x, 5 "the
virtuous
man is a kind
of measure and rule of human actions"; and the Apostle says (1 Cor.
of measure and rule of human actions"; and the Apostle says (1 Cor.
Summa Theologica
vii, 14.
Reply to Objection 3: Bodily goods are conditioned by a certain fixed
measure: wherefore surfeit of such things destroys the proper good, and
consequently gives rise to disgust and sorrow, through being contrary
to the proper good of man.
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Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that wonder is not a cause of pleasure.
Because wonder is the act of one who is ignorant of the nature of
something, as Damascene says. But knowledge, rather than ignorance, is
a cause of pleasure. Therefore wonder is not a cause of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, wonder is the beginning of wisdom, being as it
were, the road to the search of truth, as stated in the beginning of
Metaph. i, 2. But "it is more pleasant to think of what we know, than
to seek what we know not," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 7): since
in the latter case we encounter difficulties and hindrances, in the
former not; while pleasure arises from an operation which is
unhindered, as stated in Ethic. vii, 12,13. Therefore wonder hinders
rather than causes pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, everyone takes pleasure in what he is accustomed
to: wherefore the actions of habits acquired by custom, are pleasant.
But "we wonder at what is unwonted," as Augustine says (Tract. xxiv in
Joan. ). Therefore wonder is contrary to the cause of pleasure.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that wonder is the
cause of pleasure.
I answer that, It is pleasant to get what one desires, as stated above
([1283]Q[23], A[4]): and therefore the greater the desire for the thing
loved, the greater the pleasure when it is attained: indeed the very
increase of desire brings with it an increase of pleasure, according as
it gives rise to the hope of obtaining that which is loved, since it
was stated above (A[3], ad 3) that desire resulting from hope is a
cause of pleasure. Now wonder is a kind of desire for knowledge; a
desire which comes to man when he sees an effect of which the cause
either is unknown to him, or surpasses his knowledge or faculty of
understanding. Consequently wonder is a cause of pleasure, in so far as
it includes a hope of getting the knowledge which one desires to have.
For this reason whatever is wonderful is pleasing, for instance things
that are scarce. Also, representations of things, even of those which
are not pleasant in themselves, give rise to pleasure; for the soul
rejoices in comparing one thing with another, because comparison of one
thing with another is the proper and connatural act of the reason, as
the Philosopher says (Poet. iv). This again is why "it is more
delightful to be delivered from great danger, because it is something
wonderful," as stated in Rhetor. i, 11.
Reply to Objection 1: Wonder gives pleasure, not because it implies
ignorance, but in so far as it includes the desire of learning the
cause, and in so far as the wonderer learns something new, i. e. that
the cause is other than he had thought it to be. [*According to another
reading:---that he is other than he thought himself to be. ]
Reply to Objection 2: Pleasure includes two things; rest in the good,
and perception of this rest. As to the former therefore, since it is
more perfect to contemplate the known truth, than to seek for the
unknown, the contemplation of what we know, is in itself more pleasing
than the research of what we do not know. Nevertheless, as to the
second, it happens that research is sometimes more pleasing
accidentally, in so far as it proceeds from a greater desire: for
greater desire is awakened when we are conscious of our ignorance. This
is why man takes the greatest pleasure in finding or learning things
for the first time.
Reply to Objection 3: It is pleasant to do what we are wont to do,
inasmuch as this is connatural to us, as it were. And yet things that
are of rare occurrence can be pleasant, either as regards knowledge,
from the fact that we desire to know something about them, in so far as
they are wonderful; or as regards action, from the fact that "the mind
is more inclined by desire to act intensely in things that are new," as
stated in Ethic. x, 4, since more perfect operation causes more perfect
pleasure.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE EFFECTS OF PLEASURE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effects of pleasure; and under this head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure?
(2) Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself?
(3) Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason?
(4) Whether pleasure perfects operation?
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Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that expansion is not an effect of pleasure.
For expansion seems to pertain more to love, according to the Apostle
(2 Cor. 6:11): "Our heart is enlarged. " Wherefore it is written (Ps.
118:96) concerning the precept of charity: "Thy commandment is
exceeding broad. " But pleasure is a distinct passion from love.
Therefore expansion is not an effect of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, when a thing expands it is enabled to receive
more. But receiving pertains to desire, which is for something not yet
possessed. Therefore expansion seems to belong to desire rather than to
pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, contraction is contrary to expansion. But
contraction seems to belong to pleasure, for the hand closes on that
which we wish to grasp firmly: and such is the affection of appetite in
regard to that which pleases it. Therefore expansion does not pertain
to pleasure.
On the contrary, In order to express joy, it is written (Is. 60:5):
"Thou shall see and abound, thy heart shall wonder and be enlarged. "
Moreover pleasure is called by the name of "laetitia" as being derived
from "dilatatio" [expansion], as stated above ([1284]Q[31], A[3], ad
3).
I answer that, Breadth [latitudo] is a dimension of bodily magnitude:
hence it is not applied to the emotions of the soul, save
metaphorically. Now expansion denotes a kind of movement towards
breadth; and it belongs to pleasure in respect of the two things
requisite for pleasure. One of these is on the part of the apprehensive
power, which is cognizant of the conjunction with some suitable good.
As a result of this apprehension, man perceives that he has attained a
certain perfection, which is a magnitude of the spiritual order: and in
this respect man's mind is said to be magnified or expanded by
pleasure. The other requisite for pleasure is on the part of the
appetitive power, which acquiesces in the pleasurable object, and rests
therein, offering, as it were, to enfold it within itself. And thus
man's affection is expanded by pleasure, as though it surrendered
itself to hold within itself the object of its pleasure.
Reply to Objection 1: In metaphorical expressions nothing hinders one
and the same thing from being attributed to different things according
to different likenesses. And in this way expansion pertains to love by
reason of a certain spreading out, in so far as the affection of the
lover spreads out to others, so as to care, not only for his own
interests, but also for what concerns others. On the other hand
expansion pertains to pleasure, in so far as a thing becomes more ample
in itself so as to become more capacious.
Reply to Objection 2: Desire includes a certain expansion arising from
the imagination of the thing desired; but this expansion increases at
the presence of the pleasurable object: because the mind surrenders
itself more to that object when it is already taking pleasure in it,
than when it desires it before possessing it; since pleasure is the end
of desire.
Reply to Objection 3: He that takes pleasure in a thing holds it fast,
by clinging to it with all his might: but he opens his heart to it that
he may enjoy it perfectly.
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Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself?
Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure does not cause desire for
itself. Because all movement ceases when repose is reached. But
pleasure is, as it were, a certain repose of the movement of desire, as
stated above ([1285]Q[23], A[4];[1286] Q[25], A[2]). Therefore the
movement of desire ceases when pleasure is reached. Therefore pleasure
does not cause desire.
Objection 2: Further, a thing does not cause its contrary. But pleasure
is, in a way, contrary to desire, on the part of the object: since
desire regards a good which is not yet possessed, whereas pleasure
regards the good that is possessed. Therefore pleasure does not cause
desire for itself.
Objection 3: Further, distaste is incompatible with desire. But
pleasure often causes distaste. Therefore it does not cause desire.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 4:13): "Whosoever drinketh of this
water, shall thirst again": where, according to Augustine (Tract. xv in
Joan. ), water denotes pleasures of the body.
I answer that, Pleasure can be considered in two ways; first, as
existing in reality; secondly, as existing in the memory. Again thirst,
or desire, can be taken in two ways; first, properly, as denoting a
craving for something not possessed; secondly, in general, as excluding
distaste.
Considered as existing in reality, pleasure does not of itself cause
thirst or desire for itself, but only accidentally; provided we take
thirst or desire as denoting a craving for some thing not possessed:
because pleasure is an emotion of the appetite in respect of something
actually present. But it may happen that what is actually present is
not perfectly possessed: and this may be on the part of the thing
possessed, or on the part of the possessor. On the part of the thing
possessed, this happens through the thing possessed not being a
simultaneous whole; wherefore one obtains possession of it
successively, and while taking pleasure in what one has, one desires to
possess the remainder: thus if a man is pleased with the first part of
a verse, he desires to hear the second part, as Augustine says
(Confess. iv, 11). In this way nearly all bodily pleasures cause thirst
for themselves, until they are fully realized, because pleasures of
this kind arise from some movement: as is evident in pleasures of the
table. On the part of the possessor, this happens when a man possesses
a thing which is perfect in itself, yet does not possess it perfectly,
but obtains possession of it little by little. Thus in this life, a
faint perception of Divine knowledge affords us delight, and delight
sets up a thirst or desire for perfect knowledge; in which sense we may
understand the words of Ecclus. 24:29: "They that drink me shall yet
thirst. "
On the other hand, if by thirst or desire we understand the mere
intensity of the emotion, that excludes distaste, thus more than all
others spiritual pleasures cause thirst or desire for themselves.
Because bodily pleasures become distasteful by reason of their causing
an excess in the natural mode of being, when they are increased or even
when they are protracted; as is evident in the case of pleasures of the
table. This is why, when a man arrives at the point of perfection in
bodily pleasures, he wearies of them, and sometimes desires another
kind. Spiritual pleasures, on the contrary, do not exceed the natural
mode of being, but perfect nature. Hence when their point of perfection
is reached, then do they afford the greatest delight: except,
perchance, accidentally, in so far as the work of contemplation is
accompanied by some operation of the bodily powers, which tire from
protracted activity. And in this sense also we may understand those
words of Ecclus. 24:29: "They that drink me shall yet thirst": for,
even of the angels, who know God perfectly, and delight in Him, it is
written (1 Pet. 1:12) that they "desire to look at Him. "
Lastly, if we consider pleasure, not as existing in reality, but as
existing in the memory, thus it has of itself a natural tendency to
cause thirst and desire for itself: when, to wit, man returns to that
disposition, in which he was when he experienced the pleasure that is
past. But if he be changed from that disposition, the memory of that
pleasure does not give him pleasure, but distaste: for instance, the
memory of food in respect of a man who has eaten to repletion.
Reply to Objection 1: When pleasure is perfect, then it includes
complete rest; and the movement of desire, tending to what was not
possessed, ceases. But when it is imperfect, then the desire, tending
to what was not possessed, does not cease altogether.
Reply to Objection 2: That which is possessed imperfectly, is possessed
in one respect, and in another respect is not possessed. Consequently
it may be the object of desire and pleasure at the same time.
Reply to Objection 3: Pleasures cause distaste in one way, desire in
another, as stated above.
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Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure does not hinder the use of
reason. Because repose facilitates very much the due use of reason:
wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, 3) that "while we sit and
rest, the soul is inclined to knowledge and prudence"; and it is
written (Wis. 8:16): "When I go into my house, I shall repose myself
with her," i. e. wisdom. But pleasure is a kind of repose. Therefore it
helps rather than hinders the use of reason.
Objection 2: Further, things which are not in the same subject though
they be contraries, do not hinder one another. But pleasure is in the
appetitive faculty, while the use of reason is in the apprehensive
power. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use of reason.
Objection 3: Further, that which is hindered by another, seems to be
moved, as it were, thereby. But the use of an apprehensive power moves
pleasure rather than is moved by it: because it is the cause of
pleasure. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use of reason.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5), that "pleasure
destroys the estimate of prudence. "
I answer that, As is stated in Ethic. x, 5, "appropriate pleasures
increase activity . . . whereas pleasures arising from other sources
are impediments to activity. " Accordingly there is a certain pleasure
that is taken in the very act of reason, as when one takes pleasure in
contemplating or in reasoning: and such pleasure does not hinder the
act of reason, but helps it; because we are more attentive in doing
that which gives us pleasure, and attention fosters activity.
On the other hand bodily pleasures hinder the use of reason in three
ways. First, by distracting the reason. Because, as we have just
observed, we attend much to that which pleases us. Now when the
attention is firmly fixed on one thing, it is either weakened in
respect of other things, or it is entirely withdrawn from them; and
thus if the bodily pleasure be great, either it entirely hinders the
use of reason, by concentrating the mind's attention on itself; or else
it hinders it considerably. Secondly, by being contrary to reason.
Because some pleasures, especially those that are in excess, are
contrary to the order of reason: and in this sense the Philosopher says
that "bodily pleasures destroy the estimate of prudence, but not the
speculative estimate," to which they are not opposed, "for instance
that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right
angles. " In the first sense, however, they hinder both estimates.
Thirdly, by fettering the reason: in so far as bodily pleasure is
followed by a certain alteration in the body, greater even than in the
other passions, in proportion as the appetite is more vehemently
affected towards a present than towards an absent thing. Now such
bodily disturbances hinder the use of reason; as may be seen in the
case of drunkards, in whom the use of reason is fettered or hindered.
Reply to Objection 1: Bodily pleasure implies indeed repose of the
appetite in the object of pleasure; which repose is sometimes contrary
to reason; but on the part of the body it always implies alteration.
And in respect of both points, it hinders the use of reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The powers of the appetite and of apprehension
are indeed distinct parts, but belonging to the one soul. Consequently
when the soul is very intent on the action of one part, it is hindered
from attending to a contrary act of the other part.
Reply to Objection 3: The use of reason requires the due use of the
imagination and of the other sensitive powers, which are exercised
through a bodily organ. Consequently alteration in the body hinders the
use of reason, because it hinders the act of the imagination and of the
other sensitive powers.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether pleasure perfects operation?
Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure does not perfect operation.
For every human operation depends on the use of reason. But pleasure
hinders the use of reason, as stated above [1287](A[3]). Therefore
pleasure does not perfect, but weakens human operation.
Objection 2: Further, nothing perfects itself or its cause. But
pleasure is an operation (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 4), i. e. either in its
essence or in its cause. Therefore pleasure does not perfect operation.
Objection 3: Further, if pleasure perfects operation, it does so either
as end, or as form, or as agent. But not as end; because operation is
not sought for the sake of pleasure, but rather the reverse, as stated
above ([1288]Q[4], A[2]): nor as agent, because rather is it the
operation that causes pleasure: nor again as form, because, according
to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 4), "pleasure does not perfect operation,
as a habit does. " Therefore pleasure does not perfect operation.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure
perfects operation. "
I answer that, Pleasure perfects operation in two ways. First, as an
end: not indeed according as an end is that on "account of which a
thing is"; but according as every good which is added to a thing and
completes it, can be called its end. And in this sense the Philosopher
says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects operation . . . as some end
added to it": that is to say, inasmuch as to this good, which is
operation, there is added another good, which is pleasure, denoting the
repose of the appetite in a good that is presupposed. Secondly, as
agent; not indeed directly, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that
"pleasure perfects operation, not as a physician makes a man healthy,
but as health does": but it does so indirectly; inasmuch as the agent,
through taking pleasure in his action, is more eagerly intent on it,
and carries it out with greater care. And in this sense it is said in
Ethic. x, 5 that "pleasures increase their appropriate activities, and
hinder those that are not appropriate. "
Reply to Objection 1: It is not every pleasure that hinders the act of
reason, but only bodily pleasure; for this arises, not from the act of
reason, but from the act of the concupiscible faculty, which act is
intensified by pleasure. On the contrary, pleasure that arises from the
act of reason, strengthens the use of reason.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated in Phys. ii, 3 two things may be causes
of one another, if one be the efficient, the other the final cause. And
in this way, operation is the efficient cause of pleasure, while
pleasure perfects operation by way of final cause, as stated above.
The Reply to the Third Objection is evident for what has been said.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF PLEASURES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the goodness and malice of pleasures: under which
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether every pleasure is evil?
(2) If not, whether every pleasure is good?
(3) Whether any pleasure is the greatest good?
(4) Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral
good and evil?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether every pleasure is evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that every pleasure is evil. For that which
destroys prudence and hinders the use of reason, seems to be evil in
itself: since man's good is to be "in accord with reason," as Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure destroys prudence and hinders the use
of reason; and so much the more, as the pleasure is greater: wherefore
"in sexual pleasures," which are the greatest of all, "it is impossible
to understand anything," as stated in Ethic. vii, 11. Moreover, Jerome
says in his commentary on Matthew [*Origen, Hom. vi in Num. ] that "at
the time of conjugal intercourse, the presence of the Holy Ghost is not
vouchsafed, even if it be a prophet that fulfils the conjugal duty. "
Therefore pleasure is evil in itself; and consequently every pleasure
is evil.
Objection 2: Further, that which the virtuous man shuns, and the man
lacking in virtue seeks, seems to be evil in itself, and should be
avoided; because, as stated in Ethic.
x, 5 "the virtuous man is a kind
of measure and rule of human actions"; and the Apostle says (1 Cor.
2:15): "The spiritual man judgeth all things. " But children and dumb
animals, in whom there is no virtue, seek pleasure: whereas the man who
is master of himself does not. Therefore pleasures are evil in
themselves and should be avoided.
Objection 3: Further, "virtue and art are concerned about the difficult
and the good" (Ethic. ii, 3). But no art is ordained to pleasure.
Therefore pleasure is not something good.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 36:4): "Delight in the Lord. "
Since, therefore, Divine authority leads to no evil, it seems that not
every pleasure is evil.
I answer that, As stated in Ethic. x, 2,[3] some have maintained that
all pleasure is evil. The reason seems to have been that they took
account only of sensible and bodily pleasures which are more manifest;
since, also in other respects, the ancient philosophers did not
discriminate between the intelligible and the sensible, nor between
intellect and sense (De Anima iii, 3). And they held that all bodily
pleasures should be reckoned as bad, and thus that man, being prone to
immoderate pleasures, arrives at the mean of virtue by abstaining from
pleasure. But they were wrong in holding this opinion. Because, since
none can live without some sensible and bodily pleasure, if they who
teach that all pleasures are evil, are found in the act of taking
pleasure; men will be more inclined to pleasure by following the
example of their works instead of listening to the doctrine of their
words: since, in human actions and passions, wherein experience is of
great weight, example moves more than words.
We must therefore say that some pleasures are good, and that some are
evil. For pleasure is a repose of the appetitive power in some loved
good, and resulting from some operation; wherefore we assign a twofold
reason for this assertion. The first is in respect of the good in which
a man reposes with pleasure. For good and evil in the moral order
depend on agreement or disagreement with reason, as stated above
([1289]Q[18], A[5]): just as in the order of nature, a thing is said to
be natural, if it agrees with nature, and unnatural, if it disagrees.
Accordingly, just as in the natural order there is a certain natural
repose, whereby a thing rests in that which agrees with its nature, for
instance, when a heavy body rests down below; and again an unnatural
repose, whereby a thing rests in that which disagrees with its nature,
as when a heavy body rests up aloft: so, in the moral order, there is a
good pleasure, whereby the higher or lower appetite rests in that which
is in accord with reason; and an evil pleasure, whereby the appetite
rests in that which is discordant from reason and the law of God.
The second reason can be found by considering the actions, some of
which are good, some evil. Now pleasures which are conjoined to actions
are more akin to those actions, than desires, which precede them in
point of time. Wherefore, since the desires of good actions are good,
and of evil actions, evil; much more are the pleasures of good actions
good, and those of evil actions evil.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (Q[33], A[3]), it is not the
pleasures which result from an act of reason, that hinder the reason or
destroy prudence, but extraneous pleasures, such as the pleasures of
the body. These indeed hinder the use of reason, as stated above
(Q[33], A[3]), either by contrariety of the appetite that rests in
something repugnant to reason, which makes the pleasure morally bad; or
by fettering the reason: thus in conjugal intercourse, though the
pleasure be in accord with reason, yet it hinders the use of reason, on
account of the accompanying bodily change. But in this case the
pleasure is not morally evil; as neither is sleep, whereby the reason
is fettered, morally evil, if it be taken according to reason: for
reason itself demands that the use of reason be interrupted at times.
We must add, however, that although this fettering of the reason
through the pleasure of conjugal intercourse has no moral malice, since
it is neither a mortal nor a venial sin; yet it proceeds from a kind of
moral malice, namely, from the sin of our first parent; because, as
stated in the [1290]FP, Q[98], A[2] the case was different in the state
of innocence.
Reply to Objection 2: The temperate man does not shun all pleasures,
but those that are immoderate, and contrary to reason. The fact that
children and dumb animals seek pleasures, does not prove that all
pleasures are evil: because they have from God their natural appetite,
which is moved to that which is naturally suitable to them.
Reply to Objection 3: Art is not concerned with all kinds of good, but
with the making of external things, as we shall state further on
([1291]Q[57], A[3]). But actions and passions, which are within us, are
more the concern of prudence and virtue than of art. Nevertheless there
is an art of making pleasure, namely, "the art of cookery and the art
of making arguments," as stated in Ethic. vii, 12.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether every pleasure is good?
Objection 1: It would seem that every pleasure is good. Because as
stated in the [1292]FP, Q[5], A[6] there are three kinds of good: the
virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant. But everything virtuous is
good; and in like manner everything useful is good. Therefore also
every pleasure is good.
Objection 2: Further, that which is not sought for the sake of
something else, is good in itself, as stated in Ethic. i, 6,7. But
pleasure is not sought for the sake of something else; for it seems
absurd to ask anyone why he seeks to be pleased. Therefore pleasure is
good in itself. Now that which is predicated to a thing considered in
itself, is predicated thereof universally. Therefore every pleasure is
good.
Objection 3: Further, that which is desired by all, seems to be good of
itself: because good is "what all things seek," as stated in Ethic. i,
1. But everyone seeks some kind of pleasure, even children and dumb
animals. Therefore pleasure is good in itself: and consequently all
pleasure is good.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 2:14): "Who are glad when they
have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things. "
I answer that, While some of the Stoics maintained that all pleasures
are evil, the Epicureans held that pleasure is good in itself, and that
consequently all pleasures are good. They seem to have thus erred
through not discriminating between that which is good simply, and that
which is good in respect of a particular individual. That which is good
simply, is good in itself. Now that which is not good in itself, may be
good in respect of some individual in two ways. In one way, because it
is suitable to him by reason of a disposition in which he is now, which
disposition, however, is not natural: thus it is sometimes good for a
leper to eat things that are poisonous, which are not suitable simply
to the human temperament. In another way, through something unsuitable
being esteemed suitable. And since pleasure is the repose of the
appetite in some good, if the appetite reposes in that which is good
simply, the pleasure will be pleasure simply, and good simply. But if a
man's appetite repose in that which is good, not simply, but in respect
of that particular man, then his pleasure will not be pleasure simply,
but a pleasure to him; neither will it be good simply, but in a certain
respect, or an apparent good.
Reply to Objection 1: The virtuous and the useful depend on accordance
with reason, and consequently nothing is virtuous or useful, without
being good. But the pleasant depends on agreement with the appetite,
which tends sometimes to that which is discordant from reason.
Consequently not every object of pleasure is good in the moral order
which depends on the order of reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The reason why pleasure is not sought for the
sake of something else is because it is repose in the end. Now the end
may be either good or evil; although nothing can be an end except in so
far as it is good in respect of such and such a man: and so too with
regard to pleasure.
Reply to Objection 3: All things seek pleasure in the same way as they
seek good: since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in good. But,
just as it happens that not every good which is desired, is of itself
and verily good; so not every pleasure is of itself and verily good.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether any pleasure is the greatest good?
Objection 1: It would seem that no pleasure is the greatest good.
Because nothing generated is the greatest good: since generation cannot
be the last end. But pleasure is a consequence of generation: for the
fact that a thing takes pleasure is due to its being established in its
own nature, as stated above ([1293]Q[31], A[1]). Therefore no pleasure
is the greatest good.
Objection 2: Further, that which is the greatest good cannot be made
better by addition. But pleasure is made better by addition; since
pleasure together with virtue is better than pleasure without virtue.
Therefore pleasure is not the greatest good.
Objection 3: Further, that which is the greatest good is universally
good, as being good of itself: since that which is such of itself is
prior to and greater than that which is such accidentally. But pleasure
is not universally good, as stated above [1294](A[2]). Therefore
pleasure is not the greatest good.
On the contrary, Happiness is the greatest good: since it is the end of
man's life. But Happiness is not without pleasure: for it is written
(Ps. 15:11): "Thou shalt fill me with joy with Thy countenance; at Thy
right hand are delights even to the end. "
I answer that, Plato held neither with the Stoics, who asserted that
all pleasures are evil, nor with the Epicureans, who maintained that
all pleasures are good; but he said that some are good, and some evil;
yet, so that no pleasure be the sovereign or greatest good. But,
judging from his arguments, he fails in two points. First, because,
from observing that sensible and bodily pleasure consists in a certain
movement and "becoming," as is evident in satiety from eating and the
like; he concluded that all pleasure arises from some "becoming" and
movement: and from this, since "becoming" and movement are the acts of
something imperfect, it would follow that pleasure is not of the nature
of ultimate perfection. But this is seen to be evidently false as
regards intellectual pleasures: because one takes pleasure, not only in
the "becoming" of knowledge, for instance, when one learns or wonders,
as stated above ([1295]Q[32], A[8], ad 2); but also in the act of
contemplation, by making use of knowledge already acquired.
Secondly, because by greatest good he understood that which is the
supreme good simply, i. e. the good as existing apart from, and
unparticipated by, all else, in which sense God is the Supreme Good;
whereas we are speaking of the greatest good in human things. Now the
greatest good of everything is its last end. And the end, as stated
above ([1296]Q[1], A[8];[1297] Q[2], A[7]) is twofold; namely, the
thing itself, and the use of that thing; thus the miser's end is either
money or the possession of money. Accordingly, man's last end may be
said to be either God Who is the Supreme Good simply; or the enjoyment
of God, which implies a certain pleasure in the last end. And in this
sense a certain pleasure of man may be said to be the greatest among
human goods.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every pleasure arises from a "becoming"; for
some pleasures result from perfect operations, as stated above.
Accordingly nothing prevents some pleasure being the greatest good,
although every pleasure is not such.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument is true of the greatest good
simply, by participation of which all things are good; wherefore no
addition can make it better: whereas in regard to other goods, it is
universally true that any good becomes better by the addition of
another good. Moreover it might be said that pleasure is not something
extraneous to the operation of virtue, but that it accompanies it, as
stated in Ethic. i, 8.
Reply to Objection 3: That pleasure is the greatest good is due not to
the mere fact that it is pleasure, but to the fact that it is perfect
repose in the perfect good. Hence it does not follow that every
pleasure is supremely good, or even good at all. Thus a certain science
is supremely good, but not every science is.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good or
evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure is not the measure or rule of
moral good and evil. Because "that which is first in a genus is the
measure of all the rest" (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasure is not the first
thing in the moral genus, for it is preceded by love and desire.
Therefore it is not the rule of goodness and malice in moral matters.
Objection 2: Further, a measure or rule should be uniform; hence that
movement which is the most uniform, is the measure and rule of all
movements (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasures are various and multiform:
since some of them are good, and some evil. Therefore pleasure is not
the measure and rule of morals.
Objection 3: Further, judgment of the effect from its cause is more
certain than judgment of cause from effect. Now goodness or malice of
operation is the cause of goodness or malice of pleasure: because
"those pleasures are good which result from good operations, and those
are evil which arise from evil operations," as stated in Ethic. x, 5.
Therefore pleasures are not the rule and measure of moral goodness and
malice.
On the contrary, Augustine, commenting on Ps. 7:10 "The searcher of
hearts and reins is God," says: "The end of care and thought is the
pleasure which each one aims at achieving. " And the Philosopher says
(Ethic. vii, 11) that "pleasure is the architect," i. e. the principal,
"end [*St. Thomas took "finis" as being the nominative, whereas it is
the genitive---{tou telous}; and the Greek reads "He" (i. e. the
political philosopher), "is the architect of the end. "], in regard to
which, we say absolutely that this is evil, and that, good. "
I answer that, Moral goodness or malice depends chiefly on the will, as
stated above ([1298]Q[20], A[1]); and it is chiefly from the end that
we discern whether the will is good or evil. Now the end is taken to be
that in which the will reposes: and the repose of the will and of every
appetite in the good is pleasure. And therefore man is reckoned to be
good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure of the human will; since
that man is good and virtuous, who takes pleasure in the works of
virtue; and that man evil, who takes pleasure in evil works.
On the other hand, pleasures of the sensitive appetite are not the rule
of moral goodness and malice; since food is universally pleasurable to
the sensitive appetite both of good and of evil men. But the will of
the good man takes pleasure in them in accordance with reason, to which
the will of the evil man gives no heed.
Reply to Objection 1: Love and desire precede pleasure in the order of
generation. But pleasure precedes them in the order of the end, which
serves a principle in actions; and it is by the principle, which is the
rule and measure of such matters, that we form our judgment.
Reply to Objection 2: All pleasures are uniform in the point of their
being the repose of the appetite in something good: and in this respect
pleasure can be a rule or measure. Because that man is good, whose will
rests in the true good: and that man evil, whose will rests in evil.
Reply to Objection 3: Since pleasure perfects operation as its end, as
stated above ([1299]Q[33], A[4]); an operation cannot be perfectly
good, unless there be also pleasure in good: because the goodness of a
thing depends on its end. And thus, in a way, the goodness of the
pleasure is the cause of goodness in the operation.
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OF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We have now to consider pain and sorrow: concerning which we must
consider: (1) Sorrow or pain in itself; (2) Its cause; (3) Its effects;
(4) Its remedies; (5) Its goodness or malice.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pain is a passion of the soul?
(2) Whether sorrow is the same as pain?
(3) Whether sorrow or pain is contrary in pleasure?
(4) Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure?
(5) Whether there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation?
(6) Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought?
(7) Whether exterior pain is greater than interior?
(8) Of the species of sorrow.
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Whether pain is a passion of the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that pain is not a passion of the soul.
Because no passion of the soul is in the body. But pain can be in the
body, since Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii), that "bodily pain is a
sudden corruption of the well-being of that thing which the soul, by
making evil use of it, made subject to corruption. " Therefore pain is
not a passion of the soul.
Objection 2: Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the
appetitive faculty. But pain does not belong to the appetitive, but
rather to the apprehensive part: for Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx)
that "bodily pain is caused by the sense resisting a more powerful
body. " Therefore pain is not a passion of the soul.
Objection 3: Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the animal
appetite. But pain does not belong to the animal appetite, but rather
to the natural appetite; for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 14):
"Had not some good remained in nature, we should feel no pain in being
punished by the loss of good. " Therefore pain is not a passion of the
soul.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8) reckons pain among the
passions of the soul; quoting Virgil (Aeneid, vi, 733): "hence wild
desires and grovelling fears/And human laughter, human tears. "
[Translation: Conington. ]
I answer that, Just as two things are requisite for pleasure; namely,
conjunction with good and perception of this conjunction; so also two
things are requisite for pain: namely, conjunction with some evil
(which is in so far evil as it deprives one of some good), and
perception of this conjunction. Now whatever is conjoined, if it have
not the aspect of good or evil in regard to the being to which it is
conjoined, cannot cause pleasure or pain. Whence it is evident that
something under the aspect of good or evil is the object of the
pleasure or pain. But good and evil, as such, are objects of the
appetite. Consequently it is clear that pleasure and pain belong to the
appetite.
Now every appetitive movement or inclination consequent to
apprehension, belongs to the intellective or sensitive appetite: since
the inclination of the natural appetite is not consequent to an
apprehension of the subject of that appetite, but to the apprehension
of another, as stated in the [1300]FP, Q[103], AA[1],3. Since then
pleasure and pain presuppose some sense or apprehension in the same
subject, it is evident that pain, like pleasure, is in the intellective
or sensitive appetite.
Again every movement of the sensitive appetite is called a passion, as
stated above ([1301]Q[22], AA[1],3): and especially those which tend to
some defect. Consequently pain, according as it is in the sensitive
appetite, is most properly called a passion of the soul: just as bodily
ailments are properly called passions of the body. Hence Augustine (De
Civ. Dei xiv, 7,[8] [*Quoting Cicero]) reckons pain especially as being
a kind of ailment.
Reply to Objection 1: We speak of the body, because the cause of pain
is in the body: as when we suffer something hurtful to the body. But
the movement of pain is always in the soul; since "the body cannot feel
pain unless the soul feel it," as Augustine says (Super Psalm 87:4).
Reply to Objection 2: We speak of pain of the senses, not as though it
were an act of the sensitive power; but because the senses are required
for bodily pain, in the same way as for bodily pleasure.
Reply to Objection 3: Pain at the loss of good proves the goodness of
the nature, not because pain is an act of the natural appetite, but
because nature desires something as good, the removal of which being
perceived, there results the passion of pain in the sensitive appetite.
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Whether sorrow is the same as pain?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not pain. For Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) that "pain is used to express bodily suffering. "
But sorrow is used more in reference to the soul. Therefore sorrow is
not pain.
Objection 2: Further, pain is only in respect of present evil. But
sorrow can refer to both past and future evil: thus repentance is
sorrow for the past, and anxiety for the future. Therefore sorrow is
quite different from pain.
Objection 3: Further, pain seems not to follow save from the sense of
touch. But sorrow can arise from all the senses. Therefore sorrow is
not pain, and extends to more objects.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 9:2): "I have great sorrow
[Douay: 'sadness'] and continual pain [Douay: 'sorrow'] in my heart,"
thus denoting the same thing by sorrow and pain.
I answer that, Pleasure and pain can arise from a twofold apprehension,
namely, from the apprehension of an exterior sense; and from the
interior apprehension of the intellect or of the imagination. Now the
interior apprehension extends to more objects than the exterior
apprehension: because whatever things come under the exterior
apprehension, come under the interior, but not conversely. Consequently
that pleasure alone which is caused by an interior apprehension is
called joy, as stated above ([1302]Q[31], A[3]): and in like manner
that pain alone which is caused by an interior apprehension, is called
sorrow. And just as that pleasure which is caused by an exterior
apprehension, is called pleasure but not joy; so too that pain which is
caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pain indeed but not
sorrow. Accordingly sorrow is a species of pain, as joy is a species of
pleasure.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking there of the use of the
word: because "pain" is more generally used in reference to bodily
pains, which are better known, than in reference to spiritual pains.
Reply to Objection 2: External sense perceives only what is present;
but the interior cognitive power can perceive the present, past and
future. Consequently sorrow can regard present, past and future:
whereas bodily pain, which follows apprehension of the external sense,
can only regard something present.
Reply to Objection 3: The sensibles of touch are painful, not only in
so far as they are disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but also
in so far as they are contrary to nature: whereas the objects of the
other senses can indeed be disproportionate to the apprehensive power,
but they are not contrary to nature, save as they are subordinate to
the sensibles of touch. Consequently man alone, who is a perfectly
cognizant animal, takes pleasure in the objects of the other senses for
their own sake; whereas other animals take no pleasure in them save as
referable to the sensibles of touch, as stated in Ethic.
Reply to Objection 3: Bodily goods are conditioned by a certain fixed
measure: wherefore surfeit of such things destroys the proper good, and
consequently gives rise to disgust and sorrow, through being contrary
to the proper good of man.
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Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that wonder is not a cause of pleasure.
Because wonder is the act of one who is ignorant of the nature of
something, as Damascene says. But knowledge, rather than ignorance, is
a cause of pleasure. Therefore wonder is not a cause of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, wonder is the beginning of wisdom, being as it
were, the road to the search of truth, as stated in the beginning of
Metaph. i, 2. But "it is more pleasant to think of what we know, than
to seek what we know not," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 7): since
in the latter case we encounter difficulties and hindrances, in the
former not; while pleasure arises from an operation which is
unhindered, as stated in Ethic. vii, 12,13. Therefore wonder hinders
rather than causes pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, everyone takes pleasure in what he is accustomed
to: wherefore the actions of habits acquired by custom, are pleasant.
But "we wonder at what is unwonted," as Augustine says (Tract. xxiv in
Joan. ). Therefore wonder is contrary to the cause of pleasure.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that wonder is the
cause of pleasure.
I answer that, It is pleasant to get what one desires, as stated above
([1283]Q[23], A[4]): and therefore the greater the desire for the thing
loved, the greater the pleasure when it is attained: indeed the very
increase of desire brings with it an increase of pleasure, according as
it gives rise to the hope of obtaining that which is loved, since it
was stated above (A[3], ad 3) that desire resulting from hope is a
cause of pleasure. Now wonder is a kind of desire for knowledge; a
desire which comes to man when he sees an effect of which the cause
either is unknown to him, or surpasses his knowledge or faculty of
understanding. Consequently wonder is a cause of pleasure, in so far as
it includes a hope of getting the knowledge which one desires to have.
For this reason whatever is wonderful is pleasing, for instance things
that are scarce. Also, representations of things, even of those which
are not pleasant in themselves, give rise to pleasure; for the soul
rejoices in comparing one thing with another, because comparison of one
thing with another is the proper and connatural act of the reason, as
the Philosopher says (Poet. iv). This again is why "it is more
delightful to be delivered from great danger, because it is something
wonderful," as stated in Rhetor. i, 11.
Reply to Objection 1: Wonder gives pleasure, not because it implies
ignorance, but in so far as it includes the desire of learning the
cause, and in so far as the wonderer learns something new, i. e. that
the cause is other than he had thought it to be. [*According to another
reading:---that he is other than he thought himself to be. ]
Reply to Objection 2: Pleasure includes two things; rest in the good,
and perception of this rest. As to the former therefore, since it is
more perfect to contemplate the known truth, than to seek for the
unknown, the contemplation of what we know, is in itself more pleasing
than the research of what we do not know. Nevertheless, as to the
second, it happens that research is sometimes more pleasing
accidentally, in so far as it proceeds from a greater desire: for
greater desire is awakened when we are conscious of our ignorance. This
is why man takes the greatest pleasure in finding or learning things
for the first time.
Reply to Objection 3: It is pleasant to do what we are wont to do,
inasmuch as this is connatural to us, as it were. And yet things that
are of rare occurrence can be pleasant, either as regards knowledge,
from the fact that we desire to know something about them, in so far as
they are wonderful; or as regards action, from the fact that "the mind
is more inclined by desire to act intensely in things that are new," as
stated in Ethic. x, 4, since more perfect operation causes more perfect
pleasure.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE EFFECTS OF PLEASURE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effects of pleasure; and under this head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure?
(2) Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself?
(3) Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason?
(4) Whether pleasure perfects operation?
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Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that expansion is not an effect of pleasure.
For expansion seems to pertain more to love, according to the Apostle
(2 Cor. 6:11): "Our heart is enlarged. " Wherefore it is written (Ps.
118:96) concerning the precept of charity: "Thy commandment is
exceeding broad. " But pleasure is a distinct passion from love.
Therefore expansion is not an effect of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, when a thing expands it is enabled to receive
more. But receiving pertains to desire, which is for something not yet
possessed. Therefore expansion seems to belong to desire rather than to
pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, contraction is contrary to expansion. But
contraction seems to belong to pleasure, for the hand closes on that
which we wish to grasp firmly: and such is the affection of appetite in
regard to that which pleases it. Therefore expansion does not pertain
to pleasure.
On the contrary, In order to express joy, it is written (Is. 60:5):
"Thou shall see and abound, thy heart shall wonder and be enlarged. "
Moreover pleasure is called by the name of "laetitia" as being derived
from "dilatatio" [expansion], as stated above ([1284]Q[31], A[3], ad
3).
I answer that, Breadth [latitudo] is a dimension of bodily magnitude:
hence it is not applied to the emotions of the soul, save
metaphorically. Now expansion denotes a kind of movement towards
breadth; and it belongs to pleasure in respect of the two things
requisite for pleasure. One of these is on the part of the apprehensive
power, which is cognizant of the conjunction with some suitable good.
As a result of this apprehension, man perceives that he has attained a
certain perfection, which is a magnitude of the spiritual order: and in
this respect man's mind is said to be magnified or expanded by
pleasure. The other requisite for pleasure is on the part of the
appetitive power, which acquiesces in the pleasurable object, and rests
therein, offering, as it were, to enfold it within itself. And thus
man's affection is expanded by pleasure, as though it surrendered
itself to hold within itself the object of its pleasure.
Reply to Objection 1: In metaphorical expressions nothing hinders one
and the same thing from being attributed to different things according
to different likenesses. And in this way expansion pertains to love by
reason of a certain spreading out, in so far as the affection of the
lover spreads out to others, so as to care, not only for his own
interests, but also for what concerns others. On the other hand
expansion pertains to pleasure, in so far as a thing becomes more ample
in itself so as to become more capacious.
Reply to Objection 2: Desire includes a certain expansion arising from
the imagination of the thing desired; but this expansion increases at
the presence of the pleasurable object: because the mind surrenders
itself more to that object when it is already taking pleasure in it,
than when it desires it before possessing it; since pleasure is the end
of desire.
Reply to Objection 3: He that takes pleasure in a thing holds it fast,
by clinging to it with all his might: but he opens his heart to it that
he may enjoy it perfectly.
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Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself?
Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure does not cause desire for
itself. Because all movement ceases when repose is reached. But
pleasure is, as it were, a certain repose of the movement of desire, as
stated above ([1285]Q[23], A[4];[1286] Q[25], A[2]). Therefore the
movement of desire ceases when pleasure is reached. Therefore pleasure
does not cause desire.
Objection 2: Further, a thing does not cause its contrary. But pleasure
is, in a way, contrary to desire, on the part of the object: since
desire regards a good which is not yet possessed, whereas pleasure
regards the good that is possessed. Therefore pleasure does not cause
desire for itself.
Objection 3: Further, distaste is incompatible with desire. But
pleasure often causes distaste. Therefore it does not cause desire.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 4:13): "Whosoever drinketh of this
water, shall thirst again": where, according to Augustine (Tract. xv in
Joan. ), water denotes pleasures of the body.
I answer that, Pleasure can be considered in two ways; first, as
existing in reality; secondly, as existing in the memory. Again thirst,
or desire, can be taken in two ways; first, properly, as denoting a
craving for something not possessed; secondly, in general, as excluding
distaste.
Considered as existing in reality, pleasure does not of itself cause
thirst or desire for itself, but only accidentally; provided we take
thirst or desire as denoting a craving for some thing not possessed:
because pleasure is an emotion of the appetite in respect of something
actually present. But it may happen that what is actually present is
not perfectly possessed: and this may be on the part of the thing
possessed, or on the part of the possessor. On the part of the thing
possessed, this happens through the thing possessed not being a
simultaneous whole; wherefore one obtains possession of it
successively, and while taking pleasure in what one has, one desires to
possess the remainder: thus if a man is pleased with the first part of
a verse, he desires to hear the second part, as Augustine says
(Confess. iv, 11). In this way nearly all bodily pleasures cause thirst
for themselves, until they are fully realized, because pleasures of
this kind arise from some movement: as is evident in pleasures of the
table. On the part of the possessor, this happens when a man possesses
a thing which is perfect in itself, yet does not possess it perfectly,
but obtains possession of it little by little. Thus in this life, a
faint perception of Divine knowledge affords us delight, and delight
sets up a thirst or desire for perfect knowledge; in which sense we may
understand the words of Ecclus. 24:29: "They that drink me shall yet
thirst. "
On the other hand, if by thirst or desire we understand the mere
intensity of the emotion, that excludes distaste, thus more than all
others spiritual pleasures cause thirst or desire for themselves.
Because bodily pleasures become distasteful by reason of their causing
an excess in the natural mode of being, when they are increased or even
when they are protracted; as is evident in the case of pleasures of the
table. This is why, when a man arrives at the point of perfection in
bodily pleasures, he wearies of them, and sometimes desires another
kind. Spiritual pleasures, on the contrary, do not exceed the natural
mode of being, but perfect nature. Hence when their point of perfection
is reached, then do they afford the greatest delight: except,
perchance, accidentally, in so far as the work of contemplation is
accompanied by some operation of the bodily powers, which tire from
protracted activity. And in this sense also we may understand those
words of Ecclus. 24:29: "They that drink me shall yet thirst": for,
even of the angels, who know God perfectly, and delight in Him, it is
written (1 Pet. 1:12) that they "desire to look at Him. "
Lastly, if we consider pleasure, not as existing in reality, but as
existing in the memory, thus it has of itself a natural tendency to
cause thirst and desire for itself: when, to wit, man returns to that
disposition, in which he was when he experienced the pleasure that is
past. But if he be changed from that disposition, the memory of that
pleasure does not give him pleasure, but distaste: for instance, the
memory of food in respect of a man who has eaten to repletion.
Reply to Objection 1: When pleasure is perfect, then it includes
complete rest; and the movement of desire, tending to what was not
possessed, ceases. But when it is imperfect, then the desire, tending
to what was not possessed, does not cease altogether.
Reply to Objection 2: That which is possessed imperfectly, is possessed
in one respect, and in another respect is not possessed. Consequently
it may be the object of desire and pleasure at the same time.
Reply to Objection 3: Pleasures cause distaste in one way, desire in
another, as stated above.
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Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure does not hinder the use of
reason. Because repose facilitates very much the due use of reason:
wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, 3) that "while we sit and
rest, the soul is inclined to knowledge and prudence"; and it is
written (Wis. 8:16): "When I go into my house, I shall repose myself
with her," i. e. wisdom. But pleasure is a kind of repose. Therefore it
helps rather than hinders the use of reason.
Objection 2: Further, things which are not in the same subject though
they be contraries, do not hinder one another. But pleasure is in the
appetitive faculty, while the use of reason is in the apprehensive
power. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use of reason.
Objection 3: Further, that which is hindered by another, seems to be
moved, as it were, thereby. But the use of an apprehensive power moves
pleasure rather than is moved by it: because it is the cause of
pleasure. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use of reason.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5), that "pleasure
destroys the estimate of prudence. "
I answer that, As is stated in Ethic. x, 5, "appropriate pleasures
increase activity . . . whereas pleasures arising from other sources
are impediments to activity. " Accordingly there is a certain pleasure
that is taken in the very act of reason, as when one takes pleasure in
contemplating or in reasoning: and such pleasure does not hinder the
act of reason, but helps it; because we are more attentive in doing
that which gives us pleasure, and attention fosters activity.
On the other hand bodily pleasures hinder the use of reason in three
ways. First, by distracting the reason. Because, as we have just
observed, we attend much to that which pleases us. Now when the
attention is firmly fixed on one thing, it is either weakened in
respect of other things, or it is entirely withdrawn from them; and
thus if the bodily pleasure be great, either it entirely hinders the
use of reason, by concentrating the mind's attention on itself; or else
it hinders it considerably. Secondly, by being contrary to reason.
Because some pleasures, especially those that are in excess, are
contrary to the order of reason: and in this sense the Philosopher says
that "bodily pleasures destroy the estimate of prudence, but not the
speculative estimate," to which they are not opposed, "for instance
that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right
angles. " In the first sense, however, they hinder both estimates.
Thirdly, by fettering the reason: in so far as bodily pleasure is
followed by a certain alteration in the body, greater even than in the
other passions, in proportion as the appetite is more vehemently
affected towards a present than towards an absent thing. Now such
bodily disturbances hinder the use of reason; as may be seen in the
case of drunkards, in whom the use of reason is fettered or hindered.
Reply to Objection 1: Bodily pleasure implies indeed repose of the
appetite in the object of pleasure; which repose is sometimes contrary
to reason; but on the part of the body it always implies alteration.
And in respect of both points, it hinders the use of reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The powers of the appetite and of apprehension
are indeed distinct parts, but belonging to the one soul. Consequently
when the soul is very intent on the action of one part, it is hindered
from attending to a contrary act of the other part.
Reply to Objection 3: The use of reason requires the due use of the
imagination and of the other sensitive powers, which are exercised
through a bodily organ. Consequently alteration in the body hinders the
use of reason, because it hinders the act of the imagination and of the
other sensitive powers.
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Whether pleasure perfects operation?
Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure does not perfect operation.
For every human operation depends on the use of reason. But pleasure
hinders the use of reason, as stated above [1287](A[3]). Therefore
pleasure does not perfect, but weakens human operation.
Objection 2: Further, nothing perfects itself or its cause. But
pleasure is an operation (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 4), i. e. either in its
essence or in its cause. Therefore pleasure does not perfect operation.
Objection 3: Further, if pleasure perfects operation, it does so either
as end, or as form, or as agent. But not as end; because operation is
not sought for the sake of pleasure, but rather the reverse, as stated
above ([1288]Q[4], A[2]): nor as agent, because rather is it the
operation that causes pleasure: nor again as form, because, according
to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 4), "pleasure does not perfect operation,
as a habit does. " Therefore pleasure does not perfect operation.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure
perfects operation. "
I answer that, Pleasure perfects operation in two ways. First, as an
end: not indeed according as an end is that on "account of which a
thing is"; but according as every good which is added to a thing and
completes it, can be called its end. And in this sense the Philosopher
says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects operation . . . as some end
added to it": that is to say, inasmuch as to this good, which is
operation, there is added another good, which is pleasure, denoting the
repose of the appetite in a good that is presupposed. Secondly, as
agent; not indeed directly, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that
"pleasure perfects operation, not as a physician makes a man healthy,
but as health does": but it does so indirectly; inasmuch as the agent,
through taking pleasure in his action, is more eagerly intent on it,
and carries it out with greater care. And in this sense it is said in
Ethic. x, 5 that "pleasures increase their appropriate activities, and
hinder those that are not appropriate. "
Reply to Objection 1: It is not every pleasure that hinders the act of
reason, but only bodily pleasure; for this arises, not from the act of
reason, but from the act of the concupiscible faculty, which act is
intensified by pleasure. On the contrary, pleasure that arises from the
act of reason, strengthens the use of reason.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated in Phys. ii, 3 two things may be causes
of one another, if one be the efficient, the other the final cause. And
in this way, operation is the efficient cause of pleasure, while
pleasure perfects operation by way of final cause, as stated above.
The Reply to the Third Objection is evident for what has been said.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF PLEASURES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the goodness and malice of pleasures: under which
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether every pleasure is evil?
(2) If not, whether every pleasure is good?
(3) Whether any pleasure is the greatest good?
(4) Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral
good and evil?
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Whether every pleasure is evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that every pleasure is evil. For that which
destroys prudence and hinders the use of reason, seems to be evil in
itself: since man's good is to be "in accord with reason," as Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure destroys prudence and hinders the use
of reason; and so much the more, as the pleasure is greater: wherefore
"in sexual pleasures," which are the greatest of all, "it is impossible
to understand anything," as stated in Ethic. vii, 11. Moreover, Jerome
says in his commentary on Matthew [*Origen, Hom. vi in Num. ] that "at
the time of conjugal intercourse, the presence of the Holy Ghost is not
vouchsafed, even if it be a prophet that fulfils the conjugal duty. "
Therefore pleasure is evil in itself; and consequently every pleasure
is evil.
Objection 2: Further, that which the virtuous man shuns, and the man
lacking in virtue seeks, seems to be evil in itself, and should be
avoided; because, as stated in Ethic.
x, 5 "the virtuous man is a kind
of measure and rule of human actions"; and the Apostle says (1 Cor.
2:15): "The spiritual man judgeth all things. " But children and dumb
animals, in whom there is no virtue, seek pleasure: whereas the man who
is master of himself does not. Therefore pleasures are evil in
themselves and should be avoided.
Objection 3: Further, "virtue and art are concerned about the difficult
and the good" (Ethic. ii, 3). But no art is ordained to pleasure.
Therefore pleasure is not something good.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 36:4): "Delight in the Lord. "
Since, therefore, Divine authority leads to no evil, it seems that not
every pleasure is evil.
I answer that, As stated in Ethic. x, 2,[3] some have maintained that
all pleasure is evil. The reason seems to have been that they took
account only of sensible and bodily pleasures which are more manifest;
since, also in other respects, the ancient philosophers did not
discriminate between the intelligible and the sensible, nor between
intellect and sense (De Anima iii, 3). And they held that all bodily
pleasures should be reckoned as bad, and thus that man, being prone to
immoderate pleasures, arrives at the mean of virtue by abstaining from
pleasure. But they were wrong in holding this opinion. Because, since
none can live without some sensible and bodily pleasure, if they who
teach that all pleasures are evil, are found in the act of taking
pleasure; men will be more inclined to pleasure by following the
example of their works instead of listening to the doctrine of their
words: since, in human actions and passions, wherein experience is of
great weight, example moves more than words.
We must therefore say that some pleasures are good, and that some are
evil. For pleasure is a repose of the appetitive power in some loved
good, and resulting from some operation; wherefore we assign a twofold
reason for this assertion. The first is in respect of the good in which
a man reposes with pleasure. For good and evil in the moral order
depend on agreement or disagreement with reason, as stated above
([1289]Q[18], A[5]): just as in the order of nature, a thing is said to
be natural, if it agrees with nature, and unnatural, if it disagrees.
Accordingly, just as in the natural order there is a certain natural
repose, whereby a thing rests in that which agrees with its nature, for
instance, when a heavy body rests down below; and again an unnatural
repose, whereby a thing rests in that which disagrees with its nature,
as when a heavy body rests up aloft: so, in the moral order, there is a
good pleasure, whereby the higher or lower appetite rests in that which
is in accord with reason; and an evil pleasure, whereby the appetite
rests in that which is discordant from reason and the law of God.
The second reason can be found by considering the actions, some of
which are good, some evil. Now pleasures which are conjoined to actions
are more akin to those actions, than desires, which precede them in
point of time. Wherefore, since the desires of good actions are good,
and of evil actions, evil; much more are the pleasures of good actions
good, and those of evil actions evil.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (Q[33], A[3]), it is not the
pleasures which result from an act of reason, that hinder the reason or
destroy prudence, but extraneous pleasures, such as the pleasures of
the body. These indeed hinder the use of reason, as stated above
(Q[33], A[3]), either by contrariety of the appetite that rests in
something repugnant to reason, which makes the pleasure morally bad; or
by fettering the reason: thus in conjugal intercourse, though the
pleasure be in accord with reason, yet it hinders the use of reason, on
account of the accompanying bodily change. But in this case the
pleasure is not morally evil; as neither is sleep, whereby the reason
is fettered, morally evil, if it be taken according to reason: for
reason itself demands that the use of reason be interrupted at times.
We must add, however, that although this fettering of the reason
through the pleasure of conjugal intercourse has no moral malice, since
it is neither a mortal nor a venial sin; yet it proceeds from a kind of
moral malice, namely, from the sin of our first parent; because, as
stated in the [1290]FP, Q[98], A[2] the case was different in the state
of innocence.
Reply to Objection 2: The temperate man does not shun all pleasures,
but those that are immoderate, and contrary to reason. The fact that
children and dumb animals seek pleasures, does not prove that all
pleasures are evil: because they have from God their natural appetite,
which is moved to that which is naturally suitable to them.
Reply to Objection 3: Art is not concerned with all kinds of good, but
with the making of external things, as we shall state further on
([1291]Q[57], A[3]). But actions and passions, which are within us, are
more the concern of prudence and virtue than of art. Nevertheless there
is an art of making pleasure, namely, "the art of cookery and the art
of making arguments," as stated in Ethic. vii, 12.
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Whether every pleasure is good?
Objection 1: It would seem that every pleasure is good. Because as
stated in the [1292]FP, Q[5], A[6] there are three kinds of good: the
virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant. But everything virtuous is
good; and in like manner everything useful is good. Therefore also
every pleasure is good.
Objection 2: Further, that which is not sought for the sake of
something else, is good in itself, as stated in Ethic. i, 6,7. But
pleasure is not sought for the sake of something else; for it seems
absurd to ask anyone why he seeks to be pleased. Therefore pleasure is
good in itself. Now that which is predicated to a thing considered in
itself, is predicated thereof universally. Therefore every pleasure is
good.
Objection 3: Further, that which is desired by all, seems to be good of
itself: because good is "what all things seek," as stated in Ethic. i,
1. But everyone seeks some kind of pleasure, even children and dumb
animals. Therefore pleasure is good in itself: and consequently all
pleasure is good.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 2:14): "Who are glad when they
have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things. "
I answer that, While some of the Stoics maintained that all pleasures
are evil, the Epicureans held that pleasure is good in itself, and that
consequently all pleasures are good. They seem to have thus erred
through not discriminating between that which is good simply, and that
which is good in respect of a particular individual. That which is good
simply, is good in itself. Now that which is not good in itself, may be
good in respect of some individual in two ways. In one way, because it
is suitable to him by reason of a disposition in which he is now, which
disposition, however, is not natural: thus it is sometimes good for a
leper to eat things that are poisonous, which are not suitable simply
to the human temperament. In another way, through something unsuitable
being esteemed suitable. And since pleasure is the repose of the
appetite in some good, if the appetite reposes in that which is good
simply, the pleasure will be pleasure simply, and good simply. But if a
man's appetite repose in that which is good, not simply, but in respect
of that particular man, then his pleasure will not be pleasure simply,
but a pleasure to him; neither will it be good simply, but in a certain
respect, or an apparent good.
Reply to Objection 1: The virtuous and the useful depend on accordance
with reason, and consequently nothing is virtuous or useful, without
being good. But the pleasant depends on agreement with the appetite,
which tends sometimes to that which is discordant from reason.
Consequently not every object of pleasure is good in the moral order
which depends on the order of reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The reason why pleasure is not sought for the
sake of something else is because it is repose in the end. Now the end
may be either good or evil; although nothing can be an end except in so
far as it is good in respect of such and such a man: and so too with
regard to pleasure.
Reply to Objection 3: All things seek pleasure in the same way as they
seek good: since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in good. But,
just as it happens that not every good which is desired, is of itself
and verily good; so not every pleasure is of itself and verily good.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether any pleasure is the greatest good?
Objection 1: It would seem that no pleasure is the greatest good.
Because nothing generated is the greatest good: since generation cannot
be the last end. But pleasure is a consequence of generation: for the
fact that a thing takes pleasure is due to its being established in its
own nature, as stated above ([1293]Q[31], A[1]). Therefore no pleasure
is the greatest good.
Objection 2: Further, that which is the greatest good cannot be made
better by addition. But pleasure is made better by addition; since
pleasure together with virtue is better than pleasure without virtue.
Therefore pleasure is not the greatest good.
Objection 3: Further, that which is the greatest good is universally
good, as being good of itself: since that which is such of itself is
prior to and greater than that which is such accidentally. But pleasure
is not universally good, as stated above [1294](A[2]). Therefore
pleasure is not the greatest good.
On the contrary, Happiness is the greatest good: since it is the end of
man's life. But Happiness is not without pleasure: for it is written
(Ps. 15:11): "Thou shalt fill me with joy with Thy countenance; at Thy
right hand are delights even to the end. "
I answer that, Plato held neither with the Stoics, who asserted that
all pleasures are evil, nor with the Epicureans, who maintained that
all pleasures are good; but he said that some are good, and some evil;
yet, so that no pleasure be the sovereign or greatest good. But,
judging from his arguments, he fails in two points. First, because,
from observing that sensible and bodily pleasure consists in a certain
movement and "becoming," as is evident in satiety from eating and the
like; he concluded that all pleasure arises from some "becoming" and
movement: and from this, since "becoming" and movement are the acts of
something imperfect, it would follow that pleasure is not of the nature
of ultimate perfection. But this is seen to be evidently false as
regards intellectual pleasures: because one takes pleasure, not only in
the "becoming" of knowledge, for instance, when one learns or wonders,
as stated above ([1295]Q[32], A[8], ad 2); but also in the act of
contemplation, by making use of knowledge already acquired.
Secondly, because by greatest good he understood that which is the
supreme good simply, i. e. the good as existing apart from, and
unparticipated by, all else, in which sense God is the Supreme Good;
whereas we are speaking of the greatest good in human things. Now the
greatest good of everything is its last end. And the end, as stated
above ([1296]Q[1], A[8];[1297] Q[2], A[7]) is twofold; namely, the
thing itself, and the use of that thing; thus the miser's end is either
money or the possession of money. Accordingly, man's last end may be
said to be either God Who is the Supreme Good simply; or the enjoyment
of God, which implies a certain pleasure in the last end. And in this
sense a certain pleasure of man may be said to be the greatest among
human goods.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every pleasure arises from a "becoming"; for
some pleasures result from perfect operations, as stated above.
Accordingly nothing prevents some pleasure being the greatest good,
although every pleasure is not such.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument is true of the greatest good
simply, by participation of which all things are good; wherefore no
addition can make it better: whereas in regard to other goods, it is
universally true that any good becomes better by the addition of
another good. Moreover it might be said that pleasure is not something
extraneous to the operation of virtue, but that it accompanies it, as
stated in Ethic. i, 8.
Reply to Objection 3: That pleasure is the greatest good is due not to
the mere fact that it is pleasure, but to the fact that it is perfect
repose in the perfect good. Hence it does not follow that every
pleasure is supremely good, or even good at all. Thus a certain science
is supremely good, but not every science is.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good or
evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure is not the measure or rule of
moral good and evil. Because "that which is first in a genus is the
measure of all the rest" (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasure is not the first
thing in the moral genus, for it is preceded by love and desire.
Therefore it is not the rule of goodness and malice in moral matters.
Objection 2: Further, a measure or rule should be uniform; hence that
movement which is the most uniform, is the measure and rule of all
movements (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasures are various and multiform:
since some of them are good, and some evil. Therefore pleasure is not
the measure and rule of morals.
Objection 3: Further, judgment of the effect from its cause is more
certain than judgment of cause from effect. Now goodness or malice of
operation is the cause of goodness or malice of pleasure: because
"those pleasures are good which result from good operations, and those
are evil which arise from evil operations," as stated in Ethic. x, 5.
Therefore pleasures are not the rule and measure of moral goodness and
malice.
On the contrary, Augustine, commenting on Ps. 7:10 "The searcher of
hearts and reins is God," says: "The end of care and thought is the
pleasure which each one aims at achieving. " And the Philosopher says
(Ethic. vii, 11) that "pleasure is the architect," i. e. the principal,
"end [*St. Thomas took "finis" as being the nominative, whereas it is
the genitive---{tou telous}; and the Greek reads "He" (i. e. the
political philosopher), "is the architect of the end. "], in regard to
which, we say absolutely that this is evil, and that, good. "
I answer that, Moral goodness or malice depends chiefly on the will, as
stated above ([1298]Q[20], A[1]); and it is chiefly from the end that
we discern whether the will is good or evil. Now the end is taken to be
that in which the will reposes: and the repose of the will and of every
appetite in the good is pleasure. And therefore man is reckoned to be
good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure of the human will; since
that man is good and virtuous, who takes pleasure in the works of
virtue; and that man evil, who takes pleasure in evil works.
On the other hand, pleasures of the sensitive appetite are not the rule
of moral goodness and malice; since food is universally pleasurable to
the sensitive appetite both of good and of evil men. But the will of
the good man takes pleasure in them in accordance with reason, to which
the will of the evil man gives no heed.
Reply to Objection 1: Love and desire precede pleasure in the order of
generation. But pleasure precedes them in the order of the end, which
serves a principle in actions; and it is by the principle, which is the
rule and measure of such matters, that we form our judgment.
Reply to Objection 2: All pleasures are uniform in the point of their
being the repose of the appetite in something good: and in this respect
pleasure can be a rule or measure. Because that man is good, whose will
rests in the true good: and that man evil, whose will rests in evil.
Reply to Objection 3: Since pleasure perfects operation as its end, as
stated above ([1299]Q[33], A[4]); an operation cannot be perfectly
good, unless there be also pleasure in good: because the goodness of a
thing depends on its end. And thus, in a way, the goodness of the
pleasure is the cause of goodness in the operation.
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OF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We have now to consider pain and sorrow: concerning which we must
consider: (1) Sorrow or pain in itself; (2) Its cause; (3) Its effects;
(4) Its remedies; (5) Its goodness or malice.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pain is a passion of the soul?
(2) Whether sorrow is the same as pain?
(3) Whether sorrow or pain is contrary in pleasure?
(4) Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure?
(5) Whether there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation?
(6) Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought?
(7) Whether exterior pain is greater than interior?
(8) Of the species of sorrow.
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Whether pain is a passion of the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that pain is not a passion of the soul.
Because no passion of the soul is in the body. But pain can be in the
body, since Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii), that "bodily pain is a
sudden corruption of the well-being of that thing which the soul, by
making evil use of it, made subject to corruption. " Therefore pain is
not a passion of the soul.
Objection 2: Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the
appetitive faculty. But pain does not belong to the appetitive, but
rather to the apprehensive part: for Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx)
that "bodily pain is caused by the sense resisting a more powerful
body. " Therefore pain is not a passion of the soul.
Objection 3: Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the animal
appetite. But pain does not belong to the animal appetite, but rather
to the natural appetite; for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 14):
"Had not some good remained in nature, we should feel no pain in being
punished by the loss of good. " Therefore pain is not a passion of the
soul.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8) reckons pain among the
passions of the soul; quoting Virgil (Aeneid, vi, 733): "hence wild
desires and grovelling fears/And human laughter, human tears. "
[Translation: Conington. ]
I answer that, Just as two things are requisite for pleasure; namely,
conjunction with good and perception of this conjunction; so also two
things are requisite for pain: namely, conjunction with some evil
(which is in so far evil as it deprives one of some good), and
perception of this conjunction. Now whatever is conjoined, if it have
not the aspect of good or evil in regard to the being to which it is
conjoined, cannot cause pleasure or pain. Whence it is evident that
something under the aspect of good or evil is the object of the
pleasure or pain. But good and evil, as such, are objects of the
appetite. Consequently it is clear that pleasure and pain belong to the
appetite.
Now every appetitive movement or inclination consequent to
apprehension, belongs to the intellective or sensitive appetite: since
the inclination of the natural appetite is not consequent to an
apprehension of the subject of that appetite, but to the apprehension
of another, as stated in the [1300]FP, Q[103], AA[1],3. Since then
pleasure and pain presuppose some sense or apprehension in the same
subject, it is evident that pain, like pleasure, is in the intellective
or sensitive appetite.
Again every movement of the sensitive appetite is called a passion, as
stated above ([1301]Q[22], AA[1],3): and especially those which tend to
some defect. Consequently pain, according as it is in the sensitive
appetite, is most properly called a passion of the soul: just as bodily
ailments are properly called passions of the body. Hence Augustine (De
Civ. Dei xiv, 7,[8] [*Quoting Cicero]) reckons pain especially as being
a kind of ailment.
Reply to Objection 1: We speak of the body, because the cause of pain
is in the body: as when we suffer something hurtful to the body. But
the movement of pain is always in the soul; since "the body cannot feel
pain unless the soul feel it," as Augustine says (Super Psalm 87:4).
Reply to Objection 2: We speak of pain of the senses, not as though it
were an act of the sensitive power; but because the senses are required
for bodily pain, in the same way as for bodily pleasure.
Reply to Objection 3: Pain at the loss of good proves the goodness of
the nature, not because pain is an act of the natural appetite, but
because nature desires something as good, the removal of which being
perceived, there results the passion of pain in the sensitive appetite.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sorrow is the same as pain?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not pain. For Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) that "pain is used to express bodily suffering. "
But sorrow is used more in reference to the soul. Therefore sorrow is
not pain.
Objection 2: Further, pain is only in respect of present evil. But
sorrow can refer to both past and future evil: thus repentance is
sorrow for the past, and anxiety for the future. Therefore sorrow is
quite different from pain.
Objection 3: Further, pain seems not to follow save from the sense of
touch. But sorrow can arise from all the senses. Therefore sorrow is
not pain, and extends to more objects.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 9:2): "I have great sorrow
[Douay: 'sadness'] and continual pain [Douay: 'sorrow'] in my heart,"
thus denoting the same thing by sorrow and pain.
I answer that, Pleasure and pain can arise from a twofold apprehension,
namely, from the apprehension of an exterior sense; and from the
interior apprehension of the intellect or of the imagination. Now the
interior apprehension extends to more objects than the exterior
apprehension: because whatever things come under the exterior
apprehension, come under the interior, but not conversely. Consequently
that pleasure alone which is caused by an interior apprehension is
called joy, as stated above ([1302]Q[31], A[3]): and in like manner
that pain alone which is caused by an interior apprehension, is called
sorrow. And just as that pleasure which is caused by an exterior
apprehension, is called pleasure but not joy; so too that pain which is
caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pain indeed but not
sorrow. Accordingly sorrow is a species of pain, as joy is a species of
pleasure.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking there of the use of the
word: because "pain" is more generally used in reference to bodily
pains, which are better known, than in reference to spiritual pains.
Reply to Objection 2: External sense perceives only what is present;
but the interior cognitive power can perceive the present, past and
future. Consequently sorrow can regard present, past and future:
whereas bodily pain, which follows apprehension of the external sense,
can only regard something present.
Reply to Objection 3: The sensibles of touch are painful, not only in
so far as they are disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but also
in so far as they are contrary to nature: whereas the objects of the
other senses can indeed be disproportionate to the apprehensive power,
but they are not contrary to nature, save as they are subordinate to
the sensibles of touch. Consequently man alone, who is a perfectly
cognizant animal, takes pleasure in the objects of the other senses for
their own sake; whereas other animals take no pleasure in them save as
referable to the sensibles of touch, as stated in Ethic.
