If I am not mistaken,
this is what Demosthenes calls Swafitis tmcroXifiaiovs--armies which
exist only in letters.
this is what Demosthenes calls Swafitis tmcroXifiaiovs--armies which
exist only in letters.
Demosthenes - Leland - Orations
]--It has been already observed in the
prefer* to these orations that Demosthenes takes many occasions of
extolling the efforts of Athens to reduce the Spartan power, and to regain
that sovereignty which tl. sy lost by the victory of Lysander at JEgos-
Potamos. These efforts he every where represents as high instances of
magnanimity and public spirit: though revenge and jealousy had no less
share in them. The victories which the Athenians gained over Sparta
at Corinth, Naxos, Ac. , and which he here alludes to, happened about
twenty-four years before the date of this oration ; so that he might well
appeal to the memories of many persons present.
2 The numerous armies, Ac. ]--The number of Philip's threes at that
time amounted to twenty thousand foot and three thousand horse; a
great army compared with those of the Greeks. At their march to Mara-
thon the Athenians could not assemble more than '<"i thousand force*.
--Tourreil.
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? PHILIPPIC THE FIRST. 39
gaged in those enterprises which are now crowned
with success; nor could he have raised himself to
this pitch of greatness. No, Athenians, he knew this
well, that all these places are but prizes,1 laid between
the combatants, and ready for the conqueror: that
the dominions of the absent devolve naturally to those
who are in the field; the possessions of the supine to
the active and intrepid. Animated by these senti-
ments, he overturns whole countries; he holds all
people in subjection: some, as by the right of con-
quest ; others, under the title of allies and confede-
rates ; for all are willing to confederate with those
whom they see prepared and resolved to exert them-
selves as they ought.
And if you, my countrymen, will now at length be
persuaded to entertain the like sentiments; if each of
you, renouncing all evasions, will be ready to approve
himself a useful citizen, to the utmost that his station
and abilities demand; if the rich will be ready to con
tribute, and the young to take the field. in one word,
if you will be yourselves, and banish those vain hopes
which every single person entertains, that while so
many others are engaged in public business,his service
will not be required; you then (if Heaven so pleases)
shall regain your dominions, recall those opportunities
your supineness hath neglected, and chastise the inso-
lence of this man: for you are not to imagine that,
like a god, he is to enjoy his present greatness for
ever fixed and unchangeable. No, Athenians, there
are who hate him, who fear him, who envy him, even
among those seemingly the most attached to his
cause. These are passions common to mankind;
noi must we think that his friends only are exempted
from them. It is true they lie concealed at present,
as our indolence deprives them of all resource. But
let us shake off this indolence; for you see how we
1 But prizes, &c. ]--His hearers were of all others most devoted to
public games and entertainments, and must therefore have been par*
ticularly sensible of the beauty of this image.
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? 40 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
are situated; you see the outrageous arrogance of
this man, who does not leave it to your choice whether
you shall act or remain quiet: but braves you with
his menaces; and talks, as we are informed,1 in a
strain of the highest extravagance ; and is not able
to rest satisfied with his present acquisitions, but is
ever in pursuit of further conquests; and while we
sit down, inactive and irresolute, encloses us on all
sides with his toils.
When, therefore, O my countrymen! when will
you exert your vigour 1 When roused by some event ?
when forced by some necessity ? What then are we
to think of our present condition 1 To freemen, the
disgrace attending on misconduct is, in my opinion,
the most urgent necessity. Or say, is it your sole
ambition to wander through the public places, each
inquiring of the other, " What new advices V Can
any thing be more new than that a man of Macedon
should conquer the Athenians, and give law to
Greece ? --" Is Philip dead ? "2--" No, but in great dan-
ger. " How are you concerned in those rumours ?
Suppose he should meet some fatal stroke; you
would soon raise up another Philip, if your interests
1 And talks, as we are informed, &C. 1--The success which had hith
erto attended Philip's arms must naturally have inspired him with those
designs which he afterward executed against the Athenians; and
resentment of their late opposition at Thermopylae might have made him
less careful to conceal them, at least in his own court. This the orator
represents as arrogant and extravagant menaces: not that a man who
had so just a conception of the weakness of the Athenian politics, and
the vigour and abilities of their enemy, could really believe such designs
extravagant and romantic ; but it was part of his' address sometimes to
avoid shocking the national vanity of his countrymen. After all their
losses, and amid all their indolence, they could not entertain a thought
so mortifying, as that the conquerors of Persia and the arbiters of Greece
could ever see their liberty essentially affected, or their power and glory
entirely wrested from them by a king of Macedon.
2 Is Philip dead These rumours and inquiries of the Athenians were
occasioned by the wound Philip received at Methone, the year before, and
which was followed by a dangerous fit of sickness. Louginus quotes this
whole passage as a beautiful instance of those pathetic figures which
jive life and force and energy to an oration. --Tourreil.
The English reader will tnd the remark in sect. 18. of Mr. Smith'!
translation.
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? PHILIPPIC THE FIRST.
41
are thus regarded: for it is not to his own strength
that he so much owes his elevation as to oursupine-
ness. And should some accident' affect him, should
Fortune, who hath ever been more careful of the
state than we ourselves, now repeat her favours;
(and may she thus crown them! ) be assured of this,
that by being on the spot, ready to take advantage of
the confusion, you will every where be absolute mas-
ters : but in your present disposition, even if a
favourable juncture should present you with Am-
phipolis,2 you could not take possession of it while
1 Some accident, &c. If he should die. ]--"This is plainly the sense of
It: btu it must be expressed covertly, as Demosthenes has done, not to
transgress against that decorum which, Cicero says, this orator made his
first rule. For there were certain things which the ancients presumed
not to express, but in terms obscure and gentle, that they might not pro-
nounce what were called verba male ominata. They did not dare to say
to any person. If you should be killed ; if you should die: they concealed
as much as possible the melancholy and odious idea of an approaching,
or even of a distant death. The Greeks said << rt iraQois ; the Romans, st
quid humanitus contingat. --Olivet.
2 Present you with Amphipolis, &c. ]--They had nothing more at heart
than the recovery of this city. So that the orator here gives the last and
most heightening stroke to his description of their indolence. --Tourreil.
And at the same time, by artfully hinting at such an event as possible,
he rouses their attention, and enlivens their hopes and expectations.
The Italian commentatorillustrates this passage in the following man
ner: a Monet orator, quod quamvis accidat, ejusdeni (sc. Amphipolis),
compotes fieri, ipsis tamen non satis id fore ad turbandas res Macedom-
cas; cum aliis tot locis, quee memoravimus, privati, ad tan tam rernm
molem parum opis habere possint, ex una duntaxat civitate. " Accord-
ingly, the passage before us has been rendered to this effect; " If some
favourable conjuncture should deliver up Amphipolis to you, &c. , you
could not receive the least benefit from the possession, with respect to
Macedon. " The assertion of the orator, as expressed in the present trans-
lation, has been pronounced extraordinary, and the argument inconclusive.
The substance, therefore, of the present argument I shall here endeavour
to collect: " You are all earnest to be informed whether Philip be dead
or no. But, unless you change your measures, his death or life can
make no difference, or prove of any consequence. Indeed, if some acci-
dent should take him off, nothing more would be necessary to give you
the full advantage of the confusion which such an event must occasion
than to appear on the frontier of Macedon with a powerful force. This
would make you absolute masters of the country. But in your present
circumstances, what would itavail, even if such a favourable incident as
that of Philip's death should give you an opportunity of recovering Am-
phipolis ? So important an acquisition (which would in a great measure
enable you to command all Macedon) must still be lost; unless you had
yoor forces ready, you could not take possession of itWhether there
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? 42 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
this suspense prevails in your designs and in your
councils.
And now, as to the necessity of a general vigour
and alacrity; of this you must be fully persuaded :
this point, therefore, I shall urge no further. But the
nature of the armament which, I think, will extricate
you from the present difficulties, the numbers to be
raised, the subsidies required for their support, and
all the other necessaries ; how they may (in my opin-
ion) be best and most expeditiously provided; these
things 1 shall endeavour to explain. --But here I make
this request, Athenians--that you would not be pre-
cipitate, but suspend your judgment till you have
heard me fully. And if, at first, I seem to propose a
new kind of armament, let it not be thought that I
am delaying your affairs: for it is not they who cry
out "Instantly! this moment! " whose counsels suit
the present juncture (as it is not possible to repel
violences already committed by any occasional de-
tachment) ; but he who will show you of what kind
that armament must be, how great, and how sup-
ported, which may subsist until we yield to peace, or
be any thing unreasonable in this assertion, or impertinent in this argu-
ment, must be submitted to the reader. Withdeference to his judgment,
1 must declare that it appears to me to have rather more force, and to set
the fatal consequence of the indolence and irresolution of the Athenians
in a stronger light, than the other interpretation, whose propriety may be
at once determined by comparing the passage with the sentence imme-
diately preceding. In that the orator declares, that in case of Philip's
death, the Athenians had no more to do but to appear on the frontier of
Macedon, in order to gain the absolute dis1wsal of the affairs of that king-
dom : 100*071 nXrtfftov ficvovttg, &namv av rois iroayfiaat rtraoay pivois
tmofavtzs, bmas povXtaBt StoiKriaaiaBt. We must therefore be at some
pains to clear Demosthenes of the suspicion of inconsistency, if the very
next sentence be understood as containing a declaration, That although
the Athenians should not only appear on the borders of Macedon, but
there possess themselves of a post of the utmost consequence, still they
could derive no advantage from their acquisition--far from having the
whole kingdom at their disposal. What seems to have tempted the Ital-
ian commentator to suggest this interpretation is the expression diSovrvw
tuiv rwv Kaipwv ApQiirohv--if some conjunctures should oivK you
Amphipolis; which he takes in a literal sense. But the genius of spir-
ited eloquence, and of our orator in particular, fully warrants us tc
regard it only as a lively figure, and to understand no more by giving, up
than affording a favourable opportunity of gaining.
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? PHILIPPIC THE FIRST.
43
until our enemies sink beneath our arms; for thus
only can we be secured from future dangers. --These
things, I think, I can point out: not that I would pre-
vent any other person from declaring his opinion.
--Thus far am I engaged: how I can acquit myself
will immediately appear: to your judgments I appeal.
First, then, Athenians, I say that you should fit out
fifty ships of war; and then resolve, that on the first
emergency you will embark yourselves. To these I
insist that you must add transport and other neces-
sary vessels sufficient for half our horse. Thus far
we should be provided against those sudden excur-
sions from his own kingdom to Thermopylae, to the
Chersonesus,1 to Olynthus,2 to whatever places he
thinks proper. For of this he should necessarily be
persuaded, that possibly you may break out from this
immoderate . indolence, and fly to some scene of
action ; as you did to Eubcea/ and formerly, as we
1 To the Chersonesus. ]--The year before, Cersobleptes, unable to
defend this country against Philip, had put the Athenians in possession
of it. Cardia, one of the chief cities, refused to acknowledge these new
sovereigns, and had recourse to the protection of Philip, who, under pre-
tence of supporting them, carried his arms into the Chersonesus. --
Towrreil.
2 To Olynthus. ]--Philip had already committed some acts of hostility
against this state, but had not as yet formed the siege of Olynthus, or
taken anymeasures tending to it; for in such acase Demosthenes would
not have touched so lightly on an enterprise which he afterward dwells
on so often and with so much force. --Towrreil.
9 To Eubcea, ice]--Mons. Tourrreil translates this passage thus : " et
qu'il risque de retrouver en vous ces memes Atheniens qu'il rencontra
sur son chemin en Eubee," &c. (for which there is no warrant in the
original); and taking for granted that all the expeditions here mentioned
were made against Philip, he endeavours to settle the date of this to Eu-
bcea by conjecture. But it does not appear from history that Philip car-
ried his arms into that island before his attempt on Thermopyiie. In the
three succeeding Olynthiac orations there is not the least mention of such
a thing, though there is a particular recital of his expeditions in the third,
and though afterward the orator inveighs loudly against his hostile
attempts in Eubcea. T apprehend, therefore, that the expedition hinted at
in this place was that which the Athenians made about seven years
before in favour of the Eubceans against Thebes ; when in five days they
brought an army into Eubcea, and in thirty obliged the Thebans to come
to terms, and evacuate the island (according to iEschines). Demos-
thenes mentions this in other places ; particularly about the end of the
oration on the state of the Chersonesus, where he quotes part of the
Vol. I. --D
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? 44
ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
are told, to Haliartus,1 and but now to Thermopylae. '
But although we should not act with all this vigour
(which yet I must regard as our indispensable duty),
speech made byTimotheus to encourage the Athenians to this expedi
tion.
In the above note I have endeavoured to suggest some reasons why the
expeditions here alluded to could not have been made against Philip. But
it has been affirmed, that if this were so it would be almost impertinent
in our orator to mention them; that, as facts, they must be found spirit-
less, if taken in a general sense; and, as arguments, inconclusive.
The translator can with sincerity declare, that if any representation of
his tends in the least to depreciate the value of the great original, he
readily gives it up as utterly erroneous and indefensible. But at the same
time, he must observe, that if it be a fault to make use of such facts and
such arguments, it is a fault which Demosthenes has frequently com
mitted. Thus he speaks of the vigorous opposition of his countrymen to
the Lacedemonians; of their marching against the Corinthians and
Megareans; of their expelling the Thebans from Eubcea, &c . In the
second Philippic oration he tells his countrymen that the Macedonian
must regard them asihe great and strenuous defenders of fireece; because
he must be informed of the spirit which their ancestors discovered in the
days of his predecessor Alexander. If we are not to allow the orator to
reason from the conduct of his contemporaries, on former occasions, to
the conduct which they ought to pursue, or which maybe expected from
hem in their contest with Philip, what shall we say of an argument
deduced from their ancestors in the heroic age of Athena? The truth
seems to be, that although the facts supposed to be alluded to in this
passage had been passed over by historians (which I cannot admit), yet
we are not from hence to conclude that ihey had no weight or import-
ance in the Athenian assembly. We are not to judge of the light in
which they appeared there from the obscurity into which distance of
time and place may have now cast them. The reasons of this are
obvious.
t To Haliartus. ]--Tourreil refers this to some action which he sup-
poses might have happened in Bceotia in the course of the Phocian war,
and in which the Athenians might have had their share of the honour
But from the text it should seem that the event alluded to must have
happened at some considerable distance of time, and have descended to
the orator by tradition. About forty years before this oration, when
Thebes' and Sparta began to quarrel, Lysander, the Spartan general,
threatened the Thebans with a very dangerous war, and began with
laying siege to this city of Haliartus. The Thebans applied for aid to
the Athenians, which they readily granted (though the Thebans had
just before pressed for the utter demolition of their state), and obliged
Pausanias to raise the siege, alter Lysander had been killed. I appre-
hend that this is the expedition here alluded to. It was the more remark-
able as the Athenian power was then at the lowest ebb. "You, Athe-
nians ! " says Demosthenes in his oration on the Crown, "at a time
when the Lacedemonians had the absolute command both at sea and
land; when Attica was quite encompassed with their commanders and
their garrisons; when Eubcea, Tanagra, all Bceotia, Megara, JEgina,
Cleone, and the other islands were in their possession; when the state
bad not one ship, not one wall, ye marched out to Haliartus. " dec.
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? PHILIPPIC THE FIRST.
45
still the measures I propose will have their use: as
his fears may keep him quiet, when he knows we are
prepared (and this he will know, for there are too
many1 among ourselves who inform him of every
thing); or if he should despise our armament, his secu-
rity may prove fatal to him; as it will be absolutely
in our power, at the first favourable juncture, to
make a descent on his own coasts.
These, then, are the resolutions I propose, these the
provisions it will become you to make. And I pro-
nounce it still further necessary to raise some other
forces, which may harass him with perpetual incur-
sions. Talk not of your ten thousands, or twenty
thousands of foreigners; of those armies which2 ap-
pear so magnificent on paper; but let them be the
natural forces of the state ; and if you choose a
single person, if a number, if this particular man, or
whomever you appoint as general, let them be
entirely under his guidance and authority. I also
move you that subsistence be provided for them.
But as to the quality, the numbers, the maintenance
of this body--how are these points to be settled f--
I now proceed to speak of each of them distinctly.
The body of infantry, therefore,--but here give me
1 Too many, &c. ]--He glances particularly at Aristndemus and
Neoptolemus. As to jEschines, he bad not been with Philip till six
years after. --Tourreil.
2 Those armies which, Ac. ]--In the Greek it is emaroXiiiaiovi Ivvafitis.
--Instead of enumerating the various senses in which the commentators
interpret this expression, I shall copy an observation on it by the Abbe
D'Olivet, whose interpretation I have followed ;--" I have without any
refinement chosen a plain expression, which seems to hit the thought of
Demosthenes directly, and to paint strongly the bitter ridicule of the pas-
sage. " It was usual for the Athenians, on any emergency, to write to
all quarters to demand soldiers. They were answered, that in such a
place such a number would be provided : from another place so many
more might be expected. But in the end it appeared that these were by
no means so many effective men. There were great abatements to be
made from the numbers promised ; and we find besides, from this oration,
that these foreigners were not paid at all, or ill paid; so that these grand
armies were nowhere complete but in the letters written to demand them
on one part and to promise them on the other.
If I am not mistaken,
this is what Demosthenes calls Swafitis tmcroXifiaiovs--armies which
exist only in letters.
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? 46
ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
leave to warn you of an error which hath often proved
injurious to you. Think not that your preparations
never can be too magnificent; great and terrible in
your decrees, in execution weak and contemptible.
Let your preparations, let your supplies at first be
moderate, and add to these if you find them not suf
ficient. I say, then, that the whole body of infantry
should be two thousand; of these, that five hundred
should be Athenians of such an age as you shall think
proper, and with a stated time for service, not long
but such as that others may have their turn of duty.
Let the rest be formed of foreigners. To these you
are to add two hundred horse, fifty of them at least
Athenians, to serve in the same manner as the foot.
For these you are to provide transports. And now
what further preparations ? Ten light galleys; for as
he hath a naval power,1 we must be provided with
light vessels, that our troops may have a secure
convoy.
But whence are these forces to be subsisted ? This -
I shall explain when I have first given my reasons
why I think such numbers sufficient, and why I have
advised that we should serve in person. As to the
numbers, Athenians, my reason is this: it is not at
present in our power to provide a force able to meet
him in the open field, but we must harass him by
depredations: thus the war must be carried on at first
We therefore cannot think of raising a prodigious
army (for such we have neither pay nor provisions),
nor must our forces be absolutely mean. And I have
proposed that citizens should join in the service, and
help to man our fleet, because 1 am informed that
some time since the state maintained a body of aux-
iliaries at Corinth,2 which Polystratus commanded,3
1 As be bath a naval power. ]--In consequence of his engagements
with the Thessalians, he commanded their ports and ships.
2 At Corinth. ]--This was in the same war which he alludes to in the
beginning of the oration Corinth was appointed as the place of general
rendezvous for the OreeKS who confederated against Sparta.
3 Which Polystratus commanded. ]--Instead of Polystratus, which )?
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? PHILIPPIC #HE FIRST.
47
and Iphicrates, and Chabriaa, and some others; that
you yourselves served with them; and that the united
efforts of these auxiliary and domestic forces gained
a considerable victory over the Lacedaemonians. But
ever since our armies have been formed of foreigners
alone, their victories have been over our allies and
confederates, while our enemies have risen to an ex-
travagance of power. And these armies, with scarcely
the slightest attention to the service of the state, sail
orf to fight for Artabazus,1 or any other person, and
their general follows them. Nor should we wonder
at it; for he cannot command who cannot pay his
soldiers. What, then, do I recommend? That you
should take away all pretences, both from generals
and from soldiers, by a regular payment of the army,
and by incorporating domestic forces with the aux-
iliaries, to be, as it were, inspectors into the conduct
of the commanders; for at present our manner of
acting is even ridiculous. If a man should ask, "Are
you at peace, Athenians 1" the answer would imme-
diately be, " By no means; we are at war with
Philic2 Have not we chosen the usual generals and
I name little known in history, Monsieur Tourreil proposes to read Cal-
listratus, who, according to Xenophon and Diodorus, was colleague to
Iphicrates and Chabrias in the war of Corcyra. But, as Mr. Mounteney
has observed, Polystratus is again mentioned by Demosthenes, together
with Iphicrates, in the oration on the immunities ; so that it is probable
this is the true reading.
I To fight for Artabazus. ]--He here alludes to an affair which had
happened some time before, and had occasioned great commotion. The
Athenians had sent Chares at the head of a powerful force to reduce
Byzantium, Cos, and Chios, which had revolted from them. But this
general, when he had a prospect of success in that enterprise, suffered
himself to be corrupted by Artabazus, a rebellious satrap of Asia, and
assisted him against an army of seventy thousand men. Chares
received a reward proportioned to the service; but this action raised the
indignation of the Athenians, as he had not only deserted the cause of the
republic, but also incensed the King of Persia. Demosthenes, however,
here shifts the blame from Chares to his soldiers, who refused to obey
him, or rather to the people, who took no care to provide for their pay. --
Tourreil.
2 We are at war with Philip. ]--So the orator affects to speak; though
I apprehend it does not appear from history that they were at that time
directly at war with him. They had, indeed, joined with the Phnciana,
and Philip was at the head of the opposite confederacy Thus far they
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? 48 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
officers1 both of horse and foot ? " And of what use
are all these, except the single person whom you
send to the field? The rest attend your priests in
their processions. So that, as if you formed so many
men of clay, you make your officers for show, and
not for service. My countrymen! should not all
these generals have been chosen from your own body,
all these several officers from your own body, that
our force might be really Athenian ? And yet, for an
expedition in favour of Lemnos,2 the general must be
a citizen, while troops engaged in defence of our own
territories are commanded by Menelaus ! 3 I say not
this to detract from his merit; but to whomsoever
this command had been intrusted, surely he should
have derived it from your voices. 4
Perhaps you are fully5 sensible of these truths, but
were engaged against each other, though neither of them as principals in
the quarrel. The Athenians, indeed, might have made some attempts to
tecover Amphipolis; they certainly made some^ineffeclual preparations
to relieve Potidaea and Methone; and after Philip's attempt on Ther-
mopylae, did station some forces on their frontiers'to oppose him in case
he renewed his attack. But still the war was not declared in form. But
of this I shall speak more hereafter.
1 The usual generals and officers. ]--In the text they are mentioned
particularly. Ten taxiarchs (arparriyot, or generals) and phylarchs, and
two hipparchs. Each of the ten tribes chose a new general every year,
and each of these (originally, when all went to the field) had the com-
mand for one day in his turn. Philip was very pleasant on this number
of commanders. " I never," said he, " could find but one general," mean-
ing Parmenio; "but the Athenians can get ten every year. " Anciently,
the people on extraordinary occasions chose a polemarch, to determine
when the opinions of the generals were equally divided. The taxiarch
commanded the infantry, the phylarch the cavalry of his tribe. The
whole body of horse was divided into two corps, each of which was
commanded by a general of horse, or hipparch. --Tourreil.
2 In favour of Lemnos. ]--When in the social war the revolters invaded
it with a fleet of a hundred sail. --Tourreil.
3 By Menelaus! ]--Monsieur Tourreil says that this Menelaus was
the brother of Philip by another marriage. But though Philip and hi*
brother were not on good terms, yet it is not likely that the Athenians
would have trusted one so nearly allied to their enemy. --Olivet.
4 From your voices. ]--The regular method of choosing all officers.
However, the choice was sometimes left to the commander-in-chief. --
Tourreil.
5 Perhaps you are fully, dec. ]--It is not impossible hut that the people
might have been struck with the freedom and candour of the orator, and
given some marks of their approbation.
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? PHILIPPIC THE FIRST.
49
would rather hear me on another point,--that of the
supplies; what we are to raise, and from what funds.
To this I now proceed. The sum, therefore, neces-
sary for the maintenance of these forces, that the sol-
diers may be supplied with grain, is somewhat above
ninety talentsto the ten galleys forty talents, that
each vessel may have a monthly allowance of twenty
minae; to the two thousand foot the same sum, that
each soldier may receive ten drachmae a month for
corn to the two hundred horse, for a monthly allow-
ance of thirty drachmas each, twelve talents. And
let it not be thought a small convenience that the sol-
diers are supplied with grain; for I am clearly satis-
fied, that if such a provision be made, the war itself
will supply them with every thing else, so as to com-
plete their appointment, and this without any injury
to the Greeks or allies; and I myself am ready to sail
with them, and to answer for the consequence with
my life should it prove otherwise. From what funds
the sum which I propose may be supplied shall now
be explained. * * * *
[Here the secretary of the assembly reads a scheme for raismg fne sup-
plies, and proposes it to the people in form in the name of the orator. ]
These are the supplies,2 Athenians, in our power to
1 Ninety talents. ]--The Attic talent is computed by Tourreil equal to
167(. 10>>. ; by Prideaux, to 1887. <<s. ; by Arbuthnot, to 193Z. 15s. It con-
tained sixty mine, and each mina one hundred drachmae. By the com-
putation of the orator, it appears that the provisions he recomnlends to
be supplied were to last one year. --Mounteney.
2 These are the supplies, &c. i-- Dionysius of Halicarnassus gives us
the rest of this oration as a sixth Philippic, pronounced in the archonship
of Themistoeles. But it appears to me. as well as to the other inter-
preters, a natural conclusion of the first Philippic; and therefore I could
Dotprevail on myself to separate them. --Tourreil.
The scholiast is of the same opinion, and flatly accuses Dionysius of a
mistake. Mr. Mounteney has expressed greater deference for this critic.
He supposes that this second part is not that which Dionysius quotes,
but that there was another oration, since lost, which began with fha
same words; for he observes, that the former part is plainly imperfect ot
itself, and the two parts are joined in all the copies and manuscripts, and
that naturally and consistently.
T must confess, with all submission to these authorities, that although
I could not presume to separate them, yet I am not quite satisfied that
these two parts are one oration. In the first place, J cannot think that
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? 60 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
raise. And when you come to give your voices, de
termine on some effectual provision,1 that you may
oppose Philip, not by decrees and letters only, but by
actions; and, in my opinion, your plan of operation
and every tiling relating to your armament will be
much more happily adjusted if the situation of the
country which is to be the scene of action be taken
into the account; and if you reflect that the winds and
seasons have greatly contributed to the rapidity of
Philip's conquests, that he watches the blowing of
the Etesians2 and the severity of the winter, and forms
the first Philippic would end abruptly if this second part was away; for
we find in the first part all that the orator proposes to speak to in the
beginning; and it concludes, not unlike a speech in parliament, with a
motion in form, for such and such subsidies to be raised for the mainte-
nance of such and sucn forces. And as to the manner in which the second
part begins, supposing it a distinct oration, we cannot object to that, as
Dionysius quotes an oration beginning exactly in the same manner (see
his letter to Ammius). It might also be observed, that in the beginning
of the oration, having for some time exhorted the Athenians to change
their conduct and act with vigour, Demosthenes says expressly that he
intends to speak no more on that subject, and yet this second part is en
tirely taken up with it; and lastly, there are some passages in the second
part which, I suspect, do not agree to the particular time when the first
oration against Philip was pronounced; and I imagine that some editors
were sensible of this by their placing the Olynthiac orations before this,
which is called the first Philippic. These passages I shall take notice
of as they occur.
As to any similitude between the two parts, I apprehend that is no
more than what runs through all these orations, and may be accounted
for from the similitude of the subject, without joining them. But if this
second part be really a distinct oration, spoken after the destruction of
Olynthus (for this city was taken the y sar before the archonship of The-
mistocles), how comes it that this event is not mentioned in it? It had
just then thrown the Athenians into the greatest consternation; and as
it was the orator's business to encourage them, possibly he might have
kept it out of view on purpose; though, perhaps, he does bint at it ob-
scurely, and as far as was consistent with prudence, as I shall observe
by-and-by.
1 Effectual provision. ]--In the Greek it is & av bitiv apcaicft x^porofn-
care, choose those things which may be agreeable to you. I own I do
not see how their entering into the resolution they liked best would of
consequence enable them to opposo Philip effectually. Perhaps it might
be of disservice, for in other places the orator is ever cautioning them
against following the bent of their inclinations. If we should make a
very small alteration in the text, and for apcoKii read apiece-^, those things
which may be si{fficient for your purposes, I apprehend the sense would
be better and more agreeable to Demosthenes. I have taken the liberty
to translate after this reading.
2 of the Etesians. ]--Winds which blew regularly every year at Uw
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? PHILIPPIC THE FIRST.
51
his sieges when it is impossible for us to bring up our
forces,--it is your part then to consider this, and not
to carry on the war by occasional detachments (they
will ever arrive too late), but by a regular army con-
stantly kept up. And for winter-quarters you may
command Lemnos, and Thassus, and Sciathus, and
the adjacent islands, in which there are ports, and pro-
visions, and all things necessary for the soldiery in
abundance. As to the season of the year in which we
may land our forces with the greatest ease, and be in
no danger from the winds, either on the coast to which
we are bound, or at the entrance of those harbours
where we may put in for provisions, this will be easily
discovered. In what manner and at what time our
forces are to act their general will determine, accord-
ing to the j unctures of affairs. What you are to per-
form on your part is contained in the decree I have
now proposed. And if you, will be persuaded, Athe-
nians, first, to raise these supplies which I have recom-
mended ! then, to proceed to your other preparations,
your infantry, navy, and cavalry; and lastly, to con-
fine your forces by a law to that service which is
appointed to them, reserving the care and distribution
of their money to yourselves, and strictly examining
into the conduct of the general;--then your time will
be no longer wasted in continual debates on the same
subject, and scarcely to any purpose; then you will
deprive him of the most considerable of his revenues,
for his arms are now supported by seizing and making
prizes of those who pass the seas. But is this all ?
No. - You shall also be secure from his attempts;
not a. when some time since1 he fell on Lemnos and
rising of the dog-star, wh^n the Greeks were obliged to retire from action
on accc '*nt of the excessive heats, and which, as they biew from the
north, of consequence opposed any attempt of invading Macedon, or send-
ing any forces to those pans which were the seat of Philip's wars at
(tret.
I Not as when some time since, &c. ]--If this be really a part of the
fh*. t Philippic, these hostilities must have preceded the attempt on Ther-
mopylae, else the orator could not have dis'ingnished them into thost
which happened some time ago, and that ornmitted lately. Now, I can-
Vol. I -- E
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? 62
ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
Imbrus, and carried away your citizens in chains; not
as when he surprised your vessels at Gerastus, and
spoiled them of an unspeakable quantity of riches;
not as when lately he made a descent on the coast of
Marathon, and carried off our sacred galleywhile
you could neither oppose these insults, nor detach
your forces at such junctures as were thought con-
venient.
And now, Athenians, what is the reason, think ye,
that the public festivals2 in honour of Minerva and of
Bacchus are always celebrated at the appointed time,
whether the direction of them falls to the lot of men
of eminence or of persons less distinguished--festi-
vals which cost more treasure than is usually ex-
pended on a whole navy, and more numbers and
greater preparations than any one, perhaps, ever cost,
--while your expeditions have been all too late, as
that to Methone, that to Pegasse, that to Potidaea ?
The reason is this: every thing relating to the former
is ascertained by law, and every one of you knows
not tell how to reconcile such open acts of hostility with the other parts
of Philip's conduct at that time. There was a peace subsisting between
him and the Athenians which he affected to observe; and so far does he
appear from making any open and professed attack on them, that in the
taking ofPotidaea and Pydna he would not act as principal, but as ally to
the Olynthians, and, when these cities were taken, dismissed the Athe
Mian garrisons with all imaginable respect and honour; and on all occa
sions courted and cajoled the Athenians. This, then, is one of those
passages which I suspect do not agree to the particular time when the
first Philippic was spoken. But if we suppose that this, which I call the
second part, is really the oration which Dionysius quotes, and which was
spoken to engage the Athenians to defend the islanders and the cities of
the Hellespont against the attempts of Philip, then all the difficulty van
ishes. The hostilities here mentioned agree very well to a time of open
war. Now, Diodorus Siculus informs us, that it was after Olynthus
was taken that the Athenians declared war against Philip in form; and
we find, that immediately on this, he attacked them and their tributary
states with such fury that they were soon glad to sue for peace.
1 Our sacred galley. ]--There were two of these appropriated to reli
gious ceremonies, and all extraordinary emergencies and occasions of
the state,--the Paralian and the Salaminian.
prefer* to these orations that Demosthenes takes many occasions of
extolling the efforts of Athens to reduce the Spartan power, and to regain
that sovereignty which tl. sy lost by the victory of Lysander at JEgos-
Potamos. These efforts he every where represents as high instances of
magnanimity and public spirit: though revenge and jealousy had no less
share in them. The victories which the Athenians gained over Sparta
at Corinth, Naxos, Ac. , and which he here alludes to, happened about
twenty-four years before the date of this oration ; so that he might well
appeal to the memories of many persons present.
2 The numerous armies, Ac. ]--The number of Philip's threes at that
time amounted to twenty thousand foot and three thousand horse; a
great army compared with those of the Greeks. At their march to Mara-
thon the Athenians could not assemble more than '<"i thousand force*.
--Tourreil.
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? PHILIPPIC THE FIRST. 39
gaged in those enterprises which are now crowned
with success; nor could he have raised himself to
this pitch of greatness. No, Athenians, he knew this
well, that all these places are but prizes,1 laid between
the combatants, and ready for the conqueror: that
the dominions of the absent devolve naturally to those
who are in the field; the possessions of the supine to
the active and intrepid. Animated by these senti-
ments, he overturns whole countries; he holds all
people in subjection: some, as by the right of con-
quest ; others, under the title of allies and confede-
rates ; for all are willing to confederate with those
whom they see prepared and resolved to exert them-
selves as they ought.
And if you, my countrymen, will now at length be
persuaded to entertain the like sentiments; if each of
you, renouncing all evasions, will be ready to approve
himself a useful citizen, to the utmost that his station
and abilities demand; if the rich will be ready to con
tribute, and the young to take the field. in one word,
if you will be yourselves, and banish those vain hopes
which every single person entertains, that while so
many others are engaged in public business,his service
will not be required; you then (if Heaven so pleases)
shall regain your dominions, recall those opportunities
your supineness hath neglected, and chastise the inso-
lence of this man: for you are not to imagine that,
like a god, he is to enjoy his present greatness for
ever fixed and unchangeable. No, Athenians, there
are who hate him, who fear him, who envy him, even
among those seemingly the most attached to his
cause. These are passions common to mankind;
noi must we think that his friends only are exempted
from them. It is true they lie concealed at present,
as our indolence deprives them of all resource. But
let us shake off this indolence; for you see how we
1 But prizes, &c. ]--His hearers were of all others most devoted to
public games and entertainments, and must therefore have been par*
ticularly sensible of the beauty of this image.
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? 40 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
are situated; you see the outrageous arrogance of
this man, who does not leave it to your choice whether
you shall act or remain quiet: but braves you with
his menaces; and talks, as we are informed,1 in a
strain of the highest extravagance ; and is not able
to rest satisfied with his present acquisitions, but is
ever in pursuit of further conquests; and while we
sit down, inactive and irresolute, encloses us on all
sides with his toils.
When, therefore, O my countrymen! when will
you exert your vigour 1 When roused by some event ?
when forced by some necessity ? What then are we
to think of our present condition 1 To freemen, the
disgrace attending on misconduct is, in my opinion,
the most urgent necessity. Or say, is it your sole
ambition to wander through the public places, each
inquiring of the other, " What new advices V Can
any thing be more new than that a man of Macedon
should conquer the Athenians, and give law to
Greece ? --" Is Philip dead ? "2--" No, but in great dan-
ger. " How are you concerned in those rumours ?
Suppose he should meet some fatal stroke; you
would soon raise up another Philip, if your interests
1 And talks, as we are informed, &C. 1--The success which had hith
erto attended Philip's arms must naturally have inspired him with those
designs which he afterward executed against the Athenians; and
resentment of their late opposition at Thermopylae might have made him
less careful to conceal them, at least in his own court. This the orator
represents as arrogant and extravagant menaces: not that a man who
had so just a conception of the weakness of the Athenian politics, and
the vigour and abilities of their enemy, could really believe such designs
extravagant and romantic ; but it was part of his' address sometimes to
avoid shocking the national vanity of his countrymen. After all their
losses, and amid all their indolence, they could not entertain a thought
so mortifying, as that the conquerors of Persia and the arbiters of Greece
could ever see their liberty essentially affected, or their power and glory
entirely wrested from them by a king of Macedon.
2 Is Philip dead These rumours and inquiries of the Athenians were
occasioned by the wound Philip received at Methone, the year before, and
which was followed by a dangerous fit of sickness. Louginus quotes this
whole passage as a beautiful instance of those pathetic figures which
jive life and force and energy to an oration. --Tourreil.
The English reader will tnd the remark in sect. 18. of Mr. Smith'!
translation.
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? PHILIPPIC THE FIRST.
41
are thus regarded: for it is not to his own strength
that he so much owes his elevation as to oursupine-
ness. And should some accident' affect him, should
Fortune, who hath ever been more careful of the
state than we ourselves, now repeat her favours;
(and may she thus crown them! ) be assured of this,
that by being on the spot, ready to take advantage of
the confusion, you will every where be absolute mas-
ters : but in your present disposition, even if a
favourable juncture should present you with Am-
phipolis,2 you could not take possession of it while
1 Some accident, &c. If he should die. ]--"This is plainly the sense of
It: btu it must be expressed covertly, as Demosthenes has done, not to
transgress against that decorum which, Cicero says, this orator made his
first rule. For there were certain things which the ancients presumed
not to express, but in terms obscure and gentle, that they might not pro-
nounce what were called verba male ominata. They did not dare to say
to any person. If you should be killed ; if you should die: they concealed
as much as possible the melancholy and odious idea of an approaching,
or even of a distant death. The Greeks said << rt iraQois ; the Romans, st
quid humanitus contingat. --Olivet.
2 Present you with Amphipolis, &c. ]--They had nothing more at heart
than the recovery of this city. So that the orator here gives the last and
most heightening stroke to his description of their indolence. --Tourreil.
And at the same time, by artfully hinting at such an event as possible,
he rouses their attention, and enlivens their hopes and expectations.
The Italian commentatorillustrates this passage in the following man
ner: a Monet orator, quod quamvis accidat, ejusdeni (sc. Amphipolis),
compotes fieri, ipsis tamen non satis id fore ad turbandas res Macedom-
cas; cum aliis tot locis, quee memoravimus, privati, ad tan tam rernm
molem parum opis habere possint, ex una duntaxat civitate. " Accord-
ingly, the passage before us has been rendered to this effect; " If some
favourable conjuncture should deliver up Amphipolis to you, &c. , you
could not receive the least benefit from the possession, with respect to
Macedon. " The assertion of the orator, as expressed in the present trans-
lation, has been pronounced extraordinary, and the argument inconclusive.
The substance, therefore, of the present argument I shall here endeavour
to collect: " You are all earnest to be informed whether Philip be dead
or no. But, unless you change your measures, his death or life can
make no difference, or prove of any consequence. Indeed, if some acci-
dent should take him off, nothing more would be necessary to give you
the full advantage of the confusion which such an event must occasion
than to appear on the frontier of Macedon with a powerful force. This
would make you absolute masters of the country. But in your present
circumstances, what would itavail, even if such a favourable incident as
that of Philip's death should give you an opportunity of recovering Am-
phipolis ? So important an acquisition (which would in a great measure
enable you to command all Macedon) must still be lost; unless you had
yoor forces ready, you could not take possession of itWhether there
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? 42 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
this suspense prevails in your designs and in your
councils.
And now, as to the necessity of a general vigour
and alacrity; of this you must be fully persuaded :
this point, therefore, I shall urge no further. But the
nature of the armament which, I think, will extricate
you from the present difficulties, the numbers to be
raised, the subsidies required for their support, and
all the other necessaries ; how they may (in my opin-
ion) be best and most expeditiously provided; these
things 1 shall endeavour to explain. --But here I make
this request, Athenians--that you would not be pre-
cipitate, but suspend your judgment till you have
heard me fully. And if, at first, I seem to propose a
new kind of armament, let it not be thought that I
am delaying your affairs: for it is not they who cry
out "Instantly! this moment! " whose counsels suit
the present juncture (as it is not possible to repel
violences already committed by any occasional de-
tachment) ; but he who will show you of what kind
that armament must be, how great, and how sup-
ported, which may subsist until we yield to peace, or
be any thing unreasonable in this assertion, or impertinent in this argu-
ment, must be submitted to the reader. Withdeference to his judgment,
1 must declare that it appears to me to have rather more force, and to set
the fatal consequence of the indolence and irresolution of the Athenians
in a stronger light, than the other interpretation, whose propriety may be
at once determined by comparing the passage with the sentence imme-
diately preceding. In that the orator declares, that in case of Philip's
death, the Athenians had no more to do but to appear on the frontier of
Macedon, in order to gain the absolute dis1wsal of the affairs of that king-
dom : 100*071 nXrtfftov ficvovttg, &namv av rois iroayfiaat rtraoay pivois
tmofavtzs, bmas povXtaBt StoiKriaaiaBt. We must therefore be at some
pains to clear Demosthenes of the suspicion of inconsistency, if the very
next sentence be understood as containing a declaration, That although
the Athenians should not only appear on the borders of Macedon, but
there possess themselves of a post of the utmost consequence, still they
could derive no advantage from their acquisition--far from having the
whole kingdom at their disposal. What seems to have tempted the Ital-
ian commentator to suggest this interpretation is the expression diSovrvw
tuiv rwv Kaipwv ApQiirohv--if some conjunctures should oivK you
Amphipolis; which he takes in a literal sense. But the genius of spir-
ited eloquence, and of our orator in particular, fully warrants us tc
regard it only as a lively figure, and to understand no more by giving, up
than affording a favourable opportunity of gaining.
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? PHILIPPIC THE FIRST.
43
until our enemies sink beneath our arms; for thus
only can we be secured from future dangers. --These
things, I think, I can point out: not that I would pre-
vent any other person from declaring his opinion.
--Thus far am I engaged: how I can acquit myself
will immediately appear: to your judgments I appeal.
First, then, Athenians, I say that you should fit out
fifty ships of war; and then resolve, that on the first
emergency you will embark yourselves. To these I
insist that you must add transport and other neces-
sary vessels sufficient for half our horse. Thus far
we should be provided against those sudden excur-
sions from his own kingdom to Thermopylae, to the
Chersonesus,1 to Olynthus,2 to whatever places he
thinks proper. For of this he should necessarily be
persuaded, that possibly you may break out from this
immoderate . indolence, and fly to some scene of
action ; as you did to Eubcea/ and formerly, as we
1 To the Chersonesus. ]--The year before, Cersobleptes, unable to
defend this country against Philip, had put the Athenians in possession
of it. Cardia, one of the chief cities, refused to acknowledge these new
sovereigns, and had recourse to the protection of Philip, who, under pre-
tence of supporting them, carried his arms into the Chersonesus. --
Towrreil.
2 To Olynthus. ]--Philip had already committed some acts of hostility
against this state, but had not as yet formed the siege of Olynthus, or
taken anymeasures tending to it; for in such acase Demosthenes would
not have touched so lightly on an enterprise which he afterward dwells
on so often and with so much force. --Towrreil.
9 To Eubcea, ice]--Mons. Tourrreil translates this passage thus : " et
qu'il risque de retrouver en vous ces memes Atheniens qu'il rencontra
sur son chemin en Eubee," &c. (for which there is no warrant in the
original); and taking for granted that all the expeditions here mentioned
were made against Philip, he endeavours to settle the date of this to Eu-
bcea by conjecture. But it does not appear from history that Philip car-
ried his arms into that island before his attempt on Thermopyiie. In the
three succeeding Olynthiac orations there is not the least mention of such
a thing, though there is a particular recital of his expeditions in the third,
and though afterward the orator inveighs loudly against his hostile
attempts in Eubcea. T apprehend, therefore, that the expedition hinted at
in this place was that which the Athenians made about seven years
before in favour of the Eubceans against Thebes ; when in five days they
brought an army into Eubcea, and in thirty obliged the Thebans to come
to terms, and evacuate the island (according to iEschines). Demos-
thenes mentions this in other places ; particularly about the end of the
oration on the state of the Chersonesus, where he quotes part of the
Vol. I. --D
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? 44
ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
are told, to Haliartus,1 and but now to Thermopylae. '
But although we should not act with all this vigour
(which yet I must regard as our indispensable duty),
speech made byTimotheus to encourage the Athenians to this expedi
tion.
In the above note I have endeavoured to suggest some reasons why the
expeditions here alluded to could not have been made against Philip. But
it has been affirmed, that if this were so it would be almost impertinent
in our orator to mention them; that, as facts, they must be found spirit-
less, if taken in a general sense; and, as arguments, inconclusive.
The translator can with sincerity declare, that if any representation of
his tends in the least to depreciate the value of the great original, he
readily gives it up as utterly erroneous and indefensible. But at the same
time, he must observe, that if it be a fault to make use of such facts and
such arguments, it is a fault which Demosthenes has frequently com
mitted. Thus he speaks of the vigorous opposition of his countrymen to
the Lacedemonians; of their marching against the Corinthians and
Megareans; of their expelling the Thebans from Eubcea, &c . In the
second Philippic oration he tells his countrymen that the Macedonian
must regard them asihe great and strenuous defenders of fireece; because
he must be informed of the spirit which their ancestors discovered in the
days of his predecessor Alexander. If we are not to allow the orator to
reason from the conduct of his contemporaries, on former occasions, to
the conduct which they ought to pursue, or which maybe expected from
hem in their contest with Philip, what shall we say of an argument
deduced from their ancestors in the heroic age of Athena? The truth
seems to be, that although the facts supposed to be alluded to in this
passage had been passed over by historians (which I cannot admit), yet
we are not from hence to conclude that ihey had no weight or import-
ance in the Athenian assembly. We are not to judge of the light in
which they appeared there from the obscurity into which distance of
time and place may have now cast them. The reasons of this are
obvious.
t To Haliartus. ]--Tourreil refers this to some action which he sup-
poses might have happened in Bceotia in the course of the Phocian war,
and in which the Athenians might have had their share of the honour
But from the text it should seem that the event alluded to must have
happened at some considerable distance of time, and have descended to
the orator by tradition. About forty years before this oration, when
Thebes' and Sparta began to quarrel, Lysander, the Spartan general,
threatened the Thebans with a very dangerous war, and began with
laying siege to this city of Haliartus. The Thebans applied for aid to
the Athenians, which they readily granted (though the Thebans had
just before pressed for the utter demolition of their state), and obliged
Pausanias to raise the siege, alter Lysander had been killed. I appre-
hend that this is the expedition here alluded to. It was the more remark-
able as the Athenian power was then at the lowest ebb. "You, Athe-
nians ! " says Demosthenes in his oration on the Crown, "at a time
when the Lacedemonians had the absolute command both at sea and
land; when Attica was quite encompassed with their commanders and
their garrisons; when Eubcea, Tanagra, all Bceotia, Megara, JEgina,
Cleone, and the other islands were in their possession; when the state
bad not one ship, not one wall, ye marched out to Haliartus. " dec.
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? PHILIPPIC THE FIRST.
45
still the measures I propose will have their use: as
his fears may keep him quiet, when he knows we are
prepared (and this he will know, for there are too
many1 among ourselves who inform him of every
thing); or if he should despise our armament, his secu-
rity may prove fatal to him; as it will be absolutely
in our power, at the first favourable juncture, to
make a descent on his own coasts.
These, then, are the resolutions I propose, these the
provisions it will become you to make. And I pro-
nounce it still further necessary to raise some other
forces, which may harass him with perpetual incur-
sions. Talk not of your ten thousands, or twenty
thousands of foreigners; of those armies which2 ap-
pear so magnificent on paper; but let them be the
natural forces of the state ; and if you choose a
single person, if a number, if this particular man, or
whomever you appoint as general, let them be
entirely under his guidance and authority. I also
move you that subsistence be provided for them.
But as to the quality, the numbers, the maintenance
of this body--how are these points to be settled f--
I now proceed to speak of each of them distinctly.
The body of infantry, therefore,--but here give me
1 Too many, &c. ]--He glances particularly at Aristndemus and
Neoptolemus. As to jEschines, he bad not been with Philip till six
years after. --Tourreil.
2 Those armies which, Ac. ]--In the Greek it is emaroXiiiaiovi Ivvafitis.
--Instead of enumerating the various senses in which the commentators
interpret this expression, I shall copy an observation on it by the Abbe
D'Olivet, whose interpretation I have followed ;--" I have without any
refinement chosen a plain expression, which seems to hit the thought of
Demosthenes directly, and to paint strongly the bitter ridicule of the pas-
sage. " It was usual for the Athenians, on any emergency, to write to
all quarters to demand soldiers. They were answered, that in such a
place such a number would be provided : from another place so many
more might be expected. But in the end it appeared that these were by
no means so many effective men. There were great abatements to be
made from the numbers promised ; and we find besides, from this oration,
that these foreigners were not paid at all, or ill paid; so that these grand
armies were nowhere complete but in the letters written to demand them
on one part and to promise them on the other.
If I am not mistaken,
this is what Demosthenes calls Swafitis tmcroXifiaiovs--armies which
exist only in letters.
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? 46
ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
leave to warn you of an error which hath often proved
injurious to you. Think not that your preparations
never can be too magnificent; great and terrible in
your decrees, in execution weak and contemptible.
Let your preparations, let your supplies at first be
moderate, and add to these if you find them not suf
ficient. I say, then, that the whole body of infantry
should be two thousand; of these, that five hundred
should be Athenians of such an age as you shall think
proper, and with a stated time for service, not long
but such as that others may have their turn of duty.
Let the rest be formed of foreigners. To these you
are to add two hundred horse, fifty of them at least
Athenians, to serve in the same manner as the foot.
For these you are to provide transports. And now
what further preparations ? Ten light galleys; for as
he hath a naval power,1 we must be provided with
light vessels, that our troops may have a secure
convoy.
But whence are these forces to be subsisted ? This -
I shall explain when I have first given my reasons
why I think such numbers sufficient, and why I have
advised that we should serve in person. As to the
numbers, Athenians, my reason is this: it is not at
present in our power to provide a force able to meet
him in the open field, but we must harass him by
depredations: thus the war must be carried on at first
We therefore cannot think of raising a prodigious
army (for such we have neither pay nor provisions),
nor must our forces be absolutely mean. And I have
proposed that citizens should join in the service, and
help to man our fleet, because 1 am informed that
some time since the state maintained a body of aux-
iliaries at Corinth,2 which Polystratus commanded,3
1 As be bath a naval power. ]--In consequence of his engagements
with the Thessalians, he commanded their ports and ships.
2 At Corinth. ]--This was in the same war which he alludes to in the
beginning of the oration Corinth was appointed as the place of general
rendezvous for the OreeKS who confederated against Sparta.
3 Which Polystratus commanded. ]--Instead of Polystratus, which )?
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? PHILIPPIC #HE FIRST.
47
and Iphicrates, and Chabriaa, and some others; that
you yourselves served with them; and that the united
efforts of these auxiliary and domestic forces gained
a considerable victory over the Lacedaemonians. But
ever since our armies have been formed of foreigners
alone, their victories have been over our allies and
confederates, while our enemies have risen to an ex-
travagance of power. And these armies, with scarcely
the slightest attention to the service of the state, sail
orf to fight for Artabazus,1 or any other person, and
their general follows them. Nor should we wonder
at it; for he cannot command who cannot pay his
soldiers. What, then, do I recommend? That you
should take away all pretences, both from generals
and from soldiers, by a regular payment of the army,
and by incorporating domestic forces with the aux-
iliaries, to be, as it were, inspectors into the conduct
of the commanders; for at present our manner of
acting is even ridiculous. If a man should ask, "Are
you at peace, Athenians 1" the answer would imme-
diately be, " By no means; we are at war with
Philic2 Have not we chosen the usual generals and
I name little known in history, Monsieur Tourreil proposes to read Cal-
listratus, who, according to Xenophon and Diodorus, was colleague to
Iphicrates and Chabrias in the war of Corcyra. But, as Mr. Mounteney
has observed, Polystratus is again mentioned by Demosthenes, together
with Iphicrates, in the oration on the immunities ; so that it is probable
this is the true reading.
I To fight for Artabazus. ]--He here alludes to an affair which had
happened some time before, and had occasioned great commotion. The
Athenians had sent Chares at the head of a powerful force to reduce
Byzantium, Cos, and Chios, which had revolted from them. But this
general, when he had a prospect of success in that enterprise, suffered
himself to be corrupted by Artabazus, a rebellious satrap of Asia, and
assisted him against an army of seventy thousand men. Chares
received a reward proportioned to the service; but this action raised the
indignation of the Athenians, as he had not only deserted the cause of the
republic, but also incensed the King of Persia. Demosthenes, however,
here shifts the blame from Chares to his soldiers, who refused to obey
him, or rather to the people, who took no care to provide for their pay. --
Tourreil.
2 We are at war with Philip. ]--So the orator affects to speak; though
I apprehend it does not appear from history that they were at that time
directly at war with him. They had, indeed, joined with the Phnciana,
and Philip was at the head of the opposite confederacy Thus far they
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? 48 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
officers1 both of horse and foot ? " And of what use
are all these, except the single person whom you
send to the field? The rest attend your priests in
their processions. So that, as if you formed so many
men of clay, you make your officers for show, and
not for service. My countrymen! should not all
these generals have been chosen from your own body,
all these several officers from your own body, that
our force might be really Athenian ? And yet, for an
expedition in favour of Lemnos,2 the general must be
a citizen, while troops engaged in defence of our own
territories are commanded by Menelaus ! 3 I say not
this to detract from his merit; but to whomsoever
this command had been intrusted, surely he should
have derived it from your voices. 4
Perhaps you are fully5 sensible of these truths, but
were engaged against each other, though neither of them as principals in
the quarrel. The Athenians, indeed, might have made some attempts to
tecover Amphipolis; they certainly made some^ineffeclual preparations
to relieve Potidaea and Methone; and after Philip's attempt on Ther-
mopylae, did station some forces on their frontiers'to oppose him in case
he renewed his attack. But still the war was not declared in form. But
of this I shall speak more hereafter.
1 The usual generals and officers. ]--In the text they are mentioned
particularly. Ten taxiarchs (arparriyot, or generals) and phylarchs, and
two hipparchs. Each of the ten tribes chose a new general every year,
and each of these (originally, when all went to the field) had the com-
mand for one day in his turn. Philip was very pleasant on this number
of commanders. " I never," said he, " could find but one general," mean-
ing Parmenio; "but the Athenians can get ten every year. " Anciently,
the people on extraordinary occasions chose a polemarch, to determine
when the opinions of the generals were equally divided. The taxiarch
commanded the infantry, the phylarch the cavalry of his tribe. The
whole body of horse was divided into two corps, each of which was
commanded by a general of horse, or hipparch. --Tourreil.
2 In favour of Lemnos. ]--When in the social war the revolters invaded
it with a fleet of a hundred sail. --Tourreil.
3 By Menelaus! ]--Monsieur Tourreil says that this Menelaus was
the brother of Philip by another marriage. But though Philip and hi*
brother were not on good terms, yet it is not likely that the Athenians
would have trusted one so nearly allied to their enemy. --Olivet.
4 From your voices. ]--The regular method of choosing all officers.
However, the choice was sometimes left to the commander-in-chief. --
Tourreil.
5 Perhaps you are fully, dec. ]--It is not impossible hut that the people
might have been struck with the freedom and candour of the orator, and
given some marks of their approbation.
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? PHILIPPIC THE FIRST.
49
would rather hear me on another point,--that of the
supplies; what we are to raise, and from what funds.
To this I now proceed. The sum, therefore, neces-
sary for the maintenance of these forces, that the sol-
diers may be supplied with grain, is somewhat above
ninety talentsto the ten galleys forty talents, that
each vessel may have a monthly allowance of twenty
minae; to the two thousand foot the same sum, that
each soldier may receive ten drachmae a month for
corn to the two hundred horse, for a monthly allow-
ance of thirty drachmas each, twelve talents. And
let it not be thought a small convenience that the sol-
diers are supplied with grain; for I am clearly satis-
fied, that if such a provision be made, the war itself
will supply them with every thing else, so as to com-
plete their appointment, and this without any injury
to the Greeks or allies; and I myself am ready to sail
with them, and to answer for the consequence with
my life should it prove otherwise. From what funds
the sum which I propose may be supplied shall now
be explained. * * * *
[Here the secretary of the assembly reads a scheme for raismg fne sup-
plies, and proposes it to the people in form in the name of the orator. ]
These are the supplies,2 Athenians, in our power to
1 Ninety talents. ]--The Attic talent is computed by Tourreil equal to
167(. 10>>. ; by Prideaux, to 1887. <<s. ; by Arbuthnot, to 193Z. 15s. It con-
tained sixty mine, and each mina one hundred drachmae. By the com-
putation of the orator, it appears that the provisions he recomnlends to
be supplied were to last one year. --Mounteney.
2 These are the supplies, &c. i-- Dionysius of Halicarnassus gives us
the rest of this oration as a sixth Philippic, pronounced in the archonship
of Themistoeles. But it appears to me. as well as to the other inter-
preters, a natural conclusion of the first Philippic; and therefore I could
Dotprevail on myself to separate them. --Tourreil.
The scholiast is of the same opinion, and flatly accuses Dionysius of a
mistake. Mr. Mounteney has expressed greater deference for this critic.
He supposes that this second part is not that which Dionysius quotes,
but that there was another oration, since lost, which began with fha
same words; for he observes, that the former part is plainly imperfect ot
itself, and the two parts are joined in all the copies and manuscripts, and
that naturally and consistently.
T must confess, with all submission to these authorities, that although
I could not presume to separate them, yet I am not quite satisfied that
these two parts are one oration. In the first place, J cannot think that
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? 60 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
raise. And when you come to give your voices, de
termine on some effectual provision,1 that you may
oppose Philip, not by decrees and letters only, but by
actions; and, in my opinion, your plan of operation
and every tiling relating to your armament will be
much more happily adjusted if the situation of the
country which is to be the scene of action be taken
into the account; and if you reflect that the winds and
seasons have greatly contributed to the rapidity of
Philip's conquests, that he watches the blowing of
the Etesians2 and the severity of the winter, and forms
the first Philippic would end abruptly if this second part was away; for
we find in the first part all that the orator proposes to speak to in the
beginning; and it concludes, not unlike a speech in parliament, with a
motion in form, for such and such subsidies to be raised for the mainte-
nance of such and sucn forces. And as to the manner in which the second
part begins, supposing it a distinct oration, we cannot object to that, as
Dionysius quotes an oration beginning exactly in the same manner (see
his letter to Ammius). It might also be observed, that in the beginning
of the oration, having for some time exhorted the Athenians to change
their conduct and act with vigour, Demosthenes says expressly that he
intends to speak no more on that subject, and yet this second part is en
tirely taken up with it; and lastly, there are some passages in the second
part which, I suspect, do not agree to the particular time when the first
oration against Philip was pronounced; and I imagine that some editors
were sensible of this by their placing the Olynthiac orations before this,
which is called the first Philippic. These passages I shall take notice
of as they occur.
As to any similitude between the two parts, I apprehend that is no
more than what runs through all these orations, and may be accounted
for from the similitude of the subject, without joining them. But if this
second part be really a distinct oration, spoken after the destruction of
Olynthus (for this city was taken the y sar before the archonship of The-
mistocles), how comes it that this event is not mentioned in it? It had
just then thrown the Athenians into the greatest consternation; and as
it was the orator's business to encourage them, possibly he might have
kept it out of view on purpose; though, perhaps, he does bint at it ob-
scurely, and as far as was consistent with prudence, as I shall observe
by-and-by.
1 Effectual provision. ]--In the Greek it is & av bitiv apcaicft x^porofn-
care, choose those things which may be agreeable to you. I own I do
not see how their entering into the resolution they liked best would of
consequence enable them to opposo Philip effectually. Perhaps it might
be of disservice, for in other places the orator is ever cautioning them
against following the bent of their inclinations. If we should make a
very small alteration in the text, and for apcoKii read apiece-^, those things
which may be si{fficient for your purposes, I apprehend the sense would
be better and more agreeable to Demosthenes. I have taken the liberty
to translate after this reading.
2 of the Etesians. ]--Winds which blew regularly every year at Uw
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? PHILIPPIC THE FIRST.
51
his sieges when it is impossible for us to bring up our
forces,--it is your part then to consider this, and not
to carry on the war by occasional detachments (they
will ever arrive too late), but by a regular army con-
stantly kept up. And for winter-quarters you may
command Lemnos, and Thassus, and Sciathus, and
the adjacent islands, in which there are ports, and pro-
visions, and all things necessary for the soldiery in
abundance. As to the season of the year in which we
may land our forces with the greatest ease, and be in
no danger from the winds, either on the coast to which
we are bound, or at the entrance of those harbours
where we may put in for provisions, this will be easily
discovered. In what manner and at what time our
forces are to act their general will determine, accord-
ing to the j unctures of affairs. What you are to per-
form on your part is contained in the decree I have
now proposed. And if you, will be persuaded, Athe-
nians, first, to raise these supplies which I have recom-
mended ! then, to proceed to your other preparations,
your infantry, navy, and cavalry; and lastly, to con-
fine your forces by a law to that service which is
appointed to them, reserving the care and distribution
of their money to yourselves, and strictly examining
into the conduct of the general;--then your time will
be no longer wasted in continual debates on the same
subject, and scarcely to any purpose; then you will
deprive him of the most considerable of his revenues,
for his arms are now supported by seizing and making
prizes of those who pass the seas. But is this all ?
No. - You shall also be secure from his attempts;
not a. when some time since1 he fell on Lemnos and
rising of the dog-star, wh^n the Greeks were obliged to retire from action
on accc '*nt of the excessive heats, and which, as they biew from the
north, of consequence opposed any attempt of invading Macedon, or send-
ing any forces to those pans which were the seat of Philip's wars at
(tret.
I Not as when some time since, &c. ]--If this be really a part of the
fh*. t Philippic, these hostilities must have preceded the attempt on Ther-
mopylae, else the orator could not have dis'ingnished them into thost
which happened some time ago, and that ornmitted lately. Now, I can-
Vol. I -- E
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? 62
ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
Imbrus, and carried away your citizens in chains; not
as when he surprised your vessels at Gerastus, and
spoiled them of an unspeakable quantity of riches;
not as when lately he made a descent on the coast of
Marathon, and carried off our sacred galleywhile
you could neither oppose these insults, nor detach
your forces at such junctures as were thought con-
venient.
And now, Athenians, what is the reason, think ye,
that the public festivals2 in honour of Minerva and of
Bacchus are always celebrated at the appointed time,
whether the direction of them falls to the lot of men
of eminence or of persons less distinguished--festi-
vals which cost more treasure than is usually ex-
pended on a whole navy, and more numbers and
greater preparations than any one, perhaps, ever cost,
--while your expeditions have been all too late, as
that to Methone, that to Pegasse, that to Potidaea ?
The reason is this: every thing relating to the former
is ascertained by law, and every one of you knows
not tell how to reconcile such open acts of hostility with the other parts
of Philip's conduct at that time. There was a peace subsisting between
him and the Athenians which he affected to observe; and so far does he
appear from making any open and professed attack on them, that in the
taking ofPotidaea and Pydna he would not act as principal, but as ally to
the Olynthians, and, when these cities were taken, dismissed the Athe
Mian garrisons with all imaginable respect and honour; and on all occa
sions courted and cajoled the Athenians. This, then, is one of those
passages which I suspect do not agree to the particular time when the
first Philippic was spoken. But if we suppose that this, which I call the
second part, is really the oration which Dionysius quotes, and which was
spoken to engage the Athenians to defend the islanders and the cities of
the Hellespont against the attempts of Philip, then all the difficulty van
ishes. The hostilities here mentioned agree very well to a time of open
war. Now, Diodorus Siculus informs us, that it was after Olynthus
was taken that the Athenians declared war against Philip in form; and
we find, that immediately on this, he attacked them and their tributary
states with such fury that they were soon glad to sue for peace.
1 Our sacred galley. ]--There were two of these appropriated to reli
gious ceremonies, and all extraordinary emergencies and occasions of
the state,--the Paralian and the Salaminian.
