The former oration had its effect: for, instead of
punishing
Diopithes,
the Athenians supplied him with money, in order to put him in a con-
dition of continuing his expeditions.
the Athenians supplied him with money, in order to put him in a con-
dition of continuing his expeditions.
Demosthenes - Leland - Orations
2 Impossible !
No;
these and all his expeditions are really intended to
facilitate the conquest of Athens.
Let us then approve ourselves men of wisdom;
and, fully persuaded of these truths, let us shake off
our extravagant and dangerous supineness; let us
supply the necessary expenses; let us call on our
allies; let us take all possible measures for keeping
up a regular army; so that, as he hath his force con-
stantly prepared to injure and enslave the Greeks,
yours too may be ever ready to protect and assist
them. If you depend on occasional detachments,
you cannot ever expect the least degree of success:
you must keep an army constantly on foot, provide
for its maintenance, appoint public treasurers, and by
all possible means secure your military funds; and
while these officers account for all disbursements, let
your generals be bound to answer for the conduct of
the war. Let these be your measures, these your
resolutions, and you will compel Philip to live in the
1 For what name else can one give to Drongilus, and Cabyle, and
Mastira, &c. ]--Drongilus and Cabyle, however the orator streets to
treat them with contempt, are yet mentioned in history. As to Mastira,
It is entirely Unknown: hence Harpocration suggested, that instead of
Mastira we should read Bastira; a town of Thrace of that name having
been mentioned in a history of Philip written by Anaximenes, a work a
long time lost. --Tourreil.
2 In the horrors of a dungeoa ]--In the original it is, in a Barathrum.
There was a ditch or cavern in Athens of that name, into whicn crimi-
nals were precipitated. So that by this figure he not only represents
the dreadful and deadly nature of the country, but at the same time sets
Philip in the light of a wicked wretch, who merited the vilest and most
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? 134
OKATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
real ooservance of an equitable peace, and to confine
himself to his own kingdom (which is most for our
interest), or we shall fight him on equal terms.
If any man thinks that the measures I propose will
require gTeat expense, and be attended with much
toil and trouble, he thinks justly. Yet let him con-
sider what consequences must attend the state if
these measures be neglected, and it will appear that
we shall really be gainers by engaging heartily in
this cause. Suppose some god should be our surety
(for no mortal ought tobe relied on in an affair of such
moment) that, if we continue quiet, and give up all our
interests, he will not at last turn his arms against us;
it would yet be shameful; it would (I call all the
powers of heaven to witness! ) be unworthy of you,
unworthy the dignity of your country, and the glory
of your ancestors, to abandon the rest of Greece to
slavery for the sake of private ease. I, for my part,
would die rather than propose so mean a conduct:
however, if there be any other person who will re-
commend it, be it so; neglect your defence; give up
your interesis! But if there be no such counsellor;
if, on the contrary, we all foresee that the farther
this man is suffered to extend his conquests, the
more formidable and powerful enemy we must find
in him, why this reluctance ? why do we delay? or
when, my countrymen, will we perform our duty ?
Must some necessity compel us? What one may
call the necessity of freemen not only presses us
now, but hath long since been felt: that of slaves, it
is to be wished, may never approach us. And how
do these differ? To a freeman, the disgrace of past
misconduct is the most urgent necessity; to a slave
stripes and bodily pains. Far be this from us! I
I would now gladly lay before you the whole con.
duct of certain politicians: but I spare them. One
thing only I shall observe: the moment that Philip
13 mentioned there is still one ready to start up, and
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? ON THE STATE OF THE CHERSONESUS. 135
try, "What a happiness to live in peace! how-
grievous the maintenance of a great army! certain
persons have designs on our treasury ! " Thus they
delay their resolutions, and give him full liberty to
act as he pleases; hence you gain ease and indul-
gence for the present (which I fear may at some
time prove too dear a purchase); and these men
recommend themselves to your favour, and are well
paid for their service. But in my opinion there is no
need to persuade you to peace, who sit down already
thoroughly persuaded. Let it be recommended to
him who is committing hostilities: if he can be pre-
vailed on, you are ready to concur. Nor should we
think those expenses grievous which our security
requires, but the consequences which must arise if
such expenses be denied. Then as to plundering
our treasury; this must be prevented by intrusting it
to proper guardians, not by neglecting our affairs.
For my own part, Athenians, I am filled with indig-
nation when I find some persons expressing their
impatience, as if our treasures were exposed to plun-
derers, and yet utterly unaffected at the progress of
Philip, who is successively plundering every state
of Greece; and this, that he may at last fall with all
his fury on you.
What then can be the reason, Athenians, that, not-
withstanding all his manifest hostilities, all his acts
of violence, all the places he hath taken from us,
these men will not acknowledge that he hath acted
unjustly, and that he is at war with us; but accuse
those of embroiling you in a war who call on you to
oppose him, ahd to check his progress ? I shall tell
you. That popular resentment which may arise from
any disagreeable circumstances with which a war
may be attended (and it is necessary, absolutely
necessary that a war should be attended with many
such disagreeable circumstances) they would cast on
your faithful counsellors, that you may pass sentence
on them, instead of opposing Philip; and they turn
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? 136 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
accusers, instead of meeting the punishment due to
their present practices. This is the meaning of their
clamours that certain persons would involve you in
a war: hence have they raised all these cavils and
debates. I know full well, that before any Athenian
had ever moved you to declare war against him,
Philip had seized many of our dominions, and hath
now sent assistance to the Cardians. If you are
. resolved to dissemble your sense of his hostilities, he
would be the weakest of mankind if he attempted to
contradict you. But suppose he marches directly
against us, what shall we say in that case ? He will
si ill assure us that he is not at war: such were his
professions to the people of Oreum when his forces
were in the heart of their country; and to those of
Pherae, until the moment that he attacked their walls;
and thus he at first amused the Olynthians, until he
had marched his army into their territory. And will
you still insist, even in such a case, that they who call
on us to defend our country are embroiling us in a
war ? Then slavery is inevitable. There is no other
medium between an obstinate refusal to take arms
on your part, and a determined resolution to attack
us on the part of our enemy.
Nor is the danger which threatens us the same with
that of other people. It is not the conquest of Athens
which Philip aims at: no; it is our utter extirpation.
He knows full well that slavery is a state you would
not, or, if you were inclined, you could not submit
to; for sovereignty is become habitual to you. Nor
is he ignorant, that, at any unfavourable juncture, you
have more power to obstruct his enterprises than the
whole world besides.
Let us then be assured that we are contending for
the very being of our state ; let this inspire us with
abhorrence of those who have sold themselves to this
man, and let them feel the severity of public justice;
for it is not possible to conquer our foreign enemy
until we have punished those traitors who are serving
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? ON THE STATE OF THE CHERSONESTJS. 137
him within our walls. Else, while we strike on
these as so many obstacles, our enemies must neces-
sarily prove superior to us. --And whence is it that he
dares treat you with insolence (1 cannot give his pres-
ent conduct any other name), that he utters menaces
against you, while on others he confers acts of kind-
ness (to deceive them at least, if for no other pur-
pose) ? Thus, by heaping favours on the Thessa-
liaris, he hath reduced them to their present slavery.
It is not possible to recount the various artifices by
which he abused the wretched Olynthians, from his
first insidious gift of Potidae. But now he seduced
the Thebans to his party, by making them masters
of Breotia, and easing them of a great and grievous
war. And thus, by being gratified in some favourite
point, these people are either involved in calamities
known to the whole world, or wait with submission
for the moment when such calamities are to fall on
them. I do not recount all that you yourselves have
lost, Athenians; but in the very conclusion of the
peace, how have you been deceived? how have you
been despoiled ? Was not Phocis, was not Ther-
mopylae, were not ourThracian dominions, Doriscum,
Senium, and even our ally Cersobleptes,1 all wrested
from us ? Is he not at this time in possession of
Cardia ? and does he not avow it ? Whence is it, I
say, that he treats you in so singular a manner?
Because ours is the only state where there is allowed
full liberty to plead the cause of an enemy; and the
man who sells his country may harangue securely,
at the very time that you are despoiled of your
dominions. It was not safe to speak for Philip at
Olynthus until the people of Olynthus had been
i And even our ally Cersobleptes. ]--The late treaty of peace between
Philip and the Athenians was concluded without giving Cersobleptes
(then in alliance with Athens) an opportunity of acceding to it: nor was
any provision made by it for his security and protection. By this means
Philip found himself at liberty to turn his arms against him, and a few
years after drove him from his kingdom, and obliged him to become his
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? ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
gained by the surrender of Potidaea. In Thessaly it
was not safe to speak for Philip until the Thessalians
had been gained by the expulsion of the tyrants and
the recovery of their rank of amphictyons ; nor could
it have beefi safely attempted at Thebes before he had
restored Boeotia and extirpated the Phocians. But at
Athens, although he hath robbed us of Amphipolis
and the territory of Cardia; though he awes us with
his fortifications in Euboea; though he be now on his
march to Byzantiumyet his partisans may speak
for Philip without any danger Hence, some of them,
from the meanest "poverty, have on a sudden risen to
affluence; some, from obscurity and disgrace, to
eminence and honour: while you, on the contrary,
from glory, have sunk into meanness; from riches,
to poverty; for the riches of a state I take to be its
allies, its credit, its connexions; in all which you are
poor. And by your neglect of these, by your utter
insensibility to your wrongs, he is become fortunate
and great, the terror of Greeks and Barbarians; and
you abandoned and despised; splendid indeed in the
abundance8 of your markets; but as to any real pro-
vision for your security, ridiculously deficient.
There are some orators, I find, who view your
interests and their own in a quite different light.
They would persuade you to continue quiet, what-
ever injuries are offered to you: they themselves
1 To Byzantium. ]--See the introduction to the following oration.
2 Splendid indeed in the abundance, &c. ]--They who opposed Philip's
interest in the Athenian assembly were ever urging the fallen conditio*
of their country, and the dishonour of suffering another power to wrest
that pre-eminence from her which had been enjoyed for ages. Ths
speakers on the other side at first affected to despise the power of Philip*
or insisted on the sincerity and uprightness of his intentions. But now;
when the danger became too apparent, and his designs too flagrant to be
dissembled, it appears that they bad recourse to other arguments. They
endeavoured to confine the views of the Athenians to what passed within
their own walls; displayed the advantages of their trade, the flourishing
state of their commerce; and perhaps recommended it as their true policy
to attend only to these, without making themselves a party in the quar-
rels of others, or loadmg the state with the expense of maintaining wars
to support the power and interest of foreigners.
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? ON THE STATE OF THE CHERSONESUS. 139
cannot be quiet, though no one offers them the least
injury. When one of these men rises, I am sure to
hear, " What! will you not propose your decree %
will you not venture ? No; you are timid: you
want true spirit. "--I own, indeed, I am hot, nor
would I choose to be, a bold, an importunate, an au-
dacious speaker. And yet, if I mistake not, I have
more real courage than they who manage your affairs
with this rash hardiness. For he who, neglecting
the public interests, is engaged only in trials, in con-
fiscations, in rewarding, in accusing, doth not act
from any principle of courage; but as he never speaks
but to gain your favour, never proposes measures that
are attended with the least hazard: in this he has
a pledge of his security; and therefore is he daring.
But he who for his country's good oftent imes opposes
your inclinations; who gives the most salutary,
though not always the most agreeable, counsel; who
pursues those measures whose success depends more
on fortune than on prudence, and is yet willing to be
accountable for the event; this is the man of cour-
age ; this is the true patriot: not they who, by flatter-
ing your passions, have lost the most important
interests of the state ; men whom I am so far from
imitating, or deeming citizens of worth, that should
this question be proposed to me, "What services
have you done your country V though I might re-
count the galleys I have fitted out, and the public
entertainments I have exhibited,1 and the contribu-
tions I have paid, and the captives I have ran-
1 The public entertainments I have exhibited. ]--Tn the original it is,
" the offices of choregus that I have discharged. " Each of the ten tribes
of Athens had their bands of musicians to perform in the feasts of Bac-
chus, together with a poet, to compose the hymns and other pieces; and
these bands contended for a prize. The feasts were exhibited with great
magnificence; and in order to defray the charges, they appointed the
richest citizen out of each tribe (or sOmetimes he offered himself) to ex-
hibit them at his own cost. He was called the choregus; and if his
hand gained the prize, his name was inscribed, together with those of
the tribe and the poet, on the vase which was the reward of the con-
querors . --Towrrcil
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? 140 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
somed,1 and many like acts of benevolence, I would
yet pass them all by, and only say that my public
conduct hath ever been directly opposite to theirs.
I might, like them, have turned accuser, have dis-
tributed rewards and punishments : but this is a part
I never assumed: my inclinations were averse; nor
could wealth or honours prompt me to it. No; 1
confine myself to such counsels as have sunk my
reputation: but, if pursued, must raise the reputation
of my country. Thus much I may be allowed to say
without exposing myself to envy. --I should not have
thought myself a good citizen had I proposed such
measures as would have made me the first among
my countrymen, but reduced you to the last of states:
on the contrary, the faithful minister should raise the
glory of hi3 country; and, on all occasions, advise the
most salutary, not the easiest, measures. To these
nature itself inclines ; those are not to be promoted
but by the utmost efforts of a wise and faithful coun-
sellor. . "
I have heard it objected," That indeed I ever speak
with reason ; yet still this is no more than words:
that the state requires something more effectual,
some vigorous actions. " On which I shall give my
sentiments without the least reserve. The sole busi-
ness of a speaker is, in my opinion, to propose the
course you are to pursue. This were easy to be
proved. You know, that when the great Timotheus
moved you to defend the Eubceans against the tyr-
anny of Thebes, he addressed you thus: " What, my
countrymen! when the Thebans are actually in the
island, are you deliberating what is to be done? what
part to be taken 1 Will you not cover the seas with
your navies ? Why are you not at the Piraeus 1 why
are you not embarked V Thus Timotheus advised ;
thus you acted, and success ensued. But had he
spoken with the same spirit, and had your indolence
l The captives I have ransomed. ]--See the preface to the Oration on
the Peace
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? ON THE STATE OF THE CHERSONESUS. 141
prevailed, and his advice been rejected, would the
state have had the same success ? By no means.
And so in the present case; vigour and execution is
your part; from your speakers you are only to expeet
wisdom and integrity.
I shall just give the summary of my opinion, and
then descend. You should raise supplies ; you should
keep up your present forces, and reform whatever
abuses may be found in them (not break them entirely
on the first complaint). You should send ambassa-
dors into all parts, to reform, to remonstrate, to exert
all their efforts in the service of the state. But, above
all things, let those corrupt ministers feel the se-
verest punishment; let them, at all times, and in all
plaees, be the objects of your abhorrence : that wise
and faithful counsellors may appear to have consulted
their own interests as well as that of others. If you
will act thus, if you will shake off this indolence, per-
haps, even yet, perhaps, we may promise ourselves
some good fortune. But if you only just exert your-
selves in acclamations and applauses, and when any
thing is to be done sink again into your supineness, I
do not see how all the wisdom of the world can save
the state from ruin, when you deny your assistance.
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? THE TENTH ORATION AGAINST PHILIP.
Commonly called the Third.
PRONOUNCED IN THE SAME YEAR.
INTRODUCTION.
The former oration had its effect: for, instead of punishing Diopithes,
the Athenians supplied him with money, in order to put him in a con-
dition of continuing his expeditions. In the mean time Philip pursued
Iris Thracian conquests, and made himself master of several places,
which, though of little importance in themselves, yet opened him a way
to the cities Qf the Propontis, and, above all, to Byzantium, which he had
always intended to annex to his dominions. He at first tried the way
of negotiation, in order to gain the Byzantines into the number of his
allies; but this proving ineffectual, he resolved to proceed in another
manner. He had a party in the city, at whose head was the orator
Python, that engaged to deliver him up one of the gates: but while ho
was on his march towards the city the conspiracy was discovered,
which immediately determined him to talie another routa His sudden
countermarch, intended to conceal the crime of Python, really served to
confirm it. He was brought to trial j but the credit and the presents of
Philip prevailed to save him.
The efforts of the Athenians to support their interests in Eubcea, and
the power which Philip had acquired there, end which every day in-
creased, had entirely destroyed the tranquillity of this island. The people
of Oreum, divided by the Athenian and Macedonian factions, were on
the point of breaking out into a civil war, when, under pretence of
restoring their peace, Philip sent them a body of a thousand forces, under
the command of Hipponicus; which soon determined the superiority to
his side. Philistides, a tyrant, who had grown old in factions and public
contests, was intrusted with the government of Oreum, which ho ad-
ministered with all possible severity and cruelty to those in the Athenian
interest; while the other states of the island were also subjected to other
Macedonian governors. Callias, the Chalcidian, whose inconstancy had
made him espouse the interests of Athens, of Thebes, and Macedon,
successively, now returned to his engagements with Athens. He sent
deputies thither to desire assistance, and to prevail on the Athenians to
make some vigorous attempt to regain their power in Eubcea.
In the mean time the King of Persia, alarmed by the accounts of
Philip's growing power, made use of all the influence which his gold could
gain at Athens to engage the Athenians to act openly against an enemy
equally suspected by them both. This circumstance perhaps disposed
them to give the greater attention to the following oration.
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? PHILIPPIC THE THIRD.
Though we have heard a great deal, Athenians, in
almost every assembly, of those acts of violence
which Philip hath been committing ever since his
treaty, not against ours only, but the other states of
Greece ; though all, I am confident, are ready to ac-
knowledge, even they who fail in the performance,
that we should, every one of us, exert our efforts, in
eouncil and in action, to oppose and to chastise his
insolence; yet to such circumstances are you reduced
by your supineness, that I fear (shocking as it is to
say, yet) that had we all agreed to propose, and you
to embrace, such measures as would most effectually
ruin our affairs, they could not have been more
distressed than at present. And to this perhaps
a variety of causes have conspired; nor could we
have been thus affected by one or two. But, on a
strict and just inquiry, you will find it principally
owing to those orators who study rather to gain your
favour than to advance your interests; some of
whom (attentive only to the means of establishing
their own reputation and power) never extend their
thoughts beyond the present moment, and therefore
think that your views are equally confined. Others,
by their accusations and invectives against those at
the head of affairs, labour only to make the state
inflict severity on itself; that, while we are thus en-
gaged, Philip may have full power of speaking and
of acting as he pleases. Such are now the usual
methods of our statesmen; and hence all our errors
and disorders.
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? 144 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
Let me entreat you, my countrymen, thai if ]
speak some truths with boldness, I may not be ex-
posed to your resentment. Consider this: on othei
occasions, you account liberty of speech so general
a privilege of all within your walls, that aliens and
slaves1 are allowed to share it: so that many domes-
tics may be found among you speaking their thoughts
with less reserve than citizens in some other states.
But from your councils you have utterly banished
it. And the consequence is this: in your assemblies,
as you listen only to be pleased, you meet with flat-
tery and indulgence: in the circumstances of public
affairs you find yourselves threatened with the ex-
tremity of danger. If you have still the same dis-
positions I must be silent; if you will attend to your
true interests, without expecting to be flattered, I am
ready to speak. For although our affairs are wretch-
edly situated, though our inactivity hath occasioned
many losses, yet by proper vigour and resolution
you may still repair them all. What I am now going
to advance may possibly appear incredible; yet it is
a certain truth. The greatest of all our past misfor-
tunes is a circumstance the most favourable to oui
future expectations. And what is this ? That the
present difficulties are really owing to our utter dis-
regard of every thing which in any degree affected
our interests. For, were we thus situated in spite
of every effort which our duty demanded, then we
l Aliens and slaves. ]--The Athenians piqued themselves on being tha
most independent and most humane of all people. With them a
stranger had liberty of speaking as he pleased, provided he let nothing
escape him against the government. So Jar were they from admitting
him into-their public deliberations, that a citizen was not permitted to
touch on state affairs in the presence of an alien. Their slaves enjoyed
a proportionable degree of indulgence. The Saturnalia, when they
were allowed to assume the character of masters, was originally an
Athenian institution, and adopted at Rome by Numa. At Sparta and
Thessaly, on the contrary, slaves were treated with such severity, as
obliged them frequently to revolt. The humanity of Athens had its
reward: for their slaves did them considerable service on several
nccasions; at Marathon, in the war of Egina, and at Arginusa). --.
TowrreU
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? PHILIPPIC THE THIRD. 145
should regard our fortune as absolutety desperate.
But now Philip hath conquered your supineness and
inactivity; the state he hath not conquered. Noi
have you been defeated; your force hath not even
been exerted. '
Were it generally acknowledged that Philip was
at war with the state, and had really violated the
peace, the only point to be considered would then be
how to oppose him with the greatest ease and safety.
But since there are persons so strangely infatuated,
that although he be still extending his conquests,
although he hath possessed himself of a consider-
able part of our dominions, although all mankind
have suffered by his injustice, they can yet hear it
repeated in this assembly that it is some of us who
are embroiling the state in war. This suggestion
must first be guarded against; else there is reason
to apprehend that the man who moves you to oppose
your adversary may incur the censure of being author
of the war.
And, first of all, I lay down this as certain: if it
were in our power to determine whether we should
be at peace or war; if peace (that I may begin with
this) were wholly dependent on the option of the
state, there is no doubt but we should embrace it.
And I expect that he who asserts it is will, without
attempting to prevaricate, draw up his decree in form,
and propose it to your acceptance. But if the other
party hath drawn the sword, and gathered his armies
round him; if he amuse us with the name of peace,
while he really proceeds to all kinds of hostilities,
what remains but to oppose him 1 To make profes-
sions of peace, indeed, like him;--if this be agree-
able to you, I acquiesce. But if any man takes that
for peace which is enabling him, after all his other
conquests, to lead his forces hither, his mind must
be disordered; at least it is our conduct only towards
him, not his towards us, that must be called a peace.
But this it is for which all Philip's treasures are ex-
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? 146 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
pended; that he should carry on the war against
you; but that you should make no war on him. --
Should we continue thus inactive till he declares
himself our enemy, we should be the weakest of
mortals. This he would not do, although he were
in the heart of Attica, even at the Piraeus, if we may
judge from his behaviour to others. For it was not
till he came within a few miles1 of Olynthus that he
declared that " either the Olynthians must quit their
city, or he his kingdom. " Had he been accused of
this at any time before, he would have resented it,
and ambassadors must have been despatched to jus-
tify their master. In like manner, while he was
moving towards the Phocians, he still affected to
regard them as allies and friends : nay, there were
actually ambassadors from Phocis who attended him
in his march: and among us were many who in-
sisted that this march portended no good to Thebes.
Not long since, when he went into Thessaly with all
the appearance of amity, he possessed himself of
Pherse. And it is but now he told the wretched
people of Oreum that he had, in all affection, sent
some forces to inspect their affairs; for that he heard
they laboured under disorders and seditions; and
that true friends and allies should not be absent on
such occasions. And can you imagine that he, who
chose to make use of artifice rather than open force,
against enemies by no means able to distress him,
who, at most, could but have defended themselves
against him--that he will openly proclaim his hostile
designs against you; and this when you yourselves
obstinately shut your eyes against them? Impossi-
ble! He would be the absurdest of mankind, if,
while his outrages pass unnoticed, . while you are
wholly engaged in accusing some among yourselves,
and endeavouring to bring them to a trial, he should
put an end to your private contests, warn you to
I A few miles, &c. J--In Ine originai,/orty stadia, about five miles.
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? PHILIPPIC THE THIRD.
147
direct all your zeal against him, and so deprive his
pensioners of their most specious pretence for sus-
pending your resolutions; that of his not being at
war with the state. Heavens! is there any man of
a right mind who would judge of peace or war by
words, and not by actions? Surely, no man. --To
examine then the actions of Philip. --When the peace
was just concluded, before ever Diopithes had re-
ceived his commission, or those in the Chersonesus
had been sent out, he possessed himself of Senium
and Doriscum, and obliged the forces our general
had stationed in the citadel of Senium and the
Sacred Mount to evacuate these places. From these
proceedings, what are we to judge of him 1 The
peace he had ratified by the most solemn oaths. And
let it not be asked,1 of what moment is all this ? or
how is the state affected by if! Whether these
things be of no moment, or whether we are affected
by them or no, is a question of another nature. Let
the instance of violation be great or small, the sacred
obligation of faith and justice is, in all instances, the
same.
But further: when he sends his forces into the
Chersonesus, which the king, which every state of
Greece acknowledged to be ours; when he confess-
edly assists our enemies, and braves us with such
letters, what are his intentions ? for they say he is
not at war with us. For my own part, so far am I
from acknowledging such conduct to be consistent
with his treaty, that I declare, that by his attack of
the Megareans, by his attempts on the liberty of
Eubcea, by his late incursion into Thrace, by his
practices in Peloponnesus, and by his constant re-
course to the power of arms, in all his transactions
he has violated the treaty, and is at war with you;
t Let it not be asked, &c. ]--The partisans of Philip affected to speak
with contempt of these places. To deny the right of Athens to the'n
was dangerous and unpopular ; they therefore endeavoured to represent
them as beneath the public regard.
Vol. I. --:
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? 148 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
unless you will affirm, that he who prepares to invest
a city is still at peace until the walls be actually
assaulted. You cannot, surely, affirm it! He whose
designs, whose whole conduct tends to reduce me to
subjection, that man is at war with me, though not
a blow hath yet been given, not one weapon drawn.
And if any accident should happen, to what dangers
must you be exposed! The Hellespont will be no
longer yours: your enemy will become master of
Megara and Euba? a: the Peloponnesians will be
gained over to his interest. And shall I say that the
man who is thus raising his engines, and preparing
to storm the city, that he is at peace with you ? No:
from that day in Which Phocis fell beneath his arms I
date his hostilities against you. If you will instantly
oppose him, I pronounce you wise; if you delay, it
will not be in your power when you are inclined.
And so far, Athenians, do I differ from some other
speakers, that I think it now no time to debate about
the Chersonesus or Byzantium; but that we should
immediately send reinforcements, and guard these
places from all accidents, supply the generals sta-
tioned there with every thing they stand in need of,
and extend our care to all the Greeks, now in the
greatest and most imminent danger. Let me entreat
your attention while I explain the reasons which
induce me to be apprehensive of this danger; that,
if they are just, you may adopt them, and be provi
dent of your own interests at least, if those of others
do not affect you: or, if they appear frivolous and
impertinent, you may now, and ever hereafter,
neglect me as a man of an unsound mind.
That Philip, from a mean and inconsiderable Ori-
gin, hath advanced to greatness; that suspicion and
faction divide all the Greeks; that it is more to be
admired that he should become so powerful from
what he was, than that now, after such accessions
of strength, he should accomplish all his ambitious
schemes : these, and other like points which might
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? PHILIPPIC THE THIRD.
149
be dwelt on, I choose to pass over. But there is one
concession which, by the influence of your example,
all men have made to him, which hath heretofore
seen the cause of all the Grecian wars. And what
is this T An absolute power to act as he pleases;
thus to harass and plunder every state of Greece
successively; to invade and to enslave their cities.
You held the sovereignty of Greece seventy-three
years:' the Lacedaemonians commanded for the space
of twenty-nine years;2 and in these latter times,
after the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans were in
some degree of eminence. Yet neither to you, nor
to the Thebans, nor to the Lacedaemonians, did the
Greeks ever grant this uncontrolled power: far from
it. On the contrary, when you, or rather the Athe-
nians of that age, seemed to treat some persons not
with due moderation, it was universally resolved to
take up arms; even they who had no private com-
plaints espoused the cause of the injured. And
when the Lacedaemonians succeeded to your power,
the moment that they attempted to enlarge their
sway, and to make such changes in affairs as be-
trayed their ambitious designs, they were opposed
by all, even by those who were not immediately
affected by their conduct. But why do I speak of
others? We ourselves, and the Lacedaemonians,
though from the first we could allege no injuries
against, each other, yet, to redress the injured,
thought ourselves bound to draw the sword. And
all the faults of the Lacedaemonians in their thirty
years, and of our ancestors in their seventy years, do
not amount to the outrages which Philip hath com-
mitted against the Greeks within less than thirteen
1 Seventy-three years. ]--See note p. 80.
2 Twenty-nine years. l--That is, from the destruction of Athens by
Lysahder, in the last year of the 93d Olympiad, to the first war in which
the Athenians, when re-established by Conon, engaged against Sparta,
to free themselves and the other Greeks from the Spartan yoke in the
last year of the 100th Olympiad. --Tourml.
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? 150
ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
years of power;' or rather, do not all make up the
smallest part of them. This I shall easily prove in
a few words.
Olynthus, and Methone, and Apollonia, and the
two-and-thirty cities of Thrace, I pass all over;
every one of which felt such severe effects of . his
cruelty, that an observer could not easily determine
whether any of them had ever teen inhabited or no.
The destruction of the Phocians, a people so con-
siderable, shall also pass unnoticed. But think on
the condition of the Thessahans, Hath he not sub-
verted their states and cities 1 Hath he not estab-
lished his tetrarchs over them, that not only single
towns, but whole countries2 might pay htm vassalage 7
Are not the states of Eubcea in the hands of tyrants,
and this in an island bordering on Thebes and
Athens? Are not these the express words of his
letters--" they who are willing to obey me may ex-
pect peace from me ? " And he not only writes, but
confirms his menaces by actions. He marches
directly to the Hellespont: but just before he at-
tacked Ambracia: Elis,3 one of the chief cities of
Peloponnesus, is in his possession: not long since
he entertained designs against Megara. All Greece,
all the Barbarian world, is too narrow for this man's
ambition. And though we Greeks see and hear all
this, we send no embassies to each other, we express
no resentment: but into such wretchedness are we
sunk (blocked up within our several cities) that even
1 Thirteen years of power. ]--Philip had now reigned nineteen years.
But being at first engaged in wars wilh his neighbours, he did not
begin to make any considerable figure in Greece until the eighth year
of his reign; when, after the taking of Methone, he expelled the
tyrants of Thessaly, and cut ofT the Phocian army commanded by
Onomarchus. From this period Demosthenes begins his computation. -'
Tourreil.
2 Whole countries, &c. 1--The word in the original signifies a ntmrber
of different people dependent on one principal stale or city.
3 Elis, &c]--He made himself master of this place by treaty, not by
force of arms. Elis entered into the league ofthe amphictyons, by which
Philip was acknowledged as their chief; and maintained its freedom fit!
after the death of Alexander. --Tonrrsil.
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these and all his expeditions are really intended to
facilitate the conquest of Athens.
Let us then approve ourselves men of wisdom;
and, fully persuaded of these truths, let us shake off
our extravagant and dangerous supineness; let us
supply the necessary expenses; let us call on our
allies; let us take all possible measures for keeping
up a regular army; so that, as he hath his force con-
stantly prepared to injure and enslave the Greeks,
yours too may be ever ready to protect and assist
them. If you depend on occasional detachments,
you cannot ever expect the least degree of success:
you must keep an army constantly on foot, provide
for its maintenance, appoint public treasurers, and by
all possible means secure your military funds; and
while these officers account for all disbursements, let
your generals be bound to answer for the conduct of
the war. Let these be your measures, these your
resolutions, and you will compel Philip to live in the
1 For what name else can one give to Drongilus, and Cabyle, and
Mastira, &c. ]--Drongilus and Cabyle, however the orator streets to
treat them with contempt, are yet mentioned in history. As to Mastira,
It is entirely Unknown: hence Harpocration suggested, that instead of
Mastira we should read Bastira; a town of Thrace of that name having
been mentioned in a history of Philip written by Anaximenes, a work a
long time lost. --Tourreil.
2 In the horrors of a dungeoa ]--In the original it is, in a Barathrum.
There was a ditch or cavern in Athens of that name, into whicn crimi-
nals were precipitated. So that by this figure he not only represents
the dreadful and deadly nature of the country, but at the same time sets
Philip in the light of a wicked wretch, who merited the vilest and most
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? 134
OKATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
real ooservance of an equitable peace, and to confine
himself to his own kingdom (which is most for our
interest), or we shall fight him on equal terms.
If any man thinks that the measures I propose will
require gTeat expense, and be attended with much
toil and trouble, he thinks justly. Yet let him con-
sider what consequences must attend the state if
these measures be neglected, and it will appear that
we shall really be gainers by engaging heartily in
this cause. Suppose some god should be our surety
(for no mortal ought tobe relied on in an affair of such
moment) that, if we continue quiet, and give up all our
interests, he will not at last turn his arms against us;
it would yet be shameful; it would (I call all the
powers of heaven to witness! ) be unworthy of you,
unworthy the dignity of your country, and the glory
of your ancestors, to abandon the rest of Greece to
slavery for the sake of private ease. I, for my part,
would die rather than propose so mean a conduct:
however, if there be any other person who will re-
commend it, be it so; neglect your defence; give up
your interesis! But if there be no such counsellor;
if, on the contrary, we all foresee that the farther
this man is suffered to extend his conquests, the
more formidable and powerful enemy we must find
in him, why this reluctance ? why do we delay? or
when, my countrymen, will we perform our duty ?
Must some necessity compel us? What one may
call the necessity of freemen not only presses us
now, but hath long since been felt: that of slaves, it
is to be wished, may never approach us. And how
do these differ? To a freeman, the disgrace of past
misconduct is the most urgent necessity; to a slave
stripes and bodily pains. Far be this from us! I
I would now gladly lay before you the whole con.
duct of certain politicians: but I spare them. One
thing only I shall observe: the moment that Philip
13 mentioned there is still one ready to start up, and
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? ON THE STATE OF THE CHERSONESUS. 135
try, "What a happiness to live in peace! how-
grievous the maintenance of a great army! certain
persons have designs on our treasury ! " Thus they
delay their resolutions, and give him full liberty to
act as he pleases; hence you gain ease and indul-
gence for the present (which I fear may at some
time prove too dear a purchase); and these men
recommend themselves to your favour, and are well
paid for their service. But in my opinion there is no
need to persuade you to peace, who sit down already
thoroughly persuaded. Let it be recommended to
him who is committing hostilities: if he can be pre-
vailed on, you are ready to concur. Nor should we
think those expenses grievous which our security
requires, but the consequences which must arise if
such expenses be denied. Then as to plundering
our treasury; this must be prevented by intrusting it
to proper guardians, not by neglecting our affairs.
For my own part, Athenians, I am filled with indig-
nation when I find some persons expressing their
impatience, as if our treasures were exposed to plun-
derers, and yet utterly unaffected at the progress of
Philip, who is successively plundering every state
of Greece; and this, that he may at last fall with all
his fury on you.
What then can be the reason, Athenians, that, not-
withstanding all his manifest hostilities, all his acts
of violence, all the places he hath taken from us,
these men will not acknowledge that he hath acted
unjustly, and that he is at war with us; but accuse
those of embroiling you in a war who call on you to
oppose him, ahd to check his progress ? I shall tell
you. That popular resentment which may arise from
any disagreeable circumstances with which a war
may be attended (and it is necessary, absolutely
necessary that a war should be attended with many
such disagreeable circumstances) they would cast on
your faithful counsellors, that you may pass sentence
on them, instead of opposing Philip; and they turn
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? 136 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
accusers, instead of meeting the punishment due to
their present practices. This is the meaning of their
clamours that certain persons would involve you in
a war: hence have they raised all these cavils and
debates. I know full well, that before any Athenian
had ever moved you to declare war against him,
Philip had seized many of our dominions, and hath
now sent assistance to the Cardians. If you are
. resolved to dissemble your sense of his hostilities, he
would be the weakest of mankind if he attempted to
contradict you. But suppose he marches directly
against us, what shall we say in that case ? He will
si ill assure us that he is not at war: such were his
professions to the people of Oreum when his forces
were in the heart of their country; and to those of
Pherae, until the moment that he attacked their walls;
and thus he at first amused the Olynthians, until he
had marched his army into their territory. And will
you still insist, even in such a case, that they who call
on us to defend our country are embroiling us in a
war ? Then slavery is inevitable. There is no other
medium between an obstinate refusal to take arms
on your part, and a determined resolution to attack
us on the part of our enemy.
Nor is the danger which threatens us the same with
that of other people. It is not the conquest of Athens
which Philip aims at: no; it is our utter extirpation.
He knows full well that slavery is a state you would
not, or, if you were inclined, you could not submit
to; for sovereignty is become habitual to you. Nor
is he ignorant, that, at any unfavourable juncture, you
have more power to obstruct his enterprises than the
whole world besides.
Let us then be assured that we are contending for
the very being of our state ; let this inspire us with
abhorrence of those who have sold themselves to this
man, and let them feel the severity of public justice;
for it is not possible to conquer our foreign enemy
until we have punished those traitors who are serving
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? ON THE STATE OF THE CHERSONESTJS. 137
him within our walls. Else, while we strike on
these as so many obstacles, our enemies must neces-
sarily prove superior to us. --And whence is it that he
dares treat you with insolence (1 cannot give his pres-
ent conduct any other name), that he utters menaces
against you, while on others he confers acts of kind-
ness (to deceive them at least, if for no other pur-
pose) ? Thus, by heaping favours on the Thessa-
liaris, he hath reduced them to their present slavery.
It is not possible to recount the various artifices by
which he abused the wretched Olynthians, from his
first insidious gift of Potidae. But now he seduced
the Thebans to his party, by making them masters
of Breotia, and easing them of a great and grievous
war. And thus, by being gratified in some favourite
point, these people are either involved in calamities
known to the whole world, or wait with submission
for the moment when such calamities are to fall on
them. I do not recount all that you yourselves have
lost, Athenians; but in the very conclusion of the
peace, how have you been deceived? how have you
been despoiled ? Was not Phocis, was not Ther-
mopylae, were not ourThracian dominions, Doriscum,
Senium, and even our ally Cersobleptes,1 all wrested
from us ? Is he not at this time in possession of
Cardia ? and does he not avow it ? Whence is it, I
say, that he treats you in so singular a manner?
Because ours is the only state where there is allowed
full liberty to plead the cause of an enemy; and the
man who sells his country may harangue securely,
at the very time that you are despoiled of your
dominions. It was not safe to speak for Philip at
Olynthus until the people of Olynthus had been
i And even our ally Cersobleptes. ]--The late treaty of peace between
Philip and the Athenians was concluded without giving Cersobleptes
(then in alliance with Athens) an opportunity of acceding to it: nor was
any provision made by it for his security and protection. By this means
Philip found himself at liberty to turn his arms against him, and a few
years after drove him from his kingdom, and obliged him to become his
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? ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
gained by the surrender of Potidaea. In Thessaly it
was not safe to speak for Philip until the Thessalians
had been gained by the expulsion of the tyrants and
the recovery of their rank of amphictyons ; nor could
it have beefi safely attempted at Thebes before he had
restored Boeotia and extirpated the Phocians. But at
Athens, although he hath robbed us of Amphipolis
and the territory of Cardia; though he awes us with
his fortifications in Euboea; though he be now on his
march to Byzantiumyet his partisans may speak
for Philip without any danger Hence, some of them,
from the meanest "poverty, have on a sudden risen to
affluence; some, from obscurity and disgrace, to
eminence and honour: while you, on the contrary,
from glory, have sunk into meanness; from riches,
to poverty; for the riches of a state I take to be its
allies, its credit, its connexions; in all which you are
poor. And by your neglect of these, by your utter
insensibility to your wrongs, he is become fortunate
and great, the terror of Greeks and Barbarians; and
you abandoned and despised; splendid indeed in the
abundance8 of your markets; but as to any real pro-
vision for your security, ridiculously deficient.
There are some orators, I find, who view your
interests and their own in a quite different light.
They would persuade you to continue quiet, what-
ever injuries are offered to you: they themselves
1 To Byzantium. ]--See the introduction to the following oration.
2 Splendid indeed in the abundance, &c. ]--They who opposed Philip's
interest in the Athenian assembly were ever urging the fallen conditio*
of their country, and the dishonour of suffering another power to wrest
that pre-eminence from her which had been enjoyed for ages. Ths
speakers on the other side at first affected to despise the power of Philip*
or insisted on the sincerity and uprightness of his intentions. But now;
when the danger became too apparent, and his designs too flagrant to be
dissembled, it appears that they bad recourse to other arguments. They
endeavoured to confine the views of the Athenians to what passed within
their own walls; displayed the advantages of their trade, the flourishing
state of their commerce; and perhaps recommended it as their true policy
to attend only to these, without making themselves a party in the quar-
rels of others, or loadmg the state with the expense of maintaining wars
to support the power and interest of foreigners.
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? ON THE STATE OF THE CHERSONESUS. 139
cannot be quiet, though no one offers them the least
injury. When one of these men rises, I am sure to
hear, " What! will you not propose your decree %
will you not venture ? No; you are timid: you
want true spirit. "--I own, indeed, I am hot, nor
would I choose to be, a bold, an importunate, an au-
dacious speaker. And yet, if I mistake not, I have
more real courage than they who manage your affairs
with this rash hardiness. For he who, neglecting
the public interests, is engaged only in trials, in con-
fiscations, in rewarding, in accusing, doth not act
from any principle of courage; but as he never speaks
but to gain your favour, never proposes measures that
are attended with the least hazard: in this he has
a pledge of his security; and therefore is he daring.
But he who for his country's good oftent imes opposes
your inclinations; who gives the most salutary,
though not always the most agreeable, counsel; who
pursues those measures whose success depends more
on fortune than on prudence, and is yet willing to be
accountable for the event; this is the man of cour-
age ; this is the true patriot: not they who, by flatter-
ing your passions, have lost the most important
interests of the state ; men whom I am so far from
imitating, or deeming citizens of worth, that should
this question be proposed to me, "What services
have you done your country V though I might re-
count the galleys I have fitted out, and the public
entertainments I have exhibited,1 and the contribu-
tions I have paid, and the captives I have ran-
1 The public entertainments I have exhibited. ]--Tn the original it is,
" the offices of choregus that I have discharged. " Each of the ten tribes
of Athens had their bands of musicians to perform in the feasts of Bac-
chus, together with a poet, to compose the hymns and other pieces; and
these bands contended for a prize. The feasts were exhibited with great
magnificence; and in order to defray the charges, they appointed the
richest citizen out of each tribe (or sOmetimes he offered himself) to ex-
hibit them at his own cost. He was called the choregus; and if his
hand gained the prize, his name was inscribed, together with those of
the tribe and the poet, on the vase which was the reward of the con-
querors . --Towrrcil
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? 140 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
somed,1 and many like acts of benevolence, I would
yet pass them all by, and only say that my public
conduct hath ever been directly opposite to theirs.
I might, like them, have turned accuser, have dis-
tributed rewards and punishments : but this is a part
I never assumed: my inclinations were averse; nor
could wealth or honours prompt me to it. No; 1
confine myself to such counsels as have sunk my
reputation: but, if pursued, must raise the reputation
of my country. Thus much I may be allowed to say
without exposing myself to envy. --I should not have
thought myself a good citizen had I proposed such
measures as would have made me the first among
my countrymen, but reduced you to the last of states:
on the contrary, the faithful minister should raise the
glory of hi3 country; and, on all occasions, advise the
most salutary, not the easiest, measures. To these
nature itself inclines ; those are not to be promoted
but by the utmost efforts of a wise and faithful coun-
sellor. . "
I have heard it objected," That indeed I ever speak
with reason ; yet still this is no more than words:
that the state requires something more effectual,
some vigorous actions. " On which I shall give my
sentiments without the least reserve. The sole busi-
ness of a speaker is, in my opinion, to propose the
course you are to pursue. This were easy to be
proved. You know, that when the great Timotheus
moved you to defend the Eubceans against the tyr-
anny of Thebes, he addressed you thus: " What, my
countrymen! when the Thebans are actually in the
island, are you deliberating what is to be done? what
part to be taken 1 Will you not cover the seas with
your navies ? Why are you not at the Piraeus 1 why
are you not embarked V Thus Timotheus advised ;
thus you acted, and success ensued. But had he
spoken with the same spirit, and had your indolence
l The captives I have ransomed. ]--See the preface to the Oration on
the Peace
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? ON THE STATE OF THE CHERSONESUS. 141
prevailed, and his advice been rejected, would the
state have had the same success ? By no means.
And so in the present case; vigour and execution is
your part; from your speakers you are only to expeet
wisdom and integrity.
I shall just give the summary of my opinion, and
then descend. You should raise supplies ; you should
keep up your present forces, and reform whatever
abuses may be found in them (not break them entirely
on the first complaint). You should send ambassa-
dors into all parts, to reform, to remonstrate, to exert
all their efforts in the service of the state. But, above
all things, let those corrupt ministers feel the se-
verest punishment; let them, at all times, and in all
plaees, be the objects of your abhorrence : that wise
and faithful counsellors may appear to have consulted
their own interests as well as that of others. If you
will act thus, if you will shake off this indolence, per-
haps, even yet, perhaps, we may promise ourselves
some good fortune. But if you only just exert your-
selves in acclamations and applauses, and when any
thing is to be done sink again into your supineness, I
do not see how all the wisdom of the world can save
the state from ruin, when you deny your assistance.
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? THE TENTH ORATION AGAINST PHILIP.
Commonly called the Third.
PRONOUNCED IN THE SAME YEAR.
INTRODUCTION.
The former oration had its effect: for, instead of punishing Diopithes,
the Athenians supplied him with money, in order to put him in a con-
dition of continuing his expeditions. In the mean time Philip pursued
Iris Thracian conquests, and made himself master of several places,
which, though of little importance in themselves, yet opened him a way
to the cities Qf the Propontis, and, above all, to Byzantium, which he had
always intended to annex to his dominions. He at first tried the way
of negotiation, in order to gain the Byzantines into the number of his
allies; but this proving ineffectual, he resolved to proceed in another
manner. He had a party in the city, at whose head was the orator
Python, that engaged to deliver him up one of the gates: but while ho
was on his march towards the city the conspiracy was discovered,
which immediately determined him to talie another routa His sudden
countermarch, intended to conceal the crime of Python, really served to
confirm it. He was brought to trial j but the credit and the presents of
Philip prevailed to save him.
The efforts of the Athenians to support their interests in Eubcea, and
the power which Philip had acquired there, end which every day in-
creased, had entirely destroyed the tranquillity of this island. The people
of Oreum, divided by the Athenian and Macedonian factions, were on
the point of breaking out into a civil war, when, under pretence of
restoring their peace, Philip sent them a body of a thousand forces, under
the command of Hipponicus; which soon determined the superiority to
his side. Philistides, a tyrant, who had grown old in factions and public
contests, was intrusted with the government of Oreum, which ho ad-
ministered with all possible severity and cruelty to those in the Athenian
interest; while the other states of the island were also subjected to other
Macedonian governors. Callias, the Chalcidian, whose inconstancy had
made him espouse the interests of Athens, of Thebes, and Macedon,
successively, now returned to his engagements with Athens. He sent
deputies thither to desire assistance, and to prevail on the Athenians to
make some vigorous attempt to regain their power in Eubcea.
In the mean time the King of Persia, alarmed by the accounts of
Philip's growing power, made use of all the influence which his gold could
gain at Athens to engage the Athenians to act openly against an enemy
equally suspected by them both. This circumstance perhaps disposed
them to give the greater attention to the following oration.
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? PHILIPPIC THE THIRD.
Though we have heard a great deal, Athenians, in
almost every assembly, of those acts of violence
which Philip hath been committing ever since his
treaty, not against ours only, but the other states of
Greece ; though all, I am confident, are ready to ac-
knowledge, even they who fail in the performance,
that we should, every one of us, exert our efforts, in
eouncil and in action, to oppose and to chastise his
insolence; yet to such circumstances are you reduced
by your supineness, that I fear (shocking as it is to
say, yet) that had we all agreed to propose, and you
to embrace, such measures as would most effectually
ruin our affairs, they could not have been more
distressed than at present. And to this perhaps
a variety of causes have conspired; nor could we
have been thus affected by one or two. But, on a
strict and just inquiry, you will find it principally
owing to those orators who study rather to gain your
favour than to advance your interests; some of
whom (attentive only to the means of establishing
their own reputation and power) never extend their
thoughts beyond the present moment, and therefore
think that your views are equally confined. Others,
by their accusations and invectives against those at
the head of affairs, labour only to make the state
inflict severity on itself; that, while we are thus en-
gaged, Philip may have full power of speaking and
of acting as he pleases. Such are now the usual
methods of our statesmen; and hence all our errors
and disorders.
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? 144 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
Let me entreat you, my countrymen, thai if ]
speak some truths with boldness, I may not be ex-
posed to your resentment. Consider this: on othei
occasions, you account liberty of speech so general
a privilege of all within your walls, that aliens and
slaves1 are allowed to share it: so that many domes-
tics may be found among you speaking their thoughts
with less reserve than citizens in some other states.
But from your councils you have utterly banished
it. And the consequence is this: in your assemblies,
as you listen only to be pleased, you meet with flat-
tery and indulgence: in the circumstances of public
affairs you find yourselves threatened with the ex-
tremity of danger. If you have still the same dis-
positions I must be silent; if you will attend to your
true interests, without expecting to be flattered, I am
ready to speak. For although our affairs are wretch-
edly situated, though our inactivity hath occasioned
many losses, yet by proper vigour and resolution
you may still repair them all. What I am now going
to advance may possibly appear incredible; yet it is
a certain truth. The greatest of all our past misfor-
tunes is a circumstance the most favourable to oui
future expectations. And what is this ? That the
present difficulties are really owing to our utter dis-
regard of every thing which in any degree affected
our interests. For, were we thus situated in spite
of every effort which our duty demanded, then we
l Aliens and slaves. ]--The Athenians piqued themselves on being tha
most independent and most humane of all people. With them a
stranger had liberty of speaking as he pleased, provided he let nothing
escape him against the government. So Jar were they from admitting
him into-their public deliberations, that a citizen was not permitted to
touch on state affairs in the presence of an alien. Their slaves enjoyed
a proportionable degree of indulgence. The Saturnalia, when they
were allowed to assume the character of masters, was originally an
Athenian institution, and adopted at Rome by Numa. At Sparta and
Thessaly, on the contrary, slaves were treated with such severity, as
obliged them frequently to revolt. The humanity of Athens had its
reward: for their slaves did them considerable service on several
nccasions; at Marathon, in the war of Egina, and at Arginusa). --.
TowrreU
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? PHILIPPIC THE THIRD. 145
should regard our fortune as absolutety desperate.
But now Philip hath conquered your supineness and
inactivity; the state he hath not conquered. Noi
have you been defeated; your force hath not even
been exerted. '
Were it generally acknowledged that Philip was
at war with the state, and had really violated the
peace, the only point to be considered would then be
how to oppose him with the greatest ease and safety.
But since there are persons so strangely infatuated,
that although he be still extending his conquests,
although he hath possessed himself of a consider-
able part of our dominions, although all mankind
have suffered by his injustice, they can yet hear it
repeated in this assembly that it is some of us who
are embroiling the state in war. This suggestion
must first be guarded against; else there is reason
to apprehend that the man who moves you to oppose
your adversary may incur the censure of being author
of the war.
And, first of all, I lay down this as certain: if it
were in our power to determine whether we should
be at peace or war; if peace (that I may begin with
this) were wholly dependent on the option of the
state, there is no doubt but we should embrace it.
And I expect that he who asserts it is will, without
attempting to prevaricate, draw up his decree in form,
and propose it to your acceptance. But if the other
party hath drawn the sword, and gathered his armies
round him; if he amuse us with the name of peace,
while he really proceeds to all kinds of hostilities,
what remains but to oppose him 1 To make profes-
sions of peace, indeed, like him;--if this be agree-
able to you, I acquiesce. But if any man takes that
for peace which is enabling him, after all his other
conquests, to lead his forces hither, his mind must
be disordered; at least it is our conduct only towards
him, not his towards us, that must be called a peace.
But this it is for which all Philip's treasures are ex-
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? 146 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
pended; that he should carry on the war against
you; but that you should make no war on him. --
Should we continue thus inactive till he declares
himself our enemy, we should be the weakest of
mortals. This he would not do, although he were
in the heart of Attica, even at the Piraeus, if we may
judge from his behaviour to others. For it was not
till he came within a few miles1 of Olynthus that he
declared that " either the Olynthians must quit their
city, or he his kingdom. " Had he been accused of
this at any time before, he would have resented it,
and ambassadors must have been despatched to jus-
tify their master. In like manner, while he was
moving towards the Phocians, he still affected to
regard them as allies and friends : nay, there were
actually ambassadors from Phocis who attended him
in his march: and among us were many who in-
sisted that this march portended no good to Thebes.
Not long since, when he went into Thessaly with all
the appearance of amity, he possessed himself of
Pherse. And it is but now he told the wretched
people of Oreum that he had, in all affection, sent
some forces to inspect their affairs; for that he heard
they laboured under disorders and seditions; and
that true friends and allies should not be absent on
such occasions. And can you imagine that he, who
chose to make use of artifice rather than open force,
against enemies by no means able to distress him,
who, at most, could but have defended themselves
against him--that he will openly proclaim his hostile
designs against you; and this when you yourselves
obstinately shut your eyes against them? Impossi-
ble! He would be the absurdest of mankind, if,
while his outrages pass unnoticed, . while you are
wholly engaged in accusing some among yourselves,
and endeavouring to bring them to a trial, he should
put an end to your private contests, warn you to
I A few miles, &c. J--In Ine originai,/orty stadia, about five miles.
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? PHILIPPIC THE THIRD.
147
direct all your zeal against him, and so deprive his
pensioners of their most specious pretence for sus-
pending your resolutions; that of his not being at
war with the state. Heavens! is there any man of
a right mind who would judge of peace or war by
words, and not by actions? Surely, no man. --To
examine then the actions of Philip. --When the peace
was just concluded, before ever Diopithes had re-
ceived his commission, or those in the Chersonesus
had been sent out, he possessed himself of Senium
and Doriscum, and obliged the forces our general
had stationed in the citadel of Senium and the
Sacred Mount to evacuate these places. From these
proceedings, what are we to judge of him 1 The
peace he had ratified by the most solemn oaths. And
let it not be asked,1 of what moment is all this ? or
how is the state affected by if! Whether these
things be of no moment, or whether we are affected
by them or no, is a question of another nature. Let
the instance of violation be great or small, the sacred
obligation of faith and justice is, in all instances, the
same.
But further: when he sends his forces into the
Chersonesus, which the king, which every state of
Greece acknowledged to be ours; when he confess-
edly assists our enemies, and braves us with such
letters, what are his intentions ? for they say he is
not at war with us. For my own part, so far am I
from acknowledging such conduct to be consistent
with his treaty, that I declare, that by his attack of
the Megareans, by his attempts on the liberty of
Eubcea, by his late incursion into Thrace, by his
practices in Peloponnesus, and by his constant re-
course to the power of arms, in all his transactions
he has violated the treaty, and is at war with you;
t Let it not be asked, &c. ]--The partisans of Philip affected to speak
with contempt of these places. To deny the right of Athens to the'n
was dangerous and unpopular ; they therefore endeavoured to represent
them as beneath the public regard.
Vol. I. --:
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? 148 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
unless you will affirm, that he who prepares to invest
a city is still at peace until the walls be actually
assaulted. You cannot, surely, affirm it! He whose
designs, whose whole conduct tends to reduce me to
subjection, that man is at war with me, though not
a blow hath yet been given, not one weapon drawn.
And if any accident should happen, to what dangers
must you be exposed! The Hellespont will be no
longer yours: your enemy will become master of
Megara and Euba? a: the Peloponnesians will be
gained over to his interest. And shall I say that the
man who is thus raising his engines, and preparing
to storm the city, that he is at peace with you ? No:
from that day in Which Phocis fell beneath his arms I
date his hostilities against you. If you will instantly
oppose him, I pronounce you wise; if you delay, it
will not be in your power when you are inclined.
And so far, Athenians, do I differ from some other
speakers, that I think it now no time to debate about
the Chersonesus or Byzantium; but that we should
immediately send reinforcements, and guard these
places from all accidents, supply the generals sta-
tioned there with every thing they stand in need of,
and extend our care to all the Greeks, now in the
greatest and most imminent danger. Let me entreat
your attention while I explain the reasons which
induce me to be apprehensive of this danger; that,
if they are just, you may adopt them, and be provi
dent of your own interests at least, if those of others
do not affect you: or, if they appear frivolous and
impertinent, you may now, and ever hereafter,
neglect me as a man of an unsound mind.
That Philip, from a mean and inconsiderable Ori-
gin, hath advanced to greatness; that suspicion and
faction divide all the Greeks; that it is more to be
admired that he should become so powerful from
what he was, than that now, after such accessions
of strength, he should accomplish all his ambitious
schemes : these, and other like points which might
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? PHILIPPIC THE THIRD.
149
be dwelt on, I choose to pass over. But there is one
concession which, by the influence of your example,
all men have made to him, which hath heretofore
seen the cause of all the Grecian wars. And what
is this T An absolute power to act as he pleases;
thus to harass and plunder every state of Greece
successively; to invade and to enslave their cities.
You held the sovereignty of Greece seventy-three
years:' the Lacedaemonians commanded for the space
of twenty-nine years;2 and in these latter times,
after the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans were in
some degree of eminence. Yet neither to you, nor
to the Thebans, nor to the Lacedaemonians, did the
Greeks ever grant this uncontrolled power: far from
it. On the contrary, when you, or rather the Athe-
nians of that age, seemed to treat some persons not
with due moderation, it was universally resolved to
take up arms; even they who had no private com-
plaints espoused the cause of the injured. And
when the Lacedaemonians succeeded to your power,
the moment that they attempted to enlarge their
sway, and to make such changes in affairs as be-
trayed their ambitious designs, they were opposed
by all, even by those who were not immediately
affected by their conduct. But why do I speak of
others? We ourselves, and the Lacedaemonians,
though from the first we could allege no injuries
against, each other, yet, to redress the injured,
thought ourselves bound to draw the sword. And
all the faults of the Lacedaemonians in their thirty
years, and of our ancestors in their seventy years, do
not amount to the outrages which Philip hath com-
mitted against the Greeks within less than thirteen
1 Seventy-three years. ]--See note p. 80.
2 Twenty-nine years. l--That is, from the destruction of Athens by
Lysahder, in the last year of the 93d Olympiad, to the first war in which
the Athenians, when re-established by Conon, engaged against Sparta,
to free themselves and the other Greeks from the Spartan yoke in the
last year of the 100th Olympiad. --Tourml.
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? 150
ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
years of power;' or rather, do not all make up the
smallest part of them. This I shall easily prove in
a few words.
Olynthus, and Methone, and Apollonia, and the
two-and-thirty cities of Thrace, I pass all over;
every one of which felt such severe effects of . his
cruelty, that an observer could not easily determine
whether any of them had ever teen inhabited or no.
The destruction of the Phocians, a people so con-
siderable, shall also pass unnoticed. But think on
the condition of the Thessahans, Hath he not sub-
verted their states and cities 1 Hath he not estab-
lished his tetrarchs over them, that not only single
towns, but whole countries2 might pay htm vassalage 7
Are not the states of Eubcea in the hands of tyrants,
and this in an island bordering on Thebes and
Athens? Are not these the express words of his
letters--" they who are willing to obey me may ex-
pect peace from me ? " And he not only writes, but
confirms his menaces by actions. He marches
directly to the Hellespont: but just before he at-
tacked Ambracia: Elis,3 one of the chief cities of
Peloponnesus, is in his possession: not long since
he entertained designs against Megara. All Greece,
all the Barbarian world, is too narrow for this man's
ambition. And though we Greeks see and hear all
this, we send no embassies to each other, we express
no resentment: but into such wretchedness are we
sunk (blocked up within our several cities) that even
1 Thirteen years of power. ]--Philip had now reigned nineteen years.
But being at first engaged in wars wilh his neighbours, he did not
begin to make any considerable figure in Greece until the eighth year
of his reign; when, after the taking of Methone, he expelled the
tyrants of Thessaly, and cut ofT the Phocian army commanded by
Onomarchus. From this period Demosthenes begins his computation. -'
Tourreil.
2 Whole countries, &c. 1--The word in the original signifies a ntmrber
of different people dependent on one principal stale or city.
3 Elis, &c]--He made himself master of this place by treaty, not by
force of arms. Elis entered into the league ofthe amphictyons, by which
Philip was acknowledged as their chief; and maintained its freedom fit!
after the death of Alexander. --Tonrrsil.
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