklytheidea of Soviets is spreading in Germany and even in Britain, it is very important evidence that the proletarian revolution will be victorious. " See Lenin, Selected Works, 3:162, 176-77; and Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:129.
117 On these events, see Werner T. Angress, "The Takeover that Remained in Limbo: The Ger- man Experience, 1918-1923," and Paul Ignotus, "The First Two Communist Takeovers of Hun- gary: 1919 and 1948," in The Anatomy ofCommunist Takeovers, ed. Thomas T. Hammond (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975); Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy, chaps. 17, 21, 24; and Peter Pastor, Hungary between Wilson and Lenin (Boulder, Colo. : East European Quarterly, 1976).
118 Quoted in Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:128. For descriptions of domestic conditions in Europe, see Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy, 559-62 and chaps. 1 8-20, 25; and Walter Kendall, The Revolutionary Movement in Britain, 190o-1921 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), 187--95?
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Bolsheviks' faith in these tactics was based partly on their own isolation; lacking reliable information about social conditions in Europe, they exag- gerated the strength of socialist forces in the West and failed to recognize how different conditions in Europe were from those in Russia in 1917.
Finally, the Soviets relied on propaganda simply because they had no other options. Attempting to spark other proletarian revolutions was not only consistent with Bolshevik ideology, it was the only policy available once the peace offensive failed. Even if full-fledged revolutions did not occur else- where, the threat of domestic disturbances might persuade the Entente to abandon its support for the Whites. Nor was this hope entirely fanciful, as the fear of domestic unrest was one reason why Lloyd George and others had opposed an all-out effort to topple the Soviet regime in the first place.
HintsofDetente. ThefailureoftheWhitesforcedtheEntentetoreconsider its policy toward Soviet Russia, and Lloyd George began to sketch an alter- native approach in November 1919. After acknowledging that Denikin's of- fensive had been "temporarily checked," he suggested that "other methods must finally be resorted to for restoring peace and good government" in Russia. Tlhe prime minister defended the Allies' past actions by claiming they had given the anti-Bolshevik forces a fair chance, but he emphasized that "we cannot, of course, afford to continue so costly an intervention in an interminable civil war. " Although he qualified his remarks to mollify British Conservatives, Lloyd George was signaling a major shift in British policy. 119
Evidence of the change was soon apparent. Negotiations for a prisoner ex-
. change began in November-marking the first significant contact between the Entente and the Bolsheviks since the demise of the Hoover-Nansen plan-and a final agreement was signed in February 1920. 120 The Entente began to abandon counterrevolution in favor of a policy of containment, and this new objective was tacitly approved at an inter-Allied conference in De- cember. Convinced that a permanent division of the former tsarist empire would reduce the threat to British imperial interests, the British offered de facto recognition to Estonia, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in early 1920, seeking to use them as a barrier against further Soviet encroachments. 121
Lloyd George invoked the classic liberal arguments about the benefits of trade to justify his new policy. He stressed the contribution that Russian
119 The Bolsheviks did not miss the change, and Chicherin subsequently announced, "Re- lations between Britain and Russia are quite possible in spite of the profound differences be- tween Britain's and Russia's regime. . . . We are ready even to make sacrifices for the sake of a close economic connection with Britain. " Quoted in Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, p51-52; and see also Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and Versailles, 34<r"52? and Ullman, Britain and the Rus- sian Civil War, 304-307.
120 See Ullman, Britain and the Russian Civil War, 33<r"43?
121 Ibid. , 322-25; and Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and Versailles, 33o-35, 344-45.
[166]
? The Russian Revolution
grain could make to alleviating famine and high food prices in Europe and argued that trade would exert a "civilizing" influence on Soviet behavior as well. On January 16, 1920, the Allies agreed to lift the blockade and com- mence trade with Russia for the first time since 1918. As the prospects for a successful counterrevolution were fading, in short, the Entente was turning to a combination of containment and detente.
The Soviet government was clearly interested in expanding its ties with foreign powers. In addition to the negotiations for a prisoner exchange with Great Britain, the Soviet government began peace talks with Poland and Estonia and signed a formal treaty with the latter in February 1920. 122 Rela- tions with Germany were beginning to show signs of life as well; the sup- pression of the Spartacist uprising in Berlin and the collapse of the Bavarian Soviet had reduced the German fear of Bolshevism, and the harsh peace terms imposed by the Entente made collaboration with Russia more attrac- tive. Soviet-German cooperation was supported by their mutual antipathy to Poland, and Germany's rejection of an Allied request to renew the block- ade of Russia in October was clear evidence of a growing detente. A pris- oner exchange soon followed, and Germany withdrew its remaining forces from the Baltic region, thereby sowing the seeds for a future rapproche-
ment. 123 The appeals for economic links expressed during Moscow's earlier peace offensive were renewed, and efforts to initiate talks with Western gov- ernments and private business interests began in earnest later in the year. 124
Finally, the Soviet government was also starting to show a renewed com- mitment to traditional Russian interests. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is- sued a formal protest when the Paris Peace Conference awarded the Aland Islands to Finland, and it repeated its protests when Norway received Spitzbergen. Thus, as Carr points out, despite its initial disdain for "bour- geois" diplomacy, "the Soviet government found itself almost involuntarily in the posture of defending, not the interests of world revolution, but na-
122 Lenin termed the peace treaty with Estonia of "gigantic historical significance" and took up the phrase "peaceful coexistence" shortly thereafter. See Jon Jacobson, When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 18; and Xenia Eudin and Harold Fisher, Soviet Russia and the West: A Documentary Survey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), 7--9?
123 See Freund, Unholy Alliance, 42-52. The Soviet-German rapprochement was facilitated by discussions between Karl Radek, a Polish member of the Bolshevik Party who had been arrested in Germany in 1918, and a series of German officials who visited him in prison. See Edward Hallett Carr, "Radek's 'Political Salon' in Berlin, 1919,'' Soviet Studies 3, no. 4 (1952); Lionel Kochan, Russia and the Weimar Republic (Cambridge: Bowes and Bowes, 1954), 16-18; and Warren Lerner, Karl Radek: The Last Internationalist (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), 85--<)0.
124 As early as October 1919, Lenin had remarked, "We are decidedly for an economic un- derstanding with America-with all countries but especially with America. " See McFadden, Alternative Paths, 267.
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tional interests which any government of Russia would be obliged to de- fend. "125
By the spring of 1920, foreign involvement in the Russian Civil War was nearly over. The new regime had proved stronger than it looked, and the Entente was now abandoning its modest attempts to overthrow it and searching for other ways to defuse the danger. The Soviet commitment to world revolution remained intact, but the Bolsheviks, still acutely aware of their own weakness, were actively interested in a settlement with the West. 126 Unfortunately, the first moves toward a more normal relationship were temporarily interrupted by the Russo-Polish war.
The Russo-Polish War and the Balance of Threats
The first dash between Soviet and Polish troops took place in February 1919, after Soviet troops entered border areas claimed by the new govern- ment in Warsaw. Intermittent fighting continued throughout the year, with the Poles capturing Wilno in April and extending their holdings as far as Minsk by auturnn. 127
Poiand's new leaders disagreed about the final form that the new state should take, but the main factions all favored expanded borders that would provide greater security against both Russia and Germany. 128 The Poles de- clined Soviet proposals for peace negotiations, and in December the Polish head of state, Joseph Pilsudski (who was also commander-in-chief of the army), ordered the Ministry of Military Affairs to prepare for "a definitive settlement of the Russian question" in April 1920. 129
The Polish invasion began on April 25 . Mistakenly believing that the bulk of the Red Army was in the south, Pilsudski concentrated his forces there in
125 See Carr, Russian Revolution, 3:157-58; and Degras, Soviet Documents, 1:169-170, 181-82.
126 In an interview with the Manchester Guardian in October, Lenin reiterated Soviet will- ingness to abide by the terms agreed upon during Bullitt's visit to Moscow in March. See Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and Versailles, 354?
127 In Churchill's apt phrase, "The War of the Giants has ended; the quarrels of the pygmies have begun. " See Norman Davies, White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War, 1919-1920 (New York: St. Martin's, 1972), 21, 27. Other accounts of the war include Wandycz, Soviet- Polish Relations; Thomas C. Fiddick, Russia's Retreatfrom Poland, 1920: From Permanent Revolu- tion to Peaceful Coexistence (New York: St. Martin's, 1990); Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, chaps. 4? ; Warren Lerner, "Attempting a Revolution from Without: Poland in 1920," in Hammond, Anatomy ofCommunist Takeovers; Lincoln, Red Victory, chap. 12; and James M. McCann, "Be- yond the Bug: Soviet Historiography of the Soviet-Polish War of 1920," Soviet Studies 36, no. 4 (1984).
128 See Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 29-30; Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 94-100, 104-10, 118-22; and Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars, 3d ed. (Seat- tle: University of Washington Press, 1979), 31-34.
129 Pilsudski held secret talks with Bolshevik representatives in the fall of 1919 and agreed to stay out of the civil war, in part because the Whites refused to acknowledge Polish inde- pendence. See Degras, Soviet Documents, 1:177-78; Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 86-87.
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the hopes of landing a knock-out blow. The invaders encountered only light opposition and swept rapidly across the Ukraine, occupying Kiev on May 6 and pushing across the Dnieper River a few days later. The Poles' initial suc- cess was short-lived, however, and a Soviet counteroffensive soon had them racing back west nearly as fast as they had come. Poland's belligerence had already cost it most of its international support, but the possibility that the Red Army might invade Poland reawakened Western concerns. Lloyd George was especially worried that the war would interfere with the nego- tiations for a trade agreement that had just commenced in London, and
Great Britain issued a formal demarche on July 1 1 warning that if Soviets crossed the boundary set by the peace conference, "the Allies would feel bound to assist the Polish nation to defend its existence with all the means at their disposal. "130
The note also invited the Soviets to attend a conference in London to set- tle the remaining border issues in the east. On July 16, however, the Soviet Politburo rejected British mediation and ordered the Red Army "to continue and step up the offensive. " Chicherin offered to begin bilateral talks with the Poles-noting that the Soviet government had already signed peace treaties with several Baltic states "without the participation of other par- ties"-and he also announced that the Soviets would send an "enlarged" delegation to the next round of trade talks in London, in order to reach a "final" peace. 131 More ominously, his response implied that a peace settle- ment would require adjustments in Poland's internal arrangements, and in- deed the Soviets subsequently insisted that the Polish Army be replaced by
a militia "organized among the workers. "132
The Soviet decision to invade Poland is best seen as a calculated risk. 133 Lenin's support for this step is somewhat surprising, as he had opposed
1 30 In April, Lloyd George said the Poles "have gone rather mad" and described them as "a menace to the peace of Europe. " See Debo, Survival and Consolidation, 215; Ullman, Anglo- Soviet Accord, 48, i37-39; and W. P. Coates and Zelda Coates, A History ofAnglo-Soviet Rela- tions (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1944), 35?
131 See Degras, Soviet Documents, 194-97; Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 148-49, 168-69; and Branko Lazitch and Milorad M. Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern (Stanford: Hoover In- stitute Press, 1972), 1:273.
132 As Pyotr Wandycz points out, this condition was "equivalent to a demand for complete surrender. " See Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 245-47; Degras, Soviet Documents, 1:196, 201-202; and Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:213.
133 The decision to invade Poland remains the object of controversy. The traditional view is that Lenin insisted on an attempt to impose Bolshevism by force, overruling Trotsky, Stalin, and thePolishCommunists;seeCarr,BolshevikRevolution,J:209-10;Ullman, Anglo-SovietAc- cord, 165-70, 184-85; Lerner, "Revolution from Without," 98-102, and "Poland in 1920: A Case Study in Foreign-Policy Decision Making under Lenin," South Atlantic Quarterly 72, no. 3 (1973); Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 213-15; and Davies, White Eagle, Red Star. For alter- native interpretations, see Fiddick, Russia's Retreatfrom Poland; and Melograni, Lenin and the Myth ofWorld Revolution, 97-102, 112-13.
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precipitous attempts to export the revolution since the seizure of power in 1917.
He still believed the imperialist powers were intent on overthrowing the Soviet regime, however, and he seems to have viewed a Soviet Poland both as a barrier to imperialist pressure and as a bridge to Germany, which was still the main object of the Bolsheviks' revolutionary hopes. Finally, the invasion coincided with the Second Comintern Congress in Petrograd, and a socialist takeover in Poland at that moment would have strengthened Moscow's claims to primacy within the international socialist movement. 134
The Soviets did not expect to conquer Poland solely by force of arms; rather, the invasion would allow the Polish workers and peasants to over- throw the bourgeois government and establish an independent Soviet regime. 135 And Lenin was adamant about what he would do if this assump- tion were incorrect: "If the expected uprising does not occur, . . . would it be fitting to push military operations more thoroughly, risking a dangerous turn of events? Without doubt, no! " Thus, the invasion of Poland was a gamble but a limited one, and Lenin was unwilling to raise the stakes if his hopes turned out to be incorrect. 136
His error was soon apparent: the Polish proletariat did not rise up to wel- come the invading Red Army, and a Polish counterattack at the outskirts of Warsaw split the Soviet forces and sent them scurrying back across the bor- der. Peace negotiations commenced in Riga in November, and a final peace treaty was concluded in March 1918. 137
The Balance of Threats. The war between Russia and Poland supports the general proposition that revolutions alter the balance of threats in ways that make war more likely. By affecting the balance of power, perceptions of in- tent, and assessments of the offense-defense balance, the revolution in Rus-
134 Lenin saw the Poles' actions as intended "to strengthen the barrier and to deepen the gulf which separates us from the proletariat of Germany," and he told a group of European socialists that "if Poland gives itself to Communism, the universal revolution would take a decisive step. . . . [It) would mean Germany shortly falling due, Hungary reconquered, the Balkans in revolt against capitalism, Italy shaken up, it would mean bourgeois Europe crack- ing apart in a formidable hurricane. " Quoted in Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 1 14; and Fid- dick, Russia's Retreatfrom Poland, 122-23. See also Vladimir I. Lenin, Collected Works (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1966), 31:305; Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern, 1:274-'77; and Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, p87-201. .
135 In May 1920, the president of the Soviet Executive Central Committee, Mikhail Kalinin, had predicted, "If we deliver the first blow, the Polish proletariat will deliver the second and final one. . . . The western capitalists . . . will only succeed in founding yet another Soviet state with which we will enjoy close relations with the proletariat of the West. " Quoted . in Davies,
White Eagle, Red Star, 1 14.
136 Quoted in Fiddick, Russia's Retreatfrom Poland, 123-24; and see also Lerner, "Revolution from Without," 105.
137 The Treaty of Riga was quite favorable to Poland, which received considerable territory in the east and financial compensations as well. See Eudin and Fisher, Soviet Russia and the West, 18.
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sia heightened Soviet-Polish animosity and made the use of force appear espeCially attractive.
First we examine the issue of the balance of power. The underlying cause of the Russo? ? Polish war was each side's sense of insecurity. For the Poles, expansion was seen as essential to ensure their long-term security against Germany and Russia. Pilsudski "described himself as a "realist, without prejudices or theories," and Poland's unhappy past had taught him that
? Poland would either be "a state equal to the great powers of the world, or a small state that needed protection of the mighty. " He saw the revolution in Russia and the German defeat in World War I as a once-in-a-lifetime oppor- tunity and believed that the conquest of the borderlands would give Poland the size and strength it needed to survive. Failing to seize this chance, by contrast, would doom Poland to permanent inferiority. 138
Soviet behavior reflected similar concerns. In addition to the ideological commitment to world revolution, Soviet leaders saw the creation of addi- tional Soviet republics as the best way to protect Soviet Russia from outside interference. If Poland remained independent and tied to the West, Russia would be cut off from Europe and the prospects for subsequent revolutions would decrease. Even before the Red Arrriy had crossed the Polish border, in fact, Trotsky had declared that the existence of an independent bourgeois Poland was a threat to Soviet Russia. 139 If the Polish government were over- thrown, however, Russia would be more secure in the short term and better able to support revolutionary efforts elsewhere. Moreover, the restoration of Russian authority in the borderlands would eliminate the threat of further
Polish encroachments or a renewed counterrevolutionary invasion.
By contrast, ideological antipathies played only a secondary role. Al- though Pilsudski declared Bolshevism to be a "purely Russian disease" and sought to push this "foreign way of life" as far from Poland as possible, his main focus was on the balance of power. Poland's leaders were equally hos- tile to the Whites; as Pilsudski put it, "Irrespective of what her government will be Russia is terribly imperialistic. " The head of the Polish Socialist Party opposed Allied proposals for Polish intervention in Russia by saying_ "We want to be neither the advance guard nor the gendarmerie of the East," and the leader of the Populist Party stated, "A struggle against Bolshevism in particular is neither our aim nor our task. " Instead, the Polish Supreme Command emphasized that the main goal was territory, because the "re-
duction of Russia to her historical frontiers is a condition of [Poland's] exis? tence. " Ort the Soviet side, ideology exacerbated Soviet fears and inflated their hopes of spreading the revolution, but as Pyotr Wandycz notes, even
1? 38 Quoted in Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 94, 159-60; and also see temer, "Poland in 1920," 409?
139 See Lerner, "Revolution from Without," 98.
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in their case "ideological motives blended with the requirements of Russian
raison d'etat. "140
In sum, relations between bourgeois Poland and revolutionary Russia displayed the classic symptoms of an intense security dilemma. Both states saw their own expansion as necessary for their security and expansion by the other as a serious threat.
The security dilemma between Russia and Poland was compounded by a second factor, perception of intent. Each side believed that the other was hostile, sentiments that were reinforced by ignorance and ideology, com- bined with the adversary's subsequent behavior. Thus, relations between Soviet Russia and Poland confirm the tendency for revolutionary states to enter a spiral of suspicion with other powers. The shared belief that war was inevitable provided both sides with a powerful incentive to initiate it as soon as circumstances seemed favorable.
Polish behavior gave the Soviet government ample grounds for suspi- cion. The murder of four Russian Red Cross officials by Polish security forces in January 1919 was a clear warning, and Poland's refusal to negoti- ate and its steady movement east convinced Lenin and Trotsky that their ef- forts at accommodation had simply invited further aggression. The Polish invasion in April merely confirmed Soviet perceptions of threat and in- creased their incentive to replace the Polish state with a Soviet regime. 141
These perceptions of Polish hostility were magnified by the belief that Poland was a tool of the Entente. Lenin believed that with the Polish capture of Wilno the Entente "became even more impudent," and he saw the inva- sion as imperialism's latest attempt to overthrow the Soviet regime. 142 The Bolsheviks still feared a renewal of Allied support for the Whites, and! Wrangel's spring offensive seemed too well timed to be purely coincidental. This image of implacable imperialist aggression was reinforced when King George of England sent a message congratulating the Poles on the two hun- dredth anniversary of the Polish Constitution of 1791, which the Soviets in- correctly saw as an endorsement of the Polish invasion. 143
141 As one Bolshevik leader declared in July, "With these people [the Poles) there can be no peace. . . . [The] historical strife between Russia and Poland must end by friendship and uni- fication ofthe Russian and Polish Soviet republics. " See Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 174, 221; and Fiddick, Russia's Retreatfrom Poland, 29.
142 In May, Lenin told a group of soldiers that Poland's invasion had been "instigated by the Entente," and he later declared that "international capital . . . was the chief force driving the Poles into a war with us. " See Lenin, Selected Works, 3:431, and Collected Works, Jl:JOl. For Lenin's reaction to the seizure of Wilno, see Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 128.
143 Some Bolshevik leaders saw the British government as divided between hardline anti- Bolsheviks and moderate advocates of accommodation, but Lenin told Trotsky that the talks in England "have shown withfull clarity that England is helping and will help both the Poles and Wrangel. There is absolutely only one line. " Lenin's appraisal was incorrect, as the British had rejected Polish requests for military ai. d in the fall of 1919 and did little to aid the Poles.
140 See Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 94, 107-108, 126-27, 198, 287.
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Polish suspicions of Russia were equally intense. In addition to reacting to a long history of Russian domination, the Poles understandably read the Bolsheviks' early attempts to establish "Soviet" republics in the Baltic states and Byelorussia as evidence of expansionist intentions. Pilsudski was con- vinced that a war with Soviet Russia was inevitable, and he viewed the var- ious Soviet peace offers simply as attempts to buy time. 144
The defensive expansionism that drove subsequent Soviet and Polish policies underscored each state's worst fears. Poland began planning an all- out offensive in December 1919, and Lenin told Trotsky in February to "get ready for war with Poland. " Soviet preparations just strengthened the Poles' desire to strike first. 145
Momentum for war was increased by mutual perceptions. of an offen- sive advantage. In addition to believing that war was inevitable, both sides believed that they would win a swift and decisive victory. The repa- triation of Polish units at the end of World War I had brought the Polish Army up to a strength of 590,000 troops, and an assault on Pinsk in March 1920 had been surprisingly easy. In addition, the Poles were aware that Russia had been weakened by the revolution and distracted by the civil war, an assessment shared by foreign military experts and several Soviet leaders as well. 146
The Poles also recognized that this opportunity was unlikely to last. Vic- tories over Kolchak and Yudenich allowed the Soviets to fo? s more atten- tion on Poland, and Soviet troop strength in the west increased steadily after January 1920. Concerned that the Soviets would draw out the peace talks in order to build up their forces, Pilsudski decided to seize the opportunity be- fore the window closed. Thus, the Polish invasion of the Ukraine in April 1920 contains elements of preventive and preemptive war: Pilsudski at- tacked while the balance of power still favored Poland and "to forestall by his offensive an attack by Soviet troops/ti47
SeeUllman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 137-47, 163, 173-83; Fiddick, Russia's Retreatfrom Poland, 45, 100-101, 168; Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 161-62, 211-12; Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 92--93, 172-73- 220, "Lloyd George and Poland, 1919-20," 132-% and Marjan Kukiel, "The Polish-Soviet Campaign of 1920," Slavonic Review 8, no. 1 (1929), 59?
144 See Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 26-27, 65; Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 144-45.
145 Pilsudski told a French journalist in March, "My impression of Bolshevik behavior is that peace is out of the question. I know the Bolsheviks are concentrating large forces on our front. They are making a mistake. . . . Our Army is ready. " See Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 88, 98--<)9; Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 167, 1 78.
146 Pilsudski referred to White and Red Russia as "cadavers" and tried to get Wrangel to renew the war in southern Russia so as to stretch the Soviet forces even further. See Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 83-85; Brinkley, Volunteer Army, 209-10; Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Rela- tions, 141, 147-49, 167, 17); and Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 32-34.
147 This assessment was made by a group of Soviet historians. Similarly, French general Maxime Weygand later termed the Polish assault a "preventive offensive. " See Wandycz, So- viet-Polish Relations, 194; and Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 87-88.
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When the tide turned in June, however, the Soviets succumbed to their own optimistic delusions. The march on Warsaw was predicated on the be- lief that the campaign would be over before the Entente could come to Poland's rescue; and by the hope that the Polish proletariat would greet the Red Army as liberators. Despite their awareness of Poland's anti-Russian propensities, their ideological commitment to world revolution left the So- viets vulnerable to this kind of optimism even in the face of considerable contrary evidence. Polish Communists warned Lenin that a revolution in Poland was unlikely, but his normal caution evaporated in the face of the Red Army's successful advance and other apparently encouraging signs. His hopes for a revolution in the West had been renewed by the failure of the right-wing Kapp putsch in Germany in March 1920 (which he saw as analogous to the Kornilov revolt that had preceded the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917). The first signs from Poland seemed favorable as well, and reports from England and France suggested strong public opposition to any attempt to aid the Poles. 148
Uncertainty and misinformation contributed to all these miscalculations.
Soviet Russia and Poland correctly saw each other as hostile, but the level of animosity was blown out of proportion and the benefits of using force ex- aggerated. The Soviets erroneously blamed Polish expansionism on imperi- alist hostility and played up the revolutionary prospects in Poland, while mistakenly viewing working-class opposition to Allied intervention as evi- dence of Europe's own revolutionary potential. 149 For their part, the Poles overstated their own ability to attract popular support in the borderlands and underestimated the Bolsheviks' military capability and political resolve. Thus, not only was each side relatively ignorant about the other's true ca- pabilities, but each misread its own ability to impose a political solution by force.
In sum, the Russo-Polish war presents a vivid illustration of how revolu- tions foster security competition and war. Both Russia and Poland faced se- rious security problems that neither could solve without endangering the
148 Lenin's optimism about revolutionary prospects in Europe was nicely expressed in a message to Stalin in July: "The situation in Comintem is splendid . . . it is time to encourage revolution in Italy. . . . For this to happen, Hungary must be sovietized, and maybe also the Czech Lands and Romania. " He later maintained that attacking Poland would help sovietize Lithuania and Poland and aid the revolution in Germany, and that even failure "will teach us about offensive wiu . . . . We will help Hungary, Italy, and at each step we will remember where to stop. " Quoted in Volkogonov, Lenin, 388; and also see Lerner, "Revolution from Without," 102-103.
149 France supported the Polish initiative, but the Polish government made its decisions in- dependently. See Michael Jabara Carley, "Anti-Bolshevism in French Foreign Policy: The Cri- sis in Poland in 1920," International History Review 2, no. 3 (1980), and "The Politics of Anti-Bolshevism: The French Government and the Russo-Polish War, December 1919 to May 1920," Historical ]ourna/ 19, no. 1 (1976).
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other. Both sides saw the other as aggressive, and these perceptions of hos- tility grew as each state took steps to protect itself. The revolution in Russia had created a seemingly large window of opportunity, and with Poland and Russia both preparing for a war they regarded as inevitable, it is not sur- prising that the Poles moved first. Ideology reinforced the Soviet belief that Poland was a eat's paw of the Entente and fueled their hopes for an upris- ing there (although Moscow reversed course when the anticipated uprising failed to occur). Thus, by altering each side's evaluation of the balance of threats, the revolution in Russia made war with Poland virtually inevitable.
THE STRATEGY OF "PEACEFUL CoEXISTENCE"
By late 1920, the failure of Con. 1munist revolts in Germany, Hungary, and Austria had cast doubt on Soviet hopes that the revolution would soon spread to the rest of Europe. The abortive invasion of Poland merely rein- forced this trend, and Soviet officials began to abandon the belief that war with the West was inevitable and imminent. Instead, Lenin now foresaw an indefinite period of "peaceful coexistence. "150 Soviet Russia was badly in need of peace and economic reconstruction after seven years of war and rev- olution, and the Bolsheviks also believed that their capitalist opponents needed Russian markets and raw materials. Western hopes that the White armies would soon eliminate the Soviet regime had proved equally mis-
taken, and leaders on both sides saw the restoration of economic ties as the best way to accelerate recovery and enhance security. This more cooperative approach yield\ed a number of tangible benefits-although Soviet efforts to build more normal relations were repeatedly compromised by lingering suspicions and their continued commitment to world revolution.
The Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement
As noted earlier, Lloyd George had begun to advocate the restoration of trade with Russia at the end of 1919, and he told the House of Commons in February 1920, "We have failed to restore Russia to sanity by force. I believe we can save her by trade. " A broad spectrum of British business, labor, and political leaders endorsed this policy, arguing that it would help revive Britain's sagging economy. They also pointed out that other countries
150 As Lenin put it in November 1920: "Today we have to speak, not merely of a breathing space, but of there being a serious chance of a new and lengthy period of development. " Quoted in Teddy J. Uldricks, "Russia and Europe: Diplomacy, Revolution, and Economic De- velopment in the 1920s," International History Review 1, no. 1 (1979), 61; and see also Jacobson, When the. Soviet Union Entered, 18-19.
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would capture the Russian market if Britain failed to act, and that access to Russian grain would improve Europe's food supply. 151
The chief motive behind the trade negotiations, however, was political. 152 The government was worried about the impact of Bolshevik propaganda on the British Empire, and Lloyd George saw the restoration of trade as a way to persuade the Soviet government to abandon its subversive activities. 153 Accordingly, tlhe British insisted that any trade agreement include "a mutual undertaking to refrain from hostile actions or measures against the other party and from direct or indirect official propaganda. " The fear of Bolshevik subversion, which had once justified support for the Whites, now became a rationale for accommodation. 154
The Soviet government accepted the British invitation to begin trade talks in June 1920 and sent Leonid Krasin, a Soviet official with extensive busi- ness experience, to conduct the negotiations.
The final attempt to reach an accommodation with the Soviet regime dur- ing the first half of 1919 was the so-called Hoover-Nansen plan, whiclh linked Western relief aid to a ceasefire between the Red Army and the Whites. The proposal suffered the same dim fate as its predecessors. The
105 Wilson refused to meet with Bullitt upon the latter's return to Paris, and Lloyd George answered Bullitt's pleas by waving a copy of the conservative Daily Mail and saying, "As long as the British press is doing this kind of thing, how can you expect me to sensible abouR Russia? " Lloyd George later recalled, "Personally I would have dealt with the Soviets as the defacto government of Russia. So would President Wilson. But we both agreed that we could! not carry to that extent our colleagues at the [peace conference] nor the public opinion of our own countries which was frightened by Bolshevik violence and feared its spread. " See hls Truth about the Peace Treaties, 1:331; Debo, Survival and Consolidation, 50; Levin, Wilson and World Politi! Cs, 214-15; and Ullman, Britain and the Russian Civil War, 153-56.
106 The agreement called for a cease-fire and a joint pledge of noninterference in domestic politics but did not explain how either provision would be enforced. It also required an end! to Allied support for the Whites, which in effect meant abandoning the policy the Entente had followed for over a year.
107 The Bolshevik decision to accept Bullitt's proposals was clearly controversial; Zinoviev refused to speak with Bullitt, and Trotsky referred to the delegation as "eavesdroppers" sent "to assess whether we should hold firm or not. " Chicherin defended the compromise, warn- ing that a refusal would lead to renewed support for the Whites, and Lenin reminded several party gatherings that "our country alone cannot overthrow world imperialism. . . . We have to make concessions [to it]. " See Debo, Survival and Consolidation, 47-48; and McFadden, Al- ternative Paths, 228-30.
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French governen\ nt reluctantly endorsed it on April t6 but Kolchak and the emigre Political Committee protested that relief aid would merely prolong Bolshevik rule. 108 The Soviet government did not even learn of the proposal until May 4, and then responded by blaming food shortages in Russia on the civil war and the Allied blockade and pointing out that the political is- sues raised in the proposal could only be addressed by formal peace talks. By the time this message was received, however, reports of Kolchak's early
successes had reached Paris, and the Hoover-Nansen plan was quickly dropped. Like the Prinkipo proposal and the Bullitt mission, the speed with which this initiative was abandoned underscores the Entente's continued ambivalence about the proper approach to the new regime in Moscow. 109
The failure of accommodation highlights some of the obstacles to im- proving relations with a revolutionary government. The first problem was the sheer difficulty of negotiating with an unrecognized regime: the Soviets were not present at the peace conference, and unlike the Whites, they had no community of sympathizers in Paris to lobby on their behalf. Communi-
cation was hampered further by the Entente's fear that contacts with the Soviet regime might imply recognition (although this objection did not pre- vent them from sending military attaches and other representatives to work directly with the Whites). As a result, negotiations were conducted either via erratic radio broadcasts or through semiofficial emissaries such as Bul- litt. These constraints increased uncertainty and made detrimental misun- derstandings more likely. 110
Second, the opposition to accommodation was reinforced by anti-Bolshe- vik propaganda, much of it traceable to Russian exiles and the White forces themselves. Not only did the exiles' Political Committee in Paris enjoy close ties with the French government (which shared its anti-Bolshevik world- view}, but the conservative opposition that constrained Lloyd George was fueled in part by misleading or fic. titious reports from unreliable anti-Bol- shevik sources. m Thus, the general lack of information was exacerbated by "facts" that were politically inspired and predictably biased.
Third, accommodation was hampered by disagreements among the Allies as a whole and within the individual Allied governments. These divisions
108 On the origins and outcome of the Hoover-Nansen plan, see Levin, Wilson and World Politics, 217-18; Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and Versailles, 256-62; Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 1oo-102, 108-10<); and McFadden, Alternative Paths, chap. 10.
109 According to Ullman, the Allied commissioners did not receive the Soviet reply until May 14, because the French receiving station in the Eiffel Tower refused to relay the message. See Britain and the Russian Civil War, 160; and Foreign Relations, 1 9 1 9, Russia, 1 1 1-15, 351-54.
110 See Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and Versailles, 16o-61.
111 These reports, published in a British government white paper, contained accusations that the Bolsheviks had nationalized women and established "commissariats of free love," that they were using Chinese torturers, and that churches were being converted into broth- els. See Ullman, Britain and the Russian Civil War, 141-44, 173-77-
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were partly due to normal political rivalries but were enlarged by the per- sistent dearth of information. The consequence was a stalemate: the Whites received enough support to continue but not enough to win, and the Allies never followed up on the Soviets' favorable responses to their halfhearted\ proposals for detente. 112
Finally, the failure of accommodation reflected the basic truth that the Bol- sheviks were more interested in a settlement than the Allies were. No West- em leader wanted Russia to remain under Bolshevik control, and even those who opposed intervention were unwilling to pursue accommodation in the face of domestic opposition or reports of White successes. The result was a self-defeating mixture of confrontation and conciliation that simultaneously reinforced Soviet perceptions of threat and helped them strengthen their hold on power.
The Diplomacy ofIsolation
After the demise of the Hoover-Nansen plan, the Soviet government sus- pended its efforts at accommodation in favor of greater reliance on revolu- tionary propaganda. An international congress of socialist parties convened in Moscow in March, and the delegates responded to a fiery speech by an Austrian representative by voting to establish the Third Communist Inter- national, or Comintern. 113 The congress also called for colonial revolts
against the imperialist powers (a theme that the Bolsheviks repeated throughout the year}, and Foreign Minister Chicherin began propaganda broadcasts encouraging foreign workers to oppose intervention in Russia. 114
Soviet relliance on propaganda during this period was partly ideological in origin and partly a matter of necessity. The failure of the peace offensive confirmed Soviet beliefs about capitalist hostility and the inevitability of
112 As an Itallian delegate later . recalled: "We had to choose in Russia between two policies equally logical and defendable. The first is that of intervention; to go to Moscow if necessary and crush Bolshevism by force. The second consists in regarding Bolshevism as a govern- ment defacto, and to establish relations with it, if not cordial at least more or less normal. We did not know how to adopt either one or the other and we have suffered the worst conse- quences for pursuing both at the same time. Without going to war, we are in a state of war with Russia. " Quoted in Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 104.
113 The Austrian delegate, Karl Steinhardt, told the congress that "all eyes [in Europe) are turned toward revolutionary Russia. They are only waiting for her to give them the password to go into action. " Quoted in Melograni, Lenin and World Revolution, 56; and see also James W. Hulse, The Forming ofthe Communist International (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), 19-20; and Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:1 18-26.
114 As Chicherin described Soviet diplomacy during this period: "We write fewer notes to governments but more appeals to the working classes. " Two Years of Soviet Foreign Policy: the Relations of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic with Foreign Nations, from November 7, 1917, to November 7, 1919 (New York: Russian Soviet Government Bureau, 1920), 35? Also see Carr, BolshevikRevolution, 3:122-23, 235-36; and Degras, Soviet Documents, 1:15o-178.
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war, while evidence of unrest in the West sustained the hope that the spread of revolution would undermine the imperialist powers and provide Soviet Russia with new allies. As Lenin told the Eighth Party Congress in March 1919: "We are living not merely in a state, but in a system ofstates; and it is in- conceivable that the Soviet republic should continue to exist for a long pe- riod side by side with imperialist states. Ultimately one or the other must conquer. "115 Although a Communist uprising in Berlin was crushed in Janu- ary, the Bolsheviks were heartened by mutinies that forced the French expe- ditionary force to withdraw from the Ukraine and by the establishment of a Soviet republic in Hungary in March. Indeed, when a Soviet government was proclaimed in Bavaria in April, Lenin declared, "Our victory on an in- ternational scale is now completely secure. " The head of the Comintern, Gregor Zinoviev, echoed this assessment by predicting that within a year, one would begin to forget that there was ever a struggle over Communism in Europe. Lenin made a similar forecast two months later, saying that '. 'this July will be our last difficult July, and next July we shall greet the victory of
the international Soviet republic. "116 Although statements such as these were probably intended to bolster morale, they also reveal a continued faith in the inevitability of world revolution. As it happened, neither the Hun- garian nor Bavarian regime would last more than a few months, and an at- tempted Communist uprising in Vienna was to be crushed in June. 117 For the moment, however, these events reinforced the Soviets' faith in Europe's rev- olutionary potential and encouraged their continued efforts to promote it.
The Soviet government also believed that the threat of revolution might convince the Allies to abandon their support for the Whites. Chicherin's radio broadcasts were intended to hasten this process, and the British So- cialist Party's "Hands Off Russia" campaign in February 1919 and an abortive general strike later in the spring convinced Soviet leaders that rev- olutionary propaganda was an effective way to undermine public support for intervention. As Lenin told a British journalist early in the year, "En- gland may seem to you untouched, but the microbe is already there. "118 The
115 Quoted in Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:115 (emphasis in the original).
116 AsLenintoldtheComintemCongressinMarch,"Whenwehearhowquicklytheidea of Soviets is spreading in Germany and even in Britain, it is very important evidence that the proletarian revolution will be victorious. " See Lenin, Selected Works, 3:162, 176-77; and Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:129.
117 On these events, see Werner T. Angress, "The Takeover that Remained in Limbo: The Ger- man Experience, 1918-1923," and Paul Ignotus, "The First Two Communist Takeovers of Hun- gary: 1919 and 1948," in The Anatomy ofCommunist Takeovers, ed. Thomas T. Hammond (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975); Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy, chaps. 17, 21, 24; and Peter Pastor, Hungary between Wilson and Lenin (Boulder, Colo. : East European Quarterly, 1976).
118 Quoted in Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:128. For descriptions of domestic conditions in Europe, see Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy, 559-62 and chaps. 1 8-20, 25; and Walter Kendall, The Revolutionary Movement in Britain, 190o-1921 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), 187--95?
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Bolsheviks' faith in these tactics was based partly on their own isolation; lacking reliable information about social conditions in Europe, they exag- gerated the strength of socialist forces in the West and failed to recognize how different conditions in Europe were from those in Russia in 1917.
Finally, the Soviets relied on propaganda simply because they had no other options. Attempting to spark other proletarian revolutions was not only consistent with Bolshevik ideology, it was the only policy available once the peace offensive failed. Even if full-fledged revolutions did not occur else- where, the threat of domestic disturbances might persuade the Entente to abandon its support for the Whites. Nor was this hope entirely fanciful, as the fear of domestic unrest was one reason why Lloyd George and others had opposed an all-out effort to topple the Soviet regime in the first place.
HintsofDetente. ThefailureoftheWhitesforcedtheEntentetoreconsider its policy toward Soviet Russia, and Lloyd George began to sketch an alter- native approach in November 1919. After acknowledging that Denikin's of- fensive had been "temporarily checked," he suggested that "other methods must finally be resorted to for restoring peace and good government" in Russia. Tlhe prime minister defended the Allies' past actions by claiming they had given the anti-Bolshevik forces a fair chance, but he emphasized that "we cannot, of course, afford to continue so costly an intervention in an interminable civil war. " Although he qualified his remarks to mollify British Conservatives, Lloyd George was signaling a major shift in British policy. 119
Evidence of the change was soon apparent. Negotiations for a prisoner ex-
. change began in November-marking the first significant contact between the Entente and the Bolsheviks since the demise of the Hoover-Nansen plan-and a final agreement was signed in February 1920. 120 The Entente began to abandon counterrevolution in favor of a policy of containment, and this new objective was tacitly approved at an inter-Allied conference in De- cember. Convinced that a permanent division of the former tsarist empire would reduce the threat to British imperial interests, the British offered de facto recognition to Estonia, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in early 1920, seeking to use them as a barrier against further Soviet encroachments. 121
Lloyd George invoked the classic liberal arguments about the benefits of trade to justify his new policy. He stressed the contribution that Russian
119 The Bolsheviks did not miss the change, and Chicherin subsequently announced, "Re- lations between Britain and Russia are quite possible in spite of the profound differences be- tween Britain's and Russia's regime. . . . We are ready even to make sacrifices for the sake of a close economic connection with Britain. " Quoted in Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, p51-52; and see also Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and Versailles, 34<r"52? and Ullman, Britain and the Rus- sian Civil War, 304-307.
120 See Ullman, Britain and the Russian Civil War, 33<r"43?
121 Ibid. , 322-25; and Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and Versailles, 33o-35, 344-45.
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grain could make to alleviating famine and high food prices in Europe and argued that trade would exert a "civilizing" influence on Soviet behavior as well. On January 16, 1920, the Allies agreed to lift the blockade and com- mence trade with Russia for the first time since 1918. As the prospects for a successful counterrevolution were fading, in short, the Entente was turning to a combination of containment and detente.
The Soviet government was clearly interested in expanding its ties with foreign powers. In addition to the negotiations for a prisoner exchange with Great Britain, the Soviet government began peace talks with Poland and Estonia and signed a formal treaty with the latter in February 1920. 122 Rela- tions with Germany were beginning to show signs of life as well; the sup- pression of the Spartacist uprising in Berlin and the collapse of the Bavarian Soviet had reduced the German fear of Bolshevism, and the harsh peace terms imposed by the Entente made collaboration with Russia more attrac- tive. Soviet-German cooperation was supported by their mutual antipathy to Poland, and Germany's rejection of an Allied request to renew the block- ade of Russia in October was clear evidence of a growing detente. A pris- oner exchange soon followed, and Germany withdrew its remaining forces from the Baltic region, thereby sowing the seeds for a future rapproche-
ment. 123 The appeals for economic links expressed during Moscow's earlier peace offensive were renewed, and efforts to initiate talks with Western gov- ernments and private business interests began in earnest later in the year. 124
Finally, the Soviet government was also starting to show a renewed com- mitment to traditional Russian interests. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is- sued a formal protest when the Paris Peace Conference awarded the Aland Islands to Finland, and it repeated its protests when Norway received Spitzbergen. Thus, as Carr points out, despite its initial disdain for "bour- geois" diplomacy, "the Soviet government found itself almost involuntarily in the posture of defending, not the interests of world revolution, but na-
122 Lenin termed the peace treaty with Estonia of "gigantic historical significance" and took up the phrase "peaceful coexistence" shortly thereafter. See Jon Jacobson, When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 18; and Xenia Eudin and Harold Fisher, Soviet Russia and the West: A Documentary Survey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), 7--9?
123 See Freund, Unholy Alliance, 42-52. The Soviet-German rapprochement was facilitated by discussions between Karl Radek, a Polish member of the Bolshevik Party who had been arrested in Germany in 1918, and a series of German officials who visited him in prison. See Edward Hallett Carr, "Radek's 'Political Salon' in Berlin, 1919,'' Soviet Studies 3, no. 4 (1952); Lionel Kochan, Russia and the Weimar Republic (Cambridge: Bowes and Bowes, 1954), 16-18; and Warren Lerner, Karl Radek: The Last Internationalist (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), 85--<)0.
124 As early as October 1919, Lenin had remarked, "We are decidedly for an economic un- derstanding with America-with all countries but especially with America. " See McFadden, Alternative Paths, 267.
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tional interests which any government of Russia would be obliged to de- fend. "125
By the spring of 1920, foreign involvement in the Russian Civil War was nearly over. The new regime had proved stronger than it looked, and the Entente was now abandoning its modest attempts to overthrow it and searching for other ways to defuse the danger. The Soviet commitment to world revolution remained intact, but the Bolsheviks, still acutely aware of their own weakness, were actively interested in a settlement with the West. 126 Unfortunately, the first moves toward a more normal relationship were temporarily interrupted by the Russo-Polish war.
The Russo-Polish War and the Balance of Threats
The first dash between Soviet and Polish troops took place in February 1919, after Soviet troops entered border areas claimed by the new govern- ment in Warsaw. Intermittent fighting continued throughout the year, with the Poles capturing Wilno in April and extending their holdings as far as Minsk by auturnn. 127
Poiand's new leaders disagreed about the final form that the new state should take, but the main factions all favored expanded borders that would provide greater security against both Russia and Germany. 128 The Poles de- clined Soviet proposals for peace negotiations, and in December the Polish head of state, Joseph Pilsudski (who was also commander-in-chief of the army), ordered the Ministry of Military Affairs to prepare for "a definitive settlement of the Russian question" in April 1920. 129
The Polish invasion began on April 25 . Mistakenly believing that the bulk of the Red Army was in the south, Pilsudski concentrated his forces there in
125 See Carr, Russian Revolution, 3:157-58; and Degras, Soviet Documents, 1:169-170, 181-82.
126 In an interview with the Manchester Guardian in October, Lenin reiterated Soviet will- ingness to abide by the terms agreed upon during Bullitt's visit to Moscow in March. See Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and Versailles, 354?
127 In Churchill's apt phrase, "The War of the Giants has ended; the quarrels of the pygmies have begun. " See Norman Davies, White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War, 1919-1920 (New York: St. Martin's, 1972), 21, 27. Other accounts of the war include Wandycz, Soviet- Polish Relations; Thomas C. Fiddick, Russia's Retreatfrom Poland, 1920: From Permanent Revolu- tion to Peaceful Coexistence (New York: St. Martin's, 1990); Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, chaps. 4? ; Warren Lerner, "Attempting a Revolution from Without: Poland in 1920," in Hammond, Anatomy ofCommunist Takeovers; Lincoln, Red Victory, chap. 12; and James M. McCann, "Be- yond the Bug: Soviet Historiography of the Soviet-Polish War of 1920," Soviet Studies 36, no. 4 (1984).
128 See Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 29-30; Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 94-100, 104-10, 118-22; and Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars, 3d ed. (Seat- tle: University of Washington Press, 1979), 31-34.
129 Pilsudski held secret talks with Bolshevik representatives in the fall of 1919 and agreed to stay out of the civil war, in part because the Whites refused to acknowledge Polish inde- pendence. See Degras, Soviet Documents, 1:177-78; Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 86-87.
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the hopes of landing a knock-out blow. The invaders encountered only light opposition and swept rapidly across the Ukraine, occupying Kiev on May 6 and pushing across the Dnieper River a few days later. The Poles' initial suc- cess was short-lived, however, and a Soviet counteroffensive soon had them racing back west nearly as fast as they had come. Poland's belligerence had already cost it most of its international support, but the possibility that the Red Army might invade Poland reawakened Western concerns. Lloyd George was especially worried that the war would interfere with the nego- tiations for a trade agreement that had just commenced in London, and
Great Britain issued a formal demarche on July 1 1 warning that if Soviets crossed the boundary set by the peace conference, "the Allies would feel bound to assist the Polish nation to defend its existence with all the means at their disposal. "130
The note also invited the Soviets to attend a conference in London to set- tle the remaining border issues in the east. On July 16, however, the Soviet Politburo rejected British mediation and ordered the Red Army "to continue and step up the offensive. " Chicherin offered to begin bilateral talks with the Poles-noting that the Soviet government had already signed peace treaties with several Baltic states "without the participation of other par- ties"-and he also announced that the Soviets would send an "enlarged" delegation to the next round of trade talks in London, in order to reach a "final" peace. 131 More ominously, his response implied that a peace settle- ment would require adjustments in Poland's internal arrangements, and in- deed the Soviets subsequently insisted that the Polish Army be replaced by
a militia "organized among the workers. "132
The Soviet decision to invade Poland is best seen as a calculated risk. 133 Lenin's support for this step is somewhat surprising, as he had opposed
1 30 In April, Lloyd George said the Poles "have gone rather mad" and described them as "a menace to the peace of Europe. " See Debo, Survival and Consolidation, 215; Ullman, Anglo- Soviet Accord, 48, i37-39; and W. P. Coates and Zelda Coates, A History ofAnglo-Soviet Rela- tions (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1944), 35?
131 See Degras, Soviet Documents, 194-97; Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 148-49, 168-69; and Branko Lazitch and Milorad M. Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern (Stanford: Hoover In- stitute Press, 1972), 1:273.
132 As Pyotr Wandycz points out, this condition was "equivalent to a demand for complete surrender. " See Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 245-47; Degras, Soviet Documents, 1:196, 201-202; and Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:213.
133 The decision to invade Poland remains the object of controversy. The traditional view is that Lenin insisted on an attempt to impose Bolshevism by force, overruling Trotsky, Stalin, and thePolishCommunists;seeCarr,BolshevikRevolution,J:209-10;Ullman, Anglo-SovietAc- cord, 165-70, 184-85; Lerner, "Revolution from Without," 98-102, and "Poland in 1920: A Case Study in Foreign-Policy Decision Making under Lenin," South Atlantic Quarterly 72, no. 3 (1973); Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 213-15; and Davies, White Eagle, Red Star. For alter- native interpretations, see Fiddick, Russia's Retreatfrom Poland; and Melograni, Lenin and the Myth ofWorld Revolution, 97-102, 112-13.
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precipitous attempts to export the revolution since the seizure of power in 1917.
He still believed the imperialist powers were intent on overthrowing the Soviet regime, however, and he seems to have viewed a Soviet Poland both as a barrier to imperialist pressure and as a bridge to Germany, which was still the main object of the Bolsheviks' revolutionary hopes. Finally, the invasion coincided with the Second Comintern Congress in Petrograd, and a socialist takeover in Poland at that moment would have strengthened Moscow's claims to primacy within the international socialist movement. 134
The Soviets did not expect to conquer Poland solely by force of arms; rather, the invasion would allow the Polish workers and peasants to over- throw the bourgeois government and establish an independent Soviet regime. 135 And Lenin was adamant about what he would do if this assump- tion were incorrect: "If the expected uprising does not occur, . . . would it be fitting to push military operations more thoroughly, risking a dangerous turn of events? Without doubt, no! " Thus, the invasion of Poland was a gamble but a limited one, and Lenin was unwilling to raise the stakes if his hopes turned out to be incorrect. 136
His error was soon apparent: the Polish proletariat did not rise up to wel- come the invading Red Army, and a Polish counterattack at the outskirts of Warsaw split the Soviet forces and sent them scurrying back across the bor- der. Peace negotiations commenced in Riga in November, and a final peace treaty was concluded in March 1918. 137
The Balance of Threats. The war between Russia and Poland supports the general proposition that revolutions alter the balance of threats in ways that make war more likely. By affecting the balance of power, perceptions of in- tent, and assessments of the offense-defense balance, the revolution in Rus-
134 Lenin saw the Poles' actions as intended "to strengthen the barrier and to deepen the gulf which separates us from the proletariat of Germany," and he told a group of European socialists that "if Poland gives itself to Communism, the universal revolution would take a decisive step. . . . [It) would mean Germany shortly falling due, Hungary reconquered, the Balkans in revolt against capitalism, Italy shaken up, it would mean bourgeois Europe crack- ing apart in a formidable hurricane. " Quoted in Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 1 14; and Fid- dick, Russia's Retreatfrom Poland, 122-23. See also Vladimir I. Lenin, Collected Works (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1966), 31:305; Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern, 1:274-'77; and Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, p87-201. .
135 In May 1920, the president of the Soviet Executive Central Committee, Mikhail Kalinin, had predicted, "If we deliver the first blow, the Polish proletariat will deliver the second and final one. . . . The western capitalists . . . will only succeed in founding yet another Soviet state with which we will enjoy close relations with the proletariat of the West. " Quoted . in Davies,
White Eagle, Red Star, 1 14.
136 Quoted in Fiddick, Russia's Retreatfrom Poland, 123-24; and see also Lerner, "Revolution from Without," 105.
137 The Treaty of Riga was quite favorable to Poland, which received considerable territory in the east and financial compensations as well. See Eudin and Fisher, Soviet Russia and the West, 18.
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sia heightened Soviet-Polish animosity and made the use of force appear espeCially attractive.
First we examine the issue of the balance of power. The underlying cause of the Russo? ? Polish war was each side's sense of insecurity. For the Poles, expansion was seen as essential to ensure their long-term security against Germany and Russia. Pilsudski "described himself as a "realist, without prejudices or theories," and Poland's unhappy past had taught him that
? Poland would either be "a state equal to the great powers of the world, or a small state that needed protection of the mighty. " He saw the revolution in Russia and the German defeat in World War I as a once-in-a-lifetime oppor- tunity and believed that the conquest of the borderlands would give Poland the size and strength it needed to survive. Failing to seize this chance, by contrast, would doom Poland to permanent inferiority. 138
Soviet behavior reflected similar concerns. In addition to the ideological commitment to world revolution, Soviet leaders saw the creation of addi- tional Soviet republics as the best way to protect Soviet Russia from outside interference. If Poland remained independent and tied to the West, Russia would be cut off from Europe and the prospects for subsequent revolutions would decrease. Even before the Red Arrriy had crossed the Polish border, in fact, Trotsky had declared that the existence of an independent bourgeois Poland was a threat to Soviet Russia. 139 If the Polish government were over- thrown, however, Russia would be more secure in the short term and better able to support revolutionary efforts elsewhere. Moreover, the restoration of Russian authority in the borderlands would eliminate the threat of further
Polish encroachments or a renewed counterrevolutionary invasion.
By contrast, ideological antipathies played only a secondary role. Al- though Pilsudski declared Bolshevism to be a "purely Russian disease" and sought to push this "foreign way of life" as far from Poland as possible, his main focus was on the balance of power. Poland's leaders were equally hos- tile to the Whites; as Pilsudski put it, "Irrespective of what her government will be Russia is terribly imperialistic. " The head of the Polish Socialist Party opposed Allied proposals for Polish intervention in Russia by saying_ "We want to be neither the advance guard nor the gendarmerie of the East," and the leader of the Populist Party stated, "A struggle against Bolshevism in particular is neither our aim nor our task. " Instead, the Polish Supreme Command emphasized that the main goal was territory, because the "re-
duction of Russia to her historical frontiers is a condition of [Poland's] exis? tence. " Ort the Soviet side, ideology exacerbated Soviet fears and inflated their hopes of spreading the revolution, but as Pyotr Wandycz notes, even
1? 38 Quoted in Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 94, 159-60; and also see temer, "Poland in 1920," 409?
139 See Lerner, "Revolution from Without," 98.
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in their case "ideological motives blended with the requirements of Russian
raison d'etat. "140
In sum, relations between bourgeois Poland and revolutionary Russia displayed the classic symptoms of an intense security dilemma. Both states saw their own expansion as necessary for their security and expansion by the other as a serious threat.
The security dilemma between Russia and Poland was compounded by a second factor, perception of intent. Each side believed that the other was hostile, sentiments that were reinforced by ignorance and ideology, com- bined with the adversary's subsequent behavior. Thus, relations between Soviet Russia and Poland confirm the tendency for revolutionary states to enter a spiral of suspicion with other powers. The shared belief that war was inevitable provided both sides with a powerful incentive to initiate it as soon as circumstances seemed favorable.
Polish behavior gave the Soviet government ample grounds for suspi- cion. The murder of four Russian Red Cross officials by Polish security forces in January 1919 was a clear warning, and Poland's refusal to negoti- ate and its steady movement east convinced Lenin and Trotsky that their ef- forts at accommodation had simply invited further aggression. The Polish invasion in April merely confirmed Soviet perceptions of threat and in- creased their incentive to replace the Polish state with a Soviet regime. 141
These perceptions of Polish hostility were magnified by the belief that Poland was a tool of the Entente. Lenin believed that with the Polish capture of Wilno the Entente "became even more impudent," and he saw the inva- sion as imperialism's latest attempt to overthrow the Soviet regime. 142 The Bolsheviks still feared a renewal of Allied support for the Whites, and! Wrangel's spring offensive seemed too well timed to be purely coincidental. This image of implacable imperialist aggression was reinforced when King George of England sent a message congratulating the Poles on the two hun- dredth anniversary of the Polish Constitution of 1791, which the Soviets in- correctly saw as an endorsement of the Polish invasion. 143
141 As one Bolshevik leader declared in July, "With these people [the Poles) there can be no peace. . . . [The] historical strife between Russia and Poland must end by friendship and uni- fication ofthe Russian and Polish Soviet republics. " See Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 174, 221; and Fiddick, Russia's Retreatfrom Poland, 29.
142 In May, Lenin told a group of soldiers that Poland's invasion had been "instigated by the Entente," and he later declared that "international capital . . . was the chief force driving the Poles into a war with us. " See Lenin, Selected Works, 3:431, and Collected Works, Jl:JOl. For Lenin's reaction to the seizure of Wilno, see Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 128.
143 Some Bolshevik leaders saw the British government as divided between hardline anti- Bolsheviks and moderate advocates of accommodation, but Lenin told Trotsky that the talks in England "have shown withfull clarity that England is helping and will help both the Poles and Wrangel. There is absolutely only one line. " Lenin's appraisal was incorrect, as the British had rejected Polish requests for military ai. d in the fall of 1919 and did little to aid the Poles.
140 See Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 94, 107-108, 126-27, 198, 287.
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Polish suspicions of Russia were equally intense. In addition to reacting to a long history of Russian domination, the Poles understandably read the Bolsheviks' early attempts to establish "Soviet" republics in the Baltic states and Byelorussia as evidence of expansionist intentions. Pilsudski was con- vinced that a war with Soviet Russia was inevitable, and he viewed the var- ious Soviet peace offers simply as attempts to buy time. 144
The defensive expansionism that drove subsequent Soviet and Polish policies underscored each state's worst fears. Poland began planning an all- out offensive in December 1919, and Lenin told Trotsky in February to "get ready for war with Poland. " Soviet preparations just strengthened the Poles' desire to strike first. 145
Momentum for war was increased by mutual perceptions. of an offen- sive advantage. In addition to believing that war was inevitable, both sides believed that they would win a swift and decisive victory. The repa- triation of Polish units at the end of World War I had brought the Polish Army up to a strength of 590,000 troops, and an assault on Pinsk in March 1920 had been surprisingly easy. In addition, the Poles were aware that Russia had been weakened by the revolution and distracted by the civil war, an assessment shared by foreign military experts and several Soviet leaders as well. 146
The Poles also recognized that this opportunity was unlikely to last. Vic- tories over Kolchak and Yudenich allowed the Soviets to fo? s more atten- tion on Poland, and Soviet troop strength in the west increased steadily after January 1920. Concerned that the Soviets would draw out the peace talks in order to build up their forces, Pilsudski decided to seize the opportunity be- fore the window closed. Thus, the Polish invasion of the Ukraine in April 1920 contains elements of preventive and preemptive war: Pilsudski at- tacked while the balance of power still favored Poland and "to forestall by his offensive an attack by Soviet troops/ti47
SeeUllman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 137-47, 163, 173-83; Fiddick, Russia's Retreatfrom Poland, 45, 100-101, 168; Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 161-62, 211-12; Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 92--93, 172-73- 220, "Lloyd George and Poland, 1919-20," 132-% and Marjan Kukiel, "The Polish-Soviet Campaign of 1920," Slavonic Review 8, no. 1 (1929), 59?
144 See Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 26-27, 65; Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 144-45.
145 Pilsudski told a French journalist in March, "My impression of Bolshevik behavior is that peace is out of the question. I know the Bolsheviks are concentrating large forces on our front. They are making a mistake. . . . Our Army is ready. " See Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 88, 98--<)9; Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 167, 1 78.
146 Pilsudski referred to White and Red Russia as "cadavers" and tried to get Wrangel to renew the war in southern Russia so as to stretch the Soviet forces even further. See Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 83-85; Brinkley, Volunteer Army, 209-10; Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Rela- tions, 141, 147-49, 167, 17); and Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 32-34.
147 This assessment was made by a group of Soviet historians. Similarly, French general Maxime Weygand later termed the Polish assault a "preventive offensive. " See Wandycz, So- viet-Polish Relations, 194; and Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 87-88.
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When the tide turned in June, however, the Soviets succumbed to their own optimistic delusions. The march on Warsaw was predicated on the be- lief that the campaign would be over before the Entente could come to Poland's rescue; and by the hope that the Polish proletariat would greet the Red Army as liberators. Despite their awareness of Poland's anti-Russian propensities, their ideological commitment to world revolution left the So- viets vulnerable to this kind of optimism even in the face of considerable contrary evidence. Polish Communists warned Lenin that a revolution in Poland was unlikely, but his normal caution evaporated in the face of the Red Army's successful advance and other apparently encouraging signs. His hopes for a revolution in the West had been renewed by the failure of the right-wing Kapp putsch in Germany in March 1920 (which he saw as analogous to the Kornilov revolt that had preceded the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917). The first signs from Poland seemed favorable as well, and reports from England and France suggested strong public opposition to any attempt to aid the Poles. 148
Uncertainty and misinformation contributed to all these miscalculations.
Soviet Russia and Poland correctly saw each other as hostile, but the level of animosity was blown out of proportion and the benefits of using force ex- aggerated. The Soviets erroneously blamed Polish expansionism on imperi- alist hostility and played up the revolutionary prospects in Poland, while mistakenly viewing working-class opposition to Allied intervention as evi- dence of Europe's own revolutionary potential. 149 For their part, the Poles overstated their own ability to attract popular support in the borderlands and underestimated the Bolsheviks' military capability and political resolve. Thus, not only was each side relatively ignorant about the other's true ca- pabilities, but each misread its own ability to impose a political solution by force.
In sum, the Russo-Polish war presents a vivid illustration of how revolu- tions foster security competition and war. Both Russia and Poland faced se- rious security problems that neither could solve without endangering the
148 Lenin's optimism about revolutionary prospects in Europe was nicely expressed in a message to Stalin in July: "The situation in Comintem is splendid . . . it is time to encourage revolution in Italy. . . . For this to happen, Hungary must be sovietized, and maybe also the Czech Lands and Romania. " He later maintained that attacking Poland would help sovietize Lithuania and Poland and aid the revolution in Germany, and that even failure "will teach us about offensive wiu . . . . We will help Hungary, Italy, and at each step we will remember where to stop. " Quoted in Volkogonov, Lenin, 388; and also see Lerner, "Revolution from Without," 102-103.
149 France supported the Polish initiative, but the Polish government made its decisions in- dependently. See Michael Jabara Carley, "Anti-Bolshevism in French Foreign Policy: The Cri- sis in Poland in 1920," International History Review 2, no. 3 (1980), and "The Politics of Anti-Bolshevism: The French Government and the Russo-Polish War, December 1919 to May 1920," Historical ]ourna/ 19, no. 1 (1976).
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other. Both sides saw the other as aggressive, and these perceptions of hos- tility grew as each state took steps to protect itself. The revolution in Russia had created a seemingly large window of opportunity, and with Poland and Russia both preparing for a war they regarded as inevitable, it is not sur- prising that the Poles moved first. Ideology reinforced the Soviet belief that Poland was a eat's paw of the Entente and fueled their hopes for an upris- ing there (although Moscow reversed course when the anticipated uprising failed to occur). Thus, by altering each side's evaluation of the balance of threats, the revolution in Russia made war with Poland virtually inevitable.
THE STRATEGY OF "PEACEFUL CoEXISTENCE"
By late 1920, the failure of Con. 1munist revolts in Germany, Hungary, and Austria had cast doubt on Soviet hopes that the revolution would soon spread to the rest of Europe. The abortive invasion of Poland merely rein- forced this trend, and Soviet officials began to abandon the belief that war with the West was inevitable and imminent. Instead, Lenin now foresaw an indefinite period of "peaceful coexistence. "150 Soviet Russia was badly in need of peace and economic reconstruction after seven years of war and rev- olution, and the Bolsheviks also believed that their capitalist opponents needed Russian markets and raw materials. Western hopes that the White armies would soon eliminate the Soviet regime had proved equally mis-
taken, and leaders on both sides saw the restoration of economic ties as the best way to accelerate recovery and enhance security. This more cooperative approach yield\ed a number of tangible benefits-although Soviet efforts to build more normal relations were repeatedly compromised by lingering suspicions and their continued commitment to world revolution.
The Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement
As noted earlier, Lloyd George had begun to advocate the restoration of trade with Russia at the end of 1919, and he told the House of Commons in February 1920, "We have failed to restore Russia to sanity by force. I believe we can save her by trade. " A broad spectrum of British business, labor, and political leaders endorsed this policy, arguing that it would help revive Britain's sagging economy. They also pointed out that other countries
150 As Lenin put it in November 1920: "Today we have to speak, not merely of a breathing space, but of there being a serious chance of a new and lengthy period of development. " Quoted in Teddy J. Uldricks, "Russia and Europe: Diplomacy, Revolution, and Economic De- velopment in the 1920s," International History Review 1, no. 1 (1979), 61; and see also Jacobson, When the. Soviet Union Entered, 18-19.
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would capture the Russian market if Britain failed to act, and that access to Russian grain would improve Europe's food supply. 151
The chief motive behind the trade negotiations, however, was political. 152 The government was worried about the impact of Bolshevik propaganda on the British Empire, and Lloyd George saw the restoration of trade as a way to persuade the Soviet government to abandon its subversive activities. 153 Accordingly, tlhe British insisted that any trade agreement include "a mutual undertaking to refrain from hostile actions or measures against the other party and from direct or indirect official propaganda. " The fear of Bolshevik subversion, which had once justified support for the Whites, now became a rationale for accommodation. 154
The Soviet government accepted the British invitation to begin trade talks in June 1920 and sent Leonid Krasin, a Soviet official with extensive busi- ness experience, to conduct the negotiations.
