The other party seemed rather pleased no get rid of so
oppressive
a support; not perceiving,
that their own fall was prepared by his, and involved in it.
that their own fall was prepared by his, and involved in it.
Edmund Burke
440 THOUGHTS on THE CAUSE
God has been pleased to form the inhabitants of this island. If these be radically and essentially vicious, all that can be said that those men are very un happy, to whose fortune or duty falls to administer the affairs of this untoward people. hear indeed sometimes asserted, that steady perseverance in the present measures, and rigorous punishment of those who oppose them, will in course of time infallibly put an end to these disorders. But this, in my opinion,
said without much observation of our present dis position, and without any knowledge at all of the general nature of mankind. If the matter of which this nation composed be so very fermentable as these
describe leaven never will be wanting to work up, as long as discontent, revenge, and am bition, have existence in the world. Particular pun ishments are the cure for accidental distempers in the state; they inflame rather than allay those heats which arise from the settled mismanagement of the government, or from natural indisposition in the
? gentlemen
of the utmost moment not to make mistakes in the use of strong measures and firmness
then only virtue when accompanies the most
people.
wisdom. In truth, inconstancy sort of natural corrective of folly and ignorance.
am not one of those who think that the people are never in the wrong. They have been so, fre quently and outrageously, both in other countries and in this. But do say, that in all disputes between them and their rulers, the presumption at least
perfect
upon par in favor of the people.
perhaps justify me in going further.
discontents have been very prevalent,
affirmed and supported, that there has been generally
Experience may When popular
may well be
? ? it
is
it I
I a
is
is
I
a
It is
it
is
is a
it
it
a it, a
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? or THE PRESENT n1sconrnnrs. 441
something found amiss in the constitution, or in the conduct of government. The people have no interest in disorder. When they do wrong, it is their error, and not their crime. But with the governing part of the state, it is far otherwise. They certainly may act ill by design, as well as by mistake. "Les re? volutions qui arrivent dans les grands e? tats ne sont
point un efect du hazard, ni du caprice des peuples. Rien rte re? volte les grands d'un royaurne comm; un gouvernement foible et de? range? . Pour la populace, ce n'est jarnais par envie d'attaquer *qu'elle se soule? ve,
mais par impatience de soufl'rir. " These are the words of a great man; of a minister of state ; and a zealous assertor of monarchy. They are applied to the system offavoritism which was adopted by Henry the Third of France, and to the dreadful conse quences it produced. What he says of revolutions, is equally true of all great disturbances. If this pre sumption in favor of the subjects against the trustees of power be not the more probable, I am sure it is the more comfortable speculation; because it is more easy to change an administration, than to reform a people.
Upon a supposition, therefore, that, in the opening of the cause, the presumptions stand equally bal anced between the parties, there seems sufficient ground to entitle any person to a fair hearing, who
some other scheme beside that easy one which is fashionable in some fashionable companies, to account for the present discontents. It is not to be argued that we endure no grievance, because our grievances are not of the same sort with those under which we labored formerly ; not precisely those which
'1' Me? m. de Sully, tom. i. p. 133.
? attempts
? ? ? 442 THOUGHTS on THE causn .
we bore from the Tudors, or vindicated on the Stu arts. A great change has taken place in the affairs of this country. For in the silent lapse of events as material alterations have been insensibly brought about in the policy and character of governments and nations, as those which have been marked by the
have constantly observed, that the generality of peo ple are fifty years, at least, behindhand in their poli tics. There are but very few who are capable of com paring and digesting what passes before their eyes at diiferent times and occasions, so as to form the whole into a distinct system. But in books everything is settled for them, without the exertion of any consid erable diligence or sagacity. For which reason men are wise with but little reflection, and good with little self-denial, in the business of all times except their own. We are very uncorrupt and tolerably enlight ened judges of the transactions of past ages; where no passions deceive, and where the whole train of circumstances, from the trifling cause to the tragical event, is set in an orderly series before us. Few are the partisans of departed tyranny ; and to be a Whig on the business of an hundred years ago, is very con sistent with every advantage of present servility. This retrospective wisdom, and historical patriotism, are things of wonderful convenience, and serve ad mirably to reconcile the old quarrel between specula tion and practice. Many a stern republican, after gorging himself with a full feast of admiration of the Grecian commonwealths and of our true Saxon con
tumult of public revolutions.
_
It is very rare indeed for men to be wrong in their feelings concerning public misconduct ; as rare to be right in their speculation upon the cause of it. I
? ? ? ? _
or THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 443
stitution, and discharging all the splendid bile of his virtuous indignation on King John and King James, sits down perfectly satisfied to the coarsest work and homeliest job of the day he lives in. I believe there was no professed admirer of Henry the Eighth among the instruments of the last King James; nor in the court of Henry the Eighth was there, I dare say, to be found a single advocate for the favorites of Richard the Second. .
No complaisance to our court, or to our age, can make me believe nature to be so changed, but that public liberty will be among us as among our ances tors, obnoxious to some person or other; and that
? will be furnished for attempting, at least, some alteration to the prejudice of our con
stitution. These attempts will naturally vary in their mode according to times and circumstances. For ambition, though it has ever the same general views, has not at all times the same means, nor the same
opportunities
A great deal of the furniture of ancient tyranny is worn to rags ; the rest is entirely out of fashion. Besides, there are few statesmen so
very clumsy and awkward in their business, as to fall into the identical snare which has proved fatal to their
particular objects.
When an arbitrary imposition is at tempted upon the subject, undoubtedly it will not bear on its forehead the name of Ship-money. There is no
danger that an extension of the Forest laws should be the chosen mode of oppression in this age. And when we hear any instance of ministerial rapacity, to the pre judice of the rights of private life, it will certainly not
be the exaction of two hundred pullets, from a woman of fashion, for leave to lie with her own husband. *
5* " Uxor Hugonis de Nevill dat Domino Rcgi ducentas Gallinas,
predecessors.
? ? ? 444 THOUGHTS on THE CAUSE
Every age has its own manners, and its politics de pendent upon them; and the same attempts will not be made against a constitution fully formed and ma tured, that were used to destroy it in the cradle, or to resist its growth during its infancy.
Against the being of Parliament, I am satisfied, no designs have ever been entertained since the revolu tion. Every one must perceive, that it is strongly the interest of the court, to have some second cause interposed between the ministers and the people. The gentlemen of the House of Commons have an in terest equally strong in sustaining the part of that intermediate cause. However they may hire out the asufruct of their voices, they never will part with the
? fee and inheritance. Accordingly those who have been of the most known devotion to the will and pleasure of a court have, at the same time, been most forward in asserting a high authority in the House of Com mons. When they knew who were to use that au thority, and how it was to be employed, they thought it never could be carried too far. It must be always the wish of an unconstitutional statesman, that a House of Commons, who are entirely dependent upon him, should have every right of the people entirely dependent upon their pleasure. It was soon discov ered, that the forms of a free, and the ends of an arbitrary government, were things not altogether in compatible.
The power of the crown, ahnost dead and rotten as Prerogative, has grown up anew, with much more strength, and far less odium, under the name of Influence. An influence, which operated without
eo quod possit jacere una nocte cum Domino suo Hugone de Nevill. " -- Maddox, Hist. Exch. c. xiii. p. 326.
? ? _. "n
? on rm'2 PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 445
noise and without violence; an influence, which con verted the very antagonist into the instrument of power; which contained in itself a perpetual prin ciple of growth and renovation; and which the dis tresses and the prosperity of the country equally tended to augment, was an admirable substitute for
a prerogative, that, being only the offspring of anti quated prejudices, had moulded in its original stam ina irresistible principles of decay and dissolution. The ignorance of the people is a bottom but for a temporary system ; the interest of active men in the state is a foundation perpetual and infallible. How ever, some circumstances, arising, it must be con fessed, in a great degree from accident, prevented
the effects of this influence for a long time from breaking out in a manner capable of exciting any serious apprehensions. Although government was
? and flourished exceedingly, the court had drawn far less advantage than one would imagine from this great source of power.
At the revolution, the crown, deprived, for the ends of the revolution itself, of many prerogatives, was found too weak to struggle against all the diffi culties which pressed so new and unsettled a govern ment. The court was obliged therefore to delegate
a part of its powers to men of such interest as could support, and of such fidelity as would adhere to, its establishment. Such men were able to draw in a greater number to a concurrence in the common
defence. This connection, necessary at first, contin ued long after convenient; and properly conducted might indeed, in all situations, be an useful instru
ment of government. At the same time, through the intervention of men of popular weight and char
strong
? ? ? 446 rnouonrs on THE CAUSE
acter, the people possessed a security for their just proportion of importance in the state. But as the title to the crown grew stronger by long possession, and by the constant increase of its influence, these helps have of late seemed to certain persons no bet ter than incumbrances. The powerful managers for government were not sufficiently submissive to the pleasure of the possessors of immediate and personal favor, sometimes from a confidence in their own strength, natural and acquired; sometimes from a fear of offending their friends, and weakening that lead in the country which gave them a consideration independent of the court. Men acted as if the court could receive, as well as confer, an obligation. The influence of government, thus divided in appearance between the court and the leaders of parties, became in many cases an accession rather to the popular than to the royal scale; and some part of that influence, which would otherwise have been possessed as in a sort of mortmain and unalienable domain, returned again to the great ocean from whence it arose, and circulated among the people. This method, therefore, of gov erning by men of great natural interest or great ac quired consideration was viewed in a very invidious light by the true lovers of absolute monarchy. It is the nature of despotism to abhor power held by any means but its own momentary pleasure ; and to anni hilate all intermediate situations between boundless strength on its own part, and total debility on the part of the people.
To get rid of all this intermediate and independent importance, and to secure to the court the unlimited and uncontrolled use of its own vast influence, under the sole direction of its ownprivate favor, has for some
? ? ? ? OF THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS.
years past been the great object of policy. If this were compassed, the influence of the crown must of course produce all the effects which the most san guine partisans of the court could possibly desire. Government might then be carried on without any concurrence on the part of the people; without any attention to the dignity of the greater, or to the aifec tions of the lower sorts. A new project was there fore devised by a certain set of intriguing men, totally diiferent from the system of administration which had prevailed since the accession of the House of Bruns
wick. This project, I have heard, was first conceived by some persons in the court of Frederick Prince of Wales.
The earliest attempt in the execution of this design was to set up for minister, a person, in rank indeed respectable, and very ample in fortune; but who, to the moment of this vast and sudden elevation, was little known or considered in the kingdom. To him the whole nation was to yield an immediate and im plicit submission. But whether it was from want of firmness to bear up against the first opposition; or that things were not yet fully ripened, or that this method was not found the most eligible; that idea
? was soon abandoned. The instrumental part of the project was a little altered, to accommodate it to the time and to bring things more gradually and more surely to the one great end proposed.
_
The first part of the reformed plan was to draw a
line which should separate the court from the ministry. Hitherto these names had been looked upon as sy nonymous; but for the future, court and administra tion were to be considered as things totally distinct. By this operation, two systems of administration were
? ? ? 448 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE
to be formed; one which should be in the real secret and confidence; the other merely ostensible to per form the official and executory duties of government. The latter were alone to be responsible; whilst the real advisers, who enjoyed all the power, were effect ually removed from all the danger.
Secondly, A party under these leaders was to be
formed infavor of the court against the ministry : this party was to have a large share in the emoluments of government, and to hold it totally separate from, and independent of, ostensible administration.
The third point, and that on which the success of the whole scheme ultimately depended, was to bring Parliament to an acquiescence in this project. Parlia ment was therefore to be taught by degrees a total indifference to the persons, rank, influence, abilities, connections, and character of the ministers of the crown. By means of a discipline, on which I shall say more hereafter, that body was to be habituated to the most opposite interests, and the most dis cordant politics. All connections and dependencies among subjects were to be entirely dissolved. As, hitherto, business had gone through the hands of leaders of Whigs or Tories, men of talents to concili ate the people, and to engage their confidence; now the method was to be altered: and the lead was to be given to men of no sort of consideration or credit in the country. This want of natural importance was to be their very title to delegated power. Members of Parliament were to be hardened into an insensi bility to pride as well as to duty. Those high and haughty sentiments, which are the great support of independence, were to be let down gradually. Points of honor and precedence were no more to be regarded
? ? ? ? or ran PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 449
in Parliamentary decorum than in a Turkish army. It was to be avowed, as a constitutional maxim, that the king might appoint one of his footmen, or one of your footmen for minister; and that he ought to be, and that he would be, as well followed as the first name for rank or wisdom in the nation. Thus Parliament was to look on as if perfectly unconcerned, while a cabal of the closet and back-stairs was substi tuted in the place of a national administration.
With such a degree of acquiescence, any measure of any court might well be deemed thoroughly secure. The capital objects, and by much the most flattering characteristics of arbitrary power, would be obtained.
Everything would be drawn from its holdings in the country to the personal favor and inclination of the
This favor would be the sole introduction to power, and the only tenure by which it was to be held; so that no person looking towards another, and all looking towards the court, it was impossible but that the motive which solely influenced every man's
hopes must come in time to govern every man's con duct; till at last the servility became universal, in spite of the dead letter of any laws or institutions whatsoever.
How it should happen that any man could be tempted to venture upon such a project of govern ment, may at first view appear surprising. But the
fact is that opportunities very inviting to such an at
tempt have offered; and the scheme itself was not 'destitute of some arguments, not wholly unplausible, to recommend it. These opportunities and these ar
guments, the use that has been made of both, the plan for . carrying this new scheme of government
into execution, and the effects which it has pro von. 1. 29
? prince.
? ? ? 450 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE
duced, are, in my opinion, worthy of our serious con sideration.
His Majesty came to the throne of these kingdoms with more advantages than any of his predecessors since the revolution. Fourth in descent, and third in succession of his royal family, even the zealots of he reditary right, in him, saw something to flatter their favorite prejudices; and to justify a transfer of their attachments, without a change in their principles. The person and cause of the Pretender were become
contemptible ; his title disowned throughout Europe; his party disbanded in England. His Majesty came, indeed, to the inheritance of a mighty war; but, vic torious in every part of the globe, peace was always in his power, not to negotiate, but to dictate. No for eign habitudes or attachments withdrew him from the cultivation of his power at home. His revenue for the civil establishment, fixed (as it was then thought) at a large, but definite sum, was ample without being invidious. His influence, by additions from conquest, by an augmentation of debt, by an increase of military and naval establishment, much
'
*". 15I'. "'f
? and' extended. And coming to the throne in the prime and full vigor of youth, as from affection there was a strong dislike, so from dread
there seemed to be a general averseness, from giv ing anything like offence to a monarch, against whose resentment opposition could not look for a refuge in any sort of reversionary hope.
These singular advantages inspired his Majesty only with a more ardent desire to preserve unimpaired the spirit of that national freedom, to which he owed a sit uation so full of glory. But to others it suggested sen timents of a very different nature. They thought they
strengthened
? ? ? or THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 451
now beheld an opportunity (by a certain sort of states men never long undiscovered or unemployed) of draw ing to themselves by the aggrandizement of a court faction, a degree of power which they could never hope to derive from natural influence or from honorable service ; and which it was impossible they could hold with the least security, whilst the system of adminis
tration rested upon its former bottom. In order to facilitate the execution of their design, it was neces sary to make many alterations in political arrange ment, and a signal change in the opinions, habits,
and connections of the greatest part of those who at that time acted in public.
In the first place, they proceeded gradually, but not slowly, to destroy everything of strength which did not derive its principal nourishment from the imme
diate pleasure _of the court. The greatest weight of popular opinion and party connection were then with the Duke of Newcastle and Mr. Pitt. Neither of these held their importance by the new tenure of the court ; they were not therefore thought to be so proper as others for the services which were required by that
tenure. It happened very favorably for the new sys tem, that under a forced coalition there rankled an incurable alienation and disgust between the parties
which composed the administration. Mr. Pitt was
first attacked. Not satisfied with removing him from power, they endeavored by various artifices to ruin his character.
The other party seemed rather pleased no get rid of so oppressive a support; not perceiving,
that their own fall was prepared by his, and involved in it. Many other reasons prevented them from dar ing to look their true situation in the face. To the
great Whig families it was extremely disagreeable,
? ? ? ? 452 THOUGHTS on THE causn
and seemed almost unnatural, to oppose the admin istration of a prince of the House of Brunswick. Day after day they hesitated, and doubted, and lingered, expecting that other counsels would take place; and were slow to be persuaded, that all which had been done by the cabal was the effect not of humor, but of system. It was more strongly and evidently the interest of the new court faction, to get rid of the great Whig connections, than to destroy Mr. Pitt. The power of that gentleman was vast indeed and merited; but it was in a great degree personal, and therefore transient. Theirs was rooted in the coun try. For, with a good deal less of popularity, they possessed a far more natural and fixed influence. Long possession of government; vast property; obli gations of favors given and received; connection of
office; ties of blood, of alliance, of friendship (things at that time supposed of some force); the name of Whig, dear to the majority of the people; the zeal early begun and steadily continued to the royal fam ily: all these together formed a body of power in the nation, which was criminal and devoted. The great ruling principle of the cabal, and that which ani mated and harmonized all their proceedings, how va rious soever they may have been, was to signify to the world that the court would proceed upon its own proper forces only; and that the pretence of bringing any other into its service was an affront to and not
support. Therefore when the chiefs were removed, in order to go to the root, the whole party was put under proscription, so general and severe, as to take their hard-earned bread from the lowest offi cers, in manner which had never been known be fore, even in general revolutions. But was thought
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it,
? or THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS.
453
necessary effectually to destroy all dependencies but one; and to show an example of the firmness and rigor with which the new system was to be supported.
Thus for the time were pulled down, in the persons of the Whig leaders and of Mr. Pitt (in spite of the services of the one at the accession of the royal fam ily, and the recent services of the other in the war), the two only securities for the importance of the people;
power arising from popularity ; and power arising from connection. Here and there indeed a few individuals wore left standing, who gave security for their total estrangement from the odious principles of party con nection and personal attachment; and it must be confessed that most of them have religiously
? kept their faith. Such a change could not however be
made without a mighty shock to government.
To reconcile the minds of the people to all these movements, principles correspondent to them had been preached up with great zeal. Every one must
remember that the cabal set out with the most as tonishing prudery, both moral and political. Those, who in a few months after soused over head and ears i11to the deepest and dirtiest pits of corruption, cried out violently against the indirect practices in the elect ing and managing of Parliaments, which had for
merly prevailed. _ This marvellous abhorrence which the court had suddenly taken to all influence, was not only circulated in conversation through the king dom, but pompously announced to the public, with
Inany other extraordinary things, in a pamphlet* which had all the appearance of a manifesto pre paratory to some considerable enterprise. Through out it was a satire, though in terms managed and
* Sentiments of an Honest Man.
? ? ? 454 rrroucnrs on THE causn
decent enough, on the politics of the former reign. It was indeed written with no small art and address. In this piece appeared the first dawning of the new
system: there first appeared the idea (then only in speculation) of separating the court from the adminis tration; of carrying everything from national connec tion to personal regards; and of forming a regular party for that purpose, under the name of king's men.
To recommend this system to the people, a per spective view of the court, gorgeously painted, and finely illuminated from within, was exhibited to the gaping multitude. Party was to be totally done away, with all its evil works. Corruption was to be cast down from court, as Ate' was from heaven. Power was thenceforward to be the chosen residence of public spirit; and no one was to be supposed un der any sinister influence, except those who had the misfortune to be in disgrace at court, which was to stand in lieu of all vices and all corruptions. A scheme of perfection to be realized in a monarchy far
the visionary republic of Plato. The whole scenery was exactly disposed to captivate those good souls, whose credulous morality is so invaluable a treasure to crafty politicians. Indeed there was wherewithal to charm everybody, except those few who are not much pleased with professions of super natural virtue, who know of what stuif such profes sions are made, for what purposes they are designed, and in what they are sure constantly to end. Many innocent gentlemen, who had been talking prose all their lives without knowing anything of the matter, began at last to open their eyes upon their own mer its, and to attribute their not having been lords of the treasury and lords of trade many years before,
? beyond
? ? ? or THE PRESENT n1sconrnurs. 455
merely to the prevalence of party, and to the minis terial power, which had frustrated the good inten tions of the court in favor of their abilities. Now was the time to unlock the sealed fountain of royal bounty, which had been infamously monopolized and huckstered, and to let it flow at large upon the whole
The time was come, to restore royalty to its original splendor. Jlfettre le Roy hora de page, be came a sort of watchword. And it was constantly in the mouths of all the rumiers of the court, that noth ing could preserve the balance of the constitution from being overturned by the rabble, or by a faction of the nobility, but to free the sovereign effectually from that ministerial tyranny under which the royal dignity had been oppressed in the person of his Ma jesty's grandfather.
These were some of the many artifices used to rec oncile the people to the great change which was made in the persons who composed the ministry, and the still greater which was made and avowed in its con stitution. As to individuals, other methods were employed with them ; in order so thoroughly to disu nite every party, and even every family, that no con cert, order, or qfiect, might appear in any future opposi tion. And in this manner an administration without
connection with the people, or with one another, was first put in possession of government. What good consequences followed from we have all seen; whether with regard to virtue, public or private; to the ease and happiness of the sovereign or to the real strength of government. But as so much stress was then laid on the necessity of this new project, will not be amiss to take view of the effects of this royal servitude and vile durance, which was so de
people.
? ? ? a
it
;
it,
? 456 THOUGHTS on THE cAusn
plored in the reign of the late monarch, and was so carefully to be avoided in the reign of his successor.
crown connected with the liberty of his people, not only unimpaired, but improved, for the space of thir ty-three years. He overcame a dangerous rebellion, abetted by foreign force, and raging in the heart of his kingdoms; and thereby destroyed the seeds of all future rebellion that could arise upon the same prin ciple. He carried the glory, the power, the com merce of England, to a height unknown even to this renowned nation in the times of its greatest prosperi ty: and he left his succession resting on the true and only true foundations of all national and all regal greatness; affection at home, reputation abroad, trust in allies, terror in rival nations. The most ardent lover of his country cannot wish for Great Britain a happier fate than to continue as she was then left. A people, emulous as we are in affection to our present sovereign, know not how to form a prayer to heaven for a greater blessing upon his vir tues, or a higher state of felicity and glory, than that
he should live, and should reign, and when Provi dence ordains should die, exactly like his illustri ous predecessor.
A great prince may be obliged (though such thing cannot happen very often) sacrifice his pri vate inclination to his public interest. A wise prince will not think that such restraint implies condi tion of servility; and truly, such was the condition of the last reign, and the effects were also such as we have described, we ought, no less for the sake of the
The effects were these.
_ In times full of doubt and danger to his person and family, George II. maintained the dignity of his
-\
? ? ? In
a if
a
a
to
it,
? or run PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 457
sovereign whom we love, than for our own, to hear arguments convincing indeed, before we depart from the maxims of that reign, or fly in the face of this great body of strong and recent experience.
One of the principal topics which was then, and has been since, much employed by that political"' school, is an affected terror of the growth of an aris tocratic power, prejudicial to the rights of the crown, and the balance of the constitution. Any new pow ers exercised in the House of Lords, or in the House of Commons, or by the crown, ought certainly to ex cite the vigilant and anxious jealousy of a free people. Even a new and unprecedented course of action in the whole legislature, without great and evident reason, may be a subject of just uneasiness. I will not affirm, that there may not havelately appeared in the House of Lords, a disposition to some attempts derogatory to the legal rights of the subject. If any such have really appeared, they have arisen, not from
a power properly aristocratic, but from the same in fluence which is charged with having excited at tempts of a similar nature in the House of Commons; which House, if it should have been betrayed into an unfortunate quarrel with its constituents, and in volved in a charge of the very same nature, could
have neither power nor inclination to repel such at tempts in others. Those attempts in the House of Lords can no more be called aristocratic proceedings, than the proceedings with regard to the county of Middlesex in the House of Commons can with any
sense be called democratical.
It is true, that the peers have a great influence in
" * See the political Writings of the late Dr. Brown, and many others.
? ? ? ? 458 ruoucnrs on rnn causn
the kingdom, and in every part of the public concerns. While they are men of property, it is impossible to prevent except by such means as must prevent all property from its natural operation: an event not easily to be compassed, while property power nor by any means to be wished, while the least notion ex ists of the method by which the spirit of liberty acts, and of the means by which preserved. If any particular peers, by their uniform, upright, constitu
tional conduct, by their public and their private vir tues, have acquired an influence in the country; the people, on whose favor that influence depends, and from whom arose, will never be duped into an opin ion, that such greatness in peer the despotism of an aristocracy, when they know and feel to be the effect and pledge of their own importance.
am no friend to aristocracy, in the sense at least in which that word usually understood. If were not bad habit to moot cases on the supposed ruin of the constitution, should be free to declare, that if
must perish, would rather by far see resolved into any other form, than lost in that austere and in solent domination. But, whatever my dislikes may be, my fears are not upon that quarter. The ques tion, on the influence of court, and of peerage, not, which of the two dangers the more eligible, but which the more imminent. He but observer, who has not seen, that the generality of peers, far from supporting themselves in state of in dependent greatness, are but too apt to fall into an oblivion of their proper dignity, and to run headlong
into an abject servitude. Would to God were true, that the fault of _our peers were too much spirit. It worthy of some observation that these gentlemen,
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? OF' THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS.
so jealous of aristocracy, make no complaints of the
power of those peers (neither few nor inconsiderable) who are always in the train of court, and whose
whole weight must be considered as portion of the settled influence of the crown. This all safe and right; but some peers am very sorry they are not as many as they ought to be) set themselves, in the great concern of peers and commons, against back-stairs influence and clandestine government, then the alarm begins then the constitution in danger of being forced into an aristocracy.
rest little the longer on this court topic, because was much insisted upon at the time of the great change, and has been since frequently revived by
many of the agents of that party for, whilst they are terrifying the great and opulent with the horrors of mob-government, they are by other managers attempt ing (though hithertowith little success) to alarm the people with phantom of tyranny in the nobles. All this done upon their favorite principle of disunion, of sowing jealousies amongst the different orders of the state, and of disjointing the natural strength of the kingdom; that may be rendered incapable of resisting the sinister designs of wicked men, who have engrossed the royal power. '
Thus much of the topics chosen by the courtiers to recommend their system will be necessary to open little more at large the nature of that party which
was formed for its support. Without this, the whole would have been no better than visionary amuse ment, like the scheme of Harrington's political club, and not business in which the nation had real concern. As powerful party, and party con
structed on new principle, very inviting ob ject of curiosity.
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It must be remembered, that since the revolution, until the period we are speaking of, the influence of the crown had been always employed in supporting the ministers of state, and in carrying on the public business according to their opinions. But the party now in question is formed upon a very different idea. It is to intercept the favor, protection, and confidence of the crown in the passage to its ministers ; it is to come between them and their importance in Parlia ment; it is to separate them from all their natural and acquired dependencies ; it is intended as the con-P trol, not the support, of administration. The ma chinery of this system is perplexed in its movements, and false in its principle. It is formed on a supposi tion that the king is something external to his gov ernment; and that he may be honored and aggran dized, even by its debility and disgrace. The plan proceeds expressly on the idea of enfeebling the reg ular executory power. It proceeds on the idea of weakening the state in order to strengthen the court. The scheme depending entirely on distrust, on dis connection, on mutability by principle, on systematic weakness in every particular member; it is impossi ble that the total result should be substantial strength
? ofany kind.
I
As a foundation of their scheme, the cabal have established a sort of rota in the court. All sorts of parties, by this means, have been brought into admin istration; from whence few have had the good for tune to escape without disgrace ; none at all without considerable losses. In the beginning of each ar rangement no professions of confidence and support are wanting, to induce the leading men to engage. But while the ministers of the day appear in all the
l
? ? ? or rnn PRESENT msoonrnnrs. 461
pomp and pride of power, while they have all their canvas spread out to the wind, and every sail filled with the fair and prosperous gale of royal favor, in a short time they find, they know not how, a current, which sets directly against them : which prevents all progress; and even drives them backwards. They grow ashamed and mortified in a situation, which, by its vicinity to power, only serves to remind them the more strongly of their insignificance. They are obliged either to execute the orders of their inferiors, or to see themselves opposed by the natural instru ments of their office. With the loss of their dignity they lose their temper. In their turn they grow
to that cabal which, whether it supports or opposes, equally disgraces and equally betrays them. It is soon found necessary to get rid of the heads of administration ; but it is of the heads only. As there always are many rotten members belonging to the best connections, it is not hard to persuade several to continue in office without their leaders. By this means the party goes out much thinner than it came in; and is only reduced in strength by its temporary possession of power. Besides, if by acci dent, or in course of changes, that power should be recovered, the junto have thrown up a retrenchment
of these carcasses, which may serve to cover them selves in a day of danger. They conclude, not un wisely, that such rotten members will become the first objects of disgust and resentment to their ancient connections.
They contrive to form in the outward administra tion two parties at the least; which, whilst they are tearing one another to pieces, are both competitors for the favor and protection of the cabal; and, by
? troublesome
? ? ? THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE
their emulation, contribute to throw everything more and more into the hands of the interior managers.
A minister of state will sometimes keep himself totally estranged from all his colleagues; will differ from them in their councils, will privately traverse, and publicly oppose, their measures. He will, how ever, continue in his employment. Instead of suffer ing any mark of displeasure, he will be distinguished by an unbounded profusion of court rewards and ca resses; because he does what is expected, and all that is expected, from men in office. He helps to keep some form of administration in being, and keeps it at the same time as weak and divided as possible.
However, we must take care not to be mistaken, or to imagine that such persons have any weight in their opposition. When, by them, administration is convinced of its insignificancy, they are soon to be convinced of their own. They never are suffered to succeed in their opposition. They and the world are to be satisfied, that neither office, nor authority, nor property, nor ability, eloquence, counsel, skill, or union, are of the least importance ;_ but that the mere influence of the court, naked of all support, and des titute of all management, is abundantly sufficient for all its own purposes.
When any adverse connection is to be destroyed, the cabal seldom appear in the work themselves. They find out some person of whom the party enter tains a high opinion. Such a person they endeavor to delude with various pretences. They teach him first to distrust, and then to quarrel with his friends ; among whom, by the same arts, they excite a similar diffidence of him ; so that in this mutual fear and dis trust, he may suffer himself to be employed as the
? ? ? ? OI-' THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 463
instrument in the change which is brought about. Afterwards they are sure to destroy him in his turn, by setting up in his place some person in whom he had himself reposed the greatest confidence, and who serves to carry off a considerable part of his adher ents.
When such a person has broke in this manner with his connections, he is soon compelled to commit some flagrant act of iniquitous, personal hostility against some of them (such as an attempt to strip a partic ular friend of his family estate), by which the cabal hope to render the parties utterly irreconcilable. In truth, they have so contrived matters, that people have a greater hatred to the subordinate instruments than to the principal movers.
As in destroying their enemies they make use of instruments not immediately belonging to their corps,
so in advancing their own friends they pursue exactly the same method. To promote any of them to con siderable rank or emolument, they commonly take care that the recommendation shall pass through the hands of the ostensible ministry: such a recommen dation might however appear to the world, as some proof of the credit of ministers, and some means of increasing their strength. To prevent this, the per sons so advanced are directed, in all companies, indus triously to declare, that they are under no obligations whatsoever to administration ; that they have received their office from another quarter; that they are to tally free and independent.
When the faction has any job of lucre to obtain, or of vengeance to perpetrate, their way to select, for the execution, those very persons to whose habits, friendships, principles, and declarations, such pro
? ? ? is,
? THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE
ceedings are publicly known to be the most adverse; at once to render the instruments the more odious, and therefore the more dependent, and to prevent the people from ever reposing a confidence in any appear ance of private friendship or public principle.
If the administration seem now and then, from re missness, or from fear of making themselves disagree able, to suffer any popular excesses to go unpunished, the cabal immediately sets up some creature of theirs to raise a clamor against the ministers, as having shamefully betrayed the dignity of government. Then they compel the ministry to become active in confer ring rewards and honors on the persons who have been the instruments of their disgrace; and, after having first vilified them with the higher orders for suffer ing the laws to sleep over the licentiousness of the
populace, they drive them (in order to make amends for their former inactivity) to some act of atrocious violence, which renders them completely abhorred by the people. They, who remember the riots which at tended the Middlesex election, the opening of the present Parliament, and the transactions relative to Saint George's Fields, will not be at a loss for an ap plication of these remarks.
That this body may be enabled to compass all the ends of its institution, its members are scarcely ever to aim at the high and responsible offices of the state.
They are distributed with art and judgment through all the secondary, but efficient, departments of office, and through the households of all the branches of the royal family: so as on one hand to occupy all the avenues to the throne ; and on the other to forward or frustrate the execution of any measure, according to their own interests. For with the credit and sup
? ? ? ? or THE PRESENT n1scomnnrs. 465
port which they are known to have, though for the greater part in places which are only a genteel excuse for salary, they possess all the influence of the high est posts ; and they dictate publicly in almost every thing, even with a parade of superiority. Whenever they dissent (as it often happens) from their nominal leaders, the trained part of the senate, instinctively in the secret, is sure to follow them: provided the leaders, sensible of their situation, do not of them selves recede in time from their most declared opin ions. This latter is generally the case. It will not be conceivable to any one who has not seen what pleasure taken by the cabal in rendering these heads of office thoroughly contemptible and ridicu lous. And when they are become so, they have then the best chance for being well supported.
The members of the court faction are fully indom nified for not holding places on the slippery heights of the kingdom, not only by the lead in all affairs, but also by the perfect security in which they enjoy less conspicuous, but very advantageous situations. Their places are in express legal tenure, or, in effect, all of them for life. Whilst the first and most respec table persons in the kingdom are tossed about like tennis-balls, the sport of blind and insolent caprice, no minister dares even to cast an oblique glance at the lowest of their body. If an attempt be made
upon one of this corps, immediately he flies to sanctu ary, and pretends to the most inviolable of all prom ises. conveniency of public arrangement avail able to remove any one of them from the specific situation he holds; and the slightest attempt upon one of them, the most powerful minister, cer
tain preliminary to his own destruction. von. 1. 30
? ?
God has been pleased to form the inhabitants of this island. If these be radically and essentially vicious, all that can be said that those men are very un happy, to whose fortune or duty falls to administer the affairs of this untoward people. hear indeed sometimes asserted, that steady perseverance in the present measures, and rigorous punishment of those who oppose them, will in course of time infallibly put an end to these disorders. But this, in my opinion,
said without much observation of our present dis position, and without any knowledge at all of the general nature of mankind. If the matter of which this nation composed be so very fermentable as these
describe leaven never will be wanting to work up, as long as discontent, revenge, and am bition, have existence in the world. Particular pun ishments are the cure for accidental distempers in the state; they inflame rather than allay those heats which arise from the settled mismanagement of the government, or from natural indisposition in the
? gentlemen
of the utmost moment not to make mistakes in the use of strong measures and firmness
then only virtue when accompanies the most
people.
wisdom. In truth, inconstancy sort of natural corrective of folly and ignorance.
am not one of those who think that the people are never in the wrong. They have been so, fre quently and outrageously, both in other countries and in this. But do say, that in all disputes between them and their rulers, the presumption at least
perfect
upon par in favor of the people.
perhaps justify me in going further.
discontents have been very prevalent,
affirmed and supported, that there has been generally
Experience may When popular
may well be
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something found amiss in the constitution, or in the conduct of government. The people have no interest in disorder. When they do wrong, it is their error, and not their crime. But with the governing part of the state, it is far otherwise. They certainly may act ill by design, as well as by mistake. "Les re? volutions qui arrivent dans les grands e? tats ne sont
point un efect du hazard, ni du caprice des peuples. Rien rte re? volte les grands d'un royaurne comm; un gouvernement foible et de? range? . Pour la populace, ce n'est jarnais par envie d'attaquer *qu'elle se soule? ve,
mais par impatience de soufl'rir. " These are the words of a great man; of a minister of state ; and a zealous assertor of monarchy. They are applied to the system offavoritism which was adopted by Henry the Third of France, and to the dreadful conse quences it produced. What he says of revolutions, is equally true of all great disturbances. If this pre sumption in favor of the subjects against the trustees of power be not the more probable, I am sure it is the more comfortable speculation; because it is more easy to change an administration, than to reform a people.
Upon a supposition, therefore, that, in the opening of the cause, the presumptions stand equally bal anced between the parties, there seems sufficient ground to entitle any person to a fair hearing, who
some other scheme beside that easy one which is fashionable in some fashionable companies, to account for the present discontents. It is not to be argued that we endure no grievance, because our grievances are not of the same sort with those under which we labored formerly ; not precisely those which
'1' Me? m. de Sully, tom. i. p. 133.
? attempts
? ? ? 442 THOUGHTS on THE causn .
we bore from the Tudors, or vindicated on the Stu arts. A great change has taken place in the affairs of this country. For in the silent lapse of events as material alterations have been insensibly brought about in the policy and character of governments and nations, as those which have been marked by the
have constantly observed, that the generality of peo ple are fifty years, at least, behindhand in their poli tics. There are but very few who are capable of com paring and digesting what passes before their eyes at diiferent times and occasions, so as to form the whole into a distinct system. But in books everything is settled for them, without the exertion of any consid erable diligence or sagacity. For which reason men are wise with but little reflection, and good with little self-denial, in the business of all times except their own. We are very uncorrupt and tolerably enlight ened judges of the transactions of past ages; where no passions deceive, and where the whole train of circumstances, from the trifling cause to the tragical event, is set in an orderly series before us. Few are the partisans of departed tyranny ; and to be a Whig on the business of an hundred years ago, is very con sistent with every advantage of present servility. This retrospective wisdom, and historical patriotism, are things of wonderful convenience, and serve ad mirably to reconcile the old quarrel between specula tion and practice. Many a stern republican, after gorging himself with a full feast of admiration of the Grecian commonwealths and of our true Saxon con
tumult of public revolutions.
_
It is very rare indeed for men to be wrong in their feelings concerning public misconduct ; as rare to be right in their speculation upon the cause of it. I
? ? ? ? _
or THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 443
stitution, and discharging all the splendid bile of his virtuous indignation on King John and King James, sits down perfectly satisfied to the coarsest work and homeliest job of the day he lives in. I believe there was no professed admirer of Henry the Eighth among the instruments of the last King James; nor in the court of Henry the Eighth was there, I dare say, to be found a single advocate for the favorites of Richard the Second. .
No complaisance to our court, or to our age, can make me believe nature to be so changed, but that public liberty will be among us as among our ances tors, obnoxious to some person or other; and that
? will be furnished for attempting, at least, some alteration to the prejudice of our con
stitution. These attempts will naturally vary in their mode according to times and circumstances. For ambition, though it has ever the same general views, has not at all times the same means, nor the same
opportunities
A great deal of the furniture of ancient tyranny is worn to rags ; the rest is entirely out of fashion. Besides, there are few statesmen so
very clumsy and awkward in their business, as to fall into the identical snare which has proved fatal to their
particular objects.
When an arbitrary imposition is at tempted upon the subject, undoubtedly it will not bear on its forehead the name of Ship-money. There is no
danger that an extension of the Forest laws should be the chosen mode of oppression in this age. And when we hear any instance of ministerial rapacity, to the pre judice of the rights of private life, it will certainly not
be the exaction of two hundred pullets, from a woman of fashion, for leave to lie with her own husband. *
5* " Uxor Hugonis de Nevill dat Domino Rcgi ducentas Gallinas,
predecessors.
? ? ? 444 THOUGHTS on THE CAUSE
Every age has its own manners, and its politics de pendent upon them; and the same attempts will not be made against a constitution fully formed and ma tured, that were used to destroy it in the cradle, or to resist its growth during its infancy.
Against the being of Parliament, I am satisfied, no designs have ever been entertained since the revolu tion. Every one must perceive, that it is strongly the interest of the court, to have some second cause interposed between the ministers and the people. The gentlemen of the House of Commons have an in terest equally strong in sustaining the part of that intermediate cause. However they may hire out the asufruct of their voices, they never will part with the
? fee and inheritance. Accordingly those who have been of the most known devotion to the will and pleasure of a court have, at the same time, been most forward in asserting a high authority in the House of Com mons. When they knew who were to use that au thority, and how it was to be employed, they thought it never could be carried too far. It must be always the wish of an unconstitutional statesman, that a House of Commons, who are entirely dependent upon him, should have every right of the people entirely dependent upon their pleasure. It was soon discov ered, that the forms of a free, and the ends of an arbitrary government, were things not altogether in compatible.
The power of the crown, ahnost dead and rotten as Prerogative, has grown up anew, with much more strength, and far less odium, under the name of Influence. An influence, which operated without
eo quod possit jacere una nocte cum Domino suo Hugone de Nevill. " -- Maddox, Hist. Exch. c. xiii. p. 326.
? ? _. "n
? on rm'2 PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 445
noise and without violence; an influence, which con verted the very antagonist into the instrument of power; which contained in itself a perpetual prin ciple of growth and renovation; and which the dis tresses and the prosperity of the country equally tended to augment, was an admirable substitute for
a prerogative, that, being only the offspring of anti quated prejudices, had moulded in its original stam ina irresistible principles of decay and dissolution. The ignorance of the people is a bottom but for a temporary system ; the interest of active men in the state is a foundation perpetual and infallible. How ever, some circumstances, arising, it must be con fessed, in a great degree from accident, prevented
the effects of this influence for a long time from breaking out in a manner capable of exciting any serious apprehensions. Although government was
? and flourished exceedingly, the court had drawn far less advantage than one would imagine from this great source of power.
At the revolution, the crown, deprived, for the ends of the revolution itself, of many prerogatives, was found too weak to struggle against all the diffi culties which pressed so new and unsettled a govern ment. The court was obliged therefore to delegate
a part of its powers to men of such interest as could support, and of such fidelity as would adhere to, its establishment. Such men were able to draw in a greater number to a concurrence in the common
defence. This connection, necessary at first, contin ued long after convenient; and properly conducted might indeed, in all situations, be an useful instru
ment of government. At the same time, through the intervention of men of popular weight and char
strong
? ? ? 446 rnouonrs on THE CAUSE
acter, the people possessed a security for their just proportion of importance in the state. But as the title to the crown grew stronger by long possession, and by the constant increase of its influence, these helps have of late seemed to certain persons no bet ter than incumbrances. The powerful managers for government were not sufficiently submissive to the pleasure of the possessors of immediate and personal favor, sometimes from a confidence in their own strength, natural and acquired; sometimes from a fear of offending their friends, and weakening that lead in the country which gave them a consideration independent of the court. Men acted as if the court could receive, as well as confer, an obligation. The influence of government, thus divided in appearance between the court and the leaders of parties, became in many cases an accession rather to the popular than to the royal scale; and some part of that influence, which would otherwise have been possessed as in a sort of mortmain and unalienable domain, returned again to the great ocean from whence it arose, and circulated among the people. This method, therefore, of gov erning by men of great natural interest or great ac quired consideration was viewed in a very invidious light by the true lovers of absolute monarchy. It is the nature of despotism to abhor power held by any means but its own momentary pleasure ; and to anni hilate all intermediate situations between boundless strength on its own part, and total debility on the part of the people.
To get rid of all this intermediate and independent importance, and to secure to the court the unlimited and uncontrolled use of its own vast influence, under the sole direction of its ownprivate favor, has for some
? ? ? ? OF THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS.
years past been the great object of policy. If this were compassed, the influence of the crown must of course produce all the effects which the most san guine partisans of the court could possibly desire. Government might then be carried on without any concurrence on the part of the people; without any attention to the dignity of the greater, or to the aifec tions of the lower sorts. A new project was there fore devised by a certain set of intriguing men, totally diiferent from the system of administration which had prevailed since the accession of the House of Bruns
wick. This project, I have heard, was first conceived by some persons in the court of Frederick Prince of Wales.
The earliest attempt in the execution of this design was to set up for minister, a person, in rank indeed respectable, and very ample in fortune; but who, to the moment of this vast and sudden elevation, was little known or considered in the kingdom. To him the whole nation was to yield an immediate and im plicit submission. But whether it was from want of firmness to bear up against the first opposition; or that things were not yet fully ripened, or that this method was not found the most eligible; that idea
? was soon abandoned. The instrumental part of the project was a little altered, to accommodate it to the time and to bring things more gradually and more surely to the one great end proposed.
_
The first part of the reformed plan was to draw a
line which should separate the court from the ministry. Hitherto these names had been looked upon as sy nonymous; but for the future, court and administra tion were to be considered as things totally distinct. By this operation, two systems of administration were
? ? ? 448 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE
to be formed; one which should be in the real secret and confidence; the other merely ostensible to per form the official and executory duties of government. The latter were alone to be responsible; whilst the real advisers, who enjoyed all the power, were effect ually removed from all the danger.
Secondly, A party under these leaders was to be
formed infavor of the court against the ministry : this party was to have a large share in the emoluments of government, and to hold it totally separate from, and independent of, ostensible administration.
The third point, and that on which the success of the whole scheme ultimately depended, was to bring Parliament to an acquiescence in this project. Parlia ment was therefore to be taught by degrees a total indifference to the persons, rank, influence, abilities, connections, and character of the ministers of the crown. By means of a discipline, on which I shall say more hereafter, that body was to be habituated to the most opposite interests, and the most dis cordant politics. All connections and dependencies among subjects were to be entirely dissolved. As, hitherto, business had gone through the hands of leaders of Whigs or Tories, men of talents to concili ate the people, and to engage their confidence; now the method was to be altered: and the lead was to be given to men of no sort of consideration or credit in the country. This want of natural importance was to be their very title to delegated power. Members of Parliament were to be hardened into an insensi bility to pride as well as to duty. Those high and haughty sentiments, which are the great support of independence, were to be let down gradually. Points of honor and precedence were no more to be regarded
? ? ? ? or ran PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 449
in Parliamentary decorum than in a Turkish army. It was to be avowed, as a constitutional maxim, that the king might appoint one of his footmen, or one of your footmen for minister; and that he ought to be, and that he would be, as well followed as the first name for rank or wisdom in the nation. Thus Parliament was to look on as if perfectly unconcerned, while a cabal of the closet and back-stairs was substi tuted in the place of a national administration.
With such a degree of acquiescence, any measure of any court might well be deemed thoroughly secure. The capital objects, and by much the most flattering characteristics of arbitrary power, would be obtained.
Everything would be drawn from its holdings in the country to the personal favor and inclination of the
This favor would be the sole introduction to power, and the only tenure by which it was to be held; so that no person looking towards another, and all looking towards the court, it was impossible but that the motive which solely influenced every man's
hopes must come in time to govern every man's con duct; till at last the servility became universal, in spite of the dead letter of any laws or institutions whatsoever.
How it should happen that any man could be tempted to venture upon such a project of govern ment, may at first view appear surprising. But the
fact is that opportunities very inviting to such an at
tempt have offered; and the scheme itself was not 'destitute of some arguments, not wholly unplausible, to recommend it. These opportunities and these ar
guments, the use that has been made of both, the plan for . carrying this new scheme of government
into execution, and the effects which it has pro von. 1. 29
? prince.
? ? ? 450 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE
duced, are, in my opinion, worthy of our serious con sideration.
His Majesty came to the throne of these kingdoms with more advantages than any of his predecessors since the revolution. Fourth in descent, and third in succession of his royal family, even the zealots of he reditary right, in him, saw something to flatter their favorite prejudices; and to justify a transfer of their attachments, without a change in their principles. The person and cause of the Pretender were become
contemptible ; his title disowned throughout Europe; his party disbanded in England. His Majesty came, indeed, to the inheritance of a mighty war; but, vic torious in every part of the globe, peace was always in his power, not to negotiate, but to dictate. No for eign habitudes or attachments withdrew him from the cultivation of his power at home. His revenue for the civil establishment, fixed (as it was then thought) at a large, but definite sum, was ample without being invidious. His influence, by additions from conquest, by an augmentation of debt, by an increase of military and naval establishment, much
'
*". 15I'. "'f
? and' extended. And coming to the throne in the prime and full vigor of youth, as from affection there was a strong dislike, so from dread
there seemed to be a general averseness, from giv ing anything like offence to a monarch, against whose resentment opposition could not look for a refuge in any sort of reversionary hope.
These singular advantages inspired his Majesty only with a more ardent desire to preserve unimpaired the spirit of that national freedom, to which he owed a sit uation so full of glory. But to others it suggested sen timents of a very different nature. They thought they
strengthened
? ? ? or THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 451
now beheld an opportunity (by a certain sort of states men never long undiscovered or unemployed) of draw ing to themselves by the aggrandizement of a court faction, a degree of power which they could never hope to derive from natural influence or from honorable service ; and which it was impossible they could hold with the least security, whilst the system of adminis
tration rested upon its former bottom. In order to facilitate the execution of their design, it was neces sary to make many alterations in political arrange ment, and a signal change in the opinions, habits,
and connections of the greatest part of those who at that time acted in public.
In the first place, they proceeded gradually, but not slowly, to destroy everything of strength which did not derive its principal nourishment from the imme
diate pleasure _of the court. The greatest weight of popular opinion and party connection were then with the Duke of Newcastle and Mr. Pitt. Neither of these held their importance by the new tenure of the court ; they were not therefore thought to be so proper as others for the services which were required by that
tenure. It happened very favorably for the new sys tem, that under a forced coalition there rankled an incurable alienation and disgust between the parties
which composed the administration. Mr. Pitt was
first attacked. Not satisfied with removing him from power, they endeavored by various artifices to ruin his character.
The other party seemed rather pleased no get rid of so oppressive a support; not perceiving,
that their own fall was prepared by his, and involved in it. Many other reasons prevented them from dar ing to look their true situation in the face. To the
great Whig families it was extremely disagreeable,
? ? ? ? 452 THOUGHTS on THE causn
and seemed almost unnatural, to oppose the admin istration of a prince of the House of Brunswick. Day after day they hesitated, and doubted, and lingered, expecting that other counsels would take place; and were slow to be persuaded, that all which had been done by the cabal was the effect not of humor, but of system. It was more strongly and evidently the interest of the new court faction, to get rid of the great Whig connections, than to destroy Mr. Pitt. The power of that gentleman was vast indeed and merited; but it was in a great degree personal, and therefore transient. Theirs was rooted in the coun try. For, with a good deal less of popularity, they possessed a far more natural and fixed influence. Long possession of government; vast property; obli gations of favors given and received; connection of
office; ties of blood, of alliance, of friendship (things at that time supposed of some force); the name of Whig, dear to the majority of the people; the zeal early begun and steadily continued to the royal fam ily: all these together formed a body of power in the nation, which was criminal and devoted. The great ruling principle of the cabal, and that which ani mated and harmonized all their proceedings, how va rious soever they may have been, was to signify to the world that the court would proceed upon its own proper forces only; and that the pretence of bringing any other into its service was an affront to and not
support. Therefore when the chiefs were removed, in order to go to the root, the whole party was put under proscription, so general and severe, as to take their hard-earned bread from the lowest offi cers, in manner which had never been known be fore, even in general revolutions. But was thought
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453
necessary effectually to destroy all dependencies but one; and to show an example of the firmness and rigor with which the new system was to be supported.
Thus for the time were pulled down, in the persons of the Whig leaders and of Mr. Pitt (in spite of the services of the one at the accession of the royal fam ily, and the recent services of the other in the war), the two only securities for the importance of the people;
power arising from popularity ; and power arising from connection. Here and there indeed a few individuals wore left standing, who gave security for their total estrangement from the odious principles of party con nection and personal attachment; and it must be confessed that most of them have religiously
? kept their faith. Such a change could not however be
made without a mighty shock to government.
To reconcile the minds of the people to all these movements, principles correspondent to them had been preached up with great zeal. Every one must
remember that the cabal set out with the most as tonishing prudery, both moral and political. Those, who in a few months after soused over head and ears i11to the deepest and dirtiest pits of corruption, cried out violently against the indirect practices in the elect ing and managing of Parliaments, which had for
merly prevailed. _ This marvellous abhorrence which the court had suddenly taken to all influence, was not only circulated in conversation through the king dom, but pompously announced to the public, with
Inany other extraordinary things, in a pamphlet* which had all the appearance of a manifesto pre paratory to some considerable enterprise. Through out it was a satire, though in terms managed and
* Sentiments of an Honest Man.
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decent enough, on the politics of the former reign. It was indeed written with no small art and address. In this piece appeared the first dawning of the new
system: there first appeared the idea (then only in speculation) of separating the court from the adminis tration; of carrying everything from national connec tion to personal regards; and of forming a regular party for that purpose, under the name of king's men.
To recommend this system to the people, a per spective view of the court, gorgeously painted, and finely illuminated from within, was exhibited to the gaping multitude. Party was to be totally done away, with all its evil works. Corruption was to be cast down from court, as Ate' was from heaven. Power was thenceforward to be the chosen residence of public spirit; and no one was to be supposed un der any sinister influence, except those who had the misfortune to be in disgrace at court, which was to stand in lieu of all vices and all corruptions. A scheme of perfection to be realized in a monarchy far
the visionary republic of Plato. The whole scenery was exactly disposed to captivate those good souls, whose credulous morality is so invaluable a treasure to crafty politicians. Indeed there was wherewithal to charm everybody, except those few who are not much pleased with professions of super natural virtue, who know of what stuif such profes sions are made, for what purposes they are designed, and in what they are sure constantly to end. Many innocent gentlemen, who had been talking prose all their lives without knowing anything of the matter, began at last to open their eyes upon their own mer its, and to attribute their not having been lords of the treasury and lords of trade many years before,
? beyond
? ? ? or THE PRESENT n1sconrnurs. 455
merely to the prevalence of party, and to the minis terial power, which had frustrated the good inten tions of the court in favor of their abilities. Now was the time to unlock the sealed fountain of royal bounty, which had been infamously monopolized and huckstered, and to let it flow at large upon the whole
The time was come, to restore royalty to its original splendor. Jlfettre le Roy hora de page, be came a sort of watchword. And it was constantly in the mouths of all the rumiers of the court, that noth ing could preserve the balance of the constitution from being overturned by the rabble, or by a faction of the nobility, but to free the sovereign effectually from that ministerial tyranny under which the royal dignity had been oppressed in the person of his Ma jesty's grandfather.
These were some of the many artifices used to rec oncile the people to the great change which was made in the persons who composed the ministry, and the still greater which was made and avowed in its con stitution. As to individuals, other methods were employed with them ; in order so thoroughly to disu nite every party, and even every family, that no con cert, order, or qfiect, might appear in any future opposi tion. And in this manner an administration without
connection with the people, or with one another, was first put in possession of government. What good consequences followed from we have all seen; whether with regard to virtue, public or private; to the ease and happiness of the sovereign or to the real strength of government. But as so much stress was then laid on the necessity of this new project, will not be amiss to take view of the effects of this royal servitude and vile durance, which was so de
people.
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plored in the reign of the late monarch, and was so carefully to be avoided in the reign of his successor.
crown connected with the liberty of his people, not only unimpaired, but improved, for the space of thir ty-three years. He overcame a dangerous rebellion, abetted by foreign force, and raging in the heart of his kingdoms; and thereby destroyed the seeds of all future rebellion that could arise upon the same prin ciple. He carried the glory, the power, the com merce of England, to a height unknown even to this renowned nation in the times of its greatest prosperi ty: and he left his succession resting on the true and only true foundations of all national and all regal greatness; affection at home, reputation abroad, trust in allies, terror in rival nations. The most ardent lover of his country cannot wish for Great Britain a happier fate than to continue as she was then left. A people, emulous as we are in affection to our present sovereign, know not how to form a prayer to heaven for a greater blessing upon his vir tues, or a higher state of felicity and glory, than that
he should live, and should reign, and when Provi dence ordains should die, exactly like his illustri ous predecessor.
A great prince may be obliged (though such thing cannot happen very often) sacrifice his pri vate inclination to his public interest. A wise prince will not think that such restraint implies condi tion of servility; and truly, such was the condition of the last reign, and the effects were also such as we have described, we ought, no less for the sake of the
The effects were these.
_ In times full of doubt and danger to his person and family, George II. maintained the dignity of his
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sovereign whom we love, than for our own, to hear arguments convincing indeed, before we depart from the maxims of that reign, or fly in the face of this great body of strong and recent experience.
One of the principal topics which was then, and has been since, much employed by that political"' school, is an affected terror of the growth of an aris tocratic power, prejudicial to the rights of the crown, and the balance of the constitution. Any new pow ers exercised in the House of Lords, or in the House of Commons, or by the crown, ought certainly to ex cite the vigilant and anxious jealousy of a free people. Even a new and unprecedented course of action in the whole legislature, without great and evident reason, may be a subject of just uneasiness. I will not affirm, that there may not havelately appeared in the House of Lords, a disposition to some attempts derogatory to the legal rights of the subject. If any such have really appeared, they have arisen, not from
a power properly aristocratic, but from the same in fluence which is charged with having excited at tempts of a similar nature in the House of Commons; which House, if it should have been betrayed into an unfortunate quarrel with its constituents, and in volved in a charge of the very same nature, could
have neither power nor inclination to repel such at tempts in others. Those attempts in the House of Lords can no more be called aristocratic proceedings, than the proceedings with regard to the county of Middlesex in the House of Commons can with any
sense be called democratical.
It is true, that the peers have a great influence in
" * See the political Writings of the late Dr. Brown, and many others.
? ? ? ? 458 ruoucnrs on rnn causn
the kingdom, and in every part of the public concerns. While they are men of property, it is impossible to prevent except by such means as must prevent all property from its natural operation: an event not easily to be compassed, while property power nor by any means to be wished, while the least notion ex ists of the method by which the spirit of liberty acts, and of the means by which preserved. If any particular peers, by their uniform, upright, constitu
tional conduct, by their public and their private vir tues, have acquired an influence in the country; the people, on whose favor that influence depends, and from whom arose, will never be duped into an opin ion, that such greatness in peer the despotism of an aristocracy, when they know and feel to be the effect and pledge of their own importance.
am no friend to aristocracy, in the sense at least in which that word usually understood. If were not bad habit to moot cases on the supposed ruin of the constitution, should be free to declare, that if
must perish, would rather by far see resolved into any other form, than lost in that austere and in solent domination. But, whatever my dislikes may be, my fears are not upon that quarter. The ques tion, on the influence of court, and of peerage, not, which of the two dangers the more eligible, but which the more imminent. He but observer, who has not seen, that the generality of peers, far from supporting themselves in state of in dependent greatness, are but too apt to fall into an oblivion of their proper dignity, and to run headlong
into an abject servitude. Would to God were true, that the fault of _our peers were too much spirit. It worthy of some observation that these gentlemen,
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so jealous of aristocracy, make no complaints of the
power of those peers (neither few nor inconsiderable) who are always in the train of court, and whose
whole weight must be considered as portion of the settled influence of the crown. This all safe and right; but some peers am very sorry they are not as many as they ought to be) set themselves, in the great concern of peers and commons, against back-stairs influence and clandestine government, then the alarm begins then the constitution in danger of being forced into an aristocracy.
rest little the longer on this court topic, because was much insisted upon at the time of the great change, and has been since frequently revived by
many of the agents of that party for, whilst they are terrifying the great and opulent with the horrors of mob-government, they are by other managers attempt ing (though hithertowith little success) to alarm the people with phantom of tyranny in the nobles. All this done upon their favorite principle of disunion, of sowing jealousies amongst the different orders of the state, and of disjointing the natural strength of the kingdom; that may be rendered incapable of resisting the sinister designs of wicked men, who have engrossed the royal power. '
Thus much of the topics chosen by the courtiers to recommend their system will be necessary to open little more at large the nature of that party which
was formed for its support. Without this, the whole would have been no better than visionary amuse ment, like the scheme of Harrington's political club, and not business in which the nation had real concern. As powerful party, and party con
structed on new principle, very inviting ob ject of curiosity.
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It must be remembered, that since the revolution, until the period we are speaking of, the influence of the crown had been always employed in supporting the ministers of state, and in carrying on the public business according to their opinions. But the party now in question is formed upon a very different idea. It is to intercept the favor, protection, and confidence of the crown in the passage to its ministers ; it is to come between them and their importance in Parlia ment; it is to separate them from all their natural and acquired dependencies ; it is intended as the con-P trol, not the support, of administration. The ma chinery of this system is perplexed in its movements, and false in its principle. It is formed on a supposi tion that the king is something external to his gov ernment; and that he may be honored and aggran dized, even by its debility and disgrace. The plan proceeds expressly on the idea of enfeebling the reg ular executory power. It proceeds on the idea of weakening the state in order to strengthen the court. The scheme depending entirely on distrust, on dis connection, on mutability by principle, on systematic weakness in every particular member; it is impossi ble that the total result should be substantial strength
? ofany kind.
I
As a foundation of their scheme, the cabal have established a sort of rota in the court. All sorts of parties, by this means, have been brought into admin istration; from whence few have had the good for tune to escape without disgrace ; none at all without considerable losses. In the beginning of each ar rangement no professions of confidence and support are wanting, to induce the leading men to engage. But while the ministers of the day appear in all the
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pomp and pride of power, while they have all their canvas spread out to the wind, and every sail filled with the fair and prosperous gale of royal favor, in a short time they find, they know not how, a current, which sets directly against them : which prevents all progress; and even drives them backwards. They grow ashamed and mortified in a situation, which, by its vicinity to power, only serves to remind them the more strongly of their insignificance. They are obliged either to execute the orders of their inferiors, or to see themselves opposed by the natural instru ments of their office. With the loss of their dignity they lose their temper. In their turn they grow
to that cabal which, whether it supports or opposes, equally disgraces and equally betrays them. It is soon found necessary to get rid of the heads of administration ; but it is of the heads only. As there always are many rotten members belonging to the best connections, it is not hard to persuade several to continue in office without their leaders. By this means the party goes out much thinner than it came in; and is only reduced in strength by its temporary possession of power. Besides, if by acci dent, or in course of changes, that power should be recovered, the junto have thrown up a retrenchment
of these carcasses, which may serve to cover them selves in a day of danger. They conclude, not un wisely, that such rotten members will become the first objects of disgust and resentment to their ancient connections.
They contrive to form in the outward administra tion two parties at the least; which, whilst they are tearing one another to pieces, are both competitors for the favor and protection of the cabal; and, by
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their emulation, contribute to throw everything more and more into the hands of the interior managers.
A minister of state will sometimes keep himself totally estranged from all his colleagues; will differ from them in their councils, will privately traverse, and publicly oppose, their measures. He will, how ever, continue in his employment. Instead of suffer ing any mark of displeasure, he will be distinguished by an unbounded profusion of court rewards and ca resses; because he does what is expected, and all that is expected, from men in office. He helps to keep some form of administration in being, and keeps it at the same time as weak and divided as possible.
However, we must take care not to be mistaken, or to imagine that such persons have any weight in their opposition. When, by them, administration is convinced of its insignificancy, they are soon to be convinced of their own. They never are suffered to succeed in their opposition. They and the world are to be satisfied, that neither office, nor authority, nor property, nor ability, eloquence, counsel, skill, or union, are of the least importance ;_ but that the mere influence of the court, naked of all support, and des titute of all management, is abundantly sufficient for all its own purposes.
When any adverse connection is to be destroyed, the cabal seldom appear in the work themselves. They find out some person of whom the party enter tains a high opinion. Such a person they endeavor to delude with various pretences. They teach him first to distrust, and then to quarrel with his friends ; among whom, by the same arts, they excite a similar diffidence of him ; so that in this mutual fear and dis trust, he may suffer himself to be employed as the
? ? ? ? OI-' THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 463
instrument in the change which is brought about. Afterwards they are sure to destroy him in his turn, by setting up in his place some person in whom he had himself reposed the greatest confidence, and who serves to carry off a considerable part of his adher ents.
When such a person has broke in this manner with his connections, he is soon compelled to commit some flagrant act of iniquitous, personal hostility against some of them (such as an attempt to strip a partic ular friend of his family estate), by which the cabal hope to render the parties utterly irreconcilable. In truth, they have so contrived matters, that people have a greater hatred to the subordinate instruments than to the principal movers.
As in destroying their enemies they make use of instruments not immediately belonging to their corps,
so in advancing their own friends they pursue exactly the same method. To promote any of them to con siderable rank or emolument, they commonly take care that the recommendation shall pass through the hands of the ostensible ministry: such a recommen dation might however appear to the world, as some proof of the credit of ministers, and some means of increasing their strength. To prevent this, the per sons so advanced are directed, in all companies, indus triously to declare, that they are under no obligations whatsoever to administration ; that they have received their office from another quarter; that they are to tally free and independent.
When the faction has any job of lucre to obtain, or of vengeance to perpetrate, their way to select, for the execution, those very persons to whose habits, friendships, principles, and declarations, such pro
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ceedings are publicly known to be the most adverse; at once to render the instruments the more odious, and therefore the more dependent, and to prevent the people from ever reposing a confidence in any appear ance of private friendship or public principle.
If the administration seem now and then, from re missness, or from fear of making themselves disagree able, to suffer any popular excesses to go unpunished, the cabal immediately sets up some creature of theirs to raise a clamor against the ministers, as having shamefully betrayed the dignity of government. Then they compel the ministry to become active in confer ring rewards and honors on the persons who have been the instruments of their disgrace; and, after having first vilified them with the higher orders for suffer ing the laws to sleep over the licentiousness of the
populace, they drive them (in order to make amends for their former inactivity) to some act of atrocious violence, which renders them completely abhorred by the people. They, who remember the riots which at tended the Middlesex election, the opening of the present Parliament, and the transactions relative to Saint George's Fields, will not be at a loss for an ap plication of these remarks.
That this body may be enabled to compass all the ends of its institution, its members are scarcely ever to aim at the high and responsible offices of the state.
They are distributed with art and judgment through all the secondary, but efficient, departments of office, and through the households of all the branches of the royal family: so as on one hand to occupy all the avenues to the throne ; and on the other to forward or frustrate the execution of any measure, according to their own interests. For with the credit and sup
? ? ? ? or THE PRESENT n1scomnnrs. 465
port which they are known to have, though for the greater part in places which are only a genteel excuse for salary, they possess all the influence of the high est posts ; and they dictate publicly in almost every thing, even with a parade of superiority. Whenever they dissent (as it often happens) from their nominal leaders, the trained part of the senate, instinctively in the secret, is sure to follow them: provided the leaders, sensible of their situation, do not of them selves recede in time from their most declared opin ions. This latter is generally the case. It will not be conceivable to any one who has not seen what pleasure taken by the cabal in rendering these heads of office thoroughly contemptible and ridicu lous. And when they are become so, they have then the best chance for being well supported.
The members of the court faction are fully indom nified for not holding places on the slippery heights of the kingdom, not only by the lead in all affairs, but also by the perfect security in which they enjoy less conspicuous, but very advantageous situations. Their places are in express legal tenure, or, in effect, all of them for life. Whilst the first and most respec table persons in the kingdom are tossed about like tennis-balls, the sport of blind and insolent caprice, no minister dares even to cast an oblique glance at the lowest of their body. If an attempt be made
upon one of this corps, immediately he flies to sanctu ary, and pretends to the most inviolable of all prom ises. conveniency of public arrangement avail able to remove any one of them from the specific situation he holds; and the slightest attempt upon one of them, the most powerful minister, cer
tain preliminary to his own destruction. von. 1. 30
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