say, then, that just as the moral principles are necessary according to reason in its practical use, so equally neces sary according to reason in its theoretical use, to assume that every one has ground to hope for
happiness
in the measure which he has made himself worthy of his conduct, and that therefore the system of morality
only in the idea of pure reason) connected with that of hap
piness.
only in the idea of pure reason) connected with that of hap
piness.
Kant - Critique of Pure Reason
The direct or ostensive proof not only establishes the truth of the proposition to be proved, but exposes the grounds of its truth ;
the apagogic, on the other hand, may assure us of the truth of the proposition, but it cannot enable us to comprehend the grounds of its possibility. The latter accordingly, rather an auxiliary to an argument, than strictly philosophical and rational mode of procedure. In one respect, however, they have an advantage over direct proofs, from the fact, that the mode of arguing contradiction, which they employ, renders our understanding of the question more clear, and approxi
mates the proof to the certainty of an intuitional demonstra tion.
The true reason why indirect proofs are employed in dif ferent sciences, this. When the grounds upon which we seek to base cognition are too various or too profound, we try whether or not we may not discover the truth of our cog nition from its consequences. The modutponeru of reasoning from the truth of its inferences to the truth of proposition, would be admissible all the inferences that can be drawu from are k. iown to be true for in this case there can be
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only one possible ground for these inferences, and that is the
true one. But this is a quite impracticable procedure, as it surpasses Ail our powers to discover all the possible inferences that can be drawn from a proposition. But this mode of reasoning is employed, under favour, when we wish to prove the truth of a hypothesis ; in whieh cnse we admit the truth of the conclusion --which is supported by analogy --that, if all the inferences we have drawn and examined agree with the proposition assumed, all other possible inferences will also
lgree with it. But, in this way, an hypothesis can never be established as a demonstrated truth. The modus tollens of reasoning from known inferences to the unknown proposition, is not only a rigorous, but a very easy mode of proof. For, if it can be shown that but one inference from a proposition is false, then the proposition must itself be false. Instead, then, of examining, in an ostensive argument, the whole series of the grounds on which the truth of a proposition rests, we need only take the opposite of this proposition, and if one inference from it be false, then must the opposite be itself false ; and, consequently, the proposition which we wished to prove, must be true.
The apagogic method of proof is admissible only in those sciences where it is impossible to mistake a subjective re presentation for an objective cognition. Where this is pos sible, it is plain that the opposite of a given proposition may contradict merely the subjective conditions of thought, and not the objective cognition ; or it may happen that both propose tions contradict each other only under a subjective condition, which is incorrectly considered to be objective, and, as the condition is itself false, both propositions may be false, and it will, consequently, be impossible to conclude the truth of the
one from the falseness of the other.
In mathematics such subreptions are impossible ; and it is
in this science, accordingly, that the indirect mode of proof has its true place. In the science of nature, where all asser tion is based upon empirical intuition, such subreptions may
be guarded against by the repeated comparison of observa tions ; but this mode of proof is of little value in this sphere of knowledge. But the transcendental efforts of pure reason are all made in the sphere of the subjective, which is the roa. medium of all dialectical illusion ; and thus reason endeavours.
? ? ? ? THE DISCIPLINE OF FPB1 BEA8OS. 481
in its premisses, to impose upon ns subjective representations for objective cognitions. In the transcendental sphere of pure reason, then, and in the case of synthetical propositions, it is inadmissible to support a statement by disproving the counter- statement. For only two cases are possible ; either, the counter-statement is nothing but the enouncement of the inconsistency of the opposite opinion with the subjective con ditions of reason, which does not affect the real case (for example, we cannot comprehend the unconditioned necessity of the existence of a being, and hence every speculative proof of the existence of such a being must be opposed on subjective grounds, while the possibility of this being in itself cannot with justice be denied) ; or, both propositions, being dia lectical in their nature, are based upon an impossible con ception. In this latter case the rule applies --non entis nulla sunt predieata ; that is to say, what we affirm and what we deny, respecting such an object, are equally untrue, and the apagogic mode of arriving at the truth is in this case impos sible. If, for example, we presuppose that the world of sense is given in itself in its totality, it is false, either that is infinite, or that it is finite and limited in space. Both are false, because the hypothesis is false. For the notion of phenomena (as mere representations) which are given in themselves (as objects) i>> self- contradictory ; and the infinitude of this imaginary whole would, indeed, be unconditioned, but would be inconsistent (as every thing in the pheno menal world is conditioned) with the unconditioned deter mination and finitude of quantities which is presupposed in our conception.
The apagogic mode of proof is the true source of those illu sions which have always had so strong an attraction for the admirers of dogmatical philosophy. It may be compared to a champion, who maintains the honour and claims of the party he has adopted, by offering battle to all who doubt the validity of these claims and the purity of that honour ; while nothing can be proved in this way, except the respective strength oi the combatants, and the advantage, in this respect, is always on the side of the attacking party. Spectators, observing that each party is alternately conqueror and conquered, are led to
regard the subject of dispute as beycnc' the power of man to II
? ? ? ? 4b2 THANBCENDENTAL DOCTBINE OF METHOD.
decide upon. But such au opinion cannot be justified ; and it is sufficient to apply to these reasoners the remark :--
Non defensoribui istis Tempus eget.
Each must try to establish his assertions by a transcendental deduction of the grounds of proof employed in his argument, and thus enable us to see in what way the claims of reason may be supported. If an opponent bases his assertions upon subjective grounds, he may be refuted with ease ; not, how
ever to the advantage of the dogmatist, who likewise depends upon subjective sources of cognition, and is in like manner driven into a corner by his opponent. But, if parties employ the direct method of procedure, they will soon discover the difficulty, nay, the impossibility of proving their assertions, and will be forced to appeal to prescription and precedence ; or they will, by the help of criticism, discover with ease the dogmatical illusions by which they had been mocked, and compel reason to renounce its exaggerated pretensions to speculative insight, and to confine itself within the Limits of its ptoper sphere--that of practical principles.
TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. CHAPTER SECOND.
The Canon of Pcee Reason.
It is a humiliating consideration for human reason, that it
is incompetent to discover truth by means of pure speculation, but, on the contrary, stands in need of discipline to check its deviations from the straight path, and to expose the illusions which it originates. But, on the other hand, this consider ation ought to elevate and to give it confidence, for this disci pline is exercised by itself alone, and it is subject to the censure of no other power. The bounds, moreover, which it is forced to set to its speculative exercise, form likewise a check upon the fallacious pretensions of opponents ; and thus what remains of its possessions, after these exaggerate I claims have been disallowed, is secure from attack or usurpa tion. The greatest, and perhaps the only, use of all philo sophy of pure reason accordingly, of purely negativ*
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? THJ CANON 01 FUBI MA BOS.
483
character. It is not an organon for the extension, but a dis cipline for the determination of the limits of its exercise ; and without laying claim to the discovery of new truth, it has the modest merit of guarding against error.
At the same time, there must be some source of positive cognitions which belong to the domain of pure reason, and which become the causes of error only, from our mistaking their true character, while they form the goal towards which reason continually strives. How else can we account for the inextinguishable desire in the human mind to find a firm foot ing in some region beyond the limits of the world of experi ence ? --It hopes to attain to the possession of a knowledge in which it has the deepest interest. It enters upon the path of pure speculation ; but in vain. We have some reason, however, to expect that, in the only other way that lies open to --the path of practical reason, -- may meet with better success.
understand canon list of the a priori principles ot the proper employment of certain faculties of cognition. Thus general logic, in its analytical department, formal canon for the faculties of understanding and reason. In the same way, Transcendental Analytic was seen to be canon of the pure understanding for alone competent to enounce true a
priori synthetical cognitions. But, when no proper employ ment of faculty of cognition possible, no canon can exist. But the synthetical cognition of pure speculative reason as has been shown, completely impossible. There cannot, there fore, exist any canon for the speculative exercise of this faculty -- for its speculative exercise entirely dialectical and conse quently, transcendental logic, in this respect, merely dis cipline, and not canon. then, there any proper mode of employing the faculty of pure reason, --in which case there must be canon for this faculty, --this canon will relate, not to the speculative, but to the practical use reason. This canon we now proceed to investigate.
THE CANON OF PURE REASON. Section Fibst.
Of the Ultimate End the Pure Uce of Reason.
There exists in the faculty of reason natural desire so veiuure beyond the field of experience, to attempt to reach the
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utmost bounds of all cognition by the help of ideas alone, and not to rest satisfied, until it has fulfilled its course and raised the sum of its cognitions into a self-subsistent systematic whole. Is the motive for this endeavour to be found in ita speculative, or in its practical interests alone ?
Setting aside, at present, the results of the labours of pure reason in its speculative exercise, I shall merely inquire re- garding the problems, the solution of which forms its ultimate aim--whether reached or not, and in relation to which all other aims are but partial and intermediate. These highest aims must, from the nature of reason, possess complete unity ; otherwise the highest interest of humanity could not be suc cessfully promoted.
The transcendental speculation of reason relates to three things : the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God. The speculative interest which reason has in those questions is very small ; and, for its sake alone, we should not undertake the labour of transcendental investigation --a labour full of toil and ceaseless struggle. We should be loth to undertake this labour, because the dis coveries we might make would not be of the smallest use in the sphere of concrete or physical investigation. We may find out that the will is free, but this knowledge only relates to the intelligible cause of our volition. As regards the phsenomena or expressions of this will, that our actions, we are bound, in obedience to an inviolable maxim, without which reason cannot be employed in the sphere of experience, to explain these the same way as we explain all the other phenomena of nature, that to say, according to its un changeable laws. We may have discovered the spirituality and immortality of the soul, but we cannot employ this know ledge to explain the pheuomena of this life, nor the peculiar nature of the future because our conception of an incorporeal uature purely negative and does not add anything to our knowledge, and the only inferences to be drawn from are jmrely fictitious. If, again, we prove the existence of supreme intelligence, we should be able from to make the conformity to timi existing in the arrangement of the world comprehen sible but we should not be justified in deducing from anv
particular arrangement or disposition, or, inferring any, where
? not perceived. For
necessary rule of the specula
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? THE CANON OF PURE REASON.
485
tire use of reason, that we must not overlook natural causes, or refuse to listen to the teaching of experience, for the sake of deducing what we know and perceive from something that transcends all our knowledge. In one word, these three pro positions are, for the speculative reason, always transcendent, and cannot be employed as immanent principles in relation to the objects of experience ; they are, consequently, of no use to us in this sphere, being but the valueless results of the severs but unprofitable efforts of reason.
If, then, the actual cognition of these three cardinal propo sitions is perfectly useless, while Reason uses her utmost en deavours to induce ns to admit them, it is plain that their real value and importance relate to our practical, and not to our speculative interest.
? I term all that is possible through free-will, practical. But if the conditions of the exercise of free volition are empirical, reason can have only a regulative, and not a constitutive, influ ence upon and serviceable merely for the introduction of unity into its empirical laws. In the moral philosophy of prudence, for example, the sole business of reason to bring about union of all the ends, which are aimed at by our inclinations, into one ultimate end -- that of happiness, and to show the agreement which should exist among the means of attaining that end. In this sphere, accordingly, reason cannot present to us any other than pragmatical laws of free action, for oar guidance towards the aims set up by the senses, and
incompetent to give us laws which are pure and determined completely priori. On the other hand, pure practical laws, the ends of which have been given reason entirely priori, and which are not empirically conditioned, but are, on the contrary, absolutely imperative in their nature, would be pro ducts of pure reason. Such are the moral laws and these alone belong to the sphere of the practical exercise of reason, and admit of canon.
All the powers of reason, in the sphere of what may be termed pure philosophy, are, in fact, directed to the three above-mentioned These again have still higher end--the answer to the question, what we ought to do,
the will free, there God, and future world. Now, as this problem relates to our conduct, in reference to the highest aim of humanity, evident that the ultimate inten-
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tion of nature, in the constitution of our reason, has been directed to the moral alone.
We must take care, however, in turning our attention to an object which is foreign* to the sphere of transcendental philoso phy, not to injure the unity of our system by digressions, nor, on the other hand, to fail in clearness, by saying too little on the new subject of discussion. I hope to avoid both extremes, by keeping as close as possible to the transcendental, and ex
cluding all psychological, that empirical elements.
have to remark, in the first place, that at present treat of the conception of freedom in the practical sense only, and set aside the corresponding transcendental conception, which cannot be employed as ground of explanation in the phe-
nomenal world, but itself problem for pure reason.
will purely animal (zrbitrium brutum), when determined
sensuous impulses or instincts only, that is, when de
termined in pathological manner. will, which can be de
termined independently of sensuous impulses, consequently by motives presented reason alone, called free will (or- bitrium liberum) and everything which connected with this free will, either as principle or consequence, termed
practical. The existence of practical freedom can be proved from experience alone. For the human will not determined
that alone which immediately affects the senses on the contrary, we have the power, calling up the notion of what
useful or hurtful in more distant relation, of overcoming the immediate impressions on our sensuous faculty of desire. But these considerations of what desirable in relation to our whole state, that in the end good and useful, are based entirely upon reason. This faculty, accordingly, enounces laws, which are imperative or objective laws of freedom, and which tell us what ought to take place, thus distinguishing themselves from the laws of nature, which relate to that which does take place The laws of freedom or of free will are hence termed practical laws.
All practical conceptions relate to objects of pleasure and pain, and consequently,--in an Indirect manner, at least, --to objects of feeling. But is feeling not faculty of representation, but lies out of the sphere of our powers of cognition, the elements of our judgments, in so far as they relate to pleasure or pain, that is, the elements of our practical judgments, do not belong to transcendental philosophy, which has to do
ivith pure a priori cognitions alone.
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Whether reason is not itself, in the actual delivery of these aws, determined in it* turn by other influences, and whether the action which, in relation to sensuous impulses, we call free, may not, in relation to higher and more remote operative causes, really form a part of nature, --these are questions which do not here concern us. They are purely speculative questions ; and all we have to do, in the practical sphere, is to inquire into the
rule of conduct which reason has to present. Experience de monstrates to us the existence of practical freedom as one of the causes which exist in nature, that shows the causal power of reason in the determination of the will. The idea of transcendental freedom, on the contrary, requires that reason -- in relation to its causal power of commencing series of phenomena -- should be independent of all sensuous de termining causes and thus seems to be in opposition to the law of nature and to all possible experience. therefore re mains problem for the human mind. But this problem does not concern reason in its practical use and we have, therefore, in canon of pure reason, to do with only two questions, which relate to the practical interest of pure reason --Is there God and, there future life The question of transcendental freedom purely speculative, and we may therefore set entirely aside when we come to treat of practical reason. Besides, we have already fully discussed this subject
the antinomy of pure reason.
THE CANON OF PURE REASON.
Section Second.
Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Determining Ground of the Ultimate End of Pure Reaton.
Reason conducted na, in its speculative use, through the field of experience, and, as can never find complete satisfaction that sphere, from thence to speculative ideas, --which, how
ever, in the end brought us back again to experience, and thus fulfilled the purpose of reason, in a manner which, though useful, was not at all in accordance with our expectations.
now remains for us to consider whether pure reason can be employed in practical sphere, and whether will here conduct us to those ideas which attain the highest ends of pure reason.
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is we have just otited thfm. We shall thus astertaui whether, from the point of view of its practical interest, reason may not he able to supply us with that which, on the speculative side, it wholly denies us.
The whole interest of reason, speculative as well as practical, is centred in the three following questions:
1. What can 1 know?
2. What ouont I to do?
3. What mat I hofe ?
The first question is purely speculative. We have, as I flatter
myself, exhausted all the replies of which it is susceptible, and have at last found the reply with which reason must con tent itself, and with which it ought to be content, so long as it pays no regnrd to the practical. But from the two great ends lo the attainment of which all these efforts of pure reason were in fact directed, we remain just as far removed as if we had consulted our ease, and declined the task at the outset. So far, then, as knowledge s concerned, thus much, at least, is established, that, in regard to those two problems, it lies beyond our reach.
The second question is purely practical. As such it may indeed fall within the province of pure reason, but still it is not transcendental, but moral, and consequently cannot in it self form the subject of our criticism.
The third question, If I act as I onglit to do, what may I then hope? --is at once practical and theoretical. The prac tical forms a clue to the answer of the theoretical, and--in its highest form --speculative question. For all hoping has happiness for its object, and stands in precisely the same re lation to the practical and the law of morality, as knowing to the theoretical cognition of things and the law of nature. 'I he former arrives finally at the conclusion that something is (which determines the ultimate end), because something ought
to take place ; the latter, that something is (which operates as the highest cause), because something does take place.
Happiness is the satisfaction of all our desires ; extensive, in regard to their multiplicity ; intensive, in regard to their degree ; and protensive, in regard to their duration. The practical law based on the motive of happiness, I term a prag matical law (or prudential rule) ; but that law, assuming such to exist, which has no other motive than the worthiness qf
? ? ? ? TBI CANON OF MTU HUM*. 4S<<I
iein^ hapyf, I term a moral or ethical law. The first telis ua what ws have to do, if we wish to become possessed of happiness ; the second dictates how we ought to act, in order to deserve happiness. The first is based upon empirical principles ; for it is only by experience that I can learn either what incli nations exist which desire satisfaction, or what are the natural means of satisfying them. The second takes no account of our desires or the means of satisfying them, and regards only the freedom of a rational being, and the necessary conditions under which alone this freedom can harmonize with the dis tribution of happiness according to principles. This second law may therefore rest upon mere ideas of pure reason, and may be cognized a priori.
? I assume tha* there are pure moral laws which determine, entirely a priori (without regard to empirical motives, that is, to happiness), the conduct of a rational being, or in other words, the use which it makes of ita freedom, and that these
laws are absolutely imperative (not merely hypothetically, on the supposition of other empirical ends), and therefore in all respects necessary. I am warranted in assuming this, not only by the arguments of the most enlightened moralists, but by the moral judgment of every man who will make the at
tempt to form a distinct conception of such a law.
Pure reason, then, contains, not indeed in its speculative, but in its practical, or, more strictly, its moral use, principles of the possibility of experience, of such actions, namely, as, in accordance with ethical precepts, might be met with in the
history of man. For since reason commands that such actions should take place, it must be possible for them to take place ; and hence a particular kind of systematic unity -- the moral, must be possible. We have found, it is true, that the syste matic unity of nature could not be established according to speculative principles of reason, because, while reason possesses a causal power in relation to freedom, it has none in relation
to the whole sphere of nature ; and, while moral principles of reason can produce free actions, they cannot produce natural laws. It is, then, in its practical, but especially iu its moral use, that the principles of pure reason possess objective reality.
I call the world a moral world, in so far as it may be in accordance with all the ethical law* --which, by virtue of the
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TUANSCENDEKTAX DOCTRISE OF METHOJ!
freedom of reasonable beings, it can be, and according to the necessary laws of morality it ought to be. But tbis world must be conceived only as an intelligible world, inasmuch as abstraction is therein made of all conditions (ends), and even of all impediments to morality (the weakness or pravity of human nature). --So far, then, it is a mere idea, -- though still a practical idea, which may have, and ought to have, an in fluence on the world of sense, so as to bring it as far as pos sible into conformity with itself. The idea of a moral world has, therefore, objective reality, not as referring to an ODject of intelligible intuition, -- for of such an object we can form no conception whatever, --but to the world of sense, --conceived, however, as an object of pure reason in ift practical use, ? and to a corpus mysticum of rational beings in in so far as the liberum arbitrium of the individual placed, under and virtue of mornl laws, in complete systematic unity both with itself, and with the freedom of all others.
That the answer to the first of the two questions of pure reason which relate to its practical interest :--Do that which will render thee worthy of happiness. The second question this If conduct myself so as not to be unworthy of hsppi ness, may hope thereby to obtain happiness In order to arrive at the solution of this question, we must inquire whether the principles of pare reason, which prescribe a priori the law, necessarily also connect this hope with it.
?
say, then, that just as the moral principles are necessary according to reason in its practical use, so equally neces sary according to reason in its theoretical use, to assume that every one has ground to hope for happiness in the measure which he has made himself worthy of his conduct, and that therefore the system of morality
only in the idea of pure reason) connected with that of hap
piness.
Now in an intelligible, that in the moral world, in the
conception of which we make abstraction of all the impedi ments to morality (sensuous desires), such system of happi ness, connected with and proportioned to morality, may be conceived as necessary, because freedom of volition--partly incited, and partly restrained moral laws --would be itself the cause of general happiness and thus rational beings, under the guidance of such principles, would be themselves the autbon
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ooth of their own enduring welfare and that of others. But Mich a system of self-rewarding morality is only an idea, the carrying out of which depends upon the condition that every one acta as he ought ; in other words, that all' actions of reasonable beings be such as they would be if they sprung from a Supreme Will, comprehending in, or under, itself all particular wills. But since the moral law is binding on each individual in the use of his freedom of volition, even if others should not act in conformity with this law, neither the nature of things, nor the causality of actions and their relation to morality, determine how the consequences of these actions will be related to happiness ; and the necessary connection of the hope of happiness with the unceasing endeavour to become worthy of happiness, cannot be cognized by reason, if we take nature alone for our guide. This connection can be hoped for only on the assumption that the cause of nature is a supreme reason, which governs according to moral laws.
I term the idea of an intelligence in which the morally most perfect will, united with supreme blessedness, is the cause of all happiness in the world, so far as happiness stands in strict relation to morality (as the worthiness of being happy), the Ideal of the Supreme Good. It is only, then, in the ideal of the supreme original good, that pure reason can find the ground of the practically necessary connection of both elements of the highest derivative good, and accordingly of an intelligible, that moral world. Now since we are necessitated by reason to conceive ourselves as belonging to such world, while the senses present to us nothing but world of phenomena, we must assume the former as consequence of our conduct in the world of sense (since the world of sense gives us no hint of it), and therefore as future in relation to us. Thus God and future life are two hypotheses which, according to the principles of pure reason, are inseparable from the obligation which this reason imposes upon us.
Morality per te constitutes system. But we can form no system of happiness, except in so far as dispensed in strict proportion to morality. But this only possible in the in telligible world, under wise author and ruler. Such ruler, together with life in such world, which we must look upon m future, reason finds itself compelled to assume or must
regard the moral laws as idle dreams, since the necessary con.
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sequence which this same reason connects with them, must, without this hypothesis, fall to the ground. Hence also the moral laws are universally regarded as commands, which they could not be, did they not connect a priori adequate conse quences with their dictates, and thus carry with them promise* and threats. But this, again, they could not do, did they not reside in a necessary being, as the Supreme Good, which alone can render such a teleological unity possible.
Leibnitz termed the world, when viewed in relation to the rational beings which it contains, and the moral relations in which they stand to each other, under the government of the Supreme Good, the kingdom of Grace, and distinguished it from the kingdom ofNature, in which these rational beings live, under moral laws, indeed, but expect no other conse quences from their actions than such as follow according to the course of nature in the world of sense. To view ourselves, therefore, as in the kingdom of grace, in which all happiness awaits us, except in so far as we ourselves limit our partici pation in it by actions which render us unworthy of happiness, is a practically necessary idea of reason.
Practical laws, in so far as they are subjective grounds of actions, that subjective principles, are termed maxims. The judgments of morality, in its purity and ultimate results, are framed according to ideas the observance of its laws, accord ing to maxims.
The whole course of our life must be subject to moral maxims but this impossible, unless with the moral law, which mere idea, reason connects an efficient cause which ordains to all conduct which in conformity with the moral law an issue either in this or in another life, which exact conformity with our highest aims. Thus, without God and without world, invisible to us now, but hoped for, the glorious ideas of morality are, indeed, objects of approbation and of admiration, but cannot be the springs of purpose and action. For they do not satisfy all the aims which are natural to every rational being, and which are determined priori pure reason itself, and necessary.
Happiness alone is, in the view of reason, far from being
? the complete good. Reason does not approve of
much inclination may desire it), except as united with desert. On the other hand, morality "lone, and with mere desert.
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u likewise i'ar from being the complete good. To make it
complete, lie who conducts himself in n manner not unworthy
of happiness, must be able to hope for the possession of hap
piness. Even reason, unbiassed by private ends, or interested
considerations, cannot judge otherwise, if it puts itself in the
place of a being whose business it is to dispense all happiness to others. For in the practical idea both points are essen
tially combined, though in such a way that participation in happiness is rendered possible by the moral disposition, as its condition, and not conversely, the moral disposition by the prospect of happiness. For a disposition which should re quire the prospect of happiness as its necessary condition, would not be moral, and hence also would not he worthy of complete happiness --a happiness which, iuthe view of reason, recognizes no limitation but such as arises from our own im moral conduct.
Happiness, therefore, in exact proportion with the morality of rational beings (whereby they are made worthy of happi ness), constitutes alone the supreme good of a world into which we absolutely must transport ourselves according to the com mands of pure but practical reason. This world is, it is true, only an intelligible world ; for of such a systematic unity of ends as it requires, the world of sense gives us no hint. Its reality can be based on nothing else but the hypothesis of a supreme original good. In it independent reason, equipped with all the sufficiency of a supreme cause, founds, maintains, and fulfils the universal order of things, with the most perfect teleological harmony, however much this order may be hidden from us in the world of sense.
This moral theology has the peculiar advantage, in contrast with speculative theology, of leading inevitably to the concep tion of a sole, perfect, and rational First Cause, whereof specu lative theology does not give us any indication on objective grounds, far less any convincing evidence. For we find neither in transcendental nor in natural theology, however far reason may lead us in these, any ground to warrant us in assuming the existence of one only Being, which stands at the head of all natural causes, and on which these are entirely dependent. On the other hand, if we take our stand on moral ui. ity as a necessary law of the universe, and from this point of view consider what is necessary to give this law adequate elfioiency
? ? ? ? 494 TRAICSCKTDENTAI, DOCTHHTX OT METHOD.
and, for us, obligatory force, we must come to the conclude* that there is one only supreme will, which comprehends ai these laws in itself. For how, under different wills, should we find complete unity of ends? This will must be omni potent, that all nature and its relation to morality in the world may be subject to it ; omniscient, that it may have knowledge of the most secret feelings and their moral worth ; omni present, that it may be at band to supply every necessity to which the highest weal of the world may give rise ; eternal, that this harmony of nature and liberty may never fail ; and bo on.
But this systematic unity of ends in this world of intelli gences -- which, as mere nature, is only a world of sense, but as a system of freedom of volition, may be termed an in telligible, that moral world (regnum gratia) -- leads in evitably also to the teleologicnl unity of all things which con stitute this great whole, according to universal natural laws, -- just as the unity of the former according to universal and necessary moral laws, -- and unites the practical with the specu lative reason. The world must be represented as having originated from an idea, to harmonize with that use of reason without which we cannot even consider ourselves as worthy of reason, --namely, the moral use, which rests entirely on the idea of the supreme good. Hence the investigation of nature receives teleological direction, and becomes, in its widest extension, physico-theology. But this, taking its rise in moral order as unity founded on the essence of freedom, and not accidentally instituted by external commands, estab lishes the teleological view of nature on grounds which must be inseparably connected with the internal possibility of things. This gives rise to transcendental theology, which takes the ideal of the highest ontological perfection as principle of systematic unity and this principle connects all things ac cording to universal and necessary natural laws, because all things have their origin in the absolute necessity of the one only Primal Being.
What use can we make of our understanding, even re spect of experience, we do not propose ends to ourselves
But the highest ends are those of morality, and
pure reason that can give us the knowledge of these. Though supplied with these, and putting ourselves under their gui-l
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Mice, we un make no teleological use of the knowledge at nature, as regards cognition, unless nature itself has estali- lished teleological unity. For without this unity we shouM not even possess reason, because we should have no school for reason, and no cultivation through objects which afford the materials for its conceptions. But teleological unity is a necessary unity, and founded on the essence of the indi vidual will itself. Hence this will, which is the condition of the application of this unity in concreto, must be so likewise. In this way the transcendental enlargement of our rational
cognition would be, not the cause, but merely the effect of the practical teleology, which pure reason imposes upon us.
Hence, also, we find in the history of human reason that, before the moral conceptions were sufficiently purified and determined, and before men had attained to a perception of
the systematic unity of ends according to these conceptions and from necessary principles, the knowledge of nature, and even a considerable amount of intellectual culture in many other sciences, could produce only rude and vague concep tions of the Deity, sometimes even admitting of an astonish ing indifference with regard to this question altogether. But the more enlarged treatment of moral ideas, which was ren dered necessary by the extremely pure moral lawof our religion, awakened the interest, and thereby quickened the perceptions
of reason in relation to this object. In this way, and without the help either of an extended acquaintance with nature, or of a reliable transcendental insight, (for these have been wanting in all ages), a conception of the Divine Being was arrived at, which we now hold to be the correct one, not because specu lative reason convinces us of its correctness, but because it accords with the moral principles of reason. Thus it is to pure reason, but only in its practical use, that we must ascribe the merit of having connected with our highest interest ?
cognition, of which mere speculation was able only to form a conjecture, but the validity of which it was unable to estab lish, -- and of having thereby rendered not indeed demon strated dogma, but a hypothesis absolutely necessary to the essential ends of reason.
But practical reason haa reached this elevation, and has attained to the conception of sole Primal Being, as the supreme good, must not, therefore, imagine that haa
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? 496 TRANSCEKDEJTTAL DOCTBEN1 OF METHOD.
transcended the empirical conditions of its application, anil risen to the immediate cognition of new objects ; it must not presume to start from the conception which it has gained, and to deduce from it the moral laws themselves. For it was these very laws, the internal practical necessity of which led us to the hypothesis of an independent cause, or of a wise ruler of the universe, who should give them effect. Hence we are not entitled to regard them as accidental and derived from the mere will of the ruler, especially as we have no con ception of such a will, except as formed in accordance with
these laws. So far, then, as practical reason has the right to conduct us, we shall not look upon actions as binding on us, because they are the commands of God, butwe shall regard them as divine commands, because we are internally bound them. We shall study freedom under the teleologies] unity which accords with principles of reason ; we shall look upon ourselves as acting in conformity with the divine will only in so far as we hold sacred the moral law which reason teaches us from the nature of actions themselves, and we shall believe that we can obey that will only by promoting the weal of the universe in ourselves and in others. Moral theology therefore, only of immanent use. teaches us to fulfil our destiny here in the world, by placing ourselves
in harmony with the general system of ends, and warns against the fanaticism, nay, the crime of depriving reason of its legislative authority in the moral conduct of life, for the purpose of directly connecting this authority with the idea of the Supreme Being. For this would be, not an imma nent, but transcendent use of moral theology, and, like the transcendent use of mere speculation, would inevitably per vert and frustrate the ultimate ends of reason.
THE CANON OF PURE REASON. Section III.
Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief.
The holding of thing to be true, phenomenon in out understanding which may rest on objective grounds, but re quires, also, subjective causes in the mind of the person judging. If judgment valid for every rational being, then its ground objectively sufficient, and termed
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action. on the other hand, has its ground in the particular character of the subject, termed persuasion.
Persuasion mere illusion, the ground of the judgment, which lies solely in the subject, being regarded as objective.
Hence judgment of this kind has only private validity-- only valid for the individual who judges, and the holding of a thing to be true in this way cannot be communicated. But truth depends upon agreement with the object, and consequently the judgments of all understandings, true, must be in agreement with each other (consentienlia uni tertio consentiunt inter se). Conviction may, therefore, be distinguished, from an external point of view, from persua sion, by the possibility of communicating and showing its validity for the reason of every man for in this case the presumption, at least, arises, that the agreement of all judg ments with each other, in spite of the different characters of individuals, rests upon the common ground of the agreement of each with the object, and thus the correctness of the judg ment established.
? Persuasion, accordingly, cannot be subjectively distin guished from conviction, that so long as the subject views its judgment simply as phenomenon of its own mind. But we inquire whether the grounds of our judgment, which are valid for us, produce the same effect on the reason of others as on our own, we hav<< then the means, though only subjective means, not, indeed, of producing conviction, but of detecting the merely private validity of the judgment in other words, of discovering that there in the element of mere persuasion.
If we can, in addition to this, develope the subjective causes of the judgment, which we have taken for its objective grounds, and thus explain the deceptive judgment as phe- nomeuon in our mind, apart altogether from the objective character of the object, we can then expose the illusion and need be no longer deceived by although, its subjective cause lies in our nature, we cannot hope altogether to escape its influence.
can only maintain, that affirm as necessarily valid for every one, that which produces conviction. Persuasion may keep for myself, agreeable to me but cannot, ana
ought not, to attempt to impose as binding upon inert. KK
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Holding for true, or the subjective validity of a jidgment in relation to conviction (which is, at the same time, objec tively valid), hahjie three following degrees : Opinion, Belief, and Knowledge. Opinion is a consciously insufficient judg ment, subjectively as well as objectively. Belief is subjec tively sufficient, but is recognized as being objectively in sufficient. Knowledge is both subjectively and objectively sufficient. Subjective sufficiency is termed conviction (for myself) ; objective sufficiency is termed certainty (for all). I need not dwell longer on the explanation of such simple
conceptions.
I must never venture to be of opinion, without knowing
something, at least, by which my judgment, in itself merely
is brought into connection with the truth, -- which connection, although not perfect, is still something more than an arbitrary fiction. Moreover, the law of such a connection must be certain. For in relation to this law, have nothing more than opinion, my judgment but play of the imagination, without the least relation to truth. --In the judgments of pure reason, opinion lias no place. For as they do not rest on empirical grounds, and as the sphere of pure reason that of necessary truth and a priori cognition, the principle of connection in requires universality and ne cessity, and consequently perfect certainty, --otherwise we should have no guide to the truth at all. Hence absurd to have an opinion in pure mathematics we must know, or abstain from forming judgment altogether. The case the same with the maxims of morality. For we must not hazard an action on the mere opinion that allowed, but we must know to be so.
In the transcendental sphere of reason, on the other hand, the term opinion too weak, while the word knowledge too strong. From the merely speculative point of view, therefore, we cannot form judgment at all. For the subjective grounds of judgment, such as produce belief, cannot be admitted in speculative enquiries, inasmuch as they cannot stand without empirical support, and are incapable of being communicated to others in equal measure.
But only from the practical point of view that theo retically insufficient judgment can be termed belief. Now tci practical reference either to tkiil or to morality; 10 ih<
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? THE CANON OF PtJRE RBASON.
former, when the end proposed is arbitrary and accidental, to the latter, when it is absolutely necessary.
If we propose to ourselves any end whatever, the conditions of its attainment are hypothetically necessary. The necessity is subjectively, but still only comparatively, sufficient, if I am acquainted with no other conditions under which the end can be attained. On the other hand, it is sufficient, absolutely, and for every one, if I know for certain that no one can be acquainted with any other conditions, under which the attain ment of the proposed end would be possible. In the former case my supposition -- my judgment with regard to certain conditions, is a merely accidental belief; in the latter it is a necessary belief. The physician must pursue some course in the case of a patient who is in danger, but is ignorant of the nature of the disease. He observes the symptoms, and con eludes, according to the best of his judgment, that it is a case of phthisis. His belief even in his own judgment, only contingent another man might, perhaps, come nearer the truth. Such belief, contingent indeed, but still forming the ground of the actual use of means for the attainment of certain ends, term praymatical belief.
? The usual test, whether that which any one maintains merely his persuasion, or his subjective conviction at least, that his firm belief, bet. It frequently happens that man delivers his opinions with so much boldness and assurance, that he appears to be under no apprehension as to the possibility of his being in error. The offer of bet startles him, and makes him pause. Sometimes turns out that his persuasion may
be valued at ducat, but not at ten. For he does not hesi tate, perhaps, to venture ducat, but proposed to stake ten, he immediately becomes aware of the possibility of his being mistaken -- possibility which has hitherto escaped his observation. If we imagine to ourselves that we have to stake the happiness of our whole life on the truth of any proposi tion, our judgment drops its air of triumph, we take the alarm, and discover the actual strength of our belief. Thus prag matical belief has degrees, varying in proportion to the inter ests at stake.
Now, in cases where we cannot enter upon any course of action in reference to some object, and where, accordingly, oui judgment purely theoretical, we can utill represent to our
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? elves, in thought, the possibility of a course of action, foi which we suppose that we have sufficient grounds, if any meapa existed of ascertaining; the truth of the matter. Thus we find in purely theoretical judgments an analogon of practical judg ments, to which the word belief may properly be applied, and which we may term doctrinal belief. I should not hesitate to stake my all on the truth of the proposition, -- if there were any possibility of bringing it to the test of experience, --that, at least, some one of the planets, which we see, is inhabited. Hence I say that I have not merely the opinion, but the strong belief, on the correctness of which I would stake even many of the advantages of life, that there are inhabitants in other worlds.
Now we must admit that the doctrine of the existence of God belongs to doctrinal belief. For, although in respect to the theoretical cognition of the universe I do not require to form any theory which necessarily involves this idea, as the condition of my explanation of the phenomena which the universe presents, but, on the contrary, am rather bound so to use my reason as if everything were mere nature, still teleological unity is so important a conditiou of the application of my reason to nature, that it is impossible for me to ignore it -- especially since, in addition to these considerations, abundant examples of it are supplied by experience. But the sole condition, so far as my knowledge extends, under which this unity cau be my guide in the investigation of nature, is the assumption that a supreme intelligence has ordered all things according to the wisest ends. Consequently the hypothesis of a wise author of the universe is necessary for my guidance in the investigation of nature --is the condition under which alone I can fulfil an end which is contingent indeed, but by no means unimportant. Moreover, since the result of my at tempts so frequently confirms the utility of this assumption, and since nothing decisive can be adduced against follows that would be saying far too little to term my judgment, this case, mere opinion, and that, even in this theoretical con nection, may assert that firmly believe God. Still, we use words strictly, this must not be called practical, but
doctrinal belief, which the theology of nature (physico- tlieoln;:r) must also produce my mind. In the wisdom
Supreme lieing, and the shortness of life, so inadequate
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to the development of the glorious powers of human nature, we may find equally sufficient grounds for a doctrinal belie! in the future life of the human bouI.
The expression of belief in such cases, an expression of modesty from the objective point of view, but, at the same time, of firm confidence, from the subjective. If should venture to term this merely theoretical judgment even so much as hypothesis which am entitled to assume more complete conception, with regard to another world find to the cause of the world, might then be justly required of me than am, in reality, able to give. For, assume anything, even as mere hypothesis, must, at least, know so much ot the properties of suoh being as will enable me, not to form the conception, but to imagine the existence of it. But the word belief refers only to the guidance which an idea gives me, and to its subjective influence on the conduct of my reason, which forces roe to hold fast, though may net be in
position to give speculative account of it.
But mere doctrinal belief to some extent, wanting sta
bility. We often quit our hold of consequence of the difficulties which occur in speculation, though in the end we
inevitably return to again.
quite otherwise with moral belie/. For in this sphere
action absolutely necessary, that must act obedience to the moral law in all points. The end here incontrover- tibly established, and there only one condition possible, according to the best of my perception, under which this end can harmonize with all other ends, and so have practical validity -- namely, the existence of God and of future world.
know also, to certainty, that no one can be acquainted with any other conditions which conduct to the same unity of ends under the moral law. But since the moral precept is, at the same time, my maxim (as reason requires that should be). am irresistibly constrained to believe in the existence of God and future life and am sure that nothing can make me
waver in this belief, since should thereby overthrow my morn) maxims, the renunciation of which would render me hateful in my own eyes.
Ihus, while all the ambitious attempts of reason to pene trate beyond the limits of experience end in disappointment, there still enough left to satisfy us practical point
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view.
the apagogic, on the other hand, may assure us of the truth of the proposition, but it cannot enable us to comprehend the grounds of its possibility. The latter accordingly, rather an auxiliary to an argument, than strictly philosophical and rational mode of procedure. In one respect, however, they have an advantage over direct proofs, from the fact, that the mode of arguing contradiction, which they employ, renders our understanding of the question more clear, and approxi
mates the proof to the certainty of an intuitional demonstra tion.
The true reason why indirect proofs are employed in dif ferent sciences, this. When the grounds upon which we seek to base cognition are too various or too profound, we try whether or not we may not discover the truth of our cog nition from its consequences. The modutponeru of reasoning from the truth of its inferences to the truth of proposition, would be admissible all the inferences that can be drawu from are k. iown to be true for in this case there can be
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only one possible ground for these inferences, and that is the
true one. But this is a quite impracticable procedure, as it surpasses Ail our powers to discover all the possible inferences that can be drawn from a proposition. But this mode of reasoning is employed, under favour, when we wish to prove the truth of a hypothesis ; in whieh cnse we admit the truth of the conclusion --which is supported by analogy --that, if all the inferences we have drawn and examined agree with the proposition assumed, all other possible inferences will also
lgree with it. But, in this way, an hypothesis can never be established as a demonstrated truth. The modus tollens of reasoning from known inferences to the unknown proposition, is not only a rigorous, but a very easy mode of proof. For, if it can be shown that but one inference from a proposition is false, then the proposition must itself be false. Instead, then, of examining, in an ostensive argument, the whole series of the grounds on which the truth of a proposition rests, we need only take the opposite of this proposition, and if one inference from it be false, then must the opposite be itself false ; and, consequently, the proposition which we wished to prove, must be true.
The apagogic method of proof is admissible only in those sciences where it is impossible to mistake a subjective re presentation for an objective cognition. Where this is pos sible, it is plain that the opposite of a given proposition may contradict merely the subjective conditions of thought, and not the objective cognition ; or it may happen that both propose tions contradict each other only under a subjective condition, which is incorrectly considered to be objective, and, as the condition is itself false, both propositions may be false, and it will, consequently, be impossible to conclude the truth of the
one from the falseness of the other.
In mathematics such subreptions are impossible ; and it is
in this science, accordingly, that the indirect mode of proof has its true place. In the science of nature, where all asser tion is based upon empirical intuition, such subreptions may
be guarded against by the repeated comparison of observa tions ; but this mode of proof is of little value in this sphere of knowledge. But the transcendental efforts of pure reason are all made in the sphere of the subjective, which is the roa. medium of all dialectical illusion ; and thus reason endeavours.
? ? ? ? THE DISCIPLINE OF FPB1 BEA8OS. 481
in its premisses, to impose upon ns subjective representations for objective cognitions. In the transcendental sphere of pure reason, then, and in the case of synthetical propositions, it is inadmissible to support a statement by disproving the counter- statement. For only two cases are possible ; either, the counter-statement is nothing but the enouncement of the inconsistency of the opposite opinion with the subjective con ditions of reason, which does not affect the real case (for example, we cannot comprehend the unconditioned necessity of the existence of a being, and hence every speculative proof of the existence of such a being must be opposed on subjective grounds, while the possibility of this being in itself cannot with justice be denied) ; or, both propositions, being dia lectical in their nature, are based upon an impossible con ception. In this latter case the rule applies --non entis nulla sunt predieata ; that is to say, what we affirm and what we deny, respecting such an object, are equally untrue, and the apagogic mode of arriving at the truth is in this case impos sible. If, for example, we presuppose that the world of sense is given in itself in its totality, it is false, either that is infinite, or that it is finite and limited in space. Both are false, because the hypothesis is false. For the notion of phenomena (as mere representations) which are given in themselves (as objects) i>> self- contradictory ; and the infinitude of this imaginary whole would, indeed, be unconditioned, but would be inconsistent (as every thing in the pheno menal world is conditioned) with the unconditioned deter mination and finitude of quantities which is presupposed in our conception.
The apagogic mode of proof is the true source of those illu sions which have always had so strong an attraction for the admirers of dogmatical philosophy. It may be compared to a champion, who maintains the honour and claims of the party he has adopted, by offering battle to all who doubt the validity of these claims and the purity of that honour ; while nothing can be proved in this way, except the respective strength oi the combatants, and the advantage, in this respect, is always on the side of the attacking party. Spectators, observing that each party is alternately conqueror and conquered, are led to
regard the subject of dispute as beycnc' the power of man to II
? ? ? ? 4b2 THANBCENDENTAL DOCTBINE OF METHOD.
decide upon. But such au opinion cannot be justified ; and it is sufficient to apply to these reasoners the remark :--
Non defensoribui istis Tempus eget.
Each must try to establish his assertions by a transcendental deduction of the grounds of proof employed in his argument, and thus enable us to see in what way the claims of reason may be supported. If an opponent bases his assertions upon subjective grounds, he may be refuted with ease ; not, how
ever to the advantage of the dogmatist, who likewise depends upon subjective sources of cognition, and is in like manner driven into a corner by his opponent. But, if parties employ the direct method of procedure, they will soon discover the difficulty, nay, the impossibility of proving their assertions, and will be forced to appeal to prescription and precedence ; or they will, by the help of criticism, discover with ease the dogmatical illusions by which they had been mocked, and compel reason to renounce its exaggerated pretensions to speculative insight, and to confine itself within the Limits of its ptoper sphere--that of practical principles.
TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. CHAPTER SECOND.
The Canon of Pcee Reason.
It is a humiliating consideration for human reason, that it
is incompetent to discover truth by means of pure speculation, but, on the contrary, stands in need of discipline to check its deviations from the straight path, and to expose the illusions which it originates. But, on the other hand, this consider ation ought to elevate and to give it confidence, for this disci pline is exercised by itself alone, and it is subject to the censure of no other power. The bounds, moreover, which it is forced to set to its speculative exercise, form likewise a check upon the fallacious pretensions of opponents ; and thus what remains of its possessions, after these exaggerate I claims have been disallowed, is secure from attack or usurpa tion. The greatest, and perhaps the only, use of all philo sophy of pure reason accordingly, of purely negativ*
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? THJ CANON 01 FUBI MA BOS.
483
character. It is not an organon for the extension, but a dis cipline for the determination of the limits of its exercise ; and without laying claim to the discovery of new truth, it has the modest merit of guarding against error.
At the same time, there must be some source of positive cognitions which belong to the domain of pure reason, and which become the causes of error only, from our mistaking their true character, while they form the goal towards which reason continually strives. How else can we account for the inextinguishable desire in the human mind to find a firm foot ing in some region beyond the limits of the world of experi ence ? --It hopes to attain to the possession of a knowledge in which it has the deepest interest. It enters upon the path of pure speculation ; but in vain. We have some reason, however, to expect that, in the only other way that lies open to --the path of practical reason, -- may meet with better success.
understand canon list of the a priori principles ot the proper employment of certain faculties of cognition. Thus general logic, in its analytical department, formal canon for the faculties of understanding and reason. In the same way, Transcendental Analytic was seen to be canon of the pure understanding for alone competent to enounce true a
priori synthetical cognitions. But, when no proper employ ment of faculty of cognition possible, no canon can exist. But the synthetical cognition of pure speculative reason as has been shown, completely impossible. There cannot, there fore, exist any canon for the speculative exercise of this faculty -- for its speculative exercise entirely dialectical and conse quently, transcendental logic, in this respect, merely dis cipline, and not canon. then, there any proper mode of employing the faculty of pure reason, --in which case there must be canon for this faculty, --this canon will relate, not to the speculative, but to the practical use reason. This canon we now proceed to investigate.
THE CANON OF PURE REASON. Section Fibst.
Of the Ultimate End the Pure Uce of Reason.
There exists in the faculty of reason natural desire so veiuure beyond the field of experience, to attempt to reach the
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utmost bounds of all cognition by the help of ideas alone, and not to rest satisfied, until it has fulfilled its course and raised the sum of its cognitions into a self-subsistent systematic whole. Is the motive for this endeavour to be found in ita speculative, or in its practical interests alone ?
Setting aside, at present, the results of the labours of pure reason in its speculative exercise, I shall merely inquire re- garding the problems, the solution of which forms its ultimate aim--whether reached or not, and in relation to which all other aims are but partial and intermediate. These highest aims must, from the nature of reason, possess complete unity ; otherwise the highest interest of humanity could not be suc cessfully promoted.
The transcendental speculation of reason relates to three things : the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God. The speculative interest which reason has in those questions is very small ; and, for its sake alone, we should not undertake the labour of transcendental investigation --a labour full of toil and ceaseless struggle. We should be loth to undertake this labour, because the dis coveries we might make would not be of the smallest use in the sphere of concrete or physical investigation. We may find out that the will is free, but this knowledge only relates to the intelligible cause of our volition. As regards the phsenomena or expressions of this will, that our actions, we are bound, in obedience to an inviolable maxim, without which reason cannot be employed in the sphere of experience, to explain these the same way as we explain all the other phenomena of nature, that to say, according to its un changeable laws. We may have discovered the spirituality and immortality of the soul, but we cannot employ this know ledge to explain the pheuomena of this life, nor the peculiar nature of the future because our conception of an incorporeal uature purely negative and does not add anything to our knowledge, and the only inferences to be drawn from are jmrely fictitious. If, again, we prove the existence of supreme intelligence, we should be able from to make the conformity to timi existing in the arrangement of the world comprehen sible but we should not be justified in deducing from anv
particular arrangement or disposition, or, inferring any, where
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485
tire use of reason, that we must not overlook natural causes, or refuse to listen to the teaching of experience, for the sake of deducing what we know and perceive from something that transcends all our knowledge. In one word, these three pro positions are, for the speculative reason, always transcendent, and cannot be employed as immanent principles in relation to the objects of experience ; they are, consequently, of no use to us in this sphere, being but the valueless results of the severs but unprofitable efforts of reason.
If, then, the actual cognition of these three cardinal propo sitions is perfectly useless, while Reason uses her utmost en deavours to induce ns to admit them, it is plain that their real value and importance relate to our practical, and not to our speculative interest.
? I term all that is possible through free-will, practical. But if the conditions of the exercise of free volition are empirical, reason can have only a regulative, and not a constitutive, influ ence upon and serviceable merely for the introduction of unity into its empirical laws. In the moral philosophy of prudence, for example, the sole business of reason to bring about union of all the ends, which are aimed at by our inclinations, into one ultimate end -- that of happiness, and to show the agreement which should exist among the means of attaining that end. In this sphere, accordingly, reason cannot present to us any other than pragmatical laws of free action, for oar guidance towards the aims set up by the senses, and
incompetent to give us laws which are pure and determined completely priori. On the other hand, pure practical laws, the ends of which have been given reason entirely priori, and which are not empirically conditioned, but are, on the contrary, absolutely imperative in their nature, would be pro ducts of pure reason. Such are the moral laws and these alone belong to the sphere of the practical exercise of reason, and admit of canon.
All the powers of reason, in the sphere of what may be termed pure philosophy, are, in fact, directed to the three above-mentioned These again have still higher end--the answer to the question, what we ought to do,
the will free, there God, and future world. Now, as this problem relates to our conduct, in reference to the highest aim of humanity, evident that the ultimate inten-
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tion of nature, in the constitution of our reason, has been directed to the moral alone.
We must take care, however, in turning our attention to an object which is foreign* to the sphere of transcendental philoso phy, not to injure the unity of our system by digressions, nor, on the other hand, to fail in clearness, by saying too little on the new subject of discussion. I hope to avoid both extremes, by keeping as close as possible to the transcendental, and ex
cluding all psychological, that empirical elements.
have to remark, in the first place, that at present treat of the conception of freedom in the practical sense only, and set aside the corresponding transcendental conception, which cannot be employed as ground of explanation in the phe-
nomenal world, but itself problem for pure reason.
will purely animal (zrbitrium brutum), when determined
sensuous impulses or instincts only, that is, when de
termined in pathological manner. will, which can be de
termined independently of sensuous impulses, consequently by motives presented reason alone, called free will (or- bitrium liberum) and everything which connected with this free will, either as principle or consequence, termed
practical. The existence of practical freedom can be proved from experience alone. For the human will not determined
that alone which immediately affects the senses on the contrary, we have the power, calling up the notion of what
useful or hurtful in more distant relation, of overcoming the immediate impressions on our sensuous faculty of desire. But these considerations of what desirable in relation to our whole state, that in the end good and useful, are based entirely upon reason. This faculty, accordingly, enounces laws, which are imperative or objective laws of freedom, and which tell us what ought to take place, thus distinguishing themselves from the laws of nature, which relate to that which does take place The laws of freedom or of free will are hence termed practical laws.
All practical conceptions relate to objects of pleasure and pain, and consequently,--in an Indirect manner, at least, --to objects of feeling. But is feeling not faculty of representation, but lies out of the sphere of our powers of cognition, the elements of our judgments, in so far as they relate to pleasure or pain, that is, the elements of our practical judgments, do not belong to transcendental philosophy, which has to do
ivith pure a priori cognitions alone.
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Whether reason is not itself, in the actual delivery of these aws, determined in it* turn by other influences, and whether the action which, in relation to sensuous impulses, we call free, may not, in relation to higher and more remote operative causes, really form a part of nature, --these are questions which do not here concern us. They are purely speculative questions ; and all we have to do, in the practical sphere, is to inquire into the
rule of conduct which reason has to present. Experience de monstrates to us the existence of practical freedom as one of the causes which exist in nature, that shows the causal power of reason in the determination of the will. The idea of transcendental freedom, on the contrary, requires that reason -- in relation to its causal power of commencing series of phenomena -- should be independent of all sensuous de termining causes and thus seems to be in opposition to the law of nature and to all possible experience. therefore re mains problem for the human mind. But this problem does not concern reason in its practical use and we have, therefore, in canon of pure reason, to do with only two questions, which relate to the practical interest of pure reason --Is there God and, there future life The question of transcendental freedom purely speculative, and we may therefore set entirely aside when we come to treat of practical reason. Besides, we have already fully discussed this subject
the antinomy of pure reason.
THE CANON OF PURE REASON.
Section Second.
Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Determining Ground of the Ultimate End of Pure Reaton.
Reason conducted na, in its speculative use, through the field of experience, and, as can never find complete satisfaction that sphere, from thence to speculative ideas, --which, how
ever, in the end brought us back again to experience, and thus fulfilled the purpose of reason, in a manner which, though useful, was not at all in accordance with our expectations.
now remains for us to consider whether pure reason can be employed in practical sphere, and whether will here conduct us to those ideas which attain the highest ends of pure reason.
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is we have just otited thfm. We shall thus astertaui whether, from the point of view of its practical interest, reason may not he able to supply us with that which, on the speculative side, it wholly denies us.
The whole interest of reason, speculative as well as practical, is centred in the three following questions:
1. What can 1 know?
2. What ouont I to do?
3. What mat I hofe ?
The first question is purely speculative. We have, as I flatter
myself, exhausted all the replies of which it is susceptible, and have at last found the reply with which reason must con tent itself, and with which it ought to be content, so long as it pays no regnrd to the practical. But from the two great ends lo the attainment of which all these efforts of pure reason were in fact directed, we remain just as far removed as if we had consulted our ease, and declined the task at the outset. So far, then, as knowledge s concerned, thus much, at least, is established, that, in regard to those two problems, it lies beyond our reach.
The second question is purely practical. As such it may indeed fall within the province of pure reason, but still it is not transcendental, but moral, and consequently cannot in it self form the subject of our criticism.
The third question, If I act as I onglit to do, what may I then hope? --is at once practical and theoretical. The prac tical forms a clue to the answer of the theoretical, and--in its highest form --speculative question. For all hoping has happiness for its object, and stands in precisely the same re lation to the practical and the law of morality, as knowing to the theoretical cognition of things and the law of nature. 'I he former arrives finally at the conclusion that something is (which determines the ultimate end), because something ought
to take place ; the latter, that something is (which operates as the highest cause), because something does take place.
Happiness is the satisfaction of all our desires ; extensive, in regard to their multiplicity ; intensive, in regard to their degree ; and protensive, in regard to their duration. The practical law based on the motive of happiness, I term a prag matical law (or prudential rule) ; but that law, assuming such to exist, which has no other motive than the worthiness qf
? ? ? ? TBI CANON OF MTU HUM*. 4S<<I
iein^ hapyf, I term a moral or ethical law. The first telis ua what ws have to do, if we wish to become possessed of happiness ; the second dictates how we ought to act, in order to deserve happiness. The first is based upon empirical principles ; for it is only by experience that I can learn either what incli nations exist which desire satisfaction, or what are the natural means of satisfying them. The second takes no account of our desires or the means of satisfying them, and regards only the freedom of a rational being, and the necessary conditions under which alone this freedom can harmonize with the dis tribution of happiness according to principles. This second law may therefore rest upon mere ideas of pure reason, and may be cognized a priori.
? I assume tha* there are pure moral laws which determine, entirely a priori (without regard to empirical motives, that is, to happiness), the conduct of a rational being, or in other words, the use which it makes of ita freedom, and that these
laws are absolutely imperative (not merely hypothetically, on the supposition of other empirical ends), and therefore in all respects necessary. I am warranted in assuming this, not only by the arguments of the most enlightened moralists, but by the moral judgment of every man who will make the at
tempt to form a distinct conception of such a law.
Pure reason, then, contains, not indeed in its speculative, but in its practical, or, more strictly, its moral use, principles of the possibility of experience, of such actions, namely, as, in accordance with ethical precepts, might be met with in the
history of man. For since reason commands that such actions should take place, it must be possible for them to take place ; and hence a particular kind of systematic unity -- the moral, must be possible. We have found, it is true, that the syste matic unity of nature could not be established according to speculative principles of reason, because, while reason possesses a causal power in relation to freedom, it has none in relation
to the whole sphere of nature ; and, while moral principles of reason can produce free actions, they cannot produce natural laws. It is, then, in its practical, but especially iu its moral use, that the principles of pure reason possess objective reality.
I call the world a moral world, in so far as it may be in accordance with all the ethical law* --which, by virtue of the
? ? ? 4(J0
TUANSCENDEKTAX DOCTRISE OF METHOJ!
freedom of reasonable beings, it can be, and according to the necessary laws of morality it ought to be. But tbis world must be conceived only as an intelligible world, inasmuch as abstraction is therein made of all conditions (ends), and even of all impediments to morality (the weakness or pravity of human nature). --So far, then, it is a mere idea, -- though still a practical idea, which may have, and ought to have, an in fluence on the world of sense, so as to bring it as far as pos sible into conformity with itself. The idea of a moral world has, therefore, objective reality, not as referring to an ODject of intelligible intuition, -- for of such an object we can form no conception whatever, --but to the world of sense, --conceived, however, as an object of pure reason in ift practical use, ? and to a corpus mysticum of rational beings in in so far as the liberum arbitrium of the individual placed, under and virtue of mornl laws, in complete systematic unity both with itself, and with the freedom of all others.
That the answer to the first of the two questions of pure reason which relate to its practical interest :--Do that which will render thee worthy of happiness. The second question this If conduct myself so as not to be unworthy of hsppi ness, may hope thereby to obtain happiness In order to arrive at the solution of this question, we must inquire whether the principles of pare reason, which prescribe a priori the law, necessarily also connect this hope with it.
?
say, then, that just as the moral principles are necessary according to reason in its practical use, so equally neces sary according to reason in its theoretical use, to assume that every one has ground to hope for happiness in the measure which he has made himself worthy of his conduct, and that therefore the system of morality
only in the idea of pure reason) connected with that of hap
piness.
Now in an intelligible, that in the moral world, in the
conception of which we make abstraction of all the impedi ments to morality (sensuous desires), such system of happi ness, connected with and proportioned to morality, may be conceived as necessary, because freedom of volition--partly incited, and partly restrained moral laws --would be itself the cause of general happiness and thus rational beings, under the guidance of such principles, would be themselves the autbon
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ooth of their own enduring welfare and that of others. But Mich a system of self-rewarding morality is only an idea, the carrying out of which depends upon the condition that every one acta as he ought ; in other words, that all' actions of reasonable beings be such as they would be if they sprung from a Supreme Will, comprehending in, or under, itself all particular wills. But since the moral law is binding on each individual in the use of his freedom of volition, even if others should not act in conformity with this law, neither the nature of things, nor the causality of actions and their relation to morality, determine how the consequences of these actions will be related to happiness ; and the necessary connection of the hope of happiness with the unceasing endeavour to become worthy of happiness, cannot be cognized by reason, if we take nature alone for our guide. This connection can be hoped for only on the assumption that the cause of nature is a supreme reason, which governs according to moral laws.
I term the idea of an intelligence in which the morally most perfect will, united with supreme blessedness, is the cause of all happiness in the world, so far as happiness stands in strict relation to morality (as the worthiness of being happy), the Ideal of the Supreme Good. It is only, then, in the ideal of the supreme original good, that pure reason can find the ground of the practically necessary connection of both elements of the highest derivative good, and accordingly of an intelligible, that moral world. Now since we are necessitated by reason to conceive ourselves as belonging to such world, while the senses present to us nothing but world of phenomena, we must assume the former as consequence of our conduct in the world of sense (since the world of sense gives us no hint of it), and therefore as future in relation to us. Thus God and future life are two hypotheses which, according to the principles of pure reason, are inseparable from the obligation which this reason imposes upon us.
Morality per te constitutes system. But we can form no system of happiness, except in so far as dispensed in strict proportion to morality. But this only possible in the in telligible world, under wise author and ruler. Such ruler, together with life in such world, which we must look upon m future, reason finds itself compelled to assume or must
regard the moral laws as idle dreams, since the necessary con.
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? 492 TRA5SCMTDEKTAX DOCTRIKE OF METHOD.
sequence which this same reason connects with them, must, without this hypothesis, fall to the ground. Hence also the moral laws are universally regarded as commands, which they could not be, did they not connect a priori adequate conse quences with their dictates, and thus carry with them promise* and threats. But this, again, they could not do, did they not reside in a necessary being, as the Supreme Good, which alone can render such a teleological unity possible.
Leibnitz termed the world, when viewed in relation to the rational beings which it contains, and the moral relations in which they stand to each other, under the government of the Supreme Good, the kingdom of Grace, and distinguished it from the kingdom ofNature, in which these rational beings live, under moral laws, indeed, but expect no other conse quences from their actions than such as follow according to the course of nature in the world of sense. To view ourselves, therefore, as in the kingdom of grace, in which all happiness awaits us, except in so far as we ourselves limit our partici pation in it by actions which render us unworthy of happiness, is a practically necessary idea of reason.
Practical laws, in so far as they are subjective grounds of actions, that subjective principles, are termed maxims. The judgments of morality, in its purity and ultimate results, are framed according to ideas the observance of its laws, accord ing to maxims.
The whole course of our life must be subject to moral maxims but this impossible, unless with the moral law, which mere idea, reason connects an efficient cause which ordains to all conduct which in conformity with the moral law an issue either in this or in another life, which exact conformity with our highest aims. Thus, without God and without world, invisible to us now, but hoped for, the glorious ideas of morality are, indeed, objects of approbation and of admiration, but cannot be the springs of purpose and action. For they do not satisfy all the aims which are natural to every rational being, and which are determined priori pure reason itself, and necessary.
Happiness alone is, in the view of reason, far from being
? the complete good. Reason does not approve of
much inclination may desire it), except as united with desert. On the other hand, morality "lone, and with mere desert.
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u likewise i'ar from being the complete good. To make it
complete, lie who conducts himself in n manner not unworthy
of happiness, must be able to hope for the possession of hap
piness. Even reason, unbiassed by private ends, or interested
considerations, cannot judge otherwise, if it puts itself in the
place of a being whose business it is to dispense all happiness to others. For in the practical idea both points are essen
tially combined, though in such a way that participation in happiness is rendered possible by the moral disposition, as its condition, and not conversely, the moral disposition by the prospect of happiness. For a disposition which should re quire the prospect of happiness as its necessary condition, would not be moral, and hence also would not he worthy of complete happiness --a happiness which, iuthe view of reason, recognizes no limitation but such as arises from our own im moral conduct.
Happiness, therefore, in exact proportion with the morality of rational beings (whereby they are made worthy of happi ness), constitutes alone the supreme good of a world into which we absolutely must transport ourselves according to the com mands of pure but practical reason. This world is, it is true, only an intelligible world ; for of such a systematic unity of ends as it requires, the world of sense gives us no hint. Its reality can be based on nothing else but the hypothesis of a supreme original good. In it independent reason, equipped with all the sufficiency of a supreme cause, founds, maintains, and fulfils the universal order of things, with the most perfect teleological harmony, however much this order may be hidden from us in the world of sense.
This moral theology has the peculiar advantage, in contrast with speculative theology, of leading inevitably to the concep tion of a sole, perfect, and rational First Cause, whereof specu lative theology does not give us any indication on objective grounds, far less any convincing evidence. For we find neither in transcendental nor in natural theology, however far reason may lead us in these, any ground to warrant us in assuming the existence of one only Being, which stands at the head of all natural causes, and on which these are entirely dependent. On the other hand, if we take our stand on moral ui. ity as a necessary law of the universe, and from this point of view consider what is necessary to give this law adequate elfioiency
? ? ? ? 494 TRAICSCKTDENTAI, DOCTHHTX OT METHOD.
and, for us, obligatory force, we must come to the conclude* that there is one only supreme will, which comprehends ai these laws in itself. For how, under different wills, should we find complete unity of ends? This will must be omni potent, that all nature and its relation to morality in the world may be subject to it ; omniscient, that it may have knowledge of the most secret feelings and their moral worth ; omni present, that it may be at band to supply every necessity to which the highest weal of the world may give rise ; eternal, that this harmony of nature and liberty may never fail ; and bo on.
But this systematic unity of ends in this world of intelli gences -- which, as mere nature, is only a world of sense, but as a system of freedom of volition, may be termed an in telligible, that moral world (regnum gratia) -- leads in evitably also to the teleologicnl unity of all things which con stitute this great whole, according to universal natural laws, -- just as the unity of the former according to universal and necessary moral laws, -- and unites the practical with the specu lative reason. The world must be represented as having originated from an idea, to harmonize with that use of reason without which we cannot even consider ourselves as worthy of reason, --namely, the moral use, which rests entirely on the idea of the supreme good. Hence the investigation of nature receives teleological direction, and becomes, in its widest extension, physico-theology. But this, taking its rise in moral order as unity founded on the essence of freedom, and not accidentally instituted by external commands, estab lishes the teleological view of nature on grounds which must be inseparably connected with the internal possibility of things. This gives rise to transcendental theology, which takes the ideal of the highest ontological perfection as principle of systematic unity and this principle connects all things ac cording to universal and necessary natural laws, because all things have their origin in the absolute necessity of the one only Primal Being.
What use can we make of our understanding, even re spect of experience, we do not propose ends to ourselves
But the highest ends are those of morality, and
pure reason that can give us the knowledge of these. Though supplied with these, and putting ourselves under their gui-l
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? THE CANON OF PURE BEASOIT 495
Mice, we un make no teleological use of the knowledge at nature, as regards cognition, unless nature itself has estali- lished teleological unity. For without this unity we shouM not even possess reason, because we should have no school for reason, and no cultivation through objects which afford the materials for its conceptions. But teleological unity is a necessary unity, and founded on the essence of the indi vidual will itself. Hence this will, which is the condition of the application of this unity in concreto, must be so likewise. In this way the transcendental enlargement of our rational
cognition would be, not the cause, but merely the effect of the practical teleology, which pure reason imposes upon us.
Hence, also, we find in the history of human reason that, before the moral conceptions were sufficiently purified and determined, and before men had attained to a perception of
the systematic unity of ends according to these conceptions and from necessary principles, the knowledge of nature, and even a considerable amount of intellectual culture in many other sciences, could produce only rude and vague concep tions of the Deity, sometimes even admitting of an astonish ing indifference with regard to this question altogether. But the more enlarged treatment of moral ideas, which was ren dered necessary by the extremely pure moral lawof our religion, awakened the interest, and thereby quickened the perceptions
of reason in relation to this object. In this way, and without the help either of an extended acquaintance with nature, or of a reliable transcendental insight, (for these have been wanting in all ages), a conception of the Divine Being was arrived at, which we now hold to be the correct one, not because specu lative reason convinces us of its correctness, but because it accords with the moral principles of reason. Thus it is to pure reason, but only in its practical use, that we must ascribe the merit of having connected with our highest interest ?
cognition, of which mere speculation was able only to form a conjecture, but the validity of which it was unable to estab lish, -- and of having thereby rendered not indeed demon strated dogma, but a hypothesis absolutely necessary to the essential ends of reason.
But practical reason haa reached this elevation, and has attained to the conception of sole Primal Being, as the supreme good, must not, therefore, imagine that haa
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? 496 TRANSCEKDEJTTAL DOCTBEN1 OF METHOD.
transcended the empirical conditions of its application, anil risen to the immediate cognition of new objects ; it must not presume to start from the conception which it has gained, and to deduce from it the moral laws themselves. For it was these very laws, the internal practical necessity of which led us to the hypothesis of an independent cause, or of a wise ruler of the universe, who should give them effect. Hence we are not entitled to regard them as accidental and derived from the mere will of the ruler, especially as we have no con ception of such a will, except as formed in accordance with
these laws. So far, then, as practical reason has the right to conduct us, we shall not look upon actions as binding on us, because they are the commands of God, butwe shall regard them as divine commands, because we are internally bound them. We shall study freedom under the teleologies] unity which accords with principles of reason ; we shall look upon ourselves as acting in conformity with the divine will only in so far as we hold sacred the moral law which reason teaches us from the nature of actions themselves, and we shall believe that we can obey that will only by promoting the weal of the universe in ourselves and in others. Moral theology therefore, only of immanent use. teaches us to fulfil our destiny here in the world, by placing ourselves
in harmony with the general system of ends, and warns against the fanaticism, nay, the crime of depriving reason of its legislative authority in the moral conduct of life, for the purpose of directly connecting this authority with the idea of the Supreme Being. For this would be, not an imma nent, but transcendent use of moral theology, and, like the transcendent use of mere speculation, would inevitably per vert and frustrate the ultimate ends of reason.
THE CANON OF PURE REASON. Section III.
Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief.
The holding of thing to be true, phenomenon in out understanding which may rest on objective grounds, but re quires, also, subjective causes in the mind of the person judging. If judgment valid for every rational being, then its ground objectively sufficient, and termed
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497
action. on the other hand, has its ground in the particular character of the subject, termed persuasion.
Persuasion mere illusion, the ground of the judgment, which lies solely in the subject, being regarded as objective.
Hence judgment of this kind has only private validity-- only valid for the individual who judges, and the holding of a thing to be true in this way cannot be communicated. But truth depends upon agreement with the object, and consequently the judgments of all understandings, true, must be in agreement with each other (consentienlia uni tertio consentiunt inter se). Conviction may, therefore, be distinguished, from an external point of view, from persua sion, by the possibility of communicating and showing its validity for the reason of every man for in this case the presumption, at least, arises, that the agreement of all judg ments with each other, in spite of the different characters of individuals, rests upon the common ground of the agreement of each with the object, and thus the correctness of the judg ment established.
? Persuasion, accordingly, cannot be subjectively distin guished from conviction, that so long as the subject views its judgment simply as phenomenon of its own mind. But we inquire whether the grounds of our judgment, which are valid for us, produce the same effect on the reason of others as on our own, we hav<< then the means, though only subjective means, not, indeed, of producing conviction, but of detecting the merely private validity of the judgment in other words, of discovering that there in the element of mere persuasion.
If we can, in addition to this, develope the subjective causes of the judgment, which we have taken for its objective grounds, and thus explain the deceptive judgment as phe- nomeuon in our mind, apart altogether from the objective character of the object, we can then expose the illusion and need be no longer deceived by although, its subjective cause lies in our nature, we cannot hope altogether to escape its influence.
can only maintain, that affirm as necessarily valid for every one, that which produces conviction. Persuasion may keep for myself, agreeable to me but cannot, ana
ought not, to attempt to impose as binding upon inert. KK
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Holding for true, or the subjective validity of a jidgment in relation to conviction (which is, at the same time, objec tively valid), hahjie three following degrees : Opinion, Belief, and Knowledge. Opinion is a consciously insufficient judg ment, subjectively as well as objectively. Belief is subjec tively sufficient, but is recognized as being objectively in sufficient. Knowledge is both subjectively and objectively sufficient. Subjective sufficiency is termed conviction (for myself) ; objective sufficiency is termed certainty (for all). I need not dwell longer on the explanation of such simple
conceptions.
I must never venture to be of opinion, without knowing
something, at least, by which my judgment, in itself merely
is brought into connection with the truth, -- which connection, although not perfect, is still something more than an arbitrary fiction. Moreover, the law of such a connection must be certain. For in relation to this law, have nothing more than opinion, my judgment but play of the imagination, without the least relation to truth. --In the judgments of pure reason, opinion lias no place. For as they do not rest on empirical grounds, and as the sphere of pure reason that of necessary truth and a priori cognition, the principle of connection in requires universality and ne cessity, and consequently perfect certainty, --otherwise we should have no guide to the truth at all. Hence absurd to have an opinion in pure mathematics we must know, or abstain from forming judgment altogether. The case the same with the maxims of morality. For we must not hazard an action on the mere opinion that allowed, but we must know to be so.
In the transcendental sphere of reason, on the other hand, the term opinion too weak, while the word knowledge too strong. From the merely speculative point of view, therefore, we cannot form judgment at all. For the subjective grounds of judgment, such as produce belief, cannot be admitted in speculative enquiries, inasmuch as they cannot stand without empirical support, and are incapable of being communicated to others in equal measure.
But only from the practical point of view that theo retically insufficient judgment can be termed belief. Now tci practical reference either to tkiil or to morality; 10 ih<
? problematical,
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? THE CANON OF PtJRE RBASON.
former, when the end proposed is arbitrary and accidental, to the latter, when it is absolutely necessary.
If we propose to ourselves any end whatever, the conditions of its attainment are hypothetically necessary. The necessity is subjectively, but still only comparatively, sufficient, if I am acquainted with no other conditions under which the end can be attained. On the other hand, it is sufficient, absolutely, and for every one, if I know for certain that no one can be acquainted with any other conditions, under which the attain ment of the proposed end would be possible. In the former case my supposition -- my judgment with regard to certain conditions, is a merely accidental belief; in the latter it is a necessary belief. The physician must pursue some course in the case of a patient who is in danger, but is ignorant of the nature of the disease. He observes the symptoms, and con eludes, according to the best of his judgment, that it is a case of phthisis. His belief even in his own judgment, only contingent another man might, perhaps, come nearer the truth. Such belief, contingent indeed, but still forming the ground of the actual use of means for the attainment of certain ends, term praymatical belief.
? The usual test, whether that which any one maintains merely his persuasion, or his subjective conviction at least, that his firm belief, bet. It frequently happens that man delivers his opinions with so much boldness and assurance, that he appears to be under no apprehension as to the possibility of his being in error. The offer of bet startles him, and makes him pause. Sometimes turns out that his persuasion may
be valued at ducat, but not at ten. For he does not hesi tate, perhaps, to venture ducat, but proposed to stake ten, he immediately becomes aware of the possibility of his being mistaken -- possibility which has hitherto escaped his observation. If we imagine to ourselves that we have to stake the happiness of our whole life on the truth of any proposi tion, our judgment drops its air of triumph, we take the alarm, and discover the actual strength of our belief. Thus prag matical belief has degrees, varying in proportion to the inter ests at stake.
Now, in cases where we cannot enter upon any course of action in reference to some object, and where, accordingly, oui judgment purely theoretical, we can utill represent to our
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? elves, in thought, the possibility of a course of action, foi which we suppose that we have sufficient grounds, if any meapa existed of ascertaining; the truth of the matter. Thus we find in purely theoretical judgments an analogon of practical judg ments, to which the word belief may properly be applied, and which we may term doctrinal belief. I should not hesitate to stake my all on the truth of the proposition, -- if there were any possibility of bringing it to the test of experience, --that, at least, some one of the planets, which we see, is inhabited. Hence I say that I have not merely the opinion, but the strong belief, on the correctness of which I would stake even many of the advantages of life, that there are inhabitants in other worlds.
Now we must admit that the doctrine of the existence of God belongs to doctrinal belief. For, although in respect to the theoretical cognition of the universe I do not require to form any theory which necessarily involves this idea, as the condition of my explanation of the phenomena which the universe presents, but, on the contrary, am rather bound so to use my reason as if everything were mere nature, still teleological unity is so important a conditiou of the application of my reason to nature, that it is impossible for me to ignore it -- especially since, in addition to these considerations, abundant examples of it are supplied by experience. But the sole condition, so far as my knowledge extends, under which this unity cau be my guide in the investigation of nature, is the assumption that a supreme intelligence has ordered all things according to the wisest ends. Consequently the hypothesis of a wise author of the universe is necessary for my guidance in the investigation of nature --is the condition under which alone I can fulfil an end which is contingent indeed, but by no means unimportant. Moreover, since the result of my at tempts so frequently confirms the utility of this assumption, and since nothing decisive can be adduced against follows that would be saying far too little to term my judgment, this case, mere opinion, and that, even in this theoretical con nection, may assert that firmly believe God. Still, we use words strictly, this must not be called practical, but
doctrinal belief, which the theology of nature (physico- tlieoln;:r) must also produce my mind. In the wisdom
Supreme lieing, and the shortness of life, so inadequate
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to the development of the glorious powers of human nature, we may find equally sufficient grounds for a doctrinal belie! in the future life of the human bouI.
The expression of belief in such cases, an expression of modesty from the objective point of view, but, at the same time, of firm confidence, from the subjective. If should venture to term this merely theoretical judgment even so much as hypothesis which am entitled to assume more complete conception, with regard to another world find to the cause of the world, might then be justly required of me than am, in reality, able to give. For, assume anything, even as mere hypothesis, must, at least, know so much ot the properties of suoh being as will enable me, not to form the conception, but to imagine the existence of it. But the word belief refers only to the guidance which an idea gives me, and to its subjective influence on the conduct of my reason, which forces roe to hold fast, though may net be in
position to give speculative account of it.
But mere doctrinal belief to some extent, wanting sta
bility. We often quit our hold of consequence of the difficulties which occur in speculation, though in the end we
inevitably return to again.
quite otherwise with moral belie/. For in this sphere
action absolutely necessary, that must act obedience to the moral law in all points. The end here incontrover- tibly established, and there only one condition possible, according to the best of my perception, under which this end can harmonize with all other ends, and so have practical validity -- namely, the existence of God and of future world.
know also, to certainty, that no one can be acquainted with any other conditions which conduct to the same unity of ends under the moral law. But since the moral precept is, at the same time, my maxim (as reason requires that should be). am irresistibly constrained to believe in the existence of God and future life and am sure that nothing can make me
waver in this belief, since should thereby overthrow my morn) maxims, the renunciation of which would render me hateful in my own eyes.
Ihus, while all the ambitious attempts of reason to pene trate beyond the limits of experience end in disappointment, there still enough left to satisfy us practical point
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