No More Learning

But tho Respecting only a _Body sick_ of a Dropsie it be an _Extrinsick
Denomination_ to say, that its _Nature_ is _Corrupt_, because it has
a _Dry Throat_, and stands in _no need_ of Drink; yet respecting the
_Whole Compound_ or _Mind joyn’d_ to such a _Body_, ’tis not a _meer
Denomination_, but a _real Error_ of _Nature_ for it to _thirst_ when
_drink_ is _hurtful_ to it. It remains therefore here to be inquired, how
the _Goodness_ of _God_ suffers _Nature so taken_ to be _deceivable_.

First therefore I understand that a _chief difference_ between my _Mind_
and _Body_ consists in this, That my _Body_ is of its _Nature divisible_,
but my _Mind indivisible_; for while I consider my _Mind_ or _my self_,
as I am only a _thinking Thing_, I can distinguish _no parts_ in Me,
but I perceive my self to be but _one entire_ Thing; and tho the _whole
Mind_ seems to be _united_ to the _whole Body_, yet a Foot, an Arm, or
any other part of the Body being cut off, I do not therefore conceive
any _part_ of my _Mind_ taken away; Neither can its _Faculties_ of
_desiring_, _perceiving_, _understanding_, &c. be called its _Parts_, for
’tis one and the _same_, _mind_, that _desires_, that _perceives_, that
_understands_; Contrarily, I cannot think of any _Corporeal_ or _extended
Being_, which I cannot easily _divide_ into _Parts_ by my thought, and by
this I understand it to be _divisible_. And this alone (if I had known it
from no other Argument) is sufficient to inform me, that my _mind_ is
_really distinct_ from my _Body_.

Nextly I find, that my _mind_ is not _immediately affected_ by all parts
of my _body_, but only by the _Brain_, and perhaps only by one small part
of it, That, to wit, wherein the _common sense_ is said to reside; Which
part, as often as it is disposed in the _same manner_, will represent to
the _mind_ the _same thing_, tho at the same time the other parts of the
_body_ may be _differently_ order’d. And this is proved by numberless
Experiments, which need not here be related.

Moreover I discover that the _nature_ of my _body_ is such, that no part
of it can be _moved_ by an other _remote_ part thereof, but it may also
be _moved_ in the _same manner_ by some of the _interjacent_ parts, tho
the more _remote_ part lay still and acted not; As for example in the
Rope,

A⸺B⸺C⸺D

if its end D. were drawn, the end A. would be moved no otherwise, than
if one of the intermediate parts B. or C. were drawn, and the end D.
rest quiet. So when I feel _pain_ in my _Foot_, the consideration of
Physicks instructs me, that this is performed by the help of _Nerves_
dispersed through the Foot, which from thence being _continued_ like
Ropes to the very Brain, whilst they are _drawn_ in the Foot, they also
_draw_ the inward parts of the Brain to which they reach, and therein
excite a certain _motion_, which is ordain’d by _Nature_ to affect the
_mind_ with a _sense_ of _Pain_, as being in the _Foot_. But because
these Nerves must pass through the _Shin_, the _Thighs_, the _Loins_, the
_Back_, the _Neck_, before they can reach the _Brain_ from the _Foot_, it
may so happen, that tho _that part_ of them, which is in the Foot were
not touch’d, but only some of their _intermediate parts_, yet the same
_motion_, would be caused in the _Brain_, as when the _Foot_ it self is
_ill affected_, from whence ’twill necessarily follow, that the _mind_
should _perceive_ the same _Pain_. And thus may we think of any other
_Sense_.

I understand lastly, that seeing each single motion perform’d in that
part of the _Brain_, which _immediately affects_ the _mind_, excites
therein only one sort of _sense_, nothing could be contrived more
conveniently in this case, than that, of all those _Senses_ which it
can cause, it should cause that which _cheifly_, and most _frequently_
conduces to the _conservation_ of an _healthful Man_; And experience
witnesses, that to this very _end_ all our _senses_ are given us by
_Nature_; and therefore nothing can be found therein, which does not
abundantly testifie the _Power_ and _Goodness_ of _God_. Thus for
Example, when the Nerves of the Feet are violently and more than
ordinarily moved, that motion of them being propagated through the
_Medulla Spinalis_ of the Back to the inward parts of the Brain, there it
signifies to the mind, that something or other is to be felt, and what is
this but Pain, as if it were in the Foot, by which the Mind is excited
to use its indeavours for removing the Cause, as being hurtful to the
Foot. But the _Nature_ of _Man_ might have been so _order’d_ by _God_,
that That same motion in the Brain should represent to the mind any other
thing, _viz. _ either it self as ’tis in the Brain, or it self as it is
in the Foot, or in any of the other forementioned intermediate parts, or
lastly any other thing whatsoever; but none of these would have so much
conduced to the _Conservation_ of the _Body_. In the like manner when we
want drink, from thence arises a certain _dryness_ in the _Throat_, which
moves the Nerves thereof, and by their means the inward parts of the
Brain, and this motion _affects_ the _mind_ with the _sense_ of _thirst_;
because that in this case nothing is more requisite for us to know, then
that we _want drink_ for the _Preservation_ of our _Health_. So of the
Rest.

From all which ’tis manifest, that (notwithstanding the _infinite
Goodness_ of God) ’tis impossible but the _Nature_ of _Man_ as he
consists of a _mind_ and _body_ should be _deceivable_. For if any cause
should excite (not in the Foot but) in the Brain it self, or in any
other part through which the Nerves are continued from the Foot to the
Brain, that _self same_ motion, which uses to arise from the Foot being
troubled, the _Pain_ would be felt _as in the Foot_, and the _sense_
would be _naturally_ deceived; for ’tis consonant to Reason (seeing that
That same motion of the Brain alwayes represents to the mind that same
sense, and it oftner proceeds from a cause _hurtful_ to the _Foot_, than
from any other) I say ’tis reasonable, that it should make known to the
_mind_ the Pain of the _Foot_, rather than of any other _part_. And so
if a _dryness_ of _Throat_ arises (not as ’tis used from the _necessity_
of _drink_ for the _conservation_ of the _Body_, but) from an _unusual
Cause_, as it happens in a _Dropsie_, ’tis far better that it should
_then deceive us_; then that it should _alwayes deceive_ us when the
_Body_ is in _Health_, and so of the Rest.

And this consideration helps me very much, not only to _understand_ the
_Errors_ to which my _Nature_ is subject, but also to _correct_ and
_avoid_ them. For seeing I know that all my _Senses_ do oftener inform
me _falsly_ than _truely_ in those things which conduce to the _Bodies
advantage_; and seeing I can use (almost alwayes) more of them than one
to _Examine_ the same thing, as also I can use _memory_, which joyns
present and past things together, and my _understanding_ also, which
hath already discovered to me all the _causes_ of my _Errors_, I ought
no longer to fear, that what my _Senses_ daily represent to me should be
false. But especially those _extravagant Doubts_ of my First Meditation
are to be turn’d off as ridiculous; and perticularly the _chief_ of
them, _viz_. That * of not _distinguishing Sleep_ from _Waking_, for now
I plainly discover a great _difference_, between them, for my _Dreams_
are never _conjoyned_ by my _memory_ with the other _actions_ of _my
life_, as whatever happens to me _awake_ is; and certainly if (while
I were awake) any person should suddenly appear to me, and presently
disappear (as in _Dreams_) so that I could not tell _from whence_ he
came or _where_ he went, I should rather esteem it a _Spectre_ or
_Apparition feign’d_ in my Brain, then a _true Man_; but when such
things occur, as I distinctly know from _whence_, _where_, and _when_
they come, and I _conjoyn_ the _perception_ of them by my _memory_ with
the other _Accidents_ of my _life_, I am _certain_ they are represented
to me _waking_ and not _asleep_, neither ought I in the least to doubt
of their _Truth_, if after I have called up all my _senses_, _memory_,
and _understanding_ to their _Examination_ I find nothing in any of
them, that clashes with other truths; For _God_ not being a _Deceiver_,
it follows, that In such things I am not _deceived_. But because the
_urgency_ of _Action_ in the common _occurrences_ of _Affairs_ will not
alwayes allow time for such an _accurate examination_, I must confess
that _Mans life_ is _subject_ to many _Errors_ about _perticulars_, so
that the _infirmity_ of our _Nature_ must be _acknowledged_ by Us.


_FINIS. _




ADVERTISEMENT CONCERNING THE OBJECTIONS.


Among seven Parcels of Objections made by Divers Learned Persons against
these Meditations, I have made choise of the Third in the Latine Copy,
as being Penn’d by _Thomas Hobbs_ of _Malmesbury_, a Man famously known
to the World abroad, but especially to his own the English Nation; and
therefore ’tis likely that what comes from Him may be more acceptable to
his Countrymen, then what proceeds from a Stranger; and as the strength
of a Fortification is never better known then by a Forcible Resistance,
so fares it with these _Meditations_ which stand unshaken by the
Violent Opposition of so Potent an Enemy. And yet it must be Confess’d
that the Force of these Objections and Cogency of the Arguments cannot
be well apprehended by those who are not versed in other Pieces of Mr.
_Hobbs_’s Philosophy, especially His Book _De Corpore_ and _De Homine_,
The former whereof I am sure is Translated into English, and therefore
not Impertinently refer’d to Here in a Discourse to English Readers. And
this is the Reason that makes the Great _Des-Cartes_ pass over many of
these Objections so slightly, Who certainly would have Undermined the
whole Fabrick of the _Hobbian Philosophy_ had he but known upon What
Foundations it was Built.




OBJECTIONS

Made against the Foregoing

MEDITATIONS,

BY THE FAMOUS

_THOMAS HOBBS_

Of MALMESBURY,

WITH

_DES-CARTES’S_

ANSWERS.




OBJECT. I.

_Against the First Meditation: Of things Doubtful. _


’Tis evident enough from What has been said in this Meditation, that
there is no _sign_ by Which we may Distinguish our _Dreams_ from _True
Sense_ and _Waking_, and therefore that those _Phantasmes_ which we
have waking and from our Senses are not accidents inhering in Outward
Objects, neither do they Prove that such outward Objects do Exist; and
therefore if we trust our Senses without any other Ground, we may well
doubt whether any Thing _Be_ or _Not_. We therefore acknowledge the Truth
of this Meditation. But Because _Plato_ and other Antient Philosophers
argued for the same _incertainty_ in sensible Things, and because ’tis
commonly Observed by the Vulgar that ’tis hard to Distinguish Sleep from
Waking, I would not have the most excellent Author of such new Thoughts
put forth so antique Notions.


ANSWER.

Those Reasons of Doubt which by this Philosopher are admitted as _true_,
were proposed by Me only as _Probable_, and I made use of them not that
I may vend them as _new_, but partly that I may prepare the Minds of my
Readers for the Consideration of Intellectual Things, wherein they seem’d
to me very necessary; And partly that thereby I may shew how firm those
Truths are, which hereafter I lay down, seeing they cannot be Weaken’d by
these Metaphysical Doubts: So, that I never designed to gain any Honor by
repeating them, but I think I could no more omit them, then a Writer in
Physick can pass over the Description of a Disease, Whose Cure he intends
to Teach.




OBJECT. II.

_Against the Second Meditation: Of the Nature of Mans Mind. _


I _am a Thinking Thing_. ’Tis True; for because I _think_ or have a
_Phantasme_ (whether I am _awake_ or _asleep_) it follows that _I am
Thinking_, for _I Think_ and _I am Thinking_ signifie the same Thing.
Because _I Think_, it follows That _I am_, for whatever _Thinks_ cannot
be _Nothing_. But when he Adds, _That is_, _a Mind_, _a Soul_, _an
Understanding_, _Reason_, I question his Argumentation; for it does not
seem a Right Consequence to say, _I am a Thinking Thing_, therefore _I am
a Thought_, neither, _I am an Understanding Thing_, therefore _I am the
Understanding_. For in the same manner I may Conclude, _I am a Walking
Thing_, therefore _I am the Walking it self_.

Wherefore _D. Cartes_ Concludes that an _Understanding Thing_ and
_Intellection_ (which is the _Act_ of an Understanding Thing) are the
same; or at least that an _Understanding Thing_ and the _Intellect_
(which is the _Power_ of an Understanding Thing) are the same; And yet
all Philosophers distinguish the _subject_ from its _Faculties_ and
_Acts_, that is, from its _Properties_ and _Essence_, for the _Thing it
self_ is one thing, and its _Essence_ is an other. It may be therefore
that a _Thinking Thing_ is the _Subject_ of a _Mind_, _Reason_, or
_Understanding_, and therefor it may be a _Corporeal Thing_, the Contrary
Whereof is here _Assumed_ and not _Proved_; and yet this _Inference_ is
the _Foundation_ of that Conclusion which _D. Cartes_ would Establish.

[Sidenote: * _Places noted with this Asterick are the Passages of the
foregoing Meditations here Objected against. _]

In the same Meditation, on, * _I know that I am, I ask, What I am Whom I
Thus Know, Certainly the Knowledge of Me precisely so taken depends not
on those Things of whose Existence I am yet Ignorant_.

’Tis Certain the Knowledge of this Proposition _I am_, depends on this,
_I think_ as he hath rightly inform’d us; but from whence have we the
knowledge of this Proposition, _I think_? certainly from hence only,
that we cannot conceive any _Act_ without its _subject_, as _dancing_
without a _Dancer_, _knowledge_, without a _Knower_, _thought_ without a
_thinker_.

And from hence it seems to follow, that a _thinking Thing_ is a
_Corporeal Thing_; for the _Subjects_ of all _Acts_ are understood only
in a _Corporeal way_, or after the manner of _matter_, as he himself
shews hereafter by the example of a piece of Wax, which changing its
_colour_, _consistence_, _shape_, and other _Acts_ is yet known to
continue the _same thing_, that is, the _same matter subject_ to so many
_changes_. But I cannot conclude from another _thought_ that _I now
think_; for tho a Man may _think_ that he _hath thought_ (which consists
only in _memory_) yet ’tis altogether impossible for him to _think_ that
he _now thinks_, or to _know_, that _he knows_, for the question may be
put _infinitely_, how do you _know_ that you _know_, that you _know_,
that you _know_? &c.

Wherefore seeing the Knowledge of this Proposition _I am_, depends on
the knowledge of this _I think_, and the knowledge of this is from hence
only, that we cannot separate _thought_ from _thinking matter_, it seems
rather to follow, that a _thinking thing_ is _material_, than that ’tis
_immaterial_.


ANSWER.

When I said, _That is a Mind_, _a Soul_, _an Understanding_, _Reason_,
&c. I did not mean by these _names_ the _Faculties_ only, but the
_things_ indow’d with those _Faculties_; and so ’tis alwayes understood
by the two first names (_mind_ and _soul_) and very often so understood
by the two last Names (_understanding_ and _Reason_) and this I have
explain’d so often, and in so many places of these Meditations, that
there is not the least occasion of questioning my meaning.

Neither is there any parity between _Walking_ and _Thought_, for
_walking_ is used only for the _Act_ it self, but _thought_ is sometimes
used for the _Act_, sometimes for the _Faculty_, and sometimes for the
_thing_ it self, wherein the _Faculty_ resides.

Neither do I say, that the _understanding thing_ and _intellection_ are
the same, or that the _understanding thing_ and the _intellect_ are the
same, if the _intellect_ be taken for the _Faculty_, but only when ’tis
taken for the _thing it self that understands_. Yet I willingly confess,
that I have (as much as in me lay) made use of _abstracted words_ to
signifie that _thing_ or _substance_, which I would have devested of all
those things that belong not to it. Whereas contrarily this Philosopher
uses the most _concrete Words_ to signifie this _thinking thing_, such
as _subject_, _matter_, _Body_, &c. that he may not suffer it to be
separated from _Body_.

Neither am I concern’d that His manner of joyning many things together
may seem to some fitter for the discovery of Truth, than mine, wherein I
separate as much as possibly each particular. But let us omit words and
speak of things.

_It may be_ (sayes he) _that a Thinking thing is a corporeal thing,
the contrary whereof is here assumed and not proved. _ But herein he is
mistaken, for I never _assumed_ the _contrary_, neither have I used it as
a _Foundation_, for the rest of _my Superstructure_, but left it wholly
_undetermin’d_ till the _sixth Meditation_, and in that ’tis proved.

Then he tells us rightly, _that we cannot conceive any Act without its
subject_, as _thought_ without a _thinking thing_, for what _thinks_
cannot be _nothing_; but then he subjoyns without any Reason, and against
the usual manner of speaking, and contrary to all Logick, _that hence it
seem to follow, that a thinking thing is a corporeal Being_. Truly the
_subjects_ of all _Acts_ are understood under the notion of _substance_,
or if you please under the notion of _matter_ (that is to say of
_metaphysical matter_) but not therefore under the notion of _Bodies_.

But Logicians and Commonly all Men are used to say, that there are some
_Spiritual_, some _Corporeal_ substances. And by the Instance of Wax I
only proved that _Colour_, _Consistence_, _Shape_, &c. appertain not to
the _Ratio Formalis_ of the Wax; For in that Place I treated neither of
the _Ratio Formalis_ of the _Mind_, neither of _Body_.

Neither is it pertinent to the business, that the Philosopher asserts,
_That one Thought cannot be the subject of an other thought_, for Who
besides Himself ever Imagin’d This? But that I may explain the matter in
a few words, ’Tis certain that _Thought_ cannot be without a _Thinking
Thing_, neither any _Act_ or any _Accident_ without a _substance_ wherein
it resides. But seeing that we know not a _substance immediately by it
self_, but by this alone, that ’tis the _subject_ of several _Acts_, it
is very consonant to the commands of Reason and Custome, that we should
call by _different names_ those _substances_, which we perceive are the
_subjects_ of very _different Acts_ or _Accidents_, and that afterwards
we should examine, whether those _different names_ signifie _different_
or _one_ and the _same_ thing. Now there are some _Acts_ which we call
_corporeal_, as _magnitude_, _figure_, _motion_, and what ever else
cannot be thought on without _local extension_, and the _substance_
wherein these reside we call _Body_; neither can it be imagin’d that
’tis one _substance_ which is the _subject_ of _Figure_, and another
_substance_ which is the _subject_ of _local motion_, &c. Because all
these _Acts_ agree under one common notion of _Extension_. Besides
there are other _Acts_, which we call _cogitative_ or _thinking_, as
_understanding_, _will_, _imagination_, _sense_, &c. All which agree
under the common notion of _thought_, _perception_, or _Conscience_;
And the _substance_ wherein they are, we say, is a _thinking thing_,
or _mind_, or call it by whatever other name we please, so we do not
confound it with _corporeal substance_, because _cogitative Acts_ have
no affinity with _corporeal Acts_, and _thought_, which is the common
_Ratio_ of _those_ is wholly different from _Extension_, which is the
common _Ratio_ of _These_. But after we have formed two _distinct
conceptions_ of these two _substances_, from what is said in the sixth
Meditation, ’tis easie to know, whether they be _one_ and the _same_ or
_different_.




OBJECT. III.


* _Which of them is it, that is distinct from my thought? which of them
is it that can be separated from me? _

Some perhaps will answer this Question thus, I my self, who _think_ am
distinct from my _thought_, and my _thought_ is _different_ from me
(tho’ not _seperated_) as _dancing_ is _distinguished_ from the _Dancer_
(as before is noted. ) But if _Des-Cartes_ will prove, that _he_ who
_understands_ is the same with his _understanding_, we shall fall into
the Scholastick expressions, the _understanding understands_, the _sight
sees_, the _Will wills_, and then by an exact analogy, the Walking (or
at least the _Faculty_ of walking) shall walk. All which are obscure,
improper, and unworthy that perspicuity which is usual with the noble
_Des-Cartes_.


ANSWER.

I do not deny, that _I_ who _think_ am _distinct_ from my _thought_,
as a _thing_ is _distinguish’d_ from its _modus_ or _manner_; But when
I ask, _which of them is it that is distinct from my thought_? this I
understand of those various _modes_ of _thought_ there mention’d, and
not of _substance_; and when I subjoyn, _which of them is it that can be
separated from me_? I only signifie that all those _modes_ or _manners_
of _thinking_ reside in me, neither do I herein perceive what occasion of
_doubt_ or _obscurity_ can be imagined.




OBJECT. IV.


* _It remains therefore for me to Confess that I cannot Imagine what this
Wax is, but that I conceive in my mind What it is. _

There is a great Difference between _Imagination_ (that is) having
an _Idea_ of a Thing, and the _Conception of the Mind_ (that is) a
_Concluding_ from _Reasoning_ that a thing _Is_ or _Exists_. But
_Des-Cartes_ has not Declared to us in what they Differ. Besides,
the Ancient Aristotelians have clearly deliver’d as a Doctrine, that
_substance_ is not _perceived_ by _sense_ but is _Collected_ by
_Ratiocination_.

But what shall we now say, if perhaps _Ratiocination_ be nothing Else but
a _Copulation_ or _Concatenation_ of _Names_ or _Appellations_ by this
Word _Is_? From whence ’twill follow that we _Collect_ by _Reasoning_
nothing _of_ or _concerning_ the _Nature_ of _Things_, but of the _names_
of _Things_, that is to say, we only discover whether or no we _joyn_ the
_Names_ of _Things_ according to the _Agreements_ which at Pleasure we
have made concerning their _significations_; if it be so (as so it may
be) _Ratiocination_ will depend on _Words_, _Words_ on _Imagination_,
and perhaps _Imagination_ as _also Sense_ on the _Motion_ of _Corporeal
Parts_; and so the _Mind_ shall be nothing but _Motions_ in some Parts of
an _Organical Body_.


ANSWER.

I have here Explain’d the Difference between _Imagination_, and the Meer
_Conception_ of the _Mind_, by reckoning up in my Example of the Wax,
what it is therein which we _Imagine_, and what it is that we _conceive_
in our _Mind_ only: but besides this, I have explained in an other Place
How we _understand_ one way, and _Imagine_ an other way One and the same
Thing, suppose a Pentagone or Five sided Figure.

There is in _Ratiocination_ a _Conjunction_ not of _Words_, but of
_Things signified_ by _Words_; And I much admire that the _Contrary_
could Possibly enter any Mans Thoughts; For Who ever doubted but that
a _Frenchman_ and a _German_ may argue about the _same Things_, tho
they use very _Differing Words_? and does not the Philosopher Disprove
himself when he speaks of the _Agreements which at pleasure we have made
about the significations of Words_? for if he grants that _something_ is
_Signified_ by _Words_, Why will he not admit that our Ratiocinations are
rather about this _something_, then about _Words_ only? and by the same
Right that he concludes the _Mind_ to be a _Motion_, he may Conclude Also
that the Earth is Heaven, or What else he Pleases.




OBJECT. V.

_Against the Third Meditation of God. _


* _Some of These (viz. ~Humane Thoughts~) are as it were the Images of
Things, and to these alone belongs properly the Name of an Idea, as when
I Think on a Man, a Chimera, Heaven, an Angel, or God. _

When I Think on a _Man_ I perceive an _Idea_ made up of _Figure_ and
_Colour_, whereof I may _doubt_ whether it be the _Likeness_ of a _Man_
or not; and so when I think on _Heaven_. But when I think on a Chimera, I
perceive an _Image_ or _Idea_, of which I may _doubt_ whether it be the
_Likeness_ of any _Animal_ not only at present Existing, but possible to
Exist, or that ever will Exist hereafter or not.

But thinking on an _Angel_, there is offer’d to my Mind sometimes the
_Image_ of a _Flame_, sometimes the _Image_ of a _Pretty Little Boy_
with _Wings_, which I am certain has no _Likeness_ to an _Angel_, and
therefore that it is not the _Idea_ of an _Angel_; But beleiving that
there are some Creatures, Who do (as it were) wait upon God, and are
Invisible, and Immaterial, upon the _Thing Believed_ or _supposed_ we
Impose the _Name_ of _Angel_; Whereas the _Idea_, under which I Imagine
an Angel, is compounded of the Ideas of sensible Things.

In the like manner at the Venerable Name of _God_, we have _no Image_ or
_Idea_ of God, and therefore we are forbidden to _Worship God_ under any
_Image_, least we should seem to _Conceive_ Him that is inconceivable.

Whereby it appears that we have no _Idea_ of _God_; but like one _born
blind_, who being brought to the _Fire_, and perceiving himself to be
_Warmed_, knows there is _something_ by which he is _warmed_ and Hearing
it called _Fire_, he Concludes that _Fire Exists_, but yet knows not of
what _shape_ or _Colour_ the Fire is, neither has he any _Image_ or
_Idea_ thereof in his _Mind_.

So Man knowing that there must be some _Cause_ of his _Imaginations_
or _Ideas_, as also an other _cause before That_, and so _onwards_, he
is brought at last to an _End_, or to a _supposal_ of some _Eternal
Cause_, Which because it never _began_ to _Be_ cannot have any other
_Cause before it_, and thence he Concludes that ’tis _necessary_ that
some _Eternal Thing Exist_: and yet he has no _Idea_ which He can call
the _Idea_ of this _Eternal Thing_, but he names this _Thing_, which he
believes and acknowledges by the Name _God_.

But now _Des-Cartes_ proceeds from this Position, _That we have an Idea
of God in our Mind_, to prove this Theoreme, _That God (that if an
Almighty, Wise, Creatour of the World) Exists_, whereas he ought to have
explain’d this _Idea_ of _God_ better, and he should have thence deduced
not only his _Existence_, but also the _Creation_ of the World.


ANSWER.

Here the Philosopher will have the Word _Idea_ be only Understood
for the _Images_ of _Material_ Things represented in a _Corporeal_
Phantasie, by which Position he may Easily Prove, that there can be no
Proper _Idea_ of an _Angel_ or _God_. Whereas as I declare every Where,
but especially in this Place, that I take the Name _Idea_ for whatever is
immediately _perceived_ by the _Mind_, so that when I _Will_, or _Fear_,
because at the same time I _perceive_ that I _Will_ or _Fear_, this
very _Will_ or _Fear_ are reckon’d by me among the number of _Ideas_;
And I have purposely made use of that Word, because It was usual with
the Antient Philosophers to signifie the Manner of _Perceptions_ in the
_Divine Mind_, altho neither we nor they acknowledge a Phantasie in
_God_: and besides I had no fitter Word to express it by.

And I think I have sufficiently explain’d the _Idea_ of _God_ for those
that will attend my meaning, but I can never do it fully enough for those
that will Understand my Words otherwise then I intend them.

Lastly, what is here added concerning the _Creation_ of the World is
wholly beside the Question in hand.




OBJECT. VI.


* _But there are Other (~Thoughts~) That have Superadded Forms to them,
as when I Will, when I Fear, when I Affirm, when I Deny; I know I have
alwayes (whenever I think) some certain thing as the Subject or Object
of my Thought, but in this last sort of Thoughts there is something
More which I think upon then Barely the Likeness of the Thing; and of
these Thoughts some are called Wills and Affections, and others of them
Judgements. _

When any one _Fears_ or _Wills_, he has certainly the _Image_ of the
_Thing Fear’d_, or _Action Will’d_, but what more a _Willing_ or
_Fearing_ Man has in his Thoughts is not explain’d; and tho _Fear_ be a
_Thought_, yet I see not how it can be any other then the _Thought_ of
the _Thing Fear’d_; For what is the _Fear_ of a _Lion rushing on me_, but
the _Idea_ of a Lion Rushing on me, and the _Effect_ (which that _Idea_
produces in the _Heart_) whereby the Man _Fearing_ is excited to that
Animal Motion which is called Flight? but now this Motion of _Flying_
is not _Thought_, it remains therefore that in _Fear_ there is no other
_Thought_, but that which consists in the _likeness_ of the thing. And
the same may be said of _Will_.

Moreover _Affirmation_ and _Negation_ are not without a _voice_ and
_words_, and hence ’tis that Brutes can neither _affirme_ or _deny_ not
so much as in their Thought, and consequently neither can they judge.
But yet the same thought may be in a beast as in a Man; for when we
_affirme_ that a Man runs, we have not a _thought_ different from what
a Dog has when he sees his Master running; _Affirmation_ therefore or
_Negation_ superadds nothing to _meer thoughts_, unless perhaps it adds
this thought, that the _names_ of which an _Affirmation_ consists are (to
the Person _affirming_) the _Names_ of the _same thing_; and this is not
to comprehend in the _thought_ more then the _likeness_ of the _thing_,
but it is only comprehending the same _likeness twice_.


ANSWER.

’Tis self evident, That ’tis one thing to _see_ a Lion and at the same
time to _fear_ him, and an other thing _only_ to _see_ him. So ’tis one
thing to _see_ a Man Running, and an other thing to _Affirme_ within my
self (which may be done without a voice) That I _see_ him.

But in all this objection I find nothing that requires an Answer.




OBJECT. VII.


* _Now it remains for me to examine, how I have received this Idea of
God, for I have neither received it by means of my senses, neither comes
it to me without my forethought, as the Ideas of sensible things use to
do, when those things work on the Organs of my sense, or at least seem so
to work; Neither is this Idea framed by my self, for I can neither add
to, nor detract from it. Wherefore I have only to conclude, that it is
innate, even as the Idea of me my self is Natural to my self. _

If there be no _Idea_ of _God_, as it seems there is _not_ (and here ’tis
not proved that there is) this whole discourse falls to the ground. And
as to the _Idea_ of _my self_ (if I respect the _Body_) it proceeds from
_Sight_, but (if the _Soul_) there is no _Idea_ of a _Soul_, but we
collect by Ratiocination, that there is some inward thing in a Mans Body,
that imparts to it _Animal Motion_, by which it _perceives_ and _moves_,
and this (whatever it be) without any _Idea_ we call a _Soul_.


ANSWER.

If there be an _Idea_ of _God_ (as ’tis manifest that there is) this
whole _Objection_ falls to the ground; and then he subjoyns, _That we
have no Idea of the Soul, but collect it by Ratiocination_, ’Tis the same
as if he should say, that there is no _Image_ thereof represented in the
_Phantasie_, but yet, that there is such a Thing, as I call an _Idea_.




OBJECT. VIII.


* _An other Idea of the Sun as taken from the Arguments of Astronomers,
that is consequentially collected by me from certain natural notions. _

At the same time we can certainly have but one _Idea_ of the Sun, whether
it be look’d at by our eyes, or collected by _Ratiocination_ to be much
bigger than it seems; for this last is not an _Idea_ of the Sun, but a
proof by Arguments, that the _Idea_ of the _Sun_ would be much larger, if
it were look’d at nigher. But at different or several times the _Ideas_
of the Sun may be diverse, as if at one time we look at it with our bare
eye, at an other time through a Teloscope; but Astronomical arguments do
not make the _Idea_ of the Sun greater or less, but they rather tell us
that the _sensible Idea_ thereof is _false_.


ANSWER.

Here also (as before) what he says is not the _Idea_ of the Sun, and yet
is described, is that very thing which I call the _Idea_.




OBJECT. IX.


* _For without doubt those Ideas which Represent substances are something
more, or (as I may say) have more of objective Reality in them, then
those that represent only accidents or modes; and again, that by which
I understand a mighty God, Eternal, Infinite, Omniscient, Omnipotent,
Creatour of all things besides himself, has certainly in it more
objective reality, then those by which Finite substances are exhibited. _

I have before often noted that there can be no _Idea_ of _God_ or
the _Mind_: I will now superadd, That neither can there be an _Idea_
of _Substance_. For _Substance_ (Which is only _Matter Subject_ to
_Accidents_ and _Changes_) is _Collected_ only by _Reasoning_, but
it is not at all _Conceived_, neither does it _represent_ to us any
_Idea_. And if this be true, How can it be said, _That those Ideas
which represent to us Substances have in them something More, or More
Objective Reality, then those which represent to us Accidents_? Besides,
Let _Des-Cartes_ again Consider what he means by ~More Reality~? Can
_Reality_ be increas’d or diminish’d? Or does he think that One _Thing_
can be _More A Thing_ then an other Thing? let him Consider how this can
be Explain’d to our Understandings with that _Perspicuity_ or Clearness
which is requisite in all _Demonstrations_, and Which He Himself is used
to present us with upon other Occasions.


ANSWER.

I have often noted before, That that very Thing which is _evidenc’d_
by _Reason_, as also whatever else is perceived by any other Means, is
Called by Me an _Idea_. And I have sufficiently explain’d How _Reality_
may be _Encreas’d_ or _Diminish’d_, in the same manner (to wit) as
_Substance_ is _More_ a _Thing_, then A _Mode_; and if there be any such
things as _Real Qualities_, or _Incomplete Substances_, these are _More
Things_ then _Modes_, and _Less Things_ then _Complete Substances_:
and Lastly if there be an _Infinite Independent Substance_ this is
_More_ a _Thing_, then a _Finite, Dependent Substance_. And all this is
self-evident.




OBJECT. X.


* _Wherefore There only Remains the Idea of God; Wherein I must consider
whether there be not something Included, which cannot Possibly have its
Original from me. By the Word, God, I mean a certain Infinite Substance,
Independent, Omniscient, Almighty, by whom both I my self and every
thing Else That Is (if any thing do actually exist) was Created; All
which attributes are of such an High Nature That the more attentively
I consider them, the Less I Conceive my self alone possible to be the
Author of these notions; from what therefore has been said I must
Conclude there is a God. _

Considering the _Attributes_ of _God_, that from thence we may gather an
_Idea_ of _God_, and that we may enquire whether there be not something
in that _Idea_ which cannot Possibly Proceed from our selves, I discover
(if I am not Deceived) that what we think off at the _Venerable name_
of _God_ proceeds neither from our selves, neither is it Necessary that
they should have any other _Original_ then from _Outward Objects_. For
by the Name of _God_ I understand a ~Substance~, that is, I understand
that _God_ Exists (not by an _Idea_, but by Reasoning) ~Infinite~ (that
is, I cannot conceive or Imagine Terms or Parts in him so Extream, but I
can Imagine others Farther) from whence it follows, that not an _Idea_ of
_Gods Infinity_ but of my Own bounds and Limits presents it self at the
Word _Infinite_. ~Independent~, That is, I do not conceive any _Cause_
from which _God_ may proceed; from whence ’tis evident that I have no
other _Idea_ at the word _Independent_, but the memory of my own _Ideas_
which at Different Times have _Different Beginnings_, and Consequently
they must be _Dependent_.

Wherefore, to say that God is _Independent_, is only to say That _God_ is
in the Number of those things, the _Original_ whereof I do not Imagine:
and so to say that _God_ is _Infinite_, is the same as if we say That He
is in the Number of Those Things whose _Bounds_ we do not Conceive: And
thus any _Idea_ of _God_ is Exploded, for What _Idea_ can we have without
_Beginning_ or _Ending_?

~Omniscient~ or Understanding all things, Here _I_ desire to know, by
what _Idea_, _Des-Cartes_ understands _Gods Understanding_? ~Almighty~,
I desire also to know by What _Idea Gods Power_ is _understood_? For
_Power_ is in Respect of Future Things, that is, Things not Existing. For
my Part, I understand _Power_ from the Image or Memory of past Actions,
arguing with my self thus, He did so, therefore he was _able_ (or had
_Power_) to do so, therefore (continuing the same) he will again have
_Power_ to do so. But now all these are _Ideas_ that may arise from
_external Objects_.

~Creatour~ of all things, _I_ can frame an _Image_ of _Creation_ from
what I see every day, as a Man Born, or growing from a Punctum to that
shape and size he now bears; an other _Idea_ then this no man can have at
the word _Creatour_; But the _Possibility_ of _Imagining_ a Creation is
not sufficient to prove that the world _was created_. And therefore tho
it were _Demonstrated_ that some _Infinite Independent Almighty Being_
did _exist_, yet it will not from thence follow that a _Creatour exists_;
unless one can think this to be a right inference, we _believe_ that
there exists something that has created all other things, therefore the
world _was Created_ thereby.

Moreover when he says, that the _Idea_ of _God_, and of our _Soul_ is
_Innate_ or _born in us_, I would fain know, whether the _Souls_ of those
that _sleep soundly_ do _think_ unless they _dream_; If not, then at that
time they have no _Ideas_, and consequently no _Idea_ is _Innate_, for
what is _Innate_ to us is never _Absent_ from us.


ANSWER.

None of _Gods_ Attributes can proceed from _outward objects_ as from a
_Pattern_, because there is nothing found in God like what is found in
_External_, that is, _Corporeal_ things; Now ’tis manifest that whatever
we think of in him _differing_ or _unlike_ what we find in them proceeds
not from them, but from a cause of that very _diversity_ in our Thought.

And here I desire to know, how this Philosopher deduces _Gods
Understanding_ from _outward Things_, and yet I can easily explain
what _Idea_ I have thereof, by saying, that by the _Idea_ of _Gods
Understanding_ I conceive whatever is the _Form_ of any _Perception_;
For who is there that does not perceive that he _understands_
something or other, and consequently he must thereby have an _Idea_ of
_understanding_, and by enlarging it _Indefinitely_ he forms the _Idea_
of _Gods Understanding_. And so of his other Attributes.

And seeing we have made use of that _Idea_ of _God_ which is in us to
demonstrate his existence, and seeing there is contain’d in this _Idea_
such an _Immense Power_, that we conceive it a contradiction for _God_ to
_Exist_, and yet that any thing should _Be_ besides Him, which was not
_Created_ by Him, it plainly follows that demonstrating His existence
we demonstrate also that the whole world, or all things different from
_God_, were _Created_ by God.

Lastly when we assert, that some _Ideas_ are _Innate_ or _natural_ to us,
we do not mean that they are always present with us (for so no _Idea_
would be _Innate_) but only that we have in our selves a Faculty of
producing them.




OBJECT. XI.


* _The whole stress of which Argument lyes thus; because I know it
impossible for me to be of the same nature I am, ~viz~, having the Idea
of a God in me, unless really there were a God, A God (I say) that very
same God, whose Idea I have in my mind. _

Wherefore seeing ’tis not _demonstrated_ that we have an _Idea_ of
_God_, and the Christian Religion commands us to believe that _God_ is
_Inconceivable_, that is, as I suppose, that we cannot have an _Idea_ of
Him, it follows, that the _Existence_ of _God_ is not demonstrated, much
less _the Creation_.


ANSWER.
When _God_ is said to be _Inconceiveable_ ’tis understood of an _Adequate
full conception_. But I am ’een tired with often repeating, how
notwithstanding we may have an _Idea_ of _God_. So that here is nothing
brought that makes any thing against my _demonstration_.




OBJECT. XII.

_Against the Fourth Meditation, Of Truth and Falshood. _


* _By Which I understand that Error (as it is Error) is not a Real Being,
Dependent on God, but is only a Defect; and that therefore to make me Err
there is not requisite a Faculty of Erring Given me by God. _

’Tis Certain that _Ignorance_ is only a _Defect_, and that there is no
Occasion of any _Positive Faculty_ to make us _Ignorant_. But this
position is not so clear in Relation to _Error_, for Stones and Inanimate
Creatures cannot _Err_, for this Reason only, because they have not the
_Faculties_ of _Reasoning_ or _Imagination_; from whence ’tis Natural
for us to Conclude, That to _Err_ there is requisite a _Faculty_ of
_Judging_, or at least of _Imagining_, both which _Faculties_ are
_Positive_, and given to all _Creatures_ subject to Error, and to Them
only.

Moreover _Des-Cartes_ says thus, _I find_ (my Errors) _to Depend on two
concurring Causes_, viz. _on my Faculty of Knowing, and on my Faculty of
Choosing, or Freedom of my Will_. Which seems Contradictious to what he
said before; And here also we may note, that _Freedom of Will_ is assumed
without any Proof contrary to the Opinion of the Calvinists.


ANSWER.

Tho to make us _Err_ there is requisite a _Faculty_ of _Reasoning_ (or
rather of _Judging_, that is, of _Affirming_ and _Denying_) because
_Error_ is the _Defect_ thereof, yet it does not follow from thence that
this _Defect_ is any thing _Real_, for neither is _Blindness_ a _Real_
Thing, tho stones cannot be said to be _Blind_, for this Reason only,
That they are _incapable of sight_. And I much wonder that in all these
_Objections_ I have not found one _Right Inference_.

I have not here assumed any thing concerning the _Freedom_ of _Mans
Will_, unless what all Men do Experience in themselves, and is most
evident by the Light of Nature. Neither see I any Reason, Why he should
say that this is Contradictious to any former Position.

Perhaps there may be Many, who respecting _Gods predisposal_ of Things
cannot Comprehend, How their _Freedom_ of _Will_ Consists there-with,
but yet there is no Man who, respecting himself only, does not find by
Experience, That ’tis one and the same Thing to be _Willing_, and to be
_Free_. But ’tis no Place to Enquire what the Opinion of others may be in
this Matter.




OBJECT. XIII.


* _As for Example, When lately I set my self to examine Whether any
Thing Do Exist, and found, that from my setting my self to examine such a
Thing, it evidently follows, That I my self Exist, I could not but Judge,
what I so clearly understood, to be true, not that I was forced thereto
by any outward Impulse, but because a strong Propension in my Will did
follow this Great Light in my Understanding, so that I believed it so
much the more Freely and Willingly, by how much the Less indifferent I
was thereunto. _

This expression, _Great Light in the Understanding_, is _Metaphorical_,
and therefore not to be used in Argumentation; And every one, that
Doubts not of his Opinion, Pretends such a _Light_, and has no less a
_Propension_ in his _Will_ to Affirm what he doubts not, than He that
_really_ and _truely_ knows a Thing. Wherefore this _Light_ may be the
cause of _Defending_ and _Holding_ an Opinion _Obstinately_, but never of
_knowing_ an Opinion _Truly_.

Moreover not only the _Knowledge_ of _Truth_, but _Belief_ or _Giving
Assent_, are not the _Acts_ of the _Will_; for Whatever is _proved_ by
_strong Arguments_, or _Credibly_ told, we Believe whether we will or no.

’Tis true, To _Affirm_ or _Deny_ Propositions, to _Defend_ or _Oppose_
Propositions, are the _Acts_ of the _Will_; but it does not from thence
Follow that the _Internal Assent_ depends on the _Will_. Wherefore the
following Conclusion (_so that in the abuse of our Freedom of Will that
Privation consists which Constitutes Error_) is not fully Demonstrated.


ANSWER.

’Tis not much _matter_, Whether this expression, _Great Light_, be
_Argumentative_ or not, so it be explicative, as really it is, For all
men know, that by _light in the understanding_ is meant _clearness_ of
_knowledge_, which every one has not, that _thinks_ he has; and this
hinders not but this _light_ in the _Understanding_ may be very different
from an _obstinate Opinion_ taken up without _clear perception_.

But when ’tis here said, _That we assent to things clearly perceived
whether we will or no_, ’tis the same, as if it were said, _that willing
or nilling, we desire Good clearly known_; whereas the word _Nilling_,
finds no room in such Expressions, for it implies, that we will and nill
the same thing.




OBJECT XIV.

_Against the Fifth Meditation. Of the Essence of material things. _


* _As when for Example, I imagine a Triangle, tho perhaps such a Figure
exists no where out of my thoughts, nor ever will exist, yet the Nature
thereof is determinate, and its Essence or Form is immutable and eternal,
which is neither made by me nor depends on my mind, as appears from this,
that many propositions may be demonstrated of this Triangle. _

If a Triangle be _no where_, I understand not how it can have _any
Nature_, for what is _no where_, is not, and therefore has not a _Being_,
or any _Nature_.

A Triangle in the _Mind_ arises from a Triangle _seen_, or from one made
up of what has been _seen_, but when once we have given the name of a
_Triangle_ to a thing (from which we think the _Idea_ of a _Triangle_
arises) tho the Triangle it self perish, yet the _name_ continues; In
the like manner, when we have once conceived in our thought, _That all
the Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones_, and when we have
given this other name (viz. _Having its three Angles equal to two right
ones_) to a Triangle, tho afterwards there were no such thing in the
World, yet the _Name_ would still continue, and this Proposition, _A
Triangle is a Figure having three Angles equal to two right Ones_, would
be _eternally true_. But the Nature of a Triangle will not be eternal if
all Triangles were destroy’d.

This Proposition likewise, _A Man is an Animal_, will be _true_ to
_Eternity_, because the Word _Animal_ will eternally signifie what the
Word _Man_ signifies; but certainly if _Mankind_ perish, _Humane Nature_
will be no longer.

From whence ’tis Manifest, That _Essence_ as ’tis distinguish’d from
_Existence_ is nothing more than the _Copulation_ of _Names_ by this word
_Is_, and therefore _Essence_ without _Existence_ is meerly a _Fiction_
of our own; and as the _Image_ of a _Man_ in the _Mind_ is to a _Man_, so
it seems _Essence_ is to _Existence_. Or as this Proposition _Socrates
is a Man_, is to this, _Socrates Is or Exists_, so is the _Essence_ of
_Socrates_ to his Existence. Now this Proposition, _Socrates is a Man_,
when _Socrates_ does not exist, signifies only the Connection of the
Names, and the word _Is_ carries under it the _Image_ of the _unity_ of
the thing, which is called by these _Two Names_.


ANSWER.

The Difference between _Essence_ and _Existence_ is known to all Men. And
what is here said of _Eternal Names_ instead of _Eternal Truth_, has been
long ago sufficiently rejected.




OBJECT. XV.

_Against the Sixth Meditation. Of the Existence of Material Beings. _


* _And seeing God has given me no Faculty to know whether these Ideas
proceed from Bodies or not, but rather a strong inclination to believe,
that these Ideas are sent from Bodies, I see no reason, why God should
not be counted a Deceiver, if these Ideas came from any where, but from
Corporeal Beings, and therefore we must conclude that Corporeal Beings
exist. _

’Tis a received opinion, that Physicians who deceive their Patients for
their Healths sake, and Fathers, who deceive their Children for their
Good, are guilty thereby of no Crimes, for the _fault_ of _Deceit_ does
not consist in the _falsity_ of _Words_; but in the _Injury_ done to the
Person deceived.

Let _D. Cartes_ therefore consider whether this Proposition, _God can
upon no account deceive us_, Universally taken be _true_; For if it be
not _true_ so universally taken, that Conclusion, _Therefore Corporeal
Beings exist_, will not follow.


ANSWER.

’Tis not requisite for the establishment of my Conclusion, _That we
cannot be deceived on any account_ (for I willingly granted, that we
may be _often_ deceived) but that we cannot be deceived, when that our
_Error_ argues that in _God_ there is such a _Will_ to _Cheat_ us as
would be _contradictious_ to his _Nature_. And here again we have a
_wrong inference_ in this _Objection_.




The Last Objection.


* _For now I plainly discover a great difference between them (~that is
sleep and waking~) for my Dreams are never conjoyn’d by my Memory, with
the other Actions of my Life. _

I desire to Know, whether it be certain, that a Man _dreaming_, that the
_doubts_ whether he _dream or not_, may not _Dream_, that he joyns his
_Dream_ to the _Ideas_ of things past long since; if he may, than those
_Actions_ of his past life, may be thought as _true_ if he were awake.

Moreover because (as _D. Cartes_ affirms) the _Certainty_ and _truth_ of
all _knowledge_ depends only on the _knowledge_ of the _True God_, either
an Atheist cannot from the _Memory_ of his past life conclude that he
is _awake_, or else ’tis possible for a man to know that he is _awake_
without the _Knowledge_ of the _True God_.


ANSWER.

A Man that _dreams_ cannot _really_ connect his _dreams_ with the _Ideas_
of past things, tho, I confess, he may _dream_ that he so connects them;
for whoever deny’d That a man when he is _a sleep_ may be _Deceived_? But
when he awakens he may easily discover his Error.

An Atheist from the memory of his past life may collect that he is awake,
but he cannot know, that this _Sign_ is sufficient to make him _certain_,
that he is not _deceived_, unless he know that he is _created_ by a _God_
that will not _deceive_ him.


FINIS.