Therefore, we shall do well to abstain from
discussing
such a lofty subject.
Bruno-Cause-Principle-and-Unity
.
SurelyIcannotstayquietifhe,themagister[master],speaks.
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
.
You say then, Teofilo, that everything which is not a first
principle and a first cause, has a principle and a cause?
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Without the slightest doubt or dispute.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Doyoubelieve,then,thatwhoeverknowsthethingscaused and principled, may know the cause and principle?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Itisnoteasyconcerningtheproximatecauseandprinciple; and it is extremely arduous, even by way of traces, when dealing with the first cause and first principle.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . So how do you conceive that things which have both a first and proximate cause and principle can be truly known if, as far as the efficient cause is concerned (which is one of the causes that contribute to the authentic knowledge of things), they remain hidden?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I confess that it is an easy thing to set out a demonstrative doctrine, but the demonstration itself is hard. It is very easy to organize the causes, modes and methods of doctrines, but our method-makers and analysts then apply their instruments, the principles of their methods and art of arts poorly.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Like men who know how to forge fine swords, but not to wield them.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Ferme[Certainly].
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Would that one could firmly shut your eyes and keep you from ever opening them again! 1
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . ThatiswhyIsaythatthenaturalphilosopherisnotrequired to produce all causes and all principles, but merely the physical ones, and among them, only those that are principal or pertinent. Therefore, although their dependence on the first cause and first principle attributes them to that cause or that principle, there is not such a necessary relation that, from the knowledge of one, we can infer a knowledge of the other, and that is why we do not require that they be discussed within a single system.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Howisthat?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Because from the knowledge of all dependent things, we cannot infer any cognition of the first principle or of the first cause, other than by the less effectual method of vestiges; seeing that everything derives from its will or goodness, which is the principle of its operation, whence proceeds the universal effect. The same can be said of artistic products, insofar as whoever sees the statue does not behold the sculptor, and the man who sees the portrait of Helen does not see Apelles, but only the result of an operation deriving from the excellence of Apelles' talent. The representation is wholly the effect of accidents and circumstances of the 1 The latin ferme is taken jokingly by Gervasio as a term related to the Italian fermare, 'to shut'.
? ? ?
Second dialogue
? substance of that man who, in terms of his absolute essence, is totally unknown.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Sothattoknowtheuniverseistoknownothingofthebeing or of the substance of the first principle, because it is like knowing the accidents of the accidents.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Correct. But I would not want you to think that I mean there are accidents in God, or that he could be known through his accidents.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Idonotascribetoyousuchdullwit,andIknowthatitisone thing to say that all things not belonging to the nature of God are accidents, and another to say they are his accidents, and still another thing to say that they are like his accidents. This last is what I believe you are claiming for the effects of the divine operation: although they are the substance of things, or rather the natural substances themselves, they are nevertheless like acci- dents that are too remote to allow us to achieve cognitive apprehension of the divine, supernatural essence.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Wellput.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Ofthedivinesubstance,therefore,becauseitisbothinfinite and extremely remote from those effects which constitute the outer limit of the path of our discursive faculty, we can know nothing, except by means of vestiges, as the Platonists say, or of remote effects, as the Peripatetics have it, or by means of garments, as the Cabalists say, or of dorsal and back parts, as the Talmudists say, or of a mirror, shadow and enigma, as the Apocalyptics claim.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Butthereismore:sincewedonotseethatuniverseperfectly, of which the substance and principle are so hard to understand, we have far less basis for knowing the first cause and principle by means of its effects than we have of knowing Apelles through the statues he creates; for we can see the entire statue and examine it part by part, but not so the vast and infinite consequence of divine power. The resemblance, then, must be understood as not involving proportionality.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . SoitisandsoIunderstandit.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? .
Therefore, we shall do well to abstain from discussing such a lofty subject.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I agree with that, because it suffices, morally and theo- logically, to know the first principle in so far as the heavenly gods have revealed it and the prophets have borne witness to it. Not only every law and every theology, but all reformed philosophies conclude that it is the
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? token of a wroth and sacrilegious spirit to rush into demanding reasons and giving definitions of things above the sphere of our intelligence.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Good. Butthesepeopledonotdeservereproach,somuchas those deserve the highest praise who strive towards the knowledge of this principle and this cause, to apprehend its grandeur as far as possible by inspecting, with the eyes of orderly consideration, those magnificent stars and luminous bodies which are so many inhabited worlds, great creatures and superlative divinities: those which seem to be, and are, innumerable worlds not very unlike that in which we find ourselves. Since it is impos- sible for them to have being in and of themselves, being composite and dissoluble (not that they are, therefore, deserving of dissolution, as was well expressed in the Timaeus), it is necessary that they have a principle and cause, and that, as consequence of the greatness of their being, living and acting, they manifest and proclaim in an infinite space and with innu- merable voices the excellence and infinite majesty of their first cause and first principle. Leaving aside, then, as you say, that speculation, since it surpasses all sense and intellect, let us look into the principle or cause insofar as, as vestige, either it is nature itself, or it shines in the element and the bosom of nature. Question me, then, methodically, if you want me to answer likewise.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . So I will. But first of all, since you frequently employ the terms 'cause' and 'principle', I would like to know whether you consider them synonymous.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . No.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . But then what difference is there between the two? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . When we say that God is first principle and first cause,
we mean one and the same thing, using different concepts, but when we speak of principles and causes in nature, we are talking of different things using different concepts. We say that God is first principle, in so far as all things come after him according to a definite order of anteriority and posteriority, in terms of either their nature, their duration or their merit. We speak of God as first cause, in so far as all things are distinct from him, as the effect from the efficient cause, and the thing produced from its producer. And these two definitions are different, because not every- thing which is prior and of higher value is the cause of what comes after it and is of lesser value, and because not every cause is prior and of higher value than that which is caused, as is clear to whoever ponders the matter carefully.
? ?
Second dialogue
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then, tell me, what difference is there between cause and principle, as far as natural things are concerned?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Although the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, nonetheless, speaking properly, not everything that is a principle is a cause. The point is the principle or origin of the line, but not its cause; the instant is the principle or origin of activity [but not the cause of the act]; the point of departure is the principle of movement, and not the cause of movement; the premises are the principles of an argument, but not its cause. 'Principle' is, thus, a more general term than 'cause'.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then, to narrow these two terms within certain proper meanings, observing the procedure of those who express themselves most correctly, I think you take 'principle' to be that which intrinsically con- tributes to the constitution of things and remains in the effect, as they say of matter and form, which remain in the composite, or else the elements from which a thing is composed and into which a thing is resolved. You call 'cause' that which contributes to the production of things from outside, and which exists outside the composition, as is the case of the efficient cause, and of the end to which the thing produced is directed.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Verygood.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Now that we have answered the question of the difference between these things, I would like you to turn your attention first to the causes, and then to the principles. Regarding the causes, I would first like to know about the first efficient cause, then the formal, which you say is linked to the efficient, and lastly the final cause, understood as the mover of the efficient cause.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Theorderofyourpropositionpleasesmeverymuch. Asfor the efficient cause, I say that the universal physical efficient cause is the uni- versal intellect, which is the first and principal faculty of the world soul, which, in turn, is the universal form of it.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You seem to me to be not only in agreement with Empedocles' opinion, but still more certain, precise, explicit and even, as far as I can see by your statements, more profound. Thus, I would appre- ciate it if you would explain in greater detail just what you conceive this universal intellect to be.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Theuniversalintellectistheinnermost,mostrealandmost proper faculty or potential part of the world soul. It is that one and the same thing that fills everything, illuminates the universe and directs nature to produce her various species suitably. It is to the production of natural
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? things what our intellect is to the production of the representations of things. The Pythagoreans call it the 'mover' and 'agitator of the universe'. As the poet has expressed:
totamque infusa per artus,
mens agitat molem, et toto se corpore miscet. 2
[pervading its members, mind stirs the whole mass and mingles with the whole body]
The Platonists call it 'world artificer'. They believe that it proceeds from the higher world, which is indeed one, to this sensible world, which is divided into many, and where, because of the separations of its parts, both harmony and discord reign. This intellect, infusing and instilling some- thing of its own into matter, while itself remaining immobile and undis- turbed, produces all things. The hermeticists say that it is 'most fecund in seeds' or yet that it is the 'seed sower', because it impregnates matter with all forms, which, according to their nature and manner of being, succeed in shaping, forming and weaving matter in ways that are so remarkable and numerous that they cannot be ascribed to chance, nor to any other princi- ple incapable of differentiation and arrangement. Orpheus calls it 'the eye of the world', because it sees both the inside and outside of all natural things, in order that they may succeed in producing and maintaining them- selves in their proper proportions, intrinsically as well as extrinsically. Empedocles calls it 'the differentiator', since it never tires of distinguish- ing the forms confused within nature's bosom, and of summoning the gen- eration of one from the corruption of another. Plotinus says it is 'the father and progenitor', because it distributes seeds in nature's field and is the proximate dispenser of forms. As for us, we call it the 'internal artificer', because it shapes matter, forming it from inside like a seed or root shoot- ing forth and unfolding the trunk, from within the trunk thrusting out the boughs, from inside the boughs the derived branches, and unfurling buds from within these. From therein it forms, fashions and weaves, as with nerves, the leaves, flowers and fruits, and it is from the inside that, at cer- tain times, it calls back its sap from the leaves and the fruits to the twigs, from the twigs to the branches, from the branch to the trunk, from the trunk to the root. Similarly, in animals, it begins by deploying its work from the seed and from the centre of the heart, towards the outer members, and from these it finally gathers back towards the heart the faculties it had 2 Virgil, Aeneid, ? ? , ? ? ? -? .
? ? ?
Second dialogue
? extended, as if it were twining up thread it had first unwound. Now, if we believe that intellect and reason are required to produce those works - dead works, so to speak - that we know how to fashion according to certain order and by imitation on the surface of matter, as when stripping and whittling a piece of wood we cause the shape of a horse to appear, how much supe- rior must we hold that artistic intellect that, from the interior of the semi- nal matter, solders together the bones, extends the cartilage, hollows the arteries, airs the pores, interweaves the fibres, branches out the nerves and arranges the whole with such praiseworthy mystery? How much greater an artificer, I say, is he who is not limited to one part of matter, but works, con- tinually present in the whole, on the whole! There are three kinds of intel- lect: the divine, which is everything, the mundane, of which we have just spoken, which makes everything, and the other, particular ones, which become everything, because a middle term is needed between the extremes, and this is the true efficient cause, not only extrinsic, but also intrinsic, of all natural things.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I would like to hear you distinguish between your concep- tion of an efficient cause as extrinsic cause, and your idea of it as intrinsic cause.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Icallacauseextrinsicwhen,asefficient,itisnotapartofthe things composed and things produced; it is intrinsic in so far as it does not operate on the matter or outside it, but in the way we have just described. Thus, it is an extrinsic cause by its being, which is distinct from the sub- stance and the essence of its effects, and because its being does not resem- ble that of things susceptible to generation and corruption, although it operates in those things; a cause is extrinsic, with regard to the action of its operation.
? ? ?
principle and a first cause, has a principle and a cause?
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Without the slightest doubt or dispute.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Doyoubelieve,then,thatwhoeverknowsthethingscaused and principled, may know the cause and principle?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Itisnoteasyconcerningtheproximatecauseandprinciple; and it is extremely arduous, even by way of traces, when dealing with the first cause and first principle.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . So how do you conceive that things which have both a first and proximate cause and principle can be truly known if, as far as the efficient cause is concerned (which is one of the causes that contribute to the authentic knowledge of things), they remain hidden?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I confess that it is an easy thing to set out a demonstrative doctrine, but the demonstration itself is hard. It is very easy to organize the causes, modes and methods of doctrines, but our method-makers and analysts then apply their instruments, the principles of their methods and art of arts poorly.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Like men who know how to forge fine swords, but not to wield them.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Ferme[Certainly].
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Would that one could firmly shut your eyes and keep you from ever opening them again! 1
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . ThatiswhyIsaythatthenaturalphilosopherisnotrequired to produce all causes and all principles, but merely the physical ones, and among them, only those that are principal or pertinent. Therefore, although their dependence on the first cause and first principle attributes them to that cause or that principle, there is not such a necessary relation that, from the knowledge of one, we can infer a knowledge of the other, and that is why we do not require that they be discussed within a single system.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Howisthat?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Because from the knowledge of all dependent things, we cannot infer any cognition of the first principle or of the first cause, other than by the less effectual method of vestiges; seeing that everything derives from its will or goodness, which is the principle of its operation, whence proceeds the universal effect. The same can be said of artistic products, insofar as whoever sees the statue does not behold the sculptor, and the man who sees the portrait of Helen does not see Apelles, but only the result of an operation deriving from the excellence of Apelles' talent. The representation is wholly the effect of accidents and circumstances of the 1 The latin ferme is taken jokingly by Gervasio as a term related to the Italian fermare, 'to shut'.
? ? ?
Second dialogue
? substance of that man who, in terms of his absolute essence, is totally unknown.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Sothattoknowtheuniverseistoknownothingofthebeing or of the substance of the first principle, because it is like knowing the accidents of the accidents.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Correct. But I would not want you to think that I mean there are accidents in God, or that he could be known through his accidents.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Idonotascribetoyousuchdullwit,andIknowthatitisone thing to say that all things not belonging to the nature of God are accidents, and another to say they are his accidents, and still another thing to say that they are like his accidents. This last is what I believe you are claiming for the effects of the divine operation: although they are the substance of things, or rather the natural substances themselves, they are nevertheless like acci- dents that are too remote to allow us to achieve cognitive apprehension of the divine, supernatural essence.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Wellput.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Ofthedivinesubstance,therefore,becauseitisbothinfinite and extremely remote from those effects which constitute the outer limit of the path of our discursive faculty, we can know nothing, except by means of vestiges, as the Platonists say, or of remote effects, as the Peripatetics have it, or by means of garments, as the Cabalists say, or of dorsal and back parts, as the Talmudists say, or of a mirror, shadow and enigma, as the Apocalyptics claim.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Butthereismore:sincewedonotseethatuniverseperfectly, of which the substance and principle are so hard to understand, we have far less basis for knowing the first cause and principle by means of its effects than we have of knowing Apelles through the statues he creates; for we can see the entire statue and examine it part by part, but not so the vast and infinite consequence of divine power. The resemblance, then, must be understood as not involving proportionality.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . SoitisandsoIunderstandit.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? .
Therefore, we shall do well to abstain from discussing such a lofty subject.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I agree with that, because it suffices, morally and theo- logically, to know the first principle in so far as the heavenly gods have revealed it and the prophets have borne witness to it. Not only every law and every theology, but all reformed philosophies conclude that it is the
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? token of a wroth and sacrilegious spirit to rush into demanding reasons and giving definitions of things above the sphere of our intelligence.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Good. Butthesepeopledonotdeservereproach,somuchas those deserve the highest praise who strive towards the knowledge of this principle and this cause, to apprehend its grandeur as far as possible by inspecting, with the eyes of orderly consideration, those magnificent stars and luminous bodies which are so many inhabited worlds, great creatures and superlative divinities: those which seem to be, and are, innumerable worlds not very unlike that in which we find ourselves. Since it is impos- sible for them to have being in and of themselves, being composite and dissoluble (not that they are, therefore, deserving of dissolution, as was well expressed in the Timaeus), it is necessary that they have a principle and cause, and that, as consequence of the greatness of their being, living and acting, they manifest and proclaim in an infinite space and with innu- merable voices the excellence and infinite majesty of their first cause and first principle. Leaving aside, then, as you say, that speculation, since it surpasses all sense and intellect, let us look into the principle or cause insofar as, as vestige, either it is nature itself, or it shines in the element and the bosom of nature. Question me, then, methodically, if you want me to answer likewise.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . So I will. But first of all, since you frequently employ the terms 'cause' and 'principle', I would like to know whether you consider them synonymous.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . No.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . But then what difference is there between the two? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . When we say that God is first principle and first cause,
we mean one and the same thing, using different concepts, but when we speak of principles and causes in nature, we are talking of different things using different concepts. We say that God is first principle, in so far as all things come after him according to a definite order of anteriority and posteriority, in terms of either their nature, their duration or their merit. We speak of God as first cause, in so far as all things are distinct from him, as the effect from the efficient cause, and the thing produced from its producer. And these two definitions are different, because not every- thing which is prior and of higher value is the cause of what comes after it and is of lesser value, and because not every cause is prior and of higher value than that which is caused, as is clear to whoever ponders the matter carefully.
? ?
Second dialogue
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then, tell me, what difference is there between cause and principle, as far as natural things are concerned?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Although the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, nonetheless, speaking properly, not everything that is a principle is a cause. The point is the principle or origin of the line, but not its cause; the instant is the principle or origin of activity [but not the cause of the act]; the point of departure is the principle of movement, and not the cause of movement; the premises are the principles of an argument, but not its cause. 'Principle' is, thus, a more general term than 'cause'.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then, to narrow these two terms within certain proper meanings, observing the procedure of those who express themselves most correctly, I think you take 'principle' to be that which intrinsically con- tributes to the constitution of things and remains in the effect, as they say of matter and form, which remain in the composite, or else the elements from which a thing is composed and into which a thing is resolved. You call 'cause' that which contributes to the production of things from outside, and which exists outside the composition, as is the case of the efficient cause, and of the end to which the thing produced is directed.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Verygood.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Now that we have answered the question of the difference between these things, I would like you to turn your attention first to the causes, and then to the principles. Regarding the causes, I would first like to know about the first efficient cause, then the formal, which you say is linked to the efficient, and lastly the final cause, understood as the mover of the efficient cause.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Theorderofyourpropositionpleasesmeverymuch. Asfor the efficient cause, I say that the universal physical efficient cause is the uni- versal intellect, which is the first and principal faculty of the world soul, which, in turn, is the universal form of it.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You seem to me to be not only in agreement with Empedocles' opinion, but still more certain, precise, explicit and even, as far as I can see by your statements, more profound. Thus, I would appre- ciate it if you would explain in greater detail just what you conceive this universal intellect to be.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Theuniversalintellectistheinnermost,mostrealandmost proper faculty or potential part of the world soul. It is that one and the same thing that fills everything, illuminates the universe and directs nature to produce her various species suitably. It is to the production of natural
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? things what our intellect is to the production of the representations of things. The Pythagoreans call it the 'mover' and 'agitator of the universe'. As the poet has expressed:
totamque infusa per artus,
mens agitat molem, et toto se corpore miscet. 2
[pervading its members, mind stirs the whole mass and mingles with the whole body]
The Platonists call it 'world artificer'. They believe that it proceeds from the higher world, which is indeed one, to this sensible world, which is divided into many, and where, because of the separations of its parts, both harmony and discord reign. This intellect, infusing and instilling some- thing of its own into matter, while itself remaining immobile and undis- turbed, produces all things. The hermeticists say that it is 'most fecund in seeds' or yet that it is the 'seed sower', because it impregnates matter with all forms, which, according to their nature and manner of being, succeed in shaping, forming and weaving matter in ways that are so remarkable and numerous that they cannot be ascribed to chance, nor to any other princi- ple incapable of differentiation and arrangement. Orpheus calls it 'the eye of the world', because it sees both the inside and outside of all natural things, in order that they may succeed in producing and maintaining them- selves in their proper proportions, intrinsically as well as extrinsically. Empedocles calls it 'the differentiator', since it never tires of distinguish- ing the forms confused within nature's bosom, and of summoning the gen- eration of one from the corruption of another. Plotinus says it is 'the father and progenitor', because it distributes seeds in nature's field and is the proximate dispenser of forms. As for us, we call it the 'internal artificer', because it shapes matter, forming it from inside like a seed or root shoot- ing forth and unfolding the trunk, from within the trunk thrusting out the boughs, from inside the boughs the derived branches, and unfurling buds from within these. From therein it forms, fashions and weaves, as with nerves, the leaves, flowers and fruits, and it is from the inside that, at cer- tain times, it calls back its sap from the leaves and the fruits to the twigs, from the twigs to the branches, from the branch to the trunk, from the trunk to the root. Similarly, in animals, it begins by deploying its work from the seed and from the centre of the heart, towards the outer members, and from these it finally gathers back towards the heart the faculties it had 2 Virgil, Aeneid, ? ? , ? ? ? -? .
? ? ?
Second dialogue
? extended, as if it were twining up thread it had first unwound. Now, if we believe that intellect and reason are required to produce those works - dead works, so to speak - that we know how to fashion according to certain order and by imitation on the surface of matter, as when stripping and whittling a piece of wood we cause the shape of a horse to appear, how much supe- rior must we hold that artistic intellect that, from the interior of the semi- nal matter, solders together the bones, extends the cartilage, hollows the arteries, airs the pores, interweaves the fibres, branches out the nerves and arranges the whole with such praiseworthy mystery? How much greater an artificer, I say, is he who is not limited to one part of matter, but works, con- tinually present in the whole, on the whole! There are three kinds of intel- lect: the divine, which is everything, the mundane, of which we have just spoken, which makes everything, and the other, particular ones, which become everything, because a middle term is needed between the extremes, and this is the true efficient cause, not only extrinsic, but also intrinsic, of all natural things.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I would like to hear you distinguish between your concep- tion of an efficient cause as extrinsic cause, and your idea of it as intrinsic cause.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Icallacauseextrinsicwhen,asefficient,itisnotapartofthe things composed and things produced; it is intrinsic in so far as it does not operate on the matter or outside it, but in the way we have just described. Thus, it is an extrinsic cause by its being, which is distinct from the sub- stance and the essence of its effects, and because its being does not resem- ble that of things susceptible to generation and corruption, although it operates in those things; a cause is extrinsic, with regard to the action of its operation.
? ? ?
