ii): "He that has the wit to understand that
in order to know the truth it is necessary to get at the sense, will
conclude that he must not be the least troubled, no matter by what
words that sense is expressed.
in order to know the truth it is necessary to get at the sense, will
conclude that he must not be the least troubled, no matter by what
words that sense is expressed.
Summa Theologica
For the brave man intends to act
bravely: and that he shows his fortitude by acting bravely is a
consequence beside his principal intention.
Reply to Objection 3: The truth of life is the truth whereby a thing is
true, not whereby a person says what is true. Life like anything else
is said to be true, from the fact that it attains its rule and measure,
namely, the divine law; since rectitude of life depends on conformity
to that law. This truth or rectitude is common to every virtue.
Reply to Objection 4: Simplicity is so called from its opposition to
duplicity, whereby, to wit, a man shows one thing outwardly while
having another in his heart: so that simplicity pertains to this
virtue. And it rectifies the intention, not indeed directly (since this
belongs to every virtue), but by excluding duplicity, whereby a man
pretends one thing and intends another.
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Whether truth is a part of justice?
Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a part of justice. For it seems
proper to justice to give another man his due. But, by telling the
truth, one does not seem to give another man his due, as is the case in
all the foregoing parts of justice. Therefore truth is not a part of
justice.
Objection 2: Further, truth pertains to the intellect: whereas justice
is in the will, as stated above ([3204]Q[58], A[4]). Therefore truth is
not a part of justice.
Objection 3: Further, according to Jerome truth is threefold, namely,
"truth of life," "truth of justice," and "truth of doctrine. " But none
of these is a part of justice. For truth of life comprises all virtues,
as stated above (A[2], ad 3): truth of justice is the same as justice,
so that it is not one of its parts; and truth of doctrine belongs
rather to the intellectual virtues. Therefore truth is nowise a part of
justice.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons truth among the
parts of justice.
I answer that, As stated above ([3205]Q[80]), a virtue is annexed to
justice, as secondary to a principal virtue, through having something
in common with justice, while falling short from the perfect virtue
thereof. Now the virtue of truth has two things in common with justice.
In the first place it is directed to another, since the manifestation,
which we have stated to be an act of truth, is directed to another,
inasmuch as one person manifests to another the things that concern
himself. In the second place, justice sets up a certain equality
between things, and this the virtue of truth does also, for it equals
signs to the things which concern man himself. Nevertheless it falls
short of the proper aspect of justice, as to the notion of debt: for
this virtue does not regard legal debt, which justice considers, but
rather the moral debt, in so far as, out of equity, one man owes
another a manifestation of the truth. Therefore truth is a part of
justice, being annexed thereto as a secondary virtue to its principal.
Reply to Objection 1: Since man is a social animal, one man naturally
owes another whatever is necessary for the preservation of human
society. Now it would be impossible for men to live together, unless
they believed one another, as declaring the truth one to another. Hence
the virtue of truth does, in a manner, regard something as being due.
Reply to Objection 2: Truth, as known, belongs to the intellect. But
man, by his own will, whereby he uses both habits and members, utters
external signs in order to manifest the truth, and in this way the
manifestation of the truth is an act of the will.
Reply to Objection 3: The truth of which we are speaking now differs
from the truth of life, as stated in the preceding A[2], ad 3.
We speak of the truth of justice in two ways. In one way we refer to
the fact that justice itself is a certain rectitude regulated according
to the rule of the divine law; and in this way the truth of justice
differs from the truth of life, because by the truth of life a man
lives aright in himself, whereas by the truth of justice a man observes
the rectitude of the law in those judgments which refer to another man:
and in this sense the truth of justice has nothing to do with the truth
of which we speak now, as neither has the truth of life. In another way
the truth of justice may be understood as referring to the fact that,
out of justice, a man manifests the truth, as for instance when a man
confesses the truth, or gives true evidence in a court of justice. This
truth is a particular act of justice, and does not pertain directly to
this truth of which we are now speaking, because, to wit, in this
manifestation of the truth a man's chief intention is to give another
man his due. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) in describing
this virtue: "We are not speaking of one who is truthful in his
agreements, nor does this apply to matters in which justice or
injustice is questioned. "
The truth of doctrine consists in a certain manifestation of truths
relating to science wherefore neither does this truth directly pertain
to this virtue, but only that truth whereby a man, both in life and in
speech, shows himself to be such as he is, and the things that concern
him, not other, and neither greater nor less, than they are.
Nevertheless since truths of science, as known by us, are something
concerning us, and pertain to this virtue, in this sense the truth of
doctrine may pertain to this virtue, as well as any other kind of truth
whereby a man manifests, by word or deed, what he knows.
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Whether the virtue of truth inclines rather to that which is less?
Objection 1: It seems that the virtue of truth does not incline to that
which is less. For as one incurs falsehood by saying more, so does one
by saying less: thus it is no more false that four are five, than that
four are three. But "every falsehood is in itself evil, and to be
avoided," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. iv, 7). Therefore the
virtue of truth does not incline to that which is less rather than to
that which is greater.
Objection 2: Further, that a virtue inclines to the one extreme rather
than to the other, is owing to the fact that the virtue's mean is
nearer to the one extreme than to the other: thus fortitude is nearer
to daring than to timidity. But the mean of truth is not nearer to one
extreme than to the other; because truth, since it is a kind of
equality, holds to the exact mean. Therefore truth does not more
incline to that which is less.
Objection 3: Further, to forsake the truth for that which is less seems
to amount to a denial of the truth, since this is to subtract
therefrom; and to forsake the truth for that which is greater seems to
amount to an addition thereto. Now to deny the truth is more repugnant
to truth than to add something to it, because truth is incompatible
with the denial of truth, whereas it is compatible with addition.
Therefore it seems that truth should incline to that which is greater
rather than to that which is less.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "by this
virtue a man declines rather from the truth towards that which is
less. "
I answer that, There are two ways of declining from the truth to that
which is less. First, by affirming, as when a man does not show the
whole good that is in him, for instance science, holiness and so forth.
This is done without prejudice to truth, since the lesser is contained
in the greater: and in this way this virtue inclines to what is less.
For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7), "this seems to be more
prudent because exaggerations give annoyance. " For those who represent
themselves as being greater than they are, are a source of annoyance to
others, since they seem to wish to surpass others: whereas those who
make less account of themselves are a source of pleasure, since they
seem to defer to others by their moderation. Hence the Apostle says (2
Cor. 12:6): "Though I should have a mind to glory, I shall not be
foolish: for I will say the truth. But I forbear, lest any man should
think of me above that which he seeth in me or anything he heareth from
me. "
Secondly, one may incline to what is less by denying, so as to say that
what is in us is not. In this way it does not belong to this virtue to
incline to what is less, because this would imply falsehood. And yet
this would be less repugnant to the truth, not indeed as regards the
proper aspect of truth, but as regards the aspect of prudence, which
should be safeguarded in all the virtues. For since it is fraught with
greater danger and is more annoying to others, it is more repugnant to
prudence to think or boast that one has what one has not, than to think
or say that one has not what one has.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TRUTH, AND FIRST OF LYING (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to truth, and (1) lying: (2)
dissimulation or hypocrisy: (3) boasting and the opposite vice.
Concerning lying there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether lying, as containing falsehood, is always opposed to truth?
(2) Of the species of lying;
(3) Whether lying is always a sin?
(4) Whether it is always a mortal sin?
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Whether lying is always opposed to truth?
Objection 1: It seems that lying is not always opposed to truth. For
opposites are incompatible with one another. But lying is compatible
with truth, since that speaks the truth, thinking it to be false, lies,
according to Augustine (Lib. De Mendac. iii). Therefore lying is not
opposed to truth.
Objection 2: Further, the virtue of truth applies not only to words but
also to deeds, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) by
this virtue one tells the truth both in one's speech and in one's life.
But lying applies only to words, for Augustine says (Contra Mend. xii)
that "a lie is a false signification by words. " Accordingly, it seems
that lying is not directly opposed to the virtue of truth.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mendac. iii) that the
"liar's sin is the desire to deceive. " But this is not opposed to
truth, but rather to benevolence or justice. Therefore lying is not
opposed to truth.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Mend. x): "Let no one doubt
that it is a lie to tell a falsehood in order to deceive. Wherefore a
false statement uttered with intent to deceive is a manifest lie. " But
this is opposed to truth. Therefore lying is opposed to truth.
I answer that, A moral act takes its species from two things, its
object, and its end: for the end is the object of the will, which is
the first mover in moral acts. And the power moved by the will has its
own object, which is the proximate object of the voluntary act, and
stands in relation to the will's act towards the end, as material to
formal, as stated above ([3206]FS, Q[18], AA[6],7).
Now it has been said above ([3207]Q[109], A[1], ad 3) that the virtue
of truth---and consequently the opposite vices---regards a
manifestation made by certain signs: and this manifestation or
statement is an act of reason comparing sign with the thing signified;
because every representation consists in comparison, which is the
proper act of the reason. Wherefore though dumb animals manifest
something, yet they do not intend to manifest anything: but they do
something by natural instinct, and a manifestation is the result. But
when this manifestation or statement is a moral act, it must needs be
voluntary, and dependent on the intention of the will. Now the proper
object of a manifestation or statement is the true or the false. And
the intention of a bad will may bear on two things: one of which is
that a falsehood may be told; while the other is the proper effect of a
false statement, namely, that someone may be deceived.
Accordingly if these three things concur, namely, falsehood of what is
said, the will to tell a falsehood, and finally the intention to
deceive, then there is falsehood---materially, since what is said is
false, formally, on account of the will to tell an untruth, and
effectively, on account of the will to impart a falsehood.
However, the essential notion of a lie is taken from formal falsehood,
from the fact namely, that a person intends to say what is false;
wherefore also the word "mendacium" [lie] is derived from its being in
opposition to the "mind. " Consequently if one says what is false,
thinking it to be true, it is false materially, but not formally,
because the falseness is beside the intention of the speaker so that it
is not a perfect lie, since what is beside the speaker's intention is
accidental for which reason it cannot be a specific difference. If, on
the other hand, one utters' falsehood formally, through having the will
to deceive, even if what one says be true, yet inasmuch as this is a
voluntary and moral act, it contains falseness essentially and truth
accidentally, and attains the specific nature of a lie.
That a person intends to cause another to have a false opinion, by
deceiving him, does not belong to the species of lying, but to
perfection thereof, even as in the physical order, a thing acquires its
species if it has its form, even though the form's effect be lacking;
for instance a heavy body which is held up aloft by force, lest it come
down in accordance with the exigency of its form. Therefore it is
evident that lying is directly an formally opposed to the virtue of
truth.
Reply to Objection 1: We judge of a thing according to what is in it
formally and essentially rather than according to what is in it
materially and accidentally. Hence it is more in opposition to truth,
considered as a moral virtue, to tell the truth with the intention of
telling a falsehood than to tell a falsehood with the intention of
telling the truth.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii), words
hold the chief place among other signs. And so when it is said that "a
lie is a false signification by words," the term "words" denotes every
kind of sign. Wherefore if a person intended to signify something false
by means of signs, he would not be excused from lying.
Reply to Objection 3: The desire to deceive belongs to the perfection
of lying, but not to its species, as neither does any effect belong to
the species of its cause.
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Whether lies are sufficiently divided into officious, jocose, and
mischievous lies?
Objection 1: It seems that lies are not sufficiently divided into
"officious," "jocose" and "mischievous" lies. For a division should be
made according to that which pertains to a thing by reason of its
nature, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. vii, text. 43; De Part.
Animal i, 3). But seemingly the intention of the effect resulting from
a moral act is something beside and accidental to the species of that
act, so that an indefinite number of effects can result from one act.
Now this division is made according to the intention of the effect: for
a "jocose" lie is told in order to make fun, an "officious" lie for
some useful purpose, and a "mischievous" lie in order to injure
someone. Therefore lies are unfittingly divided in this way.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine (Contra Mendac. xiv) gives eight kinds
of lies. The first is "in religious doctrine"; the second is "a lie
that profits no one and injures someone"; the third "profits one party
so as to injure another"; the fourth is "told out of mere lust of lying
and deceiving"; the fifth is "told out of the desire to please"; the
sixth "injures no one, and profits /someone in saving his money"; the
seventh "injures no one and profits someone in saving him from death";
the eighth "injures no one, and profits someone in saving him from
defilement of the body. " Therefore it seems that the first division of
lies is insufficient.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) divides lying into
"boasting," which exceeds the truth in speech, and "irony," which falls
short of the truth by saying something less: and these two are not
contained under any one of the kinds mentioned above. Therefore it
seems that the aforesaid division of lies is inadequate.
On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 5:7, "Thou wilt destroy all that speak
a lie," says "that there are three kinds of lies; for some are told for
the wellbeing and convenience of someone; and there is another kind of
lie that is told in fun; but the third kind of lie is told out of
malice. " The first of these is called an officious lie, the second a
jocose lie, the third a mischievous lie. Therefore lies are divided
into these three kinds.
I answer that, Lies may be divided in three ways. First, with respect
to their nature as lies: and this is the proper and essential division
of lying. In this way, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7),
lies are of two kinds, namely, the lie which goes beyond the truth, and
this belongs to "boasting," and the lie which stops short of the truth,
and this belongs to "irony. " This division is an essential division of
lying itself, because lying as such is opposed to truth, as stated in
the preceding Article: and truth is a kind of equality, to which more
and less are in essential opposition.
Secondly, lies may be divided with respect to their nature as sins, and
with regard to those things that aggravate or diminish the sin of
lying, on the part of the end intended. Now the sin of lying is
aggravated, if by lying a person intends to injure another, and this is
called a "mischievous" lie, while the sin of lying is diminished if it
be directed to some good---either of pleasure and then it is a "jocose"
lie, or of usefulness, and then we have the "officious" lie, whereby it
is intended to help another person, or to save him from being injured.
In this way lies are divided into the three kinds aforesaid.
Thirdly, lies are divided in a more general way, with respect to their
relation to some end, whether or not this increase or diminish their
gravity: and in this way the division comprises eight kinds, as stated
in the Second Objection. Here the first three kinds are contained under
"mischievous" lies, which are either against God, and then we have the
lie "in religious doctrine," or against man, and this either with the
sole intention of injuring him, and then it is the second kind of lie,
which "profits no one, and injures someone"; or with the intention of
injuring one and at the same time profiting another, and this is the
third kind of lie, "which profits one, and injures another. " Of these
the first is the most grievous, because sins against God are always
more grievous, as stated above ([3208]FS, Q[73], A[3]): and the second
is more grievous than the third, since the latter's gravity is
diminished by the intention of profiting another.
After these three, which aggravate the sin of lying, we have a fourth,
which has its own measure of gravity without addition or diminution;
and this is the lie which is told "out of mere lust of lying and
deceiving. " This proceeds from a habit, wherefore the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iv, 7) that "the liar, when he lies from habit, delights in
lying. "
The four kinds that follow lessen the gravity of the sin of lying. For
the fifth kind is the jocose lie, which is told "with a desire to
please": and the remaining three are comprised under the officious lie,
wherein something useful to another person is intended. This usefulness
regards either external things, and then we have the sixth kind of lie,
which "profits someone in saving his money"; or his body, and this is
the seventh kind, which "saves a man from death"; or the morality of
his virtue, and this is the eighth kind, which "saves him from unlawful
defilement of his body. "
Now it is evident that the greater the good intended, the more is the
sin of lying diminished in gravity. Wherefore a careful consideration
of the matter will show that these various kinds of lies are enumerated
in their order of gravity: since the useful good is better than the
pleasurable good, and life of the body than money, and virtue than the
life of the body.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether every lie is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that not every lie is a sin. For it is evident
that the evangelists did not sin in the writing of the Gospel. Yet they
seem to have told something false: since their accounts of the words of
Christ and of others often differ from one another: wherefore seemingly
one of them must have given an untrue account. Therefore not every lie
is a sin.
Objection 2: Further, no one is rewarded by God for sin. But the
midwives of Egypt were rewarded by God for a lie, for it is stated that
"God built them houses" (Ex. 1:21). Therefore a lie is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, the deeds of holy men are related in Sacred Writ
that they may be a model of human life. But we read of certain very
holy men that they lied. Thus (Gn. 12 and 20) we are told that Abraham
said of his wife that she was his sister. Jacob also lied when he said
that he was Esau, and yet he received a blessing (Gn. 27:27-29). Again,
Judith is commended (Judith 15:10,11) although she lied to Holofernes.
Therefore not every lie is a sin.
Objection 4: Further, one ought to choose the lesser evil in order to
avoid the greater: even so a physician cuts off a limb, lest the whole
body perish. Yet less harm is done by raising a false opinion in a
person's mind, than by someone slaying or being slain. Therefore a man
may lawfully lie, to save another from committing murder, or another
from being killed.
Objection 5: Further, it is a lie not to fulfill what one has promised.
Yet one is not bound to keep all one's promises: for Isidore says
(Synonym. ii): "Break your faith when you have promised ill. " Therefore
not every lie is a sin.
Objection 6: Further, apparently a lie is a sin because thereby we
deceive our neighbor: wherefore Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. xxi):
"Whoever thinks that there is any kind of lie that is not a sin
deceives himself shamefully, since he deems himself an honest man when
he deceives others. " Yet not every lie is a cause of deception, since
no one is deceived by a jocose lie; seeing that lies of this kind are
told, not with the intention of being believed, but merely for the sake
of giving pleasure. Hence again we find hyperbolical expressions in
Holy Writ. Therefore not every lie is a sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 7:14): "Be not willing to make
any manner of lie. "
I answer that, An action that is naturally evil in respect of its genus
can by no means be good and lawful, since in order for an action to be
good it must be right in every respect: because good results from a
complete cause, while evil results from any single defect, as Dionysius
asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now a lie is evil in respect of its genus,
since it is an action bearing on undue matter. For as words are
naturally signs of intellectual acts, it is unnatural and undue for
anyone to signify by words something that is not in his mind. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "lying is in itself evil and to be
shunned, while truthfulness is good and worthy of praise. " Therefore
every lie is a sin, as also Augustine declares (Contra Mend. i).
Reply to Objection 1: It is unlawful to hold that any false assertion
is contained either in the Gospel or in any canonical Scripture, or
that the writers thereof have told untruths, because faith would be
deprived of its certitude which is based on the authority of Holy Writ.
That the words of certain people are variously reported in the Gospel
and other sacred writings does not constitute a lie. Hence Augustine
says (De Consens. Evang.
ii): "He that has the wit to understand that
in order to know the truth it is necessary to get at the sense, will
conclude that he must not be the least troubled, no matter by what
words that sense is expressed. " Hence it is evident, as he adds (De
Consens. Evang. ii), that "we must not judge that someone is lying, if
several persons fail to describe in the same way and in the same words
a thing which they remember to have seen or heard. "
Reply to Objection 2: The midwives were rewarded, not for their lie,
but for their fear of God, and for their good-will, which latter led
them to tell a lie. Hence it is expressly stated (Ex. 2:21): "And
because the midwives feared God, He built them houses. " But the
subsequent lie was not meritorious.
Reply to Objection 3: In Holy Writ, as Augustine observes (Lib. De
Mend. v), the deeds of certain persons are related as examples of
perfect virtue: and we must not believe that such persons were liars.
If, however, any of their statements appear to be untruthful, we must
understand such statements to have been figurative and prophetic. Hence
Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. v): "We must believe that whatever is
related of those who, in prophetical times, are mentioned as being
worthy of credit, was done and said by them prophetically. " As to
Abraham "when he said that Sara was his sister, he wished to hide the
truth, not to tell a lie, for she is called his sister since she was
the daughter of his father," Augustine says (QQ. Super. Gen. xxvi;
Contra Mend. x; Contra Faust. xxii). Wherefore Abraham himself said
(Gn. 20:12): "She is truly my sister, the daughter of my father, and
not the daughter of my mother," being related to him on his father's
side. Jacob's assertion that he was Esau, Isaac's first-born, was
spoken in a mystical sense, because, to wit, the latter's birthright
was due to him by right: and he made use of this mode of speech being
moved by the spirit of prophecy, in order to signify a mystery, namely,
that the younger people, i. e. the Gentiles, should supplant the
first-born, i. e. the Jews.
Some, however, are commended in the Scriptures, not on account of
perfect virtue, but for a certain virtuous disposition, seeing that it
was owing to some praiseworthy sentiment that they were moved to do
certain undue things. It is thus that Judith is praised, not for lying
to Holofernes, but for her desire to save the people, to which end she
exposed herself to danger. And yet one might also say that her words
contain truth in some mystical sense.
Reply to Objection 4: A lie is sinful not only because it injures one's
neighbor, but also on account of its inordinateness, as stated above in
this Article. Now it is not allowed to make use of anything inordinate
in order to ward off injury or defects from another: as neither is it
lawful to steal in order to give an alms, except perhaps in a case of
necessity when all things are common. Therefore it is not lawful to
tell a lie in order to deliver another from any danger whatever.
Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth prudently, by keeping it
back, as Augustine says (Contra Mend. x).
Reply to Objection 5: A man does not lie, so long as he has a mind to
do what he promises, because he does not speak contrary to what he has
in mind: but if he does not keep his promise, he seems to act without
faith in changing his mind. He may, however, be excused for two
reasons. First, if he has promised something evidently unlawful,
because he sinned in promise, and did well to change his mind.
Secondly, if circumstances have changed with regard to persons and the
business in hand. For, as Seneca states (De Benef. iv), for a man to be
bound to keep a promise, it is necessary for everything to remain
unchanged: otherwise neither did he lie in promising---since he
promised what he had in his mind, due circumstances being taken for
granted---nor was he faithless in not keeping his promise, because
circumstances are no longer the same. Hence the Apostle, though he did
not go to Corinth, whither he had promised to go (2 Cor. 1), did not
lie, because obstacles had arisen which prevented him.
Reply to Objection 6: An action may be considered in two ways. First,
in itself, secondly, with regard to the agent. Accordingly a jocose
lie, from the very genus of the action, is of a nature to deceive;
although in the intention of the speaker it is not told to deceive, nor
does it deceive by the way it is told. Nor is there any similarity in
the hyperbolical or any kind of figurative expressions, with which we
meet in Holy Writ: because, as Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. v), "it is
not a lie to do or say a thing figuratively: because every statement
must be referred to the thing stated: and when a thing is done or said
figuratively, it states what those to whom it is tendered understand it
to signify. "
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Whether every lie is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It seems that every lie is a mortal sin. For it is written
(Ps. 6:7): "Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie," and (Wis. 1:11):
"The mouth that belieth killeth the soul. " Now mortal sin alone causes
destruction and death of the soul. Therefore every lie is a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is against a precept of the decalogue is
a mortal sin. Now lying is against this precept of the decalogue: "Thou
shalt not bear false witness. " Therefore every lie is a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 36): "Every
liar breaks his faith in lying, since forsooth he wishes the person to
whom he lies to have faith in him, and yet he does not keep faith with
him, when he lies to him: and whoever breaks his faith is guilty of
iniquity. " Now no one is said to break his faith or "to be guilty of
iniquity," for a venial sin. Therefore no lie is a venial sin.
Objection 4: Further, the eternal reward is not lost save for a mortal
sin. Now, for a lie the eternal reward was lost, being exchanged for a
temporal meed. For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that "we learn from the
reward of the midwives what the sin of lying deserves: since the reward
which they deserved for their kindness, and which they might have
received in eternal life, dwindled into a temporal meed on account of
the lie of which they were guilty. " Therefore even an officious lie,
such as was that of the midwives, which seemingly is the least of lies,
is a mortal sin.
Objection 5: Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. xvii) that "it is a
precept of perfection, not only not to lie at all, but not even to wish
to lie. " Now it is a mortal sin to act against a precept. Therefore
every lie of the perfect is a mortal sin: and consequently so also is a
lie told by anyone else, otherwise the perfect would be worse off than
others.
On the contrary, Augustine says on Ps. 5:7, "Thou wilt destroy," etc. :
"There are two kinds of lie, that are not grievously sinful yet are not
devoid of sin, when we lie either in joking, or for the sake of our
neighbor's good. " But every mortal sin is grievous. Therefore jocose
and officious lies are not mortal sins.
I answer that, A mortal sin is, properly speaking, one that is contrary
to charity whereby the soul lives in union with God, as stated above
([3209]Q[24], A[12];[3210] Q[35], A[3]). Now a lie may be contrary to
charity in three ways: first, in itself; secondly, in respect of the
evil intended; thirdly, accidentally.
A lie may be in itself contrary to charity by reason of its false
signification. For if this be about divine things, it is contrary to
the charity of God, whose truth one hides or corrupts by such a lie; so
that a lie of this kind is opposed not only to the virtue of charity,
but also to the virtues of faith and religion: wherefore it is a most
grievous and a mortal sin. If, however, the false signification be
about something the knowledge of which affects a man's good, for
instance if it pertain to the perfection of science or to moral
conduct, a lie of this description inflicts an injury on one's
neighbor, since it causes him to have a false opinion, wherefore it is
contrary to charity, as regards the love of our neighbor, and
consequently is a mortal sin. On the other hand, if the false opinion
engendered by the lie be about some matter the knowledge of which is of
no consequence, then the lie in question does no harm to one's
neighbor; for instance, if a person be deceived as to some contingent
particulars that do not concern him. Wherefore a lie of this kind,
considered in itself, is not a mortal sin.
As regards the end in view, a lie may be contrary to charity, through
being told with the purpose of injuring God, and this is always a
mortal sin, for it is opposed to religion; or in order to injure one's
neighbor, in his person, his possessions or his good name, and this
also is a mortal sin, since it is a mortal sin to injure one's
neighbor, and one sins mortally if one has merely the intention of
committing a mortal sin. But if the end intended be not contrary to
charity, neither will the lie, considered under this aspect, be a
mortal sin, as in the case of a jocose lie, where some little pleasure
is intended, or in an officious lie, where the good also of one's
neighbor is intended. Accidentally a lie may be contrary to charity by
reason of scandal or any other injury resulting therefrom: and thus
again it will be a mortal sin, for instance if a man were not deterred
through scandal from lying publicly.
Reply to Objection 1: The passages quoted refer to the mischievous lie,
as a gloss explains the words of Ps. 5:7, "Thou wilt destroy all that
speak a lie. "
Reply to Objection 2: Since all the precepts of the decalogue are
directed to the love of God and our neighbor, as stated above (Q[44],
A[1], ad 3; [3211]FS, Q[100], A[5], ad 1), a lie is contrary to a
precept of the decalogue, in so far as it is contrary to the love of
God and our neighbor. Hence it is expressly forbidden to bear false
witness against our neighbor.
Reply to Objection 3: Even a venial sin can be called "iniquity" in a
broad sense, in so far as it is beside the equity of justice; wherefore
it is written (1 Jn. 3:4): "Every sin is iniquity [*Vulg. : 'And sin is
iniquity. ']. " It is in this sense that Augustine is speaking.
Reply to Objection 4: The lie of the midwives may be considered in two
ways. First as regards their feeling of kindliness towards the Jews,
and their reverence and fear of God, for which their virtuous
disposition is commended. For this an eternal reward is due. Wherefore
Jerome (in his exposition of Is. 65:21, 'And they shall build houses')
explains that God "built them spiritual houses. " Secondly, it may be
considered with regard to the external act of lying. For thereby they
could merit, not indeed eternal reward, but perhaps some temporal meed,
the deserving of which was not inconsistent with the deformity of their
lie, though this was inconsistent with their meriting an eternal
reward. It is in this sense that we must understand the words of
Gregory, and not that they merited by that lie to lose the eternal
reward as though they had already merited it by their preceding
kindliness, as the objection understands the words to mean.
Reply to Objection 5: Some say that for the perfect every lie is a
mortal sin. But this assertion is unreasonable. For no circumstance
causes a sin to be infinitely more grievous unless it transfers it to
another species. Now a circumstance of person does not transfer a sin
to another species, except perhaps by reason of something annexed to
that person, for instance if it be against his vow: and this cannot
apply to an officious or jocose lie. Wherefore an officious or a jocose
lie is not a mortal sin in perfect men, except perhaps accidentally on
account of scandal. We may take in this sense the saying of Augustine
that "it is a precept of perfection not only not to lie at all, but not
even to wish to lie": although Augustine says this not positively but
dubiously, for he begins by saying: "Unless perhaps it is a precept,"
etc. Nor does it matter that they are placed in a position to safeguard
the truth: because they are bound to safeguard the truth by virtue of
their office in judging or teaching, and if they lie in these matters
their lie will be a mortal sin: but it does not follow that they sin
mortally when they lie in other matters.
__________________________________________________________________
OF DISSIMULATION AND HYPOCRISY (FOUR ARTICLES)
In due sequence we must consider dissimulation and hypocrisy. Under
this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all dissimulation is a sin?
(2) Whether hypocrisy is dissimulation?
(3) Whether it is opposed to truth?
(4) Whether it is a mortal sin?
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Whether all dissimulation is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that not all dissimulation is a sin. For it is
written (Lk. 24:28) that our Lord "pretended [Douay: 'made as though']
he would go farther"; and Ambrose in his book on the Patriarchs (De
Abraham i) says of Abraham that he "spoke craftily to his servants,
when he said" (Gn. 22:5): "I and the boy will go with speed as far as
yonder, and after we have worshipped, will return to you. " Now to
pretend and to speak craftily savor of dissimulation: and yet it is not
to be said that there was sin in Christ or Abraham. Therefore not all
dissimulation is a sin.
Objection 2: Further, no sin is profitable. But according to Jerome, in
his commentary on Gal. 2:11, "When Peter [Vulg. : 'Cephas'] was come to
Antioch:---The example of Jehu, king of Israel, who slew the priest of
Baal, pretending that he desired to worship idols, should teach us that
dissimulation is useful and sometimes to be employed"; and David
"changed his countenance before" Achis, king of Geth (1 Kings 21:13).
Therefore not all dissimulation is a sin.
Objection 3: Further, good is contrary to evil. Therefore if it is evil
to simulate good, it is good to simulate evil.
Objection 4: Further, it is written in condemnation of certain people
(Is. 3:9): "They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they
have not hid it. " Now it pertains to dissimulation to hide one's sin.
Therefore it is reprehensible sometimes not to simulate. But it is
never reprehensible to avoid sin. Therefore dissimulation is not a sin.
On the contrary, A gloss on Is. 16:14, "In three years," etc. , says:
"Of the two evils it is less to sin openly than to simulate holiness. "
But to sin openly is always a sin. Therefore dissimulation is always a
sin.
I answer that, As stated above ([3212]Q[109], A[3];[3213] Q[110],
A[1]), it belongs to the virtue of truth to show oneself outwardly by
outward signs to be such as one is. Now outward signs are not only
words, but also deeds. Accordingly just as it is contrary to truth to
signify by words something different from that which is in one's mind,
so also is it contrary to truth to employ signs of deeds or things to
signify the contrary of what is in oneself, and this is what is
properly denoted by dissimulation. Consequently dissimulation is
properly a lie told by the signs of outward deeds. Now it matters not
whether one lie in word or in any other way, as stated above
([3214]Q[110], A[1], OBJ[2]). Wherefore, since every lie is a sin, as
stated above ([3215]Q[110], A[3]), it follows that also all
dissimulation is a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. ii), "To pretend
is not always a lie: but only when the pretense has no signification,
then it is a lie. When, however, our pretense refers to some
signification, there is no lie, but a representation of the truth. " And
he cites figures of speech as an example, where a thing is "pretended,"
for we do not mean it to be taken literally but as a figure of
something else that we wish to say. In this way our Lord "pretended He
would go farther," because He acted as if wishing to go farther; in
order to signify something figuratively either because He was far from
their faith, according to Gregory (Hom. xxiii in Ev. ); or, as Augustine
says (De QQ. Evang. ii), because, "as He was about to go farther away
from them by ascending into heaven, He was, so to speak, held back on
earth by their hospitality. "
Abraham also spoke figuratively. Wherefore Ambrose (De Abraham i) says
that Abraham "foretold what he knew not": for he intended to return
alone after sacrificing his son: but by his mouth the Lord expressed
what He was about to do. It is evident therefore that neither
dissembled.
Reply to Objection 2: Jerome employs the term "simulation" in a broad
sense for any kind of pretense. David's change of countenance was a
figurative pretense, as a gloss observes in commenting on the title of
Ps. 33, "I will bless the Lord at all times. " There is no need to
excuse Jehu's dissimulation from sin or lie, because he was a wicked
man, since he departed not from the idolatry of Jeroboam (4 Kings
10:29,31). And yet he is praised withal and received an earthly reward
from God, not for his dissimulation, but for his zeal in destroying the
worship of Baal.
Reply to Objection 3: Some say that no one may pretend to be wicked,
because no one pretends to be wicked by doing good deeds, and if he do
evil deeds, he is evil. But this argument proves nothing. Because a man
might pretend to be evil, by doing what is not evil in itself but has
some appearance of evil: and nevertheless this dissimulation is evil,
both because it is a lie, and because it gives scandal; and although he
is wicked on this account, yet his wickedness is not the wickedness he
simulates. And because dissimulation is evil in itself, its sinfulness
is not derived from the thing simulated, whether this be good or evil.
Reply to Objection 4: Just as a man lies when he signifies by word that
which he is not, yet lies not when he refrains from saying what he is,
for this is sometimes lawful; so also does a man dissemble, when by
outward signs of deeds or things he signifies that which he is not, yet
he dissembles not if he omits to signify what he is. Hence one may hide
one's sin without being guilty of dissimulation. It is thus that we
must understand the saying of Jerome on the words of Isa. 3:9, that the
"second remedy after shipwreck is to hide one's sin," lest, to wit,
others be scandalized thereby.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hypocrisy is the same as dissimulation?
Objection 1: It seems that hypocrisy is not the same as dissimulation.
For dissimulation consists in lying by deeds. But there may be
hypocrisy in showing outwardly what one does inwardly, according to
Mat. 6:2, "When thou dost an alms-deed sound not a trumpet before thee,
as the hypocrites do. " Therefore hypocrisy is not the same as
dissimulation.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7): "Some there are
who wear the habit of holiness, yet are unable to attain the merit of
perfection. We must by no means deem these to have joined the ranks of
the hypocrites, since it is one thing to sin from weakness, and another
to sin from malice. " Now those who wear the habit of holiness, without
attaining the merit of perfection, are dissemblers, since the outward
habit signifies works of perfection. Therefore dissimulation is not the
same as hypocrisy.
Objection 3: Further, hypocrisy consists in the mere intention. For our
Lord says of hypocrites (Mat. 23:5) that "all their works they do for
to be seen of men": and Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7) that "they never
consider what it is that they do, but how by their every action they
may please men. " But dissimulation consists, not in the mere intention,
but in the outward action: wherefore a gloss on Job 36:13, "Dissemblers
and crafty men prove the wrath of God," says that "the dissembler
simulates one thing and does another: he pretends chastity, and
delights in lewdness, he makes a show of poverty and fills his purse. "
Therefore hypocrisy is not the same as dissimulation.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x): "'Hypocrite' is a Greek word
corresponding to the Latin 'simulator,' for whereas he is evil within,"
he "shows himself outwardly as being good; {hypo} denoting falsehood,
and {krisis}, judgment. "
I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x), "the word hypocrite is
derived from the appearance of those who come on to the stage with a
disguised face, by changing the color of their complexion, so as to
imitate the complexion of the person they simulate, at one time under
the guise of a man, at another under the guise of a woman, so as to
deceive the people in their acting. " Hence Augustine says (De Serm.
Dom. ii) that "just as hypocrites by simulating other persons act the
parts of those they are not (since he that acts the part of Agamemnon
is not that man himself but pretends to be), so too in the Church and
in every department of human life, whoever wishes to seem what he is
not is a hypocrite: for he pretends to be just without being so in
reality. "
We must conclude, therefore, that hypocrisy is dissimulation, not,
however, any form of dissimulation, but only when one person simulates
another, as when a sinner simulates the person of a just man.
bravely: and that he shows his fortitude by acting bravely is a
consequence beside his principal intention.
Reply to Objection 3: The truth of life is the truth whereby a thing is
true, not whereby a person says what is true. Life like anything else
is said to be true, from the fact that it attains its rule and measure,
namely, the divine law; since rectitude of life depends on conformity
to that law. This truth or rectitude is common to every virtue.
Reply to Objection 4: Simplicity is so called from its opposition to
duplicity, whereby, to wit, a man shows one thing outwardly while
having another in his heart: so that simplicity pertains to this
virtue. And it rectifies the intention, not indeed directly (since this
belongs to every virtue), but by excluding duplicity, whereby a man
pretends one thing and intends another.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether truth is a part of justice?
Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a part of justice. For it seems
proper to justice to give another man his due. But, by telling the
truth, one does not seem to give another man his due, as is the case in
all the foregoing parts of justice. Therefore truth is not a part of
justice.
Objection 2: Further, truth pertains to the intellect: whereas justice
is in the will, as stated above ([3204]Q[58], A[4]). Therefore truth is
not a part of justice.
Objection 3: Further, according to Jerome truth is threefold, namely,
"truth of life," "truth of justice," and "truth of doctrine. " But none
of these is a part of justice. For truth of life comprises all virtues,
as stated above (A[2], ad 3): truth of justice is the same as justice,
so that it is not one of its parts; and truth of doctrine belongs
rather to the intellectual virtues. Therefore truth is nowise a part of
justice.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons truth among the
parts of justice.
I answer that, As stated above ([3205]Q[80]), a virtue is annexed to
justice, as secondary to a principal virtue, through having something
in common with justice, while falling short from the perfect virtue
thereof. Now the virtue of truth has two things in common with justice.
In the first place it is directed to another, since the manifestation,
which we have stated to be an act of truth, is directed to another,
inasmuch as one person manifests to another the things that concern
himself. In the second place, justice sets up a certain equality
between things, and this the virtue of truth does also, for it equals
signs to the things which concern man himself. Nevertheless it falls
short of the proper aspect of justice, as to the notion of debt: for
this virtue does not regard legal debt, which justice considers, but
rather the moral debt, in so far as, out of equity, one man owes
another a manifestation of the truth. Therefore truth is a part of
justice, being annexed thereto as a secondary virtue to its principal.
Reply to Objection 1: Since man is a social animal, one man naturally
owes another whatever is necessary for the preservation of human
society. Now it would be impossible for men to live together, unless
they believed one another, as declaring the truth one to another. Hence
the virtue of truth does, in a manner, regard something as being due.
Reply to Objection 2: Truth, as known, belongs to the intellect. But
man, by his own will, whereby he uses both habits and members, utters
external signs in order to manifest the truth, and in this way the
manifestation of the truth is an act of the will.
Reply to Objection 3: The truth of which we are speaking now differs
from the truth of life, as stated in the preceding A[2], ad 3.
We speak of the truth of justice in two ways. In one way we refer to
the fact that justice itself is a certain rectitude regulated according
to the rule of the divine law; and in this way the truth of justice
differs from the truth of life, because by the truth of life a man
lives aright in himself, whereas by the truth of justice a man observes
the rectitude of the law in those judgments which refer to another man:
and in this sense the truth of justice has nothing to do with the truth
of which we speak now, as neither has the truth of life. In another way
the truth of justice may be understood as referring to the fact that,
out of justice, a man manifests the truth, as for instance when a man
confesses the truth, or gives true evidence in a court of justice. This
truth is a particular act of justice, and does not pertain directly to
this truth of which we are now speaking, because, to wit, in this
manifestation of the truth a man's chief intention is to give another
man his due. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) in describing
this virtue: "We are not speaking of one who is truthful in his
agreements, nor does this apply to matters in which justice or
injustice is questioned. "
The truth of doctrine consists in a certain manifestation of truths
relating to science wherefore neither does this truth directly pertain
to this virtue, but only that truth whereby a man, both in life and in
speech, shows himself to be such as he is, and the things that concern
him, not other, and neither greater nor less, than they are.
Nevertheless since truths of science, as known by us, are something
concerning us, and pertain to this virtue, in this sense the truth of
doctrine may pertain to this virtue, as well as any other kind of truth
whereby a man manifests, by word or deed, what he knows.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the virtue of truth inclines rather to that which is less?
Objection 1: It seems that the virtue of truth does not incline to that
which is less. For as one incurs falsehood by saying more, so does one
by saying less: thus it is no more false that four are five, than that
four are three. But "every falsehood is in itself evil, and to be
avoided," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. iv, 7). Therefore the
virtue of truth does not incline to that which is less rather than to
that which is greater.
Objection 2: Further, that a virtue inclines to the one extreme rather
than to the other, is owing to the fact that the virtue's mean is
nearer to the one extreme than to the other: thus fortitude is nearer
to daring than to timidity. But the mean of truth is not nearer to one
extreme than to the other; because truth, since it is a kind of
equality, holds to the exact mean. Therefore truth does not more
incline to that which is less.
Objection 3: Further, to forsake the truth for that which is less seems
to amount to a denial of the truth, since this is to subtract
therefrom; and to forsake the truth for that which is greater seems to
amount to an addition thereto. Now to deny the truth is more repugnant
to truth than to add something to it, because truth is incompatible
with the denial of truth, whereas it is compatible with addition.
Therefore it seems that truth should incline to that which is greater
rather than to that which is less.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "by this
virtue a man declines rather from the truth towards that which is
less. "
I answer that, There are two ways of declining from the truth to that
which is less. First, by affirming, as when a man does not show the
whole good that is in him, for instance science, holiness and so forth.
This is done without prejudice to truth, since the lesser is contained
in the greater: and in this way this virtue inclines to what is less.
For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7), "this seems to be more
prudent because exaggerations give annoyance. " For those who represent
themselves as being greater than they are, are a source of annoyance to
others, since they seem to wish to surpass others: whereas those who
make less account of themselves are a source of pleasure, since they
seem to defer to others by their moderation. Hence the Apostle says (2
Cor. 12:6): "Though I should have a mind to glory, I shall not be
foolish: for I will say the truth. But I forbear, lest any man should
think of me above that which he seeth in me or anything he heareth from
me. "
Secondly, one may incline to what is less by denying, so as to say that
what is in us is not. In this way it does not belong to this virtue to
incline to what is less, because this would imply falsehood. And yet
this would be less repugnant to the truth, not indeed as regards the
proper aspect of truth, but as regards the aspect of prudence, which
should be safeguarded in all the virtues. For since it is fraught with
greater danger and is more annoying to others, it is more repugnant to
prudence to think or boast that one has what one has not, than to think
or say that one has not what one has.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TRUTH, AND FIRST OF LYING (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to truth, and (1) lying: (2)
dissimulation or hypocrisy: (3) boasting and the opposite vice.
Concerning lying there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether lying, as containing falsehood, is always opposed to truth?
(2) Of the species of lying;
(3) Whether lying is always a sin?
(4) Whether it is always a mortal sin?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether lying is always opposed to truth?
Objection 1: It seems that lying is not always opposed to truth. For
opposites are incompatible with one another. But lying is compatible
with truth, since that speaks the truth, thinking it to be false, lies,
according to Augustine (Lib. De Mendac. iii). Therefore lying is not
opposed to truth.
Objection 2: Further, the virtue of truth applies not only to words but
also to deeds, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) by
this virtue one tells the truth both in one's speech and in one's life.
But lying applies only to words, for Augustine says (Contra Mend. xii)
that "a lie is a false signification by words. " Accordingly, it seems
that lying is not directly opposed to the virtue of truth.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mendac. iii) that the
"liar's sin is the desire to deceive. " But this is not opposed to
truth, but rather to benevolence or justice. Therefore lying is not
opposed to truth.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Mend. x): "Let no one doubt
that it is a lie to tell a falsehood in order to deceive. Wherefore a
false statement uttered with intent to deceive is a manifest lie. " But
this is opposed to truth. Therefore lying is opposed to truth.
I answer that, A moral act takes its species from two things, its
object, and its end: for the end is the object of the will, which is
the first mover in moral acts. And the power moved by the will has its
own object, which is the proximate object of the voluntary act, and
stands in relation to the will's act towards the end, as material to
formal, as stated above ([3206]FS, Q[18], AA[6],7).
Now it has been said above ([3207]Q[109], A[1], ad 3) that the virtue
of truth---and consequently the opposite vices---regards a
manifestation made by certain signs: and this manifestation or
statement is an act of reason comparing sign with the thing signified;
because every representation consists in comparison, which is the
proper act of the reason. Wherefore though dumb animals manifest
something, yet they do not intend to manifest anything: but they do
something by natural instinct, and a manifestation is the result. But
when this manifestation or statement is a moral act, it must needs be
voluntary, and dependent on the intention of the will. Now the proper
object of a manifestation or statement is the true or the false. And
the intention of a bad will may bear on two things: one of which is
that a falsehood may be told; while the other is the proper effect of a
false statement, namely, that someone may be deceived.
Accordingly if these three things concur, namely, falsehood of what is
said, the will to tell a falsehood, and finally the intention to
deceive, then there is falsehood---materially, since what is said is
false, formally, on account of the will to tell an untruth, and
effectively, on account of the will to impart a falsehood.
However, the essential notion of a lie is taken from formal falsehood,
from the fact namely, that a person intends to say what is false;
wherefore also the word "mendacium" [lie] is derived from its being in
opposition to the "mind. " Consequently if one says what is false,
thinking it to be true, it is false materially, but not formally,
because the falseness is beside the intention of the speaker so that it
is not a perfect lie, since what is beside the speaker's intention is
accidental for which reason it cannot be a specific difference. If, on
the other hand, one utters' falsehood formally, through having the will
to deceive, even if what one says be true, yet inasmuch as this is a
voluntary and moral act, it contains falseness essentially and truth
accidentally, and attains the specific nature of a lie.
That a person intends to cause another to have a false opinion, by
deceiving him, does not belong to the species of lying, but to
perfection thereof, even as in the physical order, a thing acquires its
species if it has its form, even though the form's effect be lacking;
for instance a heavy body which is held up aloft by force, lest it come
down in accordance with the exigency of its form. Therefore it is
evident that lying is directly an formally opposed to the virtue of
truth.
Reply to Objection 1: We judge of a thing according to what is in it
formally and essentially rather than according to what is in it
materially and accidentally. Hence it is more in opposition to truth,
considered as a moral virtue, to tell the truth with the intention of
telling a falsehood than to tell a falsehood with the intention of
telling the truth.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii), words
hold the chief place among other signs. And so when it is said that "a
lie is a false signification by words," the term "words" denotes every
kind of sign. Wherefore if a person intended to signify something false
by means of signs, he would not be excused from lying.
Reply to Objection 3: The desire to deceive belongs to the perfection
of lying, but not to its species, as neither does any effect belong to
the species of its cause.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether lies are sufficiently divided into officious, jocose, and
mischievous lies?
Objection 1: It seems that lies are not sufficiently divided into
"officious," "jocose" and "mischievous" lies. For a division should be
made according to that which pertains to a thing by reason of its
nature, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. vii, text. 43; De Part.
Animal i, 3). But seemingly the intention of the effect resulting from
a moral act is something beside and accidental to the species of that
act, so that an indefinite number of effects can result from one act.
Now this division is made according to the intention of the effect: for
a "jocose" lie is told in order to make fun, an "officious" lie for
some useful purpose, and a "mischievous" lie in order to injure
someone. Therefore lies are unfittingly divided in this way.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine (Contra Mendac. xiv) gives eight kinds
of lies. The first is "in religious doctrine"; the second is "a lie
that profits no one and injures someone"; the third "profits one party
so as to injure another"; the fourth is "told out of mere lust of lying
and deceiving"; the fifth is "told out of the desire to please"; the
sixth "injures no one, and profits /someone in saving his money"; the
seventh "injures no one and profits someone in saving him from death";
the eighth "injures no one, and profits someone in saving him from
defilement of the body. " Therefore it seems that the first division of
lies is insufficient.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) divides lying into
"boasting," which exceeds the truth in speech, and "irony," which falls
short of the truth by saying something less: and these two are not
contained under any one of the kinds mentioned above. Therefore it
seems that the aforesaid division of lies is inadequate.
On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 5:7, "Thou wilt destroy all that speak
a lie," says "that there are three kinds of lies; for some are told for
the wellbeing and convenience of someone; and there is another kind of
lie that is told in fun; but the third kind of lie is told out of
malice. " The first of these is called an officious lie, the second a
jocose lie, the third a mischievous lie. Therefore lies are divided
into these three kinds.
I answer that, Lies may be divided in three ways. First, with respect
to their nature as lies: and this is the proper and essential division
of lying. In this way, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7),
lies are of two kinds, namely, the lie which goes beyond the truth, and
this belongs to "boasting," and the lie which stops short of the truth,
and this belongs to "irony. " This division is an essential division of
lying itself, because lying as such is opposed to truth, as stated in
the preceding Article: and truth is a kind of equality, to which more
and less are in essential opposition.
Secondly, lies may be divided with respect to their nature as sins, and
with regard to those things that aggravate or diminish the sin of
lying, on the part of the end intended. Now the sin of lying is
aggravated, if by lying a person intends to injure another, and this is
called a "mischievous" lie, while the sin of lying is diminished if it
be directed to some good---either of pleasure and then it is a "jocose"
lie, or of usefulness, and then we have the "officious" lie, whereby it
is intended to help another person, or to save him from being injured.
In this way lies are divided into the three kinds aforesaid.
Thirdly, lies are divided in a more general way, with respect to their
relation to some end, whether or not this increase or diminish their
gravity: and in this way the division comprises eight kinds, as stated
in the Second Objection. Here the first three kinds are contained under
"mischievous" lies, which are either against God, and then we have the
lie "in religious doctrine," or against man, and this either with the
sole intention of injuring him, and then it is the second kind of lie,
which "profits no one, and injures someone"; or with the intention of
injuring one and at the same time profiting another, and this is the
third kind of lie, "which profits one, and injures another. " Of these
the first is the most grievous, because sins against God are always
more grievous, as stated above ([3208]FS, Q[73], A[3]): and the second
is more grievous than the third, since the latter's gravity is
diminished by the intention of profiting another.
After these three, which aggravate the sin of lying, we have a fourth,
which has its own measure of gravity without addition or diminution;
and this is the lie which is told "out of mere lust of lying and
deceiving. " This proceeds from a habit, wherefore the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iv, 7) that "the liar, when he lies from habit, delights in
lying. "
The four kinds that follow lessen the gravity of the sin of lying. For
the fifth kind is the jocose lie, which is told "with a desire to
please": and the remaining three are comprised under the officious lie,
wherein something useful to another person is intended. This usefulness
regards either external things, and then we have the sixth kind of lie,
which "profits someone in saving his money"; or his body, and this is
the seventh kind, which "saves a man from death"; or the morality of
his virtue, and this is the eighth kind, which "saves him from unlawful
defilement of his body. "
Now it is evident that the greater the good intended, the more is the
sin of lying diminished in gravity. Wherefore a careful consideration
of the matter will show that these various kinds of lies are enumerated
in their order of gravity: since the useful good is better than the
pleasurable good, and life of the body than money, and virtue than the
life of the body.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether every lie is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that not every lie is a sin. For it is evident
that the evangelists did not sin in the writing of the Gospel. Yet they
seem to have told something false: since their accounts of the words of
Christ and of others often differ from one another: wherefore seemingly
one of them must have given an untrue account. Therefore not every lie
is a sin.
Objection 2: Further, no one is rewarded by God for sin. But the
midwives of Egypt were rewarded by God for a lie, for it is stated that
"God built them houses" (Ex. 1:21). Therefore a lie is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, the deeds of holy men are related in Sacred Writ
that they may be a model of human life. But we read of certain very
holy men that they lied. Thus (Gn. 12 and 20) we are told that Abraham
said of his wife that she was his sister. Jacob also lied when he said
that he was Esau, and yet he received a blessing (Gn. 27:27-29). Again,
Judith is commended (Judith 15:10,11) although she lied to Holofernes.
Therefore not every lie is a sin.
Objection 4: Further, one ought to choose the lesser evil in order to
avoid the greater: even so a physician cuts off a limb, lest the whole
body perish. Yet less harm is done by raising a false opinion in a
person's mind, than by someone slaying or being slain. Therefore a man
may lawfully lie, to save another from committing murder, or another
from being killed.
Objection 5: Further, it is a lie not to fulfill what one has promised.
Yet one is not bound to keep all one's promises: for Isidore says
(Synonym. ii): "Break your faith when you have promised ill. " Therefore
not every lie is a sin.
Objection 6: Further, apparently a lie is a sin because thereby we
deceive our neighbor: wherefore Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. xxi):
"Whoever thinks that there is any kind of lie that is not a sin
deceives himself shamefully, since he deems himself an honest man when
he deceives others. " Yet not every lie is a cause of deception, since
no one is deceived by a jocose lie; seeing that lies of this kind are
told, not with the intention of being believed, but merely for the sake
of giving pleasure. Hence again we find hyperbolical expressions in
Holy Writ. Therefore not every lie is a sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 7:14): "Be not willing to make
any manner of lie. "
I answer that, An action that is naturally evil in respect of its genus
can by no means be good and lawful, since in order for an action to be
good it must be right in every respect: because good results from a
complete cause, while evil results from any single defect, as Dionysius
asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now a lie is evil in respect of its genus,
since it is an action bearing on undue matter. For as words are
naturally signs of intellectual acts, it is unnatural and undue for
anyone to signify by words something that is not in his mind. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "lying is in itself evil and to be
shunned, while truthfulness is good and worthy of praise. " Therefore
every lie is a sin, as also Augustine declares (Contra Mend. i).
Reply to Objection 1: It is unlawful to hold that any false assertion
is contained either in the Gospel or in any canonical Scripture, or
that the writers thereof have told untruths, because faith would be
deprived of its certitude which is based on the authority of Holy Writ.
That the words of certain people are variously reported in the Gospel
and other sacred writings does not constitute a lie. Hence Augustine
says (De Consens. Evang.
ii): "He that has the wit to understand that
in order to know the truth it is necessary to get at the sense, will
conclude that he must not be the least troubled, no matter by what
words that sense is expressed. " Hence it is evident, as he adds (De
Consens. Evang. ii), that "we must not judge that someone is lying, if
several persons fail to describe in the same way and in the same words
a thing which they remember to have seen or heard. "
Reply to Objection 2: The midwives were rewarded, not for their lie,
but for their fear of God, and for their good-will, which latter led
them to tell a lie. Hence it is expressly stated (Ex. 2:21): "And
because the midwives feared God, He built them houses. " But the
subsequent lie was not meritorious.
Reply to Objection 3: In Holy Writ, as Augustine observes (Lib. De
Mend. v), the deeds of certain persons are related as examples of
perfect virtue: and we must not believe that such persons were liars.
If, however, any of their statements appear to be untruthful, we must
understand such statements to have been figurative and prophetic. Hence
Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. v): "We must believe that whatever is
related of those who, in prophetical times, are mentioned as being
worthy of credit, was done and said by them prophetically. " As to
Abraham "when he said that Sara was his sister, he wished to hide the
truth, not to tell a lie, for she is called his sister since she was
the daughter of his father," Augustine says (QQ. Super. Gen. xxvi;
Contra Mend. x; Contra Faust. xxii). Wherefore Abraham himself said
(Gn. 20:12): "She is truly my sister, the daughter of my father, and
not the daughter of my mother," being related to him on his father's
side. Jacob's assertion that he was Esau, Isaac's first-born, was
spoken in a mystical sense, because, to wit, the latter's birthright
was due to him by right: and he made use of this mode of speech being
moved by the spirit of prophecy, in order to signify a mystery, namely,
that the younger people, i. e. the Gentiles, should supplant the
first-born, i. e. the Jews.
Some, however, are commended in the Scriptures, not on account of
perfect virtue, but for a certain virtuous disposition, seeing that it
was owing to some praiseworthy sentiment that they were moved to do
certain undue things. It is thus that Judith is praised, not for lying
to Holofernes, but for her desire to save the people, to which end she
exposed herself to danger. And yet one might also say that her words
contain truth in some mystical sense.
Reply to Objection 4: A lie is sinful not only because it injures one's
neighbor, but also on account of its inordinateness, as stated above in
this Article. Now it is not allowed to make use of anything inordinate
in order to ward off injury or defects from another: as neither is it
lawful to steal in order to give an alms, except perhaps in a case of
necessity when all things are common. Therefore it is not lawful to
tell a lie in order to deliver another from any danger whatever.
Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth prudently, by keeping it
back, as Augustine says (Contra Mend. x).
Reply to Objection 5: A man does not lie, so long as he has a mind to
do what he promises, because he does not speak contrary to what he has
in mind: but if he does not keep his promise, he seems to act without
faith in changing his mind. He may, however, be excused for two
reasons. First, if he has promised something evidently unlawful,
because he sinned in promise, and did well to change his mind.
Secondly, if circumstances have changed with regard to persons and the
business in hand. For, as Seneca states (De Benef. iv), for a man to be
bound to keep a promise, it is necessary for everything to remain
unchanged: otherwise neither did he lie in promising---since he
promised what he had in his mind, due circumstances being taken for
granted---nor was he faithless in not keeping his promise, because
circumstances are no longer the same. Hence the Apostle, though he did
not go to Corinth, whither he had promised to go (2 Cor. 1), did not
lie, because obstacles had arisen which prevented him.
Reply to Objection 6: An action may be considered in two ways. First,
in itself, secondly, with regard to the agent. Accordingly a jocose
lie, from the very genus of the action, is of a nature to deceive;
although in the intention of the speaker it is not told to deceive, nor
does it deceive by the way it is told. Nor is there any similarity in
the hyperbolical or any kind of figurative expressions, with which we
meet in Holy Writ: because, as Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. v), "it is
not a lie to do or say a thing figuratively: because every statement
must be referred to the thing stated: and when a thing is done or said
figuratively, it states what those to whom it is tendered understand it
to signify. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether every lie is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It seems that every lie is a mortal sin. For it is written
(Ps. 6:7): "Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie," and (Wis. 1:11):
"The mouth that belieth killeth the soul. " Now mortal sin alone causes
destruction and death of the soul. Therefore every lie is a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is against a precept of the decalogue is
a mortal sin. Now lying is against this precept of the decalogue: "Thou
shalt not bear false witness. " Therefore every lie is a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 36): "Every
liar breaks his faith in lying, since forsooth he wishes the person to
whom he lies to have faith in him, and yet he does not keep faith with
him, when he lies to him: and whoever breaks his faith is guilty of
iniquity. " Now no one is said to break his faith or "to be guilty of
iniquity," for a venial sin. Therefore no lie is a venial sin.
Objection 4: Further, the eternal reward is not lost save for a mortal
sin. Now, for a lie the eternal reward was lost, being exchanged for a
temporal meed. For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that "we learn from the
reward of the midwives what the sin of lying deserves: since the reward
which they deserved for their kindness, and which they might have
received in eternal life, dwindled into a temporal meed on account of
the lie of which they were guilty. " Therefore even an officious lie,
such as was that of the midwives, which seemingly is the least of lies,
is a mortal sin.
Objection 5: Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. xvii) that "it is a
precept of perfection, not only not to lie at all, but not even to wish
to lie. " Now it is a mortal sin to act against a precept. Therefore
every lie of the perfect is a mortal sin: and consequently so also is a
lie told by anyone else, otherwise the perfect would be worse off than
others.
On the contrary, Augustine says on Ps. 5:7, "Thou wilt destroy," etc. :
"There are two kinds of lie, that are not grievously sinful yet are not
devoid of sin, when we lie either in joking, or for the sake of our
neighbor's good. " But every mortal sin is grievous. Therefore jocose
and officious lies are not mortal sins.
I answer that, A mortal sin is, properly speaking, one that is contrary
to charity whereby the soul lives in union with God, as stated above
([3209]Q[24], A[12];[3210] Q[35], A[3]). Now a lie may be contrary to
charity in three ways: first, in itself; secondly, in respect of the
evil intended; thirdly, accidentally.
A lie may be in itself contrary to charity by reason of its false
signification. For if this be about divine things, it is contrary to
the charity of God, whose truth one hides or corrupts by such a lie; so
that a lie of this kind is opposed not only to the virtue of charity,
but also to the virtues of faith and religion: wherefore it is a most
grievous and a mortal sin. If, however, the false signification be
about something the knowledge of which affects a man's good, for
instance if it pertain to the perfection of science or to moral
conduct, a lie of this description inflicts an injury on one's
neighbor, since it causes him to have a false opinion, wherefore it is
contrary to charity, as regards the love of our neighbor, and
consequently is a mortal sin. On the other hand, if the false opinion
engendered by the lie be about some matter the knowledge of which is of
no consequence, then the lie in question does no harm to one's
neighbor; for instance, if a person be deceived as to some contingent
particulars that do not concern him. Wherefore a lie of this kind,
considered in itself, is not a mortal sin.
As regards the end in view, a lie may be contrary to charity, through
being told with the purpose of injuring God, and this is always a
mortal sin, for it is opposed to religion; or in order to injure one's
neighbor, in his person, his possessions or his good name, and this
also is a mortal sin, since it is a mortal sin to injure one's
neighbor, and one sins mortally if one has merely the intention of
committing a mortal sin. But if the end intended be not contrary to
charity, neither will the lie, considered under this aspect, be a
mortal sin, as in the case of a jocose lie, where some little pleasure
is intended, or in an officious lie, where the good also of one's
neighbor is intended. Accidentally a lie may be contrary to charity by
reason of scandal or any other injury resulting therefrom: and thus
again it will be a mortal sin, for instance if a man were not deterred
through scandal from lying publicly.
Reply to Objection 1: The passages quoted refer to the mischievous lie,
as a gloss explains the words of Ps. 5:7, "Thou wilt destroy all that
speak a lie. "
Reply to Objection 2: Since all the precepts of the decalogue are
directed to the love of God and our neighbor, as stated above (Q[44],
A[1], ad 3; [3211]FS, Q[100], A[5], ad 1), a lie is contrary to a
precept of the decalogue, in so far as it is contrary to the love of
God and our neighbor. Hence it is expressly forbidden to bear false
witness against our neighbor.
Reply to Objection 3: Even a venial sin can be called "iniquity" in a
broad sense, in so far as it is beside the equity of justice; wherefore
it is written (1 Jn. 3:4): "Every sin is iniquity [*Vulg. : 'And sin is
iniquity. ']. " It is in this sense that Augustine is speaking.
Reply to Objection 4: The lie of the midwives may be considered in two
ways. First as regards their feeling of kindliness towards the Jews,
and their reverence and fear of God, for which their virtuous
disposition is commended. For this an eternal reward is due. Wherefore
Jerome (in his exposition of Is. 65:21, 'And they shall build houses')
explains that God "built them spiritual houses. " Secondly, it may be
considered with regard to the external act of lying. For thereby they
could merit, not indeed eternal reward, but perhaps some temporal meed,
the deserving of which was not inconsistent with the deformity of their
lie, though this was inconsistent with their meriting an eternal
reward. It is in this sense that we must understand the words of
Gregory, and not that they merited by that lie to lose the eternal
reward as though they had already merited it by their preceding
kindliness, as the objection understands the words to mean.
Reply to Objection 5: Some say that for the perfect every lie is a
mortal sin. But this assertion is unreasonable. For no circumstance
causes a sin to be infinitely more grievous unless it transfers it to
another species. Now a circumstance of person does not transfer a sin
to another species, except perhaps by reason of something annexed to
that person, for instance if it be against his vow: and this cannot
apply to an officious or jocose lie. Wherefore an officious or a jocose
lie is not a mortal sin in perfect men, except perhaps accidentally on
account of scandal. We may take in this sense the saying of Augustine
that "it is a precept of perfection not only not to lie at all, but not
even to wish to lie": although Augustine says this not positively but
dubiously, for he begins by saying: "Unless perhaps it is a precept,"
etc. Nor does it matter that they are placed in a position to safeguard
the truth: because they are bound to safeguard the truth by virtue of
their office in judging or teaching, and if they lie in these matters
their lie will be a mortal sin: but it does not follow that they sin
mortally when they lie in other matters.
__________________________________________________________________
OF DISSIMULATION AND HYPOCRISY (FOUR ARTICLES)
In due sequence we must consider dissimulation and hypocrisy. Under
this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all dissimulation is a sin?
(2) Whether hypocrisy is dissimulation?
(3) Whether it is opposed to truth?
(4) Whether it is a mortal sin?
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Whether all dissimulation is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that not all dissimulation is a sin. For it is
written (Lk. 24:28) that our Lord "pretended [Douay: 'made as though']
he would go farther"; and Ambrose in his book on the Patriarchs (De
Abraham i) says of Abraham that he "spoke craftily to his servants,
when he said" (Gn. 22:5): "I and the boy will go with speed as far as
yonder, and after we have worshipped, will return to you. " Now to
pretend and to speak craftily savor of dissimulation: and yet it is not
to be said that there was sin in Christ or Abraham. Therefore not all
dissimulation is a sin.
Objection 2: Further, no sin is profitable. But according to Jerome, in
his commentary on Gal. 2:11, "When Peter [Vulg. : 'Cephas'] was come to
Antioch:---The example of Jehu, king of Israel, who slew the priest of
Baal, pretending that he desired to worship idols, should teach us that
dissimulation is useful and sometimes to be employed"; and David
"changed his countenance before" Achis, king of Geth (1 Kings 21:13).
Therefore not all dissimulation is a sin.
Objection 3: Further, good is contrary to evil. Therefore if it is evil
to simulate good, it is good to simulate evil.
Objection 4: Further, it is written in condemnation of certain people
(Is. 3:9): "They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they
have not hid it. " Now it pertains to dissimulation to hide one's sin.
Therefore it is reprehensible sometimes not to simulate. But it is
never reprehensible to avoid sin. Therefore dissimulation is not a sin.
On the contrary, A gloss on Is. 16:14, "In three years," etc. , says:
"Of the two evils it is less to sin openly than to simulate holiness. "
But to sin openly is always a sin. Therefore dissimulation is always a
sin.
I answer that, As stated above ([3212]Q[109], A[3];[3213] Q[110],
A[1]), it belongs to the virtue of truth to show oneself outwardly by
outward signs to be such as one is. Now outward signs are not only
words, but also deeds. Accordingly just as it is contrary to truth to
signify by words something different from that which is in one's mind,
so also is it contrary to truth to employ signs of deeds or things to
signify the contrary of what is in oneself, and this is what is
properly denoted by dissimulation. Consequently dissimulation is
properly a lie told by the signs of outward deeds. Now it matters not
whether one lie in word or in any other way, as stated above
([3214]Q[110], A[1], OBJ[2]). Wherefore, since every lie is a sin, as
stated above ([3215]Q[110], A[3]), it follows that also all
dissimulation is a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. ii), "To pretend
is not always a lie: but only when the pretense has no signification,
then it is a lie. When, however, our pretense refers to some
signification, there is no lie, but a representation of the truth. " And
he cites figures of speech as an example, where a thing is "pretended,"
for we do not mean it to be taken literally but as a figure of
something else that we wish to say. In this way our Lord "pretended He
would go farther," because He acted as if wishing to go farther; in
order to signify something figuratively either because He was far from
their faith, according to Gregory (Hom. xxiii in Ev. ); or, as Augustine
says (De QQ. Evang. ii), because, "as He was about to go farther away
from them by ascending into heaven, He was, so to speak, held back on
earth by their hospitality. "
Abraham also spoke figuratively. Wherefore Ambrose (De Abraham i) says
that Abraham "foretold what he knew not": for he intended to return
alone after sacrificing his son: but by his mouth the Lord expressed
what He was about to do. It is evident therefore that neither
dissembled.
Reply to Objection 2: Jerome employs the term "simulation" in a broad
sense for any kind of pretense. David's change of countenance was a
figurative pretense, as a gloss observes in commenting on the title of
Ps. 33, "I will bless the Lord at all times. " There is no need to
excuse Jehu's dissimulation from sin or lie, because he was a wicked
man, since he departed not from the idolatry of Jeroboam (4 Kings
10:29,31). And yet he is praised withal and received an earthly reward
from God, not for his dissimulation, but for his zeal in destroying the
worship of Baal.
Reply to Objection 3: Some say that no one may pretend to be wicked,
because no one pretends to be wicked by doing good deeds, and if he do
evil deeds, he is evil. But this argument proves nothing. Because a man
might pretend to be evil, by doing what is not evil in itself but has
some appearance of evil: and nevertheless this dissimulation is evil,
both because it is a lie, and because it gives scandal; and although he
is wicked on this account, yet his wickedness is not the wickedness he
simulates. And because dissimulation is evil in itself, its sinfulness
is not derived from the thing simulated, whether this be good or evil.
Reply to Objection 4: Just as a man lies when he signifies by word that
which he is not, yet lies not when he refrains from saying what he is,
for this is sometimes lawful; so also does a man dissemble, when by
outward signs of deeds or things he signifies that which he is not, yet
he dissembles not if he omits to signify what he is. Hence one may hide
one's sin without being guilty of dissimulation. It is thus that we
must understand the saying of Jerome on the words of Isa. 3:9, that the
"second remedy after shipwreck is to hide one's sin," lest, to wit,
others be scandalized thereby.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hypocrisy is the same as dissimulation?
Objection 1: It seems that hypocrisy is not the same as dissimulation.
For dissimulation consists in lying by deeds. But there may be
hypocrisy in showing outwardly what one does inwardly, according to
Mat. 6:2, "When thou dost an alms-deed sound not a trumpet before thee,
as the hypocrites do. " Therefore hypocrisy is not the same as
dissimulation.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7): "Some there are
who wear the habit of holiness, yet are unable to attain the merit of
perfection. We must by no means deem these to have joined the ranks of
the hypocrites, since it is one thing to sin from weakness, and another
to sin from malice. " Now those who wear the habit of holiness, without
attaining the merit of perfection, are dissemblers, since the outward
habit signifies works of perfection. Therefore dissimulation is not the
same as hypocrisy.
Objection 3: Further, hypocrisy consists in the mere intention. For our
Lord says of hypocrites (Mat. 23:5) that "all their works they do for
to be seen of men": and Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7) that "they never
consider what it is that they do, but how by their every action they
may please men. " But dissimulation consists, not in the mere intention,
but in the outward action: wherefore a gloss on Job 36:13, "Dissemblers
and crafty men prove the wrath of God," says that "the dissembler
simulates one thing and does another: he pretends chastity, and
delights in lewdness, he makes a show of poverty and fills his purse. "
Therefore hypocrisy is not the same as dissimulation.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x): "'Hypocrite' is a Greek word
corresponding to the Latin 'simulator,' for whereas he is evil within,"
he "shows himself outwardly as being good; {hypo} denoting falsehood,
and {krisis}, judgment. "
I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x), "the word hypocrite is
derived from the appearance of those who come on to the stage with a
disguised face, by changing the color of their complexion, so as to
imitate the complexion of the person they simulate, at one time under
the guise of a man, at another under the guise of a woman, so as to
deceive the people in their acting. " Hence Augustine says (De Serm.
Dom. ii) that "just as hypocrites by simulating other persons act the
parts of those they are not (since he that acts the part of Agamemnon
is not that man himself but pretends to be), so too in the Church and
in every department of human life, whoever wishes to seem what he is
not is a hypocrite: for he pretends to be just without being so in
reality. "
We must conclude, therefore, that hypocrisy is dissimulation, not,
however, any form of dissimulation, but only when one person simulates
another, as when a sinner simulates the person of a just man.
