No More Learning

As every one knows, race suicide is proceeding more rapidly among the
native whites than among any other large section of the population; and
it is exactly this part of the population which has in the past
furnished most of the eminent men of the country.

It has been shown in previous chapters that eminent men do not appear
wholly by chance in the population. The production of eminence is
largely a family affair; and in America, "the land of opportunity" as
well as in older countries, people of eminence are much more
interrelated than chance would allow. It has been shown, indeed, that in
America it is at least a 500 to 1 bet that an eminent person will be
rather closely related to some other eminent person, and will not be a
sporadic appearance in the population. [118]

Taken with other considerations advanced in earlier chapters, this means
that a falling off in the reproduction of the old American best strains
means a falling off in the number of eminent men which the United States
will produce. No improvement in education can prevent a serious loss,
for the strong minds get more from education.

The old American stock has produced a vastly greater proportion of
eminence, has accomplished a great deal more proportionately, in modern
times, than has other any stock whose representatives have been coming
in large numbers as immigrants to these shores during the last
generation. It is, therefore, likely to continue to surpass them, unless
it declines too greatly in numbers. For this reason, we feel justified
in concluding that the decline of the birth-rate in the old American
stock represents a decline in the birth-rate of a superior element.

There is another way of looking at this point. The stock under
discussion has been, on the whole, economically ahead of such stocks as
are now immigrating. In competition with them under equal conditions, it
appears to remain pretty consistently ahead, economically. Now,
although we would not insist on this point too strongly, it can hardly
be questioned that eugenic value is to some extent correlated with
economic success in life, as all desirable qualities tend to be
correlated together. Within reasonable limits, it is justifiable to
treat the economically superior sections of the nation as the
eugenically superior. And it is among these economically superior
sections of the nation that the birth-rate has most rapidly and
dangerously fallen.

The constant influx of highly fecund immigrant women tends to obscure
the fact that the birth-rate of the older residents is falling below
par, and analysis of the birth-rate in various sections of the community
is necessary to give an understanding of what is actually taking place.

In Rhode Island, F. L. Hoffmann found the average number of children for
each foreign-born woman to be 3. 35, and for each native-born woman to be
2. 06. There were wide racial differences among the foreign born; the
various elements were represented by the following average number of
children per wife:

French-Canadians 4. 42
Russians 3. 51
Italians 3. 49
Irish 3. 45
Scotch and Welsh 3. 09
English 2. 89
Germans 2. 84
Swedes 2. 58
English-Canadians 2. 56
Poles 2. 31

In short, the native-born whites in this investigation fell below every
one of the foreign nationalities.

The Massachusetts censuses for 1875 and 1884 showed similar results: the
foreign-born women had 4. 5 children each, and the native-born women 2. 7
each.

Frederick S. Crum's careful investigation[119] of New England
genealogies, including 12,722 wives, has thrown a great deal of light
on the steady decline in their birth-rate. He found the average number
of children to be:

1750-1799 6. 43
1800-1849 4. 94
1850-1869 3. 47
1870-1879 2. 77

There, in four lines, is the story of the decline of the old American
stock. At present, it is barely reproducing itself, probably not even
that, for there is reason to believe that 1879 does not mark the lowest
point reached. Before 1700, less than 2% of the wives in this
investigation had only one child, now 20% of them have only one. With
the emigration of old New England families to the west, and the constant
immigration of foreign-born people to take their places, it is no cause
for surprise that New England no longer exercises the intellectual
leadership that she once held.

For Massachusetts as a whole, the birth-rate among the native-born
population was 12. 7 per 1,000 in 1890, 14. 9 in 1910, while in the
foreign-born population it was 38. 6 in 1890 and 49. 1 in 1910. After
excluding all old women and young women, the birth-rate of the
foreign-born women in Massachusetts is still found to be 3/4 greater
than that of the native-born. [120]

In short, the birth-rate of the old American stock is now so low that
that stock is dying out and being supplanted by immigrants. In order
that the stock might even hold its own, we have shown that each married
woman should bear three to four children. At present the married women
of the old white American race in New England appear to be bringing two
or less to maturity.

It will be profitable to digress for a moment to consider farther what
this disappearance of the ancient population of Massachusetts means to
the country. When all the distinguished men of the United States are
graded, in accordance with their distinction, it is regularly found, as
Frederick Adams Woods says, that "Some states in the union, some
sections of the country, have produced more eminence than others, far
beyond the expectation from their respective white populations. In this
regard Massachusetts always leads, and Connecticut is always second, and
certain southern states are always behind and fail to render their
expected quota. " The accurate methods used by Dr. Woods in this
investigation leave no room for doubt that in almost every way
Massachusetts has regularly produced twice as many eminent men as its
population would lead one to expect, and has for some ranks and types of
achievement produced about four times the expectation.

Scott Nearing's studies[121] confirm those of Dr. Woods. Taking the most
distinguished men and women America has produced, he found that the
number produced in New England, per 100,000 population, was much larger
than that produced by any other part of the country. Rhode Island, the
poorest New England state in this respect, was yet 30% above New York,
the best state outside New England.

The advantage of New England, however, he found to be rapidly
decreasing. Of the eminent persons born before 1850, 30% were New
Englanders although the population of New England in 1850 was only 11. 8%
of that of the whole country. But of the eminent younger men,--those
born between 1880 and 1889, New England, with 7. 5% of the country's
population, could claim only 12% of the genius. Cambridge, Mass. , has
produced more eminent younger men of the present time than any other
city, he discovered, but the cities which come next in order are
Nashville, Tenn. , Columbus, Ohio, Lynn, Mass. , Washington, D. C. ,
Portland, Ore. , Hartford, Conn. , Boston, Mass. , New Haven, Conn. , Kansas
City, Mo. , and Chicago, Ill.

There is reason to believe that some of the old New England stock, which
emigrated to the West, retains a higher fecundity than does that part of
the stock which remains on the Atlantic seaboard. This fact, while a
gratifying one, of course does not compensate for the low fertility of
the families which still live in New England.

Within this section of the population, the decline is undoubtedly taking
place faster in some parts than in others. Statistical evidence is not
available, to tell a great deal about this, but the birth-rate for the
graduates of some of the leading women's colleges is known, and their
student bodies are made up largely of girls of superior stork. At
Wellesley, the graph in Fig. 36 shows at a glance just what is
happening. Briefly, the graduates of that college contribute less than
one child apiece to the race. The classes do not even reproduce their
own numbers. Instead of the 3. 7 children which, according to Sprague's
calculation, they ought to bear, they are bearing . 86 of a child.

The foregoing study is one of the few to carefully distinguish between
families which were complete at the time of study and those families
where additional children may yet be born. In the studies to follow this
distinction may in some cases be made by the reader in interpreting the
data while in other cases families having some years of possible
productiveness ahead are included with others and the relative
proportion of the types is not indicated. The error in these cases is
therefore important and the reader is warned to accept them only with a
mental allowance for this factor.

The best students make an even worse showing in this respect. The
Wellesley alumnae who are members of Phi Beta Kappa,--that is, the
superior scholars--have not . 86 of a child each, but only . 65 of a
child; while the holders of the Durant and Wellesley scholarships,
awarded for intellectual superiority,[122] make the following pathetic
showing in comparison with the whole class.

WELLESLEY COLLEGE

Graduates of '01, '02, '03, '04, Status of Fall of 1912

_All_ _Durant or Wellesley_
_scholars_
Per cent married 44 35

Number of children:
Per graduate . 37 . 20
Per wife . 87 . 57

It must not be thought that Wellesley's record is an exception, for most
of the large women's colleges furnish deplorable figures. Mount
Holyoke's record is:

_Children per_ _Children per_
_Decade of graduation_ _married_ _graduate_
_graduate_

1842-1849 2. 77 2. 37
1850-1859 3. 38 2. 55
1860-1869 2. 64 1. 60
1870-1879 2. 75 1. 63
1880-1889 2. 54 1. 46
1890-1892 1. 91 0. 95

Nor can graduation from Bryn Mawr College be said to favor motherhood.
By the 376 alumnae graduated there between 1888 and 1900, only 138
children had been produced up to Jan. 1, 1913. This makes . 84 of a child
per married alumna, or . 37 of a child per graduate, since less than half
of the graduates marry. These are the figures published by the college
administration.

Professor Sprague's tabulation of the careers of Vassar college
graduates, made from official records of the college, is worth quoting
in full, for the light it throws on the histories of college girls,
after they leave college:


CLASSES FROM 1867 TO 1892

Number of graduates 959
Number that taught 431 (45%)
Number that married 509 (53%)
Number that did not marry 450 (47%)
Number that taught and afterward
married 166 (39% of all who taught)
Number that taught, married and had
children 112 (67% of all who taught
and married)
Number that taught, married and
were childless 54 (33%)
Number of children of those who
taught and had children 287 (1. 73 children per family)
Number of children of those who
married but did not teach 686 (2 per married graduate
that did not teach)
Total number of children of all
graduates 973 (1 child per graduate)
Average number of children per
married graduate 1. 91
Average number of children per
graduate 1. 00


CLASSES FROM 1867 TO 1900

Number of graduates 1739
Number that taught 800 (46%)
Number that married 854 (49%)
Number that did not marry 885 (51%)
Number that taught and afterward
married 294 (31%)
Number that taught, married and had
children 203 (69% of all who taught and married)
Number that taught, married and were
childless 91 (31%)
Number of children of those who
taught and had children 463 (1. 57 children per family)
Number of children of those who
married but did not teach 1025 (2 each)
Total number of children of all
graduates 1488 (. 8 child per graduate)
Average number of children per
married graduate 1. 74 (per married graduate)
Average number of children per graduate 0. 8

If the women's colleges were fulfilling what the writers consider to be
their duty toward their students, their graduates would have a higher
marriage and birth-rate than that of their sisters, cousins and friends
who do not go to college. But the reverse is the case. M. R. Smith's
investigation showed the comparison between college girls and girls of
equivalent social position and of the same or similar families, as
follows:

_Number of_ _Per cent childless_
_children_ _at time_

College 1. 65 25. 36
Equivalent Non-College 1. 874 17. 89

Now if education is tending toward race suicide, then the writers
believe there is something wrong with modern educational methods. And
certainly all statistics available point to the fact that girls who have
been in such an atmosphere as that of some colleges for four years, are,
from a eugenic point of view, of diminished value to the race. This is
not an argument against higher education for women, but it is a potent
argument for a different kind of higher education than many of the
colleges of America are now giving them.

This is one of the causes for the decline of the birth-rate in the old
American stock. But of course it is only one. A very large number of
causes are unquestionably at work to the same end, and the result can be
adequately changed only if it is analyzed into as many of its component
parts as possible, and each one of these dealt with separately. The
writers have emphasized the shortcoming of women's colleges, because it
is easily demonstrated and, they believe, relatively easily mitigated.
But the record of men's colleges is not beyond criticism.

Miss Smith found that among the college graduates of the 18th century in
New England, only 2% remained unmarried, while in the Yale classes of
1861-1879, 21% never married, and of the Harvard graduates from
1870-1879 26% remained single. The average number of children per
Harvard graduate of the earlier period was found to be 3. 44, for the
latest period studied 1. 92. Among the Yale graduates it was found that
the number of children per father had declined from 5. 16 to 2. 55.

[Illustration: BIRTH RATE OF HARVARD AND YALE GRADUATES

FIG. 37. --During the period under consideration it declined
steadily, although marriage was about as frequent and as early at the
end as at the beginning of the period. It is necessary to suppose that
the decline in the birth rate is due principally to voluntary limitation
of families. J. C. Phillips, who made the above graph, thinks that since
1890 the birth rate among these college graduates may be tending
slightly to rise again. ]

Figures were obtained from some other colleges, which are incomplete and
should be taken with reservation. Their incompleteness probably led the
number of children to be considerably underestimated. At Amherst,
1872-1879, it was found that 44 of the 440 graduates of the period
remained unmarried. The average number of children per married man was
1. 72. At Wesleyan it was found that 20 of the 208 graduates, from 1863
to 1870, remained single; the average number of children per married man
was 2. 31.

The only satisfactory study of the birth-rate of graduates of men's
colleges is that recently made by John C. Phillips from the class lists
of Harvard and Yale, 1850-1890, summarized in the accompanying graph
(Fig. 37). In discussing his findings, Dr. Phillips writes:

"Roughly, the number of children born per capita per married graduate
has fallen from about 3. 25 in the first decade to 2. 50 in the last
decade. The per cent of graduates marrying has remained about the same
for forty years, and is a trifle higher for Yale; but the low figure,
68% for the first decade of Harvard, is probably due to faulty records,
and must not be taken as significant.

"The next most interesting figure is the 'Children Surviving per Capita
per Graduate. ' This has fallen from over 2. 50 to about 1. 9. The per cent
of childless marriages increased very markedly during the first two
decades and held nearly level for the last two decades. For the last
decade at Yale it has even dropped slightly, an encouraging sign. It is
worthy of note that the number of children born to Yale graduates is
almost constantly a trifle higher than that for Harvard, while the
number of childless marriages is slightly less. " This is probably owing
to the larger proportion of Harvard students living in a large city.

If the birth-rate of graduates both of separate men's colleges and of
separate women's colleges is alarmingly low, that of graduates of
coeducational institutions is not always satisfactory, either. To some
extent the low birth-rate is a characteristic of educated people,
without regard to the precise nature of their education. In a study of
the graduates of Syracuse University, one of the oldest coeducational
colleges of the eastern United States, H. J. Banker found[123] that the
number of children declined with each decade. Thus married women
graduates prior to the Civil War had 2 surviving children each; in the
last decade of the nineteenth century they had only one. For married men
graduates, the number of surviving children had fallen in the same
length of time from 2. 62 to 1. 38. When all graduates, married or not,
are counted in the decade 1892-1901, it is found that the men of
Syracuse have contributed to the next generation one surviving child
each, the women only half a child apiece.

Dr. Cattell's investigation of the families of 1,000 contemporary
American men of science all of which were probably not complete however,
shows that they leave, on the average, less than two surviving children.
Only one family in 75 is larger than six, and 22% of them are childless.
Obviously, as far as those families are concerned, there will be fewer
men of inherent scientific eminence in the next generation than in this.

The decline in the birth-rate is sometimes attributed to the fact that
people as a whole are marrying later than they used to; we have already
shown that this idea is, on the whole, false. The idea that people as a
whole are marrying less than they used to is also, as we have shown,
mistaken. The decline in the general birth-rate can be attributed to
only one fact, and that is that married people are having fewer
children.

The percentage of childless wives in the American stock is steadily
increasing. Dr.
Crum's figures show the following percentage of
childless wives, in the New England genealogies with which he worked:

1750-1799 1. 88
1800-1849 4. 07
1850-1869 5. 91
1870-1879 8. 10

J. A. Hill[124] found, from the 1910 census figures, that one in eight
of the native-born wives is childless, as compared with one in five
among the Negroes, one in nineteen among the foreign born. Childlessness
of American wives is therefore a considerable, although not a
preponderant factor, in this decline of the birth rate.

Dr. Hill further found that from 10 marriages, in various stocks, the
following numbers of children could be expected:

Native-born women 27
Negro-born women 31
English-born women 34
Russian-born women 54
French Canada-born women 56
Polish-born women 62

The women of the old American stock are on the whole more sterile or, if
not sterile, less fecund, than other women in the United States. Why?

In answer, various physiological causes are often alleged. It is said
that the dissemination of venereal diseases has caused an increase of
sterility; that luxurious living lowers fecundity, and so on. It is
impossible to take the time to analyze the many explanations of this
sort which have been offered, and which are familiar to the reader; we
must content ourselves with saying that evidence of a great many kinds,
largely statistical and, in our opinion, reliable, indicates that
physiological causes play a minor part in the decrease of the
birth-rate. [125]

Or, plainly, women no longer bear as many children, because they don't
want to.

This accords with Dr. Cattel's inquiry of 461 American men of science;
in 285 cases it was stated that the family was voluntarily limited, the
cause being given as health in 133 cases, expense in 98 cases, and
various in 54 cases. Sidney Webb's investigation among "intellectuals"
in London showed an even greater proportion of voluntary limitation. The
exhaustive investigation of the Galton Laboratory of National Eugenics
leaves little room for doubt that in England the decline in the
birth-rate began about 1876-78, when the trial of Charles Bradlaugh and
the Theosophist leader, Mrs. Annie Besant, on the charge of circulating
"neo-Malthusian" literature, focused public attention on the
possibility of birth control, and gradually brought a knowledge of the
means of contraception within reach of many. In the United States
statistics are lacking, but medical men and others in a position to form
opinions generally agree that the limitation of births has been steadily
increasing for the last few decades; and with the propaganda at present
going on, it is pretty sure to increase much more rapidly during the
next decade or two.

Some instructive results can be drawn, in this connection, from a study
of the families of Methodist clergymen in the United States. [126]
Although 98 out of every hundred of them marry, and they marry early,
the birth-rate is not high. Its distribution is presented in the
accompanying graph (Fig. 38). It is evident that they have tended to
standardize the two-child family which is so much in evidence among
college professors and educated classes generally, all over the world.
The presence of a considerable number of large families raises the
average number of surviving children of prominent Methodists to 3. 12.

And in so explaining the cause of the declining birth-rate among
native-born Americans, we have also found the principal reason for the
_differential_ nature of the decline in the nation at large, which is
the feature that alarms the eugenist. The more intelligent and
well-to-do part of the population has been able to get and use the
needed information, and limit its birth-rate; the poor and ignorant has
been less able to do so, and their rate of increase has therefore been
more natural in a large percentage of cases.

It is not surprising, therefore, that many eugenists should have
advocated wider dissemination of the knowledge of means of limiting
births, with the idea that if this practice were extended to the lower
classes, their birth-rate would decrease just the same as has that of
the upper classes, and the alarming differential rate would therefore be
abolished.

[Illustration: FAMILIES OF PROMINENT METHODISTS

FIG. 38. --The heavy line shows the distribution of families of
prominent Methodists (mostly clergymen) who married only once. Eleven
percent had no surviving children and nearly half of the families
consisted of two children or less. The dotted line shows the families of
those who were twice married. It would naturally be expected that two
women would bear considerably more children than one woman, but as an
average fact it appears that a second wife means the addition of only
half a child to the minister's family. It is impossible to avoid the
conclusion that the birth-rate in these families is determined more by
the desire of the parents (based on economic grounds) than on the
natural fecundity of the women. In other words, the number of children
is limited to the number whom the minister can afford to bring up on his
inadequate salary. ]

Against this it might be argued that the desired result will never be
wholly attained, because the most effective means of birth control
involve some expense, and because their effective use presupposes a
certain amount of foresight and self-control which is not always found
among the lower strata of society.

Despite certain dangers accompanying a widespread dissemination of the
knowledge of how to limit births, it seems to be the opinion of most
eugenists that if free access to such information be not permitted that
at least such knowledge ought to be given in many families, where it
would be to the advantage of society that fewer children be produced.
Such a step, of course, must be taken on the individual responsibility
of a doctor, nurse or other social worker. A propaganda has arisen
during recent years, in the United States, for the repeal of all laws
which prohibit giving knowledge about and selling contraceptives.
Whether or not it succeeds in changing the law it will, like the
Bradlaugh-Besant episode, spread contraception widely. This propaganda
is based largely on social and economic grounds, and is sometimes
unscientific in its methods and avowed aims. But whatever its nature may
be, there seems little reason (judging from analogy in European
countries) to believe that it can be stopped.

The "infant mortality movement" also has an effect here which is rarely
recognized. It is a stock argument of birth control propagandists that a
high birth-rate means a high rate of infant mortality; but A. O. Powys
has demonstrated that cause and effect are to some extent reversed in
this statement, and that it is equally true that a high rate of infant
mortality means a high birth-rate, in a section of the population where
birth control is not practiced. The explanation is the familiar fact
that conception takes place less often in nursing mothers. But if a
child dies early or is bottle-fed, a new conception is likely to occur
much sooner than would otherwise be the case. By reducing infant
mortality and teaching mothers to feed their babies naturally, the
infant mortality movement is thereby reducing the birth-rate in the
poorer part of the population, a eugenic service which to some extent
offsets the dysgenic results that, as we shall show in the last chapter,
follow the "Save the Babies" propaganda.

With the spread of the birth control and infant mortality movements one
may therefore look forward to some diminution of the differential
element in the birth-rate, together with a further decline in that
birth-rate as a whole.

Such a situation, which seems to us almost a certainty within the next
decade or two, will not change the duty of eugenics, on which we have
been insisting in this chapter and, to a large extent, throughout the
present book. It will be just as necessary as ever that the families
which are, and have been in the past, of the greatest benefit and value
to the country, have a higher birth-rate. The greatest task of eugenics,
as we see it, will still be to find means by which the birth-rate among
such families can be increased. This increase in the birth-rate among
superior people must depend largely on a change in public sentiment.
Such a change may be brought about in many ways. The authority of
religion may be invoked, as it is by the Roman Catholic and Mormon
churches[127] whose communicants are constantly taught that fecundity is
a virtue and voluntary sterility a sin. Unfortunately their appeal fails
to make proper discriminations. Whatever may be the theological reasons
for such an attitude on the part of the churches, its practical eugenic
significance is clear enough.

Nothing can be more certain than that, if present conditions continue,
Roman Catholics will soon be in an overwhelming preponderance in the
eastern United States, because of the differential birth-rate, if for no
other reason; and that the Mormon population will steadily gain ground
in the west. Similarly, it is alleged that the population of France is
gradually assuming the characteristics of the Breton race, because that
race is the notably fecund section of the population, while nearly all
the other components of the nation are committing race suicide (although
not so rapidly as is the old white stock in New England). Again, the
role of religion in eugenics is shown in China, where ancestor worship
leads to a desire for children, and makes it a disgrace to be childless.
A process analogous to natural selection applies to religions much as it
does to races; and if the Chinese religion, with its requirement of a
high birth-rate, and the present-day American Protestant form of the
Christian religion, with its lack of eugenic teaching, should come into
direct competition, under equal conditions of environment, it is obvious
that the Chinese form would be the eventual survivor, just because its
adherents would steadily increase and those of its rival would as
steadily decrease. Such a situation may seem fanciful; yet the leaders
of every church may well consider whether the religion which they preach
is calculated to fill all the needs of its adherents, if it is silent on
the subject of eugenics.

The influence of economic factors on the birth-rate is marked. The
child, under modern urban conditions, is not an economic asset, as he
was on the farm in earlier days. He is an economic liability instead.
And with the constant rise of the standard of living, with the increase
of taxation, the child steadily becomes more of a liability. Many
married people desire children, or more children, but feel that they can
not have them without sacrificing something that they are unwilling to
sacrifice.

Analysis of this increase in the cost of children, reveals not less than
five main elements which deserve attention from eugenists.

1. It costs more to clothe children than it used to. Not only does
clothing of a given quality cost more now than it did a decade or two
ago, but there are more fabrics and designs available, and many of
these, while attractive, are costly and not durable. Compliance to
fashion has increasingly made itself felt in the clothing of the child.

2. It costs more to feed them than it used to. Not only has food for
everyone increased in price, but the standards for feeding children
have been raised. Once children were expected to be content with plain
fare; now it is more frequently the custom to give them just what the
rest of the family eats.

3. The cost of medical attention has increased. All demand more of the
doctors now than they did in the last generation. The doctors are able
to do more than they formerly could, and particularly for his children,
every man wants the best that he can possibly afford. Hence medical
attendance for a child is constantly becoming more costly, because more
frequent; and further, the amount of money which parents spend on
medical attendance for their children usually increases with any
increase in their income.

4. The cost of domestic labor is greater. Most kinds of domestic service
have more than doubled in price within the memory of relatively young
people. Moreover, it is gradually being realized that a high standard is
desirable in selecting a nurse for children. As a fact, a children's
nurse ought to have much greater qualifications than the nurse whose
duty is to care for sick adults. If a mother is obliged to delegate part
of the work of bringing up her children to some other woman, she is
beginning to recognize that this substitute mother should have superior
ability; and the teachers of subconscious psychology have emphasized the
importance of giving a child only the best possible intellectual
surroundings. Ignorant nursemaids are unwillingly tolerated, and as the
number of competent assistants for mothers is very small, the cost is
correspondingly high. An increase in the number of persons trained for
such work is to be anticipated, but it is likely that the demand for
them will grow even more rapidly; hence there is no reason to expect
that competent domestic help will become any less costly than it is now.

5. The standards of education have risen steadily. There is perhaps no
other feature which has tended more to limit families. Conscientious
parents have often determined to have no more children than they could
afford to educate in the best possible way. This meant at least a
college education, and frequently has led to one and two-child families.
It is a motive of birth control which calls for condemnation. The old
idea of valuable mental discipline for all kinds of mental work to be
gained from protracted difficult formal education is now rejected by
educational psychologists, but its prevalence in the popular mind serves
to make "higher education" still something of a fetish, from which
marvelous results, not capable of precise comprehension, are
anticipated. We do not disparage the value of a college education, in
saying that parents should not attach such importance to it as to lead
them to limit their family to the number to whom they can give 20 years
of education without pecuniary compensation.

The effect of these various factors in the increasing cost of children
is to decrease fecundity not so much on the basis of income of parents,
as on the basis of their standards. The prudent, conscientious parent is
therefore the one most affected, and the reduction in births is greatest
in that class, where eugenics is most loth to see it.

The remedy appears to be a change in public opinion which will result in
a truer idea of values. Some readjustments in family budgets are called
for, which will discriminate more clearly between expenditure that is
worth while, and that which is not. Without depriving his children of
the best medical attention and education, one may eliminate those
invidious sources of expense which benefit neither the children nor
anyone else,--overdressing, for instance. A simplification of life would
not only enable superior people to have larger families, but would often
be an advantage to the children already born.

On the other hand, the fact that higher standards in a population lead
to fewer children suggests a valuable means of reducing the birth-rate
of the inferior. Raise their low standards of living and they will
reduce their own fertility voluntarily (the birth control movement
furnishing them with the possibility). All educational work in the slums
therefore is likely to have a valuable though indirect eugenic outcome.
The poor foreign-speaking areas in large cities, where immigrants live
huddled together in squalor, should be broken up. As these people are
given new ideas of comfort, and as their children are educated in
American ways of living, there is every reason to expect a decline in
their birth-rate, similar to that which has taken place among the
native-born during the past generation.

This elevation of standards in the lower classes will be accomplished
without any particular exertion from eugenists; there are many agencies
at work in this field, although they rarely realize the result of their
work which we have just pointed out.

But to effect a discriminating change in the standards of the more
intelligent and better educated classes calls for a real effort on the
part of all those who have the welfare of society at heart. The
difficulties are great enough and the obstacles are evident enough; it
is more encouraging to look at the other side, and to see evidences that
the public is awakening. The events of every month show that the ideals
of eugenics are filtering through the public mind more rapidly than some
of us, a decade ago, felt justified in expecting. There is a growing
recognition of the danger of bad breeding; a growing recognition in some
quarters at least of the need for more children from the superior part
of the population; a growing outcry against the excessive standards of
luxury that are making children themselves luxuries. The number of those
who call themselves eugenists, or who are in sympathy with the aims of
eugenics, is increasing every year, as is evidenced by the growth of
such an organization as the American Genetic Association. Legislators
show an eager desire to pass measures that as they (too often wrongly)
believe will have a eugenic result. Most colleges and universities are
teaching the principles of heredity, and a great many of them add
definite instruction in the principles of eugenics. Although the
ultimate aim of eugenics--to raise the level of the whole human race--is
perhaps as great an undertaking as the human mind can conceive, the
American nation shows distinct signs of a willingness to grapple with
it. And this book will have failed in its purpose, if it has not
convinced the reader that means are available for attacking the problem
at many points, and that immediate progress is not a mere dream.

One of the first necessary steps is a change in educational methods to
give greater emphasis to parenthood. And this change, it is a great
pleasure to be able to say, is being made in many places. The public
schools are gradually beginning to teach mothercraft, under various
guises, in many cities and the School of Practical Arts, Columbia Univ. ,
gives a course in the "Physical Care of the Infant. " Public and private
institutions are beginning to recognize, what has long been ignored,
that parenthood is one of the functions of men and women, toward which
their education should be directed. Every such step will tend, we
believe, to increase the birth-rate among the superior classes of the
community; every such step is therefore, indirectly if not directly, a
gain for eugenics; for, as we have emphasized time and again, a change
in public opinion, to recognize parenthood as a beautiful and desirable
thing, is one of the first desiderata of the eugenics program.

The introduction of domestic science and its rapid spread are very
gratifying, yet there are serious shortcomings, as rather too vigorously
set forth by A. E. Hamilton:

"There are rows of little gas stoves over which prospective wives
conduct culinary chemical experiments. There are courses in biology,
something of physiology and hygiene, the art of interior decoration and
the science of washing clothes. There is text-book sociology and
sometimes lectures on heredity or eugenics. But the smile of incredulity
as to my seriousness when I asked a Professor in the Margaret Morrison
Carnegie School [a college of Practical Arts for Women], 'Where are the
babies? ' is typical. Babies were impossible. They would interfere with
the curriculum, there was no time for practice with babies, and besides,
where could they be got, and how could they be taken care of? The
students were altogether too busy with calories, balanced rations, and
the history of medieval art. "

Perhaps the time is not so far distant when babies will be considered an
integral part of a girl's curriculum. If educators begin systematically
to educate the emotions as well as the intellect, they will have taken a
long step toward increasing the birth-rate of the superior. The next
step will be to correlate income more truly with ability in such a way
as to make it possible for superior young parents to afford children
earlier. The child ought, if eugenically desirable, to be made an asset
rather than a liability; if this can not be done, the parents should at
least not be penalized for having children. In this chapter, emphasis
has been laid on the need for a change in public opinion; in future
chapters some economic and social reforms will be suggested, which it is
believed would tend to make superior parents feel willing to have more
children.

The education of public opinion which, acting through the many agencies
named, will gradually bring about an increase in the birth-rate of
superior people, will not be speedy; but it has begun. The writers,
therefore, feel justified in thinking, not solely as a matter of
optimistic affirmation, but because of the evidence available, that the
race suicide now taking place in the old American stock will soon reach
its lowest limit, and that thereafter the birth-rate in that particular
stock will slowly rise. If it does, and if, as seems probable, the
birth-rate in some inferior sections of the American population at the
same time falls from its present level, a change in the racial
composition of the nation will take place, which, judged by past
history, is bound to be of great eugenic value.




CHAPTER XIV

THE COLOR LINE


"A young white woman, a graduate of a great university of the far North,
where Negroes are seldom seen, resented it most indignantly when she was
threatened with social ostracism in a city farther South with a large
Negro population because she insisted upon receiving upon terms of
social equality a Negro man who had been her classmate. [128]"

The incident seems trivial. But the phenomenon back of it, the "color
line," is so far-reaching that it deserves careful examination.

As the incident suggests, the color line is not a universal phenomenon.
The Germans appear to have little aversion to receiving Negroes--_in
Germany_--on terms of equality. These same Germans, when brought face to
face with the question in their colonies, or in the southern United
States, quickly change their attitude. Similarly a Negro in Great
Britain labors under much less disadvantage than he does among the
British inhabitants of Australia or South Africa.

The color line therefore exists only as the result of race experience.
This fact alone is sufficient to suggest that one should not dismiss it
lightly as the outgrowth of bigotry. Is is not perhaps a social
adaptation with survival value?

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze society's "unconscious
reasoning" which has led to the establishment of a color line--to the
denial of social equality--wherever the white[129] and black races have
long been in contact during recent history; and to see whether this
discrimination appears to be justified by eugenics.

J. M. Mecklin[130] summarizes society's logic as follows:

"When society permits the free social intercourse of two young persons
of similar training and interests, it tacitly gives its consent to the
possible legitimate results of such relations, namely, marriage. But
marriage is not a matter that concerns the contracting parties alone; it
is social in its origin and from society come its sanctions. It is
society's legitimatised method for the perpetuation of the race in the
larger and inclusive sense of a continuous racial type which shall be
the bearer of a continuous and progressive civilization. There are,
however, within the community, two racial groups of such widely
divergent physical and psychic characteristics that the blending of the
two destroys the purity of the type of both and introduces
confusion--the result of the blend is a mongrel. The preservation of the
unbroken, self-conscious existence of the white or dominant ethnic group
is synonymous with the preservation of all that has meaning and
inspiration in its past and hope for its future. It forbids by law,
therefore, or by the equally effective social taboo, anything that would
tend to contaminate the purity of its stock or jeopardize the integrity
of its social heritage. "

It is needless to say that the "social mind" does not consciously go
through any such process of reasoning, before it draws a color line. The
social mind rarely even attempts to justify its conclusions. It merely
holds a general attitude of superiority, which in many cases appears to
be nothing more than a feeling that another race is _different_.

In what way different?

The difference between the white race and the black (or any other race)
might consist of two elements: (1) differences in heredity--biological
differences; (2) differences in traditions, environment, customs--social
differences, in short. A critical inquirer would want to know which kind
of difference was greater, for he would at once see that the second kind
might be removed by education and other social forces, while the first
kind would be substantially permanent.

It is not difficult to find persons of prominence who will assert that
all the differences between white and Negro are differences of a social
nature, that the differences of a physical nature are negligible, and
that if the Negro is "given a chance" the significant differences will
disappear. This attitude permeates the public school system of northern
states. A recent report on the condition of Negro pupils in the New York
City public schools professes to give "few, perhaps no, recommendations
that would not apply to the children of other races. Where the
application is more true in regard to colored children, it seems largely
to be because of this lack of equal justice in the cases of their
parents. Race weakness appears but this could easily be balanced by the
same or similar weakness in other races. Given an education carefully
adapted to his needs and a fair chance for employment, the normal child
of any race will succeed, unless the burden of wrong home conditions
lies too heavily upon him. "[131]

As the writer does not define what she means by "succeed," one is
obliged to guess at what she means: Her anthropology is apparently
similar to that of Franz Boas of Columbia University, who has said that,
"No proof can be given of any material inferiority of the Negro
race;--without doubt the bulk of the individuals composing the race are
equal in mental aptitude to the bulk of our own people. "

If such a statement is wholly true, the color line can hardly be
justified, but must be regarded, as it is now the case sometimes, as
merely the expression of prejudice and ignorance. If the only
differences between white and black, which can not be removed by
education, are of no real significance,--a chocolate hue of skin, a
certain kinkiness of hair, and so on,--then logically the white race
should remove the handicaps which lack of education and bad environment
have placed on the Negro, and receive him on terms of perfect equality,
in business, in politics, and in marriage.

The proposition needs only to be stated in this frank form, to arouse an
instinctive protest on the part of most Americans. Yet it has been urged
in an almost equally frank form by many writers, from the days of the
abolitionists to the present, and it seems to be the logical consequence
of the position adopted by such anthropologists as Professor Boas, and
by the educators and others who proclaim that there are no significant
differences between the Negro and the white, except such as are due to
social conditions and which, therefore, can be removed.

But what are these social differences, which it is the custom to dismiss
in such a light-hearted way? Are they not based on fundamental
incompatibilities of racial temperament, which in turn are based on
differences in heredity? Modern sociologists for the main part have no
illusions as to the ease with which these differences in racial
tradition and custom can be removed.

The social heritage of the Negro has been described at great length and
often with little regard for fact, by hundreds of writers. Only a glance
can be given the subject here, but it may profitably be asked what the
Negro did when he was left to himself in Africa.

"The most striking feature of the African Negro is the low forms of
social organization, the lack of industrial and political cooperation,
and consequently the almost entire absence of social and national
self-consciousness. This rather than intellectual inferiority explains
the lack of social sympathy, the presence of such barbarous institutions
as cannibalism and slavery, the low position of woman, inefficiency in
the industrial and mechanical arts, the low type of group morals,
rudimentary art-sense, lack of race-pride and self-assertiveness, and in
intellectual and religious life largely synonymous with fetishism and
sorcery. "[132]

An elementary knowledge of the history of Africa, or the more recent and
much-quoted example of Haiti, is sufficient to prove that the Negro's
own social heritage is at a level far below that of the whites among
whom he is living in the United States. No matter how much one may
admire some of the Negro's individual traits, one must admit that his
development of group traits is primitive, and suggests a mental
development which is also primitive.

If the number of original contributions which it has made to the world's
civilization is any fair criterion of the relative value of a race, then
the Negro race must be placed very near zero on the scale. [133]

The following historical considerations suggest that in comparison with
some other races the Negro race is germinally lacking in the higher
developments of intelligence:

1. That the Negro race in Africa has never, by its own initiative, risen
much above barbarism, although it has been exposed to a considerable
range of environments and has had abundant time in which to bring to
expression any inherited traits it may possess.

2. That when transplanted to a new environment--say, Haiti--and left to
its own resources, the Negro race has shown the same inability to rise;
it has there, indeed, lost most of what it had acquired from the
superior civilization of the French.

3. That when placed side by side with the white race, the Negro race
again fails to come up to their standard, or indeed to come anywhere
near it. It is often alleged that this third test is an unfair one; that
the social heritage of slavery must be eliminated before the Negro can
be expected to show his true worth. But contrast his career in and after
slavery with that of the Mamelukes of Egypt, who were slaves, but slaves
of good stock.