No More Learning

The campaign which followed closely resembled that of Joseph
Smith in the First Mysore War. Coote lacked cavalry to meet that
of the enemy; he lacked transport, partly owing to the lack of pre-
parations before war broke out, partly owing to the systematic
ravaging of the country by Hyder; and his movements were further
hampered by a great train of artillery, which he probably needed to
keep the enemy horse at a respectful distance, and by enormous
hordes of camp-followers, whom he would not take adequate measures
to reduce. In these circumstances, due partly to the inefficient
government which had been in control, partly to the defects of the
military system which had grown up, and partly to the vigorous,
conduct of his adversary, Coote never succeeded in commanding a
greater extent of territory than was covered by his guns. He won a
considerable tactical victory at Porto Novo (1 July, 1781), where
Hyder committed himself more closely to action than he ventured to
do again; and at Polilur, the scene of Baillie's destruction (7 August),
and Sholinghur (27 September) he drove the enemy from the field


## p. 285 (#313) ############################################

SUFFREN
285
of battle; but although these successes restored the English confidence
in themselves and their leader, such a war of attrition would exhaust
them sooner than the enemy; and neither in this year nor in 1782
did Coote make the least progress towards driving Hyder out of the
nawab's possessions, while the English resources and finances steadily
decayed.
Meanwhile a French squadron had appeared in the Indian waters,
under the command of a leader of transcendent abilities. Early in
1782 Suffren, who had succeeded to the command of the French
squadron by the death of d'Orves, announced his arrival by the
capture of grain vessels bound for Madras from the northward. At
this time the English men-of-war were under the command of Sir
Edward Hughes, a stout fighter, but without the spark of genius.
In the previous year he had actively co-operated in the capture of
Negapatam from the Dutch, and had then sailed to Ceylon, where
he had taken Trinkomali. He had under his command nine ships
of the line, of which six had been in the East for some time, with the
result that their bottoms were foul and their crews depleted. Against
them Suffren could place twelve ships in the line. In the course of
1782 four actions took place between the two squadrons-17 February,
11 April, 5 July, and 3 September. From the first the English began
to get rather the worst of it, in consequence of the superior numbers
and superior tactical skill of the French leader. Twice he succeeded
in bringing the greater part of his squadron to bear on a small part
of ours, but on the whole the English held their own by a stubborn
resistance against superior concentrations. In February the French
landed somė 2000 men under the command of Du Chemin; but
luckily he proved not nearly so competent a leader as Suffren, and
his junction with Hyder led to no change in the military situation.
On 31 August Trinkomali surrendered to Suffren, Hughes having
failed to refit himself in time to relieve it.
On the whole the campaign against Hyder in the Carnatic seems
to have been conceived on false lines. The easiest way to drive him
out was not to accept battle in the nawab's territory but to carry the
war into the enemy's dominions, which lay exposed to attack fron
the sea all along the Malabar Coast. Then he would have been
obliged to decide whether to ravage his own country or to allow the
enemy to make war in it at ease. In either case he would early have
become disgusted with a war carried on to his own evident detriment.
This was self-evident, and, as soon as Bombay had been relieved by
the progress of Hastings's negotiations from the pressure of the
Maratha War, the Supreme Government urged upon that presidency
the necessity of taking measures for an expedition against Hyder's
western provinces. The Madras Government had constantly urged
1 Bengal to Madras, 16 May, ap. Madras Mil. Consultations, 5 June, 1782.
p. 1710.


## p. 286 (#314) ############################################

286
THE CARNATIC, 1761-84
the same point, much to Coote's indignation, who thought that the
principal forces should be concentrated in the Carnatic under his
own command. However, a body of reinforcements from Europe
had been landed at Calicut, and the royal officer in command, Colonel
Humberstone, had assumed command of the Bombay troops there
and moved inland, a threat which had compelled Hyder to send his
son Tipu with a part of his army to repulse the invaders. Humber-
stone had been too weak to do more than make a demonstration and
had had to fall back before Tipu's advance; but in the beginning of
1783 the Bombay Government equipped an expedition, under the
command of one of its own officers, Brigadier Mathews, to attack
Mangalore and the province of Bednur. His success was unexpect-
edly rapid. Mangalore was carried, the passage up the ghats was
forced with ease; and the capital of the province surrendered almost
at once. But this success was due rather to the weakness of the enemy
than to the skill of the English. The Mysorean commander, Aiyaz
Khan, was disaffected to Tipu, who had then just succeeded his father,
and surrendered the capital of the province, Bednur, on condition of
retaining the management of the country under the new masters.
But these swift successes were quickly followed by complete over-
throw. Mathews scattered his scanty forces in detachments all over
the country, and neglected to concentrate them or secure his com-
munications with the coast on the news of Tipu's approach. Then,
too, the army had been distracted by quarrels over the Bednur prize-
money, and disputes between the king's and the Company's officers.
So that when Tipu appeared, as he speedily did, having for that
purpose withdrawn most of his troops from the Carnatic, he was able
to re-establish his power as quickly as he had lost it. Mathews and
all his men fell into the enemy's hands; and small garrisons in the
sea-ports of Mangalore and Honawar alone remained to keep up the
struggle.
In the autumn of 1782 Coote had returned to Calcutta, leaving
the command with Stuart, the officer who had played so dubious a
part in the Pigot business of 1776. Like Munro he had lost all the
talent he had ever had; and he had, moreover, lost a leg at the second
battle of Polilur, so that he was not only unenterprising but also
immobile. During the monsoon of 1782 he failed to get the army
ready to take the field again; so that when Hyder died early in
December, he was unable to take advantage of the three weeks that
elapsed between Hyder's death and Tipu's arrival from the Malabar.
Coast where he had been opposing Hümberstone. He did not actually
take the field until the short successes of Mathews had summoned
Tipu with the bulk of his army to the other side of India
This
was the first piece of good fortune that had befallen the English
since the beginning of the war. It was lucky that Stuart did not have
1 Coote to. Madras, 21 June, . ep. Madras Mill. Consultations of same dale,
1782, p. 1893


## p. 287 (#315) ############################################

BUSSY'S EXPEDITION
287
to encounter Hyder in the field; it was supremely lucky that he did
not have to encounter Hyder reinforced with the large body of
French troops under Bussy who arrived on the coast in the month
of April, only to find that their expected allies were elsewhere. In
these circumstances Bussy established himself at Cuddalore. In May
Stuart reluctantly marched south to oppose him. After a march of
extraordinary languor he arrived before Cuddalore on 8 June. On
the 13th followed a stubborn action in which the English secured
only a very incomplete success. Stuart's movement had been covered
by Hughes's squadron; but on the 20th in action against Suffren the
latter was so severely handled that he had to abandon his position
and put back to Madras to refit. On the 25th Bussy attacked Stuart's
position. The French were repulsed; but Hughes's retreat had placed
the English army in a most dangerous situation. Stuart at this crisis
wrote that he could not answer for the consequences if Hughes had
really gone to Madras. ' But luck still was on the side of the English.
On the 23rd Benfield received news by a special messenger that the
French and English had signed the preliminaries of peace. The news
was communicated at once to Bussy who agreed to a suspension of
arms, and the English army was saved.
The Madras army was thus set free to renew the struggle with
Tipu; it had been already decided to try a complete change of
operations and commanders; Colonel Fullarton, though far from
being the next senior officer to Stuart, was selected to attack the
southern possessions of Mysore. A beginning had already been made
earlier in the year by the capture of Dindigul. On 1 June, Fullarton
captured Dharapuram, and was preparing for a further advance when
he received orders to suspend operations until the issue of peace
proposals to Tipu should be known.
Ever since 1781, when Lord Macartney arrived as governor of
Madras, in succession to a series of Company's servants who had
clearly fallen short of the demands of their position, the Madras
Council had eagerly desired the conclusion of peace. In September,
1781, Macartney, in conjunction with Coole, Hughes and John
Macpherson, who was passing through Madras on his way to take his
seat in the council of the governor-general, took it on themselves to
address the Maratha ministry at Poona, assuring it of the sincerity
of the English proposals for an accoinmodation. This measure
Hastings had naturally and bitterly resented. Later on the Madras
authorities had repeatedly asked the Bengal Government for powers
to negotiate a peace with Hyder; a request which Hastings had
p. 2903.
1 Stuart tó Madras, 28 June, ap. Mudras Mil. Consultations, 4 July, 1783,
· Letter of 11 September, 1781, ap. Madras Mil. Consultations, 30 January,
1782, p. 243. Cf. Macartney to the Chairs, 31 July, 1781 (I. O. , Home Miscel-
laneous, 246, p. 16) and Macartney. Coote and Macpherson to Hastings, 11
September, 1781 (Brit. Mus. Add. MSS, 22454, f. 25).


## p. 288 (#316) ############################################

288
THE CARNATIC. 1761-84
evaded, preferring to entrust the negotiations to Coote. Cuote's discus-
sions, however, had come to nothing; so also did informal overtures
which were made to Tipu by Macartney, without sanction from
Bengal, early in 1783. But the preliminaries concluded in Europe
contained stipulations (Article xvi) to the effect that all allies should
be invited to accede to the present pacification. On the strength of
this, Macartney reopened conversations with Tipu, thinking it likely
that the loss of his French allies, following on the peace which Hastings
had made with the Marathas, would permit of effective negotiations;
and on applying to Bengal, he received a guarded permission, not
to enter into a separate treaty with Tipu, but to negotiate for a
cessation of hostilities and a release of prisoners. In other words,
Hastings relied on the provisions of the Treaty of Salbai to secure
a settlement. Macartney, however, was bent on making peace,
being confident that that would serve the interests of the Company
better than waiting indefinitely for Sindhia to take action against
Tipu. He dispatched commissioners to confer with Tipu, who was
still lying before Mangalore. The commandant of the English
garrison, Colonel Campbell, had accepted very disadvantageous
terms for a suspension of hostilities. He had agreed for instance to
receive no supplies of victuals by sea—the only way by which he
could possibly receive supplies. Each occasion on which the Com-
pany's vessels revictualled him occasioned therefore sharp disputes;
and Tipu seems to have considered himself warranted by his acquies-
cence in continuing work on his entrenchments, which was also a
contravention of the suspension of arms. At last on 29 January, 1784,
Campbell preferred giving up the place to continuing longer to hold
it, being driven to this by the rapidity with which the garrison was
falling sick. The situation before Mangalore had produced more than
one report that hostilities had broken out again. As a result, in
December, 1783, Brigadier Macleod had seized Kannanur, belonging
not indeed to Tipu but to one of his allies; while Fullarton also had
renewed his attack on the southern possessions of Tipu, capturing
Palghaut and Coimbatore before his movements could be counter-
manded by the deputies on their way to Mangalore.
The latter reached that place shortly after it had surrendered
and immediately opened negotiations. On 7 March terms were agreed
to which completely ignored the Treaty of Salbai. However, they
were not unreasonable. Both parties were to give up their conquests;
all prisoners were to be released; certain specified allies were included.
in short, much the same terms were obtained from Tipu as Hastings
had managed to get from the Marathas. But men's minds were
irritable with defeat and the treaty became the object of a host of
legends. Tipu was said to have treated the deputies with unparalle-
1 Articles dated 2 August, ap. Madras Mil. Consultations, 27 September,
1783, p. 4332.


## p. 289 (#317) ############################################

MACARTNEY'S POLICY
289
Jed indignity, erecting a gallows by their encampment, and keeping
them in such a state of panic that they contemplated flight to the
English ships off the town. There is reason to think that these
stories had their origin in the excitable imagination of Brigadier
Macleod. They seem to have passed to Calcutta by way of Bombay,
along with extraordinary versions of the ill-treatment accorded to the
prisoners by Tipu. The facts seem to have been that the commissioners
of their own accord pitched their tents near a gallows which had been
set up before the surrender of Mangalore for the execution of one of
Tipu's officers who had entered into communication with the English
garrison; and that, while the prisoners were not well treated, there
are no grounds for believing that any of them were deliberately
murdered. In one respect Tipu certainly violated the treaty. He did
not release all the prisoners in his hands. This was made a very
serious charge against Macartney. But we must remember that in 1793,
after a successful war, Cornwallis did not succeed in getting Tipu to
release all the prisoners whom he had taken; and it is clearly unfair
to condemn Macartney for failing to do what Cornwallis himself
after a successful war could not effect. The probability is that in each
case the persons detained were those who had submitted to circum-
cision and accepted Tipu's service; and who, though kept under a
guard, were considered by Tipu as on a different footing from those
who had consistently rejected his offers and defied his threats. These
matters, along with the fact that the treaty was distinct from, and
independent of, the treaty of Salbai induced Hastings to condemn
it with extraordinary asperity, and to move Macartney's suspension
for having disobeyed the orders of the Supreme Government. But
he can hardly have judged the matter with an unbiassed mind. The
episode of the treaty came at the end of a long series of disputes
between the Bengal and Madras Governments in which Hastings
displayed something less than the serene and balanced judgment of
which at one time he had given such striking evidence.
At the close of 1780 Lord Macartney had been appointed governor
of Madras at the moment when Hastings's friends, with Laurence
Sulivan at their head, had contracted a short-lived alliance with the
ministry under North. Macartney was therefore pledged to the
support of Hastings, and indeed came out with the full intention of
so doing. But on his arrival he found himself unable to adopt the
measures which Hastings had recommended to the southern presi-
dency. Hastings had urged an alliance with the Dutch, in order
to obtain from them a force of European infantry in return for the
cession of the district of Tinnevelly by the nawab. But Macartney
had brought out with him orders to seize the Dutch factories, since
the United Provinces had just joined the French and the Americans
in the war against Great Britain. In the second place Hastings had
advised the cession of the sarkars to the Nizam on condition of
substantial assistance from him against Hyder. Macartney had no
1
19


## p. 290 (#318) ############################################

290
THE CARNATIC: 1761-84
specific orders from the Company on this head; but none the less he
stoutly refused to dismember the Company's possessions; he urged
that such a cession would not produce effects commensurate with the
cost, and in that he was very likely right. A third cause of difference
between the two was fortuitous. Hastings, on Macartney's arrival,
had written to him advising that the raja of Tanjore should be
required, and if necessary compelled, to contribute his share to the
cost of the war. Macartney was in agreement with this view; and
forwarded an extract from Hastings's letter to the chairman and
deputy chairman of the Company in support of his own arguments.
Unfortunately the letter arrived in England when Sulivan and
Hastings's friends had lost control of the directorate; and led to severe
and unmerited reproaches directed against Hastings by the new
chairs. Hastings accused Macartney of having betrayed him to his
enemies; and does not seem to have been convinced by Macartney's
temperate and candid explanation. Gleig, it may be noted, was
mistaken in supposing that no answer was returned to Hastings's
letter of accusation. Besides these occasions of difference in which
Macartney was in the right there was that unfortunate letter to the
Marathas, which has already been mentioned, in which he was
decidedly in the wrong. The result was a strong tendency in each to
suspect and question the opinions of the other.
At the same time Macartney was involved in disputes with Coote
and with the nawab. In sending Coote to Madras the Bengal Gov-
ernment had invested him with separate and independent powers,
as the Madras Government had done with Clive, in not dissimilar
circumstances in 1756. Coote interpreted them in the widest possible
sense, neglecting to attend the meetings of the Select Committee and
declining to explain his plans for the conduct of the war, while he
harassed the committee with ceaseless complaints regarding the
shortness of transport and supplies. Both sides complained to Bengal;
and Bengal preferred to support Coote, without seriously considering
the Madras assertions that the financial management of the army,
as distinguished from the military conduct of the war, was wasteful
and extravagant. Underlying these disputes were intrigues in which
Paul Benfield took a considerable part, exasperating Coote's irritable
mind against the unfortunate governor.
From the first the resources of Madras had been wholly unequal
to the maintenance of the war. Bengal had contributed largely,
sending no less than 265 lakhs of rupees, in specie, bills, and supplies,
in the course of the four years that the war continued. But the goy-
ernment had frequently and loudly declared that it was incumbent on
the Madras Government to do everything in its power to increase its
own resources, particularly the contributions from the nawab's
! Macartney to Hastings, 10. May, 1783 (Brit. Mus. · Add. MSS, 22455,
f. 47 verso).


## p. 291 (#319) ############################################

ASSIGNMENT OF REVENUES
291
revenues. But that spring had completely dried up. Twenty years
of financial mismanagement had exhausted the nawab's treasury,
never very full. In the crisis which resulted from Hyder's invasion,
he had sought to evade payment rather than to provide with funds
the only power that would protect him. To the demands of the
Madras authorities he had returned blank refusals. Foreseeing that
this course could not be continued indefinitely, he had sent a mission
to Calcutta where terms were settled between him and the Supreme
Government, which proceeded to dispatch to Madras a special agent,
chosen with singular lack of tact from among the Madras covenanted
servants, to watch over the performance of the treaty. This was in
1781, before Macartney had arrived. In so doing Hastings and his
council had clearly overstepped the limits of their statutory powers;
but they had not doubted their power of coercing the Madras Gov-
ernment into obedience. It was as discredited as had been that of
Drake in 1756. But Macartney's arrival had changed the situation
altogether. He soon made this clear. He and the Select Committee
declared that they could not acquiesce in the appointment of an agent
to perform the functions with which they were specially charged by
the Company. But though they refused to recognise the agent whom
Hastings had appointed, they did adopt the Bengal treaty as the basis
of a new agreement which Macartney proceeded to negotiate with
the nawab. On 2 December, 1781, the latter executed an assignment
of his revenues to Macartney in person for a fixed term of five years,
reserving to his own use one-fifth of what amounts should be collected.
This agreement was formally approved by the Bengal Government.
But it soon was evident that it was no more genuine than had been
all the previous promises of the durbar. The revenues which were
collected were not paid in to the Company, but secretly transmitted
to the nawab. When it was proposed to appoint inspectors to watch
over the revenue officials, the nawab refused to grant them the
necessary powers; when it was proposed to lease out the country to
renters, the nawab refused to sign the documents appointing them.
In these circumstances Macartney resolved no longer to give way,
but to exercise himself the power of appointing the renters. In this
conduct he was confirmed by a letter from Bengal, written indeed
without knowledge of the crisis that had arisen at Madras, but
strongly and pointedly urging the absolute necessity of making the
assignment . a 'reality in order that all the resources of the country
might be made available for the conduct of the war. In this course
Macartney persevered with considerable success. The Committee of
Assigned Revenue, which he appointed to manage the business, in-
troduced great reforms into the nawab's disordered administration.
The gross revenue levied from the cultivators was reduced from 14. 4
to 13. 8 lakhs of pagodas in the six districts which rentained under
effective control, while at the same time by the abolition of a host of
needless charges the net revenue was increased from six to twelve


## p. 292 (#320) ############################################

292
THE CARNATIC, 1761-84
lakhs, and the total collections of assigned revenue amounted between
the end of 1781 and September, 1784, to over thirty-three lakhs of
pagodas, or over one hundred lakhs of rupees, not a fanam of which
would have been secured for the Company's use but for Macartney's
insistence on making the assignment a reality instead of a mere bit of
window-dressing.
The nawab, however, was untiring in his endeavours to secure
the abolition of the grant which he had made but had not intended to
make effectual. First he offered to Coote the management of the
revenues which he had already granted to Macartney; and then he
sent another mission to Bengal to induce the government to cancel
a measure of which it had repeatedly and formally approved. At
first the mission met with no success. But in the autumn of 1782, just
about the time of the return of Coote, Hastings changed his attitude.
The reasons remain obscure, but were almost certainly connected
with the necessity under which he thought he lay of preserving
the support of Benfield's friends in London. At the moment he,
Macpherson, and Coote were united on the need of annulling the
assignment. But when the matter came up for final decision in the
early part of 1783, though it was resolved that the assignment should
be annulled, yet when Hastings proposed to give Coote provisional
powers to suspend Macartney in case he failed to obey the orders of
Bengal, he failed altogether to carry the council with him. He and
Coote alone voted for the proposal; so that when Coote at last did
return to Madras, he lacked the orders to coerce Madras into obedi-
ence to most unpalatable resolutions. That government, however,
being privately informed of Hastings's intentions, had resolved no
longer to recognise the special powers which Coote had formerly
enjoyed, nor to render up the assignment until the orders of the court
of directors should be received. Coote died immediately on landing
at Madras, otherwise a fierce struggle must have resulted from the
decisions of the Bengal and Madras Governments respectively. As
it was the matter did not pass beyond the stage of controversy, the
Madras Government obstinately refusing to obey the orders of Bengal
until in 1785 the matter was settled by orders from the Company
requiring the assignment immediately to be cancelled. On this
Macartney at once resigned and went home rather than carry out a
policy which he was convinced, and rightly, could lead to nothing
except misgovernment. 1
These disputes with the Bengal Government did not exhaust the
difficulties which Macartney had to encounter. His controversy with
the commander-in-chief continued after Coote's departure to Bengal
and even after Coote's death. The Military. talents of Stuart, Coote's
L'Dodwell, "Hastings and the Assignment of the Carnatic”,. English Histo-
rical Review, XL, 375-96.


## p.
293 (#321) ############################################

THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY
293
successor, were too slender in any way to warrant the continuance of
the special powers which the commander-in-chief had been exercising;
and the Select Committee assumed the control of military affairs.
Stuart, however, paid it but an unwilling obedience and in some
points departed from its actual instructions. As soon as news of peace
with France was received, he was therefore summoned to hand over
the command of the army and return to Madras. There the dispute
developed with vigour and threatened to merge itself with the dispute
over the assignment. There appeared that same ominous conjunction,
the nawab, Benfield and Stuart, which had produced the arrest of
Pigot just seven years before. Macartney arrested Stuart, and sent
him off to England, while Benfield was ordered down to a small
station at a considerable distance from the presidency, where he
could do no harm. It is impossible to say with certainty to what
extent Macartney was justified in his belief of impending violence.
But there were many suspicious circumstances, and he cannot be
blamed for keeping on the safe side. Unluckily the matter involved
him in further disputes with the military authorities. Coote had been
commander-in-chief of the king's troops in India as well as of the
Company's and had been succeeded in this dual office by Stuart.
When the latter was dismissed in 1783 no difficulty arose over the
command of the Company's forces, but the command of the king's
was a very different question. The officer next in succession was Sir
John Burgoyne, who honestly, and, in the circumstances, justly,
doubted Macartney's power of removing the commander of the king's
troops. The two men failed to reach any agreement on the point,
and the outcome was that Macartney and the Select Committee
nominated Colonel Ross Lang, of the Company's service, to the
command-in-chief, with the rank of lieutenant-general, which placed
him in command of all the king's general officers on the coast. This
was a measure of very doubtful prudence. But for the sober conduct
of Burgoyne, it might have led to open disorder. At first all the
general officers withdrew from the army, directing their subordinates
to obey the orders issued by Lang. The object of this was to permit
the commands of government to be obeyed without giving up the
principles of the service which were regarded as sacrosanct. But
Macartney instead of accepti. . g this compromise in the spirit in which
it was offered was bent on triumph at any price. Burgoyne was
placed in arrest; the other general officers were struck off staff allow-
ances until they submitted. In the early part of his struggles with
the military he had on the whole been in the right; but in the con-
cluding part of his contest, with the king's general officers, he showed
much want of tact; and owed his success to the public spirit of his
adversaries rather than to his own wisdom. Finally the matter was
regulated by a decision from home that in future king's officers hold-
ing commands under the East India Company should receive letters
of service authorising them to exercise their rank only so long as they


## p. 294 (#322) ############################################

294
THE ĆARNATIC, 1761-84
continued in the Company's service, so that dismissal from the latter
automatically ended their authority in India.
It must be remembered that Macartney was placed in a position
of extraordinary difficulty owing to the lack of definition of powers
as between the Bengal and Madras Governments, and between the
civil government and the military commanders. The first was due to
the neglects of those who drew the Regulating Act; the second in
part to the anomalous position of the king's officers in India, in part
to the decision of Hastings in the crisis of 1780 to free Coote from
dependence on the civil government at Madras. Only a man of
very extraordinary gifts could have overcome such difficulties with
complete success.


## p. 295 (#323) ############################################

CHAPTER XVI
.
CHAIT SINGH, THE BEGAMS OF OUDH
AND FAIZULLA KHAN
THE
The Company's. exchequer had been seriously drained by the
Maratha War, and the outbreak of hostilities with France in 1778
warned Hastings that he must consider new methods of raising money.
He had recourse to the rather harsh and discreditable policy
which brought upon him the impeachment and which, when every
possible excuse has been inade for it, remains the one serious stain on
his administration. Was there no other alternative? Would it not
have been possible to raise a loan as would have been done in modern
times? The answer is that Hastings was very unwilling to contract
another bonded debt, for he had received much credit with the
directors for having paid off that which he found existing when he
came to India. He decided that he was justified in demanding from
Chait Singh, the raja of Benares, a special sum of over £50,000 in
addition to his regular tribute, or rent, of £225,000. The council
agreed, and were therefore equally responsible with Hastings for the
exaction. Francis, it is true, was inclined to demur and suggested-
a suggestion which was not accepted—that Chait Singh should be
assured at the same time that the demand was entirely exceptional,
but in the end he acquiesced in Hastings's policy. The same demand
was made in the two following years. Chait Singh naturally, follow-
ing the invariable practice in the East, protested against these
exactions, but after slight delay he paid the money.
The British methods of enforcing payment were certainly harsh.
In 1779 Chait Singh asked that the payment should be limited to
that year and his "contumacy" was punished by an order to pay
the whole in one sum instead of in instalments. When again he asked
for an indulgence of six or seven months, he was told that if he failed
to meet the original demand he would be treated as though he had
refused altogether. He urged that his agreement with the Company
should have exempted him from all contributions beyond the nor-
mal tribute. Troops were then ordered to march into his territory,
and an extra charge of £2000 was made against him for their
expenses.
In 1780, on the same day that he paid the last instalment of the
third £50,000, an entirely new demand was made upon him that he
should provide the Company with 2000 cavalry, altbergh when the
Company took over the sovereignty of Benares in 1775, he had been
merely recommended to maintain a body of that number of horse,


## p. 296 (#324) ############################################

296
CHAIT SINGH, OUDH BEGAMS, FAIZULLA KHAN
and was told that there would be "no obligation on him to do it". 1
Chait Singh replied that he was unable to spare so large a number.
The demand was then reduced to 1000. He mustered 500 horse and
500 infantry and sent a message to Hastings that these troops were
ready for his service. Chait Singh declared that he never received
an answer to this message, a statement which is almost certainly
accurate, for Hastings in his Narrative of the Insurrection practical-
ly admits it: “I do not know but it may be true. He had received
positive orders, and those had been repeated. It was his duty to
obey them, not to waste my time with letters of excuse". 2
Hastings now made up his mind to inflict upon Chait Singh the
immense fine of half a million sterling: "I was resolved to draw from
his guilt the means of relief to the Company's distress. . . . In a word
I had determined to make him pay largely for his pardon, or to exact
a severe vengeance for his past delinquency”. 3 Hastings was by this
time entirely his own master, for Wheler was the only councillor left
at Calcutta. An arrangement was made by which Hastings himself
was to go to Benares and settle the question as he deemed best, while
Wheler was to remain on duty in Bengal. The governor-general went
northward in July. Chait Singh met him at Baksar and abjectly
humbling himself, asked for pardon. Hastings refused to give him
any answer till his arrival at Benares. There he again refused to
grant him a personal interview and merely transmitted his demand
in writing. He received a letter from the raja, which to an impartial
judge would seem to err, if at all, in the direction of servility, but
which Hastings described as “Not only unsatisfactory in substance
but offensive in style”. 4
Though Hastings had taken with him only a weak escort, he
ordered Chait Singh to be put under arrest. The raja humbly submit-
ted but the troops, infuriated by the indignity placed upon their ruler
in his own capital, suddenly rose and massacred a company of British
sepoys with their officers. Chait Singh, fearing for the consequences,
escaped in the turmoil and joined his rebellious army. Hastings was
in the most imminent danger and had to fly for safety to Chunar.
There he showed his customary coolness and presence of mind,
rallied all available forces to his aid and drove back his enemy. Chait
Singh, maintaining his innocence of the massacre, was hunted over
the Ganges and fled to Gwalior. His dominions were sequestrated
and were conferred upon a nephew, the tribute at the same time
being raised from £225,000 to £400,000. The council at Calcutta, now
consisting of Wheler and Macpherson, were obviously embarrassed
in their attempts to defend and ratify these proceedings of their
chief. They felt bound to ask themselves certain questions, first,
"Where were the Governor-General's particular instructions for
1 Reports from Committee of the House of Commons, v, 489.
2 Warren Hastings, A Narrative of the Insurrrection which happened in
the Zamindary of Benares, p. 27. Idem, p. 9
4 Idem, p. 19.
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CHAIT SINGH'S TENURE
297
such extraordinary demands upon Chait Singh? ” To this they replied
that "he was fully authorised by the general tenor of his instructions”
and that in not requiring more particular injunctions “there was a
delicacy in the mode he preferred and it imposed a greater respon-
sibility. " Their second question was, "Why was Chait Singh put in
arrest when he offered to make every concession? ” to which they
replied that nothing but arrest could have convinced Chait Singh of
Hastings's determination. Their third question was "Whether there
was not a compact between him and the Company which specified that
he was only to pay them a certain annual tribute? ” They agreed that
this “involves much argument”, but they accept Hastings's own
version of the sanad or original agreement with Chait Singh given
in his Narrative. They admit that his actions "certainly precipitated
the storm from the cloud in which it had gathered", and that these
acts “judges at a distance, judges unoppressed with the actual
embarrassments of this government, may with great speciousness of
argument condemn". 1 Their attitude suggests a certain uneasiness,
together with an obvious desire to defend the governor-general. We
must deal here very shortly with certain technical and legal points
which were discussed at immense length in the impeachment. The
first is whether Chait Singh was an independent raja or a mere
zamindar. The fact was that though he undoubtedly had a zamindari
status, he had a very real measure of independence and quite an
exceptional position. Hastings had committed himself in the past to
the view that he was far more than a zamindar, but this question
clearly does not affect the main point at issue, which is whether Chait
Singh, whatever his eaxct degree of dependency upon the British,
was treated with fairness and mercy. In any case, as Grey pointed
.
out in the impeachment, Hastings's defenders were impaling them-
selves upon the horns of a dilemma, if they maintained that Chait
Singh was a mere zamindar and at the same time that the demand
made upon him was justifiable. In that case the exaction ought to
have taken the form of a general universal tax levied on all the
zamindars under the Company's rule; but it was directed only against
Chait Singh. Hastings had admitted that "there was no other person
in the situation of Chait Singh",? which was really fatal to the "mere
zamindar" theory. The second question is whether the Company had
not bound itself to levy no contribution upon him beyond his normal
tribute or rent of £225,000. It would take too long to discuss this
question in all its detail, but there is no doubt of the technical point
that such a promise had been definitely given in 1775. A later grant,
it is true, of 1776, contained the words that "all former sanads had
become null and void", and it was upon this fact that Hastings tried
to base a technical defence; but it is clear that Chait Singh had
1 Forrest, Selections from the State Papers in the Foreign Department, m,
830-2.
2 Bond, Speeches in the Trial of Warren Hastings, I, 328.
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298
CHAIT SINGH, OUDH BEGAMS, FAIZULLA KHAN
objected, as he had every right to do, to the insertion of these words,
and that the grant was altered accordingly. Hastings also claimed
that:
it [is] a right inherent in every government to impose, such assessments as it
judges expedient for the common service and protection of all its subjects; and
we are not precluded from it by any agreement subsisting between the Raja
and this government. 1
These Asiatic views naturally exposed Hastings to the attacks of
Burke.
A third question whether Chait Singh was in rebellion against the
Company hardly deserves examination. It is perfectly certain that,
until his troops broke out in detestation of the treatment to which
their ruler was subjected, the idea of rebellion had never dawned
upon the raja. The truth is that Hastings in his desperate need for
supplies allowed himself to depart from his usually generous and
kindly attitude towards Indian powers. Whatever the legal rights
and wrongs of the matter, no sane person can deny that Hastings's
treatment of the unfortunate raja was merciless and vindictive. This
can be illustrated by one incident which occurred in the year 1780.
In that year after the demand for a third sum of £50,000 had been
made, Chait Singh sending a confidential agent to Calcutta offered
Hastings a present of about £20,000. Hastings at first refused it,
which was of course the only proper course to take, for the sum was
meant as a bribe to save Chait Singh from the larger amount of
£50,000. If it was right to levy the latter sum, it was unquestionably
most improper to receive the former. But Hastings after a few days,
being in serious need of money to equip an expedition against Sindhia,
accepted the money. We need not here consider the unconstitutional
nature of his act in taking such sums without the knowledge of nis
council, the difficulties in which he involved himself by representing
the money as a gift from his private estate or the unfortunate view of
money transactions which the whole affair implies; but it is difficult
to understand how any man of ordinary feeling and consideration
for his fellow-creatures could accept the proffered gift of £20,000
and then immediately exact the larger sum of £50,000; confront his
suppliant with a further demand for troops, and, on the ground that
the demand was not met, proceed to levy a fine of £500,000. There
seems no doubt, as Sir Alfred Lyall points out and as Hastings's own
language shows, that the governor-general had never quite forgiven
Chait Singh for having in the crisis of 1777 sent an emissary to make
favour with Clavering.
Quite apart from the morality of the transaction, Hastings lies
open to criticism in regard to the policy of it. He has been justified,
after all other defences
have been surrendered, on the ground that the
1 Reports from Committees of the House of Commons, v, 463.


## p. 299 (#327) ############################################

CONDITION OF BENARES
299
a
political situation was so serious as to justify any means of obtaining
money. The answer to this is that he obtained none, and, what is
more, placed his own valuable life in the utmost peril. By his im-
prudent action in arresting Chait Singh he was responsible for the
uprising of the people of Benares; the raja escaped with part of his
wealth-the amount he took with him was in all probability grossly
exaggerated—and the rest of it amounting to twenty-three lakhs of
rupees was seized by the troops at Bijaigarh who promptly proceeded
to divide it up amongst themselves. This was largely due to an
indiscreet letter of Hastings himself which encouraged the army to
claim the prize money. The immediate result therefore on the finan-
cial side was that the Company incurred the expense of the military
operations that ensued. For the moment they got nothing, and it was
an immediate subvention that was required. Hastings afterwards
boasted, “I lost the zemindari with the rent of 22 lakhs; I recovered
it with a revenue of 40”. 1 But this only applied of course to the
future, and as a matter of fact for a long time the augmented revenue
(partly owing to the simultaneous occurrence of a famine) could not
be raised. Two successive ministers of finance were dismissed be-
cause they failed to produce it. All the evidence shows that it was a
very long time before Benares recovered from the heavy exactions
made upon it. Hastings, with a curious detachment which often pre-
vented him from seeing, or at any rate from acknowledging the
consequences of his own actions, himself bears witness to the desola-
tion of the country without apparently the least apprehension that he
was in any way responsible for it. In June, 1784, he wrote that he
would avoid Benares on his way back to Calcutta, "for I underwent
the persecution of mobs of complainants from Buxar to Joosee in my
way thither, and there is now a little mob parading even at my gate”. ?
In 1788 Lord Cornwallis sent Jonathan Duncan as a commissioner to
report on the condition of Benares. His report dealt one by one with
the districts of the province and is a most serious indictment of the
treatment meted out to Benares. In one district it is said that a third
of the land is uncultivated. In another for about twelve or fourteen
miles, "the whole appeared one continual waste as far as the eye
could reach”. In a third in a stretch of about twelve miles “not above
twenty fields of cultivated ground are to be seen: all the rest being
as far as the eye can reach, one general waste of long grass”. The
report adds significantly that this falling off in cultivation is said
to have happened in the course of a few years, that is, since the
late raja's expulsion. 3
Hastings having failed, as we have seen, to obtain any money from
Chait Singh had to seek for another source of supply. The nawab of
Oudh, Asaf-ud-daula, owed the Company at this time, for arrears of
1 Gleig, op. cit. II, 421.
2 Idem, III, 185.
8 Minutes of the Evidence in the Trial of Warren Hastings, pp. 261-2.


## p. 300 (#328) ############################################

300
CHAIT SINGH, OUDH BEGAMS, FAIZULLA KHAN
subsidy, about fifteen lakhs of rupees, and he professed that he had
no means of discharging the debt. His mother and grandmother,
the begams or princesses of Oudh, had inherited from the late nawab
large jagirs or landed estates and a treasure amounting it is said to
about £2,000,000. The nawab had long desired to get control of this
wealth and claimed that it was unjustly withheld from him. The will
had never been produced and it was claimed that by the Muham-
madan law the begams had no right to inherit so large a proportion
of the late ruler's property. In any case, it was said, this property
was really part of the wealth of the sovereign of the country and the
first claim upon it ought to have been the late nawab's debt to the
Company. All this was no doubt largely true, but in 1775 the widow
of Shuja-ud-daula, on the urgent representation of the British
Resident, agreed to pay her son £300,000 in addition to £250,000
already given to him, on condition that he and the Company
guaranteed that no further demand should ever be made upon her.
The guarantee was given. In 1781 Asaf-ud-daula, urged on thereto
by the Resident, as is clear from the private correspondence between
Hastings and Middleton, asked that he might be allowed to resume
the estates and seize the treasure of the begams. Hastings in sore
need of money agreed to the proposal and withdrew the Company's
protection from the begams. At this point the nawab, who had
probably never desired to seize the treasure, and was afraid, as the
Resident said, of the "uncommonly violent temper of his female
relations”, began to hang back, and had henceforward to be steadily
driven on by the British authorities to avail himself of the opportunity
thus given him. In December, 1781,. Hastings wrote to Middleton,
"You must not allow any negotiations or forbearance, but must
prosecute both services until the begams are at the entire mercy of
the nawab”. 1 In January, 1782, he writes to say that he had hoped
the nawab would have immediately entered upon the measures
agreed upon, but "after having long waited, with much impatience,
for this effect, I was apprised . . . that the nawab, from what cause
I know not, had shown a great reluctance to enter on this business”.
He tells the council that if the Resident cannot carry out the instruc-
tions, "I would myself proceed to Lucknow, and afford the nawab
any personal assistance for carrying them into execution . . . I dread
the imbecility and irresolution, which too much prevail in the nawab's
councils”. Hastings refers to "the pressing letters which I have
written to the nawab, the strong injunctions which I have repeated
to the Resident”. 2 Middleton replied that “the temporising and
indecisive conduct of the nawab seem to promise an issue very
different from that expected in your commands”. 3 Hastings, however,
was not to be deterred from his object by the unwillingness of
1 Forrest, Selections from the State Papers in the Foreign Department,
III, 950.
2 Report from Committees of the House of Commons, vi, 537.
3. Idem, p. 538.
9
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## p. 301 (#329) ############################################

THE BEGAM'S CASE
301
the nawab or the shrinking from strong measures of his representative,
and in February we find him writing to Scott that he had been
compelled to rouse Middleton's activity "by letters written in a style
of the greatest severity". 1
Middleton, not having satisfied Hastings as sufficiently energetic
in applying coercion, was superseded as Resident by Bristow, and
Bristow wrote in June :
The begam complains that having no pension or jagir she now subsists, her
family and herself, with the greatest difficulty. . . . Previous to my arrival her
eunuchs were kept for many months in confinement, and led out to corporal
punishment. . . . These measures failed, and you have before you the opinions
given by Major Gilpin . . . that all that force could do has been done. 2
The above quotations are perhaps sufficient to meet the theory
that Hastings was not responsible for what his agents were doing at
Faizabad and that the latter were merely carrying out the wishes of
the nawab. As a matter of fact the nawab was a reluctant party
throughout, and Hastings asks that a very severe rebuke should be
given to his minister for having assumed a very unbecoming tone of
refusal, reproach and resentment in opposition to measures recom-
mended by me and even to acts done by my authority”. As to
the actual treatment inflicted on the begam's two ministers, they
were imprisoned from January to December, 1782, and they were for
a time deprived of food and put in irons. It seems doubtful whether
flogging was actually inflicted.
Finally in December, 1782, they paid over large sums of money
and were released. The British officer who had charge of them wrote:
"I wish you had been present at the enlargement of the prisoners.
The quivering lips, the tears of joy stealing down the poor men's
cheeks was a scene truly affecting". 1
The justification put forward by Hastings for tearing up the
Company's guarantee was that the begams had supported the rising
of Chait Singh and were in rebellion against the British Government.
The answer to this appears to be that, even if it were entirely true,
the proper course would have been to confront the begams with the
charge, produce the evidence and demand proofs of innocence, not
to cancel the treaty and cast them to the tender mercies of the nawab,
or rather to those of the British Resident.
The evidence for the alleged rebellion is conflicting. It depends
upon the affidavits taken by Sir Elijah Impey, in his injudicious
attempt to support the governor-general, the statements of Colonel
Hannay and his officers, and those of Wheler and others. The
affidavits are worthless. Sir James Stephen points out that only ten
1 Gleig, op. cit.