No More Learning

The Mughul force, only 7000 strong, was completely
enveloped by 60,000 Maratha horse, its progress impeded, and its
supplies cut off. “This time the Cossack-tactics of the Marathas
were combined with the European mode of warfare (of Ibrahim
Khan Gardi) against the Nizam. ” The march from Udgir to Ausa
was a long drawn agony. The small Mughul army, slowly moving
in the open field in close column, presented a sure target to the
French-drilled artillery hovering round, while the dispersed and
wheeling Maratha horse were practically safe from their enemy's fire.
It was the situation of Panipat inverted in favour of the Marathas.
When on 3 February the Nizam reached Ausa, forty miles south of
Dharur, 40,000 Marathas attacked his rear-guard, which
straggling some miles behind, and a great disaster fell on it, all the
commanders and most of the men being killed. The victorious
was


## p. 391 (#429) ############################################

NIZAM 'ALI DEPOSES SALABAT JANG
391
Marathas then fell upon the Mughul centre and the battle raged till
sunset. The Nizam's army was in no condition to fight any more.
So, he made peace by ceding territory, yielding six million rupees in
the province of Aurangabad, half of Bijapur and Bidar, the forts of
Asir, Daulatabad and Mulher, and the cities of Bijapur and Burhanpur
to the Peshwa (February, 1760). The descendants of Asaf Jah retained
nothing more than Hyderabad, some parts of the province of Bijapur,
and a little of Bidar, and that, too, on condition of paying the
Marathas one-fourth of the revenue.
This was the apogee of Maratha success. Nemesis came at Panipat
within one year, followed by the death of Balaji Rao, the succession
of his minor son, and the internal dissensions caused by the guilty
ambition of his brother Raghunath Rao, which paralysed the Maratha
power. Seizing this opportunity, Nizam 'Ali invaded Maharashtra
in November, 1761, and made his way to within fourteen miles of
Poona. The Peshwa made peace (2 January, 1762), relinquishing
nearly half of his father's territorial gains in the Mughul Deccan.
Nizam 'Ali returned to Bidar, seized the government, and threw
Salabat Jang into prison (6 July, 1762), where the latter died two
years later. The shadowy emperor of Delhi sanctioned the usurpation
by creating Nizam 'Ali viceroy with the title of Nizam-ul-mulk Asaf
Jah II.
With the accession of Nizam 'Ali (1762) a long period of stability
begins in the affairs of the Mughul Deccan. We have at last one man
ruling for forty-one years, and passing an undisputed succession on
to his progeny. Family dissensions, except for a short and futile
outbreak by his son, end. At the same time the centre of gravity of
the Maratha power slowly shifts from Poona to northern India. The
Peshwa's family was stricken by disease, physical and moral. The
ensuing peace could have been utilised for reforming the Hyderabad
state and improving its people's lot, if only there had been wise rulers
and honest ministers.


## p. 392 (#430) ############################################

CHAPTER XIV
THE RISE OF THE MARATHA EMPIRE (1707-1761)
THE
HE aged emperor Aurangzib died in February, 1707, worn out
by his long guerrilla campaign in the Deccan. His successor, Bahadur
Shah, decided, on the advice of Zu-'l-Fiqar Khan, the viceroy of
the Deccan, to put into effect Aurangzib's plan of restoring Shahu,
the grandson of Shivaji, who, after the capture and execution of his
father Shambhuji in 1689, had been brought up in the Mughul court.
He was not twenty-six years old. Daud Khan, the deputy viceroy,
who was stationed at Aurangabad, was directed to give him all
possible assistance. After Shambhuji's death, the direction of Maratha
affairs had fallen into the hands of his half-brother Raja Ram. Raja
Ram died in 1700, whereupon his widow Tara Bai, a strong and
masterful woman, declared herself regent for her infant son Shivaji,
and profiting by the disorders at Delhi, reconquered Poona and
Chakan from the Mughuls. The return of Shahu, as was intended,
threw an apple of discord into the Maratha camp. Tara Bai refused
to give up her son's claims. She declared that Shahu was an im-
postor, assembled her ministers, and made them take an oath of
fidelity to resist the pretender to the last gasp. Shahu was granted
the customary due of chauth and sardeshmukhil of the six Deccan
provinces of Khandesh, Berar, Aurangabad, Bidar, Hyderabad and
Bijapur, and the governorship of Gondwana, Gujarat and Tanjore;
all these, of course, he was to hold from the emperor. Starting from
north of the Narbada in May, 1707, he advanced slowly southwards
during the rains, entered Satara, and was crowned in January, 1708.
He made Gadadhar Prahlad his Pratinidhi,? Bahiro Pant Pingle his
Peshwa, and Dhanaji Jadav his Senapati or commander-in-chief.
Tara Bai fell back upon Panhala, the great stronghold twelve miles
from Kolhapur, which became the capital of the rival kingdom.
As soon as the rains were over, Shahu, after celebrating the Dasahra,
the festival which marks the opening of the campaigning season,
marched against Tara Bai and took Panhala. In 1712, Tara Bai was
removed from the administration by a palace intrigue, and her place
was taken by her co-wife Rajas Bai, who claimed the throne for her
son Shambhuji;3 but this did not help Shahu, whose hold on his new
· For the meaning of the terms, see M. G. Ranade, Rise of the Maratha Power,
chap. xi and Sen, Administrative System of the Marathas, pp. 97, 243.
3 The office of Pratinidhi or King's Representative was created by Raja Ram
in 1690 and was supernumerary to Shivaji's Council of Eight. The word Peshwa,
or Prime Minister, is Persian, and dates from Muhammad I Bahmani (1358-77),
Shivaji preferred the Sanskrit title Mukhya Pradhan. Briggs, Ferishta ui, 150
note ; Grant Duff, 1, 150.
3 For details, see Kincaid and Parasnis (1931 edition), pp. 204-5.
9


## p. 393 (#431) ############################################

BALAJI VISHVANATH
393
kingdom became every day more precarious. Very few of the great
Maratha leaders had espoused his cause, and his rule was practically
confined to his capital, and a few hill-forts garrisoned by his com-
manders. The Deccan was in a state of open anarchy. The Desh-
mukhs and petty chiefs had fortified themselves in the villages in
which they resided, and plundered caravans, held up travellers to
ransom, and made war on one another with impunity. The new
viceroy of the Deccan, Chin Qilich Khan, who succeeded Daud
Khan at Aurangabad in 1712 with the title of Nizam-ul-Mulk, was
inclined to favour the Kolhapur party, and Chandra Sen Jadav,
the Senapati, who had assumed that office on the death of his father
Dhanaji in 1708, had gone over to Kolhapur, owing to a disagree-
ment with Shahu. This disagreement led to the rise of a very remark-
able man, who was destined to become the saviour of his country.
Balaji Vishvanath was a Chitpavanor Konkanastha Brahman,
whose ancestors were hereditary Deshmukhs or revenue officers of
Shrivardhan near Bankot. His early history is obscure, but towards
the end of the seventeenth century his father appears to have migrated
to the Deccan and taken service at the Satara court. For a time he
served under Dhanaji Jadav, the Senapati, who held him in high
esteem and gave him several responsible posts. This aroused the
jealousy of Dhanaji's son Chandra Sen, and shortly after the latter
became Senapati a quarrel broke out which caused Balaji to flee
for his life to Shahu's protection. Chandra Sen insolently demanded
his surrender from Shahu, and being refused, proceeded to join the
Kolhapur faction. Balaji Vishvanath, in gratitude to Shahu, made
himself invaluable to the king, in whose favour he rose daily higher
and higher. He enlisted fresh forces, for which he received the title
of Senakarta, or 'maker of armies", and came to terms with the
Nizam. He next attacked a notorious robber-chief, Damaji Thorat
of Hingangaon, who, however, defeated him and held him up to
ransom. He had better luck in putting down another rebel, Krishna
Rao of Khatav. Meanwhile, Shahu had despatched an army under
Bahiro Pant Pingle, the Peshwa, to protect the Konkan and over-
throw Kanhoji Angria, the hereditary admiral of the Maratha fleet,
who had taken the opportunity afforded by these disorders to ally
himself with Kolhapur, advance up the Bhor Ghat and seize the
forts of Rajmachi and Lohagarh, commanding this important high-
way into the Deccan. But the Peshwa was a mediocre general,
and he suffered himself to be defeated and captured. Angria now
threatened to march on Satara. Shahu was in despair, and "looked
“
around him to discover a fit person to recover his conquered districts”.
He applied to the Pratinidhi, but that officer excused himself on the
* The story of his early years, told by Grant Duff (1, 316), has been modified
by later researches. See Kincaid and Parasnis, 202 sqq. and Sardesai, Main
Currents of Maratha History, D. 102.


## p. 394 (#432) ############################################

394 RISE OF THE MARATHA EMPIRE (1707-1761)
.
ground that "the army was not at his devotion". Then, in the words
of the Maratha chronicler,
he sent for the Eight Pradhans, communicated to them the accounts he had
received, and desired them to take the necessary measures for checking these
depredations. They all remained silent. He then looked towards Balaji, who
got up and addressed the Raja, saying, "If you will give me orders, through
your good fortune they will be carried into effect. ” Upon this the Raja placed
his hand on Balaji's head and desired him to take the troops. The Maharaja
gave him the entire administration of affairs with the robes of the Peshwaship.
His fame and greatness were daily augmented; the Eight Pradhans of the State
became subject to him.
The new Peshwa set about his task with a will. Being himself a
Konkani and an old friend of Angria's, his task was a comparatively
easy one. He arranged a meeting with the Maratha admiral at a
spot not far from the modern town of Lonavla, and soon came to
terms with him. He persuaded him to release the unfortunate ex-
Peshwa, Bahiro Pant Pingle, and to transfer his allegiance from
Kolhapur to Shahu; in return, he undertook to get him confirmed
in the title of Sarkhel (admiral) and to allow him to retain possession
of Rajmachi and other strongholds. At the same time, he joined him
in attacking Angria's hereditary enemy, the Sidi, who was deprived
of many of his conquests in the Konkan. This was Balaji's first great
diplomatic triumph. Kanhoji Angria, however, until his death in
1729, remained an ally rather than a vassal of the Peshwas. The
Angrias behaved like independent rulers, making war at will upon
their neighbours, the Sidis, the Portuguese and the English, and
levying what they chose to call "the chauth of the Sea" upon coastal
traffic. Several expeditions sent against these pests from Bombay
were repulsed with loss, until, in 1755, Clive and Watson, co-
operating with the Peshwa's land forces, overthrew their stronghold
at Gheria or Vijayadurg, and put an end to their power.
Balaji, on his return from the Konkan, determined to put a stop
to anarchy in Shahu's kingdom. Freebooters were suppressed with
a strong hand, and an example was made of Damaji Thorat, whose
stronghold was razed to the ground, while he himself was thrown
into a dungeon. Civil government was restored, and the Pratinidhi
and the Ashtapradhan, or Cabinet of Eight, were appointed. But the
old system of government established by Shivaji was no longer
workable. Conditions had changed, and at home the real power lay
in the hands of the Peshwa, while in the more distant parts of the
country the great Maratha chiefs were virtually independent. Balaji
realised that the only possible working arrangement was a confederacy
of the Maratha leaders; but even then, the separatist tendencies were
constantly at work, and the jealousy felt by the Maratha chiefs for
1 See Ives, A Voyage from England to India, I, chap. VII. Clement Downing,
History of the Indian Wars (ed. Foster, 1924), pp. 28 sqq.


## p. 395 (#433) ############################################

SHIVAJI'S SWARAJYA
395
the power wielded at the court by the Brahman Peshwa was a con-
stant source of friction and danger. 1
But Balaji was by no means contented with merely keeping the
peace: his ambitions and far-seeing mind had already conceived the
plan of freeing his country entirely from foreign domination. His
master was still the vassal of Delhi, and the Peshwa's dream was to
make Shahu absolute sovereign over Shivaji's Swarajya, that is, all
the districts ruled over by Shivaji at the time of his decease. The hour
was propitious. The once-mighty Mughul empire was fast breaking
up. The throne of Delhi was occupied by a series of puppet-rulers,
all the real power being concentrated in the hands of the so-called
"King-Makers", the Sayyid brothers. One of these, Husain 'Ali
Khan, became viceroy of the Deccan in 1715. He found, however,
that he could make no headway against court-intrigues which went
on during his absence, and the depredations of the local Maratha
chiefs. In 1716, he was severely defeated by Khande Rao Dabhade,
the veteran Maratha leader, who was levying chauth on the Gujarat
border. In desperation, therefore, he opened negotiations with
Shahu, through the good offices of one Shankaraji Malhar. This gave
to Balaji Vishvanath a long-sought opportunity, and the terms which
he proposed to the Sayyid were as follows:
(1) The emperor should confirm king Shahu in the right of col-
lecting the chauth and sardeshmukhi from the six provinces of the
Deccan and Mysore, Trichinopoly and Tanjore: Shahu was to exercise
sovereign rights in all the territory composing Shivaji's swarajya,
except certain portions of Khandesh, in lieu of which, territories in
the Pandharpur district should be ceded. The fortresses of Shivner
and Trimbak should be restored, and recent Maratha conquests in
Gondwana and Berar confirmed. Shahu's mother and family should
be allowed to return to the Deccan.
(2) Shahu, on his side, was to pay a million rupees as tribute in
return for the swarajya, and 10 per cent. of the annual income for
the hereditary rights of sardeshmukhi: to maintain a body of 15,000
horse in the emperor's service in return for the chauth; and to protect
the country from depredation and robbery.
The wretched emperor Farrukh-siyar protested in vain against this
base surrender of his rights and territories : Husain 'Ali Khan,
accompanied by Balaji and 16,000 Maratha horse under Khande Rao
Dabhade, marched on Delhi, and after some fierce street-fighting
Sayyid 'Abdullah seized the emperor, blinded him, threw him into
a dungeon, and finally (1719) murdered him. Balaji remained in
1 M. G. Ranade, op. cit. pp. 208 sqq.
% In common parlance, his aim was to re-establish the Hindu-pad-pad-
shahi, or Hindu Empire of India.
3 For its extent, see P. V. Mavji, "Shivaji's Swarajya", in JBBRAS, XX, 30, sqq.
+ See chap. XI, p. 339.


## p. 396 (#434) ############################################

396 RISE OF THE MARATHA EMPIRE (1707-1761)
Delhi until the new emperor, Muhammad Shah, was forced to get
rid of his unwelcome visitors by issuing three imperial rescripts for
the chauth, sardeshmukhi and swarajya respectively. Balaji returned
in triumph to Satara, where honours were showered upon him; but
he was now nearing sixty, and the hardships of the campaign had
proved too great for him. He retired to his country-house at Saswad
near Purandar, where he expired in April, 1720. His lifework had
been completed.
Balaji Vishvanath may without exaggeration be termed the second
founder of the Maratha empire. Without his directing brain, Shahu
Raja, enervated by his upbringing in the Mughul court, would not
have survived for a year. His two great diplomatic triumphs were
the conciliation of Angria and the treaty with Delhi, but scarcely
less characteristic was his method of revenue collection, to which the
Marathas owed to a great extent their power. As Elphinstone points
out,” he deliberately preferred assignments on other proprietors, like
chauth or sardeshmukhi, to a solid territorial possession, or even a
consolidated sum. Hence the net work of revenue-collectors was spread
everywhere in the imperial domains, affording the Marathas endless
opportunities of spreading their influence. Pretexts for interference
and encroachment in an extensive territory were better than clearly
defined rights in a small one. Secondly, by insisting that the revenue
should be calculated on the assessments of the time of Todar Mal
or Malik 'Ambar, which, he knew well, a country ravaged by war
could never pay, he could always have a bill for arrears in hand.
Thirdly, by parcelling out the revenue among the chiefs, he ensured
that, while each had an interest in increasing the contribution to the
common stock, none had a compact property such as might render
him independent of the government. Lastly, the system was pur-
, .
posely made so complicated as to throw all the power into the hands
of Brahman revenue-collectors and agents, who, being of the same
caste as the Peshwa himself, naturally played into his hands. The
scheme was typical in its ingenuity.
"Balaji Vishvanath”, says Sir Richard Temple, "had a calm, com-
prehensive and commanding intellect, an imaginative and aspiring
disposition, and an aptitude for ruling rude natures by moral force,
a genius for diplomatic combinations, and a mastery of finance. " It
is impossible to dispute the justice of this estimate.
When Balaji Vishvanath died, he left two sons, Baji Rao, a young
man of twenty-two, and Chimaji Appa, a boy of twelve. Both were
destined to play a distinguished part in their country's destinies. At
the time of his father's death, Baji Rao was on field-service; but on
his return, two weeks later, he was invested by Shahu with the
Peshwa's robes of office: the Peshwaship, more Indico, was already
1 The terms are given in detail in Grant Duff, 1, 337 sqq.
? History of India, Book xri, chap. 11.
9


## p. 397 (#435) ############################################

BAJI RAO
397
becoming hereditary. ' Baji Rao, though so young, was admirably
suited for the post. Balaji, according to some of his critics, was a
statesman rather than a soldier; he was even said not to have been
a skilled horseman, and a spiteful story was told that at one time
he had required a man on each side to hold him on! None, even in
jest, could say this of Baji Rao, who had been brought up in the
saddle, and had led a cavalry charge at an age when other lads are
still at school. A contemporary artist represented him in the dress
of a common trooper, sitting with his reins on his horse's neck, while
he rubbed between his hands ears of corn. ? On this dry grain he
would subsist for days, and at night he would sleep on the ground
like an ordinary soldier, his bridle over his arm, and his lance stuck
in the ground beside him. Such a man the Marathas would fo
as they followed Shivaji in the old days, to the gates of Hell if need
be. From the moment he took office, he set out to carry into effect
his father's lofty designs for the extension of the Hindu-pad-padshahi.
Balaji's expedition to Delhi had revealed to him the weakness of the
Mughuls, and Baji Rao conceived the bold plan of attacking and
overcoming the rich and fertile plains of Malwa, and extending
Maratha rule into the heart of Hindustan. With a foresight rare in
one so young he saw that such a plan would, by giving occupation
to the turbulent Maratha chiefs, not only extend the boundaries
of Shahu's kingdom, but lead to peace nearer home. This ambitious
policy was vehemently opposed by Shripat Rao, the Pratinidhi. The
Pratinidhi or viceroy was really the first, and the Peshwa the second,
official in the court; and Shripat Rao and the other Deccanis viewed
with jealousy the meteoric rise of the young Chitpavan from the
Konkan. At the Council the Pratinidhi stigmatised an invasion of
Hindustan, before Shahu's domestic dissensions were composed, as
rash and imprudent, and he advised as an alternative the reduction
of Kolhapur and the reconquest of the Carnatic. But Baji Rao's
eloquence swept aside all opposition. "Now is our time”, said the
gallant Peshwa, “to drive the strangers from the country of the
Hindus, and acquire immortal renown. Let us strike at the trunk
of the withering tree, and the branches will fall off themselves. By
directing our efforts to Hindustan, the Maratha flag shall fly from
the Krishna to Attock. ” “You shall plant it beyond the Himalayas! "
exclaimed Shahu, carried away by the Peshwa's eloquence. "You
are, indeed, a noble son of a worthy father! " From this day onwards,
the faces of the Marathas were turned northwards: it is significant
that the chief gateway of every Maratha fortress is the Delhi Gate.
In 1724, Baji Rao crossed the Narbada in force. ' Little resistance
1 Sen, op. cit. pp. 151 sqq.
2 Grant Duff, 1, 419.
8 In the Kinnara Khanda, is the expression in the Chitnis Bakhar. The
Kinnaras, or celestial musicians, dwelt in a fabled country beyond the Hima-
layas. Kincaid and Parasnis render the words as “the throne of the Almighty".


## p. 398 (#436) ############################################

398 RISE OF THE MARATHA EMPIRE (1707-1761)
was met with, for some of the Rajputs were now beginning to side
with the Marathas, and Raja Jay Singh of Amber actively assisted
them. Malwa was repeatedly overrun, and three Maratha chiefs,
Udaji Powar, Malhar Rao Holkar, and Ranoji Sindia were left
behind to collect the tribute. They were the founders of the princely
houses of Dhar, Indore and Gwalior : the two latter were soldiers
of fortune, who had won ther spurs on the battle-field. Malhar Rao
Holkar was of the Dhangar or shepherd caste, and had started life as
a trooper: Ranoji Sindia had originally been in the service of
Shahu. Another family which arose into prominence at that time
was that of the Gaikwars of Baroda. Damaji Gaikwar won distinc-
tion at the battle of Balapur in 1720, when fighting against the Nizam
under Khande Rao Dabhade, for which Shahu conferred upon him
the title of Shamsher Bahadur, or illustrious swordsman, which is
still borne by his descendants. ? About this time also arose the prac-
tice of assigning the attack on a particular province to a certain
commander. To Khande Rao Dabhade (who had been made Senapati
for defeating the forces of Husain 'Ali Khan in 1716) was in this
way assigned the collection of the dues in Baglan and Gujarat. In
1720, Pilaji Gaikwar, the nephew of Damaji, built himself a fortress
at Songarh, fifty miles east of Şurat, and proceeded to levy chauth
and sardeshmukhi as Khande Rao's lieutenant. Sarbuland Khan, the
Mughul viceroy, was powerless to interfere, and presently Pilaji was
joined by Kanthaji Kadam Bhande, an officer of Shahu. From this
time onwards, the fair province of Gujarat enjoyed no respite from
the Maratha stranglehold.
When the Marathas (says their historian) proceeded beyond their boundary,
to collect revenue and make war were synonymous; whenever a village resis-
ted, its officers were seized, and compelled by threats, and sometimes by torture,
more or less severe, to come to a settlement; money was seldom obtainable, but
securities from bankers, with whom all the villages had dealing, were prefer--
able, as they were exchanged for bills payable in any part of India. 3
The harvest season was, for obvious reasons, usually selected for
these mulukgirit operations; villages which resisted were plundered
and fired, and the crops destroyed. Only when the monsoon made
the movements of troops impossible did the wretched inhabitants
obtain a temporary respite. Then
A deceitful calm succeeded; the fall of the rain brought back the cheering
green: the beautiful province of Gujarat, which for hundreds of miles may vie
with the finest parks of the nobles of England, was clothed, in all its natural
beauties, by rapid verdure and luxuriant vegetation. Tranquillity seemed to
reign, where a short time before, nothing was to be seen but perpetual skir-
1 The popular story that Ranoji was the Peshwa's slipper-bearer does not
appear to rest on good ground. In Selections from Peshwa's Daftar, vol. VII, No.
23, is a list of Shahu's officers, with their ranks, in 1715.
2 Vide infra, p. 402.
8 Grant Duff, 1, 464, and compare the passage quoted in the footnote.
4 An expedition to enforce the payment of revenue (p. 412 infra).


## p. 399 (#437) ############################################

THE NIZAM LEAVES DELHI
399
mishing, murder and robbery in open day: caravans pillaged even when strongly
escorted, and villages burning or deserted. 1
The scene now changes once more to Delhi. Chin Qilich Khan,
the Nizam-ul-Mulk, finding it impossible to cope with the disorders
and corruption of the Mughul court, determined to set up for himself
in the Deccan. In 1720 he suddenly crossed the Narbada and marched
southwards. Asirgarh and Burhanpur capitulated, and Chandra Sen
Jadav and a number of disaffected Marathas flocked to his standard.
He routed Dilavar and 'Alim 'Ali Khan, the governor of the Deccan,
who had been sent against him by the Sayyids, at the battles of
Khandwa and Balapur (June-August, 1720). In the latter battle, a
detachment of Marathas under Khande Rao Dabhade and Damaji
Gaikwar fought on the imperialist side with great gallantry. Further
opposition was ended when Sayyid Husain Ali was murdered, and
his brother defeated and thrown into prison, thus putting an end to
the power of the "king-makers" for ever. The Nizam now made his
.
way to the Deccan unopposed. No sooner did he arrive than he began
to renew his intrigues with Chandra Sen Jadav and other rebels and
also with Kolhapur, but he was everywhere foiled by the young
Peshwa, who had stationed the head of the army with a considerable
army of observation to watch him. In 1722, however, he was recalled
by the emperor, and on 21 February, at Agra, he was formally in-
vested with the office of minister. He at once set himself to restore
the empire to some sort of order, and to abolish revenue-farming, the
grant of assignments and the innumerable other abuses which had
arisen. But his efforts only excited the derision of the young emperor
and his degenerate court, who were determined to thwart everything
he attempted to do, and even ridiculed to his face the stern soldier,
whose rough manners were better adapted to the camp than the
palace. In December, 1723, the Nizam could tolerate this state of
things no longer. He determined to shake the dust of Delhi from off
his feet, and under the pretext of going on a hunting expedition to
retire to the Deccan. Muhammad Shah, however, knew that this
practically amounted to a declaration of independence, and treacher-
ously sent word to Mubariz Khan, the governor of Hyderabad, to
intercept and kill him if possible. Shahu, who disliked Mubariz
Khan, decided to help the Nizam, and Baji Rao found himself for
the first and last time, fighting side by side with his rival. The decisive
engagement took place at Shakarkhelda in Berar (11 October, 1724). 8
Mubari Khan was routed and killed, and the Nizam marched on to
Hyderabad and took it. He determined to make the city his capital,
for which it offered many advantages. Being further from Satara
than Aurangabad, it enabled him to conceal his movements more
i Grant Duff, 1, 366. For the Marathas in Gujarat, see Irvine, Later Mughuls,
II, chap. VIII, and Forbes, Ras Mala, Book II (chaps. I and v).
See chap. XII, p. 344.
3 See chap, XII, p. 350.


## p. 400 (#438) ############################################

400 RISE OF THE MARATHA EMPIRE (1707-1761)
>
effectually from the Marathas; and it was better placed for operations
against the Carnatic, upon which the Nizam had already designs.
From this time dates the virtual independence of the Nizam, and a
new factor is added to Deccan politics. Having failed to put him
out of the way, the emperor pardoned and confirmed him in the
government of the Deccan, depriving him, however, of the post of
minister and the provinces of Gujarat and Malwa.
The peace between the Nizam and the Marathas could not, in
the nature of things, endure very long. The Nizam chafed at the
presence of the Maratha tax-gatherers in Hyderabad, and in 1726,
while Baji Rao was away in the Carnatic, he pursued assiduously
his favourite policy of fishing in troubled waters always an easy
matter, as the Maratha chiefs cordially disliked the Chitpavan
domination at Shahu's court. Once again he came to terms with
prince Shambhuji of Kolhapur, who viewed with apprehension the
Peshwa's growing interest in Carnatic affairs. In 1726, while Baji
Rao was absent on a campaign, the two allies made a surprise attack
on Shahu, who was for a time in considerable danger. ?
The return of Baji Rao, however, soon restored that situation, and
after the Dasahra festival, on 13 September, 1727, the Peshwa ad-
vanced northwards, driving his enemy before him across the Godavari,
and devastating the country all round him. By a series of masterly
maneuvres he then proceeded to draw the Nizam into the waterless
region between Aurangabad and Paithan. Here he surrounded and
attacked him near the town of Palkhed (11 March, 1728). The
Nizam's artillery alone saved him from annihilation: retreat through
the devastated area was impossible, and on 22 March he was compelled
to sue for peace. Thus Baji Rao, unaided, had brought to his knees
the foremost soldier of his time. It was a feat of arms of which any
commander might well have been proud. The treaty was signed at
Mungi Shevgaon. The Nizam agreed to reinstate the Maratha tax-
gatherers, to pay up all arrears of chauth and sardeshmukhi, and to
recognise Shahu as sole monarch of the Deccan; but like an honour-
able soldier, he refused to consent to a clause requiring him to sur-
render his ally Shambhuji. The importance of this treaty can scarcely
be overestimated. It was a diplomatic triumph of the first order,
and a worthy sequel to the brilliant mancuvres in the field which
had preceded it. It left Shahu at last the undisputed ruler in his
ancestor's swarajya, and it was a deadly blow to Baji Rao's rivals in
the Maratha court. Little wonder that, after this, Shahu depended
still more upon his young minister, who had once again saved him
from virtual annihilation.
There still remained the smouldering embers of the war to be
extinguished. In Gujarat, Trimbak Rao Dabhade, who had suc-
1 Irvine, Later Mughuls, II, 146, 154.
? See chap. XIII, p. 380.


## p. 401 (#439) ############################################

TREATY OF WARNA
401
ceeded to the title of Senapati after the death of his father, the veteran
Khande Rao, in January, 1730,1 was assembling troops and plotting
with Pilaji Gaikwar and other chiefs, “to protect the Raja's authority",
by ridding him of his Peshwa. He had opened negotiations with
the Nizam; but Baji Rao, by means of his excellent system of
espionage, was well aware of all that was taking place. Meanwhile,
in the south, prince Shambhuji, who had been allowed to retire to
Panhala after the signing of the treaty, had allied himself to a free-
booter named Udaji Chauhan, and had encamped in bravado on the
north side of the Warna, insolently demanding to be recognised as
independent ruler of the southern half of the swarajya.
As Baji Rao was preoccupied with affairs in Gujarat, Shahu sent
Shripat Rao Pratinidhi to deal with his cousin. The Pratinidhi took
the field in January, 1730, and surprised the Kolhapur army while
it was encamped. The route was complete, and Shripat Rao captured
the royal camp with all its inmates, including Tara Bai, Rajas Bai,
Shambhuji's wife Jija Bai, and many Maratha chiefs of note. Shahu
behaved with his usual magnanimity. He released all his prisoners.
His aunt Tara Bai, however, asked not to be sent back. The lot of
the senior Maharani when the son of her co-wife reigns is never an
enviable one. "Wherever I go", she said, “I shall have a prison as
my lot: here or there is all one to me. Let me stay in peace. ” Her
request was, unfortunately for the state, acceded to: and the old
queen retired to Satara to bide her time for fresh plots. Meanwhile,
Shambhuji had surrendered unconditionally, and the two cousins met
at a magnificent darbar, where they were formally reconciled.
A treaty, commonly known as the treaty of Warna (the river being
the boundary between the territories of the combatants), was signed
on 13 April, 1731, which left Shambhuji with only a shadow of his
former power, and after this he ceases to be an important factor in
Maratha history until his death in 1760. The long strife between the
rival houses of Kolhapur and Satara, which had gone on since 1703,
was for the time being settled. --
Meanwhile, important events were taking place in the north.
Throughout the rainy season of 1730, Baji Rao had been making
preparations for the invasion of Gujarat, with the assistance of his
brother Chimaji Appa. On 10 October the brothers celebrated the
Dasahra in great splendour at Poona, and took the field at once. In
February, 1731, Baji Rao reached Ahmadabad, and concluded a
treaty with the new viceroy, Abhay Singh of Marwar, who had been
sent to supersede Sarbuland Khan. On 1 April, twelve days before
Shahu and Shambhuji signed the treaty of Warna, the Peshwa moved
out to meet the forces of Trimbak Rao and his lieutenant the Gaik-
i The date of Khande Rao's death is unknown. Grant Duff gives 1721, which
must be wrong, as conteinporary correspondence shows that he was still alive in
June, 1729. He probably died in July or August of that year.
26


## p. 402 (#440) ############################################

402
RISE OF THE MARATHA EMPIRE (1707-1761)
war, on the broad plain of Bilhapur, between Baroda and Dabhoi.
The Senapati's numerous levies proved no match for the small but
compact army of the Peshwa : the famous Khas Paga, the house-
hold cavalry, carried all before it. But Trimbak Rao, disdaining
offers to surrender, chained together the legs of his war-elephant,
and continued the fight single-handed, until a musket-ball (fired,
it is now known, by a traitor's hand) brought him down, while he
was drawing the bowstring to his ear.
his ear. The pious Shahu, deeply
shocked by this fratricidal strife, behaved with the utmost chivalry
towards the family of his late Senapati, and bestowed the office upon
his younger brother Yeshwant Rao. But the family of Dabhade never
recovered its prestige, and Baji Rao, his last and greatest rival
removed, was now sovereign in all but name. In Gujarat, the power
once wielded by the Dabhades passed to their erstwhile lieutenants,
the Gaikwars, the Mughul viceroy receding more and more into the
background. Pilaji Gaikwar was assassinated by Abhay Singh, the
Mughul viceroy, in 1732, and was succeeded by Damaji II, who was
present at Panipat, and died in 1768. 1
We must now turn our attention to Malwa, where Udaji Powar,
Malhar Rao Holkar and Ranoji Sindia had been steadily under-
mining the Mughul power. On 8 December, 1728, at Sarangpur, ,
they defeated and killed the governor, Raja Girdhar Bahadur, who
for ten years had struggled to prevent the Marathas from getting
a firm footing in his province. His successor, Daya Bahadur, suffered
a similar fate at Tala near Dhar (12 October, 1731). In 1732, the
Peshwa himself took command over the Maratha forces, sending
back his brother and Pilaji Jadav to watch over his interests at
Satara. On his arrival there he found the new viceroy was Muham-
mad Khan Bangash, whom he had defeated in Bundelkhand in 1729. 2
Muhammad Khan, receiving no support from Delhi, was unable to
stay the Maratha incursion and was relieved by Raja Jay Singh of
Amber. In 1733 the Peshwa placed in charge of Bundelkhand
a Brahman officer named Govind Pant Kher who afterwards was
known as Bundele and played a part in the Panipat campaign. The
great Rajput barons, who had once been the guardians of the empire
on its western borders, were now more and more openly throwing
off their allegiance, and welcoming the Marathas as the champions
of the Hindu religion. 3 In 1736, Jay Singh came to terms with the
Peshwa, appointing him as deputy-governor on condition that he did
not plunder imperial territories. This amounted to the virtual cession
of the province, and had not the smallest deterrent effect on Maratha
1 For the early history of the Gaikwars of Baroda, see Bombay Gazetteer,
vol vri, and Forbes, op. cit. Book III, chaps. I-m.
2 See chap. XII, p. 353. W. Irvine, The Bangash Nawabs of Farrukhabad,
p. 302, shows that the Bundelkhand campaign was before Muhammad Khan's
appointment to Malwa.
3 Malcolm, Central India, chaps. IV and v.


## p. 403 (#441) ############################################

RETURN OF THE NIZAM
403
depredations : the following year saw their horsemen crossing the
Jumna and plundering the Duab. It was now that Baji Rao planned
one of his boldest strokes. In March, 1737, Sa'adat Khan, the governor
of Oudh, had defeated Malhar Rao Holkar, and elated by his success
wrote a vainglorious letter to Delhi, boasting that he had driven
the Marathas across the Chambal. "Hearing this", wrote Baji Rao
to his brother, "I was resolved to let the emperor know the truth,
to prove that I was still in Hindustan, and to shew him flames and
the Marathas at the gate of the capital. " i Gathering a picked body
1
of horsemen and covering ten days' march in two, he swooped down
upon Delhi. Fugitives, distraught with terror, poured into the city,
The government, at first incredulous and then panic-stricken,
gathered together all available forces and despatched them to chastise
the invaders. Baji Rao, adopting the usual Maratha tactics, skilfully
fell back until he had drawn his opponents away from the walls and
well out into the open. Then he turned, and in a moment, Malhar
Rao Holkar, with Ranoji Sindia hard at his heels, crashed into their
ranks. That day the Maratha sword and lance drank deep of the
blood of the proudest of the Mughul nobles : over six hundred were
slain, and the troopers helped themselves freely to riderless horses
with their gorgeous equipments of cloth of gold. The terrified
emperor awaited in fear and trembling the approach of the victors;
but before dawn Baji Rao had vanished as swiftly as he came,
cleverly outmanoeuvring an imperial army under the minister whicin
tried to cut off his retreat (April, 1737).
By this time the opinion began to prevail that only one person
could save the empire, and stem the flood of Maratha invasion.
This was the Nizam, who, as we have seen, had shaken the dust
of Delhi from off his feet fourteen years before. He was now at
Burhanpur, closely watched by Chimaji Appa, who had received
orders, if his opponent crossed the Narbada, "to fall on his rear and
put heel-ropes on him". The Nizam's change of front was no doubt
inspired by the apprehensions he must have felt at the growing power
of the Marathas in Hindustan.
In April, 1737, the Nizam set out for Delhi, by way of Gwalior
and Agra. The capital was reached in July, and his reception was
one of the most amazing sights ever witnessed in that ancient city :
the minister escorted him personally to the emperor's presence,
amidst crowds which loudly welcomed him as their saviour. After
staying as the imperial guest until August, he took the field in order
to drive the marauders out of Hindustan. But he found Baji Rao
awaiting him, and once more he proved no match for his nimble
antagonist.
He suffered himself to be shepherded into Bhopal,
1 W. Irvine, Later Mughuls, II, 287. The letter is quoted in full in Kincaid and
Parasnis, History of the Maratha People, pp. 451-3.
2 Irvine, Later Mighuls, 11, 301.


## p. 404 (#442) ############################################

404 RISE OF THE MARATHA EMPIRE (1707-1761)
where he was closely besieged, and, as at Palkhed almost exactly
ten years earlier, he was once more compelled by the Peshwa to sign
a humiliating treaty. He agreed to grant to Baji Rao the whole of
Malwa, with the complete sovereignty of the territory between the
Narbada and the Chambal, and to obtain the emperor's confirma-
tion for these terms. Hence the calling-in of the Nizam, instead of
helping the emperor, merely led to the humiliation of both, and to
the crowning triumph of Baji Rao. The Mughul empire was tottering
to its fall : it only needed the invasion of Nadir Shah, already looming
on the horizon, to complete its destruction.
The sudden irruption of Nadir Shah into Hindustan, in 1739,
caused a panic at Poona, and for a moment Baji Rao thought that
he might continue his march southward into the Deccan. "Our
domestic quarrels”, he wrote, "are now insignificant : there is now
but one enemy in Hindustan. Hindu and Mussalman, the whole
power of the Deccan, must assemble, and I shall spread our Mara-
thas from the Narbada to the Chambal. " Fortunately, the menaced
invasion of the Deccan failed to materialise, and the Peshwa was
able to continue his operations uninterrupted. Malwa and Gujarat
had been virtually added to the Maratha empire, but the Konkan,
the fertile strip of country between the Ghats and the sea, still
remained unsubdued. Here were three rival powers, the Angrias of
Kolaba, the Abyssinians of Janjira, and the Portuguese. The Angrias,
in spite of Kanhoji's agreement with Shahu, defied the control of
the Peshwas, and levied, on their own authority, the "chauth of the
sea" on passing vessels. Equally powerful were their rivals the
Sidis, the hereditary Mughul admirals. The Maratha campaigns in
the Konkan were, however, a failure, and their chief result was
to bring the Marathas into contact with the Portuguese. The
Portuguese had been old enemies of the Marathas, on religious as
well as political grounds, but during the Peshwa's preoccupations
in the north, they had been left in peace. Their possessions on the
Bombay coast were grouped together under the title of the "province
of the north"; its governor, "the general of the north", had his
capital at Bassein. The island of Salsette, which was in Portuguese
hands, is separated from the mainland by a long, narrow creek or
arm of the sea, Bassein at the northern and Thana at the southern
extremities of which guarded the two entrances. Along the coast
were a number of fortified posts. But the Portuguese power was fast
declining. They were a proud, indolent race, with little aptitude for
commerce. The English and Dutch had driven their fleets off the
sea, and in 1661, the Lisbon government, despite frantic protests
from Goa, had suicidally ceded the island of Bombay, at the southern
extremity of Salsette, with its excellent harbour, to the English. ”
Receiving little or no help from home, the Portuguese had allowed
1 See Kincaid and Parasnis, chap. XXXIII.
• See Vol. v, p. 86.


## p. 405 (#443) ############################################

SIEGE OF BASSEIN
405
their fortresses to fall into a state of disrepair : the walls were ruinous
and manned only by a handful of tattered soldiers with a few rusty
cannon. Baji Rao cast covetous eyes on the fertile and almost
defenceless island of Salsette with its green rice fields, groves and
orchards. Here was a fruit ready to be plucked. The excuse, if one
was needed, was afforded by the haughty Luis Botelho, the governor
of Bassein, who grossly insulted the Peshwa's envoy by speaking of
his master as a "nigger". 1
Baji Rao concentrated a large force at Poona in the cold weather
of 1736-37, and being himself fully occupied with events in Hindu-
stan, he entrusted it to his brother Chimaji Appa. The Maratha
army moved down the passes with great speed and secrecy, and on
6 April, 1737, captured Thana, which, as we have seen, commanded
the southern entrance of the Salsette channel. Until the break of
the monsoon, the Marathas occupied their time in overrunning
Salsette and reducing the fortress on the island. As soon as the
rains were over, they made a general assault on Bassein itself, but
the storming party, 9000 strong, was completely defeated by its
gallant defenders, who manned the walls, sword in hand, threw down
the scaling-ladders, and killed or captured every one who reached
the ramparts. Meanwhile the government of Goa, at last awake to
the situation, sent shiploads of troops under Pedro de Mello to the
relief of Bassein. De Mello at once realised that Thana was the key
to the position : could he retake it, the Maratha forces in Salsette
would be cut off. But in the meantime, the Marathas also received
large reinforcements : Baji Rao's campaign in Malwa had come to a
successful conclusion, and Holkar and other Maratha leaders had
hastened to the scene of operations. De Mello was killed in action,
and his troops were driven back to their boats in disorder.
Bassein was now doomed. The Portuguese appealed for help to
the English at Bombay, and it cannot be said that the latter behaved
with credit in the matter. They had, indeed, little love for their
rivals, and they were anxious to do nothing to offend the Marathas.
They accordingly temporised : to the Portuguese they merely tend-
ered good advice, while to the Marathas they supplied powder and
shot : it was even asserted that the Portuguese commander was killed
by a piece aimed by an English gunner. The letters of the Portuguese
commandant are full of dignity and pathos. The garrison, he says, is
starving, and worn out by constant fighting. There is no money to
pay the soldiers. All the church plate has long ago been melted down.
"The Marathas have carried on mines, covered ways and other
approaches to the very foundation of the wall, their batteries being
very near the town : they throw large stones into the place from
mortars. ” A little moved by this touching appeal, the council sent
1 “Tratando o de Negro", Kincaid and Parasnis, 261 note, quoting a Portu-
guese authority.
>


## p. 406 (#444) ############################################

406 RISE OF THE MARATHA EMPIRE (1707-1761)
them two hundred barrels of gunpowder, and four thousand rounds
of cannon-shot. Later, with the quixotic gallantry of his nation, the
commandant actually offered to pledge to the English some of his
best cannon in return for further supplies, “having this considera-
tion, that it is most becoming my nation that it should be known
to the world how, for the preservation of their king's city, Bassein
was stripped of its artillery, the principal instruments of its defence,
whilst they put their trust more in their personal valour, in their
constant fidelity and zeal, than on the extraordinary force or hard-
ness of metal”.