The
Lokottaravadins
posit the time period by reason (*' ) of the dharma: thus that which is worldly (laukikd) relatively exists, whereas that which is transworldly (lokottara) really
anc
<< past and the future do not exist; only the present
exists.
anc
<< past and the future do not exist; only the present
exists.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-3-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991-PDF-Search-Engine
The word "all" signifies "of the five categories," abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, etc.
(ii.
52b).
71. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 259c8-260a9: Some (= the Darstantikas) say that all kleias are bad (akuiala); others, that the kleias of Kamadhatu are bad, whereas the kleias of the other Dhatus are neutral; a third hold that, among the three bonds (samyojana) of Kamadhatu, one bond is neutral, namely satkdyadrspi. . . Why is satkdyadrspi neutral? It is not bad because it does not absolutely destroy the diaya (see above, iv. 80d) and it does not destroy the diaya because it is not associated with non-shame and non-respect . . . it is neutral because it does not have retribution (vipdka). Vasumitra says: "because it does not produce gross actions of the body and voice" (compare iv. l2d, p. 580 of the English translation).
72. On morally neutral things, see ii. 66, iv. 9d.
73. Koia, ii. 57,71b.
74. Trsnd with respect to the dhydnas and the drupyas ("nonmaterial" absorptions) which are "tasteable" (viii. 6), at the moment of its arising with respect to the heavenly dwellings, is, in the higher spheres, neutral. All avidyd of the higher spheres, and the two views of satkaya and antagrdha in Kamadhatu, are neutral. Prajfid in Kamadhatu (1) associated with these two views, or (2) associated with minds arisen from retribution, etc. , is neutral, like all prajfid of the higher spheres associated with the kleias, or which is also associated with the minds arisen from retribution, etc. (The content of "etc. " varies according to the spheres, see ii. 72
? 75. Hsiian-tsang translates Aparintakas as "masters of foreign countries. " The term dhydyin is taken in a pejorative sense, see Aryadeva, Catuhiatika, 176 (Mem. As. Soc. Bengal, iii. 8,1914, p. 473): kateid dhydyi cittavibhramam anuprdptah kapdlam mama Urasi lagnam hi. . . Bad dhydna, Majjhima, iii. 14.
76. A tfsnottaradhydyin is a "meditator" who cultivates the "tasteable" dhydna (dsvddanasamprayuktadhydna, viii. 6): a dfspyuttaradhydyin produces a drspi of eternity, etc. ; a mdnottaradhydyin thinks: "I possess this dhydna, others do not possess it. " One who cultivates dhydna with excessive trsnd (tfsnottaram, trsnoparikam), or who is dominated by trsnd (tfsnottarah, tfsnddhikah, is called a tfsnottaradhydyin. The other two names are explained in the same way.
These are all different modes of klefa within those who enter into meditation; they are the root, the cause of neutral dharmas.
According to Hsiian-tsang: Why do the Aparantakas create these four neutral roots? Because the mahdpurusas cultivate the superior absorptions without passing beyond the point of departure which is made up of trsnd, drspi and mdna . . .
77. Samyutta, 32. 1, 34. 12; Ekottara, TD 2, p. 784b2. See De la Valle'e Poussin's Nirvana (1924).
78. See Mahdvyutpatti, 86, according to Taisho no. 1536; Digha, iii. 229, Anguttara, i. 197, ii. 46, Milinda, 144; Childers sub. voc. patiho. 'Five types of very different questions, Atthasdlini, p. 55, Sumangalavildsini, 68.
For ekamsikd dhammd, anekamsikd, see Digha, i. 191. 79. The Tibetan has "This person;" see page 801.
80. Hsiian-tsang takes up the above paragraph immediately before explaining the Abhidharmikas.
81. According to Hsiian-tsang: One should answer (vydkarana) by distinguishing this question. A general answer is not suitable, for even though the questioner knows in general that all does not arise, the problem has not been explained (na vydkhydtam).
82. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 75b20. The Vydkhyd explains: sappdddbhidharmapdphin.
83. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 75b29-c2: Why should one answer these questions categorically? These questions lead to great advantages, lead to good dharmas, are favorable to brahmacarya, produce bodhi, and cause one to attain nirvdna. This is why one should respond to them in a categorical manner. Compare Digha, i. 191.
84. The Tibetan has: can mi smra ba am / bdag nid lun ston du bzhug ces bya ba'i tha thsig go-
85. Missing in the Tibetan.
86. According to Hsiian-tsang: When someone asks if purusa-samjnd is identical or not identical to the dtman, one should ask: "What atman are you refering to in asking this question? ,"andifheanswers"Iamreferingtothegrossself . . . "
87. The Tibetan has de bzhin ons pa. The usual reading is de bzhin gsegs pa.
88. Svalaksanaklesa - kiefa bearing on a determinate object; the object of rdga and mdna is
always agreeable; the object of pratigha is always disagreeable.
89. Karikas 25-27 continue the presentation and the criticism of the sarvdstivdda, "the doctrine of universal existence," as understood by the Sarvastivadin-Vibhasikas. This problem is studied in the Introduction. Our text has been translated by Th. Stcherbatsky,
Footnotes 879
? 880 Chapter Five
Central Conception of Buddhism, 1923, Appendix, p. 76-91.
De la Valle'e Poussin translated the Chapter of DevaSarman's Vijnanakaya which treats
of the existence of the past and future in an anniversary volume of the E cole franchise d'Extreme-Orient.
See Kosa, i. 7c-d, 34d, iv. 35a-b, v. 62; trans, i. page 70.
Kathdvatthu, i. 7-8, note of Shwe Zan Aung, p. 375, 392 of the translation; ix. 6-7; Milinda, 50-54; Visuddhimagga, 686 (If one abandons present, past, and future defilements; comp. Kathdvatthu, xix. l).
Aryadeva, Catuhsatikd, 256-8 {Memoirs As. Soc. Bengal, iii. 8, 1914, p. 491); Bodhicarydvatdrapanjikd, 579-580 (Traikalyavadin); Madhyamaka, xvii. 14, xxii. ll, xxxv. 5; Wassilieff (on the Prasangikas), 363 (=331).
Remarks of A. B. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy, 163-5. See also the bibliography below note 94.
90. The Chinese versions give: "The three time periods (literally
'worlds,' loka) exist;" but according to the Tibetan: "The Vaibhasikas do not maintain that conditioned things (samskrtas), which have the characteristics of conditioned things, are eternal; but these masters maintain that they exist in all of the time periods" (dus mains kun tuyodpar ni gsal bar dam 'cha'o).
91. Samyuktakdgama, TD 2, p. 20all: rupam anityam atitam anagatam / kah punar vddam pratyutpannasya / evamdarit srutavdn dryasravako'tite rupe'nape- kso bhavati / anagatam rupam ndbhinandati / pratyutpannasya rupasya nirvide virdgdya nirodhdya pratipanno bhavati / atitam ced bhtksavo rupam ndbhavisyan na srutavdn dryasrdvako . . .
Compare the quotation from the same Sutra, Madhyamakavrtti, xxii. l 1; Majjhima, iii. 188.
92. Samyutta ii. 72, etc. ; Kosa, iii. 32.
93. Paramartha: "If a person says that all exists,--past, present, future, space, pratisamkhydnirodha (=Nirvana), and apratisamkhydnirodha,--it is said that this person is of the Sarvastivadin school. There are other persons who say, 'Present dharmas exist; past actions, if they have not produced their result, exist; but when they have produced their result, they no longer exist, as do neither future dharmas which are the results [of a past or present action]. ' Persons who say that the three time periods exist but who make these distinctions, are not Sarvastivadins, but Vibhajyavadins.
Vasumitra, on the KaSyapiyas (Wassiliev, 283, fol 176b): "The action whose retribution has ripened, does not exist; the action whose retribution has not ripened, exists; the samskdras arise from past causes and not from future causes. " This is the thesis of the Kassapikas, Kathdvatthu, i. 8.
On the Vibhajyavadins, above note 38.
94. The Vydkhyd gives the terms bhavanyathika, laksanayathika, avasthdnyathika, anyathanyathika.
Bhavanyathika = "one who maintains that the time periods differ (anyatha) through the fact of bhava"K\xt anyathanyathika is translated into Tibetangzhan dan gzhan du gyur pa pa; and we have the gloss purvdparam apeksydnyonya ucyate: "the time period is called reciprocally distinct (anyonya) by reason of what follows and precedes. " gzhan dan gzhan = anyonya. The Chinese sources translate
the name of the fourth master "who affirms that the difference of the time
y periods is related to their relationship (apeksd)!
See Rockhill, Life of the Buddha, p. 196 (translation of the work of Bhavya on the sects); Watters, Yuan Chwang, i. 274. The author of the Yogasutras, iii. 13, iv. 12, etc. , relies on Sarvastivadin sources, see "Notes bouddhiques," Bull. Acad, de Belgique, 1922, p. 522.
? characteristic, but it is not devoid of other characteristics, for in this hypothesis a certain future dharma could not later be this same present and past dharma.
96. The two commentators on Hsiian-tsang differ. According to Fa-pao (TD 41, p. 704all, al9-23), the future is posited relative (apeksa) to the past and the present; the past, relative to the present and the future; the present, relative the past and the future. This is also the opinion of Samghabhadra. According to P'u-kuang (TD 41, p. 311a6-8, a26-28), the future is posited relative to former things; the past, relative to later things; and the present relative to both: this is the system of the Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 396bl8-23.
97. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 396al0: "The Sarvaastivadins have four great masters who differently establish the differences of the three time periods . . . 1. Vasumitra who says that they differ through their state (avasthd); 2. Buddhadeva who says that they differ through their point of view (apeksa); 3. the follower of difference with respect to bhdva, who says: a dharma, changing its time period, differs through its bhdva, not through its nature . . . ; a dharma, passing from the future into the present, abandons its future bhdva and acquires its present bhdva, yet neither loses nor acquires its nature. . . ; and 4. the follower of difference with respect to its laksana. " The Ekavyavaharika school (i-shuo pu -^fftitB ) says that the three time periods are only speech, and that their nature does not exist.
The Lokottaravadins posit the time period by reason (*' ) of the dharma: thus that which is worldly (laukikd) relatively exists, whereas that which is transworldly (lokottara) really
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(ta-chung-pu ;fcffc? |$ )>> exists.
tn
98. The Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 396M8: refutes the theory of the difference of bhdva: "Outside of the characteristics of a dharma, what can indeed be its bhdva? " But a commentary says: The nature of a dharma in the three time periods is not transformed; there is only difference in the fact of its activity or non-activity, etc. : this is the bhdva of a dharma. But this transformation (parindma) is not similar to that of the Samkhyas: these latter say that the nature of the dharmas is eternal and yet it transforms itself into the twenty-three tattvas. Now the nature of a conditioned dharma is not eternal. It is by reason of this modification,--activity, non-activity, etc. ,--that we speak of transformation. The theories established by Ghosaka and Buddhadeva are also irreprochable: they do not present any great difference from that of Vasumitra. Only Vasumitra gives a solid and simple explanation. Furthermore the Sastra Master (Vasubandhu), in agreement with the Vibhdsd, prefers it. . .
99. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 393cl8: Sensation not yet experienced is future; while one experiences it, it is present; experienced, it is p a s t . . .
100. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 394c5: Is activity the same thing as the nature of a dharma? Is it different? It is not possible to say that it is the same thing nor that it is different. . .
101. On the definition of abhutvd bhdvah, see the sources quoted Madhyamakavrtti, p. 263, Majjhima, iii. 25, Sikssdsamuccaya, 248, Milinda, 52, etc.
102.
svabhdvah sarvadd cdsti bhdvo nityas ca nesyate /
na ca svabhdvdd bhdvo'nyo vyaktam isvaracespitam //
Quoted by Prajrlakaramati, Bodhicarydvatdra, p. 581, who utilizes (p. 579-582) the Koia
without citing his source.
That is: The self nature (svabhdva, svalaksana) of rupa, etc. , always exists; but the being,
rUpa, etc. (rupadibhdva), is not held to be eternal. Would it thus be different from its self nature? No, it is not different from its self nature. Purely arbitrary, this theory is an arbitrary action, which has no justification (ndtra yuktir asti).
Footnotes 881
? 882 Chapter Five
103. Samyukta, 13. 21 (TD 2, p. 92bl5? ).
104. According to Hsiian-tsang: "the word 'is' is applied to what exists, as well as to what does not exist. " Bodhicaryavatara, 581. 17: astiiabdasya nipdtatvdt kdlatrayavrttitvam. See ii. 55d, page 245 of our translation.
105. Or, according to one varient: "on the subject of the Parivrajakas. . . " This refers to the monks who assassinated Maudgalyayana and who affirmed the non-existence of past action:
yat karmdbhyatitam tan ndsti.
According to the gloss of the Japanese editor, this Sutra is found in Madhyama 4. 10;
according to the Vydkhyd, in the Samyuktakdgama. Neither Jdtaka 522, nor the Dhammapada commentary (x. 7), which recounts the death of Maudgalyayana, gives the name of the Parivrajakas.
106. Quotation {Samyukta, TD 2, p. 92cl6) reproduced in Bodhicaryavatara ad ix. 142 (p. 581):caksurbhiksavautpadydmdnamnakutasridagacchati/ nirudhyamdnamcanakvacit samnicayam gaccbati / iti hi bhiksavah caksur abhUtvd bhavati bh&tvd ca prativigacchati.
Another fragment of the ParamdrthaiunyatdsUtra is quoted ad ix. 73 (p. . 474): iti hi bhiksavo'sti karma / asti phalam J kdrakas tu nopalabhyate ya iman skandhdn vijahdti anyami ca skandhdn upddatte; a quotation reproduced in Madhyamakdvatdra (p. 262, Tibetan trans. ), Sutrdlamkdra, xviii. lOl (text p. 158, trans, p. 264) and utilized by Vasubandhu (Hsiian-tsang's edition, TD 29, p. 154cl3, p. 155b26) in the supplement to the Ko/a.
107. AbhUd bhavisyati ca: that which, in the present, has been or will be "visible," is the object.
108. Divyacaksuravabhdsa, vii. 42.
109. Samyukta, 26. 25. "Progress" = khyad par du 'gro. Samghabhadra (TD 29, p. 635bl7)
quotes a more developed redaction.
110. Lo rtsi ba pa rnams, "troops in the rain. " One should add this quotation to the two passages mentioned by Garbe, Sdmkhya-Philosophie, p. 36, Yogabhdsya, iii. 52 and Sdmkhyattattvakaumudi, ad 47. Samghabhadra, TD 29, p. 634a5.
111. Mahdniddesa p. 133: sabbam vuccati dvddasdyatandni; Samyutta, iv. 13: kifi ca bhikkhave sabbam? cakkhum cevarupd ca . . . Majjhima, i. 3. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 91a27. See also De la Valle'e Poussin's Nirvana (1924), Chap. Ill, Para. 1.
112. Hsiian-tsang: "The past and the future truly exist, as does the present. All those who, here, are not capable of explaining [gloss of the Japanese editor, "the objections of the Sautrantikas"] and who desire their own good (Mahdvyutpatti, 245. 1201), should know that "The nature of things is very profound;' it is not of the sphere of reasoning. Do those who are not capable of explaining it have the right to deny it? (ch'i pu neng shih pien po wet
Samghabhadra (TD 29, p. 634cl9-635a2) protests with vigor: "Do not attribute to the Vaibhasikas opinions which are not theirs! . . . What are the difficulties that I have not explained? "
I do not believe that Stcherbatski's version, p. 91, is correct, dran ba = t'ung- shih . M S = >># = to explain. There is no reason to correct "undoubtedly" by b/ad pa which is not suggested either by Hsiian-tsang or by Samghabhadra, although MacGovern thinks so.
113. Added by Paramartha. 114. Adhvasamgfhitatvdt =adhvasvabhdvatvdt,i. 7c.
115. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 394bl9: "When future conditioned (samskrta) things arise, should
? one say that they arise having already arisen, or that they arise not yet having arisen? What harm is there in admitting either of these hypotheses? Both of them are bad . . .
"Answer: One should say that the dbarma, already arisen, arises by reason of causes and conditions (hetupratyaya): this means that all dharmas already possess their self natures, each one of them remains in its nature and, already possessing this nature, one says that it has arisen. But it has not arisen from causes and conditions: even though its nature is already arisen, one says that it arises because it is produced by a complex of causes and conditions. On the other hand, an unarisen dharma arises by reason of cause and conditions: that is, a future dharma is qualified as non-arisen because it presently arises from causes and conditions. . . "
116. Above note 112 and page 821; the Japanese editor glosses vastu as "having the nature of anuiaya, etc. "
117. The Vydkhyd defines tadvisayaih as prahinaprakdravisayaih. 118. Vastu glossed as above; the defilements, v. 4.
119- According to the gloss of the Japanese editor: he continues to be bound to the Truth of Suffering (that is to say to the five updddnaskandhas considered as suffering).
120. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 449a25.
121. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 457 and following.
122. Anaya disa = anaya vartanyd.
123. See v. 3,17-18, 39.
124. Quoted in Vydkhyd (Petrograd) p. 14 line 19. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 112al3.
125. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 313bl5. See above note 21 and vi. 58b.
126. For the calculation of the dravyas, "distinct things," see v. 4-5a, 5b-c. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 243c20, p. 247b29.
127. See Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 248bll.
128. They are independent because they are associated with rdga, etc. (Vydkhyd). Hsiian-tsang: "They are not mentioned because they are very few (being two in number) and are not independent (that is, not arisng through their own force). "
129. See Atthasdlini, 369, trans. 475. Avidyd is the root of other dsravas and of samsdra. lt is said: avidyd hetuh samrdgdya . . . and yah kdscana durgatayo. . . (Itivuttaka, Para. 40); see vi.
71. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 259c8-260a9: Some (= the Darstantikas) say that all kleias are bad (akuiala); others, that the kleias of Kamadhatu are bad, whereas the kleias of the other Dhatus are neutral; a third hold that, among the three bonds (samyojana) of Kamadhatu, one bond is neutral, namely satkdyadrspi. . . Why is satkdyadrspi neutral? It is not bad because it does not absolutely destroy the diaya (see above, iv. 80d) and it does not destroy the diaya because it is not associated with non-shame and non-respect . . . it is neutral because it does not have retribution (vipdka). Vasumitra says: "because it does not produce gross actions of the body and voice" (compare iv. l2d, p. 580 of the English translation).
72. On morally neutral things, see ii. 66, iv. 9d.
73. Koia, ii. 57,71b.
74. Trsnd with respect to the dhydnas and the drupyas ("nonmaterial" absorptions) which are "tasteable" (viii. 6), at the moment of its arising with respect to the heavenly dwellings, is, in the higher spheres, neutral. All avidyd of the higher spheres, and the two views of satkaya and antagrdha in Kamadhatu, are neutral. Prajfid in Kamadhatu (1) associated with these two views, or (2) associated with minds arisen from retribution, etc. , is neutral, like all prajfid of the higher spheres associated with the kleias, or which is also associated with the minds arisen from retribution, etc. (The content of "etc. " varies according to the spheres, see ii. 72
? 75. Hsiian-tsang translates Aparintakas as "masters of foreign countries. " The term dhydyin is taken in a pejorative sense, see Aryadeva, Catuhiatika, 176 (Mem. As. Soc. Bengal, iii. 8,1914, p. 473): kateid dhydyi cittavibhramam anuprdptah kapdlam mama Urasi lagnam hi. . . Bad dhydna, Majjhima, iii. 14.
76. A tfsnottaradhydyin is a "meditator" who cultivates the "tasteable" dhydna (dsvddanasamprayuktadhydna, viii. 6): a dfspyuttaradhydyin produces a drspi of eternity, etc. ; a mdnottaradhydyin thinks: "I possess this dhydna, others do not possess it. " One who cultivates dhydna with excessive trsnd (tfsnottaram, trsnoparikam), or who is dominated by trsnd (tfsnottarah, tfsnddhikah, is called a tfsnottaradhydyin. The other two names are explained in the same way.
These are all different modes of klefa within those who enter into meditation; they are the root, the cause of neutral dharmas.
According to Hsiian-tsang: Why do the Aparantakas create these four neutral roots? Because the mahdpurusas cultivate the superior absorptions without passing beyond the point of departure which is made up of trsnd, drspi and mdna . . .
77. Samyutta, 32. 1, 34. 12; Ekottara, TD 2, p. 784b2. See De la Valle'e Poussin's Nirvana (1924).
78. See Mahdvyutpatti, 86, according to Taisho no. 1536; Digha, iii. 229, Anguttara, i. 197, ii. 46, Milinda, 144; Childers sub. voc. patiho. 'Five types of very different questions, Atthasdlini, p. 55, Sumangalavildsini, 68.
For ekamsikd dhammd, anekamsikd, see Digha, i. 191. 79. The Tibetan has "This person;" see page 801.
80. Hsiian-tsang takes up the above paragraph immediately before explaining the Abhidharmikas.
81. According to Hsiian-tsang: One should answer (vydkarana) by distinguishing this question. A general answer is not suitable, for even though the questioner knows in general that all does not arise, the problem has not been explained (na vydkhydtam).
82. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 75b20. The Vydkhyd explains: sappdddbhidharmapdphin.
83. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 75b29-c2: Why should one answer these questions categorically? These questions lead to great advantages, lead to good dharmas, are favorable to brahmacarya, produce bodhi, and cause one to attain nirvdna. This is why one should respond to them in a categorical manner. Compare Digha, i. 191.
84. The Tibetan has: can mi smra ba am / bdag nid lun ston du bzhug ces bya ba'i tha thsig go-
85. Missing in the Tibetan.
86. According to Hsiian-tsang: When someone asks if purusa-samjnd is identical or not identical to the dtman, one should ask: "What atman are you refering to in asking this question? ,"andifheanswers"Iamreferingtothegrossself . . . "
87. The Tibetan has de bzhin ons pa. The usual reading is de bzhin gsegs pa.
88. Svalaksanaklesa - kiefa bearing on a determinate object; the object of rdga and mdna is
always agreeable; the object of pratigha is always disagreeable.
89. Karikas 25-27 continue the presentation and the criticism of the sarvdstivdda, "the doctrine of universal existence," as understood by the Sarvastivadin-Vibhasikas. This problem is studied in the Introduction. Our text has been translated by Th. Stcherbatsky,
Footnotes 879
? 880 Chapter Five
Central Conception of Buddhism, 1923, Appendix, p. 76-91.
De la Valle'e Poussin translated the Chapter of DevaSarman's Vijnanakaya which treats
of the existence of the past and future in an anniversary volume of the E cole franchise d'Extreme-Orient.
See Kosa, i. 7c-d, 34d, iv. 35a-b, v. 62; trans, i. page 70.
Kathdvatthu, i. 7-8, note of Shwe Zan Aung, p. 375, 392 of the translation; ix. 6-7; Milinda, 50-54; Visuddhimagga, 686 (If one abandons present, past, and future defilements; comp. Kathdvatthu, xix. l).
Aryadeva, Catuhsatikd, 256-8 {Memoirs As. Soc. Bengal, iii. 8, 1914, p. 491); Bodhicarydvatdrapanjikd, 579-580 (Traikalyavadin); Madhyamaka, xvii. 14, xxii. ll, xxxv. 5; Wassilieff (on the Prasangikas), 363 (=331).
Remarks of A. B. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy, 163-5. See also the bibliography below note 94.
90. The Chinese versions give: "The three time periods (literally
'worlds,' loka) exist;" but according to the Tibetan: "The Vaibhasikas do not maintain that conditioned things (samskrtas), which have the characteristics of conditioned things, are eternal; but these masters maintain that they exist in all of the time periods" (dus mains kun tuyodpar ni gsal bar dam 'cha'o).
91. Samyuktakdgama, TD 2, p. 20all: rupam anityam atitam anagatam / kah punar vddam pratyutpannasya / evamdarit srutavdn dryasravako'tite rupe'nape- kso bhavati / anagatam rupam ndbhinandati / pratyutpannasya rupasya nirvide virdgdya nirodhdya pratipanno bhavati / atitam ced bhtksavo rupam ndbhavisyan na srutavdn dryasrdvako . . .
Compare the quotation from the same Sutra, Madhyamakavrtti, xxii. l 1; Majjhima, iii. 188.
92. Samyutta ii. 72, etc. ; Kosa, iii. 32.
93. Paramartha: "If a person says that all exists,--past, present, future, space, pratisamkhydnirodha (=Nirvana), and apratisamkhydnirodha,--it is said that this person is of the Sarvastivadin school. There are other persons who say, 'Present dharmas exist; past actions, if they have not produced their result, exist; but when they have produced their result, they no longer exist, as do neither future dharmas which are the results [of a past or present action]. ' Persons who say that the three time periods exist but who make these distinctions, are not Sarvastivadins, but Vibhajyavadins.
Vasumitra, on the KaSyapiyas (Wassiliev, 283, fol 176b): "The action whose retribution has ripened, does not exist; the action whose retribution has not ripened, exists; the samskdras arise from past causes and not from future causes. " This is the thesis of the Kassapikas, Kathdvatthu, i. 8.
On the Vibhajyavadins, above note 38.
94. The Vydkhyd gives the terms bhavanyathika, laksanayathika, avasthdnyathika, anyathanyathika.
Bhavanyathika = "one who maintains that the time periods differ (anyatha) through the fact of bhava"K\xt anyathanyathika is translated into Tibetangzhan dan gzhan du gyur pa pa; and we have the gloss purvdparam apeksydnyonya ucyate: "the time period is called reciprocally distinct (anyonya) by reason of what follows and precedes. " gzhan dan gzhan = anyonya. The Chinese sources translate
the name of the fourth master "who affirms that the difference of the time
y periods is related to their relationship (apeksd)!
See Rockhill, Life of the Buddha, p. 196 (translation of the work of Bhavya on the sects); Watters, Yuan Chwang, i. 274. The author of the Yogasutras, iii. 13, iv. 12, etc. , relies on Sarvastivadin sources, see "Notes bouddhiques," Bull. Acad, de Belgique, 1922, p. 522.
? characteristic, but it is not devoid of other characteristics, for in this hypothesis a certain future dharma could not later be this same present and past dharma.
96. The two commentators on Hsiian-tsang differ. According to Fa-pao (TD 41, p. 704all, al9-23), the future is posited relative (apeksa) to the past and the present; the past, relative to the present and the future; the present, relative the past and the future. This is also the opinion of Samghabhadra. According to P'u-kuang (TD 41, p. 311a6-8, a26-28), the future is posited relative to former things; the past, relative to later things; and the present relative to both: this is the system of the Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 396bl8-23.
97. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 396al0: "The Sarvaastivadins have four great masters who differently establish the differences of the three time periods . . . 1. Vasumitra who says that they differ through their state (avasthd); 2. Buddhadeva who says that they differ through their point of view (apeksa); 3. the follower of difference with respect to bhdva, who says: a dharma, changing its time period, differs through its bhdva, not through its nature . . . ; a dharma, passing from the future into the present, abandons its future bhdva and acquires its present bhdva, yet neither loses nor acquires its nature. . . ; and 4. the follower of difference with respect to its laksana. " The Ekavyavaharika school (i-shuo pu -^fftitB ) says that the three time periods are only speech, and that their nature does not exist.
The Lokottaravadins posit the time period by reason (*' ) of the dharma: thus that which is worldly (laukikd) relatively exists, whereas that which is transworldly (lokottara) really
anc
<< past and the future do not exist; only the present
exists. For the school of the Sutras (ching-pu M. W> )>
* f?
r trie
Mahasamghikas
(ta-chung-pu ;fcffc? |$ )>> exists.
tn
98. The Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 396M8: refutes the theory of the difference of bhdva: "Outside of the characteristics of a dharma, what can indeed be its bhdva? " But a commentary says: The nature of a dharma in the three time periods is not transformed; there is only difference in the fact of its activity or non-activity, etc. : this is the bhdva of a dharma. But this transformation (parindma) is not similar to that of the Samkhyas: these latter say that the nature of the dharmas is eternal and yet it transforms itself into the twenty-three tattvas. Now the nature of a conditioned dharma is not eternal. It is by reason of this modification,--activity, non-activity, etc. ,--that we speak of transformation. The theories established by Ghosaka and Buddhadeva are also irreprochable: they do not present any great difference from that of Vasumitra. Only Vasumitra gives a solid and simple explanation. Furthermore the Sastra Master (Vasubandhu), in agreement with the Vibhdsd, prefers it. . .
99. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 393cl8: Sensation not yet experienced is future; while one experiences it, it is present; experienced, it is p a s t . . .
100. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 394c5: Is activity the same thing as the nature of a dharma? Is it different? It is not possible to say that it is the same thing nor that it is different. . .
101. On the definition of abhutvd bhdvah, see the sources quoted Madhyamakavrtti, p. 263, Majjhima, iii. 25, Sikssdsamuccaya, 248, Milinda, 52, etc.
102.
svabhdvah sarvadd cdsti bhdvo nityas ca nesyate /
na ca svabhdvdd bhdvo'nyo vyaktam isvaracespitam //
Quoted by Prajrlakaramati, Bodhicarydvatdra, p. 581, who utilizes (p. 579-582) the Koia
without citing his source.
That is: The self nature (svabhdva, svalaksana) of rupa, etc. , always exists; but the being,
rUpa, etc. (rupadibhdva), is not held to be eternal. Would it thus be different from its self nature? No, it is not different from its self nature. Purely arbitrary, this theory is an arbitrary action, which has no justification (ndtra yuktir asti).
Footnotes 881
? 882 Chapter Five
103. Samyukta, 13. 21 (TD 2, p. 92bl5? ).
104. According to Hsiian-tsang: "the word 'is' is applied to what exists, as well as to what does not exist. " Bodhicaryavatara, 581. 17: astiiabdasya nipdtatvdt kdlatrayavrttitvam. See ii. 55d, page 245 of our translation.
105. Or, according to one varient: "on the subject of the Parivrajakas. . . " This refers to the monks who assassinated Maudgalyayana and who affirmed the non-existence of past action:
yat karmdbhyatitam tan ndsti.
According to the gloss of the Japanese editor, this Sutra is found in Madhyama 4. 10;
according to the Vydkhyd, in the Samyuktakdgama. Neither Jdtaka 522, nor the Dhammapada commentary (x. 7), which recounts the death of Maudgalyayana, gives the name of the Parivrajakas.
106. Quotation {Samyukta, TD 2, p. 92cl6) reproduced in Bodhicaryavatara ad ix. 142 (p. 581):caksurbhiksavautpadydmdnamnakutasridagacchati/ nirudhyamdnamcanakvacit samnicayam gaccbati / iti hi bhiksavah caksur abhUtvd bhavati bh&tvd ca prativigacchati.
Another fragment of the ParamdrthaiunyatdsUtra is quoted ad ix. 73 (p. . 474): iti hi bhiksavo'sti karma / asti phalam J kdrakas tu nopalabhyate ya iman skandhdn vijahdti anyami ca skandhdn upddatte; a quotation reproduced in Madhyamakdvatdra (p. 262, Tibetan trans. ), Sutrdlamkdra, xviii. lOl (text p. 158, trans, p. 264) and utilized by Vasubandhu (Hsiian-tsang's edition, TD 29, p. 154cl3, p. 155b26) in the supplement to the Ko/a.
107. AbhUd bhavisyati ca: that which, in the present, has been or will be "visible," is the object.
108. Divyacaksuravabhdsa, vii. 42.
109. Samyukta, 26. 25. "Progress" = khyad par du 'gro. Samghabhadra (TD 29, p. 635bl7)
quotes a more developed redaction.
110. Lo rtsi ba pa rnams, "troops in the rain. " One should add this quotation to the two passages mentioned by Garbe, Sdmkhya-Philosophie, p. 36, Yogabhdsya, iii. 52 and Sdmkhyattattvakaumudi, ad 47. Samghabhadra, TD 29, p. 634a5.
111. Mahdniddesa p. 133: sabbam vuccati dvddasdyatandni; Samyutta, iv. 13: kifi ca bhikkhave sabbam? cakkhum cevarupd ca . . . Majjhima, i. 3. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 91a27. See also De la Valle'e Poussin's Nirvana (1924), Chap. Ill, Para. 1.
112. Hsiian-tsang: "The past and the future truly exist, as does the present. All those who, here, are not capable of explaining [gloss of the Japanese editor, "the objections of the Sautrantikas"] and who desire their own good (Mahdvyutpatti, 245. 1201), should know that "The nature of things is very profound;' it is not of the sphere of reasoning. Do those who are not capable of explaining it have the right to deny it? (ch'i pu neng shih pien po wet
Samghabhadra (TD 29, p. 634cl9-635a2) protests with vigor: "Do not attribute to the Vaibhasikas opinions which are not theirs! . . . What are the difficulties that I have not explained? "
I do not believe that Stcherbatski's version, p. 91, is correct, dran ba = t'ung- shih . M S = >># = to explain. There is no reason to correct "undoubtedly" by b/ad pa which is not suggested either by Hsiian-tsang or by Samghabhadra, although MacGovern thinks so.
113. Added by Paramartha. 114. Adhvasamgfhitatvdt =adhvasvabhdvatvdt,i. 7c.
115. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 394bl9: "When future conditioned (samskrta) things arise, should
? one say that they arise having already arisen, or that they arise not yet having arisen? What harm is there in admitting either of these hypotheses? Both of them are bad . . .
"Answer: One should say that the dbarma, already arisen, arises by reason of causes and conditions (hetupratyaya): this means that all dharmas already possess their self natures, each one of them remains in its nature and, already possessing this nature, one says that it has arisen. But it has not arisen from causes and conditions: even though its nature is already arisen, one says that it arises because it is produced by a complex of causes and conditions. On the other hand, an unarisen dharma arises by reason of cause and conditions: that is, a future dharma is qualified as non-arisen because it presently arises from causes and conditions. . . "
116. Above note 112 and page 821; the Japanese editor glosses vastu as "having the nature of anuiaya, etc. "
117. The Vydkhyd defines tadvisayaih as prahinaprakdravisayaih. 118. Vastu glossed as above; the defilements, v. 4.
119- According to the gloss of the Japanese editor: he continues to be bound to the Truth of Suffering (that is to say to the five updddnaskandhas considered as suffering).
120. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 449a25.
121. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 457 and following.
122. Anaya disa = anaya vartanyd.
123. See v. 3,17-18, 39.
124. Quoted in Vydkhyd (Petrograd) p. 14 line 19. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 112al3.
125. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 313bl5. See above note 21 and vi. 58b.
126. For the calculation of the dravyas, "distinct things," see v. 4-5a, 5b-c. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 243c20, p. 247b29.
127. See Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 248bll.
128. They are independent because they are associated with rdga, etc. (Vydkhyd). Hsiian-tsang: "They are not mentioned because they are very few (being two in number) and are not independent (that is, not arisng through their own force). "
129. See Atthasdlini, 369, trans. 475. Avidyd is the root of other dsravas and of samsdra. lt is said: avidyd hetuh samrdgdya . . . and yah kdscana durgatayo. . . (Itivuttaka, Para. 40); see vi.
