No More Learning

xi, pp. 373-75.


## p. 609 (#655) ############################################

Eleanor's divorce and re-marriage
609
than the Anglo-Norman power had ever been in the days of Henry I of
France.
It was an incident of minor importance, the siege of Montreuil-Bellay
by Geoffrey the Fair, that supplied the pretext for a rupture. Gerald, the
lord of this little Angevin fortress, had placed himself at the head of a
strong coalition formed against his suzerain, Count Geoffrey, who had
retaliated by laying siege to the rebel's stronghold. But Gerald was the
king's protégé and his seneschal in Poitou ; Louis therefore made his
cause his own, and called upon Geoffrey the Fair to raise the siege (1150).
Suger, who was in this, it must be owned, more remarkable for upright-
ness than for political insight, succeeded for a time in warding off the
storm; but on 13 January 1151 he died, and since Gerald still held out
stubbornly against Geoffrey the Fair, and Geoffrey continuously refused,
not unnaturally, to comply with the royal command, hostilities broke
out.
Louis had already decided upon a line of conduct. His policy con-
sisting in putting forward Eustace of Boulogne, the son of King Stephen
of England, as a rival to the Count of Anjou and his son Henry
Plantagenet, to whom Geoffrey had transferred the duchy of Normandy
at the beginning of 1150. Acting in concert, Louis and Eustace made a
sudden descent upon Caux in May or June, 1151, and repulsed Henry at
Arques; then, in July, they advanced as far as Séez, which they burnt.
In the following month, when Louis was preparing to invade the duchy
of Normandy anew at the head of a still stronger army, a sudden attack
of fever obliged him to suspend operations. Geoffrey the Fair and his son
were only too glad to seize this opportunity of coming to terms; and
towards the end of August a treaty was signed in Paris by which they
surrendered to the king, not now Gisors alone, but the whole of the
Norman Vexin.
Unfortunately Louis then made an irreparable blunder. His love for
his wife Eleanor, which had been so ardent during the first years of their
marriage, had gradually cooled; while the queen, for her part, having
grown more and more indifferent to Louis, had been led into frailties, or
at least into follies, that were by no means pleasing to her husband. This
state of things had at last resulted in an open rupture between them, and
Louis, to whom personal feelings were of more importance than reasons
of State, prevailed upon a council held at Beaugency on 21 March 1152
to dissolve the marriage on grounds of consanguinity. Barely two months
later (May 1152) Eleanor married Henry Plantagenet, who, on the
sudden death of his father Geoffrey the Fair on 7 September 1151, had
succeeded to the county of Anjou. Since, naturally, the daughter of
Duke William X took her dowry with her to her second husband, this
marriage not only meant a loss to the monarchy of the whole duchy of
Aquitaine, but also a new and formidable acquisition of territory for its
rival.
C. MED. H. VOL. V. CH. XVIII.
39


## p. 610 (#656) ############################################

610
Henry Plantagenet becomes King of England
Too late, Louis recognised the mistake that he had made. He hastened
to take up arms once more, and, as Henry was preparing to cross the
Channel and fight King Stephen for the English crown, he again invaded
Normandy. With his army marched, not only Eustace of Boulogne but
also Count Robert of Perche, Henry the Liberal, Count of Champagne,
and even the Count of Anjou's own brother Geoffrey, who was to oppose
Henry Plantagenet on many more occasions than this. Had the attack
been conducted with vigour it might have proved disastrous for the young
Count of Anjou. It was, however, conducted timidly and half-heartedly:
Louis contented himself with besieging a few places on the frontier, of
which Neufmarché was the only one he captured. He retreated hastily
to the shelter of his own castle-walls as soon as Henry shewed signs of
retaliating. Moreover, when Henry, whose affairs demanded his presence
in England, proposed a truce at the end of August 1152, Louis—with
almost incredible weakness—instantly agreed to the suggestion.
For eight months he remained inactive. At a time when an energetic
attack on Normandy might perhaps have been fatal to Henry's success
in England, and might even have undermined his position on the
Continent, Louis abstained from action. At last he decided to cross the
Norman frontier, to besiege Vernon and make a demonstration before
Verneuil. He even succeeded, after two sieges, in entering Vernon
(August or September 1153); but he was content to do no more, while
Henry calmly pursued his advantages in England. By the time the latter
returned to Normandy in April 1154, his recognition by Stephen of
Blois as the heir to the English throne had been brought about by the
death of Eustace of Boulogne; and Louis VII in alarm hastened to sign a
treaty of peace (August 1154). This peace really amounted to a capitula-
tion on his part. By it he engaged, in return for an indemnity of 2000
silver marks, to restore the two fortresses that were all he had succeeded
in capturing, Vernon and Neufmarché, and to relinquish the title of Duke
of Aquitaine, which he had hitherto continued to use. On 25 October
following Stephen of Blois died, and a few weeks later (19 December 1154)
Henry was crowned at Westminster without any attempt on the part of
Louis to hamper the movements of his formidable enemy.
At an age when most men are in the full exercise of their powers
Louis VII, whose blundering impetuosity had once been so much to be
deplored, seemed suddenly to have become irresolute and almost sluggish.
Those who were much with him at this time lay stress on his simplicity,
his gentleness, his placability, and his piety. A certain monk of Vézelay
frankly declares that the king always inclined to compromise, that he
loved quiet and detested conflict. Another writer recalls having seen him
in the midst of a procession, modestly mingling with the crowd of clergy.
Upright and loyal himself, he had confidence in the honesty of others.
He was in the habit of walking alone amid his subjects, and it is even told of
him that one day he lay down in a forest and slept profoundly with only


## p. 611 (#657) ############################################

Louis VII betrothes his daughter to Henry the Younger 611
two knights to guard him. When someone expressed surprise, the king
answered: “I can sleep alone in perfect safety, because no man wishes
me ill. ” He carried this confiding spirit into all his dealings, without
any regard for the subtleties of the statesman. A contemporary chronicler,
Gervase of Canterbury, tells us that he was “a very Christian king, but
somewhat simple-minded. ” “A very pious man” is the description of
another writer, "a friend to the clergy, a devout servant of God, one who
was deceived by many and himself deceived none. ”
To the end of his reign his policy towards Henry II consisted in
perpetual retreat. Any attempt at resistance on the part of the King
of France invariably ended in a treaty that gave fresh advantages to his
opponent.
Hardly had Henry II established his authority in England before he
undertook the task of extending his dominions in every direction on the
Continent. In the north it was the Norman Vexin that he desired to
recapture from the King of France; in the west it was Brittany that he
aspired to make his own; in the south it was the county of Toulouse
that he demanded as a dependency of Aquitaine. This gigantic pro-
gramme he promptly set to work to carry out. .
In 1156, amid the domestic dissensions that had harassed Brittany
from time immemorial, the county of Nantes had submitted to Geoffrey
of Anjou, Henry Plantagenet's brother. When Geoffrey died on 26 July
1158, Henry claimed the succession to the county, and, as he was quite
prepared to support his claim by force of arms, his authority was
recognised at Nantes. Not only did Louis VII abstain from opposing him,
but he even went so far, it seems, as to smooth his enemy's path by authorising
him to enter Brittany with the title of Seneschal of France, which must
doubtless have given an air of legality to the King of England's act of
usurpation.
The two kings at this time were firm friends. They met near Gisors
on 31 August 1158, when Louis VII unhesitatingly agreed to betroth his
third daughter, Margaret, an infant six months old, to the King of
England's eldest son, Henry, whose age was then three years, and pledged
himself to give the bride for marriage-portion the whole of the Norman
Vexin. This dowry, till the children were of marriageable age, was to be
left in charge of the Templars. The "good and gentle” king had no
suspicions; he welcomed his rival to Paris as though he were his best
friend, and allowed him to take away the little princess. So delighted
was he with his new friendship that he even made a pilgrimage across
Normandy to Mont-Saint-Michel, accepting the attentions and marks of
affection that Henry lavished upon him during the journey without for
a moment doubting their sincerity. He was entirely absorbed in pious
thoughts. The pilgrimage to Mont-Saint-Michel failing to satisfy his
devotion, he planned a great crusade against the Moors of Spain. He
made sure that his dear friend Henry would accompany him.
CH. XVIII,
39-2


## p. 612 (#658) ############################################

612 Henry II of England occupies the Norman Vexin
The latter, however, was of a more practical nature, and, having
gathered a considerable army and formed a sound coalition, was preparing
to enforce his rights over Toulouse at the expense of Count Raymond V.
Recalled thus roughly to the world of reality, Louis VII at last awoke
and attempted to negotiate. Henry humoured him, and conferences were
held at Tours (March 1159) and Heudicourt (6-8 June 1159). But the
King of England had already resolved upon his course of action. At the
end of June his army set out towards Languedoc, occupied a portion of
that province, and proceeded rapidly in the direction of Toulouse. The
town would doubtless have fallen if Louis VII, who had followed his
rival with a few troops, had not decided, after fresh delays and renewed
attempts at negotiation, to intrench himself within the walls (September
1159). Henry dared not take so serious a step as to besiege his suzerain
the King of France; and as Louis, who was delighted at the success of a
manoeuvre that called for no effort, resolutely remained in Toulouse,
the King of England contented himself for the moment with establishing
his troops firmly in Cahors. He then hastened back to Normandy.
It was not long before Louis learnt the reasons for this rapid retreat.
Henry had gained the adherence of Theobald of Blois, Seneschal of
France, and had proceeded without delay to attack the Beauvaisis in
person. Louis had barely time to hasten thither; and when he found
that the Count of Évreux had also deserted him, and had handed over to
the King of England the castles of Montfort-l'Amauri, Rochefort, and
Épernon, he was only too glad to obtain a truce (December 1159). This truce
was followed, in May 1160, by a treaty of peace. The King of France, while
confirming the former agreement with regard to the Norman Vexin, con-
fined himself to stipulating, on behalf of the Count of Toulouse, for a
year's truce. Henry II, whatever befell, was to keep the fortresses he had
captured in Languedoc until the expiration of the truce.
The treaty was hardly signed before the English king, without a word
of warning, celebrated the marriage of his son Henry to Margaret, the
little princess whom Louis had so confidingly entrusted to his care
(2 November 1160). The young husband was only five-and-a-half years
old, and the bride was certainly not yet three! But the King of England
was impatient to lay his hand upon the dowry, the Norman Vexin, which
he succeeded in obtaining from the Templars in whose charge it had been
placed. Once more the simple-minded Louis perceived that he had been
outwitted ; once more he hankered after revenge. He arranged with
Theobald, Count of Blois, that Chaumont-sur-Loire should be made the
centre for an attack on Touraine; but in December 1160 the King of
England took possession of the place. In the following spring, after
allowing his adversary ample time to fortify himself in Gisors and to
garrison all the frontier fortresses, Louis made a show of preparing to
recover the Vexin at the point of the sword; but after a few skirmishes
he consented to a new truce. In September 1162—-yielding as usual to


## p. 613 (#659) ############################################

Louis VII protects Becket
613
the force of circumstances—he agreed to sign a treaty of peace which was
an open confession of weakness.
It was at this juncture that the case of Thomas Becket came into
prominence. We have seen in an earlier chapterhow the Archbishop of
Canterbury, at the end of the year 1164, fled from England, where his
position was imperilled, and took refuge in France. Louis VII, who
was delighted to revenge himself upon his enemy without having recourse
to arms, and was also, no doubt, honestly distressed by the misfortunes
of the prelate, had declared openly for him at the very beginning. He
gave his protection to the exile in spite of the protests of the English
king, who declared that the treaty of 1162 contained a clause to the
effect that neither of the monarchs should receive in his dominions any
rebellious subject of the other. When Henry, in one of his letters of
protest, referred to Becket as the “ex-Archbishop of Canterbury,” the
King of France exclaimed: “What! Ex-Archbishop? Why, the King
of England has no more right than I to depose even the humblest of his
clergy! " Yet for two years the matter dragged on, while every day the
discussion grew less amicable, and a fresh rupture more inevitable. War
broke out in June 1167; but again nothing was effected on either side
save a few skirmishes on the frontier. When each had burnt a village or
two and a few castles, the two kings were ready to come to terms. Henry
could employ his time more profitably than in continuing so fruitless a
struggle, and Louis was even less disposed than usual to take advantage
of his enemy's many difficulties and to conduct the war with spirit. In
August they agreed to lay down their arms until Easter 1168. On the
renewal of hostilities Louis acted with his habitual irresolution and weak-
ness, chiefly confining himself to supporting the rebellions in Aquitaine
and Brittany against Henry. The month of August saw fresh negotia-
tions, which led to new truces and new ruptures. Finally, on 6 January
1169, the two kings again met at Montmirail, near the frontier of Maine,
to arrange a peace, and at the same time to come to some conclusion on
the question of Thomas Becket, which was still unsettled. Louis VII, true
to his character, was content to receive purely nominal satisfaction, such
as the homage of the younger Henry for Normandy, Brittany, Maine,
and Anjou, and that of the English king's second son, Richard, for the
county of Poitou. As for the questions that had caused the war, they
were not considered. The Vexin, which Henry had so unceremoniously
annexed, remained in his possession ; his rights over Brittany, which he
had conquered, received formal recognition; even Thomas Becket was
almost sacrificed as well. It was not till many months had passed, and
many conferences had been held, that an apparent reconciliation was
effected between him and Henry.
Shortly after the tragic end of the Archbishop of Canterbury on
29 December 1170, the opportunity came at last to Louis VII for a
· See supra, Chap. XVII.
CH. XVIII.


## p. 614 (#660) ############################################

614
Further progress by Henry II
striking act of vengeance. Henry II, who pursued his policy of invasion
untiringly, had succeeded in securing the homage of the Count of
Toulouse (January 1173), and his power on the Continent seemed to be
more firmly established than ever, when suddenly his sons broke out
into rebellion. We have already seen how his son Henry, whose disaffec-
tion against his father had been carefully nourished by the King of
France, had (8 March 1173) suddenly fled to the French court, where
his two brothers Richard and Geoffrey soon joined him, at the instiga-
tion of Queen Eleanor. At last Louis seemed determined to take a firm
line; strong in the support of a powerful faction, which included the
Counts of Flanders, Champagne, Boulogne, Blois, Sancerre, Dreux, and
others, he at last shewed a warlike spirit. When the envoys of King
Henry-Rotrou, Archbishop of Rouen, and Arnulf, Bishop of Lisieux-
came to negotiate with Louis, he turned upon them with bitter com-
plaints of his adversary's encroachments. “Why,” he asked, “ has the
King of England, in spite of his solemn pledge, kept Margaret's dowry,
Gisors and the Vexin ? Why does he seek to incite against their rightful
sovereign the people of France, from the mountains of Auvergne to the
Rhone? Why did he receive the liege homage of the Count of Toulouse?
Tell your master that I swear I will never make peace with him without
the express consent of his wife and sons ! ” Not only was Henry the
Younger received at the court of France with every sign of favour, but
Louis VII affected to regard him as the true King of England. He had
a royal seal made for him, and took a solemn pledge to help him in the
winning of the crown. Henry the Younger received the homage of a
great number of barons, who had followed him in his rebellion.
There can be no doubt that a prompt and energetic attack would
have placed Henry II in a peculiarly dangerous position. But Louis
was no more capable than on previous occasions of acting swiftly and
striking with a firm hand. While Henry the Younger, in concert with
the Counts of Flanders and Boulogne, invaded the country round Bray,
to the north of the Seine, the King of France lingered over the siege of
Verneuil; and when, on 9 August, Henry II's army drew near, he im-
mediately decamped and began to parley with the enemy. In the
following year he made a final effort against Rouen ; but again, on the
approach of the King of England, he beat a shameful retreat, burnt
his engines of war himself (14 August 1174), entered into negotia-
tions, and finally deserted the cause of the rebels, whom he forced to
implore pardon of the King of England at Montlouis (30 September
1174).
Thus Louis VII, with his customary indolence, let slip this unexpected
opportunity of driving the English monarch into important concessions.
He allowed Henry II to reduce at his leisure his English and continental
subjects, who had risen at the call of his rebellious sons, and to enlarge
1 See supra, Chap. XVII.


## p. 615 (#661) ############################################

Increase of royal power under Louis VII
615
his dominions still further at the expense of the French monarchy by
the acquisition of the county of La Marche (1177). There was even a
time, shortly before his death, when Louis seemed to cherish the illusion
that he had transformed Henry II into a faithful friend of the Capetian
monarchy.
Yet, feeble as this “good” king appeared in his struggle with the
enterprising and active English sovereign, so strong was the force of
circumstances that, in spite of everything, he left the French monarchy
more firmly established than he found it—left it with its prestige defin-
itely restored, and its position in Europe such that it was thenceforward
a power to be reckoned with.
And first, within the limits of his own kingdom we find that Louis VII
pursued, not unsuccessfully, the work of pacification and concentration
that his father had begun with so much energy. In the preamble to
one of his charters we read that “it is the office of the Crown to crush
those who evade justice, and to support the obedient and submissive and
secure to them their rights. ” Louis VII indeed was as ready as Louis VI
to face hardships, and at times to embark upon long expeditions at the
call of the oppressed, in order to make the royal tribunal respected
throughout the country and thereby secure recognition of the king's
supremacy. In 1153, for instance, when Hervé of Donzy complained
that his father Geoffrey of Donzy was trying to deprive him unjustly of
the fief of Gien, Louis proceeded thither without delay, captured the
town, and forced the unnatural father to respect the laws of feudal
heredity. A few years later the king responded to an appeal from Dreu
of Mouchy, whom Névelon of Pierrefonds had driven out of Mouchy.
Louis mustered some troops and obliged the offender by force of arms
to shew a proper regard for justice. On two occasions, in 1163 and
1169, the canons of Clermont and of Brioude appealed to the king as
their natural protector to save them from the violence of the Counts of
Auvergne and their agents ; and Louis unhesitatingly plunged into the
mountains of central France to inflict exemplary punishment upon the
delinquents, whom he even kept for some time imprisoned. In 1166 the
Count of Chalon, too, who had dared to lay his hand on the property
of the great monastery of Cluny, felt the weight of the king's displeasure.
The count, though repeatedly summoned to answer for his misdeeds,
refused to appear; whereupon Louis marched into his territory, took
forcible possession of it, and confiscated it. In 1173 it was the turn of
the Viscount of Polignac, whom the royal troops pursued, captured, and
imprisoned, for molesting the canons of Le Puy.
As time went on the royal court of justice became able to take a
more commanding tone, and to insist that the great vassals of the Crown
should obey its summons. The Count of Nevers, the persecutor of the
monks of Vézelay, for instance, was forced in 1166 after many evasions
I
CH, XVIII.


## p. 616 (#662) ############################################

616
Appeals of distant vassals to the king
to appear before the king's tribunal in Paris and to abjure his turbulent
ways. Louis VII's words to the injured monks at the beginning of this
long affair were significant: "I have sent my messengers to summon the
count. As to what he will answer or what he will do I know nothing
as yet ; but you may rest assured that if he held as much land as the
King of England in our kingdom I should not allow his violence to go
unpunished. ” It is also noticeable that as a rule this determined language
took effect, and that the nobles brought an ever-increasing number of
cases to be tried before the king's tribunal. Thus in 1153 the Bishop of
Langres and the Duke of Burgundy travelled as far as Moret to lay their
differences before Louis.
From all quarters of France, even the most distant, appeals were
addressed to the king. In 1163 the inhabitants of Toulouse, whom he
had recently defended against Henry II, wrote to express their devotion
and to beg for further support: “Very dear lord, do not take it amiss
that we write to you so often. After God, we appeal to you as to our
good master, our protector, our liberator. Upon your power, next to
the divine power, we fix all our hopes. ” A certain lord of Uzès wrote
to him to complain of the illegal dues levied by the Count of Melgueil,
and to beg for the king's intervention. Again, in 1173 Ermengarde,
Viscountess of Narbonne, entreated him in the most urgent terms to
hasten to the rescue of Languedoc, which was threatened by Henry
Plantagenet. “We are profoundly distressed, my fellow-countrymen
and 1,” she wrote, " to see this country of ours-owing to your absence,
not to say your fault-in danger of being subjected to the authority of
a foreigner who has not the smallest right to rule over us. Do not be
angry, dear lord, at the boldness of my words; it is because I am a
vassal, especially devoted to your crown, that it grieves me to see the
lightest slur cast on your dignity. It is not merely the loss of Toulouse
that we are threatened with, but that of our whole country from the
Garonne to the Rhone, which our enemies are confident of conquering.
I feel that they are even now making all the speed they can, so that,
when they have subjected the members, they may the more easily over-
come the head. I entreat you of your valour to intervene, and appear
among us with a strong army. The audacity of your foes must be
punished, and the hopes of your friends fulfilled. ”
Beyond the frontiers of the kingdom, too, the prestige of the King
of France was steadily growing. From the kingdom of Arles came
numerous promises of fealty, if in return the king would grant his
intervention. Raynald of Bâgé, lord of La Bresse, cried urgently for
his help: “ Come into this country, where your presence is as necessary
to the churches as it is to me. Do not fear the expense;
you all that you spend ; I will do homage to you for all my castles,
which are subject to no suzerain; in a word, all that I possess shall be
at your disposal. ” In Dauphiné, when Louis VII's sister Constance was
I will repay


## p. 617 (#663) ############################################

Louis VII supports Pope Alexander III
617
לל
married to the Dauphin of Viennois, it was considered a matter for
rejoicing that the French influence had gained ground in that direction.
Thus it is not surprising to find Louis VII in 1162 playing his
accustomed part of arbitrator in the great papal schism between
Alexander III and Victor IV, the candidate of the Emperor Frederick
Barbarossa. To tell the truth the king's rôle was not always very brilliant,
nor did it reflect much credit on his perspicacity. In August and Sep-
tember 1162 Frederick, with the connivance of the Count of Champagne,
entangled him in a web of mystification which at one time nearly had
disastrous consequences. It will be well to relate the circumstances, as
we may gain from them some idea of the weaving and unravelling of
intrigues that went on round this “good” king, Louis VII.
When Hadrian IV died in 1159 two Popes had been elected at the same
time: Cardinal Roland under the name of Alexander III, and Cardinal
Octavian under that of Victor IV. Alexander III, who was elected by a
majority of the cardinals, represented the party that was opposed to the
absolute power of the Emperor, the party of Italian independence.
Between him and Frederick Barbarossa there was no possibility of
agreement, whereas naturally an alliance existed between the Emperor
and Victor IV. Alexander III, who had obtained recognition both from
Louis VII and from the King of England immediately after his election,
took refuge in France. But, whether because he had not held the balance
sufficiently equal between Louis and his rival, or because the King of
France was reckoning on the advantage over Henry II that an under-
standing with the Emperor might secure for him, the end of the year
1161 saw the opening of negotiations between Frederick and Louis.
The question of the schism was naturally placed first on the pro-
gramme.
Now, at the court of France there existed a Germanophil party
headed by Louis VII's own brother-in-law Henry the Liberal, Count of
Champagne. He it was whom the king chose to be the principal nego-
tiator; and moreover Louis made the further blunder of giving a
prominent part in the affair to the Bishop of Orleans, Manasse, who
from the first had shewn decided hostility towards Alexander III. So
successfully did these two, Henry of Champagne and Manasse, conduct
the affair in the direction of their wishes, that Louis found himself
involuntarily and almost unconsciously led into far closer relations with
Frederick than he had desired. The bishop, writing in his sovereign's
name to convey final instructions to the Count of Champagne, abused
Louis' confidence so far as to insert, on his own initiative, a phrase that
gave the count full authority to make pledges for the King of France.
Count Henry lost no time in coming to terms. It was agreed that the
two monarchs should meet on a bridge that crossed the Saône at Saint-
Jean-de-Losne on 29 August 1162; that each of them should bring his
Pope with him; and that, then and there, a mixed commission of
CH. XVIII.


## p. 618 (#664) ############################################

618
The interview at Saint-Jean-de-Losne
arbitrators should be chosen from the clergy and laymen of the two parties
to adjudicate between the two Pontiffs. Both sovereigns were pledged
to abide by this judgment; and in the case of Louis refusing to acquiesce
in these arrangements, or to accept the decision of the arbitrators,
Count Henry took a solemn oath to abjure his fealty to the King of
France and to give his allegiance to the Emperor.
In the meantime Louis, who was still ignorant of the engagements
entered into by the Count of Champagne, had made every effort to
persuade Alexander III to be present at the projected meeting. At an
interview between them at Souvigny in August 1162, the king had in
vain urged the Pope to yield in this matter, expressing surprise, with
more or less sincerity, “that since the Pontiff was conscious of the justice
of his claim he should miss this opportunity of upholding it by a public
statement of his case. ” Alexander was immovable. He agreed to send
four cardinals as delegates, but would do no more; he refused to accom-
pany the King of France.
The latter, chagrined, reached Dijon on
28 August, and found there the Count of Champagne, who revealed to
him all the clauses of the treaty and placed him—should Alexander
persist in his refusal—in this dilemma: he must either recognise Victor IV
as Pope, or he must lose the province of Champagne to the Emperor.
“What ! ” exclaimed the king, “ you presumed to take it upon yourself
to make such an engagement for me without my knowledge, without
consulting me! ” Henry quoted the letter that he had received from
Manasse, giving him full powers. The King of France perceived that
he had been tricked. It was too late for him to retire; but what could
be hoped from negotiations that were founded on misunderstandings
such as these?
On 29 August the Emperor Frederick came at dawn of day from
Dôle, accompanied by his Pope, to the bridge of Saint-Jean-de-Losne.
Finding no one there he went away, leaving only a few members of
his suite upon the spot. A little later Louis VII arrived in his turn
from Dijon, and begged Frederick's representatives to consent to a
delay, since it was only on the previous day that he had heard the
terms of the convention. At the same time he promised to secure
the presence of Pope Alexander. On the following morning the Count
of Champagne, who played a dubious part throughout the affair,
came to Louis to remind him that, should he reject the terms of the
treaty, he--Count Henry-was pledged by them to transfer his allegiance
to the Emperor. “However," added this sanctimonious individual, “I
have prevailed on the Emperor to grant a delay of three weeks, on
condition of your promising to be present, with Alexander, at another
meeting at the end of that time, and to accept on that occasion the
arbitrators’ judgment between him and his rival. You must bind your-
self by securities, in case you fail to abide by their award, to give yourself
up as a prisoner into the Emperor's hands at Besançon. ” Louis again


## p. 619 (#665) ############################################

Failure of negotiations with the Emperor
619
naively accepted the terms, and gave as his hostages the Duke of
Burgundy and the Counts of Flanders and Nevers.
He hoped to persuade Alexander to accompany him ; and indeed a
good deal of anxiety was felt at this time by the adherents of the
Pontiff. But a fresh comedy was about to be enacted. Frederick's army,
being short of provisions, had gradually broken up and disappeared ;
and at this moment the King of England, who feared nothing so much
as an alliance between Louis VII and the Emperor, responded to an
appeal from Alexander III by arriving on the scene in full force.
Frederick had but one desire—to withdraw, but to put a good face
upon it. On the morning of the appointed day, 22 September, Louis
again repaired to Saint-Jean-de-Losne, where he found no one but
Rainald of Dassel, the Chancellor of the Empire, who feigned ignorance.
Never, he declared, could it have entered his sovereign's head to submit
the decision on the pontifical election to a commission drawn from
France as well as from the Empire, seeing that none but the Emperor
and the bishops of his dominions were qualified to give judgment in
such a case. Louis then turned to the Count of Champagne, who was
standing beside him, and begged him to repeat the clauses of the con-
vention, “Well, you see ! ” exclaimed the king when this had been
done, “the Emperor, who should be here, has not appeared, and his
representatives have just changed the terms of the treaty in your very
presence! You are witness to it. ”—“That is true," answered the
count. _“I am freed, then, from all my engagements, am I not? ”-
Certainly you are free,” replied Henry. Then the king turned to the
barons and prelates of his suite. “You have all heard and seen,” he
said, “ that I have done everything in my power. Am I still bound by
the convention ? "_“ No,” answered they all, “ you have redeemed your
word. ” Then, wheeling his horse, Louis galloped away upon the road
to Dijon, turning a deaf ear to the Emperor's representatives, who tried
to detain him.
Such was the end of the tragi-comic adventure into which Louis had
so imprudently allowed himself to be drawn. It put an end for ever to
any inclination on his part to come to an understanding with the
supporters of Victor IV, and it was on the morrow of the meeting at
Saint-Jean-de-Losne that he appeared before the world as the protector
of the true Pope. Alexander III was lodged in the royal town of Sens ;
his protector Louis VII carried on a regular and constant correspondence
with him ; and his close alliance with the Capetian monarchy during the
crisis that followed his election contributed not a little to increase the
prestige of that monarchy, and to give it the position in Europe that
was established so firmly in the days of Philip Augustus.
Not only did Louis VI and Louis VII succeed in extending their
supremacy, but they contrived to place the government of their con-
CH. XVIII,


## p. 620 (#666) ############################################

620
Organisation of the central government
stantly increasing kingdom upon a firm basis. They strengthened their
authority by perfecting the machinery of the administration, and by
replacing the useless and dangerous feudal element at the court by men
whom they could trust, men of humble origin, who were well under
control and of tried wisdom.
At the accession of Louis VI all the administrative authority of the
monarchy was in the hands of the high officials of the Crown. The men
who held the great offices were all, or nearly all, chosen from among the
barons, and had but one idea-to obtain a monopoly of important
posts for their own families, and thus to secure, at the expense of the
sovereign, a position of supreme authority in the kingdom.
At the time with which we are concerned, an ambitious family, to
whom no act of effrontery seemed amiss, the family of Garlande, had
marked down as their own the chief offices at the court. Of these the post
of seneschal was undoubtedly the most important. For the holder of this
office was not only in command of the royal troops, but also exercised
authority over a large part of the king's officials, was the chief ad-
ministrator of the royal demesne, and, finally, played a considerable
part in the dispensing of justice. It has been said, with perfect truth,
,
that his position at this time was that of a “deputy king. ” This was the
office to which the Garlandes first laid siege. In Philip I's reign two of
them, Païen of Garlande and after him his brother Anseau, had already
succeeded in securing it temporarily (1101, 1104) in despite of the lords
of Rochefort-en-Iveline, who were themselves trying to acquire it for
their own family. By 1107 the post of seneschal was again held by
Anseau of Garlande, who succeeded in keeping it until the day of his
glorious death in the king's service at the siege of Le Puiset (1118).
But before that day came two of his brothers, Gilbert and Stephen,
had cast covetous eyes on other great offices. In 1106 Stephen, who was
a clerk in holy orders, obtained the position of chancellor; in 1112
Gilbert secured for himself the post of chief butler; and on the death of
Anseau it was yet another of the Garlande brothers, William, who suc-
ceeded to the seneschalship. It seemed that the ambition of this family
now knew no bounds. When the seneschal, William, died in 1120, his
brother Stephen, although in orders and already chancellor, acquired the
seneschalship for himself rather than allow it to be lost to the family.
Rarely has a man been known to abuse his position with such unconcern.
It seemed indeed as though the State held nothing that did not exist solely
for the enrichment and promotion of this scandalous priest, who deemed
it quite natural that the functions of the king's Grand Chaplain and of
the supreme head of the army should be united in his person. In his
clerical capacity he laid his hands on all the ecclesiastical benefices of
which the king could easily dispose. We find him figuring simultaneously
as Canon of Étampes, Archdeacon of Paris, Dean of the Abbey of
St Geneviève at Paris, Dean of St Samson and of St Avitus at Orleans;


## p. 621 (#667) ############################################

The king frees himself from the Garlande family 621
and one chronicler-rather a slanderous one, it is true-Guibert of
Nogent, declares that when in 1112 Stephen wished to add to all these
benefices the deanery of the cathedral church of Orleans, a bishopric
was hastily bestowed upon the existing dean in order that this desire
might be complied with. On two occasions about this time he even
intrigued to add to his acquisitions the bishopric of Beauvais or that of
Paris; but this was too much, and the king was obliged to submit when
Pope Paschal II formally prohibited the appointment.
This did not prevent Stephen of Garlande from attaining to a degree
of power that excited jealousy on every hand. The clergy raised a chorus
of protest against their unworthy brother, whom Ivo, the austere Bishop
of Chartres, described--probably with a certain amount of exaggeration
-as “an illiterate gambler and libertine," and St Bernard denounced as
a living scandal in the Church. “Who, without surprise and horror," he
cried indignantly, “can see this man serving both God and Mammon-
at one moment clad in armour at the head of armed troops, and at the
next robed in alb and stole, chanting the gospel in a church? ”
It was, however, not so much the unedifying character of his life as
his abuse of power that at last made him unendurable. “The kingdom of
France,” says a contemporary chronicler, “was entirely at his mercy," and
“he seemed not so much to serve the king as to govern him. " The day
came at length when Louis VI awoke to the danger. Urged by his wife,
Adelaide of Maurienne, whom Stephen very foolishly had treated with
disrespect, the king resolved to shake off the yoke with a determined hand.
Stephen, who shewed an increasing tendency to regard the seneschalship
as his own property, was suddenly deprived of office and driven from the
court, together with his brother Gilbert. His fall (1127) was as dramatic
as his rise. He did not yield without a struggle; and for three years
(1128–1130) stoutly fought his master. “Remember your past power,"
wrote one of Stephen's friends to him at this time, “remember your
riches, and what is still more important, the skill with which you handled
the affairs of this world. Of the great officers of state ( palatini) you were
the first; the whole kingdom of France was at the disposal of your caprice.
Like Solomon you desired to undertake great enterprises, to raise towers,
to build superb palaces, to plant vineyards, to gather round you an im-
mense household of male and female serfs. You demanded gold and silver
in heaps; in a word, you had your fill of every delight that is possible to
humanity. But pause a moment, and consider the instability of earthly
things. This king, whose affection seemed to you the strongest support
you could have, at whose side you constantly lived in virtue of your office
and the friendship he bore you, this king now pursues you with his enmity;
you are now forced to defray the expenses of the war with the money you
amassed in time of peace, and to keep a watch over your personal safety
night and day, lest the threats of your enemies should be fulfilled. ” At
last, however, Stephen was obliged to yield and humble himself and give
CH. XVIII.


## p. 622 (#668) ############################################

622
Government by non-feudal officials
up the seneschalship; and indeed he could think himself fortunate in that
he recovered not his influence-for that was gone for ever—but at least
his title of chancellor.
The lesson was a costly one for the Crown, but it was not forgotten.
There were thenceforward no more omnipotent officials before whom the
king himself was obliged to bow. Louis VI left the office of seneschal
vacant for four years, and when at last he filled it gave the appointment
to Count Ralph of Vermandois, a kinsman of his own, on whose fidelity
he could rely; and when Ralph died Louis VII left the office vacant for
two years before giving it to the Count of Blois. These men, it is true,
were important personages, and capable of commanding an army with
brilliant success; but it has been pointed out that, since the new sene-
schals lived on their own lands at a distance from the court, they were as
a rule no longer dangerous. They could no longer domineer at court, and
their functions tended to become merely honorary.
Louis VI and Louis VII followed the same tactics with regard to the
other great officers of state: sometimes leaving their posts vacant, as in
the case of the chancellorship, to which, in Louis VII's time, no one was
appointed for seven years (1172–1179); sometimes contriving to reduce
their powers to privileges of a purely honorary kind. There was an in-
creasing tendency to put all the work into the hands of docile subordinates,
who could be easily dismissed. And sometimes auxiliaries, who had no
official connexion with the government, would be called upon to lend
their aid, men chosen from the clerical rather than the baronial world or
bourgeois who understood the conduct of business affairs.
Of these confidential advisers of the Crown in the twelfth century
some are known to us—as for instance Brother Thierry Galeran, of the
Order of the Temple, who from 1132 was for thirty years or so one
of the most active agents of the King of France; and Bouchard le
Veautre, and Cadurc, and above all the famous Abbot of St Denis,
Suger. Of this last, who was a true statesman, we have already had oc-
casion to speak. For his able government as regent during Louis VII's
absence on the Second Crusade he well deserved the title that his contem-
poraries gave him, the Father of his country.
This is not the place to give a biography of this eminent monk, who,
though of obscure and humble origin, succeeded by sheer strength of
intellect, combined with remarkable tenacity and an orderly, well-balanced
mind such as was rarely met with in his day, in winning his way every-
where without ever resorting to intrigue. Little by little we see his
influence replacing that of Stephen of Garlande with Louis VI, who
called him “his intimate and his faithful counsellor. ” From the year
1130 onwards he was always at the king's side, and always ready with a
wealth of wise and moderate advice. We find him again with Louis VII,
constantly striving-sometimes to excess, as we have seen—to avoid
contention and maintain peace at any price. As regent, during the


## p. 623 (#669) ############################################

Suger, Abbot of St Denis
623
Second Crusade, he shewed especial ability in the administration of the
royal revenue, and was most skilful in his avoidance of all kinds of friction.
“There is nothing more dangerous," he said, “than to change the personnel
of government without due thought. Those who are discharged carry off
with them as much as they can, and those who take their place are so fearful
of receiving the same treatment as their predecessors that they proceed,
without loss of time, to steal a fortune. ” His policy, in a word, was
above all a policy of tact. It had a firm basis of strength, but its aim
was to avoid all direct opposition and to evade obstacles rather than
contend with them. He was a man of affairs, whose ambition was to
govern the State with the same honesty and scrupulousness that he shewed
in the government of his abbey. And in this respect he is one of the most
characteristic representatives of that new class of officials to whom Louis VII,
more and more as time passed, sought to confide the care of the adminis-
tration.
CH. XVIII.


## p. 624 (#670) ############################################

624
CHAPTER XIX.
THE COMMUNAL MOVEMENT, ESPECIALLY IN FRANCE.
NEVER was the need for united action more urgent than in the Middle
Ages. The individual counted for very little. A great feudal noble
might stand alone, might build up his own independent power, maintain
his own privileges and rule his own vassals; but in the humbler walks of
life one man alone could do little in the struggle for existence. The
Church encouraged the spirit of association for prayer and service; no
trade could be undertaken on a large scale, save by a commercial gild or
society; rights, privileges, and property were in the hands of groups of
men, who held together for the maintenance of common interests. The
communal movement was one very important aspect of this spirit of as-
sociation. It was a movement not confined to any one country, which
spread almost simultaneously throughout Germany, Italy, England,
Flanders, and France---an international movement, which may to some
extent have been independent of national boundaries, but which each
country worked out on its own lines, according to its own circum-
stances and national characteristics. Similar causes led to the formation
of the German stadt, the Italian city, the English borough, and the
French commune, and certain essential points of resemblance can be
found in all of them, but the actual form which the communal association
took, its nature, its strength, and its duration, varied not only from
country to country but from district to district-even from town to
town.
In no country can this communal movement be better studied than in
France. Perhaps it was there that the spirit of association was most
widespread, and even in Italy the success of the movement was scarcely
more rapid or more marked. On the other hand, it was there also that
the results achieved were least permanent, and that the original aim and
ambitious character of the communal movement were most completely
lost. The southern towns of France were little less strong at one time
than the Lombard communes, but their independence was of much shorter
duration.
The chief period of communal history falls between the dates 1100
and 1400. A few towns acquired self-government as early as the eleventh
century, and a few preserved their independence beyond the fourteenth;
but in France this was the exception. It was in the twelfth century,
however, that the effort to develop by means of union and association was
most successful, and that the urban communes acquired their highest


## p. 625 (#671) ############################################

General definition of Commune
625
powers. The century which followed marked for most of them the begin-
ning of decline, the gradual loss of independence, the substitution of
privileges for rights, the dropping of one ambition after another. In the
fourteenth century the true commune almost entirely disappeared. The
townsmen had not sufficiently stood together. The union had been local
not national. Each separate unit was far too weak to hold its own against
the ever-growing power of the monarchy. Financial difficulties gave the
impulse which led to the downfall of many struggling associations; the
upper classes were not content to share power with the poorer members
of their body, and internal dissensions weakened the commune against
external foes; royal support insidiously paved the way for royal pre-
dominance, and the result was the end of one of the most interesting
attempts at achieving success and progress by means of local union and
communal life.
It is impossible to give any definition of a French commune which
would be universally true. The communal movement may be taken to
mean the general spirit of association which affected the country, parti 1
cularly in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and which gave rise to many
different communal types. It is the purpose of this chapter to consider
as far as possible the causes of this movement, the principal aim which
inspired burgesses in the towns and peasants in the country to form them-
selves into groups for mutual protection and self-government. First,
however, a brief review is necessary of the varying types of association
which resulted from the communal spirit. Only here and there was the
highest stage of development reached and real independence obtained;
but the varying degrees of success all help to illustrate the communal
struggle.
A medieval commune, in the fullest meaning of the word, might be
t
regarded as a collective person: a body which could hold property, exer-
cise rights, possess vassals, and do justice. In the feudal world it took rank
by the side of the great lords of the land; like them it could both perform
and exact homage and hold courts for its tenants, and with them it could
treat on practically equal terms. It was in fact a “seigneurie collective. "
Sometimes a commune could even declare peace
and make treaties
and alliances without the license and control of any overlord. The signs
of its authority were the possession of a belfry, from which could be rung
out the signal for its general assemblies, and a public hall, in which
business could be transacted, meetings held, and justice done; the proof
of its corporate existence was the common seal, which could be affixed
to all its documents and public acts. All communes had their own
officials, elected or nominated, to carry on communal business; and the
two powers most eagerly coveted and most generally secured, though in
varying degree, were the administration of justice and the control of
finance. Both town and country, as has been already said, could and did
acquire some form or other of communal organisation, but the urban
war and
C. MED, H. VOL. V. CH. XIX.
40


## p. 626 (#672) ############################################

626
Communes jurées
communes were as a rule in the vanguard. They were the first to form
themselves into corporate bodies, and the best able to assert communal
authority.
The true urban communes were most numerous in the north and south
of the country; in the centre some towns were privileged but less inde-
pendent. In the north these communes were known as Communes jurées,
in the south, where independence was still more marked, as Consulates.
The term Commune jurée meant that all the members bound themselves
together by a mutual oath of association, which was the essential feature,
the most important bond of unity, and a method of safeguarding their
mutual rights. In these towns the burgesses were often known as jurés
de commun ; and, as the charter of Beauvais says, all men “infra murum
civitatis et in suburbiis commorantes communiam jurabant. ” Besides this
mutual oath which formed the collective body, a commune might be in
the position of a feudal vassal and then an oath had also to be taken to
the overlord. At St Quentin a charter of the eleventh century speaks of
the oath taken by members of the commune, who “jurerent firmement
par sermens a warder et a tenir, sauve la feuté de Dieu et de Saint Quentin,
sauve le droiture de Comte et de Comtesse—ens jurerent ensement ches-
cun quemune ayde a son jure et quemun conseil et quemune detenanche
et quemune deffence. ”
Of these communes of Flanders and northern France some occupied
very independent positions while others exercised comparatively limited
powers; but each one was largely a self-governing body, formed by an
oath of association and able to act as a legal person. A few examples
only can be given. St Quentin was one of the earliest of all towns to gain
municipal organisation. In the eleventh century a charter of Count
Hébert (ob. 1080) recognised and extended the privileges of the town,
granting to it a democratic constitution and almost complete independence
under a mayor and échevins. To this commune all classes took an oath,
not only burgesses but also clergy and knights; a very unusual circum-
stance in the north.
Rouen illustrates another type of commune, for it was a town
possessing the minimum of independence compatible with communal
existence. Rouen had worked its way very gradually into importance,
through the growth of its commerce and consequent increase of wealth,
and in the twelfth century acquired a charter from Geoffrey Plantagenet
(1145), which spoke in general terms of “the commune” and conferred
judicial powers upon it. At the close of the reign of Henry II of Eng-
land, Rouen was governed by a mayor and échevins, assisted by a fortnightly
meeting of cent pairs, to consider all questions of public interest; but the
mayor was chosen by Henry as Duke of Normandy from a list of names
presented by the hundred peers, and it was the duke, not the commune,
who exercised rights of high justice and was able to demand military
service. Even the oath which formed the commune jurée was almost as


## p. 627 (#673) ############################################

Consulates
627
much the oath of a feudal vassal to the duke as the genuine bond of
communal unity. But, despite these limitations, few towns have exercised
greater influence on the spread of communal organisation, and traces of
the établissements de Rouen can be found throughout all those parts of
France which fell at one time or another under the rule of the Angevin
dynasty.
In Amiens, even more than in Rouen, a good example can be found
of communal union resulting from commercial development. No charter
of creation exists for Amiens, but in the twelfth century various docu-
ments confirm the municipal organisation which the town had already
worked out for itself. Here the mayor and échevins exercised seignorial
powers of administration and justice, although the king kept in his own
hands the highest rights of jurisdiction.
In the south of France the consulates occupied a still more advanced
position than that of the communes jurées of the north; in most cases
they had obtained a more complete emancipation from the feudal yoke
and the establishment of almost independent authority under their own
consuls. Nowhere was the communal movement more widespread.
Throughout Roussillon, Provence, Languedoc, parts of Gascony and
Guienne, and as far north as Limousin and La Marche, not only towns
of importance but even tiny villages aimed at acquiring some form of
consular government. The powers which all towns coveted, here as in the
north, were judicial and financial, to which were often added rights of
local legislation and of military control. Besides their almost complete
autonomy, another feature which seems to distinguish the southern com-
munes from those of the north was the greater share taken by the nobles
in their formation. Whereas in the north it is rare to find the upper
classes even admitted as members of the commune, in the south nobles
almost always occupied some of the municipal offices, and the consular
body was frequently composed half of knights and half of burgesses. As
a rule also, an assembly of inhabitants plays a larger part in the southern
communes and appears more frequently than in the northern towns.
Here as elsewhere great variety prevailed as regards powers and inde-
pendence. Marseilles, for a short time, was practically a republic. Pro-
bably municipal officers existed there from very early times; consuls were
certainly in existence at the beginning of the twelfth century. No
distinction was made here between nobles and burgesses; both held office
indifferently. Laws were the same for all, officials were elected by all, and
a great part was played in town government by the grand conseil of
elected representatives and the cent chefs de métiers, artisans chosen by
their colleagues; on special occasions a general assembly of all citizens
was summoned to consider the most important questions. To their
suzerain, the Count of Provence, the townsmen appear to have owed little
but military service, and the statutes of the city were drawn up by the
Marseillais themselves without any seignorial assistance.
CH. XIX.
40-2


## p. 628 (#674) ############################################

628
Villes de bourgeoisie
Another important town, Montpellier, which dates its communal
government from the twelfth century, was recognised as a republic in 1204
by the King of Aragon, whom the burgesses had wanted to choose as
their lord. It had its own elected officials and had erected careful safeguards
against seignorial encroachments; but it was never absolutely independent.
The lord's bailiff attested the acts of the consuls and authority was, at
least nominally, shared between lord and commune.
In Toulouse we have an example of a commercial commune with great
external influence and practical sovereignty throughout the neighbouring
country, but with a less advanced political constitution, since the count
always exercised considerable municipal powers.
To complete this brief summary of the principal types of southern
towns, the cité of Carcassonne may be taken as representing the specially
military commune, and Lézat the almost wholly rural town. In the
latter, the consulate was evidently organised for the benefit of cultivators
and proprietors, both within and without the town walls, and the
authority shared between the abbot and the consuls of the town was
largely concerned with rural matters.
It was not always possible for the efforts of the burgesses to succeed
in establishing so complete a measure of self-government as in the com-
munes described above; and in France a third type of town is found under
the title ville de bourgeoisie or commune surveillée, which possessed certain
communal characteristics without real political power. It formed, in fact,
a privileged community rather than a free commune. Such communities
were scattered throughout all parts of France, but in the centre they
formed the prevailing type and were on the whole both prosperous and
durable; Paris herself, though with certain special characteristics of her
own, belonged to this category. Towns on the king's demesne almost
always took this form in response to the communal tendency. The
townsmen combined to obtain privileges, but royal officials retained full
judicial powers, or at most shared them with the town magistrates. The
same might happen in the case of seignorial towns, where the lords were
induced to make certain concessions but still retained political powers.
In some cases a town might have a municipal body wholly nominated
from without. This was the case at Troyes, where the count chose thir-
teen jurés, who themselves selected one of their number as mayor. In
other cases only the head official might be nominated and his assessors
elected by the town—a method adopted at Orleans, where the king's
bailiff or prévót was ultimately supreme. Some royal towns were rather
more independent than others. At Senlis, Philip Augustus handed over
to the town magistrates all his rights of justice, except in cases of murder,
rape, and homicide (1212); but later the town itself begged to renounce
powers which it could not afford to maintain, and the royal prévót was
again reinstated in his original position of supremacy (1320).