The kind of
omniscience
that is referred to in the Upani?
Buddhist-Omniscience
Naughton, Alex.
"Buddhist Omniscience.
" The Eastern Buddhist 24:1 (1991) pgs.
28-51
? Buddhist Omniscience
ALEX NAUGHTON
"Omniscience, at least for one who is not himself omniscient, is merely an opinion. "
Nathan Katz, Buddhist Images ofHuman Perfecrion, p. 2SS.
(King Pasenadi speaking to Sakyamllni):
"I asked the lord about omniscience and he explained omniscience to me in a manner which pleases, satisfies and gladdens me. "
Lord Chalmers. trans. , Fu"htr Dialogud of,he Buddha, Vol. 1, p. 70. Omniscience in ,he Indian contex'
The concept of omniscience has a long history in Indian thought. 1 The Vedas themselves do not contaill the word "omniscience," but at several points they refer to similar concepts. The god of fire, Agni, is
olle of the most popular figures addressed in the Vedic hymns, and a common epithet for him is "JIJ'avedas," which means "knowing all created beings. " However, the Vedas exhibit a characteristic known as kathenotheism, which consists of the tendency to address various different gods each as supreme. There are a bewildering variety of gods addressed in the Vedic hymns, but no one of them is clearly pre-emi- nent. Instead, depending upon which god the particular hymn is ad- dressed to, that god will be lauded with a collection of superlatives, which are addressed to a different sod in another hymn. Thus high honors for knowledge are not exclusive to Agni by any means. Varuija, known as "chief of the gods of the natural and moral order," is
I Be$1 t(f(t(nces are fOllnd in Ram Jec: SIDlh, The Corr? pt o/Omrriscknce ill AII- d",t Hindu Thought.
? ? 28
? BUDDHIST OM? ISCIENCE
supplicated saying: "According 10 his wisdom Varuna knoweth aiL" ? In another passage we find: "Prajapati! thou only comprehendest all these created things, and none beside thee. " With the development of the Upanifads we are on firmer ground, for here the Sanskrit word for "omniscience" does appear. 2 The generallendency of Ihe Upanifads is to equate omniscience with knowledge of the (ltman or soul, though there is still ascription of omniscience to the god Visnu, for example. The movement from the Vedas to the Upanifods thus presents a change in the concept of omnsi cience. What used to be reserved for the gods is now accessible to certain people as well, those who seek the IUmon. Yet knowledge of the lJtman is not what we normally take Ihe word "omnis- cience" 10 mean. This indicates that omniscience has several difef renl meanings within Indian philosophy and religion, of which the literal or common meaning, of knowing everything, is perhaps the least in- teresling. We may compare "omniscience" to "omnivorous," in- dicating that the latter certainly does not mean that one has already ealen everything, but rather that one is prepared to eat anything that is edible, which excludes a large number of things. Analogously, omnis- cience may be regarded as a potential rather than a/air accompli, the ability 10 know everything that is knowable, without having already
known it all. And the limitalion of this kind of omniscience to that which is knowable is an important distinction, since it would exclude all future evenls at least, as well as a large proportion of past events. This kind of omniscience we may call a figuralive or metaphorical om- niicience, as opposed to the more common literal omniscience. The kind of omniscience that is referred to in the Upani? ods as synonymous with knowledge of the l1tmon may be designated a spiritual omnis- cience, since in knowing the lJrman as identical wilh the fundamental nalUre of reality, one knows an underlying fealure of all seemingly separate phenomena. These various different kinds of omniscience ap- pear within the Buddhist tradition as well.
Omniscience in PlJli sources
Conlemporaneous with the development of the Upanj? ads there ap-
pear in India several differenl religious teachers who deny the efficacy
, The word in Sanskrit is SQf'VQjifo, son;a munin, "all, Or everythin," andjifo the re,ular verbal root, co,natc wilh QUr English "to know. "
? ? 29
? NAUGHTON
of the Vedas entirely. The most important o f these figures for our pur- poses are Stkyamuni Buddha and Mahlvlra, who founded the religious traditions of Buddhism and Jainism. Jaina religious eschatology main- tained that the soul had an innate capacity for knowledge, which was obscured by layers of karma, or accumulated sinful actions. Through religious practice, largely consisting of austerities, these layers could be burned off, and once they were all gone, the soul would be liberated. Having removed all obstacles to the 501. 11'5 coanition, it would naturally follOw that the soul would be omniscient. The Jains called this knowledge of the liberated soul keva/o-jriilna, and their insistence upon the reality of this attainment forms one of the hallmarks of Jaina doc- trine. l This is consistent both with Jaina sources themselves and with reports of Jaina doctrines in the PaJi scriptures. We find Abhaya the
LicchavJ saying in the Angutlora Nikilya: "Sir, NUha's son, the Unclothed, claims to be ali-knowing, all-seeing, and to have all--com- prising knowledge and vision. He says, 'Whether I walk or stand or sleep or wake, my knowledge and vision are always and without a break present before me. ' . . Similarly in the Majjhimo Nik/lyo: "When this had been said, monks, these Jains spoke to me thus; 'Your reverence, Nltaputta the Jain is ali-knowing, all? seeing; he claims all?
embracing knowledae? and-vision, saying; "Whether I am walkina or standing still or asleep or awake, knowledge-and. vision is permanently and continuously before me. " , " Finally, the CD{o-Sakuludilyi? Sutto contains the followina less than complimentary passage in which UdAyin addresses Silkyamuni:
"Some time ago, revered sir. one who was ail-knowing. all- seeing, claiming aJl--embracing knowledge-and-vision, said: 'Whether I am walking or standing still or asleep or awake, knowledge-and? vision is constantly and perpetually before me. ' He, on being asked a question by me concerning the
past, shelved the question by (asking) another, answered off the point and evinced temper and iII? will and sulkiness . . . [Buddha inquires:) 'BUI who was this, Udlyin, that all? know?
, P. S. Jaini, Tht: Jllinll Pilth 0/ PurjfiClllioll, p. 260: "Absoillte omniscience is in thrir I. adition Ihe fllndJlJT1entll criterion for liberation. " Also, K. N. Jayatilleite, &,1), Buddhl. sl Tht:Ory 0/ Knowlt:dlt, p. 204, quoting Jacobi', Ja/rlll SQINIS. says that omnis? cience WIU "one of the fundamental dogma! of the J. ins. "
? ? 30
? BUDDHIST OMNISCIENCE
ing, all-seeing, claiming all-embracing knowledge-and-vi- sion . . . on being asked a question by you . . . evinced temper and ill-will and sulkiness? ' [Udlyin replies:) 'Revered sir, it was Nltapuua the Jain. "
There are other similar passages in the pali SUIlOS, bul to ensure that the Buddhists are not misrepresenting this position of the Jainas, we may tum to their own sources, where we find: "the Jaina view of omnis? cience . . . may be now defined as an immediate and direct knowledge of all the objects of the universe, past, present and future, subtle and remote, far and near, by a single ever-lasting act of knowledge requir- inl no assistance from the senses and even mind. "? Jaini also discusses the nature of Jaina omniscience in this way: "Such knowledge is com- pared to a mirror in which everyone of the innumerable existents, in all its qualities and modes, is simuhaneousiy reHected. These 'knowables' are cognized without any volition whatsoever on the pan of the arhat. Furthermore, no activity of the senses or mind is involved; there is only direct perception by the souL'" So this Jaina omniscience would seem to be a literal kind of omniscience, which outside of the Jaina tradition is usually reserved for deities. It is an automatic kind of knowledge, re- quiring "no volition" and "no activity of the senses or mind. " In fact, "omniscient cognition and sensory cognition are held to be mutually antithetical. "6 This follows from tbe Jaina conception of the soul, which is an innately knowing entity. Having removed all obscurations, this innate feature of the soul will manifest itself completely, without any possible hindrance or limitation. So crucial is this doctrine of om- niscience to the Jaina tradition that it is used to validate all other Jaina teachings. Jaini writes that "the authority of the Jaina teachings rests ultimately on the fact that they were preached by an omniscient be- ing,"7 which seems very similar to th? idea of revelation as a source for religious teaching.
The Buddhist tradition from its inception has also made use of the concept of omniscience, but in a very different manner. In the tradi- tional account of Slkyamuni's enlightenment, the content of his
, Ram Jee Singh, TM laina Conup' 0/ Omnisc? nu, p. 18. , Jlini. op. cit. , p. 266.
, ibid. , pp. 34-35.
? Ibid. ? p. 89.
? ? ? JI
? NAUGHTON
realization is said to consist of three kinds of knowledge: of his own previous existences, clairvoyance which sees the transmigration of be- ings in accordance with their karma, and destruction of the l1Jravas, which are said to consist of sensual desire, desire for existence, and ig- norance. Having attained enlightenment, Siikyamuni decided to teach others how to achieve the same realization after being requested by BramM, one of the main deities in the Hindu pantheon. Learning that hi. own former teachers were dead, he decided to give his first teaching to the group of five monks with whom he had previously engaged in various ascetic practices. While on his way to meet them, he encountered an ascetic named Upaka. Upaka noticed that Siikyamuni didn't look like an ordinary fellow, so he asked him,
"'Who is your teacher, or who. >e dhamma do you profess? ' When this had been said, I, monks, addressed Upaka, the
Naked Ascetic, in verses:
'Victorious over all, omniscient am I. ' "I
Thai is to say, on the basis of the previously mentioned three kinds of knowledge, Siikyamuni here claims omniscience for himself. This is ob- viously not meant as a il teral omniscience, bul as a more spiritual kind such as in the Upani? ads. What is most remarkable about Ihis passage, though, is Upaka's reaction to Sakyamuni's grand pronouncement: "Thereupon Upaka said, 'Would that it might be so, friend,' shook his head, and went off on a by-path. "9 That is to say, Upaka exhibits a thoroughly skeptical attitude to Sak:yamuni's claim to omniscience, and goes offunconvinced. This reaction seems a very natural one to us, and the fact that it portrays Sakyamuni in such an uncomplimentary way directly after his enlightenment is probably good evidence for its authenticity. No later redactor would be likely to make up such a story. Even Ihough Upaka recognizes that something about Sakyamuni is special, he does not become "the first Buddhist. " The connection be- tween the three kinds of knowledge and omniscience is also mentioned in the Tevijaj -VacchagoUa Sutta, where Siikyamuni meets the wanderer Vacchagotta, who says that he has heard Sakyamuni
, L B. Horner, trans. , TheMiddle Length Sayings, Vol. J, p. 214. Also E. Thomas ne Life oj Buddha as Legend and Hislo,y. p. 83.
, Thomas, p. 83. Also Horner, p. 21S.
? 32
? BUDDHIST OMNISCIENCE
d e s c r i b e d a s o m n i s c i e n t , i n t h e m a n n e r o f t h e J a i n a s a i n t s . R e s p o n d i n g t o this report, SAkyamuni replies that he has three knowledges: he can retail his past lives, he is clairvoyant, and he has become liberated by destroying the "cankers. " These of course are the same three that con- stituted his enlightenment. Responding to Abhaya the licchavi's state- ment above, Ananda makes no mention of omniscience, but simply tells him about the basic Buddhist triad ofiTla, samltdhi, andprajillt as constituting the Buddhist path to nirvlt{la. On another occasion, when Sakyamuni is addressing Sandaka, he parodies the Jaina idea in this way:
"As to this, Sandaka, some teacher, all-knowing, all-seeing, claims all-embracing knowledge? and-vision, saying: 'Wheth- er I am walking or standing still or asleep or awake, knowl- edge? and-vision is constantly and perpetually before me. ' He enters an empty place, and he does not obtain almsfood, and a dog bites him, and he encounters a fierce elephant, and he encounters a fierce horse, and he encounters a fierce bullock, and he asks a woman and a man their name and clan, and he asks the name of a villa,e or a market town and the way . . . Whereupon, Sandaka, an intelligent person . . . goes away uninterested. "l"
That i s to say, someone who was truly omniscient would not act in such a way, and if he claims to be omniscient yet acts in the manner de- scribed above, it is difficult to take his claim seriously. In general, we find that Sakyamuni seems to be uninterested in claims of omniscience, partly because they are notoriously difficult to verify, but largely because they are not helpful for one who seeks liberation. Continuing his talk to Sandaka quoted above, SAkyamuni distinguishes four types of unsatisfactory bases for religious teaching. The first is the example jU&1 given, of a teacher who claim? to be omniscient. Second is a teacher who follows tradition. Third is a teacher who follows reason, and last is a teacher who is stupid and confused. Although the context suggests thai the first type was primarily directed at the Jainas, the principle itself is e"'pressed without reference to any specific figure, and we know from other sources that MahAvira was not alone in claiming
? ? " I. B. Homer, Irans. . Thf' Middlf' Ult&,It Sliyings, Vol. 2, p. 199.
33
? II Jayatitleke, p.
The kind of omniscience that is referred to in the Upani? ods as synonymous with knowledge of the l1tmon may be designated a spiritual omnis- cience, since in knowing the lJrman as identical wilh the fundamental nalUre of reality, one knows an underlying fealure of all seemingly separate phenomena. These various different kinds of omniscience ap- pear within the Buddhist tradition as well.
Omniscience in PlJli sources
Conlemporaneous with the development of the Upanj? ads there ap-
pear in India several differenl religious teachers who deny the efficacy
, The word in Sanskrit is SQf'VQjifo, son;a munin, "all, Or everythin," andjifo the re,ular verbal root, co,natc wilh QUr English "to know. "
? ? 29
? NAUGHTON
of the Vedas entirely. The most important o f these figures for our pur- poses are Stkyamuni Buddha and Mahlvlra, who founded the religious traditions of Buddhism and Jainism. Jaina religious eschatology main- tained that the soul had an innate capacity for knowledge, which was obscured by layers of karma, or accumulated sinful actions. Through religious practice, largely consisting of austerities, these layers could be burned off, and once they were all gone, the soul would be liberated. Having removed all obstacles to the 501. 11'5 coanition, it would naturally follOw that the soul would be omniscient. The Jains called this knowledge of the liberated soul keva/o-jriilna, and their insistence upon the reality of this attainment forms one of the hallmarks of Jaina doc- trine. l This is consistent both with Jaina sources themselves and with reports of Jaina doctrines in the PaJi scriptures. We find Abhaya the
LicchavJ saying in the Angutlora Nikilya: "Sir, NUha's son, the Unclothed, claims to be ali-knowing, all-seeing, and to have all--com- prising knowledge and vision. He says, 'Whether I walk or stand or sleep or wake, my knowledge and vision are always and without a break present before me. ' . . Similarly in the Majjhimo Nik/lyo: "When this had been said, monks, these Jains spoke to me thus; 'Your reverence, Nltaputta the Jain is ali-knowing, all? seeing; he claims all?
embracing knowledae? and-vision, saying; "Whether I am walkina or standing still or asleep or awake, knowledge-and. vision is permanently and continuously before me. " , " Finally, the CD{o-Sakuludilyi? Sutto contains the followina less than complimentary passage in which UdAyin addresses Silkyamuni:
"Some time ago, revered sir. one who was ail-knowing. all- seeing, claiming aJl--embracing knowledge-and-vision, said: 'Whether I am walking or standing still or asleep or awake, knowledge-and? vision is constantly and perpetually before me. ' He, on being asked a question by me concerning the
past, shelved the question by (asking) another, answered off the point and evinced temper and iII? will and sulkiness . . . [Buddha inquires:) 'BUI who was this, Udlyin, that all? know?
, P. S. Jaini, Tht: Jllinll Pilth 0/ PurjfiClllioll, p. 260: "Absoillte omniscience is in thrir I. adition Ihe fllndJlJT1entll criterion for liberation. " Also, K. N. Jayatilleite, &,1), Buddhl. sl Tht:Ory 0/ Knowlt:dlt, p. 204, quoting Jacobi', Ja/rlll SQINIS. says that omnis? cience WIU "one of the fundamental dogma! of the J. ins. "
? ? 30
? BUDDHIST OMNISCIENCE
ing, all-seeing, claiming all-embracing knowledge-and-vi- sion . . . on being asked a question by you . . . evinced temper and ill-will and sulkiness? ' [Udlyin replies:) 'Revered sir, it was Nltapuua the Jain. "
There are other similar passages in the pali SUIlOS, bul to ensure that the Buddhists are not misrepresenting this position of the Jainas, we may tum to their own sources, where we find: "the Jaina view of omnis? cience . . . may be now defined as an immediate and direct knowledge of all the objects of the universe, past, present and future, subtle and remote, far and near, by a single ever-lasting act of knowledge requir- inl no assistance from the senses and even mind. "? Jaini also discusses the nature of Jaina omniscience in this way: "Such knowledge is com- pared to a mirror in which everyone of the innumerable existents, in all its qualities and modes, is simuhaneousiy reHected. These 'knowables' are cognized without any volition whatsoever on the pan of the arhat. Furthermore, no activity of the senses or mind is involved; there is only direct perception by the souL'" So this Jaina omniscience would seem to be a literal kind of omniscience, which outside of the Jaina tradition is usually reserved for deities. It is an automatic kind of knowledge, re- quiring "no volition" and "no activity of the senses or mind. " In fact, "omniscient cognition and sensory cognition are held to be mutually antithetical. "6 This follows from tbe Jaina conception of the soul, which is an innately knowing entity. Having removed all obscurations, this innate feature of the soul will manifest itself completely, without any possible hindrance or limitation. So crucial is this doctrine of om- niscience to the Jaina tradition that it is used to validate all other Jaina teachings. Jaini writes that "the authority of the Jaina teachings rests ultimately on the fact that they were preached by an omniscient be- ing,"7 which seems very similar to th? idea of revelation as a source for religious teaching.
The Buddhist tradition from its inception has also made use of the concept of omniscience, but in a very different manner. In the tradi- tional account of Slkyamuni's enlightenment, the content of his
, Ram Jee Singh, TM laina Conup' 0/ Omnisc? nu, p. 18. , Jlini. op. cit. , p. 266.
, ibid. , pp. 34-35.
? Ibid. ? p. 89.
? ? ? JI
? NAUGHTON
realization is said to consist of three kinds of knowledge: of his own previous existences, clairvoyance which sees the transmigration of be- ings in accordance with their karma, and destruction of the l1Jravas, which are said to consist of sensual desire, desire for existence, and ig- norance. Having attained enlightenment, Siikyamuni decided to teach others how to achieve the same realization after being requested by BramM, one of the main deities in the Hindu pantheon. Learning that hi. own former teachers were dead, he decided to give his first teaching to the group of five monks with whom he had previously engaged in various ascetic practices. While on his way to meet them, he encountered an ascetic named Upaka. Upaka noticed that Siikyamuni didn't look like an ordinary fellow, so he asked him,
"'Who is your teacher, or who. >e dhamma do you profess? ' When this had been said, I, monks, addressed Upaka, the
Naked Ascetic, in verses:
'Victorious over all, omniscient am I. ' "I
Thai is to say, on the basis of the previously mentioned three kinds of knowledge, Siikyamuni here claims omniscience for himself. This is ob- viously not meant as a il teral omniscience, bul as a more spiritual kind such as in the Upani? ads. What is most remarkable about Ihis passage, though, is Upaka's reaction to Sakyamuni's grand pronouncement: "Thereupon Upaka said, 'Would that it might be so, friend,' shook his head, and went off on a by-path. "9 That is to say, Upaka exhibits a thoroughly skeptical attitude to Sak:yamuni's claim to omniscience, and goes offunconvinced. This reaction seems a very natural one to us, and the fact that it portrays Sakyamuni in such an uncomplimentary way directly after his enlightenment is probably good evidence for its authenticity. No later redactor would be likely to make up such a story. Even Ihough Upaka recognizes that something about Sakyamuni is special, he does not become "the first Buddhist. " The connection be- tween the three kinds of knowledge and omniscience is also mentioned in the Tevijaj -VacchagoUa Sutta, where Siikyamuni meets the wanderer Vacchagotta, who says that he has heard Sakyamuni
, L B. Horner, trans. , TheMiddle Length Sayings, Vol. J, p. 214. Also E. Thomas ne Life oj Buddha as Legend and Hislo,y. p. 83.
, Thomas, p. 83. Also Horner, p. 21S.
? 32
? BUDDHIST OMNISCIENCE
d e s c r i b e d a s o m n i s c i e n t , i n t h e m a n n e r o f t h e J a i n a s a i n t s . R e s p o n d i n g t o this report, SAkyamuni replies that he has three knowledges: he can retail his past lives, he is clairvoyant, and he has become liberated by destroying the "cankers. " These of course are the same three that con- stituted his enlightenment. Responding to Abhaya the licchavi's state- ment above, Ananda makes no mention of omniscience, but simply tells him about the basic Buddhist triad ofiTla, samltdhi, andprajillt as constituting the Buddhist path to nirvlt{la. On another occasion, when Sakyamuni is addressing Sandaka, he parodies the Jaina idea in this way:
"As to this, Sandaka, some teacher, all-knowing, all-seeing, claims all-embracing knowledge? and-vision, saying: 'Wheth- er I am walking or standing still or asleep or awake, knowl- edge? and-vision is constantly and perpetually before me. ' He enters an empty place, and he does not obtain almsfood, and a dog bites him, and he encounters a fierce elephant, and he encounters a fierce horse, and he encounters a fierce bullock, and he asks a woman and a man their name and clan, and he asks the name of a villa,e or a market town and the way . . . Whereupon, Sandaka, an intelligent person . . . goes away uninterested. "l"
That i s to say, someone who was truly omniscient would not act in such a way, and if he claims to be omniscient yet acts in the manner de- scribed above, it is difficult to take his claim seriously. In general, we find that Sakyamuni seems to be uninterested in claims of omniscience, partly because they are notoriously difficult to verify, but largely because they are not helpful for one who seeks liberation. Continuing his talk to Sandaka quoted above, SAkyamuni distinguishes four types of unsatisfactory bases for religious teaching. The first is the example jU&1 given, of a teacher who claim? to be omniscient. Second is a teacher who follows tradition. Third is a teacher who follows reason, and last is a teacher who is stupid and confused. Although the context suggests thai the first type was primarily directed at the Jainas, the principle itself is e"'pressed without reference to any specific figure, and we know from other sources that MahAvira was not alone in claiming
? ? " I. B. Homer, Irans. . Thf' Middlf' Ult&,It Sliyings, Vol. 2, p. 199.
33
? II Jayatitleke, p. 391
the attitude of the Buddha as often rellresemed in the Niklyas. "
,
nOles that "this verS( is not found in the NiklyilS but il reflects
NAUGHTON
to possess omniscience. At one point in the Mahll-ParinibbDna-Sulta, SAripulta addresses the Buddha thus: "Lord! such faith have I in the Exalted One, that melhinks there never has been, nor will there be, nor is there now any other, whether wanderer or brahmin, who is greater and wiser than Ihe Exalted One, that is to say, as regards the higher wisdom. " This is quite a natural expression of Saripulta's admiration for Sakyamuni, but Sakyamuni takes him to task for it, inquiring whether or nOI Sariputla has personally known the minds of all other sages 01" the past, present, and future. Saripulta has to admit that he has not, that he has in facl been speaking beyond his own experience. For Sariputta to meaningfully praise Sakyamuni as being omniscient would necessitate that Saripuua also be omniscient to verify Sakya- muni's realization. For S! lkyamuni one of the root causes of human confusion and suffering is that people tend to speak beyond their own experience, and it is for this reason that he rebukes S! lriputta for speaking in such a way. This rational and critical attitude of Sakya- muni is what many peopie find attractive in the pali scriptures. It is certainly a far cry from such statements as Tenullian's famous "I believe because it is absurd. " Sakyamuni considers that faith which is not based on sound reasoning and personal experience is a hindrance to spiritual realization. This anti-dogmatic altitude is exemplified in the famous goldsmith quote: "Just as wise men (test a claim to be gold) by burning, cutting and rubbing (on a touchstone), my statements, 0 monks, should be accepted after examination and not OUI of respect for me. '? I) Thatlhis altitude is still illustrative of the best of the Bud- dhist tradition is demonstrated in a recent quote from the Dalai Lama: "If there's good, strong evidence from science that such and such is Ihe case, and this is contrary 10 Buddhism, then we will change. ")!
It would be nice if we could leave the pali literature at this point, and simply report that Sakyamuni di? played a consistently critical att. ilude towards claims of omniscience, whether they were made about other leachers or addressed to himself, preferring to limit his own claims to the three kinds of knowledge we have mentioned. However, there are some further passages which render such an interpretation untenable.
? ? " In the New York Times, OcroiH:r 8, L989, Section 4, p. 6 . 34
? BUDDHIST OMNISCIENCE
Chief among these is a passage in the Kal)lJ. akatthala Sutta, which is worth quoting in extenso:
"Then King Pasenadi spoke thus to the Lord: 'I have heard this about you, revered sir: "The recluse Gotama speaks thus: There is neither a recluse nor a brahmin who, all-knowing, all-seeing, can claim a11-embracing knowledge-and-vision- this situation does not exist. " Revered sir, those who speak thus . . . I hope that these, revered sir, speak what was spoken by the Lord, that they do not misrepresenl the Lord by what is not fact, that they explain dhamma according to dhamma, and that no reasoned thesis gives occasion for contempt? '
'Those, sire, who speak thus . . . do not speak as I spoke bUI are misrepresenting me with what is not true, with what is not fact. '. . .
Then King Pasenadi spoke thus 10 the Lord: 'Could it be, revered sir.
? Buddhist Omniscience
ALEX NAUGHTON
"Omniscience, at least for one who is not himself omniscient, is merely an opinion. "
Nathan Katz, Buddhist Images ofHuman Perfecrion, p. 2SS.
(King Pasenadi speaking to Sakyamllni):
"I asked the lord about omniscience and he explained omniscience to me in a manner which pleases, satisfies and gladdens me. "
Lord Chalmers. trans. , Fu"htr Dialogud of,he Buddha, Vol. 1, p. 70. Omniscience in ,he Indian contex'
The concept of omniscience has a long history in Indian thought. 1 The Vedas themselves do not contaill the word "omniscience," but at several points they refer to similar concepts. The god of fire, Agni, is
olle of the most popular figures addressed in the Vedic hymns, and a common epithet for him is "JIJ'avedas," which means "knowing all created beings. " However, the Vedas exhibit a characteristic known as kathenotheism, which consists of the tendency to address various different gods each as supreme. There are a bewildering variety of gods addressed in the Vedic hymns, but no one of them is clearly pre-emi- nent. Instead, depending upon which god the particular hymn is ad- dressed to, that god will be lauded with a collection of superlatives, which are addressed to a different sod in another hymn. Thus high honors for knowledge are not exclusive to Agni by any means. Varuija, known as "chief of the gods of the natural and moral order," is
I Be$1 t(f(t(nces are fOllnd in Ram Jec: SIDlh, The Corr? pt o/Omrriscknce ill AII- d",t Hindu Thought.
? ? 28
? BUDDHIST OM? ISCIENCE
supplicated saying: "According 10 his wisdom Varuna knoweth aiL" ? In another passage we find: "Prajapati! thou only comprehendest all these created things, and none beside thee. " With the development of the Upanifads we are on firmer ground, for here the Sanskrit word for "omniscience" does appear. 2 The generallendency of Ihe Upanifads is to equate omniscience with knowledge of the (ltman or soul, though there is still ascription of omniscience to the god Visnu, for example. The movement from the Vedas to the Upanifods thus presents a change in the concept of omnsi cience. What used to be reserved for the gods is now accessible to certain people as well, those who seek the IUmon. Yet knowledge of the lJtman is not what we normally take Ihe word "omnis- cience" 10 mean. This indicates that omniscience has several difef renl meanings within Indian philosophy and religion, of which the literal or common meaning, of knowing everything, is perhaps the least in- teresling. We may compare "omniscience" to "omnivorous," in- dicating that the latter certainly does not mean that one has already ealen everything, but rather that one is prepared to eat anything that is edible, which excludes a large number of things. Analogously, omnis- cience may be regarded as a potential rather than a/air accompli, the ability 10 know everything that is knowable, without having already
known it all. And the limitalion of this kind of omniscience to that which is knowable is an important distinction, since it would exclude all future evenls at least, as well as a large proportion of past events. This kind of omniscience we may call a figuralive or metaphorical om- niicience, as opposed to the more common literal omniscience. The kind of omniscience that is referred to in the Upani? ods as synonymous with knowledge of the l1tmon may be designated a spiritual omnis- cience, since in knowing the lJrman as identical wilh the fundamental nalUre of reality, one knows an underlying fealure of all seemingly separate phenomena. These various different kinds of omniscience ap- pear within the Buddhist tradition as well.
Omniscience in PlJli sources
Conlemporaneous with the development of the Upanj? ads there ap-
pear in India several differenl religious teachers who deny the efficacy
, The word in Sanskrit is SQf'VQjifo, son;a munin, "all, Or everythin," andjifo the re,ular verbal root, co,natc wilh QUr English "to know. "
? ? 29
? NAUGHTON
of the Vedas entirely. The most important o f these figures for our pur- poses are Stkyamuni Buddha and Mahlvlra, who founded the religious traditions of Buddhism and Jainism. Jaina religious eschatology main- tained that the soul had an innate capacity for knowledge, which was obscured by layers of karma, or accumulated sinful actions. Through religious practice, largely consisting of austerities, these layers could be burned off, and once they were all gone, the soul would be liberated. Having removed all obstacles to the 501. 11'5 coanition, it would naturally follOw that the soul would be omniscient. The Jains called this knowledge of the liberated soul keva/o-jriilna, and their insistence upon the reality of this attainment forms one of the hallmarks of Jaina doc- trine. l This is consistent both with Jaina sources themselves and with reports of Jaina doctrines in the PaJi scriptures. We find Abhaya the
LicchavJ saying in the Angutlora Nikilya: "Sir, NUha's son, the Unclothed, claims to be ali-knowing, all-seeing, and to have all--com- prising knowledge and vision. He says, 'Whether I walk or stand or sleep or wake, my knowledge and vision are always and without a break present before me. ' . . Similarly in the Majjhimo Nik/lyo: "When this had been said, monks, these Jains spoke to me thus; 'Your reverence, Nltaputta the Jain is ali-knowing, all? seeing; he claims all?
embracing knowledae? and-vision, saying; "Whether I am walkina or standing still or asleep or awake, knowledge-and. vision is permanently and continuously before me. " , " Finally, the CD{o-Sakuludilyi? Sutto contains the followina less than complimentary passage in which UdAyin addresses Silkyamuni:
"Some time ago, revered sir. one who was ail-knowing. all- seeing, claiming aJl--embracing knowledge-and-vision, said: 'Whether I am walking or standing still or asleep or awake, knowledge-and? vision is constantly and perpetually before me. ' He, on being asked a question by me concerning the
past, shelved the question by (asking) another, answered off the point and evinced temper and iII? will and sulkiness . . . [Buddha inquires:) 'BUI who was this, Udlyin, that all? know?
, P. S. Jaini, Tht: Jllinll Pilth 0/ PurjfiClllioll, p. 260: "Absoillte omniscience is in thrir I. adition Ihe fllndJlJT1entll criterion for liberation. " Also, K. N. Jayatilleite, &,1), Buddhl. sl Tht:Ory 0/ Knowlt:dlt, p. 204, quoting Jacobi', Ja/rlll SQINIS. says that omnis? cience WIU "one of the fundamental dogma! of the J. ins. "
? ? 30
? BUDDHIST OMNISCIENCE
ing, all-seeing, claiming all-embracing knowledge-and-vi- sion . . . on being asked a question by you . . . evinced temper and ill-will and sulkiness? ' [Udlyin replies:) 'Revered sir, it was Nltapuua the Jain. "
There are other similar passages in the pali SUIlOS, bul to ensure that the Buddhists are not misrepresenting this position of the Jainas, we may tum to their own sources, where we find: "the Jaina view of omnis? cience . . . may be now defined as an immediate and direct knowledge of all the objects of the universe, past, present and future, subtle and remote, far and near, by a single ever-lasting act of knowledge requir- inl no assistance from the senses and even mind. "? Jaini also discusses the nature of Jaina omniscience in this way: "Such knowledge is com- pared to a mirror in which everyone of the innumerable existents, in all its qualities and modes, is simuhaneousiy reHected. These 'knowables' are cognized without any volition whatsoever on the pan of the arhat. Furthermore, no activity of the senses or mind is involved; there is only direct perception by the souL'" So this Jaina omniscience would seem to be a literal kind of omniscience, which outside of the Jaina tradition is usually reserved for deities. It is an automatic kind of knowledge, re- quiring "no volition" and "no activity of the senses or mind. " In fact, "omniscient cognition and sensory cognition are held to be mutually antithetical. "6 This follows from tbe Jaina conception of the soul, which is an innately knowing entity. Having removed all obscurations, this innate feature of the soul will manifest itself completely, without any possible hindrance or limitation. So crucial is this doctrine of om- niscience to the Jaina tradition that it is used to validate all other Jaina teachings. Jaini writes that "the authority of the Jaina teachings rests ultimately on the fact that they were preached by an omniscient be- ing,"7 which seems very similar to th? idea of revelation as a source for religious teaching.
The Buddhist tradition from its inception has also made use of the concept of omniscience, but in a very different manner. In the tradi- tional account of Slkyamuni's enlightenment, the content of his
, Ram Jee Singh, TM laina Conup' 0/ Omnisc? nu, p. 18. , Jlini. op. cit. , p. 266.
, ibid. , pp. 34-35.
? Ibid. ? p. 89.
? ? ? JI
? NAUGHTON
realization is said to consist of three kinds of knowledge: of his own previous existences, clairvoyance which sees the transmigration of be- ings in accordance with their karma, and destruction of the l1Jravas, which are said to consist of sensual desire, desire for existence, and ig- norance. Having attained enlightenment, Siikyamuni decided to teach others how to achieve the same realization after being requested by BramM, one of the main deities in the Hindu pantheon. Learning that hi. own former teachers were dead, he decided to give his first teaching to the group of five monks with whom he had previously engaged in various ascetic practices. While on his way to meet them, he encountered an ascetic named Upaka. Upaka noticed that Siikyamuni didn't look like an ordinary fellow, so he asked him,
"'Who is your teacher, or who. >e dhamma do you profess? ' When this had been said, I, monks, addressed Upaka, the
Naked Ascetic, in verses:
'Victorious over all, omniscient am I. ' "I
Thai is to say, on the basis of the previously mentioned three kinds of knowledge, Siikyamuni here claims omniscience for himself. This is ob- viously not meant as a il teral omniscience, bul as a more spiritual kind such as in the Upani? ads. What is most remarkable about Ihis passage, though, is Upaka's reaction to Sakyamuni's grand pronouncement: "Thereupon Upaka said, 'Would that it might be so, friend,' shook his head, and went off on a by-path. "9 That is to say, Upaka exhibits a thoroughly skeptical attitude to Sak:yamuni's claim to omniscience, and goes offunconvinced. This reaction seems a very natural one to us, and the fact that it portrays Sakyamuni in such an uncomplimentary way directly after his enlightenment is probably good evidence for its authenticity. No later redactor would be likely to make up such a story. Even Ihough Upaka recognizes that something about Sakyamuni is special, he does not become "the first Buddhist. " The connection be- tween the three kinds of knowledge and omniscience is also mentioned in the Tevijaj -VacchagoUa Sutta, where Siikyamuni meets the wanderer Vacchagotta, who says that he has heard Sakyamuni
, L B. Horner, trans. , TheMiddle Length Sayings, Vol. J, p. 214. Also E. Thomas ne Life oj Buddha as Legend and Hislo,y. p. 83.
, Thomas, p. 83. Also Horner, p. 21S.
? 32
? BUDDHIST OMNISCIENCE
d e s c r i b e d a s o m n i s c i e n t , i n t h e m a n n e r o f t h e J a i n a s a i n t s . R e s p o n d i n g t o this report, SAkyamuni replies that he has three knowledges: he can retail his past lives, he is clairvoyant, and he has become liberated by destroying the "cankers. " These of course are the same three that con- stituted his enlightenment. Responding to Abhaya the licchavi's state- ment above, Ananda makes no mention of omniscience, but simply tells him about the basic Buddhist triad ofiTla, samltdhi, andprajillt as constituting the Buddhist path to nirvlt{la. On another occasion, when Sakyamuni is addressing Sandaka, he parodies the Jaina idea in this way:
"As to this, Sandaka, some teacher, all-knowing, all-seeing, claims all-embracing knowledge? and-vision, saying: 'Wheth- er I am walking or standing still or asleep or awake, knowl- edge? and-vision is constantly and perpetually before me. ' He enters an empty place, and he does not obtain almsfood, and a dog bites him, and he encounters a fierce elephant, and he encounters a fierce horse, and he encounters a fierce bullock, and he asks a woman and a man their name and clan, and he asks the name of a villa,e or a market town and the way . . . Whereupon, Sandaka, an intelligent person . . . goes away uninterested. "l"
That i s to say, someone who was truly omniscient would not act in such a way, and if he claims to be omniscient yet acts in the manner de- scribed above, it is difficult to take his claim seriously. In general, we find that Sakyamuni seems to be uninterested in claims of omniscience, partly because they are notoriously difficult to verify, but largely because they are not helpful for one who seeks liberation. Continuing his talk to Sandaka quoted above, SAkyamuni distinguishes four types of unsatisfactory bases for religious teaching. The first is the example jU&1 given, of a teacher who claim? to be omniscient. Second is a teacher who follows tradition. Third is a teacher who follows reason, and last is a teacher who is stupid and confused. Although the context suggests thai the first type was primarily directed at the Jainas, the principle itself is e"'pressed without reference to any specific figure, and we know from other sources that MahAvira was not alone in claiming
? ? " I. B. Homer, Irans. . Thf' Middlf' Ult&,It Sliyings, Vol. 2, p. 199.
33
? II Jayatitleke, p.
The kind of omniscience that is referred to in the Upani? ods as synonymous with knowledge of the l1tmon may be designated a spiritual omnis- cience, since in knowing the lJrman as identical wilh the fundamental nalUre of reality, one knows an underlying fealure of all seemingly separate phenomena. These various different kinds of omniscience ap- pear within the Buddhist tradition as well.
Omniscience in PlJli sources
Conlemporaneous with the development of the Upanj? ads there ap-
pear in India several differenl religious teachers who deny the efficacy
, The word in Sanskrit is SQf'VQjifo, son;a munin, "all, Or everythin," andjifo the re,ular verbal root, co,natc wilh QUr English "to know. "
? ? 29
? NAUGHTON
of the Vedas entirely. The most important o f these figures for our pur- poses are Stkyamuni Buddha and Mahlvlra, who founded the religious traditions of Buddhism and Jainism. Jaina religious eschatology main- tained that the soul had an innate capacity for knowledge, which was obscured by layers of karma, or accumulated sinful actions. Through religious practice, largely consisting of austerities, these layers could be burned off, and once they were all gone, the soul would be liberated. Having removed all obstacles to the 501. 11'5 coanition, it would naturally follOw that the soul would be omniscient. The Jains called this knowledge of the liberated soul keva/o-jriilna, and their insistence upon the reality of this attainment forms one of the hallmarks of Jaina doc- trine. l This is consistent both with Jaina sources themselves and with reports of Jaina doctrines in the PaJi scriptures. We find Abhaya the
LicchavJ saying in the Angutlora Nikilya: "Sir, NUha's son, the Unclothed, claims to be ali-knowing, all-seeing, and to have all--com- prising knowledge and vision. He says, 'Whether I walk or stand or sleep or wake, my knowledge and vision are always and without a break present before me. ' . . Similarly in the Majjhimo Nik/lyo: "When this had been said, monks, these Jains spoke to me thus; 'Your reverence, Nltaputta the Jain is ali-knowing, all? seeing; he claims all?
embracing knowledae? and-vision, saying; "Whether I am walkina or standing still or asleep or awake, knowledge-and. vision is permanently and continuously before me. " , " Finally, the CD{o-Sakuludilyi? Sutto contains the followina less than complimentary passage in which UdAyin addresses Silkyamuni:
"Some time ago, revered sir. one who was ail-knowing. all- seeing, claiming aJl--embracing knowledge-and-vision, said: 'Whether I am walking or standing still or asleep or awake, knowledge-and? vision is constantly and perpetually before me. ' He, on being asked a question by me concerning the
past, shelved the question by (asking) another, answered off the point and evinced temper and iII? will and sulkiness . . . [Buddha inquires:) 'BUI who was this, Udlyin, that all? know?
, P. S. Jaini, Tht: Jllinll Pilth 0/ PurjfiClllioll, p. 260: "Absoillte omniscience is in thrir I. adition Ihe fllndJlJT1entll criterion for liberation. " Also, K. N. Jayatilleite, &,1), Buddhl. sl Tht:Ory 0/ Knowlt:dlt, p. 204, quoting Jacobi', Ja/rlll SQINIS. says that omnis? cience WIU "one of the fundamental dogma! of the J. ins. "
? ? 30
? BUDDHIST OMNISCIENCE
ing, all-seeing, claiming all-embracing knowledge-and-vi- sion . . . on being asked a question by you . . . evinced temper and ill-will and sulkiness? ' [Udlyin replies:) 'Revered sir, it was Nltapuua the Jain. "
There are other similar passages in the pali SUIlOS, bul to ensure that the Buddhists are not misrepresenting this position of the Jainas, we may tum to their own sources, where we find: "the Jaina view of omnis? cience . . . may be now defined as an immediate and direct knowledge of all the objects of the universe, past, present and future, subtle and remote, far and near, by a single ever-lasting act of knowledge requir- inl no assistance from the senses and even mind. "? Jaini also discusses the nature of Jaina omniscience in this way: "Such knowledge is com- pared to a mirror in which everyone of the innumerable existents, in all its qualities and modes, is simuhaneousiy reHected. These 'knowables' are cognized without any volition whatsoever on the pan of the arhat. Furthermore, no activity of the senses or mind is involved; there is only direct perception by the souL'" So this Jaina omniscience would seem to be a literal kind of omniscience, which outside of the Jaina tradition is usually reserved for deities. It is an automatic kind of knowledge, re- quiring "no volition" and "no activity of the senses or mind. " In fact, "omniscient cognition and sensory cognition are held to be mutually antithetical. "6 This follows from tbe Jaina conception of the soul, which is an innately knowing entity. Having removed all obscurations, this innate feature of the soul will manifest itself completely, without any possible hindrance or limitation. So crucial is this doctrine of om- niscience to the Jaina tradition that it is used to validate all other Jaina teachings. Jaini writes that "the authority of the Jaina teachings rests ultimately on the fact that they were preached by an omniscient be- ing,"7 which seems very similar to th? idea of revelation as a source for religious teaching.
The Buddhist tradition from its inception has also made use of the concept of omniscience, but in a very different manner. In the tradi- tional account of Slkyamuni's enlightenment, the content of his
, Ram Jee Singh, TM laina Conup' 0/ Omnisc? nu, p. 18. , Jlini. op. cit. , p. 266.
, ibid. , pp. 34-35.
? Ibid. ? p. 89.
? ? ? JI
? NAUGHTON
realization is said to consist of three kinds of knowledge: of his own previous existences, clairvoyance which sees the transmigration of be- ings in accordance with their karma, and destruction of the l1Jravas, which are said to consist of sensual desire, desire for existence, and ig- norance. Having attained enlightenment, Siikyamuni decided to teach others how to achieve the same realization after being requested by BramM, one of the main deities in the Hindu pantheon. Learning that hi. own former teachers were dead, he decided to give his first teaching to the group of five monks with whom he had previously engaged in various ascetic practices. While on his way to meet them, he encountered an ascetic named Upaka. Upaka noticed that Siikyamuni didn't look like an ordinary fellow, so he asked him,
"'Who is your teacher, or who. >e dhamma do you profess? ' When this had been said, I, monks, addressed Upaka, the
Naked Ascetic, in verses:
'Victorious over all, omniscient am I. ' "I
Thai is to say, on the basis of the previously mentioned three kinds of knowledge, Siikyamuni here claims omniscience for himself. This is ob- viously not meant as a il teral omniscience, bul as a more spiritual kind such as in the Upani? ads. What is most remarkable about Ihis passage, though, is Upaka's reaction to Sakyamuni's grand pronouncement: "Thereupon Upaka said, 'Would that it might be so, friend,' shook his head, and went off on a by-path. "9 That is to say, Upaka exhibits a thoroughly skeptical attitude to Sak:yamuni's claim to omniscience, and goes offunconvinced. This reaction seems a very natural one to us, and the fact that it portrays Sakyamuni in such an uncomplimentary way directly after his enlightenment is probably good evidence for its authenticity. No later redactor would be likely to make up such a story. Even Ihough Upaka recognizes that something about Sakyamuni is special, he does not become "the first Buddhist. " The connection be- tween the three kinds of knowledge and omniscience is also mentioned in the Tevijaj -VacchagoUa Sutta, where Siikyamuni meets the wanderer Vacchagotta, who says that he has heard Sakyamuni
, L B. Horner, trans. , TheMiddle Length Sayings, Vol. J, p. 214. Also E. Thomas ne Life oj Buddha as Legend and Hislo,y. p. 83.
, Thomas, p. 83. Also Horner, p. 21S.
? 32
? BUDDHIST OMNISCIENCE
d e s c r i b e d a s o m n i s c i e n t , i n t h e m a n n e r o f t h e J a i n a s a i n t s . R e s p o n d i n g t o this report, SAkyamuni replies that he has three knowledges: he can retail his past lives, he is clairvoyant, and he has become liberated by destroying the "cankers. " These of course are the same three that con- stituted his enlightenment. Responding to Abhaya the licchavi's state- ment above, Ananda makes no mention of omniscience, but simply tells him about the basic Buddhist triad ofiTla, samltdhi, andprajillt as constituting the Buddhist path to nirvlt{la. On another occasion, when Sakyamuni is addressing Sandaka, he parodies the Jaina idea in this way:
"As to this, Sandaka, some teacher, all-knowing, all-seeing, claims all-embracing knowledge? and-vision, saying: 'Wheth- er I am walking or standing still or asleep or awake, knowl- edge? and-vision is constantly and perpetually before me. ' He enters an empty place, and he does not obtain almsfood, and a dog bites him, and he encounters a fierce elephant, and he encounters a fierce horse, and he encounters a fierce bullock, and he asks a woman and a man their name and clan, and he asks the name of a villa,e or a market town and the way . . . Whereupon, Sandaka, an intelligent person . . . goes away uninterested. "l"
That i s to say, someone who was truly omniscient would not act in such a way, and if he claims to be omniscient yet acts in the manner de- scribed above, it is difficult to take his claim seriously. In general, we find that Sakyamuni seems to be uninterested in claims of omniscience, partly because they are notoriously difficult to verify, but largely because they are not helpful for one who seeks liberation. Continuing his talk to Sandaka quoted above, SAkyamuni distinguishes four types of unsatisfactory bases for religious teaching. The first is the example jU&1 given, of a teacher who claim? to be omniscient. Second is a teacher who follows tradition. Third is a teacher who follows reason, and last is a teacher who is stupid and confused. Although the context suggests thai the first type was primarily directed at the Jainas, the principle itself is e"'pressed without reference to any specific figure, and we know from other sources that MahAvira was not alone in claiming
? ? " I. B. Homer, Irans. . Thf' Middlf' Ult&,It Sliyings, Vol. 2, p. 199.
33
? II Jayatitleke, p. 391
the attitude of the Buddha as often rellresemed in the Niklyas. "
,
nOles that "this verS( is not found in the NiklyilS but il reflects
NAUGHTON
to possess omniscience. At one point in the Mahll-ParinibbDna-Sulta, SAripulta addresses the Buddha thus: "Lord! such faith have I in the Exalted One, that melhinks there never has been, nor will there be, nor is there now any other, whether wanderer or brahmin, who is greater and wiser than Ihe Exalted One, that is to say, as regards the higher wisdom. " This is quite a natural expression of Saripulta's admiration for Sakyamuni, but Sakyamuni takes him to task for it, inquiring whether or nOI Sariputla has personally known the minds of all other sages 01" the past, present, and future. Saripulta has to admit that he has not, that he has in facl been speaking beyond his own experience. For Sariputta to meaningfully praise Sakyamuni as being omniscient would necessitate that Saripuua also be omniscient to verify Sakya- muni's realization. For S! lkyamuni one of the root causes of human confusion and suffering is that people tend to speak beyond their own experience, and it is for this reason that he rebukes S! lriputta for speaking in such a way. This rational and critical attitude of Sakya- muni is what many peopie find attractive in the pali scriptures. It is certainly a far cry from such statements as Tenullian's famous "I believe because it is absurd. " Sakyamuni considers that faith which is not based on sound reasoning and personal experience is a hindrance to spiritual realization. This anti-dogmatic altitude is exemplified in the famous goldsmith quote: "Just as wise men (test a claim to be gold) by burning, cutting and rubbing (on a touchstone), my statements, 0 monks, should be accepted after examination and not OUI of respect for me. '? I) Thatlhis altitude is still illustrative of the best of the Bud- dhist tradition is demonstrated in a recent quote from the Dalai Lama: "If there's good, strong evidence from science that such and such is Ihe case, and this is contrary 10 Buddhism, then we will change. ")!
It would be nice if we could leave the pali literature at this point, and simply report that Sakyamuni di? played a consistently critical att. ilude towards claims of omniscience, whether they were made about other leachers or addressed to himself, preferring to limit his own claims to the three kinds of knowledge we have mentioned. However, there are some further passages which render such an interpretation untenable.
? ? " In the New York Times, OcroiH:r 8, L989, Section 4, p. 6 . 34
? BUDDHIST OMNISCIENCE
Chief among these is a passage in the Kal)lJ. akatthala Sutta, which is worth quoting in extenso:
"Then King Pasenadi spoke thus to the Lord: 'I have heard this about you, revered sir: "The recluse Gotama speaks thus: There is neither a recluse nor a brahmin who, all-knowing, all-seeing, can claim a11-embracing knowledge-and-vision- this situation does not exist. " Revered sir, those who speak thus . . . I hope that these, revered sir, speak what was spoken by the Lord, that they do not misrepresenl the Lord by what is not fact, that they explain dhamma according to dhamma, and that no reasoned thesis gives occasion for contempt? '
'Those, sire, who speak thus . . . do not speak as I spoke bUI are misrepresenting me with what is not true, with what is not fact. '. . .
Then King Pasenadi spoke thus 10 the Lord: 'Could it be, revered sir.
