Therefore we can make
satisfaction
for one sin without
satisfying for another.
satisfying for another.
Summa Theologica
But justice, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2,3), is not about passions, but about
operations. Since therefore satisfaction aims at removing the causes of
sin, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15), it seems that it is not
an act of justice.
Objection 3: Further, to be careful about the future is not an act of
justice but of prudence of which caution is a part. But it belongs to
satisfaction, "to give no opening to the suggestions of sin" [*Cf.
XP/Q[12]/A[3]/OBJ[1]]. Therefore satisfaction is not an act of justice.
On the contrary, No virtue but justice considers the notion of that
which is due. But satisfaction gives due honor to God, as Anselm states
(Cur Deus Homo i). Therefore satisfaction is an act of justice.
Further, no virtue save justice establishes equality between external
things. But this is done by satisfaction which establishes equality
between amendment and the previous offense. Therefore satisfaction is
an act of justice.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 3,4), the mean
of justice is considered with regard to an equation between thing and
thing according to a certain proportion. Wherefore, since the very name
of satisfaction implies an equation of the kind, because the adverb
"satis" [enough] denotes an equality of proportion, it is evident that
satisfaction is formally an act of justice. Now the act of justice,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2,4), is either an act done by
one man to another, as when a man pays another what he owes him, or an
act done by one man between two others, as when a judge does justice
between two men. When it is an act of justice of one man to another,
the equality is set up in the agent, while when it is something done
between two others, the equality is set up in the subject that has
suffered an injustice. And since satisfaction expresses equality in the
agent, it denotes, properly speaking, an act of justice of one man to
another. Now a man may do justice to another either in actions and
passions or in external things; even as one may do an injustice to
another, either by taking something away, or by a hurtful action. And
since to give is to use an external thing, the act of justice, in so
far as it establishes equality between external things, signifies,
properly speaking, a giving back: but to make satisfaction clearly
points to equality between actions, although sometimes one is put for
the other. Now equalization concerns only such things as are unequal,
wherefore satisfaction presupposes inequality among actions, which
inequality constitutes an offense; so that satisfaction regards a
previous offense. But no part of justice regards a previous offense,
except vindictive justice, which establishes equality indifferently,
whether the patient be the same subject as the agent, as when anyone
punishes himself, or whether they be distinct, as when a judge punishes
another man, since vindictive justice deals with both cases. The same
applies to penance, which implies equality in the agent only, since it
is the penitent who holds to the penance [poenam tenet], so that
penance is in a way a species of vindictive justice. This proves that
satisfaction, which implies equality in the agent with respect to a
previous offense, is a work of justice, as to that part which is called
penance.
Reply to Objection 1: Satisfaction, as appears from what has been said,
is compensation for injury inflicted. Wherefore as the injury inflicted
entailed of itself an inequality of justice, and consequently an
inequality opposed to friendship, so satisfaction brings back directly
equality of justice, and consequently equality of friendship. And since
an act is elicited by the habit to whose end it is immediately
directed, but is commanded by that habit to whose end it is directed
ultimately, hence satisfaction is elicited by justice but is commanded
by charity.
Reply to Objection 2: Although justice is chiefly about operations, yet
it is consequently about passions, in so far as they are the causes of
operations. Wherefore as justice curbs anger, lest it inflict an unjust
injury on another, and concupiscence from invading another's marriage
right, so satisfaction removes the causes of other sins.
Reply to Objection 3: Each moral virtue shares in the act of prudence,
because this virtue completes in it the conditions essential to virtue,
since each moral virtue takes its mean according to the ruling of
prudence, as is evident from the definition of virtue given in Ethic.
ii, 6.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the definition of satisfaction given in the text is suitable?
Objection 1: It would seem that the definition of satisfaction given in
the text (Sent. iv, D, 15) and quoted from Augustine [*Gennadius
Massiliensis, De Eccl. Dogm. liv] is unsuitable---viz. that
"satisfaction is to uproot the causes of sins, and to give no opening
to the suggestions thereof. " For the cause of actual sin is the fomes.
[*"Fomes" signifies literally "fuel," and metaphorically, "incentive. "
As used by the theologian, it denotes the quasi-material element and
effect of original sin, and sometimes goes under the name of
"concupiscence," Cf. [4851]FS, Q[82], A[3]. ] But we cannot remove the
"fomes" in this life. Therefore satisfaction does not consist in
removing the causes of sins.
Objection 2: Further, the cause of sin is stronger than sin itself. But
man by himself cannot remove sin. Much less therefore can he remove the
cause of sin; and so the same conclusion follows.
Objection 3: Further, since satisfaction is a part of Penance, it
regards the past and not the future. Now "to give no opening to the
suggestions of sin" regards the future. Therefore it should not be put
in the definition of satisfaction.
Objection 4: Further, satisfaction regards a past offense. Yet no
mention is made of this. Therefore the definition of satisfaction is
unsuitable.
Objection 5: Further, Anselm gives another definition (Cur Deus homo
i): "Satisfaction consists in giving God due honor," wherein no
reference is made to the things mentioned by Augustine [*Gennadius,
OBJ[1]] in this definition. Therefore one or the other is unsuitable.
Objection 6: Further, an innocent man can give due honor to God:
whereas satisfaction is not compatible with innocence. Therefore
Anselm's definition is faulty.
I answer that, Justice aims not only at removing inequality already
existing, by punishing the past fault, but also at safeguarding
equality for the future, because according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
ii, 3) "punishments are medicinal. " Wherefore satisfaction which is the
act of justice inflicting punishment, is a medicine healing past sins
and preserving from future sins: so that when one man makes
satisfaction to another, he offers compensation for the past, and takes
heed for the future. Accordingly satisfaction may be defined in two
ways, first with regard to past sin, which it heals by making
compensation, and thus it is defined as "compensation for an inflicted
injury according to the equality of justice. " The definition of Anselm
amounts to the same, for he says that "satisfaction consists in giving
God due honor"; where duty is considered in respect of the sin
committed. Secondly, satisfaction may be defined, considered as
preserving us from future sins; and as Augustine (Cf. OBJ[1]) defines
it. Now preservation from bodily sickness is assured by removing the
causes from which the sickness may ensue, for if they be taken away the
sickness cannot follow. But it is not thus in spiritual diseases, for
the free-will cannot be forced, so that even in the presence of their
causes, they can, though with difficulty, be avoided, while they can be
incurred even when their causes are removed. Hence he puts two things
in the definition of satisfaction, viz. removal of the causes, as to
the first, and the free-will's refusal to sin.
Reply to Objection 1: By "causes" we must understand the proximate
causes of actual sin, which are twofold: viz. the lust of sin through
the habit or act of a sin that has been given up, and those things
which are called the remnants of past sin; and external occasions of
sin, such as place, bad company and so forth. Such causes are removed
by satisfaction in this life, albeit the "fomes," which is the remote
cause of actual sin, is not entirely removed by satisfaction in this
life though it is weakened.
Reply to Objection 2: Since the cause of evil or of privation
(according as it has a cause) is nothing else than a defective good,
and since it is easier to destroy good than to set it up, it follows
that it is easier to uproot the causes of privation and of evil than to
remove the evil itself, which can only be removed by setting up good,
as may be seen in the case of blindness and its causes. Yet the
aforesaid are not sufficient causes of sin, for sin does not, of
necessity, ensue therefrom, but they are occasions of sin. Nor again
can satisfaction be made without God's help, since it is not possible
without charity, as we shall state further on ([4852]Q[14], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 3: Although Penance was primarily instituted and
intended with a view to the past, yet, as a consequence, it regards the
future, in so far as it is a safeguarding remedy; and the same applies
to satisfaction.
Reply to Objection 4: Augustine [*Gennadius Massiliensis, De Eccl.
Dogm. liv] defined satisfaction, as made to God, from Whom, in reality,
nothing can be taken, though the sinner, for his own part, takes
something away. Consequently in such like satisfaction, amendment for
future time is of greater weight than compensation for the past. Hence
Augustine defines satisfaction from this point of view. And yet it is
possible to gauge the compensation for the past from the heed taken for
the future, for the latter regards the same object as the former, but
in the opposite way: since when looking at the past we detest the
causes of sins on account of the sins themselves, which are the
starting-point of the movement of detestation: whereas when taking heed
of the future, we begin from the causes, that by their removal we may
avoid sins the more easily.
Reply to Objection 5: There is no reason why the same thing should not
be described in different ways according to the various things found in
it: and such is the case here, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 6: By debt is meant the debt we owe to God by reason
of the sins we have committed, because Penance regards a debt, as
stated above [4853](A[2]).
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SATISFACTION (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the possibility of satisfaction, under which head
there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether man can make satisfaction to God?
(2) Whether one man can make satisfaction for another?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether man can make satisfaction to God?
Objection 1: It would seem that man cannot make satisfaction to God.
For satisfaction should balance the offense, as shown above
([4854]Q[12], AA[2],3). But an offense against God is infinite, since
it is measured by the person against whom it is committed, for it is a
greater offense to strike a prince than anyone else. Therefore, as no
action of man can be infinite, it seems that he cannot make
satisfaction to God.
Objection 2: Further, a slave cannot make compensation for a debt,
since all that he has is his master's. But we are the slaves of God,
and whatever good we have, we owe to Him. Therefore, as satisfaction is
compensation for a past offense, it seems that we cannot offer it to
God.
Objection 3: Further, if all that a man has suffices not to pay one
debt, he cannot pay another debt. Now all that man is, all that he can
do, and all that he has, does not suffice to pay what he owes for the
blessing of creation, wherefore it is written (Is. 40:16) that "the
wood of Libanus shall not be enough for a burnt offering [*Vulg. :
'Libanus shall not be enough to burn, nor the beasts thereof for a
burnt offering']. " Therefore by no means can he make satisfaction for
the debt resulting from the offense committed.
Objection 4: Further, man is bound to spend all his time in the service
of God. Now time once lost cannot be recovered, wherefore, as Seneca
observes (Lib. i, Ep. i, ad Lucilium) loss of time is a very grievous
matter. Therefore man cannot make compensation to God, and the same
conclusion follows as before.
Objection 5: Further, mortal actual sin is more grievous than original
sin. But none could satisfy for original sin unless he were both God
and man. Neither, therefore, can he satisfy for actual sin.
On the contrary, Jerome [*Pelagius, Expos. Fidei ad Damasum] says:
"Whoever maintains that God has commanded anything impossible to man,
let him be anathema. " But satisfaction is commanded (Lk. 3:8): "Bring
forth . . . fruits worthy of penance. " Therefore it is possible to make
satisfaction to God.
Further, God is more merciful than any man. But it is possible to make
satisfaction to a man. Therefore it is possible to make satisfaction to
God.
Further, there is due satisfaction when the punishment balances the
fault, since "justice is the same as counterpassion," as the
Pythagoreans said [*Aristotle, Ethic. v, 5; Cf. [4855]SS, Q[61], A[4]].
Now punishment may equal the pleasure contained in a sin committed.
Therefore satisfaction can be made to God.
I answer that, Man becomes God's debtor in two ways; first, by reason
of favors received, secondly, by reason of sin committed: and just as
thanksgiving or worship or the like regard the debt for favors
received, so satisfaction regards the debt for sin committed. Now in
giving honor to one's parents or to the gods, as indeed the Philosopher
says (Ethic. viii, 14), it is impossible to repay them measure for
measure, but it suffices that man repay as much as he can, for
friendship does not demand measure for measure, but what is possible.
Yet even this is equal somewhat, viz. according to proportion, for as
the debt due to God is, in comparison with God, so is what man can do,
in comparison with himself, so that in another way the form of justice
is preserved. It is the same as regards satisfaction. Consequently man
cannot make satisfaction to God if "satis" [enough] denotes
quantitative equality; but he can, if it denote proportionate equality,
as explained above, and as this suffices for justice, so does it
suffice for satisfaction.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as the offense derived a certain infinity
from the infinity of the Divine majesty, so does satisfaction derive a
certain infinity from the infinity of Divine mercy, in so far as it is
quickened by grace, whereby whatever man is able to repay becomes
acceptable. Others, however, say that the offense is infinite as
regards the aversion, and in this respect it is pardoned gratuitously,
but that it is finite as turning to a mutable good, in which respect it
is possible to make satisfaction for it. But this is not to the point,
since satisfaction does not answer to sin, except as this is an offense
against God, which is a matter, not of turning to a creature but of
turning away from God. Others again say that even as regards the
aversion it is possible to make satisfaction for sin in virtue of
Christ's merit, which was, in a way, infinite. And this comes to the
same as what we said before, since grace is given to believers through
faith in the Mediator. If, however, He were to give grace otherwise,
satisfaction would suffice in the way explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: Man, who was made to God's image, has a certain
share of liberty, in so far as he is master of his actions through his
free-will; so that, through acting by his free-will, he can make
satisfaction to God, for though it belongs to God, in so far as it was
bestowed on him by God, yet it was freely bestowed on him, that he
might be his own master, which cannot be said of a slave.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument proves that it is impossible to
make equivalent satisfaction to God, but not that it is impossible to
make sufficient satisfaction to Him. For though man owes God all that
he is able to give Him, yet it is not necessary for his salvation that
he should actually do the whole of what he is able to do, for it is
impossible for him, according to his present state of life, to put
forth his whole power into any one single thing, since he has to be
heedful about many things. And so his conduct is subject to a certain
measure, viz. the fulfillment of God's commandments, over and above
which he can offer something by way of satisfaction.
Reply to Objection 4: Though man cannot recover the time that is past,
he can in the time that follows make compensation for what he should
have done in the past, since the commandment did not exact from him the
fulfillment of his whole power, as stated above (ad 3).
Reply to Objection 5: Though original sin has less of the nature of sin
than actual sin has, yet it is a more grievous evil, because it is an
infection of human nature itself, so that, unlike actual sin, it could
not be expiated by the satisfaction of a mere man.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one man can fulfill satisfactory punishment for another?
Objection 1: It would seem that one man cannot fulfill satisfactory
punishment for another. Because merit is requisite for satisfaction.
Now one man cannot merit or demerit for another, since it is written
(Ps. 61:12): "Thou wilt render to every man according to his works. "
Therefore one man cannot make satisfaction for another.
Objection 2: Further, satisfaction is condivided with contrition and
confession. But one man cannot be contrite or confess for another.
Neither therefore can one make satisfaction for another.
Objection 3: Further, by praying for another one merits also for
oneself. If therefore a man can make satisfaction for another, he
satisfies for himself by satisfying for another, so that if a man
satisfy for another he need not make satisfaction for his own sins.
Objection 4: Further, if one can satisfy for another, as soon as he
takes the debt of punishment on himself, this other is freed from his
debt. Therefore the latter will go straight to heaven, if he die after
the whole of his debt of punishment has been taken up by another; else,
if he be punished all the same, a double punishment will be paid for
the same sin, viz. by him who has begun to make satisfaction, and by
him who is punished in Purgatory.
On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 6:2): "Bear ye one another's
burdens. " Therefore it seems that one can bear the burden of punishment
laid upon another.
Further, charity avails more before God than before man. Now before
man, one can pay another's debt for love of him. Much more, therefore,
can this be done before the judgment seat of God.
I answer that, Satisfactory punishment has a twofold purpose, viz. to
pay the debt, and to serve as a remedy for the avoidance of sin.
Accordingly, as a remedy against future sin, the satisfaction of one
does not profit another, for the flesh of one man is not tamed by
another's fast; nor does one man acquire the habit of well-doing,
through the actions of another, except accidentally, in so far as a
man, by his good actions, may merit an increase of grace for another,
since grace is the most efficacious remedy for the avoidance of sin.
But this is by way of merit rather than of satisfaction. on the other
hand, as regards the payment of the debt, one man can satisfy for
another, provided he be in a state of charity, so that his works may
avail for satisfaction. Nor is it necessary that he who satisfies for
another should undergo a greater punishment than the principal would
have to undergo (as some maintain, who argue that a man profits more by
his own punishment than by another's), because punishment derives its
power of satisfaction chiefly from charity whereby man bears it. And
since greater charity is evidenced by a man satisfying for another than
for himself, less punishment is required of him who satisfies for
another, than of the principal: wherefore we read in the Lives of the
Fathers (v, 5) of one who for love of his brother did penance for a sin
which his brother had not committed, and that on account of his charity
his brother was released from a sin which he had committed. Nor is it
necessary that the one for whom satisfaction is made should be unable
to make satisfaction himself, for even if he were able, he would be
released from his debt when the other satisfied in his stead. But this
is necessary in so far as the satisfactory punishment is medicinal: so
that a man is not to be allowed to do penance for another, unless there
be evidence of some defect in the penitent, either bodily, so that he
is unable to bear it, or spiritual, so that he is not ready to undergo
it.
Reply to Objection 1: The essential reward is bestowed on a man
according to his disposition, because the fulness of the sight of God
will be according to the capacity of those who see Him. Wherefore just
as one man is not disposed thereto by another's act, so one man does
not merit the essential reward for another, unless his merit has
infinite efficacy, as the merit of Christ, whereby children come to
eternal life through Baptism. On the other hand, the temporal
punishment due to sin after the guilt has been forgiven is not measured
according to the disposition of the man to whom it is due, since
sometimes the better man owes a greater debt of punishment.
Consequently one man can merit for another as regards release from
punishment, and one man's act becomes another's, by means of charity
whereby we are "all one in Christ" (Gal. 3:28).
Reply to Objection 2: Contrition is ordained against the guilt which
affects a man's disposition to goodness or malice, so that one man is
not freed from guilt by another's contrition. In like manner by
confession a man submits to the sacraments of the Church: nor can one
man receive a sacrament instead of another, since in a sacrament grace
is given to the recipient, not to another. Consequently there is no
comparison between satisfaction and contrition and confession.
Reply to Objection 3: In the payment of the debt we consider the
measure of the punishment, whereas in merit we regard the root which is
charity: wherefore he that, through charity, merits for another, at
least congruously, merits more for himself; yet he that satisfies for
another does not also satisfy for himself, because the measure of the
punishment does not suffice for the sins of both, although by
satisfying for another he merits something greater than the release
from punishment, viz. eternal life.
Reply to Objection 4: If this man bound himself to undergo a certain
punishment, he would not be released from the debt before paying it:
wherefore he himself will suffer the punishment, as long as the other
makes satisfaction for him: and if he do not this, then both are
debtors in respect of fulfilling this punishment, one for the sin
committed, the other for his omission, so that it does not follow that
one sin is twice punished.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE QUALITY OF SATISFACTION (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the quality of satisfaction, under which head
there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a man can satisfy for one sin without satisfying for
another?
(2) Whether if a man fall into sin after being contrite for all his
sins, he can, now that he has lost charity, satisfy for his other sins
which were pardoned him through his contrition?
(3) Whether a man's previous satisfaction begins to avail when he
recovers charity?
(4) Whether works done without charity merit any good?
(5) Whether such works avail for the mitigation of the pains of hell?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a man can satisfy for one sin without satisfying for another?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man can satisfy for one sin without
satisfying for another. Because when several things are not connected
together one can be taken away without another. Now sins are not
connected together, else whoever had one would have them all. Therefore
one sin can be expiated by satisfaction, without another.
Objection 2: Further, God is more merciful than man. But man accepts
the payment of one debt without the payment of another. Therefore God
accepts satisfaction for one sin without the other.
Objection 3: Further, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15),
"satisfaction is to uproot the causes of sin, and give no opening to
the suggestions thereof. " Now this can be done with regard to one sin
and not another, as when a mall curbs his lust and perseveres in
covetousness.
Therefore we can make satisfaction for one sin without
satisfying for another.
On the contrary, The fast of those who fasted "for debates and strifes"
(Is. 58:4,5) was not acceptable to God, though fasting be a work of
satisfaction. Now satisfaction cannot be made save by works that are
acceptable to God. Therefore he that has a sin on his conscience cannot
make satisfaction to God.
Further, satisfaction is a remedy for the healing of past sins, and for
preserving from future sins, as stated above ([4856]Q[12], A[3]). But
without grace it is impossible to avoid sins. Therefore, since each sin
excludes grace, it is not possible to make satisfaction for one sin and
not for another.
I answer that, Some have held that it is possible to make satisfaction
for one sin and not for another, as the Master states (Sent. iv, D,
15). But this cannot be. For since the previous offense has to be
removed by satisfaction, the mode of satisfaction must needs be
consistent with the removal of the offense. Now removal of offense is
renewal of friendship: wherefore if there be anything to hinder the
renewal of friendship there can be no satisfaction. Since, therefore,
every sin is a hindrance to the friendship of charity, which is the
friendship of man for God, it is impossible for man to make
satisfaction for one sin while holding to another: even as neither
would a man make satisfaction to another for a blow, if while throwing
himself at his feet he were to give him another.
Reply to Objection 1: As sins are not connected together in some single
one, a man can incur one without incurring another; whereas all sins
are remitted by reason of one same thing, so that the remissions of
various sins are connected together. Consequently satisfaction cannot
be made for one and not for another.
Reply to Objection 2: When a man is under obligation to another by
reason of a debt, the only inequality between them is that which is
opposed to justice, so that for restitution nothing further is required
than that the equality of justice should be reinstated, and this can be
done in respect of one debt without another. But when the obligation is
based on an offense, there is inequality not only of justice but also
of friendship, so that for the offense to be removed by satisfaction,
not only must the equality of justice be restored by the payment of a
punishment equal to the offense, but also the equality of friendship
must be reinstated, which is impossible so long as an obstacle to
friendship remains.
Reply to Objection 3: By its weight, one sin drags us down to another,
as Gregory says (Moral. xxv): so that when a man holds to one sin, he
does not sufficiently cut himself off from the causes of further sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether, when deprived of charity, a man can make satisfaction for sins for
which he was previously contrite?
Objection 1: It would seem that if a man fall into sin after being
contrite for all his sins, he can, now that he has lost charity,
satisfy for his other sins which were already pardoned him through his
contrition. For Daniel said to Nabuchodonosor (Dan. 4:24): "Redeem thou
thy sins with alms. " Yet he was still a sinner, as is shown by his
subsequent punishment. Therefore a man can make satisfaction while in a
state of sin.
Objection 2: Further, "Man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or
hatred" (Eccles. 9:1). If therefore one cannot make satisfaction unless
one be in a state of charity, it would be impossible to know whether
one had made satisfaction, which would be unseemly.
Objection 3: Further, a man's entire action takes its form from the
intention which he had at the beginning. But a penitent is in a state
of charity when he begins to repent. Therefore his whole subsequent
satisfaction will derive its efficacy from the charity which quickens
his intention.
Objection 4: Further, satisfaction consists in a certain equalization
of guilt to punishment. But these things can be equalized even in one
who is devoid of charity. Therefore, etc.
On the contrary, "Charity covereth all sins" (Prov. 10:12). But
satisfaction has the power of blotting out sins. Therefore it is
powerless without charity.
Further, the chief work of satisfaction is almsdeeds. But alms given by
one who is devoid of charity avail nothing, as is clearly stated 1 Cor.
13:3, "If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor . . . and
have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. " Therefore there can be no
satisfaction with mortal sin.
I answer that, Some have said that if, when all a man's sins have been
pardoned through contrition, and before he has made satisfaction for
them, he falls into sin, and then makes satisfaction, such satisfaction
will be valid, so that if he die in that sin, he will not be punished
in hell for the other sins.
But this cannot be, because satisfaction requires the reinstatement of
friendship and the restoration of the equality of justice, the contrary
of which destroys friendship, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix,
1,3). Now in satisfaction made to God, the equality is based, not on
equivalence but rather on God's acceptation: so that, although the
offense be already removed by previous contrition, the works of
satisfaction must be acceptable to God, and for this they are dependent
on charity. Consequently works done without charity are not
satisfactory.
Reply to Objection 1: Daniel's advice meant that he should give up sin
and repent, and so make satisfaction by giving alms.
Reply to Objection 2: Even as man knows not for certain whether he had
charity when making satisfaction, or whether he has it now, so too he
knows not for certain whether he made full satisfaction: wherefore it
is written (Ecclus. 5:5): "Be not without fear about sin forgiven. " And
yet man need not, on account of that fear, repeat the satisfaction
made, if he is not conscious of a mortal sin. For although he may not
have expiated his punishment by that satisfaction, he does not incur
the guilt of omission through neglecting to make satisfaction; even as
he who receives the Eucharist without being conscious of a mortal sin
of which he is guilty, does not incur the guilt of receiving
unworthily.
Reply to Objection 3: His intention was interrupted by his subsequent
sin, so that it gives no virtue to the works done after that sin.
Reply to Objection 4: Sufficient equalization is impossible both as to
the Divine acceptation and as to equivalence: so that the argument
proves nothing.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether previous satisfaction begins to avail after man is restored to
charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that when a man has recovered charity his
previous satisfaction begins to avail, because a gloss on Lev. 25:25,
"If thy brother being impoverished," etc. , says that "the fruit of a
man's good works should be counted from the time when he sinned. " But
they would not be counted, unless they derived some efficacy from his
subsequent charity. Therefore they begin to avail after he recovers
charity.
Objection 2: Further, as the efficacy of satisfaction is hindered by
sin, so the efficacy of Baptism is hindered by insincerity. Now Baptism
begins to avail when insincerity ceases. Therefore satisfaction begins
to avail when sin is taken away.
Objection 3: Further, if a man is given as a penance for the sins he
has committed, to fast for several days, and then, after falling again
into sin, he completes his penance, he is not told, when he goes to
confession a second time, to fast once again. But he would be told to
do so, if he did not fulfill his duty of satisfaction by them.
Therefore his previous works become valid unto satisfaction, through
his subsequent repentance.
On the contrary, Works done without charity were not satisfactory,
through being dead works. But they are not quickened by penance.
Therefore they do not begin to be satisfactory.
Further, charity does not quicken a work, unless in some way that work
proceeds therefrom. But works cannot be acceptable to God, and
therefore cannot be satisfactory, unless they be quickened by charity.
Since then the works done without charity, in no way proceeded from
charity, nor ever can proceed therefrom, they can by no means count
towards satisfaction.
I answer that, Some have said that works done while in a state of
charity, which are called living works, are meritorious in respect of
eternal life, and satisfactory in respect of paying off the debt of
punishment; and that by subsequent charity, works done without charity
are quickened so as to be satisfactory, but not so as to be meritorious
of eternal life. But this is impossible, because works done in charity
produce both these effects for the same reason, viz. because they are
pleasing to God: wherefore just as charity by its advent cannot make
works done without charity to be pleasing in one respect, so neither
can it make them pleasing in the other respect.
Reply to Objection 1: This means that the fruits are reckoned, not from
the time when he was first in sin, but from the time when he ceased to
sin, when, to wit, he was last in sin; unless he was contrite as soon
as he had sinned, and did many good actions before he confessed. Or we
may say that the greater the contrition the more it alleviates the
punishment, and the more good actions a man does while in sin, the more
he disposes himself to the grace of contrition, so that it is probable
that he owes a smaller debt of punishment. For this reason the priest
should use discretion in taking them into account, so as to give him a
lighter penance, according as he finds him better disposed.
Reply to Objection 2: Baptism imprints a character on the soul, whereas
satisfaction does not. Hence on the advent of charity, which removes
both insincerity and sin, it causes Baptism to have its effect, whereas
it does not do this for satisfaction. Moreover Baptism confers
justification in virtue of the deed [ex opere operato] which is not
man's deed but God's, wherefore it does not become a lifeless deed as
satisfaction does, which is a deed of man.
Reply to Objection 3: Sometimes satisfaction is such as to leave an
effect in the person who makes satisfaction, even after the act of
satisfaction has been done; thus fasting leaves the body weak, and
almsdeeds result in a diminution of a person's substance, and so on. In
such cases there is no need to repeat the works of satisfaction if they
have been done while in a state of sin, because through penance they
are acceptable to God in the result they leave behind. But when a work
of satisfaction leaves behind no effect in the person that does
satisfaction, it needs to be repeated, as in the case of prayer and so
forth. Interior works, since they pass away altogether, are nowise
quickened, and must be repeated.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether works done without charity merit any, at least temporal, good?
Objection 1: It would seem that works done without charity merit some,
at least a temporal, good. For as punishment is to the evil act, so is
reward to a good act. Now no evil deed is unpunished by God the just
judge. Therefore no good deed is unrewarded, and so every good deed
merits some good.
Objection 2: Further, reward is not given except for merit. Now some
reward is given for works done without charity, wherefore it is written
(Mat. 6:2, 5, 16) of those who do good actions for the sake of human
glory, that "they have received their reward. " Therefore those works
merit some good.
Objection 3: Further, if there be two men both in sin, one of whom does
many deeds that are good in themselves and in their circumstances,
while the other does none, they are not equally near to the reception
of good things from Gods else the latter need not be advised to do any
good deeds. Now he that is nearer to God receives more of His good
things. Therefore the former, on account of his good works, merits some
good from God.
On the contrary, Augustine says that "the sinner is not worthy of the
bread he eats. " Therefore he cannot merit anything from God.
Further, he that is nothing, can merit nothing. But a sinner, through
not having charity, is nothing in respect of spiritual being, according
to 1 Cor. 13:2. Therefore he can merit nothing.
I answer that, Properly speaking a merit is an action on account of
which it is just that the agent should be given something. Now justice
is twofold: first, there is justice properly so called, which regards
something due on the part of the recipient. Secondly, there is
metaphorical justice, so to speak, which regards something due on the
part of the giver, for it may be right for the giver to give something
to which the receiver has no claim. In this sense the "fitness of the
Divine goodness" is justice; thus Anselm says (Proslog. x) that "God is
just when He spares the sinner, because this is befitting. " And in this
way merit is also twofold. The first is an act in respect of which the
agent himself has a claim to receive something, and this is called
merit of "condignity. " The second is an act the result of which is that
there is a duty of giving in the giver by reason of fittingness,
wherefore it is called merit of "congruity. " Now since in all
gratuitous givings, the primary reason of the giving is love, it is
impossible for anyone, properly speaking, to lay claim to a gift, if he
lack friendship. Wherefore, as all things, whether temporal or eternal,
are bestowed on us by the bounty of God, no one can acquire a claim to
any of them, save through charity towards God: so that works done
without charity are not condignly meritorious of any good from God
either eternal or temporal. But since it is befitting the goodness of
God, that wherever He finds a disposition He should grant the
perfection, a man is said to merit congruously some good by means of
good works done without charity. Accordingly suchlike works avail for a
threefold good, acquisition of temporal goods, disposition to grace,
habituation to good works. Since, however, this is not merit properly
so called, we should grant that such works are not meritorious of any
good, rather than that they are.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14),
since no matter what a son may do, he can never give back to his father
the equal of what he has received from him a father can never become
his son's debtor: and much less can man make God his debtor on account
of equivalence of work. Consequently no work of ours can merit a reward
by reason of its measure of goodness, but it can by reason of charity,
which makes friends hold their possessions in common. Therefore, no
matter how good a work may be, if it be done without charity, it does
not give man a claim to receive anything from God. On the other hand,
an evil deed deserves an equivalent punishment according to the measure
of its malice, because no evil has been done to us on the part of God,
like the good which He has done. Therefore, although an evil deed
deserves condign punishment, nevertheless a good deed without charity
does not merit condign reward.
Reply OBJ 2 and 3: These arguments consider merit of congruity; while
the other arguments consider merit of condignity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the aforesaid works avail for the mitigation of the pains of hell?
Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid works do not avail for
the mitigation of the pains of hell. For the measure of punishment in
hell will answer to the measure of guilt. But works done without
charity do not diminish the measure of guilt. Neither, therefore, do
they lessen the pains of hell.
Objection 2: Further, the pain of hell, though infinite in duration, is
nevertheless finite in intensity. Now anything finite is done away with
by finite subtraction. If therefore works done without charity canceled
any of the punishment due for sins, those works might be so numerous,
that the pain of hell would be done away with altogether: which is
false.
Objection 3: Further, the suffrages of the Church are more efficacious
than works done without charity. But, according to Augustine
(Enchiridion cx), "the suffrages of the Church do not profit the damned
in hell. " Much less therefore are those pains mitigated by works done
without charity.
On the contrary, Augustine also says (Enchiridion cx): "Whomsoever they
profit, either receive a full pardon, or at least find damnation itself
more tolerable. "
Further, it is a greater thing to do a good deed than to omit an evil
deed. But the omission of an evil deed always avoids a punishment, even
in one who lacks charity. Much more, therefore, do good deeds void
punishment.
I answer that, Mitigation of the pains of hell can be understood in two
ways: first, as though one were delivered from the punishment which he
already deserved, and thus, since no one is delivered from punishment
unless he be absolved from guilt, (for an effect is not diminished or
taken away unless its cause be diminished or taken away), the pain of
hell cannot be mitigated by works done without charity, since they are
unable to remove or diminish guilt. Secondly, so that the demerit of
punishment is hindered; and thus the aforesaid works diminish the pain
of hell---first because he who does such works escapes being guilty of
omitting them---secondly, because such works dispose one somewhat to
good, so that a man sins from less contempt, and indeed is drawn away
from many sins thereby.
These works do, however merit a diminution or postponement of temporal
punishment, as in the case of Achab (3 Kings 21:27, seqq. ), as also the
acquisition of temporal goods.
Some, however, say that they mitigate the pains of hell, not by
subtracting any of their substance, but by strengthening the subject,
so that he is more able to bear them. But this is impossible, because
there is no strengthening without a diminution of passibility. Now
passibility is according to the measure of guilt, wherefore if guilt is
not removed, neither can the subject be strengthened.
Some again say that the punishment is mitigated as to the remorse of
conscience, though not as to the pain of fire. But neither will this
stand, because as the pain of fire is equal to the guilt, so also is
the pain of the remorse of conscience: so that what applies to one
applies to the other.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE MEANS OF MAKING SATISFACTION (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the means of making satisfaction, under which head
there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether satisfaction must be made by means of penal works?
(2) Whether the scourges whereby God punishes man in this life, are
satisfactory?
(3) Whether the works of satisfaction are suitably reckoned, by saying
that there are three, viz. almsdeeds, fasting, and prayer?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether satisfaction must be made by means of penal works?
Objection 1: It would seem that satisfaction need not be made by means
of penal works. For satisfaction should make compensation for the
offense committed against God. Now, seemingly, no compensation is given
to God by penal works, for God does not delight in our sufferings, as
appears from Tob. 3:22. Therefore satisfaction need not be made by
means of penal works.
Objection 2: Further, the greater the charity from which a work
proceeds, the less penal is that work, for "charity hath no pain
[*Vulg. : 'Perfect charity casteth out fear, because fear hath pain']"
according to 1 Jn. 4:18. If therefore works of satisfaction need to be
penal, the more they proceed from charity, the less satisfactory will
they be: which is false.
Objection 3: Further, "Satisfaction," as Anselm states (Cur Deus homo
i) "consists in giving due honor to God. " But this can be done by other
means than penal works. Therefore satisfaction needs not to be made by
means of penal works.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xx): "It is just that the
sinner, by his repentance, should inflict on himself so much the
greater suffering, as he has brought greater harm on himself by his
sin. "
Further, the wound caused by sin should be perfectly healed by
satisfaction. Now punishment is the remedy for sins, as the Philosopher
says (Ethic. ii, 3). Therefore satisfaction should be made by means of
penal works.
I answer that, As stated above ([4857]Q[12], A[3]), satisfaction
regards both the past offense, for which compensation is made by its
means, and also future sin wherefrom we are preserved thereby: and in
both respects satisfaction needs to be made by means of penal works.
For compensation for an offense implies equality, which must needs be
between the offender and the person whom he offends. Now equalization
in human justice consists in taking away from one that which he has too
much of, and giving it to the person from whom something has been
taken. And, although nothing can be taken away from God, so far as He
is concerned, yet the sinner, for his part, deprives Him of something
by sinning as stated above ([4858]Q[12], AA[3],4). Consequently, in
order that compensation be made, something by way of satisfaction that
may conduce to the glory of God must be taken away from the sinner. Now
a good work, as such, does not deprive the agent of anything, but
perfects him: so that the deprivation cannot be effected by a good work
unless it be penal. Therefore, in order that a work be satisfactory it
needs to be good that it may conduce to God's honor, and it must be
penal, so that something may be taken away from the sinner thereby.
Again punishment preserves from future sin, because a man does not
easily fall back into sin when he has had experience of the punishment.
Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3) punishments are
medicinal.
Reply to Objection 1: Though God does not delight in our punishments as
such, yet He does, in so far as they are just, and thus they can be
satisfactory.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as, in satisfaction, we have to note the
penality of the work, so, in merit, we must observe its difficulty. Now
if the difficulty of the work itself be diminished, other things being
equal, the merit is also diminished; but if the difficulty be
diminished on the part of the promptitude of the will, this does not
diminish the merit, but increases it; and, in like manner, diminution
of the penality of a work, on account of the will being made more
prompt by charity, does not lessen the efficacy of satisfaction, but
increases it.
Reply to Objection 3: That which is due for sin is compensation for the
offense, and this cannot be done without punishment of the sinner. It
is of this debt that Anselm speaks.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the scourges of the present life are satisfactory?
Objection 1: It would seem that the scourges whereby we are punished by
God in this life, cannot be satisfactory. For nothing but what is
meritorious can be satisfactory, as is clear from what has been said
([4859]Q[14], A[2]). But we do not merit except by what is in our own
power. Since therefore the scourges with which God punishes us are not
in our power, it seems that they cannot be satisfactory.
Objection 2: Further, only the good make satisfaction. But these
scourges are inflicted on the wicked also, and are deserved by them
most of all. Therefore they cannot be satisfactory.
Objection 3: Further, satisfaction regards past sins. But these
scourges are sometimes inflicted on those who have no sins, as in the
case of Job.
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2,3), is not about passions, but about
operations. Since therefore satisfaction aims at removing the causes of
sin, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15), it seems that it is not
an act of justice.
Objection 3: Further, to be careful about the future is not an act of
justice but of prudence of which caution is a part. But it belongs to
satisfaction, "to give no opening to the suggestions of sin" [*Cf.
XP/Q[12]/A[3]/OBJ[1]]. Therefore satisfaction is not an act of justice.
On the contrary, No virtue but justice considers the notion of that
which is due. But satisfaction gives due honor to God, as Anselm states
(Cur Deus Homo i). Therefore satisfaction is an act of justice.
Further, no virtue save justice establishes equality between external
things. But this is done by satisfaction which establishes equality
between amendment and the previous offense. Therefore satisfaction is
an act of justice.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 3,4), the mean
of justice is considered with regard to an equation between thing and
thing according to a certain proportion. Wherefore, since the very name
of satisfaction implies an equation of the kind, because the adverb
"satis" [enough] denotes an equality of proportion, it is evident that
satisfaction is formally an act of justice. Now the act of justice,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2,4), is either an act done by
one man to another, as when a man pays another what he owes him, or an
act done by one man between two others, as when a judge does justice
between two men. When it is an act of justice of one man to another,
the equality is set up in the agent, while when it is something done
between two others, the equality is set up in the subject that has
suffered an injustice. And since satisfaction expresses equality in the
agent, it denotes, properly speaking, an act of justice of one man to
another. Now a man may do justice to another either in actions and
passions or in external things; even as one may do an injustice to
another, either by taking something away, or by a hurtful action. And
since to give is to use an external thing, the act of justice, in so
far as it establishes equality between external things, signifies,
properly speaking, a giving back: but to make satisfaction clearly
points to equality between actions, although sometimes one is put for
the other. Now equalization concerns only such things as are unequal,
wherefore satisfaction presupposes inequality among actions, which
inequality constitutes an offense; so that satisfaction regards a
previous offense. But no part of justice regards a previous offense,
except vindictive justice, which establishes equality indifferently,
whether the patient be the same subject as the agent, as when anyone
punishes himself, or whether they be distinct, as when a judge punishes
another man, since vindictive justice deals with both cases. The same
applies to penance, which implies equality in the agent only, since it
is the penitent who holds to the penance [poenam tenet], so that
penance is in a way a species of vindictive justice. This proves that
satisfaction, which implies equality in the agent with respect to a
previous offense, is a work of justice, as to that part which is called
penance.
Reply to Objection 1: Satisfaction, as appears from what has been said,
is compensation for injury inflicted. Wherefore as the injury inflicted
entailed of itself an inequality of justice, and consequently an
inequality opposed to friendship, so satisfaction brings back directly
equality of justice, and consequently equality of friendship. And since
an act is elicited by the habit to whose end it is immediately
directed, but is commanded by that habit to whose end it is directed
ultimately, hence satisfaction is elicited by justice but is commanded
by charity.
Reply to Objection 2: Although justice is chiefly about operations, yet
it is consequently about passions, in so far as they are the causes of
operations. Wherefore as justice curbs anger, lest it inflict an unjust
injury on another, and concupiscence from invading another's marriage
right, so satisfaction removes the causes of other sins.
Reply to Objection 3: Each moral virtue shares in the act of prudence,
because this virtue completes in it the conditions essential to virtue,
since each moral virtue takes its mean according to the ruling of
prudence, as is evident from the definition of virtue given in Ethic.
ii, 6.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the definition of satisfaction given in the text is suitable?
Objection 1: It would seem that the definition of satisfaction given in
the text (Sent. iv, D, 15) and quoted from Augustine [*Gennadius
Massiliensis, De Eccl. Dogm. liv] is unsuitable---viz. that
"satisfaction is to uproot the causes of sins, and to give no opening
to the suggestions thereof. " For the cause of actual sin is the fomes.
[*"Fomes" signifies literally "fuel," and metaphorically, "incentive. "
As used by the theologian, it denotes the quasi-material element and
effect of original sin, and sometimes goes under the name of
"concupiscence," Cf. [4851]FS, Q[82], A[3]. ] But we cannot remove the
"fomes" in this life. Therefore satisfaction does not consist in
removing the causes of sins.
Objection 2: Further, the cause of sin is stronger than sin itself. But
man by himself cannot remove sin. Much less therefore can he remove the
cause of sin; and so the same conclusion follows.
Objection 3: Further, since satisfaction is a part of Penance, it
regards the past and not the future. Now "to give no opening to the
suggestions of sin" regards the future. Therefore it should not be put
in the definition of satisfaction.
Objection 4: Further, satisfaction regards a past offense. Yet no
mention is made of this. Therefore the definition of satisfaction is
unsuitable.
Objection 5: Further, Anselm gives another definition (Cur Deus homo
i): "Satisfaction consists in giving God due honor," wherein no
reference is made to the things mentioned by Augustine [*Gennadius,
OBJ[1]] in this definition. Therefore one or the other is unsuitable.
Objection 6: Further, an innocent man can give due honor to God:
whereas satisfaction is not compatible with innocence. Therefore
Anselm's definition is faulty.
I answer that, Justice aims not only at removing inequality already
existing, by punishing the past fault, but also at safeguarding
equality for the future, because according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
ii, 3) "punishments are medicinal. " Wherefore satisfaction which is the
act of justice inflicting punishment, is a medicine healing past sins
and preserving from future sins: so that when one man makes
satisfaction to another, he offers compensation for the past, and takes
heed for the future. Accordingly satisfaction may be defined in two
ways, first with regard to past sin, which it heals by making
compensation, and thus it is defined as "compensation for an inflicted
injury according to the equality of justice. " The definition of Anselm
amounts to the same, for he says that "satisfaction consists in giving
God due honor"; where duty is considered in respect of the sin
committed. Secondly, satisfaction may be defined, considered as
preserving us from future sins; and as Augustine (Cf. OBJ[1]) defines
it. Now preservation from bodily sickness is assured by removing the
causes from which the sickness may ensue, for if they be taken away the
sickness cannot follow. But it is not thus in spiritual diseases, for
the free-will cannot be forced, so that even in the presence of their
causes, they can, though with difficulty, be avoided, while they can be
incurred even when their causes are removed. Hence he puts two things
in the definition of satisfaction, viz. removal of the causes, as to
the first, and the free-will's refusal to sin.
Reply to Objection 1: By "causes" we must understand the proximate
causes of actual sin, which are twofold: viz. the lust of sin through
the habit or act of a sin that has been given up, and those things
which are called the remnants of past sin; and external occasions of
sin, such as place, bad company and so forth. Such causes are removed
by satisfaction in this life, albeit the "fomes," which is the remote
cause of actual sin, is not entirely removed by satisfaction in this
life though it is weakened.
Reply to Objection 2: Since the cause of evil or of privation
(according as it has a cause) is nothing else than a defective good,
and since it is easier to destroy good than to set it up, it follows
that it is easier to uproot the causes of privation and of evil than to
remove the evil itself, which can only be removed by setting up good,
as may be seen in the case of blindness and its causes. Yet the
aforesaid are not sufficient causes of sin, for sin does not, of
necessity, ensue therefrom, but they are occasions of sin. Nor again
can satisfaction be made without God's help, since it is not possible
without charity, as we shall state further on ([4852]Q[14], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 3: Although Penance was primarily instituted and
intended with a view to the past, yet, as a consequence, it regards the
future, in so far as it is a safeguarding remedy; and the same applies
to satisfaction.
Reply to Objection 4: Augustine [*Gennadius Massiliensis, De Eccl.
Dogm. liv] defined satisfaction, as made to God, from Whom, in reality,
nothing can be taken, though the sinner, for his own part, takes
something away. Consequently in such like satisfaction, amendment for
future time is of greater weight than compensation for the past. Hence
Augustine defines satisfaction from this point of view. And yet it is
possible to gauge the compensation for the past from the heed taken for
the future, for the latter regards the same object as the former, but
in the opposite way: since when looking at the past we detest the
causes of sins on account of the sins themselves, which are the
starting-point of the movement of detestation: whereas when taking heed
of the future, we begin from the causes, that by their removal we may
avoid sins the more easily.
Reply to Objection 5: There is no reason why the same thing should not
be described in different ways according to the various things found in
it: and such is the case here, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 6: By debt is meant the debt we owe to God by reason
of the sins we have committed, because Penance regards a debt, as
stated above [4853](A[2]).
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SATISFACTION (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the possibility of satisfaction, under which head
there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether man can make satisfaction to God?
(2) Whether one man can make satisfaction for another?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether man can make satisfaction to God?
Objection 1: It would seem that man cannot make satisfaction to God.
For satisfaction should balance the offense, as shown above
([4854]Q[12], AA[2],3). But an offense against God is infinite, since
it is measured by the person against whom it is committed, for it is a
greater offense to strike a prince than anyone else. Therefore, as no
action of man can be infinite, it seems that he cannot make
satisfaction to God.
Objection 2: Further, a slave cannot make compensation for a debt,
since all that he has is his master's. But we are the slaves of God,
and whatever good we have, we owe to Him. Therefore, as satisfaction is
compensation for a past offense, it seems that we cannot offer it to
God.
Objection 3: Further, if all that a man has suffices not to pay one
debt, he cannot pay another debt. Now all that man is, all that he can
do, and all that he has, does not suffice to pay what he owes for the
blessing of creation, wherefore it is written (Is. 40:16) that "the
wood of Libanus shall not be enough for a burnt offering [*Vulg. :
'Libanus shall not be enough to burn, nor the beasts thereof for a
burnt offering']. " Therefore by no means can he make satisfaction for
the debt resulting from the offense committed.
Objection 4: Further, man is bound to spend all his time in the service
of God. Now time once lost cannot be recovered, wherefore, as Seneca
observes (Lib. i, Ep. i, ad Lucilium) loss of time is a very grievous
matter. Therefore man cannot make compensation to God, and the same
conclusion follows as before.
Objection 5: Further, mortal actual sin is more grievous than original
sin. But none could satisfy for original sin unless he were both God
and man. Neither, therefore, can he satisfy for actual sin.
On the contrary, Jerome [*Pelagius, Expos. Fidei ad Damasum] says:
"Whoever maintains that God has commanded anything impossible to man,
let him be anathema. " But satisfaction is commanded (Lk. 3:8): "Bring
forth . . . fruits worthy of penance. " Therefore it is possible to make
satisfaction to God.
Further, God is more merciful than any man. But it is possible to make
satisfaction to a man. Therefore it is possible to make satisfaction to
God.
Further, there is due satisfaction when the punishment balances the
fault, since "justice is the same as counterpassion," as the
Pythagoreans said [*Aristotle, Ethic. v, 5; Cf. [4855]SS, Q[61], A[4]].
Now punishment may equal the pleasure contained in a sin committed.
Therefore satisfaction can be made to God.
I answer that, Man becomes God's debtor in two ways; first, by reason
of favors received, secondly, by reason of sin committed: and just as
thanksgiving or worship or the like regard the debt for favors
received, so satisfaction regards the debt for sin committed. Now in
giving honor to one's parents or to the gods, as indeed the Philosopher
says (Ethic. viii, 14), it is impossible to repay them measure for
measure, but it suffices that man repay as much as he can, for
friendship does not demand measure for measure, but what is possible.
Yet even this is equal somewhat, viz. according to proportion, for as
the debt due to God is, in comparison with God, so is what man can do,
in comparison with himself, so that in another way the form of justice
is preserved. It is the same as regards satisfaction. Consequently man
cannot make satisfaction to God if "satis" [enough] denotes
quantitative equality; but he can, if it denote proportionate equality,
as explained above, and as this suffices for justice, so does it
suffice for satisfaction.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as the offense derived a certain infinity
from the infinity of the Divine majesty, so does satisfaction derive a
certain infinity from the infinity of Divine mercy, in so far as it is
quickened by grace, whereby whatever man is able to repay becomes
acceptable. Others, however, say that the offense is infinite as
regards the aversion, and in this respect it is pardoned gratuitously,
but that it is finite as turning to a mutable good, in which respect it
is possible to make satisfaction for it. But this is not to the point,
since satisfaction does not answer to sin, except as this is an offense
against God, which is a matter, not of turning to a creature but of
turning away from God. Others again say that even as regards the
aversion it is possible to make satisfaction for sin in virtue of
Christ's merit, which was, in a way, infinite. And this comes to the
same as what we said before, since grace is given to believers through
faith in the Mediator. If, however, He were to give grace otherwise,
satisfaction would suffice in the way explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: Man, who was made to God's image, has a certain
share of liberty, in so far as he is master of his actions through his
free-will; so that, through acting by his free-will, he can make
satisfaction to God, for though it belongs to God, in so far as it was
bestowed on him by God, yet it was freely bestowed on him, that he
might be his own master, which cannot be said of a slave.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument proves that it is impossible to
make equivalent satisfaction to God, but not that it is impossible to
make sufficient satisfaction to Him. For though man owes God all that
he is able to give Him, yet it is not necessary for his salvation that
he should actually do the whole of what he is able to do, for it is
impossible for him, according to his present state of life, to put
forth his whole power into any one single thing, since he has to be
heedful about many things. And so his conduct is subject to a certain
measure, viz. the fulfillment of God's commandments, over and above
which he can offer something by way of satisfaction.
Reply to Objection 4: Though man cannot recover the time that is past,
he can in the time that follows make compensation for what he should
have done in the past, since the commandment did not exact from him the
fulfillment of his whole power, as stated above (ad 3).
Reply to Objection 5: Though original sin has less of the nature of sin
than actual sin has, yet it is a more grievous evil, because it is an
infection of human nature itself, so that, unlike actual sin, it could
not be expiated by the satisfaction of a mere man.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one man can fulfill satisfactory punishment for another?
Objection 1: It would seem that one man cannot fulfill satisfactory
punishment for another. Because merit is requisite for satisfaction.
Now one man cannot merit or demerit for another, since it is written
(Ps. 61:12): "Thou wilt render to every man according to his works. "
Therefore one man cannot make satisfaction for another.
Objection 2: Further, satisfaction is condivided with contrition and
confession. But one man cannot be contrite or confess for another.
Neither therefore can one make satisfaction for another.
Objection 3: Further, by praying for another one merits also for
oneself. If therefore a man can make satisfaction for another, he
satisfies for himself by satisfying for another, so that if a man
satisfy for another he need not make satisfaction for his own sins.
Objection 4: Further, if one can satisfy for another, as soon as he
takes the debt of punishment on himself, this other is freed from his
debt. Therefore the latter will go straight to heaven, if he die after
the whole of his debt of punishment has been taken up by another; else,
if he be punished all the same, a double punishment will be paid for
the same sin, viz. by him who has begun to make satisfaction, and by
him who is punished in Purgatory.
On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 6:2): "Bear ye one another's
burdens. " Therefore it seems that one can bear the burden of punishment
laid upon another.
Further, charity avails more before God than before man. Now before
man, one can pay another's debt for love of him. Much more, therefore,
can this be done before the judgment seat of God.
I answer that, Satisfactory punishment has a twofold purpose, viz. to
pay the debt, and to serve as a remedy for the avoidance of sin.
Accordingly, as a remedy against future sin, the satisfaction of one
does not profit another, for the flesh of one man is not tamed by
another's fast; nor does one man acquire the habit of well-doing,
through the actions of another, except accidentally, in so far as a
man, by his good actions, may merit an increase of grace for another,
since grace is the most efficacious remedy for the avoidance of sin.
But this is by way of merit rather than of satisfaction. on the other
hand, as regards the payment of the debt, one man can satisfy for
another, provided he be in a state of charity, so that his works may
avail for satisfaction. Nor is it necessary that he who satisfies for
another should undergo a greater punishment than the principal would
have to undergo (as some maintain, who argue that a man profits more by
his own punishment than by another's), because punishment derives its
power of satisfaction chiefly from charity whereby man bears it. And
since greater charity is evidenced by a man satisfying for another than
for himself, less punishment is required of him who satisfies for
another, than of the principal: wherefore we read in the Lives of the
Fathers (v, 5) of one who for love of his brother did penance for a sin
which his brother had not committed, and that on account of his charity
his brother was released from a sin which he had committed. Nor is it
necessary that the one for whom satisfaction is made should be unable
to make satisfaction himself, for even if he were able, he would be
released from his debt when the other satisfied in his stead. But this
is necessary in so far as the satisfactory punishment is medicinal: so
that a man is not to be allowed to do penance for another, unless there
be evidence of some defect in the penitent, either bodily, so that he
is unable to bear it, or spiritual, so that he is not ready to undergo
it.
Reply to Objection 1: The essential reward is bestowed on a man
according to his disposition, because the fulness of the sight of God
will be according to the capacity of those who see Him. Wherefore just
as one man is not disposed thereto by another's act, so one man does
not merit the essential reward for another, unless his merit has
infinite efficacy, as the merit of Christ, whereby children come to
eternal life through Baptism. On the other hand, the temporal
punishment due to sin after the guilt has been forgiven is not measured
according to the disposition of the man to whom it is due, since
sometimes the better man owes a greater debt of punishment.
Consequently one man can merit for another as regards release from
punishment, and one man's act becomes another's, by means of charity
whereby we are "all one in Christ" (Gal. 3:28).
Reply to Objection 2: Contrition is ordained against the guilt which
affects a man's disposition to goodness or malice, so that one man is
not freed from guilt by another's contrition. In like manner by
confession a man submits to the sacraments of the Church: nor can one
man receive a sacrament instead of another, since in a sacrament grace
is given to the recipient, not to another. Consequently there is no
comparison between satisfaction and contrition and confession.
Reply to Objection 3: In the payment of the debt we consider the
measure of the punishment, whereas in merit we regard the root which is
charity: wherefore he that, through charity, merits for another, at
least congruously, merits more for himself; yet he that satisfies for
another does not also satisfy for himself, because the measure of the
punishment does not suffice for the sins of both, although by
satisfying for another he merits something greater than the release
from punishment, viz. eternal life.
Reply to Objection 4: If this man bound himself to undergo a certain
punishment, he would not be released from the debt before paying it:
wherefore he himself will suffer the punishment, as long as the other
makes satisfaction for him: and if he do not this, then both are
debtors in respect of fulfilling this punishment, one for the sin
committed, the other for his omission, so that it does not follow that
one sin is twice punished.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE QUALITY OF SATISFACTION (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the quality of satisfaction, under which head
there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a man can satisfy for one sin without satisfying for
another?
(2) Whether if a man fall into sin after being contrite for all his
sins, he can, now that he has lost charity, satisfy for his other sins
which were pardoned him through his contrition?
(3) Whether a man's previous satisfaction begins to avail when he
recovers charity?
(4) Whether works done without charity merit any good?
(5) Whether such works avail for the mitigation of the pains of hell?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a man can satisfy for one sin without satisfying for another?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man can satisfy for one sin without
satisfying for another. Because when several things are not connected
together one can be taken away without another. Now sins are not
connected together, else whoever had one would have them all. Therefore
one sin can be expiated by satisfaction, without another.
Objection 2: Further, God is more merciful than man. But man accepts
the payment of one debt without the payment of another. Therefore God
accepts satisfaction for one sin without the other.
Objection 3: Further, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15),
"satisfaction is to uproot the causes of sin, and give no opening to
the suggestions thereof. " Now this can be done with regard to one sin
and not another, as when a mall curbs his lust and perseveres in
covetousness.
Therefore we can make satisfaction for one sin without
satisfying for another.
On the contrary, The fast of those who fasted "for debates and strifes"
(Is. 58:4,5) was not acceptable to God, though fasting be a work of
satisfaction. Now satisfaction cannot be made save by works that are
acceptable to God. Therefore he that has a sin on his conscience cannot
make satisfaction to God.
Further, satisfaction is a remedy for the healing of past sins, and for
preserving from future sins, as stated above ([4856]Q[12], A[3]). But
without grace it is impossible to avoid sins. Therefore, since each sin
excludes grace, it is not possible to make satisfaction for one sin and
not for another.
I answer that, Some have held that it is possible to make satisfaction
for one sin and not for another, as the Master states (Sent. iv, D,
15). But this cannot be. For since the previous offense has to be
removed by satisfaction, the mode of satisfaction must needs be
consistent with the removal of the offense. Now removal of offense is
renewal of friendship: wherefore if there be anything to hinder the
renewal of friendship there can be no satisfaction. Since, therefore,
every sin is a hindrance to the friendship of charity, which is the
friendship of man for God, it is impossible for man to make
satisfaction for one sin while holding to another: even as neither
would a man make satisfaction to another for a blow, if while throwing
himself at his feet he were to give him another.
Reply to Objection 1: As sins are not connected together in some single
one, a man can incur one without incurring another; whereas all sins
are remitted by reason of one same thing, so that the remissions of
various sins are connected together. Consequently satisfaction cannot
be made for one and not for another.
Reply to Objection 2: When a man is under obligation to another by
reason of a debt, the only inequality between them is that which is
opposed to justice, so that for restitution nothing further is required
than that the equality of justice should be reinstated, and this can be
done in respect of one debt without another. But when the obligation is
based on an offense, there is inequality not only of justice but also
of friendship, so that for the offense to be removed by satisfaction,
not only must the equality of justice be restored by the payment of a
punishment equal to the offense, but also the equality of friendship
must be reinstated, which is impossible so long as an obstacle to
friendship remains.
Reply to Objection 3: By its weight, one sin drags us down to another,
as Gregory says (Moral. xxv): so that when a man holds to one sin, he
does not sufficiently cut himself off from the causes of further sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether, when deprived of charity, a man can make satisfaction for sins for
which he was previously contrite?
Objection 1: It would seem that if a man fall into sin after being
contrite for all his sins, he can, now that he has lost charity,
satisfy for his other sins which were already pardoned him through his
contrition. For Daniel said to Nabuchodonosor (Dan. 4:24): "Redeem thou
thy sins with alms. " Yet he was still a sinner, as is shown by his
subsequent punishment. Therefore a man can make satisfaction while in a
state of sin.
Objection 2: Further, "Man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or
hatred" (Eccles. 9:1). If therefore one cannot make satisfaction unless
one be in a state of charity, it would be impossible to know whether
one had made satisfaction, which would be unseemly.
Objection 3: Further, a man's entire action takes its form from the
intention which he had at the beginning. But a penitent is in a state
of charity when he begins to repent. Therefore his whole subsequent
satisfaction will derive its efficacy from the charity which quickens
his intention.
Objection 4: Further, satisfaction consists in a certain equalization
of guilt to punishment. But these things can be equalized even in one
who is devoid of charity. Therefore, etc.
On the contrary, "Charity covereth all sins" (Prov. 10:12). But
satisfaction has the power of blotting out sins. Therefore it is
powerless without charity.
Further, the chief work of satisfaction is almsdeeds. But alms given by
one who is devoid of charity avail nothing, as is clearly stated 1 Cor.
13:3, "If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor . . . and
have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. " Therefore there can be no
satisfaction with mortal sin.
I answer that, Some have said that if, when all a man's sins have been
pardoned through contrition, and before he has made satisfaction for
them, he falls into sin, and then makes satisfaction, such satisfaction
will be valid, so that if he die in that sin, he will not be punished
in hell for the other sins.
But this cannot be, because satisfaction requires the reinstatement of
friendship and the restoration of the equality of justice, the contrary
of which destroys friendship, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix,
1,3). Now in satisfaction made to God, the equality is based, not on
equivalence but rather on God's acceptation: so that, although the
offense be already removed by previous contrition, the works of
satisfaction must be acceptable to God, and for this they are dependent
on charity. Consequently works done without charity are not
satisfactory.
Reply to Objection 1: Daniel's advice meant that he should give up sin
and repent, and so make satisfaction by giving alms.
Reply to Objection 2: Even as man knows not for certain whether he had
charity when making satisfaction, or whether he has it now, so too he
knows not for certain whether he made full satisfaction: wherefore it
is written (Ecclus. 5:5): "Be not without fear about sin forgiven. " And
yet man need not, on account of that fear, repeat the satisfaction
made, if he is not conscious of a mortal sin. For although he may not
have expiated his punishment by that satisfaction, he does not incur
the guilt of omission through neglecting to make satisfaction; even as
he who receives the Eucharist without being conscious of a mortal sin
of which he is guilty, does not incur the guilt of receiving
unworthily.
Reply to Objection 3: His intention was interrupted by his subsequent
sin, so that it gives no virtue to the works done after that sin.
Reply to Objection 4: Sufficient equalization is impossible both as to
the Divine acceptation and as to equivalence: so that the argument
proves nothing.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether previous satisfaction begins to avail after man is restored to
charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that when a man has recovered charity his
previous satisfaction begins to avail, because a gloss on Lev. 25:25,
"If thy brother being impoverished," etc. , says that "the fruit of a
man's good works should be counted from the time when he sinned. " But
they would not be counted, unless they derived some efficacy from his
subsequent charity. Therefore they begin to avail after he recovers
charity.
Objection 2: Further, as the efficacy of satisfaction is hindered by
sin, so the efficacy of Baptism is hindered by insincerity. Now Baptism
begins to avail when insincerity ceases. Therefore satisfaction begins
to avail when sin is taken away.
Objection 3: Further, if a man is given as a penance for the sins he
has committed, to fast for several days, and then, after falling again
into sin, he completes his penance, he is not told, when he goes to
confession a second time, to fast once again. But he would be told to
do so, if he did not fulfill his duty of satisfaction by them.
Therefore his previous works become valid unto satisfaction, through
his subsequent repentance.
On the contrary, Works done without charity were not satisfactory,
through being dead works. But they are not quickened by penance.
Therefore they do not begin to be satisfactory.
Further, charity does not quicken a work, unless in some way that work
proceeds therefrom. But works cannot be acceptable to God, and
therefore cannot be satisfactory, unless they be quickened by charity.
Since then the works done without charity, in no way proceeded from
charity, nor ever can proceed therefrom, they can by no means count
towards satisfaction.
I answer that, Some have said that works done while in a state of
charity, which are called living works, are meritorious in respect of
eternal life, and satisfactory in respect of paying off the debt of
punishment; and that by subsequent charity, works done without charity
are quickened so as to be satisfactory, but not so as to be meritorious
of eternal life. But this is impossible, because works done in charity
produce both these effects for the same reason, viz. because they are
pleasing to God: wherefore just as charity by its advent cannot make
works done without charity to be pleasing in one respect, so neither
can it make them pleasing in the other respect.
Reply to Objection 1: This means that the fruits are reckoned, not from
the time when he was first in sin, but from the time when he ceased to
sin, when, to wit, he was last in sin; unless he was contrite as soon
as he had sinned, and did many good actions before he confessed. Or we
may say that the greater the contrition the more it alleviates the
punishment, and the more good actions a man does while in sin, the more
he disposes himself to the grace of contrition, so that it is probable
that he owes a smaller debt of punishment. For this reason the priest
should use discretion in taking them into account, so as to give him a
lighter penance, according as he finds him better disposed.
Reply to Objection 2: Baptism imprints a character on the soul, whereas
satisfaction does not. Hence on the advent of charity, which removes
both insincerity and sin, it causes Baptism to have its effect, whereas
it does not do this for satisfaction. Moreover Baptism confers
justification in virtue of the deed [ex opere operato] which is not
man's deed but God's, wherefore it does not become a lifeless deed as
satisfaction does, which is a deed of man.
Reply to Objection 3: Sometimes satisfaction is such as to leave an
effect in the person who makes satisfaction, even after the act of
satisfaction has been done; thus fasting leaves the body weak, and
almsdeeds result in a diminution of a person's substance, and so on. In
such cases there is no need to repeat the works of satisfaction if they
have been done while in a state of sin, because through penance they
are acceptable to God in the result they leave behind. But when a work
of satisfaction leaves behind no effect in the person that does
satisfaction, it needs to be repeated, as in the case of prayer and so
forth. Interior works, since they pass away altogether, are nowise
quickened, and must be repeated.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether works done without charity merit any, at least temporal, good?
Objection 1: It would seem that works done without charity merit some,
at least a temporal, good. For as punishment is to the evil act, so is
reward to a good act. Now no evil deed is unpunished by God the just
judge. Therefore no good deed is unrewarded, and so every good deed
merits some good.
Objection 2: Further, reward is not given except for merit. Now some
reward is given for works done without charity, wherefore it is written
(Mat. 6:2, 5, 16) of those who do good actions for the sake of human
glory, that "they have received their reward. " Therefore those works
merit some good.
Objection 3: Further, if there be two men both in sin, one of whom does
many deeds that are good in themselves and in their circumstances,
while the other does none, they are not equally near to the reception
of good things from Gods else the latter need not be advised to do any
good deeds. Now he that is nearer to God receives more of His good
things. Therefore the former, on account of his good works, merits some
good from God.
On the contrary, Augustine says that "the sinner is not worthy of the
bread he eats. " Therefore he cannot merit anything from God.
Further, he that is nothing, can merit nothing. But a sinner, through
not having charity, is nothing in respect of spiritual being, according
to 1 Cor. 13:2. Therefore he can merit nothing.
I answer that, Properly speaking a merit is an action on account of
which it is just that the agent should be given something. Now justice
is twofold: first, there is justice properly so called, which regards
something due on the part of the recipient. Secondly, there is
metaphorical justice, so to speak, which regards something due on the
part of the giver, for it may be right for the giver to give something
to which the receiver has no claim. In this sense the "fitness of the
Divine goodness" is justice; thus Anselm says (Proslog. x) that "God is
just when He spares the sinner, because this is befitting. " And in this
way merit is also twofold. The first is an act in respect of which the
agent himself has a claim to receive something, and this is called
merit of "condignity. " The second is an act the result of which is that
there is a duty of giving in the giver by reason of fittingness,
wherefore it is called merit of "congruity. " Now since in all
gratuitous givings, the primary reason of the giving is love, it is
impossible for anyone, properly speaking, to lay claim to a gift, if he
lack friendship. Wherefore, as all things, whether temporal or eternal,
are bestowed on us by the bounty of God, no one can acquire a claim to
any of them, save through charity towards God: so that works done
without charity are not condignly meritorious of any good from God
either eternal or temporal. But since it is befitting the goodness of
God, that wherever He finds a disposition He should grant the
perfection, a man is said to merit congruously some good by means of
good works done without charity. Accordingly suchlike works avail for a
threefold good, acquisition of temporal goods, disposition to grace,
habituation to good works. Since, however, this is not merit properly
so called, we should grant that such works are not meritorious of any
good, rather than that they are.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14),
since no matter what a son may do, he can never give back to his father
the equal of what he has received from him a father can never become
his son's debtor: and much less can man make God his debtor on account
of equivalence of work. Consequently no work of ours can merit a reward
by reason of its measure of goodness, but it can by reason of charity,
which makes friends hold their possessions in common. Therefore, no
matter how good a work may be, if it be done without charity, it does
not give man a claim to receive anything from God. On the other hand,
an evil deed deserves an equivalent punishment according to the measure
of its malice, because no evil has been done to us on the part of God,
like the good which He has done. Therefore, although an evil deed
deserves condign punishment, nevertheless a good deed without charity
does not merit condign reward.
Reply OBJ 2 and 3: These arguments consider merit of congruity; while
the other arguments consider merit of condignity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the aforesaid works avail for the mitigation of the pains of hell?
Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid works do not avail for
the mitigation of the pains of hell. For the measure of punishment in
hell will answer to the measure of guilt. But works done without
charity do not diminish the measure of guilt. Neither, therefore, do
they lessen the pains of hell.
Objection 2: Further, the pain of hell, though infinite in duration, is
nevertheless finite in intensity. Now anything finite is done away with
by finite subtraction. If therefore works done without charity canceled
any of the punishment due for sins, those works might be so numerous,
that the pain of hell would be done away with altogether: which is
false.
Objection 3: Further, the suffrages of the Church are more efficacious
than works done without charity. But, according to Augustine
(Enchiridion cx), "the suffrages of the Church do not profit the damned
in hell. " Much less therefore are those pains mitigated by works done
without charity.
On the contrary, Augustine also says (Enchiridion cx): "Whomsoever they
profit, either receive a full pardon, or at least find damnation itself
more tolerable. "
Further, it is a greater thing to do a good deed than to omit an evil
deed. But the omission of an evil deed always avoids a punishment, even
in one who lacks charity. Much more, therefore, do good deeds void
punishment.
I answer that, Mitigation of the pains of hell can be understood in two
ways: first, as though one were delivered from the punishment which he
already deserved, and thus, since no one is delivered from punishment
unless he be absolved from guilt, (for an effect is not diminished or
taken away unless its cause be diminished or taken away), the pain of
hell cannot be mitigated by works done without charity, since they are
unable to remove or diminish guilt. Secondly, so that the demerit of
punishment is hindered; and thus the aforesaid works diminish the pain
of hell---first because he who does such works escapes being guilty of
omitting them---secondly, because such works dispose one somewhat to
good, so that a man sins from less contempt, and indeed is drawn away
from many sins thereby.
These works do, however merit a diminution or postponement of temporal
punishment, as in the case of Achab (3 Kings 21:27, seqq. ), as also the
acquisition of temporal goods.
Some, however, say that they mitigate the pains of hell, not by
subtracting any of their substance, but by strengthening the subject,
so that he is more able to bear them. But this is impossible, because
there is no strengthening without a diminution of passibility. Now
passibility is according to the measure of guilt, wherefore if guilt is
not removed, neither can the subject be strengthened.
Some again say that the punishment is mitigated as to the remorse of
conscience, though not as to the pain of fire. But neither will this
stand, because as the pain of fire is equal to the guilt, so also is
the pain of the remorse of conscience: so that what applies to one
applies to the other.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE MEANS OF MAKING SATISFACTION (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the means of making satisfaction, under which head
there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether satisfaction must be made by means of penal works?
(2) Whether the scourges whereby God punishes man in this life, are
satisfactory?
(3) Whether the works of satisfaction are suitably reckoned, by saying
that there are three, viz. almsdeeds, fasting, and prayer?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether satisfaction must be made by means of penal works?
Objection 1: It would seem that satisfaction need not be made by means
of penal works. For satisfaction should make compensation for the
offense committed against God. Now, seemingly, no compensation is given
to God by penal works, for God does not delight in our sufferings, as
appears from Tob. 3:22. Therefore satisfaction need not be made by
means of penal works.
Objection 2: Further, the greater the charity from which a work
proceeds, the less penal is that work, for "charity hath no pain
[*Vulg. : 'Perfect charity casteth out fear, because fear hath pain']"
according to 1 Jn. 4:18. If therefore works of satisfaction need to be
penal, the more they proceed from charity, the less satisfactory will
they be: which is false.
Objection 3: Further, "Satisfaction," as Anselm states (Cur Deus homo
i) "consists in giving due honor to God. " But this can be done by other
means than penal works. Therefore satisfaction needs not to be made by
means of penal works.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xx): "It is just that the
sinner, by his repentance, should inflict on himself so much the
greater suffering, as he has brought greater harm on himself by his
sin. "
Further, the wound caused by sin should be perfectly healed by
satisfaction. Now punishment is the remedy for sins, as the Philosopher
says (Ethic. ii, 3). Therefore satisfaction should be made by means of
penal works.
I answer that, As stated above ([4857]Q[12], A[3]), satisfaction
regards both the past offense, for which compensation is made by its
means, and also future sin wherefrom we are preserved thereby: and in
both respects satisfaction needs to be made by means of penal works.
For compensation for an offense implies equality, which must needs be
between the offender and the person whom he offends. Now equalization
in human justice consists in taking away from one that which he has too
much of, and giving it to the person from whom something has been
taken. And, although nothing can be taken away from God, so far as He
is concerned, yet the sinner, for his part, deprives Him of something
by sinning as stated above ([4858]Q[12], AA[3],4). Consequently, in
order that compensation be made, something by way of satisfaction that
may conduce to the glory of God must be taken away from the sinner. Now
a good work, as such, does not deprive the agent of anything, but
perfects him: so that the deprivation cannot be effected by a good work
unless it be penal. Therefore, in order that a work be satisfactory it
needs to be good that it may conduce to God's honor, and it must be
penal, so that something may be taken away from the sinner thereby.
Again punishment preserves from future sin, because a man does not
easily fall back into sin when he has had experience of the punishment.
Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3) punishments are
medicinal.
Reply to Objection 1: Though God does not delight in our punishments as
such, yet He does, in so far as they are just, and thus they can be
satisfactory.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as, in satisfaction, we have to note the
penality of the work, so, in merit, we must observe its difficulty. Now
if the difficulty of the work itself be diminished, other things being
equal, the merit is also diminished; but if the difficulty be
diminished on the part of the promptitude of the will, this does not
diminish the merit, but increases it; and, in like manner, diminution
of the penality of a work, on account of the will being made more
prompt by charity, does not lessen the efficacy of satisfaction, but
increases it.
Reply to Objection 3: That which is due for sin is compensation for the
offense, and this cannot be done without punishment of the sinner. It
is of this debt that Anselm speaks.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the scourges of the present life are satisfactory?
Objection 1: It would seem that the scourges whereby we are punished by
God in this life, cannot be satisfactory. For nothing but what is
meritorious can be satisfactory, as is clear from what has been said
([4859]Q[14], A[2]). But we do not merit except by what is in our own
power. Since therefore the scourges with which God punishes us are not
in our power, it seems that they cannot be satisfactory.
Objection 2: Further, only the good make satisfaction. But these
scourges are inflicted on the wicked also, and are deserved by them
most of all. Therefore they cannot be satisfactory.
Objection 3: Further, satisfaction regards past sins. But these
scourges are sometimes inflicted on those who have no sins, as in the
case of Job.
