Lack of information also
undermined
several early attempts at accommo- dation.
Revolution and War_nodrm
2.
224 CCP influence was especially strong in the so-called May 30 movement in Shanghai. CCP membership increased from roughly 1,000 in May 1925 to 30,000 in July 1926 and nearly 6o,ooo by April 1927, and membership in the associated Socialist Youth Corps rose from 2,000 in 1925 to 35,000 in 1927, with nearly one million workers and farmers under their political control. See Kindermann, "Attempted Revolution in China," 205; and Carr, Foundations ofa Planned Economy, 3:789-9<>.
? ? 225 Zinoviev told the Fourteenth Party Congress in December 1925: "There were moments when the yoUIgI\ Chinese Communist Party and the leaders of the Shanghai trade unions [were) in favor of sharpening the conflict to the point of armed insurrection. . . . Comintem gave a directive against these moods, recommending the party to execute a gradual putting on of brakes. " Quoted in Carr, Socialism in One Country, 3:738-39.
226 See Wilber and How, Missionaries ofRevolution, 103-106, 188-95, 25o-51; Kindermann, "Attempted Revolution in China," 195-97, 206; North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, 85-87; and James Pinckney Harrison, The Long March to Power: A History of the Chinese Com- munist Party, 1921-27 (New York: Praeger, 1972), 77-Bo.
[198]
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shifting the GMD headquarters to Wuhan and arranging to remove Chiang from his party posts. 227
Chiang quickly reestablished his primacy. When pro-CCP laborers in Shanghai launched a violent uprising in February 1927, Chiang kept his own forces outside the city while the workers battled the local authorities. Still con- vinced that Chiang could be trusted, Stalin ordered the Communist forces to hide their weapons and avoid a direct conflict with Chiang's forces, telling the ECCI that Chiang and the Right-GMD had to be "utilized to the end, squeezed like a lemon and then thrown away. " But it was Chiang who did the squeezing: after reaching an agreement with the local warlords, his troops began a bloody campaign against the disarmed and helpless Communists in Shanghai. "Within a few days," writes Robert North, "the Shanghai Commu- nists and their labor supporters were all but annihilated. " Stalin still refused
to permit the CCP to withdraw from the united front, however, and ordered it to maintain its alliance with the Left-GMD and to purge the united front of "unreliable elements. "228 The Left-GMD saw this order as a threat to their own positions and promptly expelled the Communists from Wuhan in July. With the united front in ruins and the CCP now isolated, Stalin at last authorized an armed insurrection. These poorly planned uprisings were crushed, and by the end of 1927 the Soviet Union's entire Chinese policy lay in ruins. 229
The debacle in China illustrates why exporting a revolution is difficult, particularly when a revolutionary state tries to guide the revolution from afar. Soviet officials misjudged events in China because they were poorly in- formed about conditions there and because they tried to apply principles that had worked in Russia to a fundamentally different set of circumstances. Soviet efforts to promote revolution in China may have aided the eventual triumph of the CCP by helping it acquire greater discipline and organiza- tional coherence, but a successful revolution would take place only after the
Chinese Communists abandoned unquestioned obedience to Moscow and developed their own revolutionary strategy. 230
Prelude to Stalinism: The War Scare of 1 927. The deterioration of the So- viet Union's international position culminated in the so-called war scare of 1927, which ended with the expulsion of Trotsky and Zinoviev and cleared the way for Stalin's "revolution from above. " Although some authors have
227 SeeNorth,MoscowandChineseCommunists,90-93?
228 Ibid. , 97, 105-107.
229 To make matters worse, the warlord regime in Beijing had broken relations with
Moscow and executed twenty Communists in April, after a raid on the Soviet embassy un- covered evidence of subversive activities.
230 SeeWilberandHow,MissionariesofRevolution,416-17. Forageneralaccountofthede- bacle in China, see Conrad Brandt, Stalin's Failure in China, 1924-1927 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958).
? ? Revolution and War
interpreted this episode as a Stalinist hoax devised to undermine his do- mestic rivals, the available evidence suggests that the Soviet fear of war was genuine. 231 Stalin had warned in October 1926 that "the period of peaceful coexistence was fading into the past," and Bukharin issued an even more ominous warning in January. Their statements triggered a flurry of hoarding and other signs of public alarm, which Stalin sought to dispel in March. These events suggest that the war scare was a genuine re- sponse to international trends and did not originate with Stalin alone. 232
The war scare became overt at the Central Committee Plenum in April 1927, when Stalin's opponents attempted to blame him for the Soviet Union's deterioriating international position. By arguing that war was im- minent, however, they unwittingly undermined their own positions. Stalin accused his opponents of sowing dissension in the face of a growing exter- nal threat and declared that "the chief contemporary question is the threat of a new imperialist war . . . against the Soviet Union in particular. "233
Stalin's counterattack discredited his opponents and the war scare passed quickly, but it was more than just a manifestation of the internal struggle for power. Soviet diplomats, worried about the risk of war, went to great lengths to persuade France and Germany not to imitate Britain's decision to break relations. The Soviet delegation to the World Economic Conference stressed the danger of war and the need for economic ties between the two social systems, and Litvinov made a dramatic appeal for total disarmament at a League of Nations conference in November. Finally, Stalin's report to the Fifteenth Party Congress in December 1927 warned that the period of "peaceful coexistence" was giving way to "a period of imperialist attacks" and he reminded the party, "Our task consists in postporung the war, in buying ourselves off by paying a tribute to the capitalists, and in taking all measures to maintain peaceful relations. "234 Thus, the fear of war seems to
231 Examplesofthe"hoax"interpretationincludeAdamB. Ulam,ExpansionandCoexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1 917-1973 (New York: Praeger, 1974), 165? 6; Fischer, Soviets in World Af- fairs, 2:739-42; and Robert V. Daniels, The Conscience ofthe Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1? <>), 285-86.
232 In March, Bukharin declared, "We have no guarantee against an invasion of our coun-
try. It is of course not a question of today or tomorrow, or even of next month, but we have no guarantee whatever that it may not come in the spring or the autumn. " Stalin's view at this point was much less alarmist, and he argued the Soviet Union's "active policy of peace . . . makes war with our country difficult. " Quoted in Alfred G. Meyer, "The War Scare of 1927,'' Soviet Union/Union Sovietique 5, no. 1 (1978), 4? ; and see also John Sontag, "The Soviet War Scare of 1927," The Russian Review 34, no. 1 (1975).
233 Foreignobserversreportedthatthefearofwarwasevident"evenamongcautiousmem- bers of the [Soviet] government" and there was another wave of hoarding during the summer. Quoted in Meyer, "War Scare," 9-16; and see also Degras, Soviet Documents, 2:233-35; Carr, Foundations ofa Planned Economy, 3:S-11; and Fischer, Soviets in World Affairs, 2:740.
234 For these quotations and further discussion, see Meyer, "War Scare," 3, 24-25; Carr, Foundations ofa Planned Economy, 3:27; Sontag, "Soviet War Scare," 72-73; and Eudin and Fisher, Soviet Russia and the West, 407-409.
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have been genuine, even if it also gave Stalin a golden opportunity to elim- inate his principal rivals. It also provided a rationale for the brutal strategy of autarky and forced industrialization that Stalin initiated several years later, for if the West was unremittingly bent on war, then the Soviet Union needed the capacity to defend itself and could not expect the capitalist states to help them acquire the necessary forces.
Yet as noted earlier, Soviet perceptions of a growing capitalist danger were largely a mirage. None of the Western powers was planning to attack the Soviet Union, and their anti-Soviet policies were for the most part de- fensive responses to Soviet actions. Unfortunately, the Soviets' enduring be-
lief in capitalist hostility and their long-range commitment to world revolution combined to undo the progress achieved after 1921 and prevent the Soviet Union from taking its place as a fully accepted member of the in- ternational community.
In one sense, the doctrine of "socialism in one country" was the culmina- tion of a process that had begun as soon as the Soviets gained control. Hav- ing successfully seized state power, the Bolsheviks automatically acquired an interest in preserving their position within a particular geographic area. In practice, this meant defending the security of the Soviet state, so when the revolution failed to spread as expected, Russia's new leaders concen- trated on enhancing their hold on power within their own borders. Soviet diplomacy began forging working relations with a number of foreign pow- ers, and the Comintern was converted from an international revolutionary party into an obedient tool of Soviet policy.
In another sense, however, "socialism in one country" marked a return to the harsh and conflictive image of international relations that had domi- nated Soviet perceptions during the civil war. Soviet officials gave up their hopes of integrating Russia into the world economy and became increas- ingly fearful of a renewed imperialist war. If world revolution was no longer seen as imminent, neither was normalization. Thus, the Soviet Union would have to go it alone, and Stalin's formula of autarky, forced industri- alization, and the primacy of Soviet state interests was the logical (and tragic) result.
CoNCLUSION: THE RussiAN REvoLUTION AND BALANCE OF THREAT THEORY
The international impact of the Russian Revolution was to intensify the level of security competition between states. To be sure, the revolu- tion did reduce the level of conflict briefly by taking Russia out of World War I, and a weakened Russia would have been a ripe source of conflict
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even if Nicholas II had retained his throne. By dissolving the tsarist em- pire and bringing to power a messianic and xenophobic revolutionary movement, however, the Bolshevik revolution raised the level of inter- national tension substantially. In the short term, it opened a window of opportunity and gave other states additional incentives to intervene. Over the longer term, it created a new state that was fundamentally hos- tile to the prevailing international order and openly committed to spreading its principles to other countries. Because one simply cannot imagine tsarist Russia adopting such a policy or having the same impact on the other great powers, we may safely infer that tlne revolution was
responsible for the intense suspicions that characterized Soviet foreign relations after 1918.
The Balance ofPower
The revolution in Russia caused a major shift in the balance of power in Eurasia. As the theory in chapter 2 predicts, this shift exacerbated existing incentives for conflict and created a number of new ones.
The initial motive behind Allied intervention in Russia was the fear that the revolution would shift the balance of power in favor of Germany. Afteir the war, European intervention was fueled by the Allies' concern over Rus- sia's place in the postwar balance of power and by each great power's desire to enhance its position vis-a-vis the others. A similar pattern occurred in the Far East: Japan and China endeavored to take advantage of Russia's weak- ness while the United States tried to check Japanese ambitions and support the largely nonexistent forces of Russian liberalism. The Russo-Polish war sprang from similar roots, insofar as Poland's leaders believed that expan- sion was necessary for their long-term security and that Russia's weakness was an opportunity Poland could not ignore.
The detente that began after the civil war can also be traced to states' growing awareness of the true balance of power. The end of the Russo- Polish war offers the most obvious example; according to Pyotr Wandycz, "peace became possible only after both sides tried to accomplish their aims and failed. At that point there was no alternative. "235 Similarly, the Allies withdrew from Russia after recognizing that removing the Bolsheviks would require a much larger commitment of men and money than they were willing to undertake. Balance-of-power logic is also revealed in the rapprochement between Soviet Russia and Weimar Germany and the friendship treaties with Afghanistan, Turkey, and Iran. In each case, isolated powers joined forces to counter a specific external threat, despite their obvi- ous ideological differences.
235 Soviet-Polish Relations, 290; and see also Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3=216. [202]
? The Russian Revolution
Perceptions ofIntent
The diplomacy of the Russian Revolution highlights the tendency for revolutionary states to assume the worst about other states' intentions, an assumption that is usually reciprocated. Although both the Soviets and the onlookers had! legitimate grounds for suspicion, each side interpreted the other's actions in ways that reinforced its initial suspicions and inflated the perceived level of threat even more. In the end, the Soviet susceptibil- ity to a highly paranoid view of world politics helped derail the initial process of normalization and ensured that Soviet foreign relations would remain deeply conflictive for several more decades.
The belief that the capitalist world was intrinsically hostile was a central tenet of Bolshevik ideology, so Soviet Russia tended to view the behavior of other powers in the least generous terms possible. The Soviets saw Western support for the Whites as directed primarily against them (though the pol- icy was originally inspired by fear of Germany), and they interpreted the Entente's offers of support prior to Brest-Litovsk as an insincere attempt to lure them to their doom. Allied policy at the Paris Peace Conference was seen as hostile and duplicitous, and the Soviets subsequently accused Britain and France of instigating the Polish invasion in 1920 as well. These inferences were all of dubious validity: the Allies were sincerely interested in supporting the Russian war effort, on condition the Bolsheviks be willing to resume fighting; Allied policy at the peace conference owed more to un- certainty and nnternal disagreements than to any careful plan to overthrow Soviet Russia; and the Polish invasion, which was Pilsudski's own doing, was condemned by most Western officials. Yet the Soviets clung to their idea of imperialism as intrinsically hostile, even after the capitalist powers had begun to trade with Russia and several had provided extensive relief aid during the famine in the Ukraine in 1921-22. The belief that Soviet Russia could at best achieve a temporary accommodation with capitalism justified
the Bolsheviks' continued efforts to subvert the Western powers and im- peded the establishment of more normal relations despite the other great powers' genuine interest in relaxing tensions.
The Entente powers also failed to appreciate how their own actions rein- forced Soviet suspicions. Allied intervention in Russia during World War I was driven by the incorrect belief that the Bolsheviks were German agents, and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was seen as evidence of pro-German sym- pathies rather than as a desperate concession to German power. Subsequent Soviet peace offers never received adequate attention (because Allied states- men did not trust them and were loathe to confer recognition on the new regime), and accommodation was further discouraged by the belief that it would do no good. Although Wilsdn and Lloyd George wanted to respond favorably to the Soviet peace offensive, their efforts foundered in the face of
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opposition from France, the White leaders, and conservatives at home. Fi- nally, the Allies do not seem to have realized that the Soviet government would inevitably regard their stated disinterest in interfering in Russia as wholly insincere, since Allied troops were already present on Russian soil and the Entente was already supporting the Whites militarily. The result was the worst of all possible worlds: these inconsistencies appeared to the Soviets as evidence of imperialist duplicity, while the Entente believed their own actions to have been part of a genuine if not very extensive effort to bring peace to a divided and war-ravaged Russia.
Conflict between Russia and the West was not due solely to this sort of misperception, of course, and both sides also had legitimate grounds for suspicion. The Bolsheviks did aspire to lead a worldwide movement that would usher in the socialist epoch; for this reason, conservatives such as Lansing, Foch, and Churchill regarded Bolshevism as the embodiment of evil, and even such moderates as Lloyd George and Wilson preferred that Russia be governed by a non-Bolshevik regime. At the same time, however, both sides seem to have underestimated the existing willingness to compro- mise. They therefore may have neglected to pursue promising opportunities for accommodation; for example, a deal along the lines of either the Prinkipo proposal or the terms worked out by Bullitt in March 1919 would have been no worse, and probably considerably better, than continued Western involvement in the civil war. Given the mutual suspicions and the absence of established channels of communication, however, these possibil-
ities never had much chance. 236 Similarly, a less confrontational policy would have made it ea,sier for the Soviets to end Western intervention and obtain the economic assistance they so desperately needed.
While it never vanished completely, the extreme hostility that shaped in- ternational relations during the Russian Civil War began to ease after 1920. Both the Soviets and their peers abroad remained wary, but they were in- creasingly willing to attempt limited forms of cooperation. Lenin's New Economic Policy was seen by many as a sign of moderation, and the Soviets agreed to suspend hostile propaganda as part of the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement (though these activities continued under the auspices of the Comintern). Soviet representatives attended international conferences in Genoa and Lausanne in 1922 and 1923, and the government signed friend- ship treaties with Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan despite the anti-Communist policies that each regime pursued at home. By 1925 Moscow had estab- lished diplomatic relations with most of the other great powers and was playing an increasingly active role in other international forums. As each side's image as incorrigibly aggressive eroded, the level of threat declined and more normal relations became possible. The tragedy of Soviet diplo-
? 236 On this point, see Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and Versailles, 379-Bo, 396-9- 7.
? ? The Russian Revolu tion
macy lies in the fact that Bolshevik ideology predisposed them to assume the worst about their adversaries, and to interpret any setback as evidence of renewed imperialist aggression. And from the Soviet perspective, the greater tragedy is that their own self-defeating actions undoubtedly left them unnecessarily isolated and insecure. 237
Offense, Defense, and the Export ofRevolution
The early history of revolutionary Russia supports the hypothesis that revolutions nourish a state's perceptions of a particular sort of offensive ad- vantage. The Bolsheviks were convinced that a worldwide socialist revolu- tion was inevitable and their long-term survival depended on it. Although Lenin warned against placing too much hope in an imminent world revolu- tion, the belief that their triumph in Russia would soon be repeated else- where affected Soviet policy at several critical moments. The assumption of a forthcoming wave of revolutions across Europe cost them considerable territory at Brest-Litovsk. It also meant the Soviets viewed the formation of the Hungarian and Bavarian Soviets, the Kapp putsch in Germany, the army mutinies and labor disturbances in France, and the "Hands Off Russia" movement in England as signs that the revolutionary tide was still rising. The decision to invade Poland in 1920 rested on similar expectations, as did the Soviets' continued reliance on propaganda and subversion despite the negative responses these activities provoked.
Over time, however, a steady diet of failure eroded Soviet hopes for an im- minent upheaval in the West. Indeed, where the Second Congress of the Com- intern had breathlessly tracked the Red Army's progress in Poland, the Third Congress admitted that "the world revolution . . . will require a prolonged pe- riod of revolutionary struggle. "238 Although Soviet hopes rebounded on occa- sion, the ideal of world revolution was gradually subordinated to the more immediate need to enhance the power, security, and status of the Soviet state. But because the goal of world revolution was never formally abandoned, other states remained wary long after the danger had faded.
Perceptions of the offense-defense balance affected foreign responses to the revolution as well, in mixed ways. During World War I, advocates of Al- lied intervention argued that the Central Powers could easily exploit vast areas of Russia while a modest Allied force could avert this possibility at rel- atively low cost. After the war, Soviet hopes that the revolution would spread to Europe were mirrored by Western fears that the Bolsheviks might be right. Many Western statesmen believed Europe was vulnerable to revo- lutionary subversion in the aftermath of World War I, justifying their sup-
237 See Uldricks, "Russia and Europe," 8cHll.
238 Quoted in Eudin and Fisher, Soviet Russia and the West, 87.
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port for the Whites during the civil war and playing a key role in the En- tente's decision not to recognize the new regime. 239 The belief that the Soviet regime was fragile and unpopular encouraged these policies as well: sup- port for the Whites made more sense if the Bolsheviks were vulnerable, and accommodation would be unnecessary if the Soviet regime were about to collapse. 240 Thus, the impression of Soviet Russia as both dangerous and
vulnerable led to repeated attempts to isolate or overthrow it, even if these efforts were not especially extensive.
Indeed, despite the widespread consensus that Bolshevism was a threat, there was little agreement on how to respond to it. The differences were based largely on competing assessments of the offense-defense balance, and in par- ticular, on the expected cost of trying to overcome the new regime. Churchill and Clemenceau thought Bolshevik Russia would be relatively easy to re- move, while Wilson and Lloyd George believed intervention would merely increase the appeal of Bolshevism both at home and abroad. And once it be- came clear that ousting the Soviet regime would require a major Western ef- fort-owing to both Russia's vast size and the Bolsheviks' unexpected staying power-the Allies abandoned their halfhearted efforts to topple it and turned to a combination of containment and accommodation instead.
Thus, perceptions of a profound offensive advantage over Soviet Russia were not universal, especially with respect to the prospects for foreign in- tervention. Although they regarded the Soviet regime as illegitimate and unpopular, the leaders of the Entente quickly realized that their own popu- lations would not support a large-scale effort to overturn it. As a result, they were forced to pin their hopes on the corrupt, contentious Whites or on still- born schemes for action by various Eastern European forces. The Allies' awareness that intervention in Russia would not be easy stands in marked contrast to the cavalier approach to intervention that France's enemies adopted in 1792-93, and is the main reason why the revolution in Russia did not lead to a larger war. 241
239 According to William Chamberlin, "probably the decisive factor in bringing about a continuation of the policy of limited intervention was the fear, by no means unreasonable or ungrounded in 1919, that Bolshevism in one form or another might spread to other European countries. " Russian Rroolution, 2:152.
240 In November 1917, the British Foreign Office reported that "Bolshevism was probably on its last legs," and U. S. ambassador David Francis declared, "This Bolshevik government can not survive. " According to Phillip Knightley, "in the two years from November 1917 to November 1919, the New York Times reported no fewer than ninety-one times that the Bol- shevikswereabouttofallor,indeed,hadalreadyfallen. "SeeRobertK. Murray,RedScare:A Study ofNational Hysteria, 1919-1920 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 40; and Phillip Knight- ley, The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist, and Mythmaker (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), 138.
241 Even Churchill opposed the use of conscripts in Russia, and recalled that "it would not have been right after the Great War was over, even had it been possible, to use British, French, or American troops in Russia. " Aftermath, 286.
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The Russian Revolution confirms that expectations about the likelihood of a revolution spreading (or collapsing) will have a powerful effect on rela- tions between a revolutionary state and its main foreign adversaries. It also suggests that states' initial assessments are not cast in stone, and the secu- rity competition sparked by a revolution can ease once each side's initial ex- pectations are dispelled.
Uncertainty and Misinformation
Uncertainty and misinformation helped magnify each side's perceptions of threat, thereby contributing to the security competition that followed the Rus- sian Revolution. During World War I, for example, British and French responses to the revolution were based on a series of unlikely scenarios-in- volving the seizure of Allied supplies, the arming of German and Austrian prisoners of war, and the possible use of Vladivostok as a German U-boat base. The worries were baseless, but the Western powers could not simply re- ject them out of hand. The United States was vulnerable to this problem as well, as revealed by Wilson's decision to send U. S. troops to northern Russia to guard Allied stores that were no longer there. France's expedition to Odessa in 1918 was based on its ignorance about conditions in the Ukraine, just as British aid to the Whites was sustained in part by inaccurate estimates of their truemilitaryprospects. Fromtheverybegingnin ,therefore,alackofinforma- tion contributed to the growing conflict between Moscow and the West.
Lack of information also undermined several early attempts at accommo- dation. The severing of diplomatic relations and the withdrawal of Western diplomats left the Allies without a reliable way to ascertain if support for Bol- shevism was growing or declining and made it difficult for either side to de- termine what the other was doing and why. Accommodation was also impeded by the near impossibility of communicating directly with the Soviet regime. The Bolsheviks had been excluded from the peace conference, and communication with Moscow was further impaired by the Allies' reluctance to take steps that might signal their acceptance of the Soviet regime. As a re- sult, the two sides were forced to rely on unreliable radio communications or on unofficial emissaries who were all too easy to disregard. These obstacles
introduced additional delays and ensured that positive efforts would be overtaken by events. The isolation of Soviet Russia also meant that the anti- Bolshevik exiles (whose ranks included many former tsarist officials) became Russia's main voice in the West. As one would expect, the exiles opposed any understanding with the new regime, and their testimony reinforced Allied intransigence at several crucial moments. 242
242 See Tongour, "Diplomacy in Exile"; Kennan, Decision to Intervene, chap. 14; and Ullman, Britain and the Russian Civil War, 141-44, 173? 77.
? ? ? ? Revolution and War
Most important of all, neither the Soviets nor the Entente powers could gauge the potential for either revolution or counterrevolution in the wake of the Bolshevik victory in Russia. Fear of Bolshevism justified Western efforts to overthrow the new regime (or at least to keep it at arm's length), while Soviet hopes for world revolution accounted for the invasion of Poland in 1920 and their continued willingness to engage in counterproductive acts of revolutionary subversion.
Socialization and Learning
Finally, the early history of Soviet foreign relations lends partial-but only partial-support to neorealist claims about the socializing effects of anarchy. On the one hand, Soviet leaders did moderate their revo? utionary aims in order to advance specific diplomatic objectives, and they proved to be adept practioners of traditional balance-of-power politics. Moreover, as each side gained a more accurate estimate of the balance of threats, the level of security competition declined, prospects for cooperation increased, and Soviet for- eign relations took on a more normal cast. On the other hand, Bolshevik ide- ology continued to shape both its avowed objectives and its perceptions of foreign powers, even when the policies that emerged exacerbated its isola- tion and insecurity. Such behavior is difficult to reconcile with a purely struc- tural theory such as neorealism, which reminds us that foreign policy is never determined solely by structural factors. With hindsight, it is all too ob- vious that Leninist ideology was a serious handicap for Soviet diplomacy. Both the commitment to world revolution and the deep suspicion of other states endured because, first, the evidence against them was not clear-cut; second, they were a central part of the CPSU's claim to rule; third, they had been institutionalized in the Comintem and in the CPSU itself; and fourth, the Communist system inhibited critical debate about fundamental princi- ples. As a result, although the Soviet Union made tactical adjustments in re-
sponse to changing conditions, it did not formally abandon its revolutionary agenda until 1986, when it was already on its last legs. 243
The diplomacy of the fledgling Soviet state backs my tlheory that revolu- tions intensify security competition between states and raise the probability of war. Moscow's relations with most other states deteriorated badly after 1917, several foreign powers tried to overthrow the new regime, foreign troops occupied portions of Russian territory until 1924, and Russia and Poland fought a brief but intense war in 1920. Relations between Russia and
243 1986markedthefirsttimewhenacongressoftheCommunistPartyoftheSovietUnion omitted an assessment of the "world revolutionary process. " See Jacobson, When the Soviet
? Union Entered, 30.
[208]
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the outside world improved slightly from 1921 to 1924, but efforts to estab- lish more cordial relations ultimately failed to overcome the mutual percep- tions of threat, keeping the Soviet Union in a self-imposed state of partial isolation.
This unfortunate result was due primarily to the enduring legacy of Bol- shevik ideology. Although the revolution in Russia had not spread as they had anticipated, the Soviet leaders were unable or unwilling to give up the long-range goal of world revolution. They quickly learned to make tactical adjustments for the sake of immediate advantages (something Leninist ide- ology had long endorsed), but external pressures did not induce them to abandon the overthrow of capitalism as a long-term objective. And holding fast to this policy had very real costs, as it greatly increased the number of potential enemies the Soviets faced and would make it far more difficult to attract allies in the future.
Unlike the French case, however, the revolution in Russia did not lead to a war among the great powers. In addition to the sheer size of Soviet Russia (and the innate defensive advantage that this produced), the absence of great-power war is also explained by the massive bloodletting that had taken place between 1914 and 1918. Despite the intense fears of Bolshevism and their deep suspicion of Soviet intentions, none of the European powers was in a position to make a serious effort to oust the Soviet regime. This ob- servation reminds us that understanding the foreign relations of revolu- tionary states requires a broad perspective. Beyond the preferences and capabilities of the new regime, one must also consider the aims and capaci- ties of the other states in the system.
? ? ? ? The Iranian Revolution
We have in reality, then, no choice but to . . . overthrow all treacherous, corrupt, oppressive, and criminal regimes.
-Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini
Nobody is ever ready for a revolution.
-Gary Sick, White House aide for Iran, 1977-81
Like the French and Russian revolutions, the Islamic upheaval in Iran confirms that revolutions raise the level of security competition between states. By altering the regional balance of power, the revolution in Iran both threatened other states and created opportunities for them. It also triggered
spirals of hostility between the new regime and several other countries, which raised the level of threat even further. The fear that the revolution would spread made the danger seem greater, and lingering opposition within Iran fed the new regime's fears of foreign plots and gave its rivals the impression that it would be easy to overturn. Foreign responses to the revo- lution were also affected by uncertainty and misinformation, which exacer- bated each side's perceptions of threat.
The hopes and fears that accompanied the revolution turned out to be greatly exaggerated. Although the Iranian example did encourage funda- mentalists in other countries, it was not the sole (or even the most impor- tant) cause of the Islamic resurgence, and Iranian efforts to export the revolution to other countries have been largely unsuccessful. Foreign beliefs that the new regime would collapse turned out to be equally misguided; the Islamic Republic has survived diplomatic isolation, economic difficulties, a costly war, and internal conflicts that have endured for over fifteen years. Again we find that revolutions are both hard to spread and hard to reverse.
Finally, the Iranian Revolution offers only modest support for neorealist claims about the socializing effects of the international system. As in the So- viet case, key members of the revolutionary elite sought to moderate Iran- ian diplomacy in order to improve its international position. Their efforts were erratic and incomplete, however, for several reasons: the evidence in
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favor of moderation was ambiguous, the commitment to a radical foreign policy was central to the legitimacy of the clerical regime, and the revolu- tionary government was tom between competing factions and thus unable to sustain a consistent line.
This chapter consists of three main sections. First I describe the origins of the Islamic Republic and summarize its ideological foundations. After that, I examine the foreign policy of the new regime and describe how other states responded, focusing primarily on its first decade in power. Finally, i compare the evolution of Iran's foreign relations against the propositions developed in chapter 2.
THE ORIGINS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC The Fall of the Shah
In simple terms, the regime of Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi fell be- cause the shah's reformist policies alienated a broad spectrum of Iranian so- ciety that he was unable to coopt yet unwilling to suppress by brute force. 1 Opposition to the shah arose from, first, the economic and social disloca- tions generated by his rapid modernization program; second, clerical resis- tance to the intrusion of alien values and the shah's attempt to reduce their influence; and third, the widespread perception that the shah was a U. S. puppet and the head of a corrupt and decadent elite. 2
The revolutionary crisis began late in 1977, after the shah's decision to relax police controls and judicial procedures had revived the liberal opposi- tion and sparked! several clashes between antigovernment demonstrators and the shah's internal police. The challenge grew in January 1978, after an insulting attack on the radical clergy in a government newspaper triggered a series of riots by theology students, in which seventy students were killed. The riots began an escalating cycle of popular demonstrations through the
1 Accounts of the lrar nian revolution include Said Amir Arjomand, The Turbanfor the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran (London: Oxford University Press, 1988); Dilip Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985); Shaul Bakhash, The Reign ofthe Ay- atollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 1984); John D. Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981); Farideh Farhi, States and Urban-Based Revolutions: Iran and Nicaragua (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990); and Misagh Parsa, Socia/ Origins of the Iranian Revolution (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989).
2 Opposition to the shah included the liberal National Front, the pro-Communist Tudeh Party, the Liberation Movement (which advocated a synthesis of Islam with modem Western thought), left-wing guerrilla organizations such as the Sazman-i Mujahedin-i Khalq-i Iran (or Islamic Mujahedin) and the Sazaman-i Cherikha-yi Feda'i Khalq-i Iran (or Marxist Feda'i), and Muslim clerics such as Khomeini. See Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), chap. 10, and The Iranian Mojahedin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); and Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution, 42-56.
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spring and summer, and a mass demonstration in Tehran drew nearly five hundred thousand participants in September. The shah declared martial law and ordered the military to suppress the demonstrations, but these actions merely united the liberal opposition and the radlical clerics. By No- vember, a series of strikes had shut down the bazaars, universities, govern- ment offices, banks, and much of the oil industry.
The radicalization of the revolution was due in part to the shah's refusan either to make bold concessions or to order a massive crackdown. His inde-? cision was exacerbated by his deteriorating health and an inability to obtain clear and consistent advice from the United States, which did not appreciate the seriousness of the crisis until very late. 3 Strikes and demonstrations con- tinued through December, with the army rank and file becoming in- creasingly reluctant to use force against the opposition. Support from Washington was evaporating as well, as U. S. officials belatedly realized that the shah might be beyond saving. In desperation, the shah at last offered to negotiate with the opposition. After persuading Shahpour Bakhtiar, a prominent member of the liberal National Front, to lead a caretaker govern- ment, the shah agreed to leave the country for a "vacation" and to accept a greatly diminished role. It was a meaningless agreement, as the Pahlavi state was dissolving rapidly by this point and authority had already begun to pass into the hands of local governing bodies (or komitehs), many of which were controlled by clerics loyal to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the
intellectual spiritual leader of the opposition. Khomeini returned to a tu- multuous welcome on February 1, and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces declared itself neutral ten days later. Bakhtiar immediately resigned and went into hiding, marking the final end of the Pahlavi state.
Khomeini's Revolutionary Program
Many diverse groups participated in the anti-shah coalition, but Ayatol- lah Ruhollah Khomeini was clearly its dominant figure. Khomeini had op- posed the shah's regime since the early 196os, when his criticisms of Iran's dependence on the United States had led to his arrest and subsequent exile in Iraq. He began extolling a radical doctrine of Islamic government while in exile and built an extensive network of supporters among the clergy. This
3 Accounts of U. S. handling of the revolution vary in assigning blame, but all agree that American decision-makers were deeply divided and U. S. advice was inconsistent. See Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran (New York: Random House, 191! 5); James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy ofAmerican-Iranian Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19f! 8), chap. 7; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs ofthe National Security Advisor, 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1983), 354? ; William Sullivan, Mission to Iran (New York: W. W. Norton, 19f! 1); and Stempel, Inside the Iranian Rev- olution, chap. 14. The shah's memoirs place the blame for his ouster on the United States; see Mohammad Reza Shah, Answer to History (New York: Stein and Day, 19&).
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combination of ideology and organization would prove to be a potent revo- lutionary weapon. 4
The central element of Khomeini's revolutionary program was his insis-. tence that the shah's regime be replaced by a government based on Islamic law. Khomeini also argued that the clergy should play an active and direct role in the political system, to ensure that it conformed to Islamic princi- ples. 5 In the absence of direct guidance from the Prophet Muhammed or his chosen successors, he argued, Islamic government should be based on the
"guardianship of the jurisprudent" (velayet-e faqih). "Since the rule of Islam is the rule of law," he wrote, "only the jurists, and no one else, should be in charge of the government. They are the ones who can govern as God or- dered. "6 Thus, not only did Khomeini reject the separation of religion and politics, but his vision of Islamic government placed the clergy in a position of primacy?
Khomeini' s blueprint for Islamic government rested on several other core beliefs. First, he regarded all other forms of government as illegitimate, because they were not based on Islam, and believed that the major world powers were innately hostile and aggressive. Dividing the world into "op- pressors" (the superpowers, their allies, and their various puppets) and the "oppressed" (the victims of imperialist exploitation, such as Iran), Khomeini
accused the Western powers of deliberately seeking "to keep us backward, to keep us in our present miserable state so that they can exploit our riches, our underground wealth, our lands, and our human resources. " For this reason, he argued, the imperialist powers had "separated the various seg- ments of the Islamic ummah (community) from each other and artificially
4 See Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, 35-44; Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 475-79, and Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 1o-12; and Arjomand, Turbanfor the Crown, 94-102.
5 Khomeini declared that "Islam is political or it is nothing" and insisted that "this slogan of the separation of religion and politics and the demand that Islamic scholars not intervene in social and political affairs have been formulated and propagated by the imperialists; it is only the irreligious who repeat them. " Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations ofImam Khomeini, trans. Hamid Algar (Berkeley, Calif. : Mizan Press, 1981), 37-38.
6 Quoted in Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 477?
7 "If a worthy individual possessing [knowledge of the law and justice) arises and estab- lishes a government, he will possess the same authority as the Most Noble Messenger [the Prophet Mohammed) . . . and it will be the duty of all people to obey him. " Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 62. For summaries of Khomeini's theory of Islamic government, see Farhang Rajaee, Islamic Values and World View: Khomeini on Man, the State, and International Politics (Lan- ham, Md. : University Press of America, 1983); David Menashri, "Khomeini's Vision: Nation- alism or World Order? " in his edited Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World (Boulder, Colo. : Westview, 1990); Marvin Zonis and Daniel Bromberg, Khomeini, the Islamic Republic ofIran, and the Arab World (Cambridge: Harvard Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1987); and Greg- ory Rose, "Velayet-e Faqih and the Recovery of Islamic Identity in the Thought of Ayatollah Khomeini," in Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi'ismfrom Quietism to Revolution, ed. Nikki Ked- die (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).
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created separate nations. " In addition to "corrupting the minds and morals of the people," the oppressors had replaced the judicial process and poHti- cal laws of Islam with "European importations" and "installed their agents in power. " According to Khomeini, therefore, the only way to end foreign exploitation was to overthrow agents such as the shah and establish a gov- ernment based on Islamic principles. 8
This Manichean worldview precluded any compromise with the shah or his foreign patrons. Khomeini told his followers in November 1978, "If you give [the shah] a breathing spell, tomorrow neither Islam nor your country nor your family will be left for you. Do not give him a chance; squeeze his neck until he is strangled. " He was particularly suspicious of the United States, whose support for the shah qualified it as the "Great Satan," but the Soviet Union and the other major powers were seen as equally hostile. 9 For Khomeini, the superpowers were driven by an incor- rigible lust for power and were especially dangerous for Iran. Even after the shah was gone, Khomeini warned that the great powers sought "to break Iran into pieces, to stage a coup d'etat and pave the way for the . . . supervision of foreigners. " Neither patience nor conciliation could remove the danger, because the "Satans are making plans [against Islam] for a cen- tury from now. "10
Second, Khomeini rejected existing state boundaries as "the product of the deficient human mind" and emphasized that "Muslims are one family, even if they are subject to different governments and even if they live in re- gions remote from one another. " Accordingly, he called for active efforts to spread the revolution beyond Iran's borders, declaring that "we have in re- ality, then, no choice but to . . . overthrow all treacherous, corrupt, oppres- sive, and criminal regimes. " He also argued that his doctrine of Islamic government would end the artificial divisions imposed by the West al! 1ld
8 "It is the duty of all of us to overthrow the taghut, i. e. , the illegitimate political powers that ? now rule fthe entire Islamic world. The government apparatus of tyrannical and anti-popular regimes must be replaced by institutions serving the public good and administered accord- ing to Islamic law. In this way an Islamic government will gradually come into existence. " Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 34-35, 48-50, 136, 147. See also Shireen T. Hunter, Iran and the World: Continuity in Revolutionary Decade (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 37-41; . and Richard Cottam, "Iran-Motives behind Its Foreign Policy," Survival 28, no. 6
( 1 986).
9 In 1964, Khomeini had declared, "America is worse than Britain; Britain is worse than America. The Soviet Union is worse than both of them. " For these quotations, see Arjomand, Turbanfor the Crown, 102; and Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 185.
10 Khomeini also warned, "Neither the West nor the East will leave us alone. They will try everything in their power to prevent Iran from settling down. " Quoted in W. R. Campbell and Djamchid Darvich, "Global Implications of the Islamic Revolution for the Status Quo in the Persian Gulf," Journal ofSoutli Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 5, no. 1 (1981), 42; and see also Rajaee, Islamic Values, 75-78; and Roy Parviz Mottahedeh, "Iran's Foreign Devils," For- eign Policy 38 (198o).
? ? ? ? The Iranian Revolution
recreate a unified Muslim ummah. And though the Muslim world was the
primary object of his revolutionary ambitions, Khomeini and his followers
occasionally suggested that the ultimate goal was the creation of a global
community that would transcend the existing state system altogether. 11 In
addition, Khomeini argued that failure to spread the revolution would leave
Iran vulnerable to the "oppressors" or their various puppets. Once in
power, he declared, "We should try to export our revolution to the world.
. . . If we remain in an enclosed environment we shall definitely face defeat. "
Thus, there were both offensive and defensive justifications for an expan-
sionist policy; although he repeatedly denied that it would involve the use
of force, spreading the revolution beyond Iran was both a means to ensure
Iran's security and an end in itself. 12
Third, like other revolutionary ideologies, Khomeini's worldview com- bined long-term optimism with an emphasis on sacrifice andl discipline. He preached, "The Quran says 'And hold fast . .
224 CCP influence was especially strong in the so-called May 30 movement in Shanghai. CCP membership increased from roughly 1,000 in May 1925 to 30,000 in July 1926 and nearly 6o,ooo by April 1927, and membership in the associated Socialist Youth Corps rose from 2,000 in 1925 to 35,000 in 1927, with nearly one million workers and farmers under their political control. See Kindermann, "Attempted Revolution in China," 205; and Carr, Foundations ofa Planned Economy, 3:789-9<>.
? ? 225 Zinoviev told the Fourteenth Party Congress in December 1925: "There were moments when the yoUIgI\ Chinese Communist Party and the leaders of the Shanghai trade unions [were) in favor of sharpening the conflict to the point of armed insurrection. . . . Comintem gave a directive against these moods, recommending the party to execute a gradual putting on of brakes. " Quoted in Carr, Socialism in One Country, 3:738-39.
226 See Wilber and How, Missionaries ofRevolution, 103-106, 188-95, 25o-51; Kindermann, "Attempted Revolution in China," 195-97, 206; North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, 85-87; and James Pinckney Harrison, The Long March to Power: A History of the Chinese Com- munist Party, 1921-27 (New York: Praeger, 1972), 77-Bo.
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shifting the GMD headquarters to Wuhan and arranging to remove Chiang from his party posts. 227
Chiang quickly reestablished his primacy. When pro-CCP laborers in Shanghai launched a violent uprising in February 1927, Chiang kept his own forces outside the city while the workers battled the local authorities. Still con- vinced that Chiang could be trusted, Stalin ordered the Communist forces to hide their weapons and avoid a direct conflict with Chiang's forces, telling the ECCI that Chiang and the Right-GMD had to be "utilized to the end, squeezed like a lemon and then thrown away. " But it was Chiang who did the squeezing: after reaching an agreement with the local warlords, his troops began a bloody campaign against the disarmed and helpless Communists in Shanghai. "Within a few days," writes Robert North, "the Shanghai Commu- nists and their labor supporters were all but annihilated. " Stalin still refused
to permit the CCP to withdraw from the united front, however, and ordered it to maintain its alliance with the Left-GMD and to purge the united front of "unreliable elements. "228 The Left-GMD saw this order as a threat to their own positions and promptly expelled the Communists from Wuhan in July. With the united front in ruins and the CCP now isolated, Stalin at last authorized an armed insurrection. These poorly planned uprisings were crushed, and by the end of 1927 the Soviet Union's entire Chinese policy lay in ruins. 229
The debacle in China illustrates why exporting a revolution is difficult, particularly when a revolutionary state tries to guide the revolution from afar. Soviet officials misjudged events in China because they were poorly in- formed about conditions there and because they tried to apply principles that had worked in Russia to a fundamentally different set of circumstances. Soviet efforts to promote revolution in China may have aided the eventual triumph of the CCP by helping it acquire greater discipline and organiza- tional coherence, but a successful revolution would take place only after the
Chinese Communists abandoned unquestioned obedience to Moscow and developed their own revolutionary strategy. 230
Prelude to Stalinism: The War Scare of 1 927. The deterioration of the So- viet Union's international position culminated in the so-called war scare of 1927, which ended with the expulsion of Trotsky and Zinoviev and cleared the way for Stalin's "revolution from above. " Although some authors have
227 SeeNorth,MoscowandChineseCommunists,90-93?
228 Ibid. , 97, 105-107.
229 To make matters worse, the warlord regime in Beijing had broken relations with
Moscow and executed twenty Communists in April, after a raid on the Soviet embassy un- covered evidence of subversive activities.
230 SeeWilberandHow,MissionariesofRevolution,416-17. Forageneralaccountofthede- bacle in China, see Conrad Brandt, Stalin's Failure in China, 1924-1927 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958).
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interpreted this episode as a Stalinist hoax devised to undermine his do- mestic rivals, the available evidence suggests that the Soviet fear of war was genuine. 231 Stalin had warned in October 1926 that "the period of peaceful coexistence was fading into the past," and Bukharin issued an even more ominous warning in January. Their statements triggered a flurry of hoarding and other signs of public alarm, which Stalin sought to dispel in March. These events suggest that the war scare was a genuine re- sponse to international trends and did not originate with Stalin alone. 232
The war scare became overt at the Central Committee Plenum in April 1927, when Stalin's opponents attempted to blame him for the Soviet Union's deterioriating international position. By arguing that war was im- minent, however, they unwittingly undermined their own positions. Stalin accused his opponents of sowing dissension in the face of a growing exter- nal threat and declared that "the chief contemporary question is the threat of a new imperialist war . . . against the Soviet Union in particular. "233
Stalin's counterattack discredited his opponents and the war scare passed quickly, but it was more than just a manifestation of the internal struggle for power. Soviet diplomats, worried about the risk of war, went to great lengths to persuade France and Germany not to imitate Britain's decision to break relations. The Soviet delegation to the World Economic Conference stressed the danger of war and the need for economic ties between the two social systems, and Litvinov made a dramatic appeal for total disarmament at a League of Nations conference in November. Finally, Stalin's report to the Fifteenth Party Congress in December 1927 warned that the period of "peaceful coexistence" was giving way to "a period of imperialist attacks" and he reminded the party, "Our task consists in postporung the war, in buying ourselves off by paying a tribute to the capitalists, and in taking all measures to maintain peaceful relations. "234 Thus, the fear of war seems to
231 Examplesofthe"hoax"interpretationincludeAdamB. Ulam,ExpansionandCoexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1 917-1973 (New York: Praeger, 1974), 165? 6; Fischer, Soviets in World Af- fairs, 2:739-42; and Robert V. Daniels, The Conscience ofthe Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1? <>), 285-86.
232 In March, Bukharin declared, "We have no guarantee against an invasion of our coun-
try. It is of course not a question of today or tomorrow, or even of next month, but we have no guarantee whatever that it may not come in the spring or the autumn. " Stalin's view at this point was much less alarmist, and he argued the Soviet Union's "active policy of peace . . . makes war with our country difficult. " Quoted in Alfred G. Meyer, "The War Scare of 1927,'' Soviet Union/Union Sovietique 5, no. 1 (1978), 4? ; and see also John Sontag, "The Soviet War Scare of 1927," The Russian Review 34, no. 1 (1975).
233 Foreignobserversreportedthatthefearofwarwasevident"evenamongcautiousmem- bers of the [Soviet] government" and there was another wave of hoarding during the summer. Quoted in Meyer, "War Scare," 9-16; and see also Degras, Soviet Documents, 2:233-35; Carr, Foundations ofa Planned Economy, 3:S-11; and Fischer, Soviets in World Affairs, 2:740.
234 For these quotations and further discussion, see Meyer, "War Scare," 3, 24-25; Carr, Foundations ofa Planned Economy, 3:27; Sontag, "Soviet War Scare," 72-73; and Eudin and Fisher, Soviet Russia and the West, 407-409.
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have been genuine, even if it also gave Stalin a golden opportunity to elim- inate his principal rivals. It also provided a rationale for the brutal strategy of autarky and forced industrialization that Stalin initiated several years later, for if the West was unremittingly bent on war, then the Soviet Union needed the capacity to defend itself and could not expect the capitalist states to help them acquire the necessary forces.
Yet as noted earlier, Soviet perceptions of a growing capitalist danger were largely a mirage. None of the Western powers was planning to attack the Soviet Union, and their anti-Soviet policies were for the most part de- fensive responses to Soviet actions. Unfortunately, the Soviets' enduring be-
lief in capitalist hostility and their long-range commitment to world revolution combined to undo the progress achieved after 1921 and prevent the Soviet Union from taking its place as a fully accepted member of the in- ternational community.
In one sense, the doctrine of "socialism in one country" was the culmina- tion of a process that had begun as soon as the Soviets gained control. Hav- ing successfully seized state power, the Bolsheviks automatically acquired an interest in preserving their position within a particular geographic area. In practice, this meant defending the security of the Soviet state, so when the revolution failed to spread as expected, Russia's new leaders concen- trated on enhancing their hold on power within their own borders. Soviet diplomacy began forging working relations with a number of foreign pow- ers, and the Comintern was converted from an international revolutionary party into an obedient tool of Soviet policy.
In another sense, however, "socialism in one country" marked a return to the harsh and conflictive image of international relations that had domi- nated Soviet perceptions during the civil war. Soviet officials gave up their hopes of integrating Russia into the world economy and became increas- ingly fearful of a renewed imperialist war. If world revolution was no longer seen as imminent, neither was normalization. Thus, the Soviet Union would have to go it alone, and Stalin's formula of autarky, forced industri- alization, and the primacy of Soviet state interests was the logical (and tragic) result.
CoNCLUSION: THE RussiAN REvoLUTION AND BALANCE OF THREAT THEORY
The international impact of the Russian Revolution was to intensify the level of security competition between states. To be sure, the revolu- tion did reduce the level of conflict briefly by taking Russia out of World War I, and a weakened Russia would have been a ripe source of conflict
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even if Nicholas II had retained his throne. By dissolving the tsarist em- pire and bringing to power a messianic and xenophobic revolutionary movement, however, the Bolshevik revolution raised the level of inter- national tension substantially. In the short term, it opened a window of opportunity and gave other states additional incentives to intervene. Over the longer term, it created a new state that was fundamentally hos- tile to the prevailing international order and openly committed to spreading its principles to other countries. Because one simply cannot imagine tsarist Russia adopting such a policy or having the same impact on the other great powers, we may safely infer that tlne revolution was
responsible for the intense suspicions that characterized Soviet foreign relations after 1918.
The Balance ofPower
The revolution in Russia caused a major shift in the balance of power in Eurasia. As the theory in chapter 2 predicts, this shift exacerbated existing incentives for conflict and created a number of new ones.
The initial motive behind Allied intervention in Russia was the fear that the revolution would shift the balance of power in favor of Germany. Afteir the war, European intervention was fueled by the Allies' concern over Rus- sia's place in the postwar balance of power and by each great power's desire to enhance its position vis-a-vis the others. A similar pattern occurred in the Far East: Japan and China endeavored to take advantage of Russia's weak- ness while the United States tried to check Japanese ambitions and support the largely nonexistent forces of Russian liberalism. The Russo-Polish war sprang from similar roots, insofar as Poland's leaders believed that expan- sion was necessary for their long-term security and that Russia's weakness was an opportunity Poland could not ignore.
The detente that began after the civil war can also be traced to states' growing awareness of the true balance of power. The end of the Russo- Polish war offers the most obvious example; according to Pyotr Wandycz, "peace became possible only after both sides tried to accomplish their aims and failed. At that point there was no alternative. "235 Similarly, the Allies withdrew from Russia after recognizing that removing the Bolsheviks would require a much larger commitment of men and money than they were willing to undertake. Balance-of-power logic is also revealed in the rapprochement between Soviet Russia and Weimar Germany and the friendship treaties with Afghanistan, Turkey, and Iran. In each case, isolated powers joined forces to counter a specific external threat, despite their obvi- ous ideological differences.
235 Soviet-Polish Relations, 290; and see also Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3=216. [202]
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Perceptions ofIntent
The diplomacy of the Russian Revolution highlights the tendency for revolutionary states to assume the worst about other states' intentions, an assumption that is usually reciprocated. Although both the Soviets and the onlookers had! legitimate grounds for suspicion, each side interpreted the other's actions in ways that reinforced its initial suspicions and inflated the perceived level of threat even more. In the end, the Soviet susceptibil- ity to a highly paranoid view of world politics helped derail the initial process of normalization and ensured that Soviet foreign relations would remain deeply conflictive for several more decades.
The belief that the capitalist world was intrinsically hostile was a central tenet of Bolshevik ideology, so Soviet Russia tended to view the behavior of other powers in the least generous terms possible. The Soviets saw Western support for the Whites as directed primarily against them (though the pol- icy was originally inspired by fear of Germany), and they interpreted the Entente's offers of support prior to Brest-Litovsk as an insincere attempt to lure them to their doom. Allied policy at the Paris Peace Conference was seen as hostile and duplicitous, and the Soviets subsequently accused Britain and France of instigating the Polish invasion in 1920 as well. These inferences were all of dubious validity: the Allies were sincerely interested in supporting the Russian war effort, on condition the Bolsheviks be willing to resume fighting; Allied policy at the peace conference owed more to un- certainty and nnternal disagreements than to any careful plan to overthrow Soviet Russia; and the Polish invasion, which was Pilsudski's own doing, was condemned by most Western officials. Yet the Soviets clung to their idea of imperialism as intrinsically hostile, even after the capitalist powers had begun to trade with Russia and several had provided extensive relief aid during the famine in the Ukraine in 1921-22. The belief that Soviet Russia could at best achieve a temporary accommodation with capitalism justified
the Bolsheviks' continued efforts to subvert the Western powers and im- peded the establishment of more normal relations despite the other great powers' genuine interest in relaxing tensions.
The Entente powers also failed to appreciate how their own actions rein- forced Soviet suspicions. Allied intervention in Russia during World War I was driven by the incorrect belief that the Bolsheviks were German agents, and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was seen as evidence of pro-German sym- pathies rather than as a desperate concession to German power. Subsequent Soviet peace offers never received adequate attention (because Allied states- men did not trust them and were loathe to confer recognition on the new regime), and accommodation was further discouraged by the belief that it would do no good. Although Wilsdn and Lloyd George wanted to respond favorably to the Soviet peace offensive, their efforts foundered in the face of
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opposition from France, the White leaders, and conservatives at home. Fi- nally, the Allies do not seem to have realized that the Soviet government would inevitably regard their stated disinterest in interfering in Russia as wholly insincere, since Allied troops were already present on Russian soil and the Entente was already supporting the Whites militarily. The result was the worst of all possible worlds: these inconsistencies appeared to the Soviets as evidence of imperialist duplicity, while the Entente believed their own actions to have been part of a genuine if not very extensive effort to bring peace to a divided and war-ravaged Russia.
Conflict between Russia and the West was not due solely to this sort of misperception, of course, and both sides also had legitimate grounds for suspicion. The Bolsheviks did aspire to lead a worldwide movement that would usher in the socialist epoch; for this reason, conservatives such as Lansing, Foch, and Churchill regarded Bolshevism as the embodiment of evil, and even such moderates as Lloyd George and Wilson preferred that Russia be governed by a non-Bolshevik regime. At the same time, however, both sides seem to have underestimated the existing willingness to compro- mise. They therefore may have neglected to pursue promising opportunities for accommodation; for example, a deal along the lines of either the Prinkipo proposal or the terms worked out by Bullitt in March 1919 would have been no worse, and probably considerably better, than continued Western involvement in the civil war. Given the mutual suspicions and the absence of established channels of communication, however, these possibil-
ities never had much chance. 236 Similarly, a less confrontational policy would have made it ea,sier for the Soviets to end Western intervention and obtain the economic assistance they so desperately needed.
While it never vanished completely, the extreme hostility that shaped in- ternational relations during the Russian Civil War began to ease after 1920. Both the Soviets and their peers abroad remained wary, but they were in- creasingly willing to attempt limited forms of cooperation. Lenin's New Economic Policy was seen by many as a sign of moderation, and the Soviets agreed to suspend hostile propaganda as part of the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement (though these activities continued under the auspices of the Comintern). Soviet representatives attended international conferences in Genoa and Lausanne in 1922 and 1923, and the government signed friend- ship treaties with Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan despite the anti-Communist policies that each regime pursued at home. By 1925 Moscow had estab- lished diplomatic relations with most of the other great powers and was playing an increasingly active role in other international forums. As each side's image as incorrigibly aggressive eroded, the level of threat declined and more normal relations became possible. The tragedy of Soviet diplo-
? 236 On this point, see Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and Versailles, 379-Bo, 396-9- 7.
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macy lies in the fact that Bolshevik ideology predisposed them to assume the worst about their adversaries, and to interpret any setback as evidence of renewed imperialist aggression. And from the Soviet perspective, the greater tragedy is that their own self-defeating actions undoubtedly left them unnecessarily isolated and insecure. 237
Offense, Defense, and the Export ofRevolution
The early history of revolutionary Russia supports the hypothesis that revolutions nourish a state's perceptions of a particular sort of offensive ad- vantage. The Bolsheviks were convinced that a worldwide socialist revolu- tion was inevitable and their long-term survival depended on it. Although Lenin warned against placing too much hope in an imminent world revolu- tion, the belief that their triumph in Russia would soon be repeated else- where affected Soviet policy at several critical moments. The assumption of a forthcoming wave of revolutions across Europe cost them considerable territory at Brest-Litovsk. It also meant the Soviets viewed the formation of the Hungarian and Bavarian Soviets, the Kapp putsch in Germany, the army mutinies and labor disturbances in France, and the "Hands Off Russia" movement in England as signs that the revolutionary tide was still rising. The decision to invade Poland in 1920 rested on similar expectations, as did the Soviets' continued reliance on propaganda and subversion despite the negative responses these activities provoked.
Over time, however, a steady diet of failure eroded Soviet hopes for an im- minent upheaval in the West. Indeed, where the Second Congress of the Com- intern had breathlessly tracked the Red Army's progress in Poland, the Third Congress admitted that "the world revolution . . . will require a prolonged pe- riod of revolutionary struggle. "238 Although Soviet hopes rebounded on occa- sion, the ideal of world revolution was gradually subordinated to the more immediate need to enhance the power, security, and status of the Soviet state. But because the goal of world revolution was never formally abandoned, other states remained wary long after the danger had faded.
Perceptions of the offense-defense balance affected foreign responses to the revolution as well, in mixed ways. During World War I, advocates of Al- lied intervention argued that the Central Powers could easily exploit vast areas of Russia while a modest Allied force could avert this possibility at rel- atively low cost. After the war, Soviet hopes that the revolution would spread to Europe were mirrored by Western fears that the Bolsheviks might be right. Many Western statesmen believed Europe was vulnerable to revo- lutionary subversion in the aftermath of World War I, justifying their sup-
237 See Uldricks, "Russia and Europe," 8cHll.
238 Quoted in Eudin and Fisher, Soviet Russia and the West, 87.
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port for the Whites during the civil war and playing a key role in the En- tente's decision not to recognize the new regime. 239 The belief that the Soviet regime was fragile and unpopular encouraged these policies as well: sup- port for the Whites made more sense if the Bolsheviks were vulnerable, and accommodation would be unnecessary if the Soviet regime were about to collapse. 240 Thus, the impression of Soviet Russia as both dangerous and
vulnerable led to repeated attempts to isolate or overthrow it, even if these efforts were not especially extensive.
Indeed, despite the widespread consensus that Bolshevism was a threat, there was little agreement on how to respond to it. The differences were based largely on competing assessments of the offense-defense balance, and in par- ticular, on the expected cost of trying to overcome the new regime. Churchill and Clemenceau thought Bolshevik Russia would be relatively easy to re- move, while Wilson and Lloyd George believed intervention would merely increase the appeal of Bolshevism both at home and abroad. And once it be- came clear that ousting the Soviet regime would require a major Western ef- fort-owing to both Russia's vast size and the Bolsheviks' unexpected staying power-the Allies abandoned their halfhearted efforts to topple it and turned to a combination of containment and accommodation instead.
Thus, perceptions of a profound offensive advantage over Soviet Russia were not universal, especially with respect to the prospects for foreign in- tervention. Although they regarded the Soviet regime as illegitimate and unpopular, the leaders of the Entente quickly realized that their own popu- lations would not support a large-scale effort to overturn it. As a result, they were forced to pin their hopes on the corrupt, contentious Whites or on still- born schemes for action by various Eastern European forces. The Allies' awareness that intervention in Russia would not be easy stands in marked contrast to the cavalier approach to intervention that France's enemies adopted in 1792-93, and is the main reason why the revolution in Russia did not lead to a larger war. 241
239 According to William Chamberlin, "probably the decisive factor in bringing about a continuation of the policy of limited intervention was the fear, by no means unreasonable or ungrounded in 1919, that Bolshevism in one form or another might spread to other European countries. " Russian Rroolution, 2:152.
240 In November 1917, the British Foreign Office reported that "Bolshevism was probably on its last legs," and U. S. ambassador David Francis declared, "This Bolshevik government can not survive. " According to Phillip Knightley, "in the two years from November 1917 to November 1919, the New York Times reported no fewer than ninety-one times that the Bol- shevikswereabouttofallor,indeed,hadalreadyfallen. "SeeRobertK. Murray,RedScare:A Study ofNational Hysteria, 1919-1920 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 40; and Phillip Knight- ley, The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist, and Mythmaker (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), 138.
241 Even Churchill opposed the use of conscripts in Russia, and recalled that "it would not have been right after the Great War was over, even had it been possible, to use British, French, or American troops in Russia. " Aftermath, 286.
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The Russian Revolution confirms that expectations about the likelihood of a revolution spreading (or collapsing) will have a powerful effect on rela- tions between a revolutionary state and its main foreign adversaries. It also suggests that states' initial assessments are not cast in stone, and the secu- rity competition sparked by a revolution can ease once each side's initial ex- pectations are dispelled.
Uncertainty and Misinformation
Uncertainty and misinformation helped magnify each side's perceptions of threat, thereby contributing to the security competition that followed the Rus- sian Revolution. During World War I, for example, British and French responses to the revolution were based on a series of unlikely scenarios-in- volving the seizure of Allied supplies, the arming of German and Austrian prisoners of war, and the possible use of Vladivostok as a German U-boat base. The worries were baseless, but the Western powers could not simply re- ject them out of hand. The United States was vulnerable to this problem as well, as revealed by Wilson's decision to send U. S. troops to northern Russia to guard Allied stores that were no longer there. France's expedition to Odessa in 1918 was based on its ignorance about conditions in the Ukraine, just as British aid to the Whites was sustained in part by inaccurate estimates of their truemilitaryprospects. Fromtheverybegingnin ,therefore,alackofinforma- tion contributed to the growing conflict between Moscow and the West.
Lack of information also undermined several early attempts at accommo- dation. The severing of diplomatic relations and the withdrawal of Western diplomats left the Allies without a reliable way to ascertain if support for Bol- shevism was growing or declining and made it difficult for either side to de- termine what the other was doing and why. Accommodation was also impeded by the near impossibility of communicating directly with the Soviet regime. The Bolsheviks had been excluded from the peace conference, and communication with Moscow was further impaired by the Allies' reluctance to take steps that might signal their acceptance of the Soviet regime. As a re- sult, the two sides were forced to rely on unreliable radio communications or on unofficial emissaries who were all too easy to disregard. These obstacles
introduced additional delays and ensured that positive efforts would be overtaken by events. The isolation of Soviet Russia also meant that the anti- Bolshevik exiles (whose ranks included many former tsarist officials) became Russia's main voice in the West. As one would expect, the exiles opposed any understanding with the new regime, and their testimony reinforced Allied intransigence at several crucial moments. 242
242 See Tongour, "Diplomacy in Exile"; Kennan, Decision to Intervene, chap. 14; and Ullman, Britain and the Russian Civil War, 141-44, 173? 77.
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Most important of all, neither the Soviets nor the Entente powers could gauge the potential for either revolution or counterrevolution in the wake of the Bolshevik victory in Russia. Fear of Bolshevism justified Western efforts to overthrow the new regime (or at least to keep it at arm's length), while Soviet hopes for world revolution accounted for the invasion of Poland in 1920 and their continued willingness to engage in counterproductive acts of revolutionary subversion.
Socialization and Learning
Finally, the early history of Soviet foreign relations lends partial-but only partial-support to neorealist claims about the socializing effects of anarchy. On the one hand, Soviet leaders did moderate their revo? utionary aims in order to advance specific diplomatic objectives, and they proved to be adept practioners of traditional balance-of-power politics. Moreover, as each side gained a more accurate estimate of the balance of threats, the level of security competition declined, prospects for cooperation increased, and Soviet for- eign relations took on a more normal cast. On the other hand, Bolshevik ide- ology continued to shape both its avowed objectives and its perceptions of foreign powers, even when the policies that emerged exacerbated its isola- tion and insecurity. Such behavior is difficult to reconcile with a purely struc- tural theory such as neorealism, which reminds us that foreign policy is never determined solely by structural factors. With hindsight, it is all too ob- vious that Leninist ideology was a serious handicap for Soviet diplomacy. Both the commitment to world revolution and the deep suspicion of other states endured because, first, the evidence against them was not clear-cut; second, they were a central part of the CPSU's claim to rule; third, they had been institutionalized in the Comintem and in the CPSU itself; and fourth, the Communist system inhibited critical debate about fundamental princi- ples. As a result, although the Soviet Union made tactical adjustments in re-
sponse to changing conditions, it did not formally abandon its revolutionary agenda until 1986, when it was already on its last legs. 243
The diplomacy of the fledgling Soviet state backs my tlheory that revolu- tions intensify security competition between states and raise the probability of war. Moscow's relations with most other states deteriorated badly after 1917, several foreign powers tried to overthrow the new regime, foreign troops occupied portions of Russian territory until 1924, and Russia and Poland fought a brief but intense war in 1920. Relations between Russia and
243 1986markedthefirsttimewhenacongressoftheCommunistPartyoftheSovietUnion omitted an assessment of the "world revolutionary process. " See Jacobson, When the Soviet
? Union Entered, 30.
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the outside world improved slightly from 1921 to 1924, but efforts to estab- lish more cordial relations ultimately failed to overcome the mutual percep- tions of threat, keeping the Soviet Union in a self-imposed state of partial isolation.
This unfortunate result was due primarily to the enduring legacy of Bol- shevik ideology. Although the revolution in Russia had not spread as they had anticipated, the Soviet leaders were unable or unwilling to give up the long-range goal of world revolution. They quickly learned to make tactical adjustments for the sake of immediate advantages (something Leninist ide- ology had long endorsed), but external pressures did not induce them to abandon the overthrow of capitalism as a long-term objective. And holding fast to this policy had very real costs, as it greatly increased the number of potential enemies the Soviets faced and would make it far more difficult to attract allies in the future.
Unlike the French case, however, the revolution in Russia did not lead to a war among the great powers. In addition to the sheer size of Soviet Russia (and the innate defensive advantage that this produced), the absence of great-power war is also explained by the massive bloodletting that had taken place between 1914 and 1918. Despite the intense fears of Bolshevism and their deep suspicion of Soviet intentions, none of the European powers was in a position to make a serious effort to oust the Soviet regime. This ob- servation reminds us that understanding the foreign relations of revolu- tionary states requires a broad perspective. Beyond the preferences and capabilities of the new regime, one must also consider the aims and capaci- ties of the other states in the system.
? ? ? ? The Iranian Revolution
We have in reality, then, no choice but to . . . overthrow all treacherous, corrupt, oppressive, and criminal regimes.
-Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini
Nobody is ever ready for a revolution.
-Gary Sick, White House aide for Iran, 1977-81
Like the French and Russian revolutions, the Islamic upheaval in Iran confirms that revolutions raise the level of security competition between states. By altering the regional balance of power, the revolution in Iran both threatened other states and created opportunities for them. It also triggered
spirals of hostility between the new regime and several other countries, which raised the level of threat even further. The fear that the revolution would spread made the danger seem greater, and lingering opposition within Iran fed the new regime's fears of foreign plots and gave its rivals the impression that it would be easy to overturn. Foreign responses to the revo- lution were also affected by uncertainty and misinformation, which exacer- bated each side's perceptions of threat.
The hopes and fears that accompanied the revolution turned out to be greatly exaggerated. Although the Iranian example did encourage funda- mentalists in other countries, it was not the sole (or even the most impor- tant) cause of the Islamic resurgence, and Iranian efforts to export the revolution to other countries have been largely unsuccessful. Foreign beliefs that the new regime would collapse turned out to be equally misguided; the Islamic Republic has survived diplomatic isolation, economic difficulties, a costly war, and internal conflicts that have endured for over fifteen years. Again we find that revolutions are both hard to spread and hard to reverse.
Finally, the Iranian Revolution offers only modest support for neorealist claims about the socializing effects of the international system. As in the So- viet case, key members of the revolutionary elite sought to moderate Iran- ian diplomacy in order to improve its international position. Their efforts were erratic and incomplete, however, for several reasons: the evidence in
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? The Iranian Revolution
favor of moderation was ambiguous, the commitment to a radical foreign policy was central to the legitimacy of the clerical regime, and the revolu- tionary government was tom between competing factions and thus unable to sustain a consistent line.
This chapter consists of three main sections. First I describe the origins of the Islamic Republic and summarize its ideological foundations. After that, I examine the foreign policy of the new regime and describe how other states responded, focusing primarily on its first decade in power. Finally, i compare the evolution of Iran's foreign relations against the propositions developed in chapter 2.
THE ORIGINS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC The Fall of the Shah
In simple terms, the regime of Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi fell be- cause the shah's reformist policies alienated a broad spectrum of Iranian so- ciety that he was unable to coopt yet unwilling to suppress by brute force. 1 Opposition to the shah arose from, first, the economic and social disloca- tions generated by his rapid modernization program; second, clerical resis- tance to the intrusion of alien values and the shah's attempt to reduce their influence; and third, the widespread perception that the shah was a U. S. puppet and the head of a corrupt and decadent elite. 2
The revolutionary crisis began late in 1977, after the shah's decision to relax police controls and judicial procedures had revived the liberal opposi- tion and sparked! several clashes between antigovernment demonstrators and the shah's internal police. The challenge grew in January 1978, after an insulting attack on the radical clergy in a government newspaper triggered a series of riots by theology students, in which seventy students were killed. The riots began an escalating cycle of popular demonstrations through the
1 Accounts of the lrar nian revolution include Said Amir Arjomand, The Turbanfor the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran (London: Oxford University Press, 1988); Dilip Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985); Shaul Bakhash, The Reign ofthe Ay- atollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 1984); John D. Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981); Farideh Farhi, States and Urban-Based Revolutions: Iran and Nicaragua (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990); and Misagh Parsa, Socia/ Origins of the Iranian Revolution (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989).
2 Opposition to the shah included the liberal National Front, the pro-Communist Tudeh Party, the Liberation Movement (which advocated a synthesis of Islam with modem Western thought), left-wing guerrilla organizations such as the Sazman-i Mujahedin-i Khalq-i Iran (or Islamic Mujahedin) and the Sazaman-i Cherikha-yi Feda'i Khalq-i Iran (or Marxist Feda'i), and Muslim clerics such as Khomeini. See Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), chap. 10, and The Iranian Mojahedin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); and Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution, 42-56.
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spring and summer, and a mass demonstration in Tehran drew nearly five hundred thousand participants in September. The shah declared martial law and ordered the military to suppress the demonstrations, but these actions merely united the liberal opposition and the radlical clerics. By No- vember, a series of strikes had shut down the bazaars, universities, govern- ment offices, banks, and much of the oil industry.
The radicalization of the revolution was due in part to the shah's refusan either to make bold concessions or to order a massive crackdown. His inde-? cision was exacerbated by his deteriorating health and an inability to obtain clear and consistent advice from the United States, which did not appreciate the seriousness of the crisis until very late. 3 Strikes and demonstrations con- tinued through December, with the army rank and file becoming in- creasingly reluctant to use force against the opposition. Support from Washington was evaporating as well, as U. S. officials belatedly realized that the shah might be beyond saving. In desperation, the shah at last offered to negotiate with the opposition. After persuading Shahpour Bakhtiar, a prominent member of the liberal National Front, to lead a caretaker govern- ment, the shah agreed to leave the country for a "vacation" and to accept a greatly diminished role. It was a meaningless agreement, as the Pahlavi state was dissolving rapidly by this point and authority had already begun to pass into the hands of local governing bodies (or komitehs), many of which were controlled by clerics loyal to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the
intellectual spiritual leader of the opposition. Khomeini returned to a tu- multuous welcome on February 1, and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces declared itself neutral ten days later. Bakhtiar immediately resigned and went into hiding, marking the final end of the Pahlavi state.
Khomeini's Revolutionary Program
Many diverse groups participated in the anti-shah coalition, but Ayatol- lah Ruhollah Khomeini was clearly its dominant figure. Khomeini had op- posed the shah's regime since the early 196os, when his criticisms of Iran's dependence on the United States had led to his arrest and subsequent exile in Iraq. He began extolling a radical doctrine of Islamic government while in exile and built an extensive network of supporters among the clergy. This
3 Accounts of U. S. handling of the revolution vary in assigning blame, but all agree that American decision-makers were deeply divided and U. S. advice was inconsistent. See Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran (New York: Random House, 191! 5); James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy ofAmerican-Iranian Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19f! 8), chap. 7; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs ofthe National Security Advisor, 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1983), 354? ; William Sullivan, Mission to Iran (New York: W. W. Norton, 19f! 1); and Stempel, Inside the Iranian Rev- olution, chap. 14. The shah's memoirs place the blame for his ouster on the United States; see Mohammad Reza Shah, Answer to History (New York: Stein and Day, 19&).
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combination of ideology and organization would prove to be a potent revo- lutionary weapon. 4
The central element of Khomeini's revolutionary program was his insis-. tence that the shah's regime be replaced by a government based on Islamic law. Khomeini also argued that the clergy should play an active and direct role in the political system, to ensure that it conformed to Islamic princi- ples. 5 In the absence of direct guidance from the Prophet Muhammed or his chosen successors, he argued, Islamic government should be based on the
"guardianship of the jurisprudent" (velayet-e faqih). "Since the rule of Islam is the rule of law," he wrote, "only the jurists, and no one else, should be in charge of the government. They are the ones who can govern as God or- dered. "6 Thus, not only did Khomeini reject the separation of religion and politics, but his vision of Islamic government placed the clergy in a position of primacy?
Khomeini' s blueprint for Islamic government rested on several other core beliefs. First, he regarded all other forms of government as illegitimate, because they were not based on Islam, and believed that the major world powers were innately hostile and aggressive. Dividing the world into "op- pressors" (the superpowers, their allies, and their various puppets) and the "oppressed" (the victims of imperialist exploitation, such as Iran), Khomeini
accused the Western powers of deliberately seeking "to keep us backward, to keep us in our present miserable state so that they can exploit our riches, our underground wealth, our lands, and our human resources. " For this reason, he argued, the imperialist powers had "separated the various seg- ments of the Islamic ummah (community) from each other and artificially
4 See Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, 35-44; Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 475-79, and Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 1o-12; and Arjomand, Turbanfor the Crown, 94-102.
5 Khomeini declared that "Islam is political or it is nothing" and insisted that "this slogan of the separation of religion and politics and the demand that Islamic scholars not intervene in social and political affairs have been formulated and propagated by the imperialists; it is only the irreligious who repeat them. " Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations ofImam Khomeini, trans. Hamid Algar (Berkeley, Calif. : Mizan Press, 1981), 37-38.
6 Quoted in Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 477?
7 "If a worthy individual possessing [knowledge of the law and justice) arises and estab- lishes a government, he will possess the same authority as the Most Noble Messenger [the Prophet Mohammed) . . . and it will be the duty of all people to obey him. " Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 62. For summaries of Khomeini's theory of Islamic government, see Farhang Rajaee, Islamic Values and World View: Khomeini on Man, the State, and International Politics (Lan- ham, Md. : University Press of America, 1983); David Menashri, "Khomeini's Vision: Nation- alism or World Order? " in his edited Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World (Boulder, Colo. : Westview, 1990); Marvin Zonis and Daniel Bromberg, Khomeini, the Islamic Republic ofIran, and the Arab World (Cambridge: Harvard Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1987); and Greg- ory Rose, "Velayet-e Faqih and the Recovery of Islamic Identity in the Thought of Ayatollah Khomeini," in Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi'ismfrom Quietism to Revolution, ed. Nikki Ked- die (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).
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created separate nations. " In addition to "corrupting the minds and morals of the people," the oppressors had replaced the judicial process and poHti- cal laws of Islam with "European importations" and "installed their agents in power. " According to Khomeini, therefore, the only way to end foreign exploitation was to overthrow agents such as the shah and establish a gov- ernment based on Islamic principles. 8
This Manichean worldview precluded any compromise with the shah or his foreign patrons. Khomeini told his followers in November 1978, "If you give [the shah] a breathing spell, tomorrow neither Islam nor your country nor your family will be left for you. Do not give him a chance; squeeze his neck until he is strangled. " He was particularly suspicious of the United States, whose support for the shah qualified it as the "Great Satan," but the Soviet Union and the other major powers were seen as equally hostile. 9 For Khomeini, the superpowers were driven by an incor- rigible lust for power and were especially dangerous for Iran. Even after the shah was gone, Khomeini warned that the great powers sought "to break Iran into pieces, to stage a coup d'etat and pave the way for the . . . supervision of foreigners. " Neither patience nor conciliation could remove the danger, because the "Satans are making plans [against Islam] for a cen- tury from now. "10
Second, Khomeini rejected existing state boundaries as "the product of the deficient human mind" and emphasized that "Muslims are one family, even if they are subject to different governments and even if they live in re- gions remote from one another. " Accordingly, he called for active efforts to spread the revolution beyond Iran's borders, declaring that "we have in re- ality, then, no choice but to . . . overthrow all treacherous, corrupt, oppres- sive, and criminal regimes. " He also argued that his doctrine of Islamic government would end the artificial divisions imposed by the West al! 1ld
8 "It is the duty of all of us to overthrow the taghut, i. e. , the illegitimate political powers that ? now rule fthe entire Islamic world. The government apparatus of tyrannical and anti-popular regimes must be replaced by institutions serving the public good and administered accord- ing to Islamic law. In this way an Islamic government will gradually come into existence. " Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 34-35, 48-50, 136, 147. See also Shireen T. Hunter, Iran and the World: Continuity in Revolutionary Decade (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 37-41; . and Richard Cottam, "Iran-Motives behind Its Foreign Policy," Survival 28, no. 6
( 1 986).
9 In 1964, Khomeini had declared, "America is worse than Britain; Britain is worse than America. The Soviet Union is worse than both of them. " For these quotations, see Arjomand, Turbanfor the Crown, 102; and Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 185.
10 Khomeini also warned, "Neither the West nor the East will leave us alone. They will try everything in their power to prevent Iran from settling down. " Quoted in W. R. Campbell and Djamchid Darvich, "Global Implications of the Islamic Revolution for the Status Quo in the Persian Gulf," Journal ofSoutli Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 5, no. 1 (1981), 42; and see also Rajaee, Islamic Values, 75-78; and Roy Parviz Mottahedeh, "Iran's Foreign Devils," For- eign Policy 38 (198o).
? ? ? ? The Iranian Revolution
recreate a unified Muslim ummah. And though the Muslim world was the
primary object of his revolutionary ambitions, Khomeini and his followers
occasionally suggested that the ultimate goal was the creation of a global
community that would transcend the existing state system altogether. 11 In
addition, Khomeini argued that failure to spread the revolution would leave
Iran vulnerable to the "oppressors" or their various puppets. Once in
power, he declared, "We should try to export our revolution to the world.
. . . If we remain in an enclosed environment we shall definitely face defeat. "
Thus, there were both offensive and defensive justifications for an expan-
sionist policy; although he repeatedly denied that it would involve the use
of force, spreading the revolution beyond Iran was both a means to ensure
Iran's security and an end in itself. 12
Third, like other revolutionary ideologies, Khomeini's worldview com- bined long-term optimism with an emphasis on sacrifice andl discipline. He preached, "The Quran says 'And hold fast . .
