" Now mammon
signifies
riches.
Summa Theologica
Now there are many needs
of human life other than those mentioned above, for instance, a blind
man needs a leader, a lame man needs someone to lean on, a poor man
needs riches. Therefore these almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated.
Objection 3: Further, almsgiving is a work of mercy. But the reproof of
the wrong-doer savors, apparently, of severity rather than of mercy.
Therefore it ought not to be reckoned among the spiritual almsdeeds.
Objection 4: Further, almsgiving is intended for the supply of a
defect. But no man is without the defect of ignorance in some matter or
other. Therefore, apparently, each one ought to instruct anyone who is
ignorant of what he knows himself.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Nom. in Evang. ix): "Let him that hath
understanding beware lest he withhold his knowledge; let him that hath
abundance of wealth, watch lest he slacken his merciful bounty; let him
who is a servant to art be most solicitous to share his skill and
profit with his neighbor; let him who has an opportunity of speaking
with the wealthy, fear lest he be condemned for retaining his talent,
if when he has the chance he plead not with him the cause of the poor. "
Therefore the aforesaid almsdeeds are suitably enumerated in respect of
those things whereof men have abundance or insufficiency.
I answer that, The aforesaid distinction of almsdeeds is suitably taken
from the various needs of our neighbor: some of which affect the soul,
and are relieved by spiritual almsdeeds, while others affect the body,
and are relieved by corporal almsdeeds. For corporal need occurs either
during this life or afterwards. If it occurs during this life, it is
either a common need in respect of things needed by all, or it is a
special need occurring through some accident supervening. In the first
case, the need is either internal or external. Internal need is
twofold: one which is relieved by solid food, viz. hunger, in respect
of which we have "to feed the hungry"; while the other is relieved by
liquid food, viz. thirst, and in respect of this we have "to give drink
to the thirsty. " The common need with regard to external help is
twofold; one in respect of clothing, and as to this we have "to clothe
the naked": while the other is in respect of a dwelling place, and as
to this we have "to harbor the harborless. " Again if the need be
special, it is either the result of an internal cause, like sickness,
and then we have "to visit the sick," or it results from an external
cause, and then we have "to ransom the captive. " After this life we
give "burial to the dead. "
In like manner spiritual needs are relieved by spiritual acts in two
ways, first by asking for help from God, and in this respect we have
"prayer," whereby one man prays for others; secondly, by giving human
assistance, and this in three ways. First, in order to relieve a
deficiency on the part of the intellect, and if this deficiency be in
the speculative intellect, the remedy is applied by "instructing," and
if in the practical intellect, the remedy is applied by "counselling. "
Secondly, there may be a deficiency on the part of the appetitive
power, especially by way of sorrow, which is remedied by "comforting. "
Thirdly, the deficiency may be due to an inordinate act; and this may
be the subject of a threefold consideration. First, in respect of the
sinner, inasmuch as the sin proceeds from his inordinate will, and thus
the remedy takes the form of "reproof. " Secondly, in respect of the
person sinned against; and if the sin be committed against ourselves,
we apply the remedy by "pardoning the injury," while, if it be
committed against God or our neighbor, it is not in our power to
pardon, as Jerome observes (Super Matth. xviii, 15). Thirdly, in
respect of the result of the inordinate act, on account of which the
sinner is an annoyance to those who live with him, even beside his
intention; in which case the remedy is applied by "bearing with him,"
especially with regard to those who sin out of weakness, according to
Rom. 15:1: "We that are stronger, ought to bear the infirmities of the
weak," and not only as regards their being infirm and consequently
troublesome on account of their unruly actions, but also by bearing any
other burdens of theirs with them, according to Gal. 6:2: "Bear ye one
another's burdens. "
Reply to Objection 1: Burial does not profit a dead man as though his
body could be capable of perception after death. In this sense Our Lord
said that those who kill the body "have no more that they can do"; and
for this reason He did not mention the burial of the dead with the
other works of mercy, but those only which are more clearly necessary.
Nevertheless it does concern the deceased what is done with his body:
both that he may live in the memory of man whose respect he forfeits if
he remain without burial, and as regards a man's fondness for his own
body while he was yet living, a fondness which kindly persons should
imitate after his death. It is thus that some are praised for burying
the dead, as Tobias, and those who buried Our Lord; as Augustine says
(De Cura pro Mort. iii).
Reply to Objection 2: All other needs are reduced to these, for
blindness and lameness are kinds of sickness, so that to lead the
blind, and to support the lame, come to the same as visiting the sick.
In like manner to assist a man against any distress that is due to an
extrinsic cause comes to the same as the ransom of captives. And the
wealth with which we relieve the poor is sought merely for the purpose
of relieving the aforesaid needs: hence there was no reason for special
mention of this particular need.
Reply to Objection 3: The reproof of the sinner, as to the exercise of
the act of reproving, seems to imply the severity of justice, but, as
to the intention of the reprover, who wishes to free a man from the
evil of sin, it is an act of mercy and lovingkindness, according to
Prov. 27:6: "Better are the wounds of a friend, than the deceitful
kisses of an enemy. "
Reply to Objection 4: Nescience is not always a defect, but only when
it is about what one ought to know, and it is a part of almsgiving to
supply this defect by instruction. In doing this however we should
observe the due circumstances of persons, place and time, even as in
other virtuous acts.
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Whether corporal alms are of more account than spiritual alms?
Objection 1: It would seem that corporal alms are of more account than
spiritual alms. For it is more praiseworthy to give an alms to one who
is in greater want, since an almsdeed is to be praised because it
relieves one who is in need. Now the body which is relieved by corporal
alms, is by nature more needy than the spirit which is relieved by
spiritual alms. Therefore corporal alms are of more account.
Objection 2: Further, an alms is less praiseworthy and meritorious if
the kindness is compensated, wherefore Our Lord says (Lk. 14:12): "When
thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy neighbors who are rich,
lest perhaps they also invite thee again. Now there is always
compensation in spiritual almsdeeds, since he who prays for another,
profits thereby, according to Ps. 34:13: "My prayer shall be turned
into my bosom: and he who teaches another, makes progress in knowledge,
which cannot be said of corporal almsdeeds. Therefore corporal
almsdeeds are of more account than spiritual almsdeeds.
Objection 3: Further, an alms is to be commended if the needy one is
comforted by it: wherefore it is written (Job 31:20): "If his sides
have not blessed me," and the Apostle says to Philemon (verse 7): "The
bowels of the saints have been refreshed by thee, brother. " Now a
corporal alms is sometimes more welcome to a needy man than a spiritual
alms. Therefore bodily almsdeeds are of more account than spiritual
almsdeeds.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 20) on the
words, "Give to him that asketh of thee" (Mat. 5:42): "You should give
so as to injure neither yourself nor another, and when you refuse what
another asks you must not lose sight of the claims of justice, and send
him away empty; at times indeed you will give what is better than what
is asked for, if you reprove him that asks unjustly. " Now reproof is a
spiritual alms. Therefore spiritual almsdeeds are preferable to
corporal almsdeeds.
I answer that, There are two ways of comparing these almsdeeds. First,
simply; and in this respect, spiritual almsdeeds hold the first place,
for three reasons. First, because the offering is more excellent, since
it is a spiritual gift, which surpasses a corporal gift, according to
Prov. 4:2: "I will give you a good gift, forsake not My Law. " Secondly,
on account of the object succored, because the spirit is more excellent
than the body, wherefore, even as a man in looking after himself, ought
to look to his soul more than to his body, so ought he in looking after
his neighbor, whom he ought to love as himself. Thirdly, as regards the
acts themselves by which our neighbor is succored, because spiritual
acts are more excellent than corporal acts, which are, in a fashion,
servile.
Secondly, we may compare them with regard to some particular case, when
some corporal alms excels some spiritual alms: for instance, a man in
hunger is to be fed rather than instructed, and as the Philosopher
observes (Topic. iii, 2), for a needy man "money is better than
philosophy," although the latter is better simply.
Reply to Objection 1: It is better to give to one who is in greater
want, other things being equal, but if he who is less needy is better,
and is in want of better things, it is better to give to him: and it is
thus in the case in point.
Reply to Objection 2: Compensation does not detract from merit and
praise if it be not intended, even as human glory, if not intended,
does not detract from virtue. Thus Sallust says of Cato (Catilin. ),
that "the less he sought fame, the more he became famous": and thus it
is with spiritual almsdeeds.
Nevertheless the intention of gaining spiritual goods does not detract
from merit, as the intention of gaining corporal goods.
Reply to Objection 3: The merit of an almsgiver depends on that in
which the will of the recipient rests reasonably, and not on that in
which it rests when it is inordinate.
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Whether corporal almsdeeds have a spiritual effect?
Objection 1: It would seem that corporal almsdeeds have not a spiritual
effect. For no effect exceeds its cause. But spiritual goods exceed
corporal goods. Therefore corporal almsdeeds have no spiritual effect.
Objection 2: Further, the sin of simony consists in giving the corporal
for the spiritual, and it is to be utterly avoided. Therefore one ought
not to give alms in order to receive a spiritual effect.
Objection 3: Further, to multiply the cause is to multiply the effect.
If therefore corporal almsdeeds cause a spiritual effect, the greater
the alms, the greater the spiritual profit, which is contrary to what
we read (Lk. 21:3) of the widow who cast two brass mites into the
treasury, and in Our Lord's own words "cast in more than . . . all. "
Therefore bodily almsdeeds have no spiritual effect.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:18): "The alms of a man . .
. shall preserve the grace of a man as the apple of the eye. "
I answer that, Corporal almsdeeds may be considered in three ways.
First, with regard to their substance, and in this way they have merely
a corporal effect, inasmuch as they supply our neighbor's corporal
needs. Secondly, they may be considered with regard to their cause, in
so far as a man gives a corporal alms out of love for God and his
neighbor, and in this respect they bring forth a spiritual fruit,
according to Ecclus. 29:13, 14: "Lose thy money for thy brother . . .
place thy treasure in the commandments of the Most High, and it shall
bring thee more profit than gold. "
Thirdly, with regard to the effect, and in this way again, they have a
spiritual fruit, inasmuch as our neighbor, who is succored by a
corporal alms, is moved to pray for his benefactor; wherefore the above
text goes on (Ecclus. 29:15): "Shut up alms in the heart of the poor,
and it shall obtain help for thee from all evil. "
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers corporal almsdeeds as to
their substance.
Reply to Objection 2: He who gives an alms does rot intend to buy a
spiritual thing with a corporal thing, for he knows that spiritual
things infinitely surpass corporal things, but he intends to merit a
spiritual fruit through the love of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: The widow who gave less in quantity, gave more in
proportion; and thus we gather that the fervor of her charity, whence
corporal almsdeeds derive their spiritual efficacy, was greater.
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Whether almsgiving is a matter of precept?
Objection 1: It would seem that almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
For the counsels are distinct from the precepts. Now almsgiving is a
matter of counsel, according to Dan. 4:24: "Let my counsel be
acceptable to the King; [Vulg. : 'to thee, and'] redeem thou thy sins
with alms. " Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
Objection 2: Further, it is lawful for everyone to use and to keep what
is his own. Yet by keeping it he will not give alms. Therefore it is
lawful not to give alms: and consequently almsgiving is not a matter of
precept.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is a matter of precept binds the
transgressor at some time or other under pain of mortal sin, because
positive precepts are binding for some fixed time. Therefore, if
almsgiving were a matter of precept, it would be possible to point to
some fixed time when a man would commit a mortal sin unless he gave an
alms. But it does not appear how this can be so, because it can always
be deemed probable that the person in need can be relieved in some
other way, and that what we would spend in almsgiving might be needful
to ourselves either now or in some future time. Therefore it seems that
almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
Objection 4: Further, every commandment is reducible to the precepts of
the Decalogue. But these precepts contain no reference to almsgiving.
Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
On the contrary, No man is punished eternally for omitting to do what
is not a matter of precept. But some are punished eternally for
omitting to give alms, as is clear from Mat. 25:41-43. Therefore
almsgiving is a matter of precept.
I answer that, As love of our neighbor is a matter of precept, whatever
is a necessary condition to the love of our neighbor is a matter of
precept also. Now the love of our neighbor requires that not only
should we be our neighbor's well-wishers, but also his well-doers,
according to 1 Jn. 3:18: "Let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but
in deed, and in truth. " And in order to be a person's well-wisher and
well-doer, we ought to succor his needs: this is done by almsgiving.
Therefore almsgiving is a matter of precept.
Since, however, precepts are about acts of virtue, it follows that all
almsgiving must be a matter of precept, in so far as it is necessary to
virtue, namely, in so far as it is demanded by right reason. Now right
reason demands that we should take into consideration something on the
part of the giver, and something on the part of the recipient. On the
part of the giver, it must be noted that he should give of his surplus,
according to Lk. 11:41: "That which remaineth, give alms. " This surplus
is to be taken in reference not only to himself, so as to denote what
is unnecessary to the individual, but also in reference to those of
whom he has charge (in which case we have the expression "necessary to
the person" [*The official necessities of a person in position] taking
the word "person" as expressive of dignity). Because each one must
first of all look after himself and then after those over whom he has
charge, and afterwards with what remains relieve the needs of others.
Thus nature first, by its nutritive power, takes what it requires for
the upkeep of one's own body, and afterwards yields the residue for the
formation of another by the power of generation.
On the part of the recipient it is requisite that he should be in need,
else there would be no reason for giving him alms: yet since it is not
possible for one individual to relieve the needs of all, we are not
bound to relieve all who are in need, but only those who could not be
succored if we not did succor them. For in such cases the words of
Ambrose apply, "Feed him that dies of hunger: if thou hast not fed him,
thou hast slain him" [*Cf. Canon Pasce, dist. lxxxvi, whence the words,
as quoted, are taken]. Accordingly we are bound to give alms of our
surplus, as also to give alms to one whose need is extreme: otherwise
almsgiving, like any other greater good, is a matter of counsel.
Reply to Objection 1: Daniel spoke to a king who was not subject to
God's Law, wherefore such things as were prescribed by the Law which he
did not profess, had to be counselled to him. Or he may have been
speaking in reference to a case in which almsgiving was not a matter of
precept.
Reply to Objection 2: The temporal goods which God grants us, are ours
as to the ownership, but as to the use of them, they belong not to us
alone but also to such others as we are able to succor out of what we
have over and above our needs. Hence Basil says [*Hom. super Luc. xii,
18]: "If you acknowledge them," viz. your temporal goods, "as coming
from God, is He unjust because He apportions them unequally? Why are
you rich while another is poor, unless it be that you may have the
merit of a good stewardship, and he the reward of patience? It is the
hungry man's bread that you withhold, the naked man's cloak that you
have stored away, the shoe of the barefoot that you have left to rot,
the money of the needy that you have buried underground: and so you
injure as many as you might help. " Ambrose expresses himself in the
same way.
Reply to Objection 3: There is a time when we sin mortally if we omit
to give alms; on the part of the recipient when we see that his need is
evident and urgent, and that he is not likely to be succored
otherwise---on the part of the giver, when he has superfluous goods,
which he does not need for the time being, as far as he can judge with
probability. Nor need he consider every case that may possibly occur in
the future, for this would be to think about the morrow, which Our Lord
forbade us to do (Mat. 6:34), but he should judge what is superfluous
and what necessary, according as things probably and generally occur.
Reply to Objection 4: All succor given to our neighbor is reduced to
the precept about honoring our parents. For thus does the Apostle
interpret it (1 Tim. 4:8) where he says: "Dutifulness* [Douay:
'Godliness'] is profitable to all things, having promise of the life
that now is, and of that which is to come," and he says this because
the precept about honoring our parents contains the promise, "that thou
mayest be longlived upon the land" (Ex. 20:12): and dutifulness
comprises all kinds of almsgiving. [*"Pietas," whence our English word
"Piety. " Cf. also inf. [2607] Q[101], A[2]. ]
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Whether one ought to give alms out of what one needs?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to give alms out of what
one needs. For the order of charity should be observed not only as
regards the effect of our benefactions but also as regards our interior
affections. Now it is a sin to contravene the order of charity, because
this order is a matter of precept. Since, then, the order of charity
requires that a man should love himself more than his neighbor, it
seems that he would sin if he deprived himself of what he needed, in
order to succor his neighbor.
Objection 2: Further, whoever gives away what he needs himself,
squanders his own substance, and that is to be a prodigal, according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). But no sinful deed should be done.
Therefore we should not give alms out of what we need.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:8): "If any man have
not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath
denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel. " Now if a man gives of
what he needs for himself or for his charge, he seems to detract from
the care he should have for himself or his charge. Therefore it seems
that whoever gives alms from what he needs, sins gravely.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 19:21): "If thou wilt be perfect,
go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor. " Now he that gives all
he has to the poor, gives not only what he needs not, but also what he
needs. Therefore a man may give alms out of what he needs.
I answer that, A thing is necessary in two ways: first, because without
it something is impossible, and it is altogether wrong to give alms out
of what is necessary to us in this sense; for instance, if a man found
himself in the presence of a case of urgency, and had merely sufficient
to support himself and his children, or others under his charge, he
would be throwing away his life and that of others if he were to give
away in alms, what was then necessary to him. Yet I say this without
prejudice to such a case as might happen, supposing that by depriving
himself of necessaries a man might help a great personage, and a
support of the Church or State, since it would be a praiseworthy act to
endanger one's life and the lives of those who are under our charge for
the delivery of such a person, since the common good is to be preferred
to one's own.
Secondly, a thing is said to be necessary, if a man cannot without it
live in keeping with his social station, as regards either himself or
those of whom he has charge. The "necessary" considered thus is not an
invariable quantity, for one might add much more to a man's property,
and yet not go beyond what he needs in this way, or one might take much
from him, and he would still have sufficient for the decencies of life
in keeping with his own position. Accordingly it is good to give alms
of this kind of "necessary"; and it is a matter not of precept but of
counsel. Yet it would be inordinate to deprive oneself of one's own, in
order to give to others to such an extent that the residue would be
insufficient for one to live in keeping with one's station and the
ordinary occurrences of life: for no man ought to live unbecomingly.
There are, however, three exceptions to the above rule. The first is
when a man changes his state of life, for instance, by entering
religion, for then he gives away all his possessions for Christ's sake,
and does the deed of perfection by transferring himself to another
state. Secondly, when that which he deprives himself of, though it be
required for the decencies of life, can nevertheless easily be
recovered, so that he does not suffer extreme inconvenience. Thirdly,
when he is in presence of extreme indigence in an individual, or great
need on the part of the common weal. For in such cases it would seem
praiseworthy to forego the requirements of one's station, in order to
provide for a greater need.
The objections may be easily solved from what has been said.
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Whether one may give alms out of ill-gotten goods?
Objection 1: It would seem that one may give alms out of ill-gotten
goods. For it is written (Lk. 16:9): "Make unto you friends of the
mammon of iniquity.
" Now mammon signifies riches. Therefore it is
lawful to make unto oneself spiritual friends by giving alms out of
ill-gotten riches.
Objection 2: Further, all filthy lucre seems to be ill-gotten. But the
profits from whoredom are filthy lucre; wherefore it was forbidden (Dt.
23:18) to offer therefrom sacrifices or oblations to God: "Thou shalt
not offer the hire of a strumpet . . . in the house of . . . thy God. "
In like manner gains from games of chance are ill-gotten, for, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1), "we take such like gains from our
friends to whom we ought rather to give. " And most of all are the
profits from simony ill-gotten, since thereby the Holy Ghost is
wronged. Nevertheless out of such gains it is lawful to give alms.
Therefore one may give alms out of ill-gotten goods.
Objection 3: Further, greater evils should be avoided more than lesser
evils. Now it is less sinful to keep back another's property than to
commit murder, of which a man is guilty if he fails to succor one who
is in extreme need, as appears from the words of Ambrose who says (Cf.
Canon Pasce dist. lxxxvi, whence the words, as quoted, are taken):
"Feed him that dies of hunger, if thou hast not fed him, thou hast
slain him". Therefore, in certain cases, it is lawful to give alms of
ill-gotten goods.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 2): "Give alms
from your just labors. For you will not bribe Christ your judge, not to
hear you with the poor whom you rob . . . Give not alms from interest
and usury: I speak to the faithful to whom we dispense the Body of
Christ. "
I answer that, A thing may be ill-gotten in three ways. In the first
place a thing is ill-gotten if it be due to the person from whom it is
gotten, and may not be kept by the person who has obtained possession
of it; as in the case of rapine, theft and usury, and of such things a
man may not give alms since he is bound to restore them.
Secondly, a thing is ill-gotten, when he that has it may not keep it,
and yet he may not return it to the person from whom he received it,
because he received it unjustly, while the latter gave it unjustly.
This happens in simony, wherein both giver and receiver contravene the
justice of the Divine Law, so that restitution is to be made not to the
giver, but by giving alms. The same applies to all similar cases of
illegal giving and receiving.
Thirdly, a thing is ill-gotten, not because the taking was unlawful,
but because it is the outcome of something unlawful, as in the case of
a woman's profits from whoredom. This is filthy lucre properly so
called, because the practice of whoredom is filthy and against the Law
of God, yet the woman does not act unjustly or unlawfully in taking the
money. Consequently it is lawful to keep and to give in alms what is
thus acquired by an unlawful action.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. 2), "Some have
misunderstood this saying of Our Lord, so as to take another's property
and give thereof to the poor, thinking that they are fulfilling the
commandment by so doing. This interpretation must be amended. Yet all
riches are called riches of iniquity, as stated in De Quaest. Ev. ii,
34, because "riches are not unjust save for those who are themselves
unjust, and put all their trust in them. Or, according to Ambrose in
his commentary on Lk. 16:9, "Make unto yourselves friends," etc. , "He
calls mammon unjust, because it draws our affections by the various
allurements of wealth. " Or, because "among the many ancestors whose
property you inherit, there is one who took the property of others
unjustly, although you know nothing about it," as Basil says in a
homily (Hom. super Luc. A, 5). Or, all riches are styled riches "of
iniquity," i. e. , of "inequality," because they are not distributed
equally among all, one being in need, and another in affluence.
Reply to Objection 2: We have already explained how alms may be given
out of the profits of whoredom. Yet sacrifices and oblations were not
made therefrom at the altar, both on account of the scandal, and
through reverence for sacred things. It is also lawful to give alms out
of the profits of simony, because they are not due to him who paid,
indeed he deserves to lose them. But as to the profits from games of
chance, there would seem to be something unlawful as being contrary to
the Divine Law, when a man wins from one who cannot alienate his
property, such as minors, lunatics and so forth, or when a man, with
the desire of making money out of another man, entices him to play, and
wins from him by cheating. In these cases he is bound to restitution,
and consequently cannot give away his gains in alms. Then again there
would seem to be something unlawful as being against the positive civil
law, which altogether forbids any such profits. Since, however, a civil
law does not bind all, but only those who are subject to that law, and
moreover may be abrogated through desuetude, it follows that all such
as are bound by these laws are bound to make restitution of such gains,
unless perchance the contrary custom prevail, or unless a man win from
one who enticed him to play, in which case he is not bound to
restitution, because the loser does not deserve to be paid back: and
yet he cannot lawfully keep what he has won, so long as that positive
law is in force, wherefore in this case he ought to give it away in
alms.
Reply to Objection 3: All things are common property in a case of
extreme necessity. Hence one who is in such dire straits may take
another's goods in order to succor himself, if he can find no one who
is willing to give him something. For the same reason a man may retain
what belongs to another, and give alms thereof; or even take something
if there be no other way of succoring the one who is in need. If
however this be possible without danger, he must ask the owner's
consent, and then succor the poor man who is in extreme necessity.
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Whether one who is under another's power can give alms?
Objection 1: It would seem that one who is under another's power can
give alms. For religious are under the power of their prelates to whom
they have vowed obedience. Now if it were unlawful for them to give
alms, they would lose by entering the state of religion, for as Ambrose
[*The quotation is from the works of Ambrosiaster. Cf. Index to
ecclesiastical authorities quoted by St. Thomas] says on 1 Tim. 4:8:
"'Dutifulness [Douay: 'godliness'] is profitable to all things': The
sum total of the Christian religion consists in doing one's duty by
all," and the most creditable way of doing this is to give alms.
Therefore those who are in another's power can give alms.
Objection 2: Further, a wife is under her husband's power (Gn. 3:16).
But a wife can give alms since she is her husband's partner; hence it
is related of the Blessed Lucy that she gave alms without the knowledge
of her betrothed [*"Sponsus" The matrimonial institutions of the Romans
were so entirely different from ours that "sponsus" is no longer
accurately rendered either "husband" or "betrothed. "] Therefore a
person is not prevented from giving alms, by being under another's
power.
Objection 3: Further, the subjection of children to their parents is
founded on nature, wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. 6:1): "Children,
obey your parents in the Lord. " But, apparently, children may give alms
out of their parents' property. For it is their own, since they are the
heirs; wherefore, since they can employ it for some bodily use, it
seems that much more can they use it in giving alms so as to profit
their souls. Therefore those who are under another's power can give
alms.
Objection 4: Further, servants are under their master's power,
according to Titus 2:9: "Exhort servants to be obedient to their
masters. " Now they may lawfully do anything that will profit their
masters: and this would be especially the case if they gave alms for
them. Therefore those who are under another's power can give alms.
On the contrary, Alms should not be given out of another's property;
and each one should give alms out of the just profit of his own labor
as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 2). Now if those who are subject
to anyone were to give alms, this would be out of another's property.
Therefore those who are under another's power cannot give alms.
I answer that, Anyone who is under another's power must, as such, be
ruled in accordance with the power of his superior: for the natural
order demands that the inferior should be ruled according to its
superior. Therefore in those matters in which the inferior is subject
to his superior, his ministrations must be subject to the superior's
permission.
Accordingly he that is under another's power must not give alms of
anything in respect of which he is subject to that other, except in so
far as he has been commissioned by his superior. But if he has
something in respect of which he is not under the power of his
superior, he is no longer subject to another in its regard, being
independent in respect of that particular thing, and he can give alms
therefrom.
Reply to Objection 1: If a monk be dispensed through being commissioned
by his superior, he can give alms from the property of his monaster, in
accordance with the terms of his commission; but if he has no such
dispensation, since he has nothing of his own, he cannot give alms
without his abbot's permission either express or presumed for some
probable reason: except in a case of extreme necessity, when it would
be lawful for him to commit a theft in order to give an alms. Nor does
it follow that he is worse off than before, because, as stated in De
Eccles. Dogm. lxxi, "it is a good thing to give one's property to the
poor little by little, but it is better still to give all at once in
order to follow Christ, and being freed from care, to be needy with
Christ. "
Reply to Objection 2: A wife, who has other property besides her dowry
which is for the support of the burdens of marriage, whether that
property be gained by her own industry or by any other lawful means,
can give alms, out of that property, without asking her husband's
permission: yet such alms should be moderate, lest through giving too
much she impoverish her husband. Otherwise she ought not to give alms
without the express or presumed consent of her husband, except in cases
of necessity as stated, in the case of a monk, in the preceding Reply.
For though the wife be her husband's equal in the marriage act, yet in
matters of housekeeping, the head of the woman is the man, as the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:3). As regards Blessed Lucy, she had a
betrothed, not a husband, wherefore she could give alms with her
mother's consent.
Reply to Objection 3: What belongs to the children belongs also to the
father: wherefore the child cannot give alms, except in such small
quantity that one may presume the father to be willing: unless,
perchance, the father authorize his child to dispose of any particular
property. The same applies to servants. Hence the Reply to the Fourth
Objection is clear.
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Whether one ought to give alms to those rather who are more closely united
to us?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to give alms to those
rather who are more closely united to us. For it is written (Ecclus.
12:4, 6): "Give to the merciful and uphold not the sinner . . . Do good
to the humble and give not to the ungodly. " Now it happens sometimes
that those who are closely united to us are sinful and ungodly.
Therefore we ought not to give alms to them in preference to others.
Objection 2: Further, alms should be given that we may receive an
eternal reward in return, according to Mat. 6:18: "And thy Father Who
seeth in secret, will repay thee. " Now the eternal reward is gained
chiefly by the alms which are given to the saints, according to Lk.
16:9: "Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity, that when you
shall fail, they may receive you into everlasting dwellings, which
passage Augustine expounds (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 1): "Who shall have
everlasting dwellings unless the saints of God? And who are they that
shall be received by them into their dwellings, if not those who succor
them in their needs? Therefore alms should be given to the more holy
persons rather than to those who are more closely united to us.
Objection 3: Further, man is more closely united to himself. But a man
cannot give himself an alms. Therefore it seems that we are not bound
to give alms to those who are most closely united to us.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:8): "If any man have not
care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied
the faith, and is worse than an infidel. "
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28), "it falls
to us by lot, as it were, to have to look to the welfare of those who
are more closely united to us. " Nevertheless in this matter we must
employ discretion, according to the various degrees of connection,
holiness and utility. For we ought to give alms to one who is much
holier and in greater want, and to one who is more useful to the common
weal, rather than to one who is more closely united to us, especially
if the latter be not very closely united, and has no special claim on
our care then and there, and who is not in very urgent need.
Reply to Objection 1: We ought not to help a sinner as such, that is by
encouraging him to sin, but as man, that is by supporting his nature.
Reply to Objection 2: Almsdeeds deserve on two counts to receive an
eternal reward. First because they are rooted in charity, and in this
respect an almsdeed is meritorious in so far as it observes the order
of charity, which requires that, other things being equal, we should,
in preference, help those who are more closely connected with us.
Wherefore Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): "It is with commendable
liberality that you forget not your kindred, if you know them to be in
need, for it is better that you should yourself help your own family,
who would be ashamed to beg help from others. " Secondly, almsdeeds
deserve to be rewarded eternally, through the merit of the recipient,
who prays for the giver, and it is in this sense that Augustine is
speaking.
Reply to Objection 3: Since almsdeeds are works of mercy, just as a man
does not, properly speaking, pity himself, but only by a kind of
comparison, as stated above ([2608]Q[30], AA[1],2), so too, properly
speaking, no man gives himself an alms, unless he act in another's
person; thus when a man is appointed to distribute alms, he can take
something for himself, if he be in want, on the same ground as when he
gives to others.
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Whether alms should be given in abundance?
Objection 1: It would seem that alms should not be given in abundance.
For we ought to give alms to those chiefly who are most closely
connected with us. But we ought not to give to them in such a way that
they are likely to become richer thereby, as Ambrose says (De Officiis
i, 30). Therefore neither should we give abundantly to others.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): "We should not
lavish our wealth on others all at once, we should dole it out by
degrees. " But to give abundantly is to give lavishly. Therefore alms
should not be given in abundance.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 8:13): "Not that others
should be eased," i. e. should live on you without working themselves,
"and you burthened," i. e. impoverished. But this would be the result if
alms were given in abundance. Therefore we ought not to give alms
abundantly.
On the contrary, It is written (Tob. 4:93): "If thou have much, give
abundantly. "
I answer that, Alms may be considered abundant in relation either to
the giver, or to the recipient: in relation to the giver, when that
which a man gives is great as compared with his means. To give thus is
praiseworthy, wherefore Our Lord (Lk. 21:3,4) commended the widow
because "of her want, she cast in all the living that she had. "
Nevertheless those conditions must be observed which were laid down
when we spoke of giving alms out of one's necessary goods [2609](A[9]).
On the part of the recipient, an alms may be abundant in two ways;
first, by relieving his need sufficiently, and in this sense it is
praiseworthy to give alms: secondly, by relieving his need more than
sufficiently; this is not praiseworthy, and it would be better to give
to several that are in need, wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:3):
"If I should distribute . . . to feed the poor," on which words a gloss
comments: "Thus we are warned to be careful in giving alms, and to
give, not to one only, but to many, that we may profit many. "
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers abundance of alms as
exceeding the needs of the recipient.
Reply to Objection 2: The passage quoted considers abundance of alms on
the part of the giver; but the sense is that God does not wish a man to
lavish all his wealth at once, except when he changes his state of
life, wherefore he goes on to say: "Except we imitate Eliseus who slew
his oxen and fed the poor with what he had, so that no household cares
might keep him back" (3 Kings 19:21).
Reply to Objection 3: In the passage quoted the words, "not that others
should be eased or refreshed," refer to that abundance of alms which
surpasses the need of the recipient, to whom one should give alms not
that he may have an easy life, but that he may have relief.
Nevertheless we must bring discretion to bear on the matter, on account
of the various conditions of men, some of whom are more daintily
nurtured, and need finer food and clothing. Hence Ambrose says (De
Officiis i, 30): "When you give an alms to a man, you should take into
consideration his age and his weakness; and sometimes the shame which
proclaims his good birth; and again that perhaps he has fallen from
riches to indigence through no fault of his own. "
With regard to the words that follow, "and you burdened," they refer to
abundance on the part of the giver. Yet, as a gloss says on the same
passage, "he says this, not because it would be better to give in
abundance, but because he fears for the weak, and he admonishes them so
to give that they lack not for themselves. "
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OF FRATERNAL CORRECTION (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider Fraternal Correction, under which head there are
eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fraternal correction is an act of charity?
(2) Whether it is a matter of precept?
(3) Whether this precept binds all, or only superiors?
(4) Whether this precept binds the subject to correct his superior?
(5) Whether a sinner may correct anyone?
(6) Whether one ought to correct a person who becomes worse through
being corrected?
(7) Whether secret correction should precede denouncement?
(8) Whether witnesses should be called before denouncement?
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Whether fraternal correction is an act of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction is not an act of
charity. For a gloss on Mat. 18:15, "If thy brother shall offend
against thee," says that "a man should reprove his brother out of zeal
for justice. " But justice is a distinct virtue from charity. Therefore
fraternal correction is an act, not of charity, but of justice.
Objection 2: Further, fraternal correction is given by secret
admonition. Now admonition is a kind of counsel, which is an act of
prudence, for a prudent man is one who is of good counsel (Ethic. vi,
5). Therefore fraternal correction is an act, not of charity, but of
prudence.
Objection 3: Further, contrary acts do not belong to the same virtue.
Now it is an act of charity to bear with a sinner, according to Gal.
6:2: "Bear ye one another's burdens, and so you shall fulfil the law of
Christ," which is the law of charity. Therefore it seems that the
correction of a sinning brother, which is contrary to bearing with him,
is not an act of charity.
On the contrary, To correct the wrongdoer is a spiritual almsdeed. But
almsdeeds are works of charity, as stated above ([2610]Q[32], A[1]).
Therefore fraternal correction is an act of charity.
I answer that, The correction of the wrongdoer is a remedy which should
be employed against a man's sin. Now a man's sin may be considered in
two ways, first as being harmful to the sinner, secondly as conducing
to the harm of others, by hurting or scandalizing them, or by being
detrimental to the common good, the justice of which is disturbed by
that man's sin.
Consequently the correction of a wrongdoer is twofold, one which
applies a remedy to the sin considered as an evil of the sinner
himself. This is fraternal correction properly so called, which is
directed to the amendment of the sinner.
of human life other than those mentioned above, for instance, a blind
man needs a leader, a lame man needs someone to lean on, a poor man
needs riches. Therefore these almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated.
Objection 3: Further, almsgiving is a work of mercy. But the reproof of
the wrong-doer savors, apparently, of severity rather than of mercy.
Therefore it ought not to be reckoned among the spiritual almsdeeds.
Objection 4: Further, almsgiving is intended for the supply of a
defect. But no man is without the defect of ignorance in some matter or
other. Therefore, apparently, each one ought to instruct anyone who is
ignorant of what he knows himself.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Nom. in Evang. ix): "Let him that hath
understanding beware lest he withhold his knowledge; let him that hath
abundance of wealth, watch lest he slacken his merciful bounty; let him
who is a servant to art be most solicitous to share his skill and
profit with his neighbor; let him who has an opportunity of speaking
with the wealthy, fear lest he be condemned for retaining his talent,
if when he has the chance he plead not with him the cause of the poor. "
Therefore the aforesaid almsdeeds are suitably enumerated in respect of
those things whereof men have abundance or insufficiency.
I answer that, The aforesaid distinction of almsdeeds is suitably taken
from the various needs of our neighbor: some of which affect the soul,
and are relieved by spiritual almsdeeds, while others affect the body,
and are relieved by corporal almsdeeds. For corporal need occurs either
during this life or afterwards. If it occurs during this life, it is
either a common need in respect of things needed by all, or it is a
special need occurring through some accident supervening. In the first
case, the need is either internal or external. Internal need is
twofold: one which is relieved by solid food, viz. hunger, in respect
of which we have "to feed the hungry"; while the other is relieved by
liquid food, viz. thirst, and in respect of this we have "to give drink
to the thirsty. " The common need with regard to external help is
twofold; one in respect of clothing, and as to this we have "to clothe
the naked": while the other is in respect of a dwelling place, and as
to this we have "to harbor the harborless. " Again if the need be
special, it is either the result of an internal cause, like sickness,
and then we have "to visit the sick," or it results from an external
cause, and then we have "to ransom the captive. " After this life we
give "burial to the dead. "
In like manner spiritual needs are relieved by spiritual acts in two
ways, first by asking for help from God, and in this respect we have
"prayer," whereby one man prays for others; secondly, by giving human
assistance, and this in three ways. First, in order to relieve a
deficiency on the part of the intellect, and if this deficiency be in
the speculative intellect, the remedy is applied by "instructing," and
if in the practical intellect, the remedy is applied by "counselling. "
Secondly, there may be a deficiency on the part of the appetitive
power, especially by way of sorrow, which is remedied by "comforting. "
Thirdly, the deficiency may be due to an inordinate act; and this may
be the subject of a threefold consideration. First, in respect of the
sinner, inasmuch as the sin proceeds from his inordinate will, and thus
the remedy takes the form of "reproof. " Secondly, in respect of the
person sinned against; and if the sin be committed against ourselves,
we apply the remedy by "pardoning the injury," while, if it be
committed against God or our neighbor, it is not in our power to
pardon, as Jerome observes (Super Matth. xviii, 15). Thirdly, in
respect of the result of the inordinate act, on account of which the
sinner is an annoyance to those who live with him, even beside his
intention; in which case the remedy is applied by "bearing with him,"
especially with regard to those who sin out of weakness, according to
Rom. 15:1: "We that are stronger, ought to bear the infirmities of the
weak," and not only as regards their being infirm and consequently
troublesome on account of their unruly actions, but also by bearing any
other burdens of theirs with them, according to Gal. 6:2: "Bear ye one
another's burdens. "
Reply to Objection 1: Burial does not profit a dead man as though his
body could be capable of perception after death. In this sense Our Lord
said that those who kill the body "have no more that they can do"; and
for this reason He did not mention the burial of the dead with the
other works of mercy, but those only which are more clearly necessary.
Nevertheless it does concern the deceased what is done with his body:
both that he may live in the memory of man whose respect he forfeits if
he remain without burial, and as regards a man's fondness for his own
body while he was yet living, a fondness which kindly persons should
imitate after his death. It is thus that some are praised for burying
the dead, as Tobias, and those who buried Our Lord; as Augustine says
(De Cura pro Mort. iii).
Reply to Objection 2: All other needs are reduced to these, for
blindness and lameness are kinds of sickness, so that to lead the
blind, and to support the lame, come to the same as visiting the sick.
In like manner to assist a man against any distress that is due to an
extrinsic cause comes to the same as the ransom of captives. And the
wealth with which we relieve the poor is sought merely for the purpose
of relieving the aforesaid needs: hence there was no reason for special
mention of this particular need.
Reply to Objection 3: The reproof of the sinner, as to the exercise of
the act of reproving, seems to imply the severity of justice, but, as
to the intention of the reprover, who wishes to free a man from the
evil of sin, it is an act of mercy and lovingkindness, according to
Prov. 27:6: "Better are the wounds of a friend, than the deceitful
kisses of an enemy. "
Reply to Objection 4: Nescience is not always a defect, but only when
it is about what one ought to know, and it is a part of almsgiving to
supply this defect by instruction. In doing this however we should
observe the due circumstances of persons, place and time, even as in
other virtuous acts.
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Whether corporal alms are of more account than spiritual alms?
Objection 1: It would seem that corporal alms are of more account than
spiritual alms. For it is more praiseworthy to give an alms to one who
is in greater want, since an almsdeed is to be praised because it
relieves one who is in need. Now the body which is relieved by corporal
alms, is by nature more needy than the spirit which is relieved by
spiritual alms. Therefore corporal alms are of more account.
Objection 2: Further, an alms is less praiseworthy and meritorious if
the kindness is compensated, wherefore Our Lord says (Lk. 14:12): "When
thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy neighbors who are rich,
lest perhaps they also invite thee again. Now there is always
compensation in spiritual almsdeeds, since he who prays for another,
profits thereby, according to Ps. 34:13: "My prayer shall be turned
into my bosom: and he who teaches another, makes progress in knowledge,
which cannot be said of corporal almsdeeds. Therefore corporal
almsdeeds are of more account than spiritual almsdeeds.
Objection 3: Further, an alms is to be commended if the needy one is
comforted by it: wherefore it is written (Job 31:20): "If his sides
have not blessed me," and the Apostle says to Philemon (verse 7): "The
bowels of the saints have been refreshed by thee, brother. " Now a
corporal alms is sometimes more welcome to a needy man than a spiritual
alms. Therefore bodily almsdeeds are of more account than spiritual
almsdeeds.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 20) on the
words, "Give to him that asketh of thee" (Mat. 5:42): "You should give
so as to injure neither yourself nor another, and when you refuse what
another asks you must not lose sight of the claims of justice, and send
him away empty; at times indeed you will give what is better than what
is asked for, if you reprove him that asks unjustly. " Now reproof is a
spiritual alms. Therefore spiritual almsdeeds are preferable to
corporal almsdeeds.
I answer that, There are two ways of comparing these almsdeeds. First,
simply; and in this respect, spiritual almsdeeds hold the first place,
for three reasons. First, because the offering is more excellent, since
it is a spiritual gift, which surpasses a corporal gift, according to
Prov. 4:2: "I will give you a good gift, forsake not My Law. " Secondly,
on account of the object succored, because the spirit is more excellent
than the body, wherefore, even as a man in looking after himself, ought
to look to his soul more than to his body, so ought he in looking after
his neighbor, whom he ought to love as himself. Thirdly, as regards the
acts themselves by which our neighbor is succored, because spiritual
acts are more excellent than corporal acts, which are, in a fashion,
servile.
Secondly, we may compare them with regard to some particular case, when
some corporal alms excels some spiritual alms: for instance, a man in
hunger is to be fed rather than instructed, and as the Philosopher
observes (Topic. iii, 2), for a needy man "money is better than
philosophy," although the latter is better simply.
Reply to Objection 1: It is better to give to one who is in greater
want, other things being equal, but if he who is less needy is better,
and is in want of better things, it is better to give to him: and it is
thus in the case in point.
Reply to Objection 2: Compensation does not detract from merit and
praise if it be not intended, even as human glory, if not intended,
does not detract from virtue. Thus Sallust says of Cato (Catilin. ),
that "the less he sought fame, the more he became famous": and thus it
is with spiritual almsdeeds.
Nevertheless the intention of gaining spiritual goods does not detract
from merit, as the intention of gaining corporal goods.
Reply to Objection 3: The merit of an almsgiver depends on that in
which the will of the recipient rests reasonably, and not on that in
which it rests when it is inordinate.
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Whether corporal almsdeeds have a spiritual effect?
Objection 1: It would seem that corporal almsdeeds have not a spiritual
effect. For no effect exceeds its cause. But spiritual goods exceed
corporal goods. Therefore corporal almsdeeds have no spiritual effect.
Objection 2: Further, the sin of simony consists in giving the corporal
for the spiritual, and it is to be utterly avoided. Therefore one ought
not to give alms in order to receive a spiritual effect.
Objection 3: Further, to multiply the cause is to multiply the effect.
If therefore corporal almsdeeds cause a spiritual effect, the greater
the alms, the greater the spiritual profit, which is contrary to what
we read (Lk. 21:3) of the widow who cast two brass mites into the
treasury, and in Our Lord's own words "cast in more than . . . all. "
Therefore bodily almsdeeds have no spiritual effect.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:18): "The alms of a man . .
. shall preserve the grace of a man as the apple of the eye. "
I answer that, Corporal almsdeeds may be considered in three ways.
First, with regard to their substance, and in this way they have merely
a corporal effect, inasmuch as they supply our neighbor's corporal
needs. Secondly, they may be considered with regard to their cause, in
so far as a man gives a corporal alms out of love for God and his
neighbor, and in this respect they bring forth a spiritual fruit,
according to Ecclus. 29:13, 14: "Lose thy money for thy brother . . .
place thy treasure in the commandments of the Most High, and it shall
bring thee more profit than gold. "
Thirdly, with regard to the effect, and in this way again, they have a
spiritual fruit, inasmuch as our neighbor, who is succored by a
corporal alms, is moved to pray for his benefactor; wherefore the above
text goes on (Ecclus. 29:15): "Shut up alms in the heart of the poor,
and it shall obtain help for thee from all evil. "
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers corporal almsdeeds as to
their substance.
Reply to Objection 2: He who gives an alms does rot intend to buy a
spiritual thing with a corporal thing, for he knows that spiritual
things infinitely surpass corporal things, but he intends to merit a
spiritual fruit through the love of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: The widow who gave less in quantity, gave more in
proportion; and thus we gather that the fervor of her charity, whence
corporal almsdeeds derive their spiritual efficacy, was greater.
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Whether almsgiving is a matter of precept?
Objection 1: It would seem that almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
For the counsels are distinct from the precepts. Now almsgiving is a
matter of counsel, according to Dan. 4:24: "Let my counsel be
acceptable to the King; [Vulg. : 'to thee, and'] redeem thou thy sins
with alms. " Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
Objection 2: Further, it is lawful for everyone to use and to keep what
is his own. Yet by keeping it he will not give alms. Therefore it is
lawful not to give alms: and consequently almsgiving is not a matter of
precept.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is a matter of precept binds the
transgressor at some time or other under pain of mortal sin, because
positive precepts are binding for some fixed time. Therefore, if
almsgiving were a matter of precept, it would be possible to point to
some fixed time when a man would commit a mortal sin unless he gave an
alms. But it does not appear how this can be so, because it can always
be deemed probable that the person in need can be relieved in some
other way, and that what we would spend in almsgiving might be needful
to ourselves either now or in some future time. Therefore it seems that
almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
Objection 4: Further, every commandment is reducible to the precepts of
the Decalogue. But these precepts contain no reference to almsgiving.
Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
On the contrary, No man is punished eternally for omitting to do what
is not a matter of precept. But some are punished eternally for
omitting to give alms, as is clear from Mat. 25:41-43. Therefore
almsgiving is a matter of precept.
I answer that, As love of our neighbor is a matter of precept, whatever
is a necessary condition to the love of our neighbor is a matter of
precept also. Now the love of our neighbor requires that not only
should we be our neighbor's well-wishers, but also his well-doers,
according to 1 Jn. 3:18: "Let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but
in deed, and in truth. " And in order to be a person's well-wisher and
well-doer, we ought to succor his needs: this is done by almsgiving.
Therefore almsgiving is a matter of precept.
Since, however, precepts are about acts of virtue, it follows that all
almsgiving must be a matter of precept, in so far as it is necessary to
virtue, namely, in so far as it is demanded by right reason. Now right
reason demands that we should take into consideration something on the
part of the giver, and something on the part of the recipient. On the
part of the giver, it must be noted that he should give of his surplus,
according to Lk. 11:41: "That which remaineth, give alms. " This surplus
is to be taken in reference not only to himself, so as to denote what
is unnecessary to the individual, but also in reference to those of
whom he has charge (in which case we have the expression "necessary to
the person" [*The official necessities of a person in position] taking
the word "person" as expressive of dignity). Because each one must
first of all look after himself and then after those over whom he has
charge, and afterwards with what remains relieve the needs of others.
Thus nature first, by its nutritive power, takes what it requires for
the upkeep of one's own body, and afterwards yields the residue for the
formation of another by the power of generation.
On the part of the recipient it is requisite that he should be in need,
else there would be no reason for giving him alms: yet since it is not
possible for one individual to relieve the needs of all, we are not
bound to relieve all who are in need, but only those who could not be
succored if we not did succor them. For in such cases the words of
Ambrose apply, "Feed him that dies of hunger: if thou hast not fed him,
thou hast slain him" [*Cf. Canon Pasce, dist. lxxxvi, whence the words,
as quoted, are taken]. Accordingly we are bound to give alms of our
surplus, as also to give alms to one whose need is extreme: otherwise
almsgiving, like any other greater good, is a matter of counsel.
Reply to Objection 1: Daniel spoke to a king who was not subject to
God's Law, wherefore such things as were prescribed by the Law which he
did not profess, had to be counselled to him. Or he may have been
speaking in reference to a case in which almsgiving was not a matter of
precept.
Reply to Objection 2: The temporal goods which God grants us, are ours
as to the ownership, but as to the use of them, they belong not to us
alone but also to such others as we are able to succor out of what we
have over and above our needs. Hence Basil says [*Hom. super Luc. xii,
18]: "If you acknowledge them," viz. your temporal goods, "as coming
from God, is He unjust because He apportions them unequally? Why are
you rich while another is poor, unless it be that you may have the
merit of a good stewardship, and he the reward of patience? It is the
hungry man's bread that you withhold, the naked man's cloak that you
have stored away, the shoe of the barefoot that you have left to rot,
the money of the needy that you have buried underground: and so you
injure as many as you might help. " Ambrose expresses himself in the
same way.
Reply to Objection 3: There is a time when we sin mortally if we omit
to give alms; on the part of the recipient when we see that his need is
evident and urgent, and that he is not likely to be succored
otherwise---on the part of the giver, when he has superfluous goods,
which he does not need for the time being, as far as he can judge with
probability. Nor need he consider every case that may possibly occur in
the future, for this would be to think about the morrow, which Our Lord
forbade us to do (Mat. 6:34), but he should judge what is superfluous
and what necessary, according as things probably and generally occur.
Reply to Objection 4: All succor given to our neighbor is reduced to
the precept about honoring our parents. For thus does the Apostle
interpret it (1 Tim. 4:8) where he says: "Dutifulness* [Douay:
'Godliness'] is profitable to all things, having promise of the life
that now is, and of that which is to come," and he says this because
the precept about honoring our parents contains the promise, "that thou
mayest be longlived upon the land" (Ex. 20:12): and dutifulness
comprises all kinds of almsgiving. [*"Pietas," whence our English word
"Piety. " Cf. also inf. [2607] Q[101], A[2]. ]
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Whether one ought to give alms out of what one needs?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to give alms out of what
one needs. For the order of charity should be observed not only as
regards the effect of our benefactions but also as regards our interior
affections. Now it is a sin to contravene the order of charity, because
this order is a matter of precept. Since, then, the order of charity
requires that a man should love himself more than his neighbor, it
seems that he would sin if he deprived himself of what he needed, in
order to succor his neighbor.
Objection 2: Further, whoever gives away what he needs himself,
squanders his own substance, and that is to be a prodigal, according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). But no sinful deed should be done.
Therefore we should not give alms out of what we need.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:8): "If any man have
not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath
denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel. " Now if a man gives of
what he needs for himself or for his charge, he seems to detract from
the care he should have for himself or his charge. Therefore it seems
that whoever gives alms from what he needs, sins gravely.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 19:21): "If thou wilt be perfect,
go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor. " Now he that gives all
he has to the poor, gives not only what he needs not, but also what he
needs. Therefore a man may give alms out of what he needs.
I answer that, A thing is necessary in two ways: first, because without
it something is impossible, and it is altogether wrong to give alms out
of what is necessary to us in this sense; for instance, if a man found
himself in the presence of a case of urgency, and had merely sufficient
to support himself and his children, or others under his charge, he
would be throwing away his life and that of others if he were to give
away in alms, what was then necessary to him. Yet I say this without
prejudice to such a case as might happen, supposing that by depriving
himself of necessaries a man might help a great personage, and a
support of the Church or State, since it would be a praiseworthy act to
endanger one's life and the lives of those who are under our charge for
the delivery of such a person, since the common good is to be preferred
to one's own.
Secondly, a thing is said to be necessary, if a man cannot without it
live in keeping with his social station, as regards either himself or
those of whom he has charge. The "necessary" considered thus is not an
invariable quantity, for one might add much more to a man's property,
and yet not go beyond what he needs in this way, or one might take much
from him, and he would still have sufficient for the decencies of life
in keeping with his own position. Accordingly it is good to give alms
of this kind of "necessary"; and it is a matter not of precept but of
counsel. Yet it would be inordinate to deprive oneself of one's own, in
order to give to others to such an extent that the residue would be
insufficient for one to live in keeping with one's station and the
ordinary occurrences of life: for no man ought to live unbecomingly.
There are, however, three exceptions to the above rule. The first is
when a man changes his state of life, for instance, by entering
religion, for then he gives away all his possessions for Christ's sake,
and does the deed of perfection by transferring himself to another
state. Secondly, when that which he deprives himself of, though it be
required for the decencies of life, can nevertheless easily be
recovered, so that he does not suffer extreme inconvenience. Thirdly,
when he is in presence of extreme indigence in an individual, or great
need on the part of the common weal. For in such cases it would seem
praiseworthy to forego the requirements of one's station, in order to
provide for a greater need.
The objections may be easily solved from what has been said.
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Whether one may give alms out of ill-gotten goods?
Objection 1: It would seem that one may give alms out of ill-gotten
goods. For it is written (Lk. 16:9): "Make unto you friends of the
mammon of iniquity.
" Now mammon signifies riches. Therefore it is
lawful to make unto oneself spiritual friends by giving alms out of
ill-gotten riches.
Objection 2: Further, all filthy lucre seems to be ill-gotten. But the
profits from whoredom are filthy lucre; wherefore it was forbidden (Dt.
23:18) to offer therefrom sacrifices or oblations to God: "Thou shalt
not offer the hire of a strumpet . . . in the house of . . . thy God. "
In like manner gains from games of chance are ill-gotten, for, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1), "we take such like gains from our
friends to whom we ought rather to give. " And most of all are the
profits from simony ill-gotten, since thereby the Holy Ghost is
wronged. Nevertheless out of such gains it is lawful to give alms.
Therefore one may give alms out of ill-gotten goods.
Objection 3: Further, greater evils should be avoided more than lesser
evils. Now it is less sinful to keep back another's property than to
commit murder, of which a man is guilty if he fails to succor one who
is in extreme need, as appears from the words of Ambrose who says (Cf.
Canon Pasce dist. lxxxvi, whence the words, as quoted, are taken):
"Feed him that dies of hunger, if thou hast not fed him, thou hast
slain him". Therefore, in certain cases, it is lawful to give alms of
ill-gotten goods.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 2): "Give alms
from your just labors. For you will not bribe Christ your judge, not to
hear you with the poor whom you rob . . . Give not alms from interest
and usury: I speak to the faithful to whom we dispense the Body of
Christ. "
I answer that, A thing may be ill-gotten in three ways. In the first
place a thing is ill-gotten if it be due to the person from whom it is
gotten, and may not be kept by the person who has obtained possession
of it; as in the case of rapine, theft and usury, and of such things a
man may not give alms since he is bound to restore them.
Secondly, a thing is ill-gotten, when he that has it may not keep it,
and yet he may not return it to the person from whom he received it,
because he received it unjustly, while the latter gave it unjustly.
This happens in simony, wherein both giver and receiver contravene the
justice of the Divine Law, so that restitution is to be made not to the
giver, but by giving alms. The same applies to all similar cases of
illegal giving and receiving.
Thirdly, a thing is ill-gotten, not because the taking was unlawful,
but because it is the outcome of something unlawful, as in the case of
a woman's profits from whoredom. This is filthy lucre properly so
called, because the practice of whoredom is filthy and against the Law
of God, yet the woman does not act unjustly or unlawfully in taking the
money. Consequently it is lawful to keep and to give in alms what is
thus acquired by an unlawful action.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. 2), "Some have
misunderstood this saying of Our Lord, so as to take another's property
and give thereof to the poor, thinking that they are fulfilling the
commandment by so doing. This interpretation must be amended. Yet all
riches are called riches of iniquity, as stated in De Quaest. Ev. ii,
34, because "riches are not unjust save for those who are themselves
unjust, and put all their trust in them. Or, according to Ambrose in
his commentary on Lk. 16:9, "Make unto yourselves friends," etc. , "He
calls mammon unjust, because it draws our affections by the various
allurements of wealth. " Or, because "among the many ancestors whose
property you inherit, there is one who took the property of others
unjustly, although you know nothing about it," as Basil says in a
homily (Hom. super Luc. A, 5). Or, all riches are styled riches "of
iniquity," i. e. , of "inequality," because they are not distributed
equally among all, one being in need, and another in affluence.
Reply to Objection 2: We have already explained how alms may be given
out of the profits of whoredom. Yet sacrifices and oblations were not
made therefrom at the altar, both on account of the scandal, and
through reverence for sacred things. It is also lawful to give alms out
of the profits of simony, because they are not due to him who paid,
indeed he deserves to lose them. But as to the profits from games of
chance, there would seem to be something unlawful as being contrary to
the Divine Law, when a man wins from one who cannot alienate his
property, such as minors, lunatics and so forth, or when a man, with
the desire of making money out of another man, entices him to play, and
wins from him by cheating. In these cases he is bound to restitution,
and consequently cannot give away his gains in alms. Then again there
would seem to be something unlawful as being against the positive civil
law, which altogether forbids any such profits. Since, however, a civil
law does not bind all, but only those who are subject to that law, and
moreover may be abrogated through desuetude, it follows that all such
as are bound by these laws are bound to make restitution of such gains,
unless perchance the contrary custom prevail, or unless a man win from
one who enticed him to play, in which case he is not bound to
restitution, because the loser does not deserve to be paid back: and
yet he cannot lawfully keep what he has won, so long as that positive
law is in force, wherefore in this case he ought to give it away in
alms.
Reply to Objection 3: All things are common property in a case of
extreme necessity. Hence one who is in such dire straits may take
another's goods in order to succor himself, if he can find no one who
is willing to give him something. For the same reason a man may retain
what belongs to another, and give alms thereof; or even take something
if there be no other way of succoring the one who is in need. If
however this be possible without danger, he must ask the owner's
consent, and then succor the poor man who is in extreme necessity.
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Whether one who is under another's power can give alms?
Objection 1: It would seem that one who is under another's power can
give alms. For religious are under the power of their prelates to whom
they have vowed obedience. Now if it were unlawful for them to give
alms, they would lose by entering the state of religion, for as Ambrose
[*The quotation is from the works of Ambrosiaster. Cf. Index to
ecclesiastical authorities quoted by St. Thomas] says on 1 Tim. 4:8:
"'Dutifulness [Douay: 'godliness'] is profitable to all things': The
sum total of the Christian religion consists in doing one's duty by
all," and the most creditable way of doing this is to give alms.
Therefore those who are in another's power can give alms.
Objection 2: Further, a wife is under her husband's power (Gn. 3:16).
But a wife can give alms since she is her husband's partner; hence it
is related of the Blessed Lucy that she gave alms without the knowledge
of her betrothed [*"Sponsus" The matrimonial institutions of the Romans
were so entirely different from ours that "sponsus" is no longer
accurately rendered either "husband" or "betrothed. "] Therefore a
person is not prevented from giving alms, by being under another's
power.
Objection 3: Further, the subjection of children to their parents is
founded on nature, wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. 6:1): "Children,
obey your parents in the Lord. " But, apparently, children may give alms
out of their parents' property. For it is their own, since they are the
heirs; wherefore, since they can employ it for some bodily use, it
seems that much more can they use it in giving alms so as to profit
their souls. Therefore those who are under another's power can give
alms.
Objection 4: Further, servants are under their master's power,
according to Titus 2:9: "Exhort servants to be obedient to their
masters. " Now they may lawfully do anything that will profit their
masters: and this would be especially the case if they gave alms for
them. Therefore those who are under another's power can give alms.
On the contrary, Alms should not be given out of another's property;
and each one should give alms out of the just profit of his own labor
as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 2). Now if those who are subject
to anyone were to give alms, this would be out of another's property.
Therefore those who are under another's power cannot give alms.
I answer that, Anyone who is under another's power must, as such, be
ruled in accordance with the power of his superior: for the natural
order demands that the inferior should be ruled according to its
superior. Therefore in those matters in which the inferior is subject
to his superior, his ministrations must be subject to the superior's
permission.
Accordingly he that is under another's power must not give alms of
anything in respect of which he is subject to that other, except in so
far as he has been commissioned by his superior. But if he has
something in respect of which he is not under the power of his
superior, he is no longer subject to another in its regard, being
independent in respect of that particular thing, and he can give alms
therefrom.
Reply to Objection 1: If a monk be dispensed through being commissioned
by his superior, he can give alms from the property of his monaster, in
accordance with the terms of his commission; but if he has no such
dispensation, since he has nothing of his own, he cannot give alms
without his abbot's permission either express or presumed for some
probable reason: except in a case of extreme necessity, when it would
be lawful for him to commit a theft in order to give an alms. Nor does
it follow that he is worse off than before, because, as stated in De
Eccles. Dogm. lxxi, "it is a good thing to give one's property to the
poor little by little, but it is better still to give all at once in
order to follow Christ, and being freed from care, to be needy with
Christ. "
Reply to Objection 2: A wife, who has other property besides her dowry
which is for the support of the burdens of marriage, whether that
property be gained by her own industry or by any other lawful means,
can give alms, out of that property, without asking her husband's
permission: yet such alms should be moderate, lest through giving too
much she impoverish her husband. Otherwise she ought not to give alms
without the express or presumed consent of her husband, except in cases
of necessity as stated, in the case of a monk, in the preceding Reply.
For though the wife be her husband's equal in the marriage act, yet in
matters of housekeeping, the head of the woman is the man, as the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:3). As regards Blessed Lucy, she had a
betrothed, not a husband, wherefore she could give alms with her
mother's consent.
Reply to Objection 3: What belongs to the children belongs also to the
father: wherefore the child cannot give alms, except in such small
quantity that one may presume the father to be willing: unless,
perchance, the father authorize his child to dispose of any particular
property. The same applies to servants. Hence the Reply to the Fourth
Objection is clear.
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Whether one ought to give alms to those rather who are more closely united
to us?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to give alms to those
rather who are more closely united to us. For it is written (Ecclus.
12:4, 6): "Give to the merciful and uphold not the sinner . . . Do good
to the humble and give not to the ungodly. " Now it happens sometimes
that those who are closely united to us are sinful and ungodly.
Therefore we ought not to give alms to them in preference to others.
Objection 2: Further, alms should be given that we may receive an
eternal reward in return, according to Mat. 6:18: "And thy Father Who
seeth in secret, will repay thee. " Now the eternal reward is gained
chiefly by the alms which are given to the saints, according to Lk.
16:9: "Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity, that when you
shall fail, they may receive you into everlasting dwellings, which
passage Augustine expounds (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 1): "Who shall have
everlasting dwellings unless the saints of God? And who are they that
shall be received by them into their dwellings, if not those who succor
them in their needs? Therefore alms should be given to the more holy
persons rather than to those who are more closely united to us.
Objection 3: Further, man is more closely united to himself. But a man
cannot give himself an alms. Therefore it seems that we are not bound
to give alms to those who are most closely united to us.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:8): "If any man have not
care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied
the faith, and is worse than an infidel. "
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28), "it falls
to us by lot, as it were, to have to look to the welfare of those who
are more closely united to us. " Nevertheless in this matter we must
employ discretion, according to the various degrees of connection,
holiness and utility. For we ought to give alms to one who is much
holier and in greater want, and to one who is more useful to the common
weal, rather than to one who is more closely united to us, especially
if the latter be not very closely united, and has no special claim on
our care then and there, and who is not in very urgent need.
Reply to Objection 1: We ought not to help a sinner as such, that is by
encouraging him to sin, but as man, that is by supporting his nature.
Reply to Objection 2: Almsdeeds deserve on two counts to receive an
eternal reward. First because they are rooted in charity, and in this
respect an almsdeed is meritorious in so far as it observes the order
of charity, which requires that, other things being equal, we should,
in preference, help those who are more closely connected with us.
Wherefore Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): "It is with commendable
liberality that you forget not your kindred, if you know them to be in
need, for it is better that you should yourself help your own family,
who would be ashamed to beg help from others. " Secondly, almsdeeds
deserve to be rewarded eternally, through the merit of the recipient,
who prays for the giver, and it is in this sense that Augustine is
speaking.
Reply to Objection 3: Since almsdeeds are works of mercy, just as a man
does not, properly speaking, pity himself, but only by a kind of
comparison, as stated above ([2608]Q[30], AA[1],2), so too, properly
speaking, no man gives himself an alms, unless he act in another's
person; thus when a man is appointed to distribute alms, he can take
something for himself, if he be in want, on the same ground as when he
gives to others.
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Whether alms should be given in abundance?
Objection 1: It would seem that alms should not be given in abundance.
For we ought to give alms to those chiefly who are most closely
connected with us. But we ought not to give to them in such a way that
they are likely to become richer thereby, as Ambrose says (De Officiis
i, 30). Therefore neither should we give abundantly to others.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): "We should not
lavish our wealth on others all at once, we should dole it out by
degrees. " But to give abundantly is to give lavishly. Therefore alms
should not be given in abundance.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 8:13): "Not that others
should be eased," i. e. should live on you without working themselves,
"and you burthened," i. e. impoverished. But this would be the result if
alms were given in abundance. Therefore we ought not to give alms
abundantly.
On the contrary, It is written (Tob. 4:93): "If thou have much, give
abundantly. "
I answer that, Alms may be considered abundant in relation either to
the giver, or to the recipient: in relation to the giver, when that
which a man gives is great as compared with his means. To give thus is
praiseworthy, wherefore Our Lord (Lk. 21:3,4) commended the widow
because "of her want, she cast in all the living that she had. "
Nevertheless those conditions must be observed which were laid down
when we spoke of giving alms out of one's necessary goods [2609](A[9]).
On the part of the recipient, an alms may be abundant in two ways;
first, by relieving his need sufficiently, and in this sense it is
praiseworthy to give alms: secondly, by relieving his need more than
sufficiently; this is not praiseworthy, and it would be better to give
to several that are in need, wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:3):
"If I should distribute . . . to feed the poor," on which words a gloss
comments: "Thus we are warned to be careful in giving alms, and to
give, not to one only, but to many, that we may profit many. "
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers abundance of alms as
exceeding the needs of the recipient.
Reply to Objection 2: The passage quoted considers abundance of alms on
the part of the giver; but the sense is that God does not wish a man to
lavish all his wealth at once, except when he changes his state of
life, wherefore he goes on to say: "Except we imitate Eliseus who slew
his oxen and fed the poor with what he had, so that no household cares
might keep him back" (3 Kings 19:21).
Reply to Objection 3: In the passage quoted the words, "not that others
should be eased or refreshed," refer to that abundance of alms which
surpasses the need of the recipient, to whom one should give alms not
that he may have an easy life, but that he may have relief.
Nevertheless we must bring discretion to bear on the matter, on account
of the various conditions of men, some of whom are more daintily
nurtured, and need finer food and clothing. Hence Ambrose says (De
Officiis i, 30): "When you give an alms to a man, you should take into
consideration his age and his weakness; and sometimes the shame which
proclaims his good birth; and again that perhaps he has fallen from
riches to indigence through no fault of his own. "
With regard to the words that follow, "and you burdened," they refer to
abundance on the part of the giver. Yet, as a gloss says on the same
passage, "he says this, not because it would be better to give in
abundance, but because he fears for the weak, and he admonishes them so
to give that they lack not for themselves. "
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OF FRATERNAL CORRECTION (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider Fraternal Correction, under which head there are
eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fraternal correction is an act of charity?
(2) Whether it is a matter of precept?
(3) Whether this precept binds all, or only superiors?
(4) Whether this precept binds the subject to correct his superior?
(5) Whether a sinner may correct anyone?
(6) Whether one ought to correct a person who becomes worse through
being corrected?
(7) Whether secret correction should precede denouncement?
(8) Whether witnesses should be called before denouncement?
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Whether fraternal correction is an act of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction is not an act of
charity. For a gloss on Mat. 18:15, "If thy brother shall offend
against thee," says that "a man should reprove his brother out of zeal
for justice. " But justice is a distinct virtue from charity. Therefore
fraternal correction is an act, not of charity, but of justice.
Objection 2: Further, fraternal correction is given by secret
admonition. Now admonition is a kind of counsel, which is an act of
prudence, for a prudent man is one who is of good counsel (Ethic. vi,
5). Therefore fraternal correction is an act, not of charity, but of
prudence.
Objection 3: Further, contrary acts do not belong to the same virtue.
Now it is an act of charity to bear with a sinner, according to Gal.
6:2: "Bear ye one another's burdens, and so you shall fulfil the law of
Christ," which is the law of charity. Therefore it seems that the
correction of a sinning brother, which is contrary to bearing with him,
is not an act of charity.
On the contrary, To correct the wrongdoer is a spiritual almsdeed. But
almsdeeds are works of charity, as stated above ([2610]Q[32], A[1]).
Therefore fraternal correction is an act of charity.
I answer that, The correction of the wrongdoer is a remedy which should
be employed against a man's sin. Now a man's sin may be considered in
two ways, first as being harmful to the sinner, secondly as conducing
to the harm of others, by hurting or scandalizing them, or by being
detrimental to the common good, the justice of which is disturbed by
that man's sin.
Consequently the correction of a wrongdoer is twofold, one which
applies a remedy to the sin considered as an evil of the sinner
himself. This is fraternal correction properly so called, which is
directed to the amendment of the sinner.
