No More Learning

Akbar Khan was close by, and on
11 March a successful sortie was made. It was not, however, till
31 March, 1842, when dragoons and horse artillery had reached him.
that Pollock began his famous march. His difficulties of transport
1 Law, India under Lord Ellenborough, p. 1.
2 Brit. Mus. Add. MSS; 37707, f. 145.
3 Idern, 37707, £. 187.


## p. 513 (#541) ############################################

ELLENBOROUGH'S ARRIVAL
513
.
were great, and, though he had secured at last some sort of co-opera-
tion from the Sikhs, it was not till 5 April that he advanced to attack
the Khaibar. This was successfully managed. 'Ali-Masjid was aban-
doned by the Afghans. Pollock, leaving the Sikhs to guard the pass,
well or ill, pushed forward and marched into Jallalabad on the 16th.
Meanwhile Sale had on the 7th attacked and burnt Akbar Khan's
camp and all danger for the moment was over.
On 8 October, 1841, the post of governor-general of India in
succession to Auckland was offered to and accepted by Lord Ellen-
borough. He had long been closely connected with Indian affairs, as
he had been appointed president of the Board of Control in 1828.
Lord Ellenborough reached Calcutta on 28 February, 1842. His
general policy as regards Afghanistan is indicated in the well-known
dispatch of 15 March to the commander-in-chief. It has been the
subject of much criticism, and yet it is difficult to see that he could
have said anything better. Sir Henry Hardinge has recorded that
he desired no stronger proof of Ellenborough's ability and soundness
of judgment than it afforded, and we can certainly add that it supplies
extraordinary evidence of his rapid grasp of the essential features of
the situation. After a brief historical review it continues :
All these circumstances, followed as they have been by the universal
hostility of the whole people of Afghanistan, united at the present moment
against us in a war which has assumed a religious, as well as national charac-
ter, compel us to adopt the conclusion, that the possession of Afghanistan,
could we recover it, would be a source of weakness, rather than of strength,
in resisting the invasion of any army from the west, and therefore, that the
ground upon which the policy of the advance of our troops to that country
mainly rested, has altogether ceased to exist.
After saying that the British can be no longer bound to support the
cause of Shah Shuja it proceeds:
Whatever course we may hereafter take, must rest solely upon military
considerations, and have, in the first instance, regard to the safety of the de-
tached bodies of our troops at Jellalabad, at Ghuznee, at Khelat-i-Ghilzye, and
Candahar, to the security of our troops now in the field from all unnecessary
risk, and finally, to the re-establishment of our military reputation by the
infliction of some signal and decisive blow upon the Afghans, which may make
it appear to them, to our own subjects and to our allies, that we have the
power of inflicting punishment upon those who commit atrocities, and violate
their faith, and that we withdraw ultimately from Afghanistan, not from any
deficiency of means to maintain our position, but because we are satisfied that
the King we have set up, has not, as we were erroneously led to imagine, the
support of the nation over which he has been placed.
Very significant are the paragraphs of Lord Ellenborough’s
dispatch to which most attention has been directed. They run :
We are of opinion that it would be erroneous to suppose that a forward
position in Upper Afghanistan would have the effect of controlling the Sikhs,
or that a forward position above the passes of Lower Afghanistan would have
the effect of controlling the Beloochees, and the Sindians, by the appearance of
confidence and strength. That which will really, and will alone control the
33


## p. 514 (#542) ############################################

514
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
Sikhs, the Beloochees, and the Sindians, and all the other nations beyond and
within the Indus, is the knowledge that we possess an army; perfect in its
equipment, possessed of all the means of movement, and so secure in its com-
munications with the country from which its supplies and its reinforcements
are drawn, as to be able at any time to act with vigour and effect against any
enemy.
In war, reputation is strength; but reputation is lost by the rash exposure
of the most gallant troops under circumstances which render defeat more pro-
bable than victory; and a succession of reverses will dishearten any soldiers,
and most of all, those whose courage and devotion have been mainly the result
of their confidence that they were always led to certain success. We would,
therefore, strongly impress upon the commanders of the forces employed in
Afghanistan and Sind the importance of incurring no unnecessary risk, and of
bringing their troops into action under circumstances which may afford full
scope to the superiority they derive from their discipline. At the same time,
we are aware that no great object can be accomplished without incurring some
risk; and we should therefore consider that the object of striking a decisive
blow at the Afghans, more especially if such blow could be struck in com-
bination with measures for the relief of Ghuznee-a blow which might re-
establish our military character beyond the Indus, and leave a deep impres-
sion of our power, and of the vigour with which it would be applied to punish
an atrocious enemy,—would be one for which risk might be justifiably incur-
red, all due and possible precaution being taken to diminish such unnecessary
risk, and to secure decisive success.
The commanders of the forces in Upper and Lower Afghanistan will in all
the operations they may design, bear in mind these general views and opinions
of the Government of India. They will, in the first instance, endeavour to
relieve all the garrisons in Afghanistan, which are now surrounded by the
enemy. The relief of these garrisons is a point deeply affecting the military
character of the army, and deeply interesting to the feelings of their country;
but to make a rash attempt to effect such relief, in any case, without a rea-
sonable prospect of success, would be to afford no real aid to the brave men
who are surrounded, and fruitlessly to sacrifice other good soldiers, whose
preservation is equally dear to the government they serve. To effect the
release of the prisoners taken at Cabool is an object likewise deeply interesting
in point of feeling and of honour. That object can, probably, only be accom-
plished by taking hostages from such part of the country as may be in, or may
come into, our possession; and with reference to this object, and to that of
the relief of Ghuznee, it may possibly become a question in the event of Major-
General Pollock's effecting a junction with Sir Robert Sale, whether the united
force shall return to the country below the Khyber Pass, or take a forward
position near Jellalabad, or even advance to Cabool. 1
The conditions of such further advance are then stated. This long
extract (with which may be compared Lord Ellenborough's memo-
randum to Queen Victoria of 18 March and his letter home of 21
March, 1842)2 is sufficiently complete to show Lord Ellenborough's
real meaning. What he obviously intended to convey was that, as
soon as it was possible safely to do so, everyone must retire from
Afghanistan, that before they did so some decisive blow must be
struck if possible, and that those on the spot, subject to certain general
conditions of caution, must make the decision.
How necessary
caution was is evident enough; even so well informed an officer as
Major Rawlinson had suggested that Kandahar should be handed
1 Ellenborough MSS. (P. R. O. ), 83.
2 Colchester, Indian Administration of Lord Ellenborough, pp. 17 and 176.
2


## p. 515 (#543) ############################################

KANDAHAR RELIEVED
516
over to Shah Kamran and that we should give him our general
support, though the attitude of Persia was uncertain.
On 6 April, 1842, the governor-general left Calcutta and no one
can accuse him of want of activity. We must look at the situation
from his point of view. At Kandahar was Nott, who had been asked
in the early days of the trouble at Kabul to send Maclaren's brigade
to Elphinstone's assistance. It was sent but returned, because unable
to advance, on 8 December, 1841. Its return has been criticised on
.
several grounds, but Nott at all events was glad enough to see it back
again. The country round Kandahar was in a state of insurrection,
and after much tortuous negotiation an army of insurgents settled
down about five miles from the city on 12 January, 1842. Nott went
out and scattered them, but his victory only seemed to bring the
surro! 'nding Durani chiefs into more open hostility, and under Mirza
Ahmad th gave active resistance to the enemy. On 21 February
Nott received the belated message from Elphinstone and Pottinger
ordering the evacuation of Kandahar and Kħilat-i-Ghilzai, the latter
a fort under Leech about half way to Ghazni. He felt under no
obligation to obey this command, for the position of the English in
the country, as was pointed out by the Durani chiefs, was now sone-
what anomalous, and required independent consideration. Nott
decided, therefore, to stay where he was. On 10 March the city was
wellnigh captured by a stratagem. On the 31st news came of the
fall of Ghazni; Khilat-i-Ghilzai was still holding out. But where was
the rescue party from Sind? About the close of February, 1842,
Brigadier England approached the Bolan Pass. He left Dadur on
7 March and reached Quetta on the 16th. But on the 28th he was
beaten at Hakulzai and retreated, with some discredit, to Quetta.
At last, on 30 April, aided by Nott's men from Kandahar, he got
through the Khojak Pass and the two brigades entered the city on
10 May.
The position was now somewhat clearer, and it had been simpli-
fied still further by what had happened at the capital. Shah Shuja,
who had continued to reign as the nominal king at the Bala Hissar,
on 5 April was shot down by men posted by Shuja-ud-daula, son of
Zaman Shah, as he set out for Jallalabad. There is much uncertainty
as to the cause of the murder, but it was doubtless the inevitable
outcome of Barakzai feeling whatever the immediate occasion.
We have therefore now this position. A strong force on the west
at Kandahar, with very uncertain means of communication with its
base, and a strong force at Jallalabad in an even worse position as
regards supplies and reinforcements. Both forces, as things were, ,
were unable to move forward. When, therefore, Lord Ellenborough
on his march up-country heard of General England's repulse and the
fall of Ghazni he gave the instructions which have been the subject
of so much controversy. On 18 April he wrote to the commander-
in-chief :


## p. 516 (#544) ############################################

516
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
I cannot think that Major-General Pollock will under his instructions of
the 15th ult. remain at or near Jellalabad. Your Excellency is so much nearer
to Peshawar than I am that I depend upon your giving any instructions upon
that head to Major-General Pollock which you may think necessary. His
position is far from satisfactory, even during his operation; with an active
enemy in his front and a large force of Sikhs in his rear he is placed almost in
the fauces caudinae if there should be treachery. Then this horrible climate,
so much more destructive than any battle, which in three days may deprive
him of two thirds of his force. . . . 1
On the 19th he reviewed the whole position, allowing the com-
mander-in-chief to decide as to General Pollock, but pointing out the
advantages of the force remaining at Jallalabad during the hot
weather on the ground of health and on account of the influence
which the presence of this force might have upon negotiations for
the exchange of prisoners. On the other hand he spoke of the decision
which had been taken in favour of ultimate retirement to the Indus
and the difficulties in which the force would find itself "at one end
of a long and difficult pass with an enemy in front and an ally not
to be entirely depended upon, in its rear”? The orders to Nott were
as follows. The letter is dated Benares, 19 April, 1842 :
1. I am directed by the Governor-General to instruct you to take imme-
diate measures for drawing off the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzie. You will
effectually destroy all such guns as you cannot conveniently bring away. You
will destroy the fort likewise unless, at the time at which the operation shall
be effected which is hereinbefore enjoined, Prince Timur having remained
faithful to the British interests shall possess sufficient force to be reasonably
expected to be able to maintain that fort upon your giving it into his charge.
2. You will evacuate the city of Candahar giving that too into the charge
of Prince Timur under the circumstances above mentioned. You will other-
wise ruin its defences before you abandon it.
3. You will then proceed to take up a position at Quetta until the season
may enable you to return upon Sukkur.
4. The object of the above directed measures is to withdraw all our forces
to Sukkur at the earliest period at which the season, and other circumstances,
may permit you to take up a new positior. there. The manner of effecting this
now necessary object is, however, left to your discretion.
5. You will understand that, in the event of Prince Timur having conti-
med faithful, it is the desire of the Governor-General to afford him the means
of preserving by his own native troops or any other troops in his pay the city
of Candahar and the fort of Khelat-i-Ghilzye, but no British guns must be left
which you can carry away, and no British officer must remain in his service
retaining his commission in the British army. 3
It has often been stated that Lord Ellenborough at this period
was in a state of panic, but a letter to Peel of 21 April, 1842, does not
give any such impression; it runs :
At last we have got a victory, and our military character is re-established.
Sir Robert Sale has completely defeated the Afghans under the walls of Jellala-
bad. Major-General Pollock has forced the Khyber Pass and is in march on Jella-
labad. These events took place on the 6th and 7th of this month. The garrison
of Khilat-i-Ghilzye is safe, but is not yet drawn off. Candahar has been nearly
lost by the error of General Nott. Brigadier Eragland was repulsed in a move.
ment he should never have made towards Candahar with an insufficient force
1 Ellenborough MSS, 83. ? Idem, 83.
3 Idem, 95.


## p. 517 (#545) ############################################

ELLENBOROUGH'S ORDERS
617
I am satisfied that the momentary success of Sale and of Pollock must not
lead us to change our view of what ought to be our permanent policy. We
mụst draw back our forces into positions in which they may have certain and
easy communication with India. You will see all I think in my letters to the
Commander-in-Chief and the Secret Committee. The victory of Jellalabad
does not change my opinion. Send us every man you can. We want them
all, as you will see when you read the letter to the Secret Committee. I am
making the most of my victory with the troops here and everywhere. . . .
The commander-in-chief did not give the suggested instructions
to Pollock till 29 April, 1842, and even then he specified conditions
under which retirement might be delayed. But on 29 April a letter
had been sent by the governor-general informing Pollock that:
The aspect of affairs in Upper Afghanistan appears to be such according
to the last advices received by the Governor-General, that his lordship cannot
but contemplate the possibility of your having been led by the absence of
serious opposition on the part of any army in the field, by the divisions amongst
the Afghan chiefs, and by the natural desire you muzi, in common with every
true soldier, have of displaying again the British flag in triumph. upon the
scene of our late disasters, to advance upon and occupy the city of Cabool.
Those who have criticised this letter have often forgotten that it was
sent just when the news had reached the governor-general that Shah
Shuja had been assassinated. Hitherto Lord Ellenborough had had to
resist those who were pressing for a fresh occupation of Afghanistan.
A letter which he wrote to the Duke of Wellington on 17 May, 1842,
has often been misunderstood because only partially quoted; it runs :
But I must tell you that in not ordering the army to Ghuznee and Cabul
without the means of movement or supply, and in giving up the irrational
schemes of extending our dominions to the westward, I stand alone and have
to; withstand against the whole monstrous body of political agents. I have
acted altogether in all that I have done upon my own judgment. 1
But that he contemplated considerable exercise of individual judg-
ment even at this early stage is evident from the letter to Nott of
13 May, 1842 :
Your position when supplied with treasure, ammunition, and medicines,
will be more favourable than the Governor-General had reason to suppose it
would be when the instructions of the 19th ultimo were addressed to you, but
this improvement of your position is not such as to induce his Lordship to vary.
the instructions, in as far as they direct your retiring upon Sukkur.
That movement you will make at such period and with such precautions
as may best conduce to the preservation of the health of your troops and the
efficiency of your army.
The Governor-General understands that consistently with the necessary
regard to these objects of primary importance you cannot retire below the
passes till October.
Neither does the decease of Shah Shoojah induce the Governor-General
to vary those instructions as far as they relate to the measures you were direc-
ted to adopt on evacuating the fort of Knelat-i-Ghilzye and the city of Candahar.
In the present divided state of Afghanistan the Governor-General is not
prepared to recognise anyone as the governor of that country; but the fidelity
of Prince Timour would justify his being so put in possession of those places
and of Giriskh on your returning to the Indus. 2
1 Colchester, op. cit. p. 196.
2 Ellenborough MSS, 95.


## p. 518 (#546) ############################################

518
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
In the same general sense is the letter from Ellenborough to the
commander-in-chief of 14 May.
What no doubt Lord Ellenborough was really afraid of, and with
some reason, was action on the part of the Sikhs. On 23 May, 1842,
he wrote to the commander-in-chief:
I have removed, I trust, by the declaration I have made, the apprehension
which appears to have been entertained that the British Government desired
to have possession of Peshawur. This apprehension in Mr Clerk's opinion led
to the congregating of so large a Sikh force there.
Pollock had hitherto delayed on the question of carriage, and he
gladly welcomed the idea of a forward movement; on 1 June, 1842, a
very wide discretion was allowed him. Nott's position was quite
different, and in any case depended largely on that of Pollock. On
1 June a letter was written to him directing his retirement as soon as
the season would permit.
So Nott busied himself with maintaining his position and with
the withdrawal of the Khilat garrison. But by a letter of 4 July he
too received full discretionary powers which allowed him to go back
via Ghazni and Kabul. It was now for the irst time that he had
sufficient transport and that Lord Ellenborough, with many natural
misgivings, was able to sanction his advance.
It was in this letter that the instruction was contained which
afterwards excited so much ridicule. It ran :
If you should be enabled by a coup de main to get possession of Ghuznee
and Cabool, you will act as you see fit, and leave decisive proofs of the power
of the British army, without impeaching its humanity. You will bring away
from the tomb of Mahmood of Ghuznee, his club, which hangs over it; and
you will bring away the gates of his tomb, which are the gates of the Temple
of Somnaut. These will be the just trophies of your successful march.
But as regards this direction those who know the East will hesitate to
condemn Lord Ellenborough; and they will also be pretty sure that
the idea was either suggested or approved by those around him. It
is a trifling affair in any case, but Wade attests the fact that the
Gates had been demanded by Ranjit Singh in 1831. 2 The Duke of
Wellington approved of Lord Ellenborough's conduct in this matter.
The discretion as to the route was again fully allowed to Nott in a
letter of 10 July. On the 6th of that month Lord Ellenborough
summed up the matter in a letter to the Duke of Wellington:
The case is one in which, at this distance, I could not direct an advance,
but, at the same time, I should hardly be justified in continuing to prohibit it.
It is entirely a question of commissariat.
By the end of June, Pollock had sufficient transport but it was not
till the middle of August, 1842, that he heard that Nott was going to
Kabul. He started from Jallalabad on the 20th of that month,
1 Ellenborough MSS, 83.
2 Cunningham, Sikhs, pp. 198-7.


## p. 519 (#547) ############################################

KABUL REOCCUPIED
519
reaching Gandammak on the 23rd and scattering a body of the enemy
near by. On 1 September Fath Jung, the puppet king, gave himself
up, and, having heard that Nott had started, Pollock set off for the
capital on the 7th, defeated the Ghilzais at Jagdallak on the 8th, and
on the 13th won a great final victory over Akbar Khan at Tezin near
the fatal pass of Khurd Kabul. The hope of the Barakzais fled, and
on the 15th Pollock was in Kabul.
Nott had made preparations for moving his force from Kandahar
to Quetta when on 20 July, having received sufficient transport and
the governor-general's letter of the 4th, he decided to march to
Ghazni and Kabul with a portion of his army. The rest of the force
was to return under the appropriate care of Brigadier England, and
with him went Prince Taimur Shah (Shah Shuja's eldest son), who
had no sort of authority in the country. They left Safdar Jung, the
younger son, in possession, a move which shows how little the actual
significance of events in Afghanistan had been realised even then.
There was no trouble till Nott's army reached Mukur, 160 miles from
Kandahar, on 27 August, 1842, and there irregular fighting began.
Ghazni was occupied on 6 September and the fortifications destroyed.
The army marched away, carrying with them the gates of Somnath,
and on 17 September they camped outside the city of Kabul.
Lord Ellenborough had been very careful to state that all he
wished, once the garrisons were relieved and the prisoners restored.
was to leave Afghanistan as soon as possible, but Pollock thought it
necessary for the time being to enthrone Fath Jung in the Bala
Hissar, without of course any hope of future help from the English.
There was not entire sympathy between Nott and Pollock, but fortu-
nately this did not interfere with the release of the prisoners, who
had been carried off in the direction of the Hindu Kush, and who,
after the most extraordinary adventures, rescued themselves and on
17 September joined a relief party which had been sent under Sir
Richniond Shakespeare.
All that remained was to break up the gathering forces of the
Barakzais which Aminullah Khan was bringing together and which
might have annoyed the army on its way back to India. This was
effected by General McCaskill who won a battle at Istalif in Kohistan
on 29 September. The Great Bazaar of Kabul was, rather unfor-
tunately, selected for destruction as a reminder of the evil that had
been done by those accustomed to stream through its arcades, and
on 12 October the army marched away from the city. On the same
day Fath Jung having abdicated, Prince Shapur, another son of Shah
Shuja, was declared king.
Meanwhile Lord Ellenborough issued a proclamation at Simla,
dated 1 October, 1842, which is open to little criticism beyond this,
that he might well have left unnoticed the faults, sufficiently obvious,
of those who were responsible for the disasters which had occurred.


## p. 520 (#548) ############################################

520
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
It annoyed Auckland, who made the ridiculous remark, to a party
of friends of whom Greville was one, that he had been convinced
that Lord Ellenborough was mad from the moment of his landing.
Ellenborough's defence of his proclamation and of his orders as to
the Somnath Gates, which is to be found in a letter to the Secret
Committee of 28 March, 1843, has much to recommend it.
The most important part of the proclamation was that in which
it was stated that the governor-general would willingly recognise any
government approved by the Afghans themselves, which should
appear desirous and capable of maintaining friendly relations with
neighbouring states. The opportunity was soon given. Those Afghans
who had been detained in India were allowed to return and the most
important of them all was Dost Muhammad, a wooden spoon which
could be thrown anywhere, as he described himself. Early in 1843
he returned to Afghanistan and to its throne, for poor Prince Shapur
had long since fled for his life to Peshawar.
The armies of Pollock and Nott returned through the Khaibar
without any great difficulty, though they suffered occasionally from
the depredations of freebooters. They destroyed the defences of
Jallalabad and 'Ali Masjid as they passed, thus perhaps happily
rendering useless a scheme for handing over Jallalabad to the Sikhs.
Then they passed through Peshawar and across the Panjab and were
welcomed in December, 1842, very magnificently, by the governor-
general and the army of reserve which he had assembled at Firozpur,
with the idea of overawing the Sikhs. But althoi. gh there was great
rejoicing, and although rewards were deservedly given to those
chiefly concerned, there is no doubt that the errors of the first part of
the war cast their shadow over the triumphs of the second. It suited
the politicians who were really responsible for the first invasion of
Afghanistan to treat the whole war as one connected incident; whereas
in reality it consisted of four distinct-operations.
That Auckland's
invasion of Afghanistan was a terrible mistake is obvious; the
government of the country under Macnaghten was a failure; the
conduct of the authorities when the revolt of November occurred is
open to the gravest criticism, and forms perhaps the most painful
episode in our military history; but the work of Pollock, Sale and
Nott reflects nothing but credit on the British and Indian troops
whom they led and who displayed the highest courage and endurance.
Lord Ellenborough's conduct throughout a most difficult time still
awaits detailed and candid examination, but in spite of the careless
censures which one text-book after another has repeated from his
own day to ours, his reputation has the powerful support of the Duke
of Wellington and Lord Hardinge. The Duke's letter of 9 October,
1842, in which he gives a carefully considered and generously
expressed approval of Lord Ellenborough's conduct in regard to the
relief operations, is perhaps the most important testimony in his
favour. It concludes:


## p. 521 (#549) ############################################

THE EVACUATION
521
These observations just tend to show that it is impossible for anybody at a
distance, even informed as you must be, to dictate the exact course of a mili-
tary operation. This must be left to the officers on the spot. And you have
acted most handsomely by yours. You have stated clearly your objects. You
have afforded them ample means and you have suggested the mode of execu-
tion with all the reasons in favour of and against your suggestions, the latter
formed upon the knowledge acquired by experience. You could not do more.
You might have done less. I concur in all your objects. I think your generals
ought to be successful in carrying into execution your views. 1
Equally valuable and conclusive are the marginal comments by the
Duke on the letter of Lord Ellenborough to the Secret Committee of
17 May, 1842. ?
1 See the whole letter ap. Law, op. cit. pp. 42 sqq.
2 Idem, pp. 33 sqq.


## p. 522 (#550) ############################################

CHAPTER XXIX
THE CONQUEST OF SIND AND THE PANJAB
1. SIND
THE conquest of Sind and the subjugation of the Sikhs, though
no doubt often contemplated as possible before the invasion of
Afghanistan, were very closely connected with it; almost to the extent
of cause and effect, as can be seen from Lord Ellenborough's memo-
randum of 23 April, 1839. 1 Sind has a long interesting history, which
has been dealt with in previous volumes of this work, so that it will
suffice to refer to it very briefly. The province was theoretically
subject to Afghanistan but the tribute due was often withheld. In
1783 Mir Fath 'Ali Khan overthrew the last of the Kaloras and
established himself as Rais of Sind, the first of the Talpura mirs. His
family divided the country between them, and so we have the
Hyderabad or Shahdadpur family ruling Central Sind from the
capital; the Mirpur or Mapikani family at Mirpur; and the Sohrabani
line at Khairpur. Mir Fath 'Ali Khan died in 1802, leaving a son,
Subudar Khan; but his three brothers Ghulam 'Ali, Karam 'Ali, and
Murad 'Ali shared the sovereignty. Of these Ghulam 'Ali left a son
Mir Muhammad Khan; Karam 'Ali left no issue; and Murad 'Ali left
two sons, Mir Nur Muhammad Khan and Mir Nasir Khan, who with
their cousins just named, Subudar Khan and Mir Muhammad Khan,
were ruling, if ruling it could be called, in 1838; and of these Subudar
Khan was a Sunni and the other three were Shiahs, which affected
their several relations with Persia. Mir Nur Muhammad Khan held
a nominal superiority in position. In 1841 he died leaving two sons,
Shahdad and Husain 'Ali, and it was the latter of these that he con-
fided on his deathbed, together with Nasir Khan, to the care of
Outram. The Khairpur family was very numerous, but they were
all more or less subject in 1838 to Mir Rustam Khan, an aged chief
who had taken part in the original establishment of his family in the
country. At Mirpur, Shir Muhammad, known as the Lion of Mirpur,
was the ruler, though he was supposed to be to some extent controlled
by the mirs of Hyderabad.
The East India Company had re-established its factory at Tatta
in 1758; it was abandoned in 1775; but the idea of trade remained,
though a commercial mission to the Talpura mirs in 1799. ended
abruptly and without result. Negotiations at the beginning of the
nineteenth century were directed against the French, and a treaty
1 Law, op. cit. pp. 1 sqq.
? Parliamentary Papers, 1843, XXXIX, 316.
8 Idem, p. 260.


## p. 523 (#551) ############################################

NAVIGATION OF THE INDUS
523
with the amirs in 1809 provided that they should not allow that
"tribe" to establish itself in Sind. Similarly, a treaty of 1820 said
that no European or American settlements should be allowed, and
that raids on British or allied territory should be restrained;1 with
regard to the latter matter a raid of the Khosas upon Cutch forced
the Company to send a field force there in 1825, and with this little
expedition went James Burnes, brother of the more famous Alexander,
who was invited, after the military operations had finished, to visit
the amirs of Sind at Hyderabad. His published account of his journey
is still valuable as an early description of a practically unknown
country. It may have been this connection which led to the sending
of Alexander Burnes to visit Ranjit Singh by way of the Indus. ?
The course of that river was now for the first time known to the
English; and exaggerated ideas seem to have been entertained, both
in India and in England, as to its future as a highway of commerce.
Colonel Pottinger, therefore, recently appointed Resident in Sind,
arranged a treaty on 20 April, 1832 (supplementary articles were
added two days later), with Mir Murad 'Ali in Hyderabad, which
was afterwards confirmed by Mir Rustam Khan in Khairpur, some
of the articles of which had importance in the future. Such were :
II. That the two contracting Powers bind themselves never to look with
the eye of covetousness on the possessions of each other.
III. That the British Government has requested a passage for the mer-
chants and traders of Hindustan by the rivers and roads of Sinde, by which
they may transport their goods and merchandise from one country to another;
and the said Government of Hyderabad hereby acquiesces in the same request,
on the three following conditions :
1. That no person shall bring any description of military stores by the
above river or roads.
2. That no armed vessels or boats shall come by the said river.
3. That no English merchants shall be allowed to settle in Sinde, bui
shall come as occasion requires, and having stopped to transact their business,
shall return to India.
It was also provided that a tariff of tolls should be drawn up and
mutually agreed upon, and the details of this tariff were settled by
a treaty of 1834. 3 The next year Colonel Pottinger obtained leavé
to survey the coast of the delta of the Indus. In view of what followed
it is important to remember that there was considerable probability
(as can be seen from Lord Auckland's correspondence) of the invasion
of Sind by Ranjit Singh in 1836. He had demanded a heavy tribute
from the amirs, had actually captured a fort near Shikarpur, and was
making preparations for further operations. This led the governor-
general to try to come to a closer arrangement with the amirs on the
one hand, and to induce the Sikhs to give up their designs on Sind
>
1 Aitchison, op. cit. VII, 351, 352. ? Ellenborough, Political Diary, 1, 275.
8 Aitchison, op. cit. VII, 353 and 357.


## p. 524 (#552) ############################################

524
CONQUEST OF SIND AND THE PANJAB
a
on the other. The dispatch to Pottinger of 26 September, 1830,
contains the following significant paragraphs :
You will in treating with the Amirs communicate with them, without
reserve, in reference to the dangerous position in which they stand, and you
will apprise them, that this Government is sensible how essential it is, not to
their interests only, but to their very existence, that the ties by which they are
connected with the British Empire should be strengthened.
It is difficult at this distance immediately to prescribe to you the conditions
upon which the British Government should agree to enter into a closer alliance;
but you will avow its readiness, under such circumstances as are likely to arise,
and upon such conditions as may be reasonable, to enter more ostensibly, than
has hitherto been the case, into alliance with the Ameers of Sinde.
Whether the communication which you may make to the Ameers, in pursu-
ance of these instructions, shall end in no new result, or in the mere reception,
at the Court of Hyderabad, of a British Agent, or in the advance of a subsidiary
force, for the protection of the Sinde territories, will probably depend upon the
conduct of the Maharajah, and the course of events.
The Governor-General in Council sincerely desires, that the extension of
British influence in the direction of the Indus, should be effected by the pursuit
of commercial and peaceful objects alone. In interposing for the protection of
Sinde from imminent danger, the British Government may justly expect to
receive, in return, some corresponding advantages. His Lordship in Council
would not, without your deliberate advice, and a very careful consideration of
all the circumstances of the position of Sinde, enter into a general engagement
to defend that country from all external enemies; but he does not hesitate to
authorise you to promise his mediation in all disputes between the Ameers
and the Government of Lahore, if a reasonable equivalent be assented to. As
one condition of this mediation, and with a view to enable this Government
readily to give effect to it, it would be advantageous if the Ameers would con-
sent permanently to receive a body of British troops, to be stationed at their
capital, the expense of the detachment being paid from the Sinde revenues.
His Lordship in Council would not insist upon this, as an indispensable part of
any arrangement, but he empowers you (reserving all points of detail) to
agree to it on his part, should the Ameers not persist in opposing it under any
circumstances. Short of this the present mediation of the British Government
with Maharajah Runjeet Singh, may be promised, on the condition of the re-
ception of a British agent at Hyderabad, and, of course, of all the relations
between Sinde and Lahore being conducted solely through the medium of
British Officers. . . . 1
Although Lord Auckland wrote on 27 December, 1837, that he
was disappointed with the progress of negotiations, he certainly
helped Sind greatly in regard to Ranjit Singh, and though it was un-
willingly done, Pottinger concluded on 20 April, 1838, a treaty with
the amirs of Hyderabad by which the governor-general promised his
mediation in the matter and the amirs consented to receive an
accredited British minister. 2 No doubt the main idea in the minds
of Lord Auckland and his advisers was the security of the trading
privileges on the Indus, but this soon gave way to larger schemes
connected with the Afghan War. When that struggle became probable,
Lord Auckland considered the whole position as altered; and though
it may be argued with some justice that Sind was no longer part of
Afghanistan, that Shah Shuja had already freed the amirs from any
1 Parliamentary Papers, 1843, XXXIX, 15. 2 Aitchison, op. cit. VII, 363.


## p. 525 (#553) ############################################

THE TRIPARTITE TREATY
525
claims he might have upon them, and that treaty obligations stood
in the way of military movements through their country, there is
something, though perhaps not very much, to be said for the governor-
general's contention that what had now arisen was a larger question,
one of the defence of India, an Asian not only an Indian question, and
one in which Russia and Persia were concerned as well as the frontier
of the Indian states.
The Tripartite Treaty of 26 June, 1838, between the government
of India, Ranjit Singh and Shah Shuja contained important refer-
ences to Sind:
IV. Regarding Shikarpoor and the territory of Sinde lying on the right
bank of the Indus, the Shah will agree to abide by whatever may be settled as
right and proper in conformity with the happy relations of friendship subsisting
between the British Government and the Maharajah, through Captain Wade.
XVI. Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk agrees to relinquish, for himself, his heirs
and successors, all claims of supremacy, and arrears of tribute, over the country
now held by the Ameers of Sinde (which will continue to belong to the Ameers
and their successors in perpetuity) on condition of the payment to him by
the Ameers of such a sum as may be determined under the mediation of the
British Government; 15,00,000 of rupees of such payment being made over by
him to Maharajah Runjeet Singh.
A copy of the treaty was sent to Pottinger on 26 July, 1838, and he
was instructed to press its lesson home on the amirs :
"You will”, he was told, “in the first place state to the Ameers that, in the
opinion of the Governor-General, a crisis has arrived at which it is essentially
requisite for the security of British India, that the real friends of that Power
should unequivocally manifest their attachment to its interests; and you will
further apprise them that a combination of the Powers to the Westward, ap-
parently having objects in view calculated to be injurious to our Empire in
the East, has compelled the Governor-General to enter into a counter-com-
bination for the purpose of frustrating those objects. "'i
If the Amirs co-operated and consented to the abrogation of the
article in the former treaty as to the use of the Indus for the con-
veyance of military stores-well and good. They would secure
-.
independence from Afghanistan at a comparatively cheap rate. If
they did not do so, Shikarpur would be occupied and the amirs would
be left to the vengeance of Shah Shuja. If the amirs were found to
have entered into any engagements with the shah of Persia, Pottinger
might request the immediate advance of a British force from the
Bombay army, sufficient to occupy the capital, and announce the
breaking off of friendly relations with such of the amirs as had taken
part in the Persian alliance.
With reference to this last point there is some difficulty. Pottinger.
wrote on 13 August that the Amir Nur Muhammad Khan had sent
an 'arizat to the shah and that possibly the Amirs Nasir Khan and
Muhammad Khan had done the same. Mir Subudar Khan had not
taken part, possibly because he was a Sunni. "Potti. ger's words show
1 Parliamentary Papers, ut supra, p. 65.


## p. 526 (#554) ############################################

526
CONQUEST OF SIND AND THE PANJAB
now
his opinion and are worth repeating because those who use them in
controversy often quote one part without the other :
5. I do not myself ascribe any immediate political object to this Ureeza.
I feel almost certain that it proceeds solely from the bigotry of Sheeaism, of
which intolerant sect all the Ameers, with the exception of Sobdar, are rigid
followers. It is not, however, to be concealed that the allusion to the messages
with which the Hajee is charged will authorise a much more extended and
important interpretation of the Ameer's address; and, as a matter which seems
already known to so many individuals (for the scribe was sent to copy the
letter at the house of Mirza Bakir Goorgian, where several persons likewise
met to discuss the proper style) can hardly be considered a secret, I propose
to take an early occasion, after reaching Hyderabad, to introduce the topic to
the Ameers, and to demand a categorical declaration of their intentions.
6. The important political events and arrangements which are
pending will do even more than my observations, to open the eyes of any of
the Ameers who may be wavering between our alliance and that of Persia, to
the precipice on which they stand; but I shall not fail to tell them distinctly,
that the day they connect themselves with any other Power will be the last of
their independent authority, if not. of their rule, for that we have the ready
power to crush and annihilate them, and will not hesitate to call it into action,
should it appear requisite, however remotely, for either the integrity or safety
of our Empire, or its frontiers. 1
Pottinger was under no illusions as to what might be expected
from the amirs in the way of help. He knew that the danger would
be greatest when the troops had passed through, and hence, on 20
December, 1838, he urged the hurrying up of the reserve force from
Bombay. He saw that the amirs valued very slightly the promise
of freedom from Afghanistan, because they were free already, and
because, as has been already said, they held releases from tribute
given by Shah Shuja. Lord Auckland could, however, only push
cn. Burnes was sent to Sind to try and arrange matters regarding
the passage of the troops to Afghanistan, and he wrote on 11 Novem-
ber to Pottinger that Mir Rustam Khan had heard from Mir Nur
Muhammad Khan in favour of resistance to the English army, and
that the mir of Khairpur had refused to take part in any such scheme.
"I could only tell him", adds Burnes, "that if a shot was fired in the
country against the English, Sinde would become a province of
British India. ” 3 Pottinger showed courage and discretion, but
supplies were withheld as long as possible. On 2 December, 1838,
he writes :
I also sent a moonshee to Nur Mahomed Khan to inform him that part of
the troops had arrived; that if grain was not sold to them the general officer
commanding would take it by force, paying its price, and would make a signal
example of Gholam Shah and all others who might oppose the people disposing
of their property to us. 4
And even when he is more hopeful there is evidence of distrust :
"My intelligence from Hyderabad", he writes on 15 December, 1838, "up
to the 13th instant, leads me to believe that the Ameers there, excepting Sobdar,
are now really exerting themselves to obtain carriage for this army, as the only
1 Parliamentary Papers, ut supra, p. 67.
2 Idem, p. 160.
3 Idem, p. 127.
4 Idem, p. 150.
>


## p. 527 (#555) ############################################

TREATIES WITH THE MIRS
527
means that offer of getting rid of it. At the same time, they are adopting all
sorts of precautions, which evince a total distrust of our designs, and have
already assembled a considerable body of their rabble of troops at the capital.
They have also written to all the chiefs, whether Beloochees or not, to be in
readiness with their quotas in case of necessity, etc. ” 1
It is clear that events were altering men's minds as to the future,
for, although Pottinger characterised Burnes's notions and proposals
as rash and embarrassing, that officer hit the mark when on 17
December, 1838, he stated that the government had determined on
fixing a subsidiary force in Sind permanently, this being one of the
suggested results of the Persian intrigues. On 24 December, 1838,
Burnes signed a treaty with Mir Rustam Khan. 2 Its chief clauses
provided for the protection by the British of the principality of
Khairpur, the submission of all external relations to British control
and the furnishing of such troops and assistance by the state as were
necessary during the war. A separate article authorised the English
to occupy for the time being the island of Bukkur, thus securing the
passage of the Indus.
It would be useless to enter into the details of the negotiations
with the amirs of Hyderabad. They wished to prevent the passage
of the British troops, but they could not prevent it, and the advance
of Sir John Keane's force on their capital obliged them to accept the
new. treaty, which was finally signed on 11 March, 1839. 3 Lord
Auckland on 13 March summarised its effects as follows:
The main provisions of the proposed engagements are, that the confederacy
of the Amirs is virtually dissolved, each chief being upheld in his own posses-
sions, and bound to refer his differences with the other chiefs, to our arbitra-
tion; that Sinde is placed formally under British protection and brought within
the circle of our Indian relations; that a British force is to be fixed in Lower
Sinde, at Tatta, or other such point to the Westward of the Indus as the British
Government may determine; a sum of three lacs of rupees per annum, in aid
of the cost of this force, being paid in equal proportions by the three Amirs,
Mir Noor Mahomed Khan, Mir Nusseer Mahomed Khan, and Mir Mahomed
Khan; and that the navigation of the Indus, from the sea to the most northern
point of the Sinde territory, is rendered free of all toll. These are objects of
high undoubted value, and especially so when acquired without bloodshed, as
the first advance towards that consolidation of our influence, and extension of
the general benefits of commerce, throughout Afghanistan, which form the
great end of our designs. 4
It is clear that one step led to another. On 2 January, 1839, Lord
Aucklind wrote to Hobhouse :
I have rejected propositions for the forfeiture of territory, for it would give
a character of grasping to our enterprise which would be very injurious to us,
and the establishment of our dominion at the north of the Indus would excite
alarm and jealousy up to the very source of the river.
And yet on 3 February, 1839, Karachi passed into the hands of
the English. On 2 September the same year Pottinger was informed :
It is not in contemplation to maintain permanently a large military force
1 Parliamentary Papers, ut supra, p. 157. 2 Aitchison, op. cit. VII, 363.
3 Idem, p. 369.
4 Parliamentary Papers, ut supra, p. 237.


## p. 528 (#556) ############################################

528
CONQUEST OF SIND AND THE PANJAB
at that place (Karachi) but a small detachment will always remain there. . . .
The question of the number and the stations of any force which may after the
return of the army of the Indus be left in Sind, is still under the consideration
of his Lordship, and under discussion with you, and with other political and
military authorities. . . . 1
Thus the unfortunate amirs found themselves when the Afghan
War was in progress saddled with a general liability to help the
British forces; parts of their territory had been taken from them,
obviously for ever; they had to contribute in varying proportions a
large amount of money, instead of the old tribute, in order to main-
tain troops in their midst whom they did not want; and their inde-
pendent position was gone for ever, because they had now come
definitely within the sphere of British influence. There was obvious
injustice in these arrangements, though one can easily see how 'diffi-
cult it was for the authorities to have acted otherwise than as they
did. In this connection it must be noted that Outram took the place
of Pottinger on 24 February, 1840, and the part that he took in all
that happened between that date and the battle of Miani does not
seem to have received sufficient attention. Macnaghten would have
liked some scheme that would have handed over Sind, wholly or in
part, to the Afghans. But Lord Auckland wrote to him on 15 June,
1839 :
I do not agree with you in your views with regard to Sind. I consider
Afghanistan and Sind to be absolutely severed by the Tripartite Treaty, and
any further reckoning for new offences must be between us and the Amirs.
It is important to remember that the home authorities were with
the governor-general, or, we might say, were behind him, in support
of this policy. In a letter to Macnaghten of 8 January, 1840, Lord
Auckland says that the directors
attach with the Governor-General the utmost importance to the complete main-
tenance of the British superiority in Sind and the navigation of the Indus not
only during the occupation of Afghanistan but permanently.
From this to the acquisition of territory was but a step, and
when a treaty was ratified in July, 1841, with the only remaining
amir, the amir of Mirpur, binding him to certain payments, guaran-
teeing him in the possession of his territory and against foreign
aggressions, but placing his foreign relations under British control,
Sind may be said to have passed under British authority to a very
considerable extent.
The difficulties with the amirs continued for the rest of Lord
Auckland's term of office, and the Sind problem was one of the many
he left to the unfortunate Lord Ellenborough. But it does not seem
that Lord Ellenborough was unduly anxious to take possession of the
country in the first instance. On 27 April, 1842, in a minute written
at Allahabad, he speaks in the following cold and sensible strain :
It may be expedient with a view to the navigation of the Indus to cetain
1 Parliamentary Papers, ut supra, p. 278. : Aitchison, op. cit. VII, 371.
>


## p. 529 (#557) ############################################

POSITION IN SIND
529
our new relations with Sinde even after the cessation of military operations in
that quarter shall have rendered the continuance of those relations no longer
indispensable; but the more recent reports as to the river Indus and our im-
proved acquaintance with the populations on its banks, and the countries with
which it communicates, certainly lead to the conclusion that the hopes originally
entertained of extending our commerce were to a great degree exaggerated. . . .
It is now 77 years since the first acquisition was made of the Dewannee. During
a large portion of the period which has since elapsed, we have been extending
our dominions, but we have not equally increased our revenue while we in-
creased our charges. The acquisitions which have been made may, some of
them, have been necessary in order to secure what we already possessed, some of
them may have more than repaid in revenue the cost of governing and protect-
ing them. The consequence of extended dominion has necessarily been a more
extensive employment of British-born subjects in military and civil capacities,
but the general revenue of the State has not been improved, and the govern-
ment has diminished means of improving the condition of the people. 1
Still, as the government made no secret of its intention to hold
Karachi, Bukkur and Sukkur at least, it is not surprising that Outram
discovered ample evidence that the amirs were intriguing with the
enemies of Great Britain, and there was little doubt that they were
ready to take advantage of any opportunity that might arise. In a
letter of 14 May, 1842, to the commander-in-chief, Lord Ellenborough
said :
I see everywhere the effect of the reverse sustained at Cabul. The late
successes of which I have made the most may have checked the feeling that
was growing up that we had no longer our former power, but within the last
few weeks there have been strong indications that we were no longer consi-
dered to be what we were. Major Outram has observed a commencing change
in the Ameers of Sinde. .