Therefore
the sixth beatitude
which comprises the sight of God, does not respond to the gift of
understanding.
which comprises the sight of God, does not respond to the gift of
understanding.
Summa Theologica
Now understanding is a
natural habit of the soul, whereby self-evident principles are known,
as stated in Ethic. vi, 6. Therefore it should not be reckoned among
the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, the Divine gifts are shared by creatures
according to their capacity and mode, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom.
iv). Now the mode of human nature is to know the truth, not simply
(which is a sign of understanding), but discursively (which is a sign
of reason), as Dionysius explains (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore the Divine
knowledge which is bestowed on man, should be called a gift of reason
rather than a gift of understanding.
Objection 3: Further, in the powers of the soul the understanding is
condivided with the will (De Anima iii, 9,10). Now no gift of the Holy
Ghost is called after the will. Therefore no gift of the Holy Ghost
should receive the name of understanding.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2): "The Spirit of the Lord
shall rest upon him, the Spirit of wisdom of understanding. "
I answer that, Understanding implies an intimate knowledge, for
"intelligere" [to understand] is the same as "intus legere" [to read
inwardly]. This is clear to anyone who considers the difference between
intellect and sense, because sensitive knowledge is concerned with
external sensible qualities, whereas intellective knowledge penetrates
into the very essence of a thing, because the object of the intellect
is "what a thing is," as stated in De Anima iii, 6.
Now there are many kinds of things that are hidden within, to find
which human knowledge has to penetrate within so to speak. Thus, under
the accidents lies hidden the nature of the substantial reality, under
words lies hidden their meaning; under likenesses and figures the truth
they denote lies hidden (because the intelligible world is enclosed
within as compared with the sensible world, which is perceived
externally), and effects lie hidden in their causes, and vice versa.
Hence we may speak of understanding with regard to all these things.
Since, however, human knowledge begins with the outside of things as it
were, it is evident that the stronger the light of the understanding,
the further can it penetrate into the heart of things. Now the natural
light of our understanding is of finite power; wherefore it can reach
to a certain fixed point. Consequently man needs a supernatural light
in order to penetrate further still so as to know what it cannot know
by its natural light: and this supernatural light which is bestowed on
man is called the gift of understanding.
Reply to Objection 1: The natural light instilled within us, manifests
only certain general principles, which are known naturally. But since
man is ordained to supernatural happiness, as stated above (Q[2], A[3];
[2356]FS, Q[3] , A[8]), man needs to reach to certain higher truths,
for which he requires the gift of understanding.
Reply to Objection 2: The discourse of reason always begins from an
understanding and ends at an understanding; because we reason by
proceeding from certain understood principles, and the discourse of
reason is perfected when we come to understand what hitherto we
ignored. Hence the act of reasoning proceeds from something previously
understood. Now a gift of grace does not proceed from the light of
nature, but is added thereto as perfecting it. Wherefore this addition
is not called "reason" but "understanding," since the additional light
is in comparison with what we know supernaturally, what the natural
light is in regard to those things which we known from the first.
Reply to Objection 3: "Will" denotes simply a movement of the appetite
without indicating any excellence; whereas "understanding" denotes a
certain excellence of a knowledge that penetrates into the heart of
things. Hence the supernatural gift is called after the understanding
rather than after the will.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the gift of understanding is compatible with faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is
incompatible with faith. For Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 15) that
"the thing which is understood is bounded by the comprehension of him
who understands it. " But the thing which is believed is not
comprehended, according to the word of the Apostle to the Philippians
3:12: "Not as though I had already comprehended [Douay: 'attained'], or
were already perfect. " Therefore it seems that faith and understanding
are incompatible in the same subject.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is understood is seen by the
understanding. But faith is of things that appear not, as stated above
([2357]Q[1], A[4];[2358] Q[4], A[1]). Therefore faith is incompatible
with understanding in the same subject.
Objection 3: Further, understanding is more certain than science. But
science and faith are incompatible in the same subject, as stated above
([2359]Q[1], AA[4],5). Much less, therefore, can understanding and
faith be in the same subject.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 15) that "understanding
enlightens the mind concerning the things it has heard. " Now one who
has faith can be enlightened in his mind concerning what he has heard;
thus it is written (Lk. 24:27, 32) that Our Lord opened the scriptures
to His disciples, that they might understand them. Therefore
understanding is compatible with faith.
I answer that, We need to make a twofold distinction here: one on the
side of faith, the other on the part of understanding.
On the side of faith the distinction to be made is that certain things,
of themselves, come directly under faith, such as the mystery to three
Persons in one God, and the incarnation of God the Son; whereas other
things come under faith, through being subordinate, in one way or
another, to those just mentioned, for instance, all that is contained
in the Divine Scriptures.
On the part of understanding the distinction to be observed is that
there are two ways in which we may be said to understand. In one way,
we understand a thing perfectly, when we arrive at knowing the essence
of the thing we understand, and the very truth considered in itself of
the proposition understood. In this way, so long as the state of faith
lasts, we cannot understand those things which are the direct object of
faith: although certain other things that are subordinate to faith can
be understood even in this way.
In another way we understand a thing imperfectly, when the essence of a
thing or the truth of a proposition is not known as to its quiddity or
mode of being, and yet we know that whatever be the outward
appearances, they do not contradict the truth, in so far as we
understand that we ought not to depart from matters of faith, for the
sake of things that appear externally. In this way, even during the
state of faith, nothing hinders us from understanding even those things
which are the direct object of faith.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first three
argue in reference to perfect understanding, while the last refers to
the understanding of matters subordinate to faith.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the gift of understanding is merely speculative or also practical?
Objection 1: It would seem that understanding, considered as a gift of
the Holy Ghost, is not practical, but only speculative. For, according
to Gregory (Moral. i, 32), "understanding penetrates certain more
exalted things. " But the practical intellect is occupied, not with
exalted, but with inferior things, viz. singulars, about which actions
are concerned. Therefore understanding, considered as a gift, is not
practical.
Objection 2: Further, the gift of understanding is something more
excellent than the intellectual virtue of understanding. But the
intellectual virtue of understanding is concerned with none but
necessary things, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 6). Much
more, therefore, is the gift of understanding concerned with none but
necessary matters. Now the practical intellect is not about necessary
things, but about things which may be otherwise than they are, and
which may result from man's activity. Therefore the gift of
understanding is not practical.
Objection 3: Further, the gift of understanding enlightens the mind in
matters which surpass natural reason. Now human activities, with which
the practical intellect is concerned, do not surpass natural reason,
which is the directing principle in matters of action, as was made
clear above ([2360]FS, Q[58], A[2]; [2361]FS, Q[71], A[6]). Therefore
the gift of understanding is not practical.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 110:10): "A good understanding to
all that do it. "
I answer that, As stated above [2362](A[2]), the gift of understanding
is not only about those things which come under faith first and
principally, but also about all things subordinate to faith. Now good
actions have a certain relationship to faith: since "faith worketh
through charity," according to the Apostle (Gal. 5:6). Hence the gift
of understanding extends also to certain actions, not as though these
were its principal object, but in so far as the rule of our actions is
the eternal law, to which the higher reason, which is perfected by the
gift of understanding, adheres by contemplating and consulting it, as
Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 7).
Reply to Objection 1: The things with which human actions are concerned
are not surpassingly exalted considered in themselves, but, as referred
to the rule of the eternal law, and to the end of Divine happiness,
they are exalted so that they can be the matter of understanding.
Reply to Objection 2: The excellence of the gift of understanding
consists precisely in its considering eternal or necessary matters, not
only as they are rules of human actions, because a cognitive virtue is
the more excellent, according to the greater extent of its object.
Reply to Objection 3: The rule of human actions is the human reason and
the eternal law, as stated above ([2363]FS, Q[71], A[6]). Now the
eternal law surpasses human reason: so that the knowledge of human
actions, as ruled by the eternal law, surpasses the natural reason, and
requires the supernatural light of a gift of the Holy Ghost.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the gift of understanding is in all who are in a state of grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is not in all
who are in a state of grace. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "the
gift of understanding is given as a remedy against dulness of mind. "
Now many who are in a state of grace suffer from dulness of mind.
Therefore the gift of understanding is not in all who are in a state of
grace.
Objection 2: Further, of all the things that are connected with
knowledge, faith alone seems to be necessary for salvation, since by
faith Christ dwells in our hearts, according to Eph. 3:17. Now the gift
of understanding is not in everyone that has faith; indeed, those who
have faith ought to pray that they may understand, as Augustine says
(De Trin. xv, 27). Therefore the gift of understanding is not necessary
for salvation: and, consequently, is not in all who are in a state of
grace.
Objection 3: Further, those things which are common to all who are in a
state of grace, are never withdrawn from them. Now the grace of
understanding and of the other gifts sometimes withdraws itself
profitably, for, at times, "when the mind is puffed up with
understanding sublime things, it becomes sluggish and dull in base and
vile things," as Gregory observes (Moral. ii, 49). Therefore the gift
of understanding is not in all who are in a state of grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 81:5): "They have not known or
understood, they walk on in darkness. " But no one who is in a state of
grace walks in darkness, according to Jn. 8:12: "He that followeth Me,
walketh not in darkness. " Therefore no one who is in a state of grace
is without the gift of understanding.
I answer that, In all who are in a state of grace, there must needs be
rectitude of the will, since grace prepares man's will for good,
according to Augustine (Contra Julian. Pelag. iv, 3). Now the will
cannot be rightly directed to good, unless there be already some
knowledge of the truth, since the object of the will is good
understood, as stated in De Anima iii, 7. Again, just as the Holy Ghost
directs man's will by the gift of charity, so as to move it directly to
some supernatural good; so also, by the gift of understanding, He
enlightens the human mind, so that it knows some supernatural truth, to
which the right will needs to tend.
Therefore, just as the gift of charity is in all of those who have
sanctifying grace, so also is the gift of understanding.
Reply to Objection 1: Some who have sanctifying grace may suffer
dulness of mind with regard to things that are not necessary for
salvation; but with regard to those that are necessary for salvation,
they are sufficiently instructed by the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Jn.
2:27: "His unction teacheth you of all things. "
Reply to Objection 2: Although not all who have faith understand fully
the things that are proposed to be believed, yet they understand that
they ought to believe them, and that they ought nowise to deviate from
them.
Reply to Objection 3: With regard to things necessary for salvation,
the gift of understanding never withdraws from holy persons: but, in
order that they may have no incentive to pride, it does withdraw
sometimes with regard to other things, so that their mind is unable to
penetrate all things clearly.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the gift of understanding is found also in those who have not
sanctifying grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is found also
in those who have not sanctifying grace. For Augustine, in expounding
the words of Ps. 118:20: "My soul hath coveted to long for Thy
justifications," says: "Understanding flies ahead, and man's will is
weak and slow to follow. " But in all who have sanctifying grace, the
will is prompt on account of charity. Therefore the gift of
understanding can be in those who have not sanctifying grace.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Dan. 10:1) that "there is need of
understanding in a" prophetic "vision," so that, seemingly, there is no
prophecy without the gift of understanding. But there can be prophecy
without sanctifying grace, as evidenced by Mat. 7:22, where those who
say: "We have prophesied in Thy name [*Vulg. : 'Have we not prophesied
in Thy name? ]," are answered with the words: "I never knew you. "
Therefore the gift of understanding can be without sanctifying grace.
Objection 3: Further, the gift of understanding responds to the virtue
of faith, according to Is. 7:9, following another reading [*The
Septuagint]: "If you will not believe you shall not understand. " Now
faith can be without sanctifying grace. Therefore the gift of
understanding can be without it.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 6:45): "Every one that hath heard
of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me. " Now it is by the
intellect, as Gregory observes (Moral. i, 32), that we learn or
understand what we hear. Therefore whoever has the gift of
understanding, cometh to Christ, which is impossible without
sanctifying grace. Therefore the gift of understanding cannot be
without sanctifying grace.
I answer that, As stated above ([2364]FS, Q[68], AA[1],2) the gifts of
the Holy Ghost perfect the soul, according as it is amenable to the
motion of the Holy Ghost. Accordingly then, the intellectual light of
grace is called the gift of understanding, in so far as man's
understanding is easily moved by the Holy Ghost, the consideration of
which movement depends on a true apprehension of the end. Wherefore
unless the human intellect be moved by the Holy Ghost so far as to have
a right estimate of the end, it has not yet obtained the gift of
understanding, however much the Holy Ghost may have enlightened it in
regard to other truths that are preambles to the faith.
Now to have a right estimate about the last end one must not be in
error about the end, and must adhere to it firmly as to the greatest
good: and no one can do this without sanctifying grace; even as in
moral matters a man has a right estimate about the end through a habit
of virtue. Therefore no one has the gift of understanding without
sanctifying grace.
Reply to Objection 1: By understanding Augustine means any kind of
intellectual light, that, however, does not fulfil all the conditions
of a gift, unless the mind of man be so far perfected as to have a
right estimate about the end.
Reply to Objection 2: The understanding that is requisite for prophecy,
is a kind of enlightenment of the mind with regard to the things
revealed to the prophet: but it is not an enlightenment of the mind
with regard to a right estimate about the last end, which belongs to
the gift of understanding.
Reply to Objection 3: Faith implies merely assent to what is proposed
but understanding implies a certain perception of the truth, which
perception, except in one who has sanctifying grace, cannot regard the
end, as stated above. Hence the comparison fails between understanding
and faith.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the gift of understanding is distinct from the other gifts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is not
distinct from the other gifts. For there is no distinction between
things whose opposites are not distinct. Now "wisdom is contrary to
folly, understanding is contrary to dulness, counsel is contrary to
rashness, knowledge is contrary to ignorance," as Gregory states
(Moral. ii, 49). But there would seem to be no difference between
folly, dulness, ignorance and rashness. Therefore neither does
understanding differ from the other gifts.
Objection 2: Further, the intellectual virtue of understanding differs
from the other intellectual virtues in that it is proper to it to be
about self-evident principles. But the gift of understanding is not
about any self-evident principles, since the natural habit of first
principles suffices in respect of those matters which are naturally
self-evident: while faith is sufficient in respect of such things as
are supernatural, since the articles of faith are like first principles
in supernatural knowledge, as stated above ([2365]Q[1], A[7]).
Therefore the gift of understanding does not differ from the other
intellectual gifts.
Objection 3: Further, all intellectual knowledge is either speculative
or practical. Now the gift of understanding is related to both, as
stated above [2366](A[3]). Therefore it is not distinct from the other
intellectual gifts, but comprises them all.
On the contrary, When several things are enumerated together they must
be, in some way, distinct from one another, because distinction is the
origin of number. Now the gift of understanding is enumerated together
with the other gifts, as appears from Is. 11:2. Therefore the gift of
understanding is distinct from the other gifts.
I answer that, The difference between the gift of understanding and
three of the others, viz. piety, fortitude, and fear, is evident, since
the gift of understanding belongs to the cognitive power, while the
three belong to the appetitive power.
But the difference between this gift of understanding and the remaining
three, viz. wisdom, knowledge, and counsel, which also belong to the
cognitive power, is not so evident. To some [*William of Auxerre, Sum.
Aur. III, iii, 8], it seems that the gift of understanding differs from
the gifts of knowledge and counsel, in that these two belong to
practical knowledge, while the gift of understanding belongs to
speculative knowledge; and that it differs from the gift of wisdom,
which also belongs to speculative knowledge, in that wisdom is
concerned with judgment, while understanding renders the mind apt to
grasp the things that are proposed, and to penetrate into their very
heart. And in this sense we have assigned the number of the gifts,
above ([2367]FS, Q[68], A[4]).
But if we consider the matter carefully, the gift of understanding is
concerned not only with speculative, but also with practical matters,
as stated above [2368](A[3]), and likewise, the gift of knowledge
regards both matters, as we shall show further on (Q[9], A[3]), and
consequently, we must take their distinction in some other way. For all
these four gifts are ordained to supernatural knowledge, which, in us,
takes its foundation from faith. Now "faith is through hearing" (Rom.
10:17). Hence some things must be proposed to be believed by man, not
as seen, but as heard, to which he assents by faith. But faith, first
and principally, is about the First Truth, secondarily, about certain
considerations concerning creatures, and furthermore extends to the
direction of human actions, in so far as it works through charity, as
appears from what has been said above (Q[4], A[2], ad 3).
Accordingly on the part of the things proposed to faith for belief, two
things are requisite on our part: first that they be penetrated or
grasped by the intellect, and this belongs to the gift of
understanding. Secondly, it is necessary that man should judge these
things aright, that he should esteem that he ought to adhere to these
things, and to withdraw from their opposites: and this judgment, with
regard to Divine things belong to the gift of wisdom, but with regard
to created things, belongs to the gift of knowledge, and as to its
application to individual actions, belongs to the gift of counsel.
Reply to Objection 1: The foregoing difference between those four gifts
is clearly in agreement with the distinction of those things which
Gregory assigns as their opposites. For dulness is contrary to
sharpness, since an intellect is said, by comparison, to be sharp, when
it is able to penetrate into the heart of the things that are proposed
to it. Hence it is dulness of mind that renders the mind unable to
pierce into the heart of a thing. A man is said to be a fool if he
judges wrongly about the common end of life, wherefore folly is
properly opposed to wisdom, which makes us judge aright about the
universal cause. Ignorance implies a defect in the mind, even about any
particular things whatever, so that it is contrary to knowledge, which
gives man a right judgment about particular causes, viz. about
creatures. Rashness is clearly opposed to counsel, whereby man does not
proceed to action before deliberating with his reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The gift of understanding is about the first
principles of that knowledge which is conferred by grace; but otherwise
than faith, because it belongs to faith to assent to them, while it
belongs to the gift of understanding to pierce with the mind the things
that are said.
Reply to Objection 3: The gift of understanding is related to both
kinds of knowledge, viz. speculative and practical, not as to the
judgment, but as to apprehension, by grasping what is said.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the sixth beatitude, "Blessed are the clean of heart," etc. ,
responds to the gift of understanding?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sixth beatitude, "Blessed are the
clean of heart, for they shall see God," does not respond to the gift
of understanding. Because cleanness of heart seems to belong chiefly to
the appetite. But the gift of understanding belongs, not to the
appetite, but rather to the intellectual power. Therefore the aforesaid
beatitude does not respond to the gift of understanding.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Acts 15:9): "Purifying their
hearts by faith. " Now cleanness of heart is acquired by the heart being
purified. Therefore the aforesaid beatitude is related to the virtue of
faith rather than to the gift of understanding.
Objection 3: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in the
present state of life. But the sight of God does not belong to the
present life, since it is that which gives happiness to the Blessed, as
stated above ([2369]FS, Q[3], A[8]).
Therefore the sixth beatitude
which comprises the sight of God, does not respond to the gift of
understanding.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "The
sixth work of the Holy Ghost which is understanding, is applicable to
the clean of heart, whose eye being purified, they can see what eye
hath not seen. "
I answer that, Two things are contained in the sixth beatitude, as also
in the others, one by way of merit, viz. cleanness of heart; the other
by way of reward, viz. the sight of God, as stated above ([2370]FS,
Q[69], AA[2] ,4), and each of these, in some way, responds to the gift
of understanding.
For cleanness is twofold. One is a preamble and a disposition to seeing
God, and consists in the heart being cleansed of inordinate affections:
and this cleanness of heart is effected by the virtues and gifts
belonging to the appetitive power. The other cleanness of heart is a
kind of complement to the sight of God; such is the cleanness of the
mind that is purged of phantasms and errors, so as to receive the
truths which are proposed to it about God, no longer by way of
corporeal phantasms, nor infected with heretical misrepresentations:
and this cleanness is the result of the gift of understanding.
Again, the sight of God is twofold. One is perfect, whereby God's
Essence is seen: the other is imperfect, whereby, though we see not
what God is, yet we see what He is not; and whereby, the more perfectly
do we know God in this life, the more we understand that He surpasses
all that the mind comprehends. Each of these visions of God belongs to
the gift of understanding; the first, to the gift of understanding in
its state of perfection, as possessed in heaven; the second, to the
gift of understanding in its state of inchoation, as possessed by
wayfarers.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first two
arguments refer to the first kind of cleanness; while the third refers
to the perfect vision of God. Moreover the gifts both perfect us in
this life by way of inchoation, and will be fulfilled, as stated above
([2371]FS, Q[69], A[2]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether faith, among the fruits, responds to the gift of understanding?
Objection 1: It would seem that, among the fruits, faith does not
respond to the gift of understanding. For understanding is the fruit of
faith, since it is written (Is. 7:9) according to another reading [*The
Septuagint]: "If you will not believe you shall not understand," where
our version has: "If you will not believe, you shall not continue. "
Therefore fruit is not the fruit of understanding.
Objection 2: Further, that which precedes is not the fruit of what
follows. But faith seems to precede understanding, since it is the
foundation of the entire spiritual edifice, as stated above
([2372]Q[4], AA[1],7). Therefore faith is not the fruit of
understanding.
Objection 3: Further, more gifts pertain to the intellect than to the
appetite. Now, among the fruits, only one pertains to the intellect;
namely, faith, while all the others pertain to the appetite. Therefore
faith, seemingly, does not pertain to understanding more than to
wisdom, knowledge or counsel.
On the contrary, The end of a thing is its fruit. Now the gift of
understanding seems to be ordained chiefly to the certitude of faith,
which certitude is reckoned a fruit. For a gloss on Gal. 5:22 says that
the "faith which is a fruit, is certitude about the unseen. " Therefore
faith, among the fruits, responds to the gift of understanding.
I answer that, The fruits of the Spirit, as stated above ([2373]FS,
Q[70], A[1]), when we were discussing them, are so called because they
are something ultimate and delightful, produced in us by the power of
the Holy Ghost. Now the ultimate and delightful has the nature of an
end, which is the proper object of the will: and consequently that
which is ultimate and delightful with regard to the will, must be,
after a fashion, the fruit of all the other things that pertain to the
other powers.
Accordingly, therefore, to this kind of gift of virtue that perfects a
power, we may distinguish a double fruit: one, belonging to the same
power; the other, the last of all as it were, belonging to the will. In
this way we must conclude that the fruit which properly responds to the
gift of understanding is faith, i. e. the certitude of faith; while the
fruit that responds to it last of all is joy, which belongs to the
will.
Reply to Objection 1: Understanding is the fruit of faith, taken as a
virtue. But we are not taking faith in this sense here, but for a kind
of certitude of faith, to which man attains by the gift of
understanding.
Reply to Objection 2: Faith cannot altogether precede understanding,
for it would be impossible to assent by believing what is proposed to
be believed, without understanding it in some way. However, the
perfection of understanding follows the virtue of faith: which
perfection of understanding is itself followed by a kind of certainty
of faith.
Reply to Objection 3: The fruit of practical knowledge cannot consist
in that very knowledge, since knowledge of that kind is known not for
its own sake, but for the sake of something else. On the other hand,
speculative knowledge has its fruit in its very self, which fruit is
the certitude about the thing known. Hence the gift of counsel, which
belongs only to practical knowledge, has no corresponding fruit of its
own: while the gifts of wisdom, understanding and knowledge, which can
belongs also to speculative knowledge, have but one corresponding
fruit, which is certainly denoted by the name of faith. The reason why
there are several fruits pertaining to the appetitive faculty, is
because, as already stated, the character of end, which the word fruit
implies, pertains to the appetitive rather than to the intellective
part.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE GIFT OF KNOWLEDGE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the gift of knowledge, under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether knowledge is a gift?
(2) Whether it is about Divine things?
(3) Whether it is speculative or practical?
(4) Which beatitude responds to it?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether knowledge is a gift?
Objection 1: It would seem that knowledge is not a gift. For the gifts
of the Holy Ghost surpass the natural faculty. But knowledge implies an
effect of natural reason: for the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that
a "demonstration is a syllogism which produces knowledge. " Therefore
knowledge is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are common to all
holy persons, as stated above (Q[8], A[4]; [2374]FS, Q[68], A[5]). Now
Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "many of the faithful lack
knowledge though they have faith. " Therefore knowledge is not a gift.
Objection 3: Further, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, as
stated above ([2375]FS, Q[68], A[8]). Therefore one gift suffices for
the perfection of one virtue. Now the gift of understanding responds to
the virtue of faith, as stated above (Q[8], A[2]). Therefore the gift
of knowledge does not respond to that virtue, nor does it appear to
which other virtue it can respond. Since, then, the gifts are
perfections of virtues, as stated above ([2376]FS, Q[68], AA[1],2), it
seems that knowledge is not a gift.
On the contrary, Knowledge is reckoned among the seven gifts (Is.
11:2).
I answer that, Grace is more perfect than nature, and, therefore, does
not fail in those things wherein man can be perfected by nature. Now,
when a man, by his natural reason, assents by his intellect to some
truth, he is perfected in two ways in respect of that truth: first,
because he grasps it; secondly, because he forms a sure judgment on it.
Accordingly, two things are requisite in order that the human intellect
may perfectly assent to the truth of the faith: one of these is that he
should have a sound grasp of the things that are proposed to be
believed, and this pertains to the gift of understanding, as stated
above ([2377]Q[8], A[6]): while the other is that he should have a sure
and right judgment on them, so as to discern what is to be believed,
from what is not to be believed, and for this the gift of knowledge is
required.
Reply to Objection 1: Certitude of knowledge varies in various natures,
according to the various conditions of each nature. Because man forms a
sure judgment about a truth by the discursive process of his reason:
and so human knowledge is acquired by means of demonstrative reasoning.
On the other hand, in God, there is a sure judgment of truth, without
any discursive process, by simple intuition, as was stated in the
[2378]FP, Q[14], A[7]; wherefore God's knowledge is not discursive, or
argumentative, but absolute and simple, to which that knowledge is
likened which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, since it is a participated
likeness thereof.
Reply to Objection 2: A twofold knowledge may be had about matters of
belief. One is the knowledge of what one ought to believe by discerning
things to be believed from things not to be believe: in this way
knowledge is a gift and is common to all holy persons. The other is a
knowledge about matters of belief, whereby one knows not only what one
ought to believe, but also how to make the faith known, how to induce
others to believe, and confute those who deny the faith. This knowledge
is numbered among the gratuitous graces, which are not given to all,
but to some. Hence Augustine, after the words quoted, adds: "It is one
thing for a man merely to know what he ought to believe, and another to
know how to dispense what he believes to the godly, and to defend it
against the ungodly. "
Reply to Objection 3: The gifts are more perfect than the moral and
intellectual virtues; but they are not more perfect than the
theological virtues; rather are all the gifts ordained to the
perfection of the theological virtues, as to their end. Hence it is not
unreasonable if several gifts are ordained to one theological virtue.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the gift of knowledge is about Divine things?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of knowledge is about Divine
things. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "knowledge begets,
nourishes and strengthens faith. " Now faith is about Divine things,
because its object is the First Truth, as stated above ([2379]Q[1],
A[1]). Therefore the gift of knowledge also is about Divine things.
Objection 2: Further, the gift of knowledge is more excellent than
acquired knowledge. But there is an acquired knowledge about Divine
things, for instance, the science of metaphysics. Much more therefore
is the gift of knowledge about Divine things.
Objection 3: Further, according to Rom. 1:20, "the invisible things of
God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are
made. " If therefore there is knowledge about created things, it seems
that there is also knowledge of Divine things.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1): "The knowledge of
Divine things may be properly called wisdom, and the knowledge of human
affairs may properly receive the name of knowledge. "
I answer that, A sure judgment about a thing formed chiefly from its
cause, and so the order of judgments should be according to the order
of causes. For just as the first cause is the cause of the second, so
ought the judgment about the second cause to be formed through the
first cause: nor is it possible to judge of the first cause through any
other cause; wherefore the judgment which is formed through the first
cause, is the first and most perfect judgment.
Now in those things where we find something most perfect, the common
name of the genus is appropriated for those things which fall short of
the most perfect, and some special name is adapted to the most perfect
thing, as is the case in Logic. For in the genus of convertible terms,
that which signifies "what a thing is," is given the special name of
"definition," but the convertible terms which fall short of this,
retain the common name, and are called "proper" terms.
Accordingly, since the word knowledge implies certitude of judgment as
stated above [2380](A[1]), if this certitude of the judgment is derived
from the highest cause, the knowledge has a special name, which is
wisdom: for a wise man in any branch of knowledge is one who knows the
highest cause of that kind of knowledge, and is able to judge of all
matters by that cause: and a wise man "absolutely," is one who knows
the cause which is absolutely highest, namely God. Hence the knowledge
of Divine things is called "wisdom," while the knowledge of human
things is called "knowledge," this being the common name denoting
certitude of judgment, and appropriated to the judgment which is formed
through second causes. Accordingly, if we take knowledge in this way,
it is a distinct gift from the gift of wisdom, so that the gift of
knowledge is only about human or created things.
Reply to Objection 1: Although matters of faith are Divine and eternal,
yet faith itself is something temporal in the mind of the believer.
Hence to know what one ought to believe, belongs to the gift of
knowledge, but to know in themselves the very things we believe, by a
kind of union with them, belongs to the gift of wisdom. Therefore the
gift of wisdom corresponds more to charity which unites man's mind to
God.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument takes knowledge in the generic
acceptation of the term: it is not thus that knowledge is a special
gift, but according as it is restricted to judgments formed through
created things.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([2381]Q[1], A[1]), every
cognitive habit regards formally the mean through which things are
known, and materially, the things that are known through the mean. And
since that which is formal, is of most account, it follows that those
sciences which draw conclusions about physical matter from mathematical
principles, are reckoned rather among the mathematical sciences,
though, as to their matter they have more in common with physical
sciences: and for this reason it is stated in Phys. ii, 2 that they are
more akin to physics. Accordingly, since man knows God through His
creatures, this seems to pertain to "knowledge," to which it belongs
formally, rather than to "wisdom," to which it belongs materially: and,
conversely, when we judge of creatures according to Divine things, this
pertains to "wisdom" rather than to "knowledge. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the gift of knowledge is practical knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that the knowledge, which is numbered among
the gifts, is practical knowledge. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii,
14) that "knowledge is concerned with the actions in which we make use
of external things. " But the knowledge which is concerned about actions
is practical. Therefore the gift of knowledge is practical.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): "Knowledge is nought
if it hath not its use for piety . . . and piety is very useless if it
lacks the discernment of knowledge. " Now it follows from this authority
that knowledge directs piety. But this cannot apply to a speculative
science. Therefore the gift of knowledge is not speculative but
practical.
Objection 3: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are only in the
righteous, as stated above (Q[9], A[5]). But speculative knowledge can
be also in the unrighteous, according to James 4:17: "To him . . . who
knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin. " Therefore the
gift of knowledge is not speculative but practical.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): "Knowledge on her own day
prepares a feast, because she overcomes the fast of ignorance in the
mind. " Now ignorance is not entirely removed, save by both kinds of
knowledge, viz. speculative and practical. Therefore the gift of
knowledge is both speculative and practical.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[9], A[8]), the gift of knowledge,
like the gift of understanding, is ordained to the certitude of faith.
Now faith consists primarily and principally in speculation, in as much
as it is founded on the First Truth. But since the First Truth is also
the last end for the sake of which our works are done, hence it is that
faith extends to works, according to Gal. 5:6: "Faith . . . worketh by
charity. "
The consequence is that the gift of knowledge also, primarily and
principally indeed, regards speculation, in so far as man knows what he
ought to hold by faith; yet, secondarily, it extends to works, since we
are directed in our actions by the knowledge of matters of faith, and
of conclusions drawn therefrom.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of the gift of knowledge,
in so far as it extends to works; for action is ascribed to knowledge,
yet not action solely, nor primarily: and in this way it directs piety.
Hence the Reply to the Second Objection is clear.
Reply to Objection 3: As we have already stated ([2382]Q[8], A[5])
about the gift of understanding, not everyone who understands, has the
gift of understanding, but only he that understands through a habit of
grace: and so we must take note, with regard to the gift of knowledge,
that they alone have the gift of knowledge, who judge aright about
matters of faith and action, through the grace bestowed on them, so as
never to wander from the straight path of justice. This is the
knowledge of holy things, according to Wis. 10:10: "She conducted the
just . . . through the right ways . . . and gave him the knowledge of
holy things. "
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Whether the third beatitude, "Blessed are they that mourn," etc. corresponds
to the gift of knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that the third beatitude, "Blessed are they
that mourn," does not correspond to the gift of knowledge. For, even as
evil is the cause of sorrow and grief, so is good the cause of joy. Now
knowledge brings good to light rather than evil, since the latter is
known through evil: for "the straight line rules both itself and the
crooked line" (De Anima i, 5). Therefore the aforesaid beatitude does
not suitably correspond to the gift of knowledge.
Objection 2: Further, consideration of truth is an act of knowledge.
Now there is no sorrow in the consideration of truth; rather is there
joy, since it is written (Wis. 8:16): "Her conversation hath no
bitterness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness. "
Therefore the aforesaid beatitude does not suitably correspond with the
gift of knowledge.
Objection 3: Further, the gift of knowledge consists in speculation,
before operation. Now, in so far as it consists in speculation, sorrow
does not correspond to it, since "the speculative intellect is not
concerned about things to be sought or avoided" (De Anima iii, 9).
Therefore the aforesaid beatitude is not suitably reckoned to
correspond with the gift of knowledge.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte iv): "Knowledge
befits the mourner, who has discovered that he has been mastered by the
evil which he coveted as though it were good. "
I answer that, Right judgment about creatures belongs properly to
knowledge. Now it is through creatures that man's aversion from God is
occasioned, according to Wis. 14:11: "Creatures . . . are turned to an
abomination . . . and a snare to the feet of the unwise," of those,
namely, who do not judge aright about creatures, since they deem the
perfect good to consist in them. Hence they sin by placing their last
end in them, and lose the true good. It is by forming a right judgment
of creatures that man becomes aware of the loss (of which they may be
the occasion), which judgment he exercises through the gift of
knowledge.
Hence the beatitude of sorrow is said to correspond to the gift of
knowledge.
Reply to Objection 1: Created goods do not cause spiritual joy, except
in so far as they are referred to the Divine good, which is the proper
cause of spiritual joy. Hence spiritual peace and the resulting joy
correspond directly to the gift of wisdom: but to the gift of knowledge
there corresponds, in the first place, sorrow for past errors, and, in
consequence, consolation, since, by his right judgment, man directs
creatures to the Divine good. For this reason sorrow is set forth in
this beatitude, as the merit, and the resulting consolation, as the
reward; which is begun in this life, and is perfected in the life to
come.
Reply to Objection 2: Man rejoices in the very consideration of truth;
yet he may sometimes grieve for the thing, the truth of which he
considers: it is thus that sorrow is ascribed to knowledge.
Reply to Objection 3: No beatitude corresponds to knowledge, in so far
as it consists in speculation, because man's beatitude consists, not in
considering creatures, but in contemplating God. But man's beatitude
does consist somewhat in the right use of creatures, and in
well-ordered love of them: and this I say with regard to the beatitude
of a wayfarer. Hence beatitude relating to contemplation is not
ascribed to knowledge, but to understanding and wisdom, which are about
Divine things.
__________________________________________________________________
OF UNBELIEF IN GENERAL (TWELVE ARTICLES)
In due sequence we must consider the contrary vices: first, unbelief,
which is contrary to faith; secondly, blasphemy, which is opposed to
confession of faith; thirdly, ignorance and dulness of mind, which are
contrary to knowledge and understanding.
As to the first, we must consider (1) unbelief in general; (2) heresy;
(3) apostasy from the faith.
Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether unbelief is a sin?
(2) What is its subject?
(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?
(4) Whether every action of unbelievers is a sin?
(5) Of the species of unbelief;
(6) Of their comparison, one with another;
(7) Whether we ought to dispute about faith with unbelievers?
(8) Whether they ought to be compelled to the faith?
(9) Whether we ought to have communications with them?
(10) Whether unbelievers can have authority over Christians?
(11) Whether the rites of unbelievers should be tolerated?
natural habit of the soul, whereby self-evident principles are known,
as stated in Ethic. vi, 6. Therefore it should not be reckoned among
the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, the Divine gifts are shared by creatures
according to their capacity and mode, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom.
iv). Now the mode of human nature is to know the truth, not simply
(which is a sign of understanding), but discursively (which is a sign
of reason), as Dionysius explains (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore the Divine
knowledge which is bestowed on man, should be called a gift of reason
rather than a gift of understanding.
Objection 3: Further, in the powers of the soul the understanding is
condivided with the will (De Anima iii, 9,10). Now no gift of the Holy
Ghost is called after the will. Therefore no gift of the Holy Ghost
should receive the name of understanding.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2): "The Spirit of the Lord
shall rest upon him, the Spirit of wisdom of understanding. "
I answer that, Understanding implies an intimate knowledge, for
"intelligere" [to understand] is the same as "intus legere" [to read
inwardly]. This is clear to anyone who considers the difference between
intellect and sense, because sensitive knowledge is concerned with
external sensible qualities, whereas intellective knowledge penetrates
into the very essence of a thing, because the object of the intellect
is "what a thing is," as stated in De Anima iii, 6.
Now there are many kinds of things that are hidden within, to find
which human knowledge has to penetrate within so to speak. Thus, under
the accidents lies hidden the nature of the substantial reality, under
words lies hidden their meaning; under likenesses and figures the truth
they denote lies hidden (because the intelligible world is enclosed
within as compared with the sensible world, which is perceived
externally), and effects lie hidden in their causes, and vice versa.
Hence we may speak of understanding with regard to all these things.
Since, however, human knowledge begins with the outside of things as it
were, it is evident that the stronger the light of the understanding,
the further can it penetrate into the heart of things. Now the natural
light of our understanding is of finite power; wherefore it can reach
to a certain fixed point. Consequently man needs a supernatural light
in order to penetrate further still so as to know what it cannot know
by its natural light: and this supernatural light which is bestowed on
man is called the gift of understanding.
Reply to Objection 1: The natural light instilled within us, manifests
only certain general principles, which are known naturally. But since
man is ordained to supernatural happiness, as stated above (Q[2], A[3];
[2356]FS, Q[3] , A[8]), man needs to reach to certain higher truths,
for which he requires the gift of understanding.
Reply to Objection 2: The discourse of reason always begins from an
understanding and ends at an understanding; because we reason by
proceeding from certain understood principles, and the discourse of
reason is perfected when we come to understand what hitherto we
ignored. Hence the act of reasoning proceeds from something previously
understood. Now a gift of grace does not proceed from the light of
nature, but is added thereto as perfecting it. Wherefore this addition
is not called "reason" but "understanding," since the additional light
is in comparison with what we know supernaturally, what the natural
light is in regard to those things which we known from the first.
Reply to Objection 3: "Will" denotes simply a movement of the appetite
without indicating any excellence; whereas "understanding" denotes a
certain excellence of a knowledge that penetrates into the heart of
things. Hence the supernatural gift is called after the understanding
rather than after the will.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the gift of understanding is compatible with faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is
incompatible with faith. For Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 15) that
"the thing which is understood is bounded by the comprehension of him
who understands it. " But the thing which is believed is not
comprehended, according to the word of the Apostle to the Philippians
3:12: "Not as though I had already comprehended [Douay: 'attained'], or
were already perfect. " Therefore it seems that faith and understanding
are incompatible in the same subject.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is understood is seen by the
understanding. But faith is of things that appear not, as stated above
([2357]Q[1], A[4];[2358] Q[4], A[1]). Therefore faith is incompatible
with understanding in the same subject.
Objection 3: Further, understanding is more certain than science. But
science and faith are incompatible in the same subject, as stated above
([2359]Q[1], AA[4],5). Much less, therefore, can understanding and
faith be in the same subject.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 15) that "understanding
enlightens the mind concerning the things it has heard. " Now one who
has faith can be enlightened in his mind concerning what he has heard;
thus it is written (Lk. 24:27, 32) that Our Lord opened the scriptures
to His disciples, that they might understand them. Therefore
understanding is compatible with faith.
I answer that, We need to make a twofold distinction here: one on the
side of faith, the other on the part of understanding.
On the side of faith the distinction to be made is that certain things,
of themselves, come directly under faith, such as the mystery to three
Persons in one God, and the incarnation of God the Son; whereas other
things come under faith, through being subordinate, in one way or
another, to those just mentioned, for instance, all that is contained
in the Divine Scriptures.
On the part of understanding the distinction to be observed is that
there are two ways in which we may be said to understand. In one way,
we understand a thing perfectly, when we arrive at knowing the essence
of the thing we understand, and the very truth considered in itself of
the proposition understood. In this way, so long as the state of faith
lasts, we cannot understand those things which are the direct object of
faith: although certain other things that are subordinate to faith can
be understood even in this way.
In another way we understand a thing imperfectly, when the essence of a
thing or the truth of a proposition is not known as to its quiddity or
mode of being, and yet we know that whatever be the outward
appearances, they do not contradict the truth, in so far as we
understand that we ought not to depart from matters of faith, for the
sake of things that appear externally. In this way, even during the
state of faith, nothing hinders us from understanding even those things
which are the direct object of faith.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first three
argue in reference to perfect understanding, while the last refers to
the understanding of matters subordinate to faith.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the gift of understanding is merely speculative or also practical?
Objection 1: It would seem that understanding, considered as a gift of
the Holy Ghost, is not practical, but only speculative. For, according
to Gregory (Moral. i, 32), "understanding penetrates certain more
exalted things. " But the practical intellect is occupied, not with
exalted, but with inferior things, viz. singulars, about which actions
are concerned. Therefore understanding, considered as a gift, is not
practical.
Objection 2: Further, the gift of understanding is something more
excellent than the intellectual virtue of understanding. But the
intellectual virtue of understanding is concerned with none but
necessary things, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 6). Much
more, therefore, is the gift of understanding concerned with none but
necessary matters. Now the practical intellect is not about necessary
things, but about things which may be otherwise than they are, and
which may result from man's activity. Therefore the gift of
understanding is not practical.
Objection 3: Further, the gift of understanding enlightens the mind in
matters which surpass natural reason. Now human activities, with which
the practical intellect is concerned, do not surpass natural reason,
which is the directing principle in matters of action, as was made
clear above ([2360]FS, Q[58], A[2]; [2361]FS, Q[71], A[6]). Therefore
the gift of understanding is not practical.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 110:10): "A good understanding to
all that do it. "
I answer that, As stated above [2362](A[2]), the gift of understanding
is not only about those things which come under faith first and
principally, but also about all things subordinate to faith. Now good
actions have a certain relationship to faith: since "faith worketh
through charity," according to the Apostle (Gal. 5:6). Hence the gift
of understanding extends also to certain actions, not as though these
were its principal object, but in so far as the rule of our actions is
the eternal law, to which the higher reason, which is perfected by the
gift of understanding, adheres by contemplating and consulting it, as
Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 7).
Reply to Objection 1: The things with which human actions are concerned
are not surpassingly exalted considered in themselves, but, as referred
to the rule of the eternal law, and to the end of Divine happiness,
they are exalted so that they can be the matter of understanding.
Reply to Objection 2: The excellence of the gift of understanding
consists precisely in its considering eternal or necessary matters, not
only as they are rules of human actions, because a cognitive virtue is
the more excellent, according to the greater extent of its object.
Reply to Objection 3: The rule of human actions is the human reason and
the eternal law, as stated above ([2363]FS, Q[71], A[6]). Now the
eternal law surpasses human reason: so that the knowledge of human
actions, as ruled by the eternal law, surpasses the natural reason, and
requires the supernatural light of a gift of the Holy Ghost.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the gift of understanding is in all who are in a state of grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is not in all
who are in a state of grace. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "the
gift of understanding is given as a remedy against dulness of mind. "
Now many who are in a state of grace suffer from dulness of mind.
Therefore the gift of understanding is not in all who are in a state of
grace.
Objection 2: Further, of all the things that are connected with
knowledge, faith alone seems to be necessary for salvation, since by
faith Christ dwells in our hearts, according to Eph. 3:17. Now the gift
of understanding is not in everyone that has faith; indeed, those who
have faith ought to pray that they may understand, as Augustine says
(De Trin. xv, 27). Therefore the gift of understanding is not necessary
for salvation: and, consequently, is not in all who are in a state of
grace.
Objection 3: Further, those things which are common to all who are in a
state of grace, are never withdrawn from them. Now the grace of
understanding and of the other gifts sometimes withdraws itself
profitably, for, at times, "when the mind is puffed up with
understanding sublime things, it becomes sluggish and dull in base and
vile things," as Gregory observes (Moral. ii, 49). Therefore the gift
of understanding is not in all who are in a state of grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 81:5): "They have not known or
understood, they walk on in darkness. " But no one who is in a state of
grace walks in darkness, according to Jn. 8:12: "He that followeth Me,
walketh not in darkness. " Therefore no one who is in a state of grace
is without the gift of understanding.
I answer that, In all who are in a state of grace, there must needs be
rectitude of the will, since grace prepares man's will for good,
according to Augustine (Contra Julian. Pelag. iv, 3). Now the will
cannot be rightly directed to good, unless there be already some
knowledge of the truth, since the object of the will is good
understood, as stated in De Anima iii, 7. Again, just as the Holy Ghost
directs man's will by the gift of charity, so as to move it directly to
some supernatural good; so also, by the gift of understanding, He
enlightens the human mind, so that it knows some supernatural truth, to
which the right will needs to tend.
Therefore, just as the gift of charity is in all of those who have
sanctifying grace, so also is the gift of understanding.
Reply to Objection 1: Some who have sanctifying grace may suffer
dulness of mind with regard to things that are not necessary for
salvation; but with regard to those that are necessary for salvation,
they are sufficiently instructed by the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Jn.
2:27: "His unction teacheth you of all things. "
Reply to Objection 2: Although not all who have faith understand fully
the things that are proposed to be believed, yet they understand that
they ought to believe them, and that they ought nowise to deviate from
them.
Reply to Objection 3: With regard to things necessary for salvation,
the gift of understanding never withdraws from holy persons: but, in
order that they may have no incentive to pride, it does withdraw
sometimes with regard to other things, so that their mind is unable to
penetrate all things clearly.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the gift of understanding is found also in those who have not
sanctifying grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is found also
in those who have not sanctifying grace. For Augustine, in expounding
the words of Ps. 118:20: "My soul hath coveted to long for Thy
justifications," says: "Understanding flies ahead, and man's will is
weak and slow to follow. " But in all who have sanctifying grace, the
will is prompt on account of charity. Therefore the gift of
understanding can be in those who have not sanctifying grace.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Dan. 10:1) that "there is need of
understanding in a" prophetic "vision," so that, seemingly, there is no
prophecy without the gift of understanding. But there can be prophecy
without sanctifying grace, as evidenced by Mat. 7:22, where those who
say: "We have prophesied in Thy name [*Vulg. : 'Have we not prophesied
in Thy name? ]," are answered with the words: "I never knew you. "
Therefore the gift of understanding can be without sanctifying grace.
Objection 3: Further, the gift of understanding responds to the virtue
of faith, according to Is. 7:9, following another reading [*The
Septuagint]: "If you will not believe you shall not understand. " Now
faith can be without sanctifying grace. Therefore the gift of
understanding can be without it.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 6:45): "Every one that hath heard
of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me. " Now it is by the
intellect, as Gregory observes (Moral. i, 32), that we learn or
understand what we hear. Therefore whoever has the gift of
understanding, cometh to Christ, which is impossible without
sanctifying grace. Therefore the gift of understanding cannot be
without sanctifying grace.
I answer that, As stated above ([2364]FS, Q[68], AA[1],2) the gifts of
the Holy Ghost perfect the soul, according as it is amenable to the
motion of the Holy Ghost. Accordingly then, the intellectual light of
grace is called the gift of understanding, in so far as man's
understanding is easily moved by the Holy Ghost, the consideration of
which movement depends on a true apprehension of the end. Wherefore
unless the human intellect be moved by the Holy Ghost so far as to have
a right estimate of the end, it has not yet obtained the gift of
understanding, however much the Holy Ghost may have enlightened it in
regard to other truths that are preambles to the faith.
Now to have a right estimate about the last end one must not be in
error about the end, and must adhere to it firmly as to the greatest
good: and no one can do this without sanctifying grace; even as in
moral matters a man has a right estimate about the end through a habit
of virtue. Therefore no one has the gift of understanding without
sanctifying grace.
Reply to Objection 1: By understanding Augustine means any kind of
intellectual light, that, however, does not fulfil all the conditions
of a gift, unless the mind of man be so far perfected as to have a
right estimate about the end.
Reply to Objection 2: The understanding that is requisite for prophecy,
is a kind of enlightenment of the mind with regard to the things
revealed to the prophet: but it is not an enlightenment of the mind
with regard to a right estimate about the last end, which belongs to
the gift of understanding.
Reply to Objection 3: Faith implies merely assent to what is proposed
but understanding implies a certain perception of the truth, which
perception, except in one who has sanctifying grace, cannot regard the
end, as stated above. Hence the comparison fails between understanding
and faith.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the gift of understanding is distinct from the other gifts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is not
distinct from the other gifts. For there is no distinction between
things whose opposites are not distinct. Now "wisdom is contrary to
folly, understanding is contrary to dulness, counsel is contrary to
rashness, knowledge is contrary to ignorance," as Gregory states
(Moral. ii, 49). But there would seem to be no difference between
folly, dulness, ignorance and rashness. Therefore neither does
understanding differ from the other gifts.
Objection 2: Further, the intellectual virtue of understanding differs
from the other intellectual virtues in that it is proper to it to be
about self-evident principles. But the gift of understanding is not
about any self-evident principles, since the natural habit of first
principles suffices in respect of those matters which are naturally
self-evident: while faith is sufficient in respect of such things as
are supernatural, since the articles of faith are like first principles
in supernatural knowledge, as stated above ([2365]Q[1], A[7]).
Therefore the gift of understanding does not differ from the other
intellectual gifts.
Objection 3: Further, all intellectual knowledge is either speculative
or practical. Now the gift of understanding is related to both, as
stated above [2366](A[3]). Therefore it is not distinct from the other
intellectual gifts, but comprises them all.
On the contrary, When several things are enumerated together they must
be, in some way, distinct from one another, because distinction is the
origin of number. Now the gift of understanding is enumerated together
with the other gifts, as appears from Is. 11:2. Therefore the gift of
understanding is distinct from the other gifts.
I answer that, The difference between the gift of understanding and
three of the others, viz. piety, fortitude, and fear, is evident, since
the gift of understanding belongs to the cognitive power, while the
three belong to the appetitive power.
But the difference between this gift of understanding and the remaining
three, viz. wisdom, knowledge, and counsel, which also belong to the
cognitive power, is not so evident. To some [*William of Auxerre, Sum.
Aur. III, iii, 8], it seems that the gift of understanding differs from
the gifts of knowledge and counsel, in that these two belong to
practical knowledge, while the gift of understanding belongs to
speculative knowledge; and that it differs from the gift of wisdom,
which also belongs to speculative knowledge, in that wisdom is
concerned with judgment, while understanding renders the mind apt to
grasp the things that are proposed, and to penetrate into their very
heart. And in this sense we have assigned the number of the gifts,
above ([2367]FS, Q[68], A[4]).
But if we consider the matter carefully, the gift of understanding is
concerned not only with speculative, but also with practical matters,
as stated above [2368](A[3]), and likewise, the gift of knowledge
regards both matters, as we shall show further on (Q[9], A[3]), and
consequently, we must take their distinction in some other way. For all
these four gifts are ordained to supernatural knowledge, which, in us,
takes its foundation from faith. Now "faith is through hearing" (Rom.
10:17). Hence some things must be proposed to be believed by man, not
as seen, but as heard, to which he assents by faith. But faith, first
and principally, is about the First Truth, secondarily, about certain
considerations concerning creatures, and furthermore extends to the
direction of human actions, in so far as it works through charity, as
appears from what has been said above (Q[4], A[2], ad 3).
Accordingly on the part of the things proposed to faith for belief, two
things are requisite on our part: first that they be penetrated or
grasped by the intellect, and this belongs to the gift of
understanding. Secondly, it is necessary that man should judge these
things aright, that he should esteem that he ought to adhere to these
things, and to withdraw from their opposites: and this judgment, with
regard to Divine things belong to the gift of wisdom, but with regard
to created things, belongs to the gift of knowledge, and as to its
application to individual actions, belongs to the gift of counsel.
Reply to Objection 1: The foregoing difference between those four gifts
is clearly in agreement with the distinction of those things which
Gregory assigns as their opposites. For dulness is contrary to
sharpness, since an intellect is said, by comparison, to be sharp, when
it is able to penetrate into the heart of the things that are proposed
to it. Hence it is dulness of mind that renders the mind unable to
pierce into the heart of a thing. A man is said to be a fool if he
judges wrongly about the common end of life, wherefore folly is
properly opposed to wisdom, which makes us judge aright about the
universal cause. Ignorance implies a defect in the mind, even about any
particular things whatever, so that it is contrary to knowledge, which
gives man a right judgment about particular causes, viz. about
creatures. Rashness is clearly opposed to counsel, whereby man does not
proceed to action before deliberating with his reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The gift of understanding is about the first
principles of that knowledge which is conferred by grace; but otherwise
than faith, because it belongs to faith to assent to them, while it
belongs to the gift of understanding to pierce with the mind the things
that are said.
Reply to Objection 3: The gift of understanding is related to both
kinds of knowledge, viz. speculative and practical, not as to the
judgment, but as to apprehension, by grasping what is said.
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Whether the sixth beatitude, "Blessed are the clean of heart," etc. ,
responds to the gift of understanding?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sixth beatitude, "Blessed are the
clean of heart, for they shall see God," does not respond to the gift
of understanding. Because cleanness of heart seems to belong chiefly to
the appetite. But the gift of understanding belongs, not to the
appetite, but rather to the intellectual power. Therefore the aforesaid
beatitude does not respond to the gift of understanding.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Acts 15:9): "Purifying their
hearts by faith. " Now cleanness of heart is acquired by the heart being
purified. Therefore the aforesaid beatitude is related to the virtue of
faith rather than to the gift of understanding.
Objection 3: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in the
present state of life. But the sight of God does not belong to the
present life, since it is that which gives happiness to the Blessed, as
stated above ([2369]FS, Q[3], A[8]).
Therefore the sixth beatitude
which comprises the sight of God, does not respond to the gift of
understanding.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "The
sixth work of the Holy Ghost which is understanding, is applicable to
the clean of heart, whose eye being purified, they can see what eye
hath not seen. "
I answer that, Two things are contained in the sixth beatitude, as also
in the others, one by way of merit, viz. cleanness of heart; the other
by way of reward, viz. the sight of God, as stated above ([2370]FS,
Q[69], AA[2] ,4), and each of these, in some way, responds to the gift
of understanding.
For cleanness is twofold. One is a preamble and a disposition to seeing
God, and consists in the heart being cleansed of inordinate affections:
and this cleanness of heart is effected by the virtues and gifts
belonging to the appetitive power. The other cleanness of heart is a
kind of complement to the sight of God; such is the cleanness of the
mind that is purged of phantasms and errors, so as to receive the
truths which are proposed to it about God, no longer by way of
corporeal phantasms, nor infected with heretical misrepresentations:
and this cleanness is the result of the gift of understanding.
Again, the sight of God is twofold. One is perfect, whereby God's
Essence is seen: the other is imperfect, whereby, though we see not
what God is, yet we see what He is not; and whereby, the more perfectly
do we know God in this life, the more we understand that He surpasses
all that the mind comprehends. Each of these visions of God belongs to
the gift of understanding; the first, to the gift of understanding in
its state of perfection, as possessed in heaven; the second, to the
gift of understanding in its state of inchoation, as possessed by
wayfarers.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first two
arguments refer to the first kind of cleanness; while the third refers
to the perfect vision of God. Moreover the gifts both perfect us in
this life by way of inchoation, and will be fulfilled, as stated above
([2371]FS, Q[69], A[2]).
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Whether faith, among the fruits, responds to the gift of understanding?
Objection 1: It would seem that, among the fruits, faith does not
respond to the gift of understanding. For understanding is the fruit of
faith, since it is written (Is. 7:9) according to another reading [*The
Septuagint]: "If you will not believe you shall not understand," where
our version has: "If you will not believe, you shall not continue. "
Therefore fruit is not the fruit of understanding.
Objection 2: Further, that which precedes is not the fruit of what
follows. But faith seems to precede understanding, since it is the
foundation of the entire spiritual edifice, as stated above
([2372]Q[4], AA[1],7). Therefore faith is not the fruit of
understanding.
Objection 3: Further, more gifts pertain to the intellect than to the
appetite. Now, among the fruits, only one pertains to the intellect;
namely, faith, while all the others pertain to the appetite. Therefore
faith, seemingly, does not pertain to understanding more than to
wisdom, knowledge or counsel.
On the contrary, The end of a thing is its fruit. Now the gift of
understanding seems to be ordained chiefly to the certitude of faith,
which certitude is reckoned a fruit. For a gloss on Gal. 5:22 says that
the "faith which is a fruit, is certitude about the unseen. " Therefore
faith, among the fruits, responds to the gift of understanding.
I answer that, The fruits of the Spirit, as stated above ([2373]FS,
Q[70], A[1]), when we were discussing them, are so called because they
are something ultimate and delightful, produced in us by the power of
the Holy Ghost. Now the ultimate and delightful has the nature of an
end, which is the proper object of the will: and consequently that
which is ultimate and delightful with regard to the will, must be,
after a fashion, the fruit of all the other things that pertain to the
other powers.
Accordingly, therefore, to this kind of gift of virtue that perfects a
power, we may distinguish a double fruit: one, belonging to the same
power; the other, the last of all as it were, belonging to the will. In
this way we must conclude that the fruit which properly responds to the
gift of understanding is faith, i. e. the certitude of faith; while the
fruit that responds to it last of all is joy, which belongs to the
will.
Reply to Objection 1: Understanding is the fruit of faith, taken as a
virtue. But we are not taking faith in this sense here, but for a kind
of certitude of faith, to which man attains by the gift of
understanding.
Reply to Objection 2: Faith cannot altogether precede understanding,
for it would be impossible to assent by believing what is proposed to
be believed, without understanding it in some way. However, the
perfection of understanding follows the virtue of faith: which
perfection of understanding is itself followed by a kind of certainty
of faith.
Reply to Objection 3: The fruit of practical knowledge cannot consist
in that very knowledge, since knowledge of that kind is known not for
its own sake, but for the sake of something else. On the other hand,
speculative knowledge has its fruit in its very self, which fruit is
the certitude about the thing known. Hence the gift of counsel, which
belongs only to practical knowledge, has no corresponding fruit of its
own: while the gifts of wisdom, understanding and knowledge, which can
belongs also to speculative knowledge, have but one corresponding
fruit, which is certainly denoted by the name of faith. The reason why
there are several fruits pertaining to the appetitive faculty, is
because, as already stated, the character of end, which the word fruit
implies, pertains to the appetitive rather than to the intellective
part.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE GIFT OF KNOWLEDGE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the gift of knowledge, under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether knowledge is a gift?
(2) Whether it is about Divine things?
(3) Whether it is speculative or practical?
(4) Which beatitude responds to it?
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Whether knowledge is a gift?
Objection 1: It would seem that knowledge is not a gift. For the gifts
of the Holy Ghost surpass the natural faculty. But knowledge implies an
effect of natural reason: for the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that
a "demonstration is a syllogism which produces knowledge. " Therefore
knowledge is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are common to all
holy persons, as stated above (Q[8], A[4]; [2374]FS, Q[68], A[5]). Now
Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "many of the faithful lack
knowledge though they have faith. " Therefore knowledge is not a gift.
Objection 3: Further, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, as
stated above ([2375]FS, Q[68], A[8]). Therefore one gift suffices for
the perfection of one virtue. Now the gift of understanding responds to
the virtue of faith, as stated above (Q[8], A[2]). Therefore the gift
of knowledge does not respond to that virtue, nor does it appear to
which other virtue it can respond. Since, then, the gifts are
perfections of virtues, as stated above ([2376]FS, Q[68], AA[1],2), it
seems that knowledge is not a gift.
On the contrary, Knowledge is reckoned among the seven gifts (Is.
11:2).
I answer that, Grace is more perfect than nature, and, therefore, does
not fail in those things wherein man can be perfected by nature. Now,
when a man, by his natural reason, assents by his intellect to some
truth, he is perfected in two ways in respect of that truth: first,
because he grasps it; secondly, because he forms a sure judgment on it.
Accordingly, two things are requisite in order that the human intellect
may perfectly assent to the truth of the faith: one of these is that he
should have a sound grasp of the things that are proposed to be
believed, and this pertains to the gift of understanding, as stated
above ([2377]Q[8], A[6]): while the other is that he should have a sure
and right judgment on them, so as to discern what is to be believed,
from what is not to be believed, and for this the gift of knowledge is
required.
Reply to Objection 1: Certitude of knowledge varies in various natures,
according to the various conditions of each nature. Because man forms a
sure judgment about a truth by the discursive process of his reason:
and so human knowledge is acquired by means of demonstrative reasoning.
On the other hand, in God, there is a sure judgment of truth, without
any discursive process, by simple intuition, as was stated in the
[2378]FP, Q[14], A[7]; wherefore God's knowledge is not discursive, or
argumentative, but absolute and simple, to which that knowledge is
likened which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, since it is a participated
likeness thereof.
Reply to Objection 2: A twofold knowledge may be had about matters of
belief. One is the knowledge of what one ought to believe by discerning
things to be believed from things not to be believe: in this way
knowledge is a gift and is common to all holy persons. The other is a
knowledge about matters of belief, whereby one knows not only what one
ought to believe, but also how to make the faith known, how to induce
others to believe, and confute those who deny the faith. This knowledge
is numbered among the gratuitous graces, which are not given to all,
but to some. Hence Augustine, after the words quoted, adds: "It is one
thing for a man merely to know what he ought to believe, and another to
know how to dispense what he believes to the godly, and to defend it
against the ungodly. "
Reply to Objection 3: The gifts are more perfect than the moral and
intellectual virtues; but they are not more perfect than the
theological virtues; rather are all the gifts ordained to the
perfection of the theological virtues, as to their end. Hence it is not
unreasonable if several gifts are ordained to one theological virtue.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the gift of knowledge is about Divine things?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of knowledge is about Divine
things. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "knowledge begets,
nourishes and strengthens faith. " Now faith is about Divine things,
because its object is the First Truth, as stated above ([2379]Q[1],
A[1]). Therefore the gift of knowledge also is about Divine things.
Objection 2: Further, the gift of knowledge is more excellent than
acquired knowledge. But there is an acquired knowledge about Divine
things, for instance, the science of metaphysics. Much more therefore
is the gift of knowledge about Divine things.
Objection 3: Further, according to Rom. 1:20, "the invisible things of
God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are
made. " If therefore there is knowledge about created things, it seems
that there is also knowledge of Divine things.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1): "The knowledge of
Divine things may be properly called wisdom, and the knowledge of human
affairs may properly receive the name of knowledge. "
I answer that, A sure judgment about a thing formed chiefly from its
cause, and so the order of judgments should be according to the order
of causes. For just as the first cause is the cause of the second, so
ought the judgment about the second cause to be formed through the
first cause: nor is it possible to judge of the first cause through any
other cause; wherefore the judgment which is formed through the first
cause, is the first and most perfect judgment.
Now in those things where we find something most perfect, the common
name of the genus is appropriated for those things which fall short of
the most perfect, and some special name is adapted to the most perfect
thing, as is the case in Logic. For in the genus of convertible terms,
that which signifies "what a thing is," is given the special name of
"definition," but the convertible terms which fall short of this,
retain the common name, and are called "proper" terms.
Accordingly, since the word knowledge implies certitude of judgment as
stated above [2380](A[1]), if this certitude of the judgment is derived
from the highest cause, the knowledge has a special name, which is
wisdom: for a wise man in any branch of knowledge is one who knows the
highest cause of that kind of knowledge, and is able to judge of all
matters by that cause: and a wise man "absolutely," is one who knows
the cause which is absolutely highest, namely God. Hence the knowledge
of Divine things is called "wisdom," while the knowledge of human
things is called "knowledge," this being the common name denoting
certitude of judgment, and appropriated to the judgment which is formed
through second causes. Accordingly, if we take knowledge in this way,
it is a distinct gift from the gift of wisdom, so that the gift of
knowledge is only about human or created things.
Reply to Objection 1: Although matters of faith are Divine and eternal,
yet faith itself is something temporal in the mind of the believer.
Hence to know what one ought to believe, belongs to the gift of
knowledge, but to know in themselves the very things we believe, by a
kind of union with them, belongs to the gift of wisdom. Therefore the
gift of wisdom corresponds more to charity which unites man's mind to
God.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument takes knowledge in the generic
acceptation of the term: it is not thus that knowledge is a special
gift, but according as it is restricted to judgments formed through
created things.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([2381]Q[1], A[1]), every
cognitive habit regards formally the mean through which things are
known, and materially, the things that are known through the mean. And
since that which is formal, is of most account, it follows that those
sciences which draw conclusions about physical matter from mathematical
principles, are reckoned rather among the mathematical sciences,
though, as to their matter they have more in common with physical
sciences: and for this reason it is stated in Phys. ii, 2 that they are
more akin to physics. Accordingly, since man knows God through His
creatures, this seems to pertain to "knowledge," to which it belongs
formally, rather than to "wisdom," to which it belongs materially: and,
conversely, when we judge of creatures according to Divine things, this
pertains to "wisdom" rather than to "knowledge. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the gift of knowledge is practical knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that the knowledge, which is numbered among
the gifts, is practical knowledge. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii,
14) that "knowledge is concerned with the actions in which we make use
of external things. " But the knowledge which is concerned about actions
is practical. Therefore the gift of knowledge is practical.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): "Knowledge is nought
if it hath not its use for piety . . . and piety is very useless if it
lacks the discernment of knowledge. " Now it follows from this authority
that knowledge directs piety. But this cannot apply to a speculative
science. Therefore the gift of knowledge is not speculative but
practical.
Objection 3: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are only in the
righteous, as stated above (Q[9], A[5]). But speculative knowledge can
be also in the unrighteous, according to James 4:17: "To him . . . who
knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin. " Therefore the
gift of knowledge is not speculative but practical.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): "Knowledge on her own day
prepares a feast, because she overcomes the fast of ignorance in the
mind. " Now ignorance is not entirely removed, save by both kinds of
knowledge, viz. speculative and practical. Therefore the gift of
knowledge is both speculative and practical.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[9], A[8]), the gift of knowledge,
like the gift of understanding, is ordained to the certitude of faith.
Now faith consists primarily and principally in speculation, in as much
as it is founded on the First Truth. But since the First Truth is also
the last end for the sake of which our works are done, hence it is that
faith extends to works, according to Gal. 5:6: "Faith . . . worketh by
charity. "
The consequence is that the gift of knowledge also, primarily and
principally indeed, regards speculation, in so far as man knows what he
ought to hold by faith; yet, secondarily, it extends to works, since we
are directed in our actions by the knowledge of matters of faith, and
of conclusions drawn therefrom.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of the gift of knowledge,
in so far as it extends to works; for action is ascribed to knowledge,
yet not action solely, nor primarily: and in this way it directs piety.
Hence the Reply to the Second Objection is clear.
Reply to Objection 3: As we have already stated ([2382]Q[8], A[5])
about the gift of understanding, not everyone who understands, has the
gift of understanding, but only he that understands through a habit of
grace: and so we must take note, with regard to the gift of knowledge,
that they alone have the gift of knowledge, who judge aright about
matters of faith and action, through the grace bestowed on them, so as
never to wander from the straight path of justice. This is the
knowledge of holy things, according to Wis. 10:10: "She conducted the
just . . . through the right ways . . . and gave him the knowledge of
holy things. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the third beatitude, "Blessed are they that mourn," etc. corresponds
to the gift of knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that the third beatitude, "Blessed are they
that mourn," does not correspond to the gift of knowledge. For, even as
evil is the cause of sorrow and grief, so is good the cause of joy. Now
knowledge brings good to light rather than evil, since the latter is
known through evil: for "the straight line rules both itself and the
crooked line" (De Anima i, 5). Therefore the aforesaid beatitude does
not suitably correspond to the gift of knowledge.
Objection 2: Further, consideration of truth is an act of knowledge.
Now there is no sorrow in the consideration of truth; rather is there
joy, since it is written (Wis. 8:16): "Her conversation hath no
bitterness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness. "
Therefore the aforesaid beatitude does not suitably correspond with the
gift of knowledge.
Objection 3: Further, the gift of knowledge consists in speculation,
before operation. Now, in so far as it consists in speculation, sorrow
does not correspond to it, since "the speculative intellect is not
concerned about things to be sought or avoided" (De Anima iii, 9).
Therefore the aforesaid beatitude is not suitably reckoned to
correspond with the gift of knowledge.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte iv): "Knowledge
befits the mourner, who has discovered that he has been mastered by the
evil which he coveted as though it were good. "
I answer that, Right judgment about creatures belongs properly to
knowledge. Now it is through creatures that man's aversion from God is
occasioned, according to Wis. 14:11: "Creatures . . . are turned to an
abomination . . . and a snare to the feet of the unwise," of those,
namely, who do not judge aright about creatures, since they deem the
perfect good to consist in them. Hence they sin by placing their last
end in them, and lose the true good. It is by forming a right judgment
of creatures that man becomes aware of the loss (of which they may be
the occasion), which judgment he exercises through the gift of
knowledge.
Hence the beatitude of sorrow is said to correspond to the gift of
knowledge.
Reply to Objection 1: Created goods do not cause spiritual joy, except
in so far as they are referred to the Divine good, which is the proper
cause of spiritual joy. Hence spiritual peace and the resulting joy
correspond directly to the gift of wisdom: but to the gift of knowledge
there corresponds, in the first place, sorrow for past errors, and, in
consequence, consolation, since, by his right judgment, man directs
creatures to the Divine good. For this reason sorrow is set forth in
this beatitude, as the merit, and the resulting consolation, as the
reward; which is begun in this life, and is perfected in the life to
come.
Reply to Objection 2: Man rejoices in the very consideration of truth;
yet he may sometimes grieve for the thing, the truth of which he
considers: it is thus that sorrow is ascribed to knowledge.
Reply to Objection 3: No beatitude corresponds to knowledge, in so far
as it consists in speculation, because man's beatitude consists, not in
considering creatures, but in contemplating God. But man's beatitude
does consist somewhat in the right use of creatures, and in
well-ordered love of them: and this I say with regard to the beatitude
of a wayfarer. Hence beatitude relating to contemplation is not
ascribed to knowledge, but to understanding and wisdom, which are about
Divine things.
__________________________________________________________________
OF UNBELIEF IN GENERAL (TWELVE ARTICLES)
In due sequence we must consider the contrary vices: first, unbelief,
which is contrary to faith; secondly, blasphemy, which is opposed to
confession of faith; thirdly, ignorance and dulness of mind, which are
contrary to knowledge and understanding.
As to the first, we must consider (1) unbelief in general; (2) heresy;
(3) apostasy from the faith.
Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether unbelief is a sin?
(2) What is its subject?
(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?
(4) Whether every action of unbelievers is a sin?
(5) Of the species of unbelief;
(6) Of their comparison, one with another;
(7) Whether we ought to dispute about faith with unbelievers?
(8) Whether they ought to be compelled to the faith?
(9) Whether we ought to have communications with them?
(10) Whether unbelievers can have authority over Christians?
(11) Whether the rites of unbelievers should be tolerated?
