The limits of Louis XIV's ambitions comes through quite clearly in the recent revisionist work of scholars such as William Beik, Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in
Languedoc
(Cambridge, 1985), and Roger Mettam, Power and Faction in Louis XIV's France (Oxford, 1988).
Cult of the Nation in France
But the effect was rather spoiled by the fact that we spent dinner watching "Happy Days" on television.
Just as France retains only tiny remnants of its once vast peasantry, so it has only kept shreds of its once vast empire: Guadeloupe, Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, Martinique, New Caledonia and so forth--a small, thin, and widely scattered archipelago where one can still use French currency, speak the French language, and walk into post offices identical to the ones on Pa- risian street corners. The rest disappeared in the great wave of decoloniza- tion in the 1950s and 1960s. Beyond this tiny formal empire, there is also a much larger informal one, for France still maintains legions of civil ser- vants, businessmen, and aid workers in its former African colonies, not to mention soldiers. But if French influence remains strong in these na- tions, its civilizing mission has almost entirely vanished. Far from granting French citizenship to "meritorious" Africans, the French state devotes con- siderable efforts to keeping them out of France, lest they swell an already large immigrant population.
The issue of immigration itself is, as it has always been, fraught and complex. Nearly every party to the ongoing debate in France over immi- grants has an interest in presenting the problems of the current wave of immigrants (especially the millions of Arabs and Berbers who have made Islam France's second largest religion, after Catholicism) as more serious than any similar problems in the past. The National Front and other
214 The Cult of the Nation in France
? rightists do so to garner support for an absolute halt to immigration and intensified efforts of repatriation. Opposing political forces do so in order to justify large-scale public efforts to relieve the misery in which many im- migrants live. Even though, in a recent poll, no less than 38 percent of the French population confessed to some racist feelings about immigrants, and even though the National Front routinely has won up to 15 percent of the vote, the prejudice and even violence dealt to previous waves of im- migrants ironically offer some hope that eventually the North Africans, too, may find themselves integrated more fully into French society and cul- ture. 42 Southeast Asians, and to a lesser extent black African immigrants, are becoming so already. On the other hand, at least two phenomena do suggest a need for caution. One is the growing popularity of anti-Western fundamentalism in some sectors of France's Muslim communities, leading to a radical rejection of assimilation. The other is the ghettoization of im- migrant communities, characterized by high levels of unemployment and crime, and physical isolation in the miserable suburban confines of vast, sterile housing projects.
Even if the North African Muslims do eventually follow the example of their Belgian, Italian, Polish, and Iberian predecessors, a different fact is now becoming clear: they will most likely have no successors. In the pres- ent French political climate, and thanks above all to the National Front, even the Socialist Party has strongly committed itself to ending immigra- tion, cracking down on clandestine immigration, and shipping illegal im- migrants back to their countries of origin. Meanwhile, the president of the Republic has openly remarked that he sympathizes with his compatriots who must put up with the "noise" and the "smells" generated by an "over- dose" of immigrants. 43 In the 1980s and 1990s the United States has again become the leading immigrant nation in the West, and is being trans- formed by immigration to an extent not seen for a century. By contrast, the French are making it clear that once they have digested the current immi- grant populations, they have no appetite for more. In this sense, the field of immigration, too, is closed to republican nationalism.
Supposing that France did still have peasants, an empire, and ongoing waves of immigration, would there still be a vigorous republican national impulse to instill republican values in these outsiders and to integrate them seamlessly into the national community? The answer is far from ob- vious. As Pierre Nora and others have noted, French republicanism in many ways reached its peak a century ago, thanks above all to its conflict
Conclusion 215
? with a frankly anti-republican Catholic right. This opponent remained a serious threat throughout the interwar years, and of course took power in 1940 thanks to the Nazi conquerors. But the experience of Vichy wholly discredited it, and it has never regained its electoral base. The National Front is itself a largely republican party; it flies the republican tricolor even as its supporters celebrate Joan of Arc. After the war, not only did French republicanism find itself without a powerful opponent to justify its contin- ued vigilance and activity; it was also sapped by the competing forces of Gaullism and Marxism. They have declined in their turn in the past twenty years, but it has not been to either the ideological or electoral advantage of Third Republic-style republicanism and the political parties that embod- ied it. 44 Whether or not the French Revolution is finally over, as Franc? ois Furet famously claimed, it has ceased to matter in mainstream French poli- tics, where middle-of-the-road parties with often identical policies com- pete to dominate a Republic of the Center largely similar to other Western European democracies. 45
Just as important, republicanism has in a sense lost its principal in- strument of spreading the creed, the public education system. Obviously, French public education itself is larger than ever (French civil servants once liked to boast that "l'e? ducation nationale" was the single largest orga- nization in Europe, after the Red Army--now, presumably, it is the larg- est). But since the war it has undergone some fundamental transforma- tions. First, its center of gravity has shifted upwards. Whereas once the lyce? es were elite institutions and the universities and grandes e? coles were re- served for a tiny minority, now virtually all French children receive second- ary education. Franc? ois Mitterrand set a goal of bringing 80 percent of the population at least through the baccalaureat, and the intolerable crowding in many universities testifies to the system's progress towards this goal. As the system increasingly came to center on adolescents rather than young children, it would inevitably have moved away from the sort of heavy- handed patriotic indoctrination characteristic of the Third Republic. But that indoctrination has in any case faded away for very different reasons, and instituteurs now rarely treat patriotic and moral education as more important tasks than the imparting of basic skills. 46
In this context, one cannot overestimate the importance of the events of May 1968. Whatever else this extraordinary episode accomplished, it came close to destroying the magisterial authority previously enjoyed by French educators, and their overweening confidence in their ability to shape their
216 The Cult of the Nation in France
? charges to fit a pattern of their own devising. While students had helped lead previous French rebellions, they had not done so directly against their own teachers and educational institutions. In the wake of 1968, teachers could no longer occupy the same moral position they had held before--es- pecially after the students of 1968 became teachers in their turn. 47
Beyond all these social, political, and cultural reasons why the republi- can vision of the nation has dissolved, leaving a perceived crisis in its wake, there is another, perhaps more fundamental reason. Nationalism, while de- veloping in large part against religion, also developed out of it, and did so at a time of general, profound religious faith. Above all, the order and har- mony that nationalists hoped to establish in this world, while seen as part of this world and not a reflection or extension of celestial order, was none- theless envisioned as a terrestrial counterpart to the order and harmony discerned by Christians in heaven. Hence it is doubtful that nationalism can remain the same in an era characterized not merely by the interioriza- tion of religion, but by the thorough evaporation of religious faith, to the extent that the original, religious conception of order and harmony no longer resonates in most people's minds with anything like the strength it did in the eighteenth century. What are the successors of Rabaut Saint- Etienne to do when they no longer need to fight against the priests--when, moreover, what the priests themselves were trying to accomplish no longer has any meaning to most of the population?
In our own profoundly disenchanted world, it is perhaps not surprising that in fact, most of the foundational concepts discussed in Chapter 1 are losing their centrality, in France and beyond. The word "civilization" is spoken with irony more often than not. The same is true for "patrie"--in- deed, this word seems to be fast disappearing from the French lexicon, to the extent that if the abbe? Coyer returned to France today, he would undoubtedly see the need to reprint his little dissertation lamenting the word's absence. "Society," as is often remarked, is steadily giving way to "culture" in everything from the most abstruse academic discourse to the most popular media. We may not be at the "end of history," but we do seem to be at the end of a period in which reshaping human society into some sort of ideally harmonious order was seen as the central task for hu- man beings to accomplish. Assuring a reasonable degree of comfort and security is now often seen as all that is possible. As in the decades around 1700, inhabitants of the West are again living in a time of "anti-enthusi- asm," though now they are reacting against ideological, as opposed to reli- gious enthusiasms.
Conclusion 217
? And what of the nation? In this not-so-brave new world, which admit- tedly extends over only the small portion of the globe that can take a rea- sonable degree of comfort and security for granted, will it simply become irrelevant? Will France steadily dissolve into Europe, cyberspace, and the global marketplace, whatever stubborn words the prime minister may summon against this fate? I do not think so. But if the nation does remain a central organizing principle of human life, it will do so in a very different manner from the past two centuries. It will do so not as a field of homoge- neity, but as a site of exchange, where different cultures meet and mix, in constant movement. National identity and national character will survive, but they will refer as much to the particular style of the meeting and mix- ing as to the things that are meeting and mixing.
Parts of France itself have already become this sort of kaleidoscope na- tion, as a stroll through central Paris, with its overwhelming selection of foods, music, and clothing from around the world, easily demonstrates. Many prominent French commentators and politicians, attached by a blend of conviction, nostalgia, and self-interest to the old national creed and the institutions that embodied it, may decry the change, but they have so far proved incapable of doing anything to reverse it (legislation on pro- tecting the French language, for instance, has been an often ludicrous fail- ure). They are unlikely to become more effective in the near future. Today, with France more prosperous, peaceful, and secure than at any time in its history, the nationalism that flourished between the late eighteenth cen- tury and the mid-twentieth is distant from the experiences and concerns of most of the French. This change may be partly regrettable, for French re- publican nationalism, if party to much that was terrible, particularly at its origins, had something noble and grand to it as well. Nonetheless, the French will be fortunate if they are able, in the years to come, to look back on their nationalist past with sympathy and admiration, but also with a degree of puzzled incomprehension.
? ? Notes
Introduction: Constructing the Nation
1. Maximilien Robespierre, Discours et rapports a` la Convention, ed. Marc Bouloiseau (Paris, 1965), 79.
2. On Rabaut, see Andre? Dupont, Rabaut Saint-Etienne, 1743-1793: Un prot- estant de? fenseur de la liberte? religieuse (Strasbourg, 1946, repr. Geneva, 1989).
3. Re? impression de l'ancien Moniteur, 32 vols. (Paris, 1840), Dec. 22, 1792, 803.
The speech was reprinted as Jean-Paul Rabaut, Projet d'e? ducation nationale
(Paris, 1792).
4. Cited in Mona Ozouf, "La Re? volution franc? aise et la formation de l'homme
nouveau," in L'homme re? ge? ne? re? : Essais sur la Re? volution franc? aise (Paris, 1989),
116-157, at 125.
5. Moniteur, 802-3.
6. Ibid. , 802-3.
7. Ibid. , 803.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid. , 804.
10. Rabaut de Saint-Etienne, Projet.
11. It has principally been noticed for its influence on the subsequent educa-
tional projects. See Jean-Louis Labarrie`re, "De la vertu du citoyen e? claire? ," in Josiane Boulad-Ayoub, ed. , Former un nouveau peuple? Pouvoir, e? ducation, re? volution (Quebec, 1996), 57-69, esp. 66-67; Robert J. Vignery, The French Revolution and the Schools: Educational Policies of the Mountain 1792-1794 (Madison, 1965), 45, 77; Dominque Julia, Les trois couleurs du tableau noir: La Re? volution (Paris, 1981), 46, 89-96; and Bronislaw Baczko, Une e? ducation pour la de? mocratie: Textes et projets de l'e? poque re? volutionnaire (Paris, 1982), which reproduces the later, printed version of the speech on 295-301.
12. On this subject, see notably Colette Beaune, Naissance de la nation France (Paris, 1985), and Myriam Yardeni, La conscience nationale en France pendant les guerres de religion (1559-1598) (Louvain, 1971).
219
220
Notes to Pages 3-5
? 13.
Here I am taking issue with influential scholars who see the rise of nations and the rise of nationalism as the same essential phenomenon. See for in- stance Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford, 1983); Benedict An- derson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Na- tionalism (London, 1983); John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (New York, 1982); Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Pro- gramme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge, 1989). These scholars all take a "modern- ist" approach, locating the origins of nations and nationalism alike around 1800, but the same conflation is also typical of scholars who project the phe- nomenon further back in time, for instance Adrian Hastings, The Construc- tion of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism (Cambridge, 1998), or Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (Reno, 1991).
For an excellent synthesis of this aspect of nationalism, see Anne-Marie Thiesse, La cre? ation des identite? s nationales: Europe XVIIIe-XXe sie`cle (Paris, 1999). For a discussion of the language of restoration and reconstruction, even in the most radical moments of the French Revolution, see Chapter 5 below.
This point is valid for the "civic" (as opposed to "ethnic") form of national- ism, to borrow the distinction formulated most notably by John Plamenatz in "Two Types of Nationalism," in Eugene Kamenka, ed. , Nationalism: The Na- ture and Evolution of an Idea (New York, 1976). The distinction has recently been challenged, notably by Anne-Marie Thiesse.
Geoff Eley, "State Formation, Nationalism, and Political Culture: Some Thoughts on the Unification of Germany," in From Unification to Nazism: Re- interpreting the German Past (London, 1986), 66. See also Celia Applegate, A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat (Berkeley, 1990), and Thiesse, passim.
In making an argument about how new ways of looking at the world become "thinkable," I am drawing on numerous works in cultural theory, political theory, and cultural anthropology. Among the most important are Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," History and Theory VIII/1 (1969), 3-53; J. G. A. Pocock, "Political Languages and Their Implications," in Pocock, Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History (New York, 1971), 3-41; Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York, 1973), 193-233; Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan (New York, 1973). I am also indebted to the example of Keith Mi- chael Baker in Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Cul- ture in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, 1990).
The argument that for centuries "nation" meant primarily communities of foreign university students, developed particularly by Guido Zernatto in "Na-
14.
Notes to Pages 3-5
15.
16.
17.
18.
tion: The History of a Word," Review of Politics, 6 (1944), 351-66, has been too easily accepted by many scholars. See the persuasive evidence presented by Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood, 14-17 (although the author proceeds to draw unwarranted conclusions about the antiquity of national- ism itself); Jean-Yves Guiomar, La nation entre l'histoire et la raison (Paris, 1990), 13; and Claude-Gilbert Dubois, ed. , L'imaginaire de la nation 1792- 1992 (Bordeaux, 1992), 20.
19. Cited in Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood, 17; Dictionnaire de l'Acade? mie Franc? oise (Paris, 1694), s. v. "nation. "
20. For Richelieu's project, which never came to fruition, see Nicolas Legras, Acade? mie royale de Richelieu (n. p. , 1642). For Mazarin's, which quickly lost its "integrative" purpose and became simply a prestigious Parisian colle`ge, see Alfred Franklin, Recherches historiques sur le colle`ge des quatre nations (Paris, 1862).
21. I here take issue with recent attempts to push the origins of nationalism fur- ther back in time, such as Anthony D. Smith's National Identity and The Eth- nic Origins of Nations (Oxford, 1986), and Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, Mass. , 1992). A compelling recent synthesis making the same case, and arguing for the centrality of the early modern Netherlands and England, is Philip S. Gorski, "The Mosaic Moment: An Early Modernist Critique of Modernist Theories of Nationalism," American Jour- nal of Sociology, CV/5 (2000), 1428-68. Even Gorski, however, still tends to conflate nationalism and national identity (e. g. p. 1430, where he takes the antiquity of the word "nation" as evidence for "nationalism qua ideology"
antedating the modern era).
Notes to Pages 6-8
22. On the origins of the word, see Beatrice Hyslop, French Nationalism in 1789 According to the General Cahiers (New York, 1934), 22; Jacques Godechot, "Nation, patrie, nationalisme et patriotisme en France au XVIIIe sie`cle," in Annales de l'histoire de la Re? volution franc? aise, 206 (1971), 481-501.
23. This formulation is based on a reading of Anderson, Imagined Communities, esp. 17-23.
24.
The limits of Louis XIV's ambitions comes through quite clearly in the recent revisionist work of scholars such as William Beik, Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc (Cambridge, 1985), and Roger Mettam, Power and Faction in Louis XIV's France (Oxford, 1988). The perils of reading modern "language poli- tics" back into the early modern period have been amply demonstrated by Henri Peyre, La royaute? et les langues provinciales (Paris, 1933), 58-91; Danielle Trudeau, "L'ordonnance de Villers-Cottere^ts et la langue franc? aise: Histoire ou interpre? tation," Bibliothe`que d'humanisme et Renaissance, XLV (1983), 461-472; and Paul Cohen, "Courtly French, Learned Latin, and Peas-
Notes to Pages 6-8 221
? 222
Notes to Pages 8-9
? 25.
ant Patois: The Making of a National Language in Early Modern France," 2 vols. , Ph. D. diss. , Princeton University, 2000.
A good starting point in the immense literature on this subject is still John Bossy, "The Counter-Reformation and the People of Catholic Europe," Past and Present, 47 (1970), 51-70. More recently, see Louis Chatellier, The Europe of the Devout: The Catholic Reformation and the Formation of a New Society, trans. Jean Birrell (Cambridge, 1989), and R. Po-Chia Hsia, The World of Catholic Renewal, 1540-1770 (Cambridge, 1998). On the case of Brittany, see the superb study by Alain Croix, La Bretagne aux 16e et 17e sie`cles: La vie, la mort, la foi, 2 vols. (Paris, 1981). On the Catholic clergy see also Timothy Tackett, Priest and Parish in Eighteenth-Century France: A Social and Political Study of the Cure? s in the Diocese of Dauphine? , 1750-1791 (Princeton, 1977), and Philip T. Hoffman, Church and Community in the Diocese of Lyon, 1500- 1789 (New Haven, 1984). Keith P. Luria provides an interesting revisionist view on the Catholic Reformation in Territories of Grace: Cultural Change in the Seventeenth-Century Diocese of Grenoble (Berkeley, 1991).
On Britain, see Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (New Ha- ven, 1992). For the "peripheral" states, see especially Franco Venturi, Sette- cento Riformatore, III and IV (Turin, 1979 and 1984). Colley (p. 86) has re- cently noted that "it remains unclear why this resurgence of interest in matters patriotic occurred in so many different countries at the same time. " See, for instance, the copious publications of Robert Lafont on "Occitania. " Maryon McDonald, "We Are Not French! ": Language, Culture and Identity in Brittany (London, 1989), offers a valuable corrective to this point of view. On the supposed crisis of French identity, see David A. Bell, "Paris Blues," The New Republic, Sept. 1, 1997, and the Conclusion, below.
26.
27.
Notes to Pages 8-9
28. Colley, Britons; Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France (Stanford, 1976), are the most prominent general works on their subjects. On Britain, see also Gerald Newman, The Rise of English National- ism: A Cultural History (London, 1987); Steven Pincus, Protestantism and Patriotism: Ideologies and the Making of English Foreign Policy, 1650-1688 (Cambridge, 1996); Richard Helgerson, Forms of Nationhood: The Elizabethan Writing of England (Chicago, 1992); Brendan Bradshaw and Peter Roberts, eds. , British Consciousness and British Identity: The Making of Britain, 1533- 1707 (Cambridge, 1998); Colin Kidd, British Identities before Nationalism: Ethnicity and Nationhood in the Atlantic World, 1600-1800 (Cambridge, 1999). On nineteenth-century France, see also Caroline Ford, Creating the Nation in Provincial France: Religion and Political Identity in Brittany (Prince- ton, 1993), and James Lehning, Peasant and French: Cultural Contact in Ru- ral France during the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 1995). Nearly all the general works on nationalism listed in the bibliography (available at www. davidbell. net) accord considerable attention to French history.
Notes to Pages 9-10 223
? 29. See particularly Gellner, Nations and Nationalism; Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism; Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen.
30. Cited in Ferdinand Brunot et al. , Histoire de la langue franc? aise, des origines a` 1900, 13 vols. (Paris, 1905-53), IX, pt. I, 4.
31. See notably Anderson, Imagined Communities; Greenfeld, Nationalism; Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations and National Identity; Josep R. Llobera, The God of Modernity: The Development of Nationalism in Western Europe (Oxford, 1994); John Armstrong, Nations before Nationalism (Chapel Hill, 1982); Carla Hesse and Thomas Laqueur, "Introduction: National Cultures before Nationalism," Representations 47 (1994), 1-12; Hagen Schulze, Staat und Nation in der europai? schen Geschichte (Munich, 1994).
32. The fundamental introductory works on the political culture of the old re- gime are: Baker, Inventing the French Revolution; Roger Chartier, The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Durham, 1991); Keith Michael Baker, ed. , The Political Culture of the Old Regime (Oxford, 1987). See also Jeffrey Merrick, The Desacralization of the French Monarchy in the Eighteenth Century (Baton Rouge, 1990) and Dale Van Kley, The Damiens Affair and the Unraveling of the Old Regime, 1750-1770 (Princeton, 1984). Notes to Pages 9-10
33. See especially Pierre Nora, ed. , Les lieux de me? moire, 7 vols. (Paris, 1984-93); Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley, 1989); Sahlins, "Fictions of a Catholic France: The Natural- ization of Foreigners, 1685-1787," Representations, 47 (1994), 85-110; Sahlins, with Jean-Franc? ois Dubost, Et si on faisait payer les e? trangers? Louis XIV, les immigre? s et quelques autres (Paris, 1999). Also important are two stimulating, if more narrowly focused new works on patriotism: Edmond Dziembowski, Un nouveau patriotisme franc? ais, 1750-1770: La France face a` la puissance anglaise a` l'e? poque de la guerre de Sept Ans (Ox- ford, 1998), and He? le`ne Dupuy, "Gene`se de la Patrie Moderne: La naissance de l'ide? e moderne de patrie en France avant et pendant la Re? volution," Ph. D. diss. , Universite? de Paris-I (1995). Other recent works on early mod- ern French national sentiment include Greenfeld, 89-188; Sophie Wahnich, L'impossible citoyen: L'e? tranger dans le discours de la Re? volution franc? aise (Paris, 1997); and the books discussed in David A. Bell, "French Na- tional Identity in the Early Modern Period," Journal of Modern History, LXVIII/1 (1996), 84-113. Steven Englund is currently writing an ambi- tious history of modern French nationalism. Michael Rapport's Nation- ality and Citizenship in Revolutionary France: The Treatment of For- eigners, 1789-99 (Oxford, 2000) appeared too late to be consulted for this book.
34. See on this point especially Yardeni, La conscience nationale, and Alphonse Dupront, "Du sentiment national," in M. Franc? ois, ed. , La France et les franc? ais (Paris, 1972), 1423-74.
224
Notes to Pages 10-11
? 35.
36. 37. 38.
For a sharp criticism of Pierre Nora, Colette Beaune, and Miriam Yardeni on this point, see Steven Englund, "The Ghost of Nation Past," Journal of Modern History, LXIV (1992), 299-320.
Jean Soanen, "Sur l'amour de la patrie" (1683), in J. P. Migne, ed. , Les orateurs sacre? s, 99 vols. (Paris, 1844-66), XL, 1280-95.
[Franc? ois-Ignace d'Espiard de la Borde], Essais sur le ge? nie et le caracte`re des nations, divise? en six livres, 3 vols. (Brussels, 1743).
It sold well enough to have three subsequent editions and an English transla- tion: [Franc? ois-Ignace d'Espiard de la Borde], L'Esprit des nations, 2 vols. (The Hague, 1752 and 1753; Geneva, 1753); d'Espiard, The Spirit of the Na- tions (London, 1753). D'Espiard's continuing obscurity was such that in 1769 Jean-Louis Castilhon plagiarized large portions of the book for his own Con- side? rations sur les causes physiques et morales de la diversite? du ge? nie des moeurs, et du gouvernement des nations, 2 vols. (Bouillon, 1769). In addition, Oliver Goldsmith plagiarized several long sections of the English translation in writing his "The Effects Which Climates Have upon Men, and Other Ani- mals. " See Michael Griffin, "Oliver Goldsmith and Franc? ois-Ignace Espiard de la Borde: An Instance of Plagiarism," Review of English Studies, L (1999), 59-64.
As Robert Shackleton noted in Montesquieu: A Critical Biography (Oxford, 1961), 308-9, Montesquieu almost certainly derived part of his theory of cli- mate from d'Espiard. If anything, Shackleton probably underestimates the importance of d'Espiard's work for Montesquieu.
D'Espiard, Essais, II, bk. IV, 41.
Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, and Harold Samuel Stone, trans. and ed. (Cambridge, 1989), e. g. 310 (section entitled "How careful one must be not to change the general spirit of a na- tion"); Voltaire, Essai sur l'histoire ge? ne? rale et sur les moeurs et l'esprit des na- tions (Paris, 1756).
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Conside? rations sur le gouvernement de Pologne et sur sa re? formation projete? e (1772), in Oeuvres comple`tes, 4 vols. (Paris, 1964), III, 960-1.
See Martin Papenheim, Erinnerung und Unsterblichkeit: Semantische Studien zum Todenkult in Frankreich (1715-1794) (Stuttgart, 1992), 156-200; Jean- Claude Bonnet, Naissance du Panthe? on: Essai sur le culte des grands hommes (Paris, 1998).
Voltaire to Charles Bordes, March 23, 1765, in Les oeuvres comple`tes de Vol- taire, Theodore Besterman, ed. , 134 vols. (Oxford, 1970-76), CXII, 477. On the plays, see most recently Anne Boe? s, La lanterne magique de l'histoire: Essai sur le the? a^tre historique en France de 1750 a` 1789 (Oxford, 1982). It is also worth noting that the Academy of Inscriptions and Belles-Lettres, following
Notes to Pages 10-11
39.
40. 41.
42.
43.
44.
its reorganization in 1701, concerned itself almost entirely with French his- tory and literature, and helped lead a rebirth of scholarly interest in these subjects.
45. See Roger Bickart, Les parlements et la notion de souverainete? nationale au XVIIIe sie`cle (Paris, 1932), and Chapter 2, below.
46. Rene? Louis de Voyer de Paulmy d'Argenson, Journal et me? moires, Rathe? ry, ed. , 8 vols. (Paris, 1859), VIII, 315 (June 26, 1754); history work cited in Elisabeth Fehrenbach, "Nation," in Rolf Reichardt and Eberhard Schmitt, eds. , Hand- buch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich, 1680-1820, vol. VII (Mu- nich, 1986), 75-107, at 98.
47. Jacques Godard to Cortot, Nov. 7, 1788, in Archives De? partementales de la Co^te d'Or, E 642.
48. See Jean Locquin, La peinture d'histoire en France de 1747 a` 1785 (Paris, 1912); Jacques Silvestre de Sacy, Le comte d'Angiviller, dernier directeur ge? ne? ral des batiments du roi (Paris, 1953); Francis H. Dowley, "D'Angiviller's Grands Hommes and the Significant Moment," The Art Bulletin, XXXIX (1957), 259- 77; Andrew McClellan, "D'Angiviller's 'Great Men' of France and the Politics of the Parlements. " Art History, 13/2 (1990), 177-92; and Chapter 4, below. Sergent's engraving was almost certainly inspired by West's famous rendi- tion of the death of Montcalm's opponent, General Wolfe, in the same 1759
battle. Notes to Pages 11-12
49. See Dziembowski, Un nouveau patriotisme, and Chapter 3, below.
50. [Manson], Examen impartial du Sie? ge de Calais (Calais, 1765), pp. 8-9.
51. Bedos, Le ne? gotiant patriote (Amsterdam and Paris, 1784); Maupin, Projet
patriotique sur la vigne, les vins rouges, les vins blancs et les cidres (Paris, 1787); Philippe-Nicolas Pia, Avis patriotique concernant les personnes suffoque? es par la vapeur de charbon qui paroissent mortes et qui ne l'e? tant pas peuvent recevoir des secours pour e^tre rappelle? es a` la vie (Paris, 1776).
52. De Forges, Des ve? ritables inte? re^ts de la patrie (Rotterdam, 1764), 20.
53. French National Library Catalogue, available at catalogue. bnf. fr. The follow- ing list, drawn from the ARTFL database (humanities. uchicago. edu/ARTFL),
gives the frequency, per 100,000 words:
Date
1690-1709 1710-1729 1730-1749 1750-1769 1770-1789
Nation Patrie
4.
Just as France retains only tiny remnants of its once vast peasantry, so it has only kept shreds of its once vast empire: Guadeloupe, Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, Martinique, New Caledonia and so forth--a small, thin, and widely scattered archipelago where one can still use French currency, speak the French language, and walk into post offices identical to the ones on Pa- risian street corners. The rest disappeared in the great wave of decoloniza- tion in the 1950s and 1960s. Beyond this tiny formal empire, there is also a much larger informal one, for France still maintains legions of civil ser- vants, businessmen, and aid workers in its former African colonies, not to mention soldiers. But if French influence remains strong in these na- tions, its civilizing mission has almost entirely vanished. Far from granting French citizenship to "meritorious" Africans, the French state devotes con- siderable efforts to keeping them out of France, lest they swell an already large immigrant population.
The issue of immigration itself is, as it has always been, fraught and complex. Nearly every party to the ongoing debate in France over immi- grants has an interest in presenting the problems of the current wave of immigrants (especially the millions of Arabs and Berbers who have made Islam France's second largest religion, after Catholicism) as more serious than any similar problems in the past. The National Front and other
214 The Cult of the Nation in France
? rightists do so to garner support for an absolute halt to immigration and intensified efforts of repatriation. Opposing political forces do so in order to justify large-scale public efforts to relieve the misery in which many im- migrants live. Even though, in a recent poll, no less than 38 percent of the French population confessed to some racist feelings about immigrants, and even though the National Front routinely has won up to 15 percent of the vote, the prejudice and even violence dealt to previous waves of im- migrants ironically offer some hope that eventually the North Africans, too, may find themselves integrated more fully into French society and cul- ture. 42 Southeast Asians, and to a lesser extent black African immigrants, are becoming so already. On the other hand, at least two phenomena do suggest a need for caution. One is the growing popularity of anti-Western fundamentalism in some sectors of France's Muslim communities, leading to a radical rejection of assimilation. The other is the ghettoization of im- migrant communities, characterized by high levels of unemployment and crime, and physical isolation in the miserable suburban confines of vast, sterile housing projects.
Even if the North African Muslims do eventually follow the example of their Belgian, Italian, Polish, and Iberian predecessors, a different fact is now becoming clear: they will most likely have no successors. In the pres- ent French political climate, and thanks above all to the National Front, even the Socialist Party has strongly committed itself to ending immigra- tion, cracking down on clandestine immigration, and shipping illegal im- migrants back to their countries of origin. Meanwhile, the president of the Republic has openly remarked that he sympathizes with his compatriots who must put up with the "noise" and the "smells" generated by an "over- dose" of immigrants. 43 In the 1980s and 1990s the United States has again become the leading immigrant nation in the West, and is being trans- formed by immigration to an extent not seen for a century. By contrast, the French are making it clear that once they have digested the current immi- grant populations, they have no appetite for more. In this sense, the field of immigration, too, is closed to republican nationalism.
Supposing that France did still have peasants, an empire, and ongoing waves of immigration, would there still be a vigorous republican national impulse to instill republican values in these outsiders and to integrate them seamlessly into the national community? The answer is far from ob- vious. As Pierre Nora and others have noted, French republicanism in many ways reached its peak a century ago, thanks above all to its conflict
Conclusion 215
? with a frankly anti-republican Catholic right. This opponent remained a serious threat throughout the interwar years, and of course took power in 1940 thanks to the Nazi conquerors. But the experience of Vichy wholly discredited it, and it has never regained its electoral base. The National Front is itself a largely republican party; it flies the republican tricolor even as its supporters celebrate Joan of Arc. After the war, not only did French republicanism find itself without a powerful opponent to justify its contin- ued vigilance and activity; it was also sapped by the competing forces of Gaullism and Marxism. They have declined in their turn in the past twenty years, but it has not been to either the ideological or electoral advantage of Third Republic-style republicanism and the political parties that embod- ied it. 44 Whether or not the French Revolution is finally over, as Franc? ois Furet famously claimed, it has ceased to matter in mainstream French poli- tics, where middle-of-the-road parties with often identical policies com- pete to dominate a Republic of the Center largely similar to other Western European democracies. 45
Just as important, republicanism has in a sense lost its principal in- strument of spreading the creed, the public education system. Obviously, French public education itself is larger than ever (French civil servants once liked to boast that "l'e? ducation nationale" was the single largest orga- nization in Europe, after the Red Army--now, presumably, it is the larg- est). But since the war it has undergone some fundamental transforma- tions. First, its center of gravity has shifted upwards. Whereas once the lyce? es were elite institutions and the universities and grandes e? coles were re- served for a tiny minority, now virtually all French children receive second- ary education. Franc? ois Mitterrand set a goal of bringing 80 percent of the population at least through the baccalaureat, and the intolerable crowding in many universities testifies to the system's progress towards this goal. As the system increasingly came to center on adolescents rather than young children, it would inevitably have moved away from the sort of heavy- handed patriotic indoctrination characteristic of the Third Republic. But that indoctrination has in any case faded away for very different reasons, and instituteurs now rarely treat patriotic and moral education as more important tasks than the imparting of basic skills. 46
In this context, one cannot overestimate the importance of the events of May 1968. Whatever else this extraordinary episode accomplished, it came close to destroying the magisterial authority previously enjoyed by French educators, and their overweening confidence in their ability to shape their
216 The Cult of the Nation in France
? charges to fit a pattern of their own devising. While students had helped lead previous French rebellions, they had not done so directly against their own teachers and educational institutions. In the wake of 1968, teachers could no longer occupy the same moral position they had held before--es- pecially after the students of 1968 became teachers in their turn. 47
Beyond all these social, political, and cultural reasons why the republi- can vision of the nation has dissolved, leaving a perceived crisis in its wake, there is another, perhaps more fundamental reason. Nationalism, while de- veloping in large part against religion, also developed out of it, and did so at a time of general, profound religious faith. Above all, the order and har- mony that nationalists hoped to establish in this world, while seen as part of this world and not a reflection or extension of celestial order, was none- theless envisioned as a terrestrial counterpart to the order and harmony discerned by Christians in heaven. Hence it is doubtful that nationalism can remain the same in an era characterized not merely by the interioriza- tion of religion, but by the thorough evaporation of religious faith, to the extent that the original, religious conception of order and harmony no longer resonates in most people's minds with anything like the strength it did in the eighteenth century. What are the successors of Rabaut Saint- Etienne to do when they no longer need to fight against the priests--when, moreover, what the priests themselves were trying to accomplish no longer has any meaning to most of the population?
In our own profoundly disenchanted world, it is perhaps not surprising that in fact, most of the foundational concepts discussed in Chapter 1 are losing their centrality, in France and beyond. The word "civilization" is spoken with irony more often than not. The same is true for "patrie"--in- deed, this word seems to be fast disappearing from the French lexicon, to the extent that if the abbe? Coyer returned to France today, he would undoubtedly see the need to reprint his little dissertation lamenting the word's absence. "Society," as is often remarked, is steadily giving way to "culture" in everything from the most abstruse academic discourse to the most popular media. We may not be at the "end of history," but we do seem to be at the end of a period in which reshaping human society into some sort of ideally harmonious order was seen as the central task for hu- man beings to accomplish. Assuring a reasonable degree of comfort and security is now often seen as all that is possible. As in the decades around 1700, inhabitants of the West are again living in a time of "anti-enthusi- asm," though now they are reacting against ideological, as opposed to reli- gious enthusiasms.
Conclusion 217
? And what of the nation? In this not-so-brave new world, which admit- tedly extends over only the small portion of the globe that can take a rea- sonable degree of comfort and security for granted, will it simply become irrelevant? Will France steadily dissolve into Europe, cyberspace, and the global marketplace, whatever stubborn words the prime minister may summon against this fate? I do not think so. But if the nation does remain a central organizing principle of human life, it will do so in a very different manner from the past two centuries. It will do so not as a field of homoge- neity, but as a site of exchange, where different cultures meet and mix, in constant movement. National identity and national character will survive, but they will refer as much to the particular style of the meeting and mix- ing as to the things that are meeting and mixing.
Parts of France itself have already become this sort of kaleidoscope na- tion, as a stroll through central Paris, with its overwhelming selection of foods, music, and clothing from around the world, easily demonstrates. Many prominent French commentators and politicians, attached by a blend of conviction, nostalgia, and self-interest to the old national creed and the institutions that embodied it, may decry the change, but they have so far proved incapable of doing anything to reverse it (legislation on pro- tecting the French language, for instance, has been an often ludicrous fail- ure). They are unlikely to become more effective in the near future. Today, with France more prosperous, peaceful, and secure than at any time in its history, the nationalism that flourished between the late eighteenth cen- tury and the mid-twentieth is distant from the experiences and concerns of most of the French. This change may be partly regrettable, for French re- publican nationalism, if party to much that was terrible, particularly at its origins, had something noble and grand to it as well. Nonetheless, the French will be fortunate if they are able, in the years to come, to look back on their nationalist past with sympathy and admiration, but also with a degree of puzzled incomprehension.
? ? Notes
Introduction: Constructing the Nation
1. Maximilien Robespierre, Discours et rapports a` la Convention, ed. Marc Bouloiseau (Paris, 1965), 79.
2. On Rabaut, see Andre? Dupont, Rabaut Saint-Etienne, 1743-1793: Un prot- estant de? fenseur de la liberte? religieuse (Strasbourg, 1946, repr. Geneva, 1989).
3. Re? impression de l'ancien Moniteur, 32 vols. (Paris, 1840), Dec. 22, 1792, 803.
The speech was reprinted as Jean-Paul Rabaut, Projet d'e? ducation nationale
(Paris, 1792).
4. Cited in Mona Ozouf, "La Re? volution franc? aise et la formation de l'homme
nouveau," in L'homme re? ge? ne? re? : Essais sur la Re? volution franc? aise (Paris, 1989),
116-157, at 125.
5. Moniteur, 802-3.
6. Ibid. , 802-3.
7. Ibid. , 803.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid. , 804.
10. Rabaut de Saint-Etienne, Projet.
11. It has principally been noticed for its influence on the subsequent educa-
tional projects. See Jean-Louis Labarrie`re, "De la vertu du citoyen e? claire? ," in Josiane Boulad-Ayoub, ed. , Former un nouveau peuple? Pouvoir, e? ducation, re? volution (Quebec, 1996), 57-69, esp. 66-67; Robert J. Vignery, The French Revolution and the Schools: Educational Policies of the Mountain 1792-1794 (Madison, 1965), 45, 77; Dominque Julia, Les trois couleurs du tableau noir: La Re? volution (Paris, 1981), 46, 89-96; and Bronislaw Baczko, Une e? ducation pour la de? mocratie: Textes et projets de l'e? poque re? volutionnaire (Paris, 1982), which reproduces the later, printed version of the speech on 295-301.
12. On this subject, see notably Colette Beaune, Naissance de la nation France (Paris, 1985), and Myriam Yardeni, La conscience nationale en France pendant les guerres de religion (1559-1598) (Louvain, 1971).
219
220
Notes to Pages 3-5
? 13.
Here I am taking issue with influential scholars who see the rise of nations and the rise of nationalism as the same essential phenomenon. See for in- stance Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford, 1983); Benedict An- derson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Na- tionalism (London, 1983); John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (New York, 1982); Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Pro- gramme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge, 1989). These scholars all take a "modern- ist" approach, locating the origins of nations and nationalism alike around 1800, but the same conflation is also typical of scholars who project the phe- nomenon further back in time, for instance Adrian Hastings, The Construc- tion of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism (Cambridge, 1998), or Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (Reno, 1991).
For an excellent synthesis of this aspect of nationalism, see Anne-Marie Thiesse, La cre? ation des identite? s nationales: Europe XVIIIe-XXe sie`cle (Paris, 1999). For a discussion of the language of restoration and reconstruction, even in the most radical moments of the French Revolution, see Chapter 5 below.
This point is valid for the "civic" (as opposed to "ethnic") form of national- ism, to borrow the distinction formulated most notably by John Plamenatz in "Two Types of Nationalism," in Eugene Kamenka, ed. , Nationalism: The Na- ture and Evolution of an Idea (New York, 1976). The distinction has recently been challenged, notably by Anne-Marie Thiesse.
Geoff Eley, "State Formation, Nationalism, and Political Culture: Some Thoughts on the Unification of Germany," in From Unification to Nazism: Re- interpreting the German Past (London, 1986), 66. See also Celia Applegate, A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat (Berkeley, 1990), and Thiesse, passim.
In making an argument about how new ways of looking at the world become "thinkable," I am drawing on numerous works in cultural theory, political theory, and cultural anthropology. Among the most important are Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," History and Theory VIII/1 (1969), 3-53; J. G. A. Pocock, "Political Languages and Their Implications," in Pocock, Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History (New York, 1971), 3-41; Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York, 1973), 193-233; Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan (New York, 1973). I am also indebted to the example of Keith Mi- chael Baker in Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Cul- ture in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, 1990).
The argument that for centuries "nation" meant primarily communities of foreign university students, developed particularly by Guido Zernatto in "Na-
14.
Notes to Pages 3-5
15.
16.
17.
18.
tion: The History of a Word," Review of Politics, 6 (1944), 351-66, has been too easily accepted by many scholars. See the persuasive evidence presented by Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood, 14-17 (although the author proceeds to draw unwarranted conclusions about the antiquity of national- ism itself); Jean-Yves Guiomar, La nation entre l'histoire et la raison (Paris, 1990), 13; and Claude-Gilbert Dubois, ed. , L'imaginaire de la nation 1792- 1992 (Bordeaux, 1992), 20.
19. Cited in Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood, 17; Dictionnaire de l'Acade? mie Franc? oise (Paris, 1694), s. v. "nation. "
20. For Richelieu's project, which never came to fruition, see Nicolas Legras, Acade? mie royale de Richelieu (n. p. , 1642). For Mazarin's, which quickly lost its "integrative" purpose and became simply a prestigious Parisian colle`ge, see Alfred Franklin, Recherches historiques sur le colle`ge des quatre nations (Paris, 1862).
21. I here take issue with recent attempts to push the origins of nationalism fur- ther back in time, such as Anthony D. Smith's National Identity and The Eth- nic Origins of Nations (Oxford, 1986), and Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, Mass. , 1992). A compelling recent synthesis making the same case, and arguing for the centrality of the early modern Netherlands and England, is Philip S. Gorski, "The Mosaic Moment: An Early Modernist Critique of Modernist Theories of Nationalism," American Jour- nal of Sociology, CV/5 (2000), 1428-68. Even Gorski, however, still tends to conflate nationalism and national identity (e. g. p. 1430, where he takes the antiquity of the word "nation" as evidence for "nationalism qua ideology"
antedating the modern era).
Notes to Pages 6-8
22. On the origins of the word, see Beatrice Hyslop, French Nationalism in 1789 According to the General Cahiers (New York, 1934), 22; Jacques Godechot, "Nation, patrie, nationalisme et patriotisme en France au XVIIIe sie`cle," in Annales de l'histoire de la Re? volution franc? aise, 206 (1971), 481-501.
23. This formulation is based on a reading of Anderson, Imagined Communities, esp. 17-23.
24.
The limits of Louis XIV's ambitions comes through quite clearly in the recent revisionist work of scholars such as William Beik, Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc (Cambridge, 1985), and Roger Mettam, Power and Faction in Louis XIV's France (Oxford, 1988). The perils of reading modern "language poli- tics" back into the early modern period have been amply demonstrated by Henri Peyre, La royaute? et les langues provinciales (Paris, 1933), 58-91; Danielle Trudeau, "L'ordonnance de Villers-Cottere^ts et la langue franc? aise: Histoire ou interpre? tation," Bibliothe`que d'humanisme et Renaissance, XLV (1983), 461-472; and Paul Cohen, "Courtly French, Learned Latin, and Peas-
Notes to Pages 6-8 221
? 222
Notes to Pages 8-9
? 25.
ant Patois: The Making of a National Language in Early Modern France," 2 vols. , Ph. D. diss. , Princeton University, 2000.
A good starting point in the immense literature on this subject is still John Bossy, "The Counter-Reformation and the People of Catholic Europe," Past and Present, 47 (1970), 51-70. More recently, see Louis Chatellier, The Europe of the Devout: The Catholic Reformation and the Formation of a New Society, trans. Jean Birrell (Cambridge, 1989), and R. Po-Chia Hsia, The World of Catholic Renewal, 1540-1770 (Cambridge, 1998). On the case of Brittany, see the superb study by Alain Croix, La Bretagne aux 16e et 17e sie`cles: La vie, la mort, la foi, 2 vols. (Paris, 1981). On the Catholic clergy see also Timothy Tackett, Priest and Parish in Eighteenth-Century France: A Social and Political Study of the Cure? s in the Diocese of Dauphine? , 1750-1791 (Princeton, 1977), and Philip T. Hoffman, Church and Community in the Diocese of Lyon, 1500- 1789 (New Haven, 1984). Keith P. Luria provides an interesting revisionist view on the Catholic Reformation in Territories of Grace: Cultural Change in the Seventeenth-Century Diocese of Grenoble (Berkeley, 1991).
On Britain, see Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (New Ha- ven, 1992). For the "peripheral" states, see especially Franco Venturi, Sette- cento Riformatore, III and IV (Turin, 1979 and 1984). Colley (p. 86) has re- cently noted that "it remains unclear why this resurgence of interest in matters patriotic occurred in so many different countries at the same time. " See, for instance, the copious publications of Robert Lafont on "Occitania. " Maryon McDonald, "We Are Not French! ": Language, Culture and Identity in Brittany (London, 1989), offers a valuable corrective to this point of view. On the supposed crisis of French identity, see David A. Bell, "Paris Blues," The New Republic, Sept. 1, 1997, and the Conclusion, below.
26.
27.
Notes to Pages 8-9
28. Colley, Britons; Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France (Stanford, 1976), are the most prominent general works on their subjects. On Britain, see also Gerald Newman, The Rise of English National- ism: A Cultural History (London, 1987); Steven Pincus, Protestantism and Patriotism: Ideologies and the Making of English Foreign Policy, 1650-1688 (Cambridge, 1996); Richard Helgerson, Forms of Nationhood: The Elizabethan Writing of England (Chicago, 1992); Brendan Bradshaw and Peter Roberts, eds. , British Consciousness and British Identity: The Making of Britain, 1533- 1707 (Cambridge, 1998); Colin Kidd, British Identities before Nationalism: Ethnicity and Nationhood in the Atlantic World, 1600-1800 (Cambridge, 1999). On nineteenth-century France, see also Caroline Ford, Creating the Nation in Provincial France: Religion and Political Identity in Brittany (Prince- ton, 1993), and James Lehning, Peasant and French: Cultural Contact in Ru- ral France during the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 1995). Nearly all the general works on nationalism listed in the bibliography (available at www. davidbell. net) accord considerable attention to French history.
Notes to Pages 9-10 223
? 29. See particularly Gellner, Nations and Nationalism; Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism; Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen.
30. Cited in Ferdinand Brunot et al. , Histoire de la langue franc? aise, des origines a` 1900, 13 vols. (Paris, 1905-53), IX, pt. I, 4.
31. See notably Anderson, Imagined Communities; Greenfeld, Nationalism; Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations and National Identity; Josep R. Llobera, The God of Modernity: The Development of Nationalism in Western Europe (Oxford, 1994); John Armstrong, Nations before Nationalism (Chapel Hill, 1982); Carla Hesse and Thomas Laqueur, "Introduction: National Cultures before Nationalism," Representations 47 (1994), 1-12; Hagen Schulze, Staat und Nation in der europai? schen Geschichte (Munich, 1994).
32. The fundamental introductory works on the political culture of the old re- gime are: Baker, Inventing the French Revolution; Roger Chartier, The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Durham, 1991); Keith Michael Baker, ed. , The Political Culture of the Old Regime (Oxford, 1987). See also Jeffrey Merrick, The Desacralization of the French Monarchy in the Eighteenth Century (Baton Rouge, 1990) and Dale Van Kley, The Damiens Affair and the Unraveling of the Old Regime, 1750-1770 (Princeton, 1984). Notes to Pages 9-10
33. See especially Pierre Nora, ed. , Les lieux de me? moire, 7 vols. (Paris, 1984-93); Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley, 1989); Sahlins, "Fictions of a Catholic France: The Natural- ization of Foreigners, 1685-1787," Representations, 47 (1994), 85-110; Sahlins, with Jean-Franc? ois Dubost, Et si on faisait payer les e? trangers? Louis XIV, les immigre? s et quelques autres (Paris, 1999). Also important are two stimulating, if more narrowly focused new works on patriotism: Edmond Dziembowski, Un nouveau patriotisme franc? ais, 1750-1770: La France face a` la puissance anglaise a` l'e? poque de la guerre de Sept Ans (Ox- ford, 1998), and He? le`ne Dupuy, "Gene`se de la Patrie Moderne: La naissance de l'ide? e moderne de patrie en France avant et pendant la Re? volution," Ph. D. diss. , Universite? de Paris-I (1995). Other recent works on early mod- ern French national sentiment include Greenfeld, 89-188; Sophie Wahnich, L'impossible citoyen: L'e? tranger dans le discours de la Re? volution franc? aise (Paris, 1997); and the books discussed in David A. Bell, "French Na- tional Identity in the Early Modern Period," Journal of Modern History, LXVIII/1 (1996), 84-113. Steven Englund is currently writing an ambi- tious history of modern French nationalism. Michael Rapport's Nation- ality and Citizenship in Revolutionary France: The Treatment of For- eigners, 1789-99 (Oxford, 2000) appeared too late to be consulted for this book.
34. See on this point especially Yardeni, La conscience nationale, and Alphonse Dupront, "Du sentiment national," in M. Franc? ois, ed. , La France et les franc? ais (Paris, 1972), 1423-74.
224
Notes to Pages 10-11
? 35.
36. 37. 38.
For a sharp criticism of Pierre Nora, Colette Beaune, and Miriam Yardeni on this point, see Steven Englund, "The Ghost of Nation Past," Journal of Modern History, LXIV (1992), 299-320.
Jean Soanen, "Sur l'amour de la patrie" (1683), in J. P. Migne, ed. , Les orateurs sacre? s, 99 vols. (Paris, 1844-66), XL, 1280-95.
[Franc? ois-Ignace d'Espiard de la Borde], Essais sur le ge? nie et le caracte`re des nations, divise? en six livres, 3 vols. (Brussels, 1743).
It sold well enough to have three subsequent editions and an English transla- tion: [Franc? ois-Ignace d'Espiard de la Borde], L'Esprit des nations, 2 vols. (The Hague, 1752 and 1753; Geneva, 1753); d'Espiard, The Spirit of the Na- tions (London, 1753). D'Espiard's continuing obscurity was such that in 1769 Jean-Louis Castilhon plagiarized large portions of the book for his own Con- side? rations sur les causes physiques et morales de la diversite? du ge? nie des moeurs, et du gouvernement des nations, 2 vols. (Bouillon, 1769). In addition, Oliver Goldsmith plagiarized several long sections of the English translation in writing his "The Effects Which Climates Have upon Men, and Other Ani- mals. " See Michael Griffin, "Oliver Goldsmith and Franc? ois-Ignace Espiard de la Borde: An Instance of Plagiarism," Review of English Studies, L (1999), 59-64.
As Robert Shackleton noted in Montesquieu: A Critical Biography (Oxford, 1961), 308-9, Montesquieu almost certainly derived part of his theory of cli- mate from d'Espiard. If anything, Shackleton probably underestimates the importance of d'Espiard's work for Montesquieu.
D'Espiard, Essais, II, bk. IV, 41.
Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, and Harold Samuel Stone, trans. and ed. (Cambridge, 1989), e. g. 310 (section entitled "How careful one must be not to change the general spirit of a na- tion"); Voltaire, Essai sur l'histoire ge? ne? rale et sur les moeurs et l'esprit des na- tions (Paris, 1756).
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Conside? rations sur le gouvernement de Pologne et sur sa re? formation projete? e (1772), in Oeuvres comple`tes, 4 vols. (Paris, 1964), III, 960-1.
See Martin Papenheim, Erinnerung und Unsterblichkeit: Semantische Studien zum Todenkult in Frankreich (1715-1794) (Stuttgart, 1992), 156-200; Jean- Claude Bonnet, Naissance du Panthe? on: Essai sur le culte des grands hommes (Paris, 1998).
Voltaire to Charles Bordes, March 23, 1765, in Les oeuvres comple`tes de Vol- taire, Theodore Besterman, ed. , 134 vols. (Oxford, 1970-76), CXII, 477. On the plays, see most recently Anne Boe? s, La lanterne magique de l'histoire: Essai sur le the? a^tre historique en France de 1750 a` 1789 (Oxford, 1982). It is also worth noting that the Academy of Inscriptions and Belles-Lettres, following
Notes to Pages 10-11
39.
40. 41.
42.
43.
44.
its reorganization in 1701, concerned itself almost entirely with French his- tory and literature, and helped lead a rebirth of scholarly interest in these subjects.
45. See Roger Bickart, Les parlements et la notion de souverainete? nationale au XVIIIe sie`cle (Paris, 1932), and Chapter 2, below.
46. Rene? Louis de Voyer de Paulmy d'Argenson, Journal et me? moires, Rathe? ry, ed. , 8 vols. (Paris, 1859), VIII, 315 (June 26, 1754); history work cited in Elisabeth Fehrenbach, "Nation," in Rolf Reichardt and Eberhard Schmitt, eds. , Hand- buch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich, 1680-1820, vol. VII (Mu- nich, 1986), 75-107, at 98.
47. Jacques Godard to Cortot, Nov. 7, 1788, in Archives De? partementales de la Co^te d'Or, E 642.
48. See Jean Locquin, La peinture d'histoire en France de 1747 a` 1785 (Paris, 1912); Jacques Silvestre de Sacy, Le comte d'Angiviller, dernier directeur ge? ne? ral des batiments du roi (Paris, 1953); Francis H. Dowley, "D'Angiviller's Grands Hommes and the Significant Moment," The Art Bulletin, XXXIX (1957), 259- 77; Andrew McClellan, "D'Angiviller's 'Great Men' of France and the Politics of the Parlements. " Art History, 13/2 (1990), 177-92; and Chapter 4, below. Sergent's engraving was almost certainly inspired by West's famous rendi- tion of the death of Montcalm's opponent, General Wolfe, in the same 1759
battle. Notes to Pages 11-12
49. See Dziembowski, Un nouveau patriotisme, and Chapter 3, below.
50. [Manson], Examen impartial du Sie? ge de Calais (Calais, 1765), pp. 8-9.
51. Bedos, Le ne? gotiant patriote (Amsterdam and Paris, 1784); Maupin, Projet
patriotique sur la vigne, les vins rouges, les vins blancs et les cidres (Paris, 1787); Philippe-Nicolas Pia, Avis patriotique concernant les personnes suffoque? es par la vapeur de charbon qui paroissent mortes et qui ne l'e? tant pas peuvent recevoir des secours pour e^tre rappelle? es a` la vie (Paris, 1776).
52. De Forges, Des ve? ritables inte? re^ts de la patrie (Rotterdam, 1764), 20.
53. French National Library Catalogue, available at catalogue. bnf. fr. The follow- ing list, drawn from the ARTFL database (humanities. uchicago. edu/ARTFL),
gives the frequency, per 100,000 words:
Date
1690-1709 1710-1729 1730-1749 1750-1769 1770-1789
Nation Patrie
4.
