No More Learning

On the contrary, In reckoning what is required for a thing we ought not
to pass over the end, which is the chief part of everything. Now the
remission of sins is the end of the justification of the ungodly; for
it is written (Is. 27:9): "This is all the fruit, that the sin thereof
should be taken away. " Hence the remission of sins ought to be reckoned
amongst the things required for justification.

I answer that, There are four things which are accounted to be
necessary for the justification of the ungodly, viz. the infusion of
grace, the movement of the free-will towards God by faith, the movement
of the free-will towards sin, and the remission of sins. The reason for
this is that, as stated above [2221](A[1]), the justification of the
ungodly is a movement whereby the soul is moved by God from a state of
sin to a state of justice. Now in the movement whereby one thing is
moved by another, three things are required: first, the motion of the
mover; secondly, the movement of the moved; thirdly, the consummation
of the movement, or the attainment of the end. On the part of the
Divine motion, there is the infusion of grace; on the part of the
free-will which is moved, there are two movements---of departure from
the term "whence," and of approach to the term "whereto"; but the
consummation of the movement or the attainment of the end of the
movement is implied in the remission of sins; for in this is the
justification of the ungodly completed.

Reply to Objection 1: The justification of the ungodly is called the
remission of sins, even as every movement has its species from its
term. Nevertheless, many other things are required in order to reach
the term, as stated above [2222](A[5]).

Reply to Objection 2: The infusion of grace and the remission of sin
may be considered in two ways: first, with respect to the substance of
the act, and thus they are the same; for by the same act God bestows
grace and remits sin. Secondly, they may be considered on the part of
the objects; and thus they differ by the difference between guilt,
which is taken away, and grace, which is infused; just as in natural
things generation and corruption differ, although the generation of one
thing is the corruption of another.

Reply to Objection 3: This enumeration is not the division of a genus
into its species, in which the things enumerated must be simultaneous;
but it is division of the things required for the completion of
anything; and in this enumeration we may have what precedes and what
follows, since some of the principles and parts of a composite thing
may precede and some follow.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the justification of the ungodly takes place in an instant or
successively?

Objection 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly does
not take place in an instant, but successively, since, as already
stated [2223](A[3]), for the justification of the ungodly, there is
required a movement of free-will. Now the act of the free-will is
choice, which requires the deliberation of counsel, as stated above
(Q[13], A[1]). Hence, since deliberation implies a certain reasoning
process, and this implies succession, the justification of the ungodly
would seem to be successive.

Objection 2: Further, the free-will's movement is not without actual
consideration. But it is impossible to understand many things actually
and at once, as stated above ([2224]FP, Q[85], A[4]). Hence, since for
the justification of the ungodly there is required a movement of the
free-will towards several things, viz. towards God and towards sin, it
would seem impossible for the justification of the ungodly to be in an
instant.

Objection 3: Further, a form that may be greater or less, e. g.
blackness or whiteness, is received successively by its subject. Now
grace may be greater or less, as stated above ([2225]Q[112], A[4]).
Hence it is not received suddenly by its subject. Therefore, seeing
that the infusion of grace is required for the justification of the
ungodly, it would seem that the justification of the ungodly cannot be
in an instant.

Objection 4: Further, the free-will's movement, which cooperates in
justification, is meritorious; and hence it must proceed from grace,
without which there is no merit, as we shall state further on
([2226]Q[114], A[2]). Now a thing receives its form before operating by
this form. Hence grace is first infused, and then the free-will is
moved towards God and to detest sin. Hence justification is not all at
once.

Objection 5: Further, if grace is infused into the soul, there must be
an instant when it first dwells in the soul; so, too, if sin is
forgiven there must be a last instant that man is in sin. But it cannot
be the same instant, otherwise opposites would be in the same
simultaneously. Hence they must be two successive instants; between
which there must be time, as the Philosopher says (Phys. vi, 1).
Therefore the justification of the ungodly takes place not all at once,
but successively.

On the contrary, The justification of the ungodly is caused by the
justifying grace of the Holy Spirit. Now the Holy Spirit comes to men's
minds suddenly, according to Acts 2:2: "And suddenly there came a sound
from heaven as of a mighty wind coming," upon which the gloss says that
"the grace of the Holy Ghost knows no tardy efforts. " Hence the
justification of the ungodly is not successive, but instantaneous.

I answer that, The entire justification of the ungodly consists as to
its origin in the infusion of grace. For it is by grace that free-will
is moved and sin is remitted. Now the infusion of grace takes place in
an instant and without succession. And the reason of this is that if a
form be not suddenly impressed upon its subject, it is either because
that subject is not disposed, or because the agent needs time to
dispose the subject. Hence we see that immediately the matter is
disposed by a preceding alteration, the substantial form accrues to the
matter; thus because the atmosphere of itself is disposed to receive
light, it is suddenly illuminated by a body actually luminous. Now it
was stated ([2227]Q[112], A[2]) that God, in order to infuse grace into
the soul, needs no disposition, save what He Himself has made. And
sometimes this sufficient disposition for the reception of grace He
makes suddenly, sometimes gradually and successively, as stated above
([2228]Q[112], A[2], ad 2). For the reason why a natural agent cannot
suddenly dispose matter is that in the matter there is a resistant
which has some disproportion with the power of the agent; and hence we
see that the stronger the agent, the more speedily is the matter
disposed. Therefore, since the Divine power is infinite, it can
suddenly dispose any matter whatsoever to its form; and much more man's
free-will, whose movement is by nature instantaneous. Therefore the
justification of the ungodly by God takes place in an instant.

Reply to Objection 1: The movement of the free-will, which concurs in
the justification of the ungodly, is a consent to detest sin, and to
draw near to God; and this consent takes place suddenly. Sometimes,
indeed, it happens that deliberation precedes, yet this is not of the
substance of justification, but a way of justification; as local
movement is a way of illumination, and alteration to generation.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([2229]FP, Q[85], A[5]), there is
nothing to prevent two things being understood at once, in so far as
they are somehow one; thus we understand the subject and predicate
together, inasmuch as they are united in the order of one affirmation.
And in the same manner can the free-will be moved to two things at once
in so far as one is ordained to the other. Now the free-will's movement
towards sin is ordained to the free-will's movement towards God, since
a man detests sin, as contrary to God, to Whom he wishes to cling.
Hence in the justification of the ungodly the free-will simultaneously
detests sin and turns to God, even as a body approaches one point and
withdraws from another simultaneously.

Reply to Objection 3: The reason why a form is not received
instantaneously in the matter is not the fact that it can inhere more
or less; for thus the light would not be suddenly received in the air,
which can be illumined more or less. But the reason is to be sought on
the part of the disposition of the matter or subject, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 4: The same instant the form is acquired, the thing
begins to operate with the form; as fire, the instant it is generated
moves upwards, and if its movement was instantaneous, it would be
terminated in the same instant. Now to will and not to will---the
movements of the free-will---are not successive, but instantaneous.
Hence the justification of the ungodly must not be successive.

Reply to Objection 5: The succession of opposites in the same subject
must be looked at differently in the things that are subject to time
and in those that are above time. For in those that are in time, there
is no last instant in which the previous form inheres in the subject;
but there is the last time, and the first instant that the subsequent
form inheres in the matter or subject; and this for the reason, that in
time we are not to consider one instant, since neither do instants
succeed each other immediately in time, nor points in a line, as is
proved in Physic. vi, 1. But time is terminated by an instant. Hence in
the whole of the previous time wherein anything is moving towards its
form, it is under the opposite form; but in the last instant of this
time, which is the first instant of the subsequent time, it has the
form which is the term of the movement.

But in those that are above time, it is otherwise. For if there be any
succession of affections or intellectual conceptions in them (as in the
angels), such succession is not measured by continuous time, but by
discrete time, even as the things measured are not continuous, as
stated above ([2230]FP, Q[53], AA[2],3). In these, therefore, there is
a last instant in which the preceding is, and a first instant in which
the subsequent is. Nor must there be time in between, since there is no
continuity of time, which this would necessitate.

Now the human mind, which is justified, is, in itself, above time, but
is subject to time accidentally, inasmuch as it understands with
continuity and time, with respect to the phantasms in which it
considers the intelligible species, as stated above ([2231]FP, Q[85],
AA[1],2). We must, therefore, decide from this about its change as
regards the condition of temporal movements, i. e. we must say that
there is no last instant that sin inheres, but a last time; whereas
there is a first instant that grace inheres; and in all the time
previous sin inhered.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the infusion of grace is naturally the first of the things required
for the justification of the ungodly?

Objection 1: It would seem that the infusion of grace is not what is
naturally required first for the justification of the ungodly. For we
withdraw from evil before drawing near to good, according to Ps. 33:15:
"Turn away from evil, and do good. " Now the remission of sins regards
the turning away from evil, and the infusion of grace regards the
turning to good. Hence the remission of sin is naturally before the
infusion of grace.

Objection 2: Further, the disposition naturally precedes the form to
which it disposes. Now the free-will's movement is a disposition for
the reception of grace. Therefore it naturally precedes the infusion of
grace.

Objection 3: Further, sin hinders the soul from tending freely to God.
Now a hindrance to movement must be removed before the movement takes
place. Hence the remission of sin and the free-will's movement towards
sin are naturally before the infusion of grace.

On the contrary, The cause is naturally prior to its effect. Now the
infusion of grace is the cause of whatever is required for the
justification of the ungodly, as stated above [2232](A[7]). Therefore
it is naturally prior to it.

I answer that, The aforesaid four things required for the justification
of the ungodly are simultaneous in time, since the justification of the
ungodly is not successive, as stated above [2233](A[7]); but in the
order of nature, one is prior to another; and in their natural order
the first is the infusion of grace; the second, the free-will's
movement towards God; the third, the free-will's movement towards sin;
the fourth, the remission of sin.

The reason for this is that in every movement the motion of the mover
is naturally first; the disposition of the matter, or the movement of
the moved, is second; the end or term of the movement in which the
motion of the mover rests, is last. Now the motion of God the Mover is
the infusion of grace, as stated above [2234](A[6]); the movement or
disposition of the moved is the free-will's double movement; and the
term or end of the movement is the remission of sin, as stated above
[2235](A[6]). Hence in their natural order the first in the
justification of the ungodly is the infusion of grace; the second is
the free-will's movement towards God; the third is the free-will's
movement towards sin, for he who is being justified detests sin because
it is against God, and thus the free-will's movement towards God
naturally precedes the free-will's movement towards sin, since it is
its cause and reason; the fourth and last is the remission of sin, to
which this transmutation is ordained as to an end, as stated above
([2236]AA[1],6).

Reply to Objection 1: The withdrawal from one term and approach to
another may be looked at in two ways: first, on the part of the thing
moved, and thus the withdrawal from a term naturally precedes the
approach to a term, since in the subject of movement the opposite which
is put away is prior to the opposite which the subject moved attains to
by its movement. But on the part of the agent it is the other way
about, since the agent, by the form pre-existing in it, acts for the
removal of the opposite form; as the sun by its light acts for the
removal of darkness, and hence on the part of the sun, illumination is
prior to the removal of darkness; but on the part of the atmosphere to
be illuminated, to be freed from darkness is, in the order of nature,
prior to being illuminated, although both are simultaneous in time. And
since the infusion of grace and the remission of sin regard God Who
justifies, hence in the order of nature the infusion of grace is prior
to the freeing from sin. But if we look at what is on the part of the
man justified, it is the other way about, since in the order of nature
the being freed from sin is prior to the obtaining of justifying grace.
Or it may be said that the term "whence" of justification is sin; and
the term "whereto" is justice; and that grace is the cause of the
forgiveness of sin and of obtaining of justice.

Reply to Objection 2: The disposition of the subject precedes the
reception of the form, in the order of nature; yet it follows the
action of the agent, whereby the subject is disposed. And hence the
free-will's movement precedes the reception of grace in the order of
nature, and follows the infusion of grace.

Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 9), in
movements of the soul the movement toward the speculative principle or
the practical end is the very first, but in exterior movements the
removal of the impediment precedes the attainment of the end. And as
the free-will's movement is a movement of the soul, in the order of
nature it moves towards God as to its end, before removing the
impediment of sin.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the justification of the ungodly is God's greatest work?

Objection 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly is not
God's greatest work. For it is by the justification of the ungodly that
we attain the grace of a wayfarer. Now by glorification we receive
heavenly grace, which is greater. Hence the glorification of angels and
men is a greater work than the justification of the ungodly.

Objection 2: Further, the justification of the ungodly is ordained to
the particular good of one man. But the good of the universe is greater
than the good of one man, as is plain from Ethic. i, 2. Hence the
creation of heaven and earth is a greater work than the justification
of the ungodly.

Objection 3: Further, to make something from nothing, where there is
nought to cooperate with the agent, is greater than to make something
with the cooperation of the recipient. Now in the work of creation
something is made from nothing, and hence nothing can cooperate with
the agent; but in the justification of the ungodly God makes something
from something, i. e. a just man from a sinner, and there is a
cooperation on man's part, since there is a movement of the free-will,
as stated above [2237](A[3]). Hence the justification of the ungodly is
not God's greatest work.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 144:9): "His tender mercies are
over all His works," and in a collect [*Tenth Sunday after Pentecost]
we say: "O God, Who dost show forth Thine all-mightiness most by
pardoning and having mercy," and Augustine, expounding the words,
"greater than these shall he do" (Jn. 14:12) says that "for a just man
to be made from a sinner, is greater than to create heaven and earth. "

I answer that, A work may be called great in two ways: first, on the
part of the mode of action, and thus the work of creation is the
greatest work, wherein something is made from nothing; secondly, a work
may be called great on account of what is made, and thus the
justification of the ungodly, which terminates at the eternal good of a
share in the Godhead, is greater than the creation of heaven and earth,
which terminates at the good of mutable nature. Hence, Augustine, after
saying that "for a just man to be made from a sinner is greater than to
create heaven and earth," adds, "for heaven and earth shall pass away,
but the justification of the ungodly shall endure. "

Again, we must bear in mind that a thing is called great in two ways:
first, in an absolute quantity, and thus the gift of glory is greater
than the gift of grace that sanctifies the ungodly; and in this respect
the glorification of the just is greater than the justification of the
ungodly. Secondly, a thing may be said to be great in proportionate
quantity, and thus the gift of grace that justifies the ungodly is
greater than the gift of glory that beatifies the just, for the gift of
grace exceeds the worthiness of the ungodly, who are worthy of
punishment, more than the gift of glory exceeds the worthiness of the
just, who by the fact of their justification are worthy of glory. Hence
Augustine says: "Let him that can, judge whether it is greater to
create the angels just, than to justify the ungodly. Certainly, if they
both betoken equal power, one betokens greater mercy. "

And thus the reply to the first is clear.

Reply to Objection 2: The good of the universe is greater than the
particular good of one, if we consider both in the same genus. But the
good of grace in one is greater than the good of nature in the whole
universe.

Reply to Objection 3: This objection rests on the manner of acting, in
which way creation is God's greatest work.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the justification of the ungodly is a miraculous work?

Objection 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly is a
miraculous work. For miraculous works are greater than non-miraculous.
Now the justification of the ungodly is greater than the other
miraculous works, as is clear from the quotation from Augustine
[2238](A[9]). Hence the justification of the ungodly is a miraculous
work.

Objection 2: Further, the movement of the will in the soul is like the
natural inclination in natural things. But when God works in natural
things against their inclination of their nature, it is a miraculous
work, as when He gave sight to the blind or raised the dead. Now the
will of the ungodly is bent on evil. Hence, since God in justifying a
man moves him to good, it would seem that the justification of the
ungodly is miraculous.

Objection 3: Further, as wisdom is a gift of God, so also is justice.
Now it is miraculous that anyone should suddenly obtain wisdom from God
without study. Therefore it is miraculous that the ungodly should be
justified by God.

On the contrary, Miraculous works are beyond natural power. Now the
justification of the ungodly is not beyond natural power; for Augustine
says (De Praed. Sanct. v) that "to be capable of having faith and to be
capable of having charity belongs to man's nature; but to have faith
and charity belongs to the grace of the faithful. " Therefore the
justification of the ungodly is not miraculous.

I answer that, In miraculous works it is usual to find three things:
the first is on the part of the active power, because they can only be
performed by Divine power; and they are simply wondrous, since their
cause is hidden, as stated above ([2239]FP, Q[105], A[7]). And thus
both the justification of the ungodly and the creation of the world,
and, generally speaking, every work that can be done by God alone, is
miraculous.

Secondly, in certain miraculous works it is found that the form
introduced is beyond the natural power of such matter, as in the
resurrection of the dead, life is above the natural power of such a
body. And thus the justification of the ungodly is not miraculous,
because the soul is naturally capable of grace; since from its having
been made to the likeness of God, it is fit to receive God by grace, as
Augustine says, in the above quotation.

Thirdly, in miraculous works something is found besides the usual and
customary order of causing an effect, as when a sick man suddenly and
beyond the wonted course of healing by nature or art, receives perfect
health; and thus the justification of the ungodly is sometimes
miraculous and sometimes not. For the common and wonted course of
justification is that God moves the soul interiorly and that man is
converted to God, first by an imperfect conversion, that it may
afterwards become perfect; because "charity begun merits increase, and
when increased merits perfection," as Augustine says (In Epist. Joan.
Tract. v). Yet God sometimes moves the soul so vehemently that it
reaches the perfection of justice at once, as took place in the
conversion of Paul, which was accompanied at the same time by a
miraculous external prostration. Hence the conversion of Paul is
commemorated in the Church as miraculous.

Reply to Objection 1: Certain miraculous works, although they are less
than the justification of the ungodly, as regards the good caused, are
beyond the wonted order of such effects, and thus have more of the
nature of a miracle.

Reply to Objection 2: It is not a miraculous work, whenever a natural
thing is moved contrary to its inclination, otherwise it would be
miraculous for water to be heated, or for a stone to be thrown upwards;
but only whenever this takes place beyond the order of the proper
cause, which naturally does this. Now no other cause save God can
justify the ungodly, even as nothing save fire can heat water. Hence
the justification of the ungodly by God is not miraculous in this
respect.

Reply to Objection 3: A man naturally acquires wisdom and knowledge
from God by his own talent and study. Hence it is miraculous when a man
is made wise or learned outside this order. But a man does not
naturally acquire justifying grace by his own action, but by God's.
Hence there is no parity.
__________________________________________________________________

OF MERIT (TEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider merit, which is the effect of cooperating grace;
and under this head there are ten points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a man can merit anything from God?

(2) Whether without grace anyone can merit eternal life?

(3) Whether anyone with grace may merit eternal life condignly?

(4) Whether it is chiefly through the instrumentality of charity that
grace is the principle of merit?

(5) Whether a man may merit the first grace for himself?

(6) Whether he may merit it for someone else?

(7) Whether anyone can merit restoration after sin?

(8) Whether he can merit for himself an increase of grace or charity?

(9) Whether he can merit final perseverance?

(10) Whether temporal goods fall under merit?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether a man may merit anything from God?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man can merit nothing from God. For
no one, it would seem, merits by giving another his due. But by all the
good we do, we cannot make sufficient return to God, since yet more is
His due, as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14). Hence it is
written (Lk. 17:10): "When you have done all these things that are
commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done that
which we ought to do. " Therefore a man can merit nothing from God.

Objection 2: Further, it would seem that a man merits nothing from God,
by what profits himself only, and profits God nothing. Now by acting
well, a man profits himself or another man, but not God, for it is
written (Job 35:7): "If thou do justly, what shalt thou give Him, or
what shall He receive of thy hand. " Hence a man can merit nothing from
God.

Objection 3: Further, whoever merits anything from another makes him
his debtor; for a man's wage is a debt due to him. Now God is no one's
debtor; hence it is written (Rom. 11:35): "Who hath first given to Him,
and recompense shall be made to him? " Hence no one can merit anything
from God.

On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 31:16): "There is a reward for thy
work. " Now a reward means something bestowed by reason of merit. Hence
it would seem that a man may merit from God.

I answer that, Merit and reward refer to the same, for a reward means
something given anyone in return for work or toil, as a price for it.
Hence, as it is an act of justice to give a just price for anything
received from another, so also is it an act of justice to make a return
for work or toil. Now justice is a kind of equality, as is clear from
the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 3), and hence justice is simply between
those that are simply equal; but where there is no absolute equality
between them, neither is there absolute justice, but there may be a
certain manner of justice, as when we speak of a father's or a master's
right (Ethic. v, 6), as the Philosopher says.
And hence where there is
justice simply, there is the character of merit and reward simply. But
where there is no simple right, but only relative, there is no
character of merit simply, but only relatively, in so far as the
character of justice is found there, since the child merits something
from his father and the slave from his lord.

Now it is clear that between God and man there is the greatest
inequality: for they are infinitely apart, and all man's good is from
God. Hence there can be no justice of absolute equality between man and
God, but only of a certain proportion, inasmuch as both operate after
their own manner. Now the manner and measure of human virtue is in man
from God. Hence man's merit with God only exists on the presupposition
of the Divine ordination, so that man obtains from God, as a reward of
his operation, what God gave him the power of operation for, even as
natural things by their proper movements and operations obtain that to
which they were ordained by God; differently, indeed, since the
rational creature moves itself to act by its free-will, hence its
action has the character of merit, which is not so in other creatures.

Reply to Objection 1: Man merits, inasmuch as he does what he ought, by
his free-will; otherwise the act of justice whereby anyone discharges a
debt would not be meritorious.

Reply to Objection 2: God seeks from our goods not profit, but glory,
i. e. the manifestation of His goodness; even as He seeks it also in His
own works. Now nothing accrues to Him, but only to ourselves, by our
worship of Him. Hence we merit from God, not that by our works anything
accrues to Him, but inasmuch as we work for His glory.

Reply to Objection 3: Since our action has the character of merit, only
on the presupposition of the Divine ordination, it does not follow that
God is made our debtor simply, but His own, inasmuch as it is right
that His will should be carried out.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether anyone without grace can merit eternal life?

Objection 1: It would seem that without grace anyone can merit eternal
life. For man merits from God what he is divinely ordained to, as
stated above [2240](A[1]). Now man by his nature is ordained to
beatitude as his end; hence, too, he naturally wishes to be blessed.
Hence man by his natural endowments and without grace can merit
beatitude which is eternal life.

Objection 2: Further, the less a work is due, the more meritorious it
is. Now, less due is that work which is done by one who has received
fewer benefits. Hence, since he who has only natural endowments has
received fewer gifts from God, than he who has gratuitous gifts as well
as nature, it would seem that his works are more meritorious with God.
And thus if he who has grace can merit eternal life to some extent,
much more may he who has no grace.

Objection 3: Further, God's mercy and liberality infinitely surpass
human mercy and liberality. Now a man may merit from another, even
though he has not hitherto had his grace. Much more, therefore, would
it seem that a man without grace may merit eternal life.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 6:23): "The grace of God, life
everlasting. "

I answer that, Man without grace may be looked at in two states, as was
said above ([2241]Q[109], A[2]): the first, a state of perfect nature,
in which Adam was before his sin; the second, a state of corrupt
nature, in which we are before being restored by grace. Therefore, if
we speak of man in the first state, there is only one reason why man
cannot merit eternal life without grace, by his purely natural
endowments, viz. because man's merit depends on the Divine
pre-ordination. Now no act of anything whatsoever is divinely ordained
to anything exceeding the proportion of the powers which are the
principles of its act; for it is a law of Divine providence that
nothing shall act beyond its powers. Now everlasting life is a good
exceeding the proportion of created nature; since it exceeds its
knowledge and desire, according to 1 Cor. 2:9: "Eye hath not seen, nor
ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man. " And hence it
is that no created nature is a sufficient principle of an act
meritorious of eternal life, unless there is added a supernatural gift,
which we call grace. But if we speak of man as existing in sin, a
second reason is added to this, viz. the impediment of sin. For since
sin is an offense against God, excluding us from eternal life, as is
clear from what has been said above ([2242]Q[71], A[6];[2243] Q[113],
A[2]), no one existing in a state of mortal sin can merit eternal life
unless first he be reconciled to God, through his sin being forgiven,
which is brought about by grace. For the sinner deserves not life, but
death, according to Rom. 6:23: "The wages of sin is death. "

Reply to Objection 1: God ordained human nature to attain the end of
eternal life, not by its own strength, but by the help of grace; and in
this way its act can be meritorious of eternal life.

Reply to Objection 2: Without grace a man cannot have a work equal to a
work proceeding from grace, since the more perfect the principle, the
more perfect the action. But the objection would hold good, if we
supposed the operations equal in both cases.

Reply to Objection 3: With regard to the first reason adduced, the case
is different in God and in man. For a man receives all his power of
well-doing from God, and not from man. Hence a man can merit nothing
from God except by His gift, which the Apostle expresses aptly saying
(Rom. 11:35): "Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be
made to him? " But man may merit from man, before he has received
anything from him, by what he has received from God.

But as regards the second proof taken from the impediment of sin, the
case is similar with man and God, since one man cannot merit from
another whom he has offended, unless he makes satisfaction to him and
is reconciled.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether a man in grace can merit eternal life condignly?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man in grace cannot merit eternal
life condignly, for the Apostle says (Rom. 8:18): "The sufferings of
this time are not worthy [condignae] to be compared with the glory to
come, that shall be revealed in us. " But of all meritorious works, the
sufferings of the saints would seem the most meritorious. Therefore no
works of men are meritorious of eternal life condignly.

Objection 2: Further, on Rom. 6:23, "The grace of God, life
everlasting," a gloss says: "He might have truly said: 'The wages of
justice, life everlasting'; but He preferred to say 'The grace of God,
life everlasting,' that we may know that God leads us to life
everlasting of His own mercy and not by our merits. " Now when anyone
merits something condignly he receives it not from mercy, but from
merit. Hence it would seem that a man with grace cannot merit life
everlasting condignly.

Objection 3: Further, merit that equals the reward, would seem to be
condign. Now no act of the present life can equal everlasting life,
which surpasses our knowledge and our desire, and moreover, surpasses
the charity or love of the wayfarer, even as it exceeds nature.
Therefore with grace a man cannot merit eternal life condignly.

On the contrary, What is granted in accordance with a fair judgment,
would seem a condign reward. But life everlasting is granted by God, in
accordance with the judgment of justice, according to 2 Tim. 4:8: "As
to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the
Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day. " Therefore man
merits everlasting life condignly.

I answer that, Man's meritorious work may be considered in two ways:
first, as it proceeds from free-will; secondly, as it proceeds from the
grace of the Holy Ghost. If it is considered as regards the substance
of the work, and inasmuch as it springs from the free-will, there can
be no condignity because of the very great inequality. But there is
congruity, on account of an equality of proportion: for it would seem
congruous that, if a man does what he can, God should reward him
according to the excellence of his power.

If, however, we speak of a meritorious work, inasmuch as it proceeds
from the grace of the Holy Ghost moving us to life everlasting, it is
meritorious of life everlasting condignly. For thus the value of its
merit depends upon the power of the Holy Ghost moving us to life
everlasting according to Jn. 4:14: "Shall become in him a fount of
water springing up into life everlasting. " And the worth of the work
depends on the dignity of grace, whereby a man, being made a partaker
of the Divine Nature, is adopted as a son of God, to whom the
inheritance is due by right of adoption, according to Rom. 8:17: "If
sons, heirs also. "

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle is speaking of the substance of these
sufferings.

Reply to Objection 2: This saying is to be understood of the first
cause of our reaching everlasting life, viz. God's mercy. But our merit
is a subsequent cause.

Reply to Objection 3: The grace of the Holy Ghost which we have at
present, although unequal to glory in act, is equal to it virtually as
the seed of a tree, wherein the whole tree is virtually. So likewise by
grace of the Holy Ghost dwells in man; and He is a sufficient cause of
life everlasting; hence, 2 Cor. 1:22, He is called the "pledge" of our
inheritance.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether grace is the principle of merit through charity rather than the
other virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not the principle of merit
through charity rather than the other virtues. For wages are due to
work, according to Mat. 20:8: "Call the laborers and pay them their
hire. " Now every virtue is a principle of some operation, since virtue
is an operative habit, as stated above ([2244]Q[55], A[2]). Hence every
virtue is equally a principle of merit.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:8): "Every man shall
receive his own reward according to his labor. " Now charity lessens
rather than increases the labor, because as Augustine says (De Verbis
Dom. , Serm. lxx), "love makes all hard and repulsive tasks easy and
next to nothing. " Hence charity is no greater principle of merit than
any other virtue.

Objection 3: Further, the greatest principle of merit would seem to be
the one whose acts are most meritorious. But the acts of faith and
patience or fortitude would seem to be the most meritorious, as appears
in the martyrs, who strove for the faith patiently and bravely even
till death. Hence other virtues are a greater principle of merit than
charity.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 14:21): "He that loveth Me, shall
be loved of My Father; and I will love him and will manifest Myself to
him. " Now everlasting life consists in the manifest knowledge of God,
according to Jn. 17:3: "This is eternal life: that they may know Thee,
the only true" and living "God. " Hence the merit of eternal life rests
chiefly with charity.

I answer that, As we may gather from what has been stated above
[2245](A[1]), human acts have the nature of merit from two causes:
first and chiefly from the Divine ordination, inasmuch as acts are said
to merit that good to which man is divinely ordained. Secondly, on the
part of free-will, inasmuch as man, more than other creatures, has the
power of voluntary acts by acting by himself. And in both these ways
does merit chiefly rest with charity. For we must bear in mind that
everlasting life consists in the enjoyment of God. Now the human mind's
movement to the fruition of the Divine good is the proper act of
charity, whereby all the acts of the other virtues are ordained to this
end, since all the other virtues are commanded by charity. Hence the
merit of life everlasting pertains first to charity, and secondly, to
the other virtues, inasmuch as their acts are commanded by charity. So,
likewise, is it manifest that what we do out of love we do most
willingly. Hence, even inasmuch as merit depends on voluntariness,
merit is chiefly attributed to charity.

Reply to Objection 1: Charity, inasmuch as it has the last end for
object, moves the other virtues to act. For the habit to which the end
pertains always commands the habits to which the means pertain, as was
said above ([2246]Q[9], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 2: A work can be toilsome and difficult in two ways:
first, from the greatness of the work, and thus the greatness of the
work pertains to the increase of merit; and thus charity does not
lessen the toil---rather, it makes us undertake the greatest toils,
"for it does great things, if it exists," as Gregory says (Hom. in
Evang. xxx). Secondly, from the defect of the operator; for what is not
done with a ready will is hard and difficult to all of us, and this
toil lessens merit and is removed by charity.

Reply to Objection 3: The act of faith is not meritorious unless "faith
. . . worketh by charity" (Gal. 5:6). So, too, the acts of patience and
fortitude are not meritorious unless a man does them out of charity,
according to 1 Cor. 13:3: "If I should deliver my body to be burned,
and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. "
__________________________________________________________________

Whether a man may merit for himself the first grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man may merit for himself the first
grace, because, as Augustine says (Ep. clxxxvi), "faith merits
justification. " Now a man is justified by the first grace. Therefore a
man may merit the first grace.

Objection 2: Further, God gives grace only to the worthy. Now, no one
is said to be worthy of some good, unless he has merited it condignly.
Therefore we may merit the first grace condignly.

Objection 3: Further, with men we may merit a gift already received.
Thus if a man receives a horse from his master, he merits it by a good
use of it in his master's service. Now God is much more bountiful than
man. Much more, therefore, may a man, by subsequent works, merit the
first grace already received from God.

On the contrary, The nature of grace is repugnant to reward of works,
according to Rom. 4:4: "Now to him that worketh, the reward is not
reckoned according to grace but according to debt. " Now a man merits
what is reckoned to him according to debt, as the reward of his works.
Hence a man may not merit the first grace.

I answer that, The gift of grace may be considered in two ways: first
in the nature of a gratuitous gift, and thus it is manifest that all
merit is repugnant to grace, since as the Apostle says (Rom. 11:6), "if
by grace, it is not now by works. " Secondly, it may be considered as
regards the nature of the thing given, and thus, also, it cannot come
under the merit of him who has not grace, both because it exceeds the
proportion of nature, and because previous to grace a man in the state
of sin has an obstacle to his meriting grace, viz. sin. But when anyone
has grace, the grace already possessed cannot come under merit, since
reward is the term of the work, but grace is the principle of all our
good works, as stated above ([2247]Q[109]). But of anyone merits a
further gratuitous gift by virtue of the preceding grace, it would not
be the first grace. Hence it is manifest that no one can merit for
himself the first grace.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Retract. i, 23), he was
deceived on this point for a time, believing the beginning of faith to
be from us, and its consummation to be granted us by God; and this he
here retracts. And seemingly it is in this sense that he speaks of
faith as meriting justification. But if we suppose, as indeed it is a
truth of faith, that the beginning of faith is in us from God, the
first act must flow from grace; and thus it cannot be meritorious of
the first grace. Therefore man is justified by faith, not as though
man, by believing, were to merit justification, but that, he believes,
whilst he is being justified; inasmuch as a movement of faith is
required for the justification of the ungodly, as stated above
([2248]Q[113], A[4]).

Reply to Objection 2: God gives grace to none but to the worthy, not
that they were previously worthy, but that by His grace He makes them
worthy, Who alone "can make him clean that is conceived of unclean
seed" (Job 14:4).

Reply to Objection 3: Man's every good work proceeds from the first
grace as from its principle; but not from any gift of man.
Consequently, there is no comparison between gifts of grace and gifts
of men.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether a man can merit the first grace for another?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man can merit the first grace for
another. Because on Mat. 9:2: "Jesus seeing their faith," etc. a gloss
says: "How much is our personal faith worth with God, Who set such a
price on another's faith, as to heal the man both inwardly and
outwardly! " Now inward healing is brought about by grace. Hence a man
can merit the first grace for another.

Objection 2: Further, the prayers of the just are not void, but
efficacious, according to James 5:16: "The continued prayer of a just
man availeth much. " Now he had previously said: "Pray one for another,
that you may be saved. " Hence, since man's salvation can only be
brought about by grace, it seems that one man may merit for another his
first grace.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Lk. 16:9): "Make unto you friends
of the mammon of iniquity, that when you shall fail they may receive
you into everlasting dwellings. " Now it is through grace alone that
anyone is received into everlasting dwellings, for by it alone does
anyone merit everlasting life as stated above [2249](A[2]; Q[109],
A[5]). Hence one man may by merit obtain for another his first grace.

On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 15:1): "If Moses and Samuel shall
stand before Me, My soul is not towards this people" ---yet they had
great merit with God. Hence it seems that no one can merit the first
grace for another.

I answer that, As shown above ([2250]AA[1],3,4), our works are
meritorious from two causes: first, by virtue of the Divine motion; and
thus we merit condignly; secondly, according as they proceed from
free-will in so far as we do them willingly, and thus they have
congruous merit, since it is congruous that when a man makes good use
of his power God should by His super-excellent power work still higher
things. And therefore it is clear that no one can merit condignly for
another his first grace, save Christ alone; since each one of us is
moved by God to reach life everlasting through the gift of grace; hence
condign merit does not reach beyond this motion. But Christ's soul is
moved by God through grace, not only so as to reach the glory of life
everlasting, but so as to lead others to it, inasmuch as He is the Head
of the Church, and the Author of human salvation, according to Heb.
2:10: "Who hath brought many children into glory [to perfect] the
Author of their salvation. "

But one may merit the first grace for another congruously; because a
man in grace fulfils God's will, and it is congruous and in harmony
with friendship that God should fulfil man's desire for the salvation
of another, although sometimes there may be an impediment on the part
of him whose salvation the just man desires. And it is in this sense
that the passage from Jeremias speaks.

Reply to Objection 1: A man's faith avails for another's salvation by
congruous and not by condign merit.

Reply to Objection 2: The impetration of prayer rests on mercy, whereas
condign merit rests on justice; hence a man may impetrate many things
from the Divine mercy in prayer, which he does not merit in justice,
according to Dan. 9:18: "For it is not for our justifications that we
present our prayers before Thy face, but for the multitude of Thy
tender mercies. "

Reply to Objection 3: The poor who receive alms are said to receive
others into everlasting dwellings, either by impetrating their
forgiveness in prayer, or by meriting congruously by other good works,
or materially speaking, inasmuch as by these good works of mercy,
exercised towards the poor, we merit to be received into everlasting
dwellings.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether a man may merit restoration after a fall?

Objection 1: It would seem that anyone may merit for himself
restoration after a fall. For what a man may justly ask of God, he may
justly merit. Now nothing may more justly be besought of God than to be
restored after a fall, as Augustine says [*Cf. Ennar. i super Ps.
lxx. ], according to Ps. 70:9: "When my strength shall fail, do not Thou
forsake me. " Hence a man may merit to be restored after a fall.

Objection 2: Further, a man's works benefit himself more than another.
Now a man may, to some extent, merit for another his restoration after
a fall, even as his first grace. Much more, therefore, may he merit for
himself restoration after a fall.

Objection 3: Further, when a man is once in grace he merits life
everlasting by the good works he does, as was shown above [2251](A[2];
Q[109], A[5]). Now no one can attain life everlasting unless he is
restored by grace. Hence it would seem that he merits for himself
restoration.

On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 18:24): "If the just man turn
himself away from his justice and do iniquity . . . all his justices
which he hath done shall not be remembered. " Therefore his previous
merits will nowise help him to rise again. Hence no one can merit for
himself restoration after a fall.