No More Learning

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Whether God is omnipotent?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not omnipotent. For movement and
passiveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with God, for
He is immovable, as was said above ([209]Q[2], A[3]). Therefore He is
not omnipotent.

Objection 2: Further, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot sin,
nor "deny Himself" as it is said in 2 Tim. 2:13. Therefore He is not
omnipotent.

Objection 3: Further, it is said of God that He manifests His
omnipotence "especially by sparing and having mercy" [*Collect, 10th
Sunday after Pentecost]. Therefore the greatest act possible to the
divine power is to spare and have mercy. There are things much greater,
however, than sparing and having mercy; for example, to create another
world, and the like. Therefore God is not omnipotent.

Objection 4: Further, upon the text, "God hath made foolish the wisdom
of this world" (1 Cor. 1:20), a gloss says: "God hath made the wisdom
of this world foolish [*Vulg. : 'Hath not God', etc. ] by showing those
things to be possible which it judges to be impossible. " Whence it
would seem that nothing is to be judged possible or impossible in
reference to inferior causes, as the wisdom of this world judges them;
but in reference to the divine power. If God, then, were omnipotent,
all things would be possible; nothing, therefore impossible. But if we
take away the impossible, then we destroy also the necessary; for what
necessarily exists is impossible not to exist. Therefore there would be
nothing at all that is necessary in things if God were omnipotent. But
this is an impossibility. Therefore God is not omnipotent.

On the contrary, It is said: "No word shall be impossible with God"
(Lk. 1:37).

I answer that, All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems
difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for
there may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we
say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider the matter
aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this
phrase, "God can do all things," is rightly understood to mean that God
can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said to
be omnipotent. Now according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 17), a
thing is said to be possible in two ways. First in relation to some
power, thus whatever is subject to human power is said to be possible
to man. Secondly absolutely, on account of the relation in which the
very terms stand to each other. Now God cannot be said to be omnipotent
through being able to do all things that are possible to created
nature; for the divine power extends farther than that. If, however, we
were to say that God is omnipotent because He can do all things that
are possible to His power, there would be a vicious circle in
explaining the nature of His power. For this would be saying nothing
else but that God is omnipotent, because He can do all that He is able
to do.

It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent because He can do
all things that are possible absolutely; which is the second way of
saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or
impossible absolutely, according to the relation in which the very
terms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not
incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates sits; and absolutely
impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the
subject, as, for instance, that a man is a donkey.

It must, however, be remembered that since every agent produces an
effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds a thing
possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on
which its active power is founded; for instance, the power of giving
warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of being
warmed. The divine existence, however, upon which the nature of power
in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus of
being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being. Whence,
whatsoever has or can have the nature of being, is numbered among the
absolutely possible things, in respect of which God is called
omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the idea of being except
non-being. Therefore, that which implies being and non-being at the
same time is repugnant to the idea of an absolutely possible thing,
within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under
the divine omnipotence, not because of any defect in the power of God,
but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing.
Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is
numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God is
called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come
within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have the
aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things
cannot be done, than that God cannot do them. Nor is this contrary to
the word of the angel, saying: "No word shall be impossible with God. "
For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word, because no
intellect can possibly conceive such a thing.

Reply to Objection 1: God is said to be omnipotent in respect to His
active power, not to passive power, as was shown above [210](A[1]).
Whence the fact that He is immovable or impassible is not repugnant to
His omnipotence.

Reply to Objection 2: To sin is to fall short of a perfect action;
hence to be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is
repugnant to omnipotence. Therefore it is that God cannot sin, because
of His omnipotence. Nevertheless, the Philosopher says (Topic. iv, 3)
that God can deliberately do what is evil. But this must be understood
either on a condition, the antecedent of which is impossible---as, for
instance, if we were to say that God can do evil things if He will. For
there is no reason why a conditional proposition should not be true,
though both the antecedent and consequent are impossible: as if one
were to say: "If man is a donkey, he has four feet. " Or he may be
understood to mean that God can do some things which now seem to be
evil: which, however, if He did them, would then be good. Or he is,
perhaps, speaking after the common manner of the heathen, who thought
that men became gods, like Jupiter or Mercury.

Reply to Objection 3: God's omnipotence is particularly shown in
sparing and having mercy, because in this is it made manifest that God
has supreme power, that He freely forgives sins. For it is not for one
who is bound by laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free
will. Or, because by sparing and having mercy upon men, He leads them
on to the participation of an infinite good; which is the ultimate
effect of the divine power. Or because, as was said above ([211]Q[21],
A[4]), the effect of the divine mercy is the foundation of all the
divine works. For nothing is due to anyone, except on account of
something already given him gratuitously by God. In this way the divine
omnipotence is particularly made manifest, because to it pertains the
first foundation of all good things.

Reply to Objection 4: The absolute possible is not so called in
reference either to higher causes, or to inferior causes, but in
reference to itself. But the possible in reference to some power is
named possible in reference to its proximate cause. Hence those things
which it belongs to God alone to do immediately---as, for example, to
create, to justify, and the like---are said to be possible in reference
to a higher cause. Those things, however, which are of such kind as to
be done by inferior causes are said to be possible in reference to
those inferior causes. For it is according to the condition of the
proximate cause that the effect has contingency or necessity, as was
shown above ([212]Q[14], A[1], ad 2). Thus is it that the wisdom of the
world is deemed foolish, because what is impossible to nature, it
judges to be impossible to God. So it is clear that the omnipotence of
God does not take away from things their impossibility and necessity.
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Whether God can make the past not to have been?

Objection 1: It seems that God can make the past not to have been. For
what is impossible in itself is much more impossible than that which is
only impossible accidentally. But God can do what is impossible in
itself, as to give sight to the blind, or to raise the dead. Therefore,
and much more can He do what is only impossible accidentally. Now for
the past not to have been is impossible accidentally: thus for Socrates
not to be running is accidentally impossible, from the fact that his
running is a thing of the past. Therefore God can make the past not to
have been.

Objection 2: Further, what God could do, He can do now, since His power
is not lessened. But God could have effected, before Socrates ran, that
he should not run. Therefore, when he has run, God could effect that he
did not run.

Objection 3: Further, charity is a more excellent virtue than
virginity. But God can supply charity that is lost; therefore also lost
virginity. Therefore He can so effect that what was corrupt should not
have been corrupt.

On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. 22 ad Eustoch. ): "Although God can do
all things, He cannot make a thing that is corrupt not to have been
corrupted. " Therefore, for the same reason, He cannot effect that
anything else which is past should not have been.

I answer that, As was said above ([213]Q[7], A[2]), there does not fall
under the scope of God's omnipotence anything that implies a
contradiction. Now that the past should not have been implies a
contradiction. For as it implies a contradiction to say that Socrates
is sitting, and is not sitting, so does it to say that he sat, and did
not sit. But to say that he did sit is to say that it happened in the
past. To say that he did not sit, is to say that it did not happen.
Whence, that the past should not have been, does not come under the
scope of divine power. This is what Augustine means when he says
(Contra Faust. xxix, 5): "Whosoever says, If God is almighty, let Him
make what is done as if it were not done, does not see that this is to
say: If God is almighty let Him effect that what is true, by the very
fact that it is true, be false": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi,
2): "Of this one thing alone is God deprived---namely, to make undone
the things that have been done. "

Reply to Objection 1: Although it is impossible accidentally for the
past not to have been, if one considers the past thing itself, as, for
instance, the running of Socrates; nevertheless, if the past thing is
considered as past, that it should not have been is impossible, not
only in itself, but absolutely since it implies a contradiction. Thus,
it is more impossible than the raising of the dead; in which there is
nothing contradictory, because this is reckoned impossible in reference
to some power, that is to say, some natural power; for such impossible
things do come beneath the scope of divine power.

Reply to Objection 2: As God, in accordance with the perfection of the
divine power, can do all things, and yet some things are not subject to
His power, because they fall short of being possible; so, also, if we
regard the immutability of the divine power, whatever God could do, He
can do now. Some things, however, at one time were in the nature of
possibility, whilst they were yet to be done, which now fall short of
the nature of possibility, when they have been done. So is God said not
to be able to do them, because they themselves cannot be done.

Reply to Objection 3: God can remove all corruption of the mind and
body from a woman who has fallen; but the fact that she had been
corrupt cannot be removed from her; as also is it impossible that the
fact of having sinned or having lost charity thereby can be removed
from the sinner.
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Whether God can do what He does not?

Objection 1: It seems that God cannot do other than what He does. For
God cannot do what He has not foreknown and pre-ordained that He would
do. But He neither foreknew nor pre-ordained that He would do anything
except what He does. Therefore He cannot do except what He does.

Objection 2: Further, God can only do what ought to be done and what is
right to be done. But God is not bound to do what He does not; nor is
it right that He should do what He does not. Therefore He cannot do
except what He does.

Objection 3: Further, God cannot do anything that is not good and
befitting creation. But it is not good for creatures nor befitting them
to be otherwise than as they are. Therefore God cannot do except what
He does.

On the contrary, It is said: "Thinkest thou that I cannot ask My
Father, and He will give Me presently more than twelve legions of
angels? " (Mat. 26:53). But He neither asked for them, nor did His
Father show them to refute the Jews. Therefore God can do what He does
not.

I answer that, In this matter certain persons erred in two ways. Some
laid it down that God acts from natural necessity in such way that as
from the action of nature nothing else can happen beyond what actually
takes place---as, for instance, from the seed of man, a man must come,
and from that of an olive, an olive; so from the divine operation there
could not result other things, nor another order of things, than that
which now is. But we showed above ([214]Q[19], A[3]) that God does not
act from natural necessity, but that His will is the cause of all
things; nor is that will naturally and from any necessity determined to
those things. Whence in no way at all is the present course of events
produced by God from any necessity, so that other things could not
happen. Others, however, said that the divine power is restricted to
this present course of events through the order of the divine wisdom
and justice without which God does nothing. But since the power of God,
which is His essence, is nothing else but His wisdom, it can indeed be
fittingly said that there is nothing in the divine power which is not
in the order of the divine wisdom; for the divine wisdom includes the
whole potency of the divine power. Yet the order placed in creation by
divine wisdom, in which order the notion of His justice consists, as
said above ([215]Q[21], A[2]), is not so adequate to the divine wisdom
that the divine wisdom should be restricted to this present order of
things. Now it is clear that the whole idea of order which a wise man
puts into things made by him is taken from their end. So, when the end
is proportionate to the things made for that end, the wisdom of the
maker is restricted to some definite order. But the divine goodness is
an end exceeding beyond all proportion things created. Whence the
divine wisdom is not so restricted to any particular order that no
other course of events could happen. Wherefore we must simply say that
God can do other things than those He has done.

Reply to Objection 1: In ourselves, in whom power and essence are
distinct from will and intellect, and again intellect from wisdom, and
will from justice, there can be something in the power which is not in
the just will nor in the wise intellect. But in God, power and essence,
will and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same. Whence,
there can be nothing in the divine power which cannot also be in His
just will or in His wise intellect. Nevertheless, because His will
cannot be determined from necessity to this or that order of things,
except upon supposition, as was said above ([216]Q[19], A[3]), neither
are the wisdom and justice of God restricted to this present order, as
was shown above; so nothing prevents there being something in the
divine power which He does not will, and which is not included in the
order which He has place in things. Again, because power is considered
as executing, the will as commanding, and the intellect and wisdom as
directing; what is attributed to His power considered in itself, God is
said to be able to do in accordance with His absolute power. Of such a
kind is everything which has the nature of being, as was said above
[217](A[3]). What is, however, attributed to the divine power,
according as it carries into execution the command of a just will, God
is said to be able to do by His ordinary power. In this manner, we must
say that God can do other things by His absolute power than those He
has foreknown and pre-ordained He would do. But it could not happen
that He should do anything which He had not foreknown, and had not
pre-ordained that He would do, because His actual doing is subject to
His foreknowledge and pre-ordination, though His power, which is His
nature, is not so. For God does things because He wills so to do; yet
the power to do them does not come from His will, but from His nature.

Reply to Objection 2: God is bound to nobody but Himself. Hence, when
it is said that God can only do what He ought, nothing else is meant by
this than that God can do nothing but what is befitting to Himself, and
just. But these words "befitting" and "just" may be understood in two
ways: one, in direct connection with the verb "is"; and thus they would
be restricted to the present order of things; and would concern His
power. Then what is said in the objection is false; for the sense is
that God can do nothing except what is now fitting and just. If,
however, they be joined directly with the verb "can" (which has the
effect of extending the meaning), and then secondly with "is," the
present will be signified, but in a confused and general way. The
sentence would then be true in this sense: "God cannot do anything
except that which, if He did it, would be suitable and just. "

Reply to Objection 3: Although this order of things be restricted to
what now exists, the divine power and wisdom are not thus restricted.
Whence, although no other order would be suitable and good to the
things which now are, yet God can do other things and impose upon them
another order.
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Whether God can do better than what He does?

Objection 1: It seems that God cannot do better than He does. For
whatever God does, He does in a most powerful and wise way. But a thing
is so much the better done as it is more powerfully and wisely done.
Therefore God cannot do anything better than He does.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine thus argues (Contra Maximin. iii, 8):
"If God could, but would not, beget a Son His equal, He would have been
envious. " For the same reason, if God could have made better things
than He has done, but was not willing so to do, He would have been
envious. But envy is far removed from God. Therefore God makes
everything of the best. He cannot therefore make anything better than
He does.

Objection 3: Further, what is very good and the best of all cannot be
bettered; because nothing is better than the best. But as Augustine
says (Enchiridion 10), "each thing that God has made is good, and,
taken all together they are very good; because in them all consists the
wondrous beauty of the universe. " Therefore the good in the universe
could not be made better by God.

Objection 4: Further, Christ as man is full of grace and truth, and has
the Spirit without measure; and so He cannot be better. Again created
happiness is described as the highest good, and thus cannot be better.
And the Blessed Virgin Mary is raised above all the choirs of angels,
and so cannot be better than she is. God cannot therefore make all
things better than He has made them.

On the contrary, It is said (Eph. 3:20): "God is able to do all things
more abundantly than we desire or understand. "

I answer that, The goodness of anything is twofold; one, which is of
the essence of it---thus, for instance, to be rational pertains to the
essence of man. As regards this good, God cannot make a thing better
than it is itself; although He can make another thing better than it;
even as He cannot make the number four greater than it is; because if
it were greater it would no longer be four, but another number. For the
addition of a substantial difference in definitions is after the manner
of the addition of unity of numbers (Metaph. viii, 10). Another kind of
goodness is that which is over and above the essence; thus, the good of
a man is to be virtuous or wise. As regards this kind of goodness, God
can make better the things He has made. Absolutely speaking, however,
God can make something else better than each thing made by Him.

Reply to Objection 1: When it is said that God can make a thing better
than He makes it, if "better" is taken substantively, this proposition
is true. For He can always make something else better than each
individual thing: and He can make the same thing in one way better than
it is, and in another way not; as was explained above. If, however,
"better" is taken as an adverb, implying the manner of the making; thus
God cannot make anything better than He makes it, because He cannot
make it from greater wisdom and goodness. But if it implies the manner
of the thing done, He can make something better; because He can give to
things made by Him a better manner of existence as regards the
accidents, although not as regards the substance.

Reply to Objection 2: It is of the nature of a son that he should be
equal to his father, when he comes to maturity. But it is not of the
nature of anything created, that it should be better than it was made
by God. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 3: The universe, the present creation being
supposed, cannot be better, on account of the most beautiful order
given to things by God; in which the good of the universe consists. For
if any one thing were bettered, the proportion of order would be
destroyed; as if one string were stretched more than it ought to be,
the melody of the harp would be destroyed. Yet God could make other
things, or add something to the present creation; and then there would
be another and a better universe.

Reply to Objection 4: The humanity of Christ, from the fact that it is
united to the Godhead; and created happiness from the fact that it is
the fruition of God; and the Blessed Virgin from the fact that she is
the mother of God; have all a certain infinite dignity from the
infinite good, which is God. And on this account there cannot be
anything better than these; just as there cannot be anything better
than God.
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OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES)

After considering all that pertains to the unity of the divine essence,
we come to treat of the divine beatitude. Concerning this, there are
four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether beatitude belongs to God?

(2) In regard to what is God called blessed; does this regard His act
of intellect?

(3) Whether He is essentially the beatitude of each of the blessed?

(4) Whether all other beatitude is included in the divine beatitude?
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Whether beatitude belongs to God?

Objection 1: It seems that beatitude does not belong to God. For
beatitude according to Boethius (De Consol. iv) "is a state made
perfect by the aggregation of all good things. " But the aggregation of
goods has no place in God; nor has composition. Therefore beatitude
does not belong to God.

Objection 2: Further, beatitude or happiness is the reward of virtue,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9). But reward does not apply
to God; as neither does merit.
Therefore neither does beatitude.

On the contrary, The Apostle says: "Which in His times He shall show,
who is the Blessed and only Almighty, the King of Kings and Lord of
Lords. " (1 Tim. 6:15).

I answer that, Beatitude belongs to God in a very special manner. For
nothing else is understood to be meant by the term beatitude than the
perfect good of an intellectual nature; which is capable of knowing
that it has a sufficiency of the good which it possesses, to which it
is competent that good or ill may befall, and which can control its own
actions. All of these things belong in a most excellent manner to God,
namely, to be perfect, and to possess intelligence. Whence beatitude
belongs to God in the highest degree.

Reply to Objection 1: Aggregation of good is in God, after the manner
not of composition, but of simplicity; for those things which in
creatures is manifold, pre-exist in God, as was said above ([218]Q[4],
A[2]; [219]Q[13], A[4]), in simplicity and unity.

Reply to Objection 2: It belongs as an accident to beatitude or
happiness to be the reward of virtue, so far as anyone attains to
beatitude; even as to be the term of generation belongs accidentally to
a being, so far as it passes from potentiality to act. As, then, God
has being, though not begotten; so He has beatitude, although not
acquired by merit.
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Whether God is called blessed in respect of His intellect?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not called blessed in respect to His
intellect. For beatitude is the highest good. But good is said to be in
God in regard to His essence, because good has reference to being which
is according to essence, according to Boethius (De Hebdom. ). Therefore
beatitude also is said to be in God in regard to His essence, and not
to His intellect.

Objection 2: Further, Beatitude implies the notion of end. Now the end
is the object of the will, as also is the good. Therefore beatitude is
said to be in God with reference to His will, and not with reference to
His intellect.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxii, 7): "He is in glory, Who
whilst He rejoices in Himself, needs not further praise. " To be in
glory, however, is the same as to be blessed. Therefore, since we enjoy
God in respect to our intellect, because "vision is the whole of the
reward," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii), it would seem that
beatitude is said to be in God in respect of His intellect.

I answer that, Beatitude, as stated above [220](A[1]), is the perfect
good of an intellectual nature. Thus it is that, as everything desires
the perfection of its nature, intellectual nature desires naturally to
be happy. Now that which is most perfect in any intellectual nature is
the intellectual operation, by which in some sense it grasps
everything. Whence the beatitude of every intellectual nature consists
in understanding. Now in God, to be and to understand are one and the
same thing; differing only in the manner of our understanding them.
Beatitude must therefore be assigned to God in respect of His
intellect; as also to the blessed, who are called blesses [beati] by
reason of the assimilation to His beatitude.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves that beatitude belongs to
God; not that beatitude pertains essentially to Him under the aspect of
His essence; but rather under the aspect of His intellect.

Reply to Objection 2: Since beatitude is a good, it is the object of
the will; now the object is understood as prior to the act of a power.
Whence in our manner of understanding, divine beatitude precedes the
act of the will at rest in it. This cannot be other than the act of the
intellect; and thus beatitude is to be found in an act of the
intellect.
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Whether God is the beatitude of each of the blessed?

Objection 1: It seems that God is the beatitude of each of the blessed.
For God is the supreme good, as was said above ([221]Q[6], AA[2],4).
But it is quite impossible that there should be many supreme goods, as
also is clear from what has been said above ([222]Q[11], A[3]).
Therefore, since it is of the essence of beatitude that it should be
the supreme good, it seems that beatitude is nothing else but God
Himself.

Objection 2: Further, beatitude is the last end of the rational nature.
But to be the last end of the rational nature belongs only to God.
Therefore the beatitude of every blessed is God alone.

On the contrary, The beatitude of one is greater than that of another,
according to 1 Cor. 15:41: "Star differeth from star in glory. " But
nothing is greater than God. Therefore beatitude is something different
from God.

I answer that, The beatitude of an intellectual nature consists in an
act of the intellect. In this we may consider two things, namely, the
object of the act, which is the thing understood; and the act itself
which is to understand. If, then, beatitude be considered on the side
of the object, God is the only beatitude; for everyone is blessed from
this sole fact, that he understands God, in accordance with the saying
of Augustine (Confess. v, 4): "Blessed is he who knoweth Thee, though
he know nought else. " But as regards the act of understanding,
beatitude is a created thing in beatified creatures; but in God, even
in this way, it is an uncreated thing.

Reply to Objection 1: Beatitude, as regards its object, is the supreme
good absolutely, but as regards its act, in beatified creatures it is
their supreme good, not absolutely, but in that kind of goods which a
creature can participate.

Reply to Objection 2: End is twofold, namely, "objective" and
"subjective," as the Philosopher says (Greater Ethics i, 3), namely,
the "thing itself" and "its use. " Thus to a miser the end is money, and
its acquisition. Accordingly God is indeed the last end of a rational
creature, as the thing itself; but created beatitude is the end, as the
use, or rather fruition, of the thing.
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Whether all other beatitude is included in the beatitude of God?

Objection 1: It seems that the divine beatitude does not embrace all
other beatitudes. For there are some false beatitudes. But nothing
false can be in God. Therefore the divine beatitude does not embrace
all other beatitudes.

Objection 2: Further, a certain beatitude, according to some, consists
in things corporeal; as in pleasure, riches, and such like. Now none of
these have to do with God, since He is incorporeal. Therefore His
beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes.

On the contrary, Beatitude is a certain perfection. But the divine
perfection embraces all other perfection, as was shown above
([223]Q[4], A[2] ). Therefore the divine beatitude embraces all other
beatitudes.

I answer that, Whatever is desirable in whatsoever beatitude, whether
true or false, pre-exists wholly and in a more eminent degree in the
divine beatitude. As to contemplative happiness, God possesses a
continual and most certain contemplation of Himself and of all things
else; and as to that which is active, He has the governance of the
whole universe. As to earthly happiness, which consists in delight,
riches, power, dignity, and fame, according to Boethius (De Consol.
iii, 10), He possesses joy in Himself and all things else for His
delight; instead of riches He has that complete self-sufficiency, which
is promised by riches; in place of power, He has omnipotence; for
dignities, the government of all things; and in place of fame, He
possesses the admiration of all creatures.

Reply to Objection 1: A particular kind of beatitude is false according
as it falls short of the idea of true beatitude; and thus it is not in
God. But whatever semblance it has, howsoever slight, of beatitude, the
whole of it pre-exists in the divine beatitude.

Reply to Objection 2: The good that exists in things corporeal in a
corporeal manner, is also in God, but in a spiritual manner.

We have now spoken enough concerning what pertains to the unity of the
divine essence.
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TREATISE ON THE MOST HOLY TRINITY (QQ[27]-43)
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THE PROCESSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS (FIVE ARTICLES)

Having considered what belongs to the unity of the divine essence, it
remains to treat of what belongs to the Trinity of the persons in God.
And because the divine Persons are distinguished from each other
according to the relations of origin, the order of the doctrine leads
us to consider firstly, the question of origin or procession; secondly,
the relations of origin; thirdly, the persons.

Concerning procession there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is procession in God?

(2) Whether any procession in God can be called generation?

(3) Whether there can be any other procession in God besides
generation.

(4) Whether that other procession can be called generation?

(5) Whether there are more than two processions in God?
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Whether there is procession in God?

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be any procession in God.
For procession signifies outward movement. But in God there is nothing
mobile, nor anything extraneous. Therefore neither is there procession
in God.

Objection 2: Further, everything which proceeds differs from that
whence it proceeds. But in God there is no diversity; but supreme
simplicity. Therefore in God there is no procession.

Objection 3: Further, to proceed from another seems to be against the
nature of the first principle. But God is the first principle, as shown
above ([224]Q[2], A[3]). Therefore in God there is no procession.

On the contrary, Our Lord says, "From God I proceeded" (Jn. 8:42).

I answer that, Divine Scripture uses, in relation to God, names which
signify procession. This procession has been differently understood.
Some have understood it in the sense of an effect, proceeding from its
cause; so Arius took it, saying that the Son proceeds from the Father
as His primary creature, and that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the
Father and the Son as the creature of both. In this sense neither the
Son nor the Holy Ghost would be true God: and this is contrary to what
is said of the Son, "That . . . we may be in His true Son. This is true
God" (1 Jn. 5:20). Of the Holy Ghost it is also said, "Know you not
that your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost? " (1 Cor. 6:19).
Now, to have a temple is God's prerogative. Others take this procession
to mean the cause proceeding to the effect, as moving it, or impressing
its own likeness on it; in which sense it was understood by Sabellius,
who said that God the Father is called Son in assuming flesh from the
Virgin, and that the Father also is called Holy Ghost in sanctifying
the rational creature, and moving it to life. The words of the Lord
contradict such a meaning, when He speaks of Himself, "The Son cannot
of Himself do anything" (Jn. 5:19); while many other passages show the
same, whereby we know that the Father is not the Son. Careful
examination shows that both of these opinions take procession as
meaning an outward act; hence neither of them affirms procession as
existing in God Himself; whereas, since procession always supposes
action, and as there is an outward procession corresponding to the act
tending to external matter, so there must be an inward procession
corresponding to the act remaining within the agent. This applies most
conspicuously to the intellect, the action of which remains in the
intelligent agent. For whenever we understand, by the very fact of
understanding there proceeds something within us, which is a conception
of the object understood, a conception issuing from our intellectual
power and proceeding from our knowledge of that object. This conception
is signified by the spoken word; and it is called the word of the heart
signified by the word of the voice.

As God is above all things, we should understand what is said of God,
not according to the mode of the lowest creatures, namely bodies, but
from the similitude of the highest creatures, the intellectual
substances; while even the similitudes derived from these fall short in
the representation of divine objects. Procession, therefore, is not to
be understood from what it is in bodies, either according to local
movement or by way of a cause proceeding forth to its exterior effect,
as, for instance, like heat from the agent to the thing made hot.
Rather it is to be understood by way of an intelligible emanation, for
example, of the intelligible word which proceeds from the speaker, yet
remains in him. In that sense the Catholic Faith understands procession
as existing in God.

Reply to Objection 1: This objection comes from the idea of procession
in the sense of local motion, or of an action tending to external
matter, or to an exterior effect; which kind of procession does not
exist in God, as we have explained.

Reply to Objection 2: Whatever proceeds by way of outward procession is
necessarily distinct from the source whence it proceeds, whereas,
whatever proceeds within by an intelligible procession is not
necessarily distinct; indeed, the more perfectly it proceeds, the more
closely it is one with the source whence it proceeds. For it is clear
that the more a thing is understood, the more closely is the
intellectual conception joined and united to the intelligent agent;
since the intellect by the very act of understanding is made one with
the object understood. Thus, as the divine intelligence is the very
supreme perfection of God ([225]Q[14], A[2]), the divine Word is of
necessity perfectly one with the source whence He proceeds, without any
kind of diversity.

Reply to Objection 3: To proceed from a principle, so as to be
something outside and distinct from that principle, is irreconcilable
with the idea of a first principle; whereas an intimate and uniform
procession by way of an intelligible act is included in the idea of a
first principle. For when we call the builder the principle of the
house, in the idea of such a principle is included that of his art; and
it would be included in the idea of the first principle were the
builder the first principle of the house. God, Who is the first
principle of all things, may be compared to things created as the
architect is to things designed.
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Whether any procession in God can be called generation?

Objection 1: It would seem that no procession in God can be called
generation. For generation is change from non-existence to existence,
and is opposed to corruption; while matter is the subject of both.
Nothing of all this belongs to God. Therefore generation cannot exist
in God.

Objection 2: Further, procession exists in God, according to an
intelligible mode, as above explained [226](A[1]). But such a process
is not called generation in us; therefore neither is it to be so called
in God.

Objection 3: Further, anything that is generated derives existence from
its generator. Therefore such existence is a derived existence. But no
derived existence can be a self-subsistence. Therefore, since the
divine existence is self-subsisting ([227]Q[3], A[4]), it follows that
no generated existence can be the divine existence. Therefore there is
no generation in God.

On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 2:7): "This day have I begotten Thee. "

I answer that, The procession of the Word in God is called generation.
In proof whereof we must observe that generation has a twofold meaning:
one common to everything subject to generation and corruption; in which
sense generation is nothing but change from non-existence to existence.
In another sense it is proper and belongs to living things; in which
sense it signifies the origin of a living being from a conjoined living
principle; and this is properly called birth. Not everything of that
kind, however, is called begotten; but, strictly speaking, only what
proceeds by way of similitude. Hence a hair has not the aspect of
generation and sonship, but only that has which proceeds by way of a
similitude. Nor will any likeness suffice; for a worm which is
generated from animals has not the aspect of generation and sonship,
although it has a generic similitude; for this kind of generation
requires that there should be a procession by way of similitude in the
same specific nature; as a man proceeds from a man, and a horse from a
horse. So in living things, which proceed from potential to actual
life, such as men and animals, generation includes both these kinds of
generation. But if there is a being whose life does not proceed from
potentiality to act, procession (if found in such a being) excludes
entirely the first kind of generation; whereas it may have that kind of
generation which belongs to living things. So in this manner the
procession of the Word in God is generation; for He proceeds by way of
intelligible action, which is a vital operation:---from a conjoined
principle (as above described):---by way of similitude, inasmuch as the
concept of the intellect is a likeness of the object conceived:---and
exists in the same nature, because in God the act of understanding and
His existence are the same, as shown above ([228]Q[14], A[4]). Hence
the procession of the Word in God is called generation; and the Word
Himself proceeding is called the Son.

Reply to Objection 1: This objection is based on the idea of generation
in the first sense, importing the issuing forth from potentiality to
act; in which sense it is not found in God.

Reply to Objection 2: The act of human understanding in ourselves is
not the substance itself of the intellect; hence the word which
proceeds within us by intelligible operation is not of the same nature
as the source whence it proceeds; so the idea of generation cannot be
properly and fully applied to it. But the divine act of intelligence is
the very substance itself of the one who understands ([229]Q[14],
A[4]). The Word proceeding therefore proceeds as subsisting in the same
nature; and so is properly called begotten, and Son. Hence Scripture
employs terms which denote generation of living things in order to
signify the procession of the divine Wisdom, namely, conception and
birth; as is declared in the person of the divine Wisdom, "The depths
were not as yet, and I was already conceived; before the hills, I was
brought forth. " (Prov. 8:24). In our way of understanding we use the
word "conception" in order to signify that in the word of our intellect
is found the likeness of the thing understood, although there be no
identity of nature.

Reply to Objection 3: Not everything derived from another has existence
in another subject; otherwise we could not say that the whole substance
of created being comes from God, since there is no subject that could
receive the whole substance. So, then, what is generated in God
receives its existence from the generator, not as though that existence
were received into matter or into a subject (which would conflict with
the divine self-subsistence); but when we speak of His existence as
received, we mean that He Who proceeds receives divine existence from
another; not, however, as if He were other from the divine nature. For
in the perfection itself of the divine existence are contained both the
Word intelligibly proceeding and the principle of the Word, with
whatever belongs to His perfection ([230]Q[4], A[2]).
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Whether any other procession exists in God besides that of the Word?

Objection 1: It would seem that no other procession exists in God
besides the generation of the Word. Because, for whatever reason we
admit another procession, we should be led to admit yet another, and so
on to infinitude; which cannot be. Therefore we must stop at the first,
and hold that there exists only one procession in God.

Objection 2: Further, every nature possesses but one mode of
self-communication; because operations derive unity and diversity from
their terms. But procession in God is only by way of communication of
the divine nature. Therefore, as there is only one divine nature
([231]Q[11], A[4] ), it follows that only one procession exists in God.

Objection 3: Further, if any other procession but the intelligible
procession of the Word existed in God, it could only be the procession
of love, which is by the operation of the will. But such a procession
is identified with the intelligible procession of the intellect,
inasmuch as the will in God is the same as His intellect ([232]Q[19],
A[1]). Therefore in God there is no other procession but the procession
of the Word.

On the contrary, The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father (Jn. 15:26);
and He is distinct from the Son, according to the words, "I will ask My
Father, and He will give you another Paraclete" (Jn. 14:16). Therefore
in God another procession exists besides the procession of the Word.

I answer that, There are two processions in God; the procession of the
Word, and another.

In evidence whereof we must observe that procession exists in God, only
according to an action which does not tend to anything external, but
remains in the agent itself. Such an action in an intellectual nature
is that of the intellect, and of the will. The procession of the Word
is by way of an intelligible operation. The operation of the will
within ourselves involves also another procession, that of love,
whereby the object loved is in the lover; as, by the conception of the
word, the object spoken of or understood is in the intelligent agent.
Hence, besides the procession of the Word in God, there exists in Him
another procession called the procession of love.

Reply to Objection 1: There is no need to go on to infinitude in the
divine processions; for the procession which is accomplished within the
agent in an intellectual nature terminates in the procession of the
will.

Reply to Objection 2: All that exists in God, is God ([233]Q[3],
AA[3],4); whereas the same does not apply to others. Therefore the
divine nature is communicated by every procession which is not outward,
and this does not apply to other natures.

Reply to Objection 3: Though will and intellect are not diverse in God,
nevertheless the nature of will and intellect requires the processions
belonging to each of them to exist in a certain order. For the
procession of love occurs in due order as regards the procession of the
Word; since nothing can be loved by the will unless it is conceived in
the intellect. So as there exists a certain order of the Word to the
principle whence He proceeds, although in God the substance of the
intellect and its concept are the same; so, although in God the will
and the intellect are the same, still, inasmuch as love requires by its
very nature that it proceed only from the concept of the intellect,
there is a distinction of order between the procession of love and the
procession of the Word in God.
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Whether the procession of love in God is generation?

Objection 1: It would seem that the procession of love in God is
generation. For what proceeds by way of likeness of nature among living
things is said to be generated and born. But what proceeds in God by
way of love proceeds in the likeness of nature; otherwise it would be
extraneous to the divine nature, and would be an external procession.
Therefore what proceeds in God by way of love, proceeds as generated
and born.

Objection 2: Further, as similitude is of the nature of the word, so
does it belong to love. Hence it is said, that "every beast loves its
like" (Ecclus. 13:19). Therefore if the Word is begotten and born by
way of likeness, it seems becoming that love should proceed by way of
generation.

Objection 3: Further, what is not in any species is not in the genus.
So if there is a procession of love in God, there ought to be some
special name besides this common name of procession. But no other name
is applicable but generation. Therefore the procession of love in God
is generation.

On the contrary, Were this true, it would follow that the Holy Ghost
Who proceeds as love, would proceed as begotten; which is against the
statement of Athanasius: "The Holy Ghost is from the Father and the
Son, not made, nor begotten, but proceeding.