Thus it may be said that a just judge
wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he
would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man.
wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he
would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man.
Summa Theologica
Therefore God does not will things apart from Himself.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Thess. 4:3): "This is the will of
God, your sanctification. "
I answer that, God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from
Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above
[128](A[1]). For natural things have a natural inclination not only
towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, if
possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good
amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that every agent, in
so far as it is perfect and in act, produces its like. It pertains,
therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible
to others the good possessed; and especially does this pertain to the
divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of
likeness. Hence, if natural things, in so far as they are perfect,
communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the
divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much
as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to be, and other things
to be; but Himself as the end, and other things as ordained to that
end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that other things should
be partakers therein.
Reply to Objection 1: The divine will is God's own existence
essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways
of understanding them and expressing them, as is clear from what has
already been said ([129]Q[13], A[4]). For when we say that God exists,
no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say
that God wills. Therefore, although He is not anything apart from
Himself, yet He does will things apart from Himself.
Reply to Objection 2: In things willed for the sake of the end, the
whole reason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves
the will, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of
the end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing so wills
nothing else than health; and this alone moves his will. It is
different with one who takes a draught that is pleasant, which anyone
may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for its own
sake. Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself only for the
sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it does not follow that
anything else moves His will, except His goodness. So, as He
understands things apart from Himself by understanding His own essence,
so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own goodness.
Reply to Objection 3: From the fact that His own goodness suffices the
divine will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from
itself, but rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its
goodness. Thus, too, the divine intellect, though its perfection
consists in its very knowledge of the divine essence, yet in that
essence knows other things.
Reply to Objection 4: As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the
many only in the one, in the same way the divine will is one and
simple, as willing the many only through the one, that is, through its
own goodness.
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Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?
Objection 1: It seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily. For
everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills from
eternity, for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever
He wills, He wills necessarily.
Objection 2: Further, God wills things apart from Himself, inasmuch as
He wills His own goodness. Now God wills His own goodness necessarily.
Therefore He wills things apart from Himself necessarily.
Objection 3: Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is
necessary, for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of
all necessity, as above shown ([130]Q[2], A[3]). But it belongs to His
nature to will whatever He wills; since in God there can be nothing
over and above His nature as stated in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever
He wills, He wills necessarily.
Objection 4: Further, being that is not necessary, and being that is
possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore, God does
not necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible for Him not
to will it, and therefore possible for Him to will what He does not
will. And so the divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two
things, and imperfect, since everything contingent is imperfect and
mutable.
Objection 5: Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one
or the other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined to
one or the other by some other power, as the Commentator [*Averroes]
says in Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent with regard
to anything, it follows that His determination to act comes from
another; and thus He has some cause prior to Himself.
Objection 6: Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as
the divine knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore
whatever God wills, He wills necessarily.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 1:11): "Who worketh all things
according to the counsel of His will. " Now, what we work according to
the counsel of the will, we do not will necessarily. Therefore God does
not will necessarily whatever He wills.
I answer that, There are two ways in which a thing is said to be
necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to
be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the
predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: thus it is
absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the
subject forms part of the notion of the predicate; thus it is
absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it
is not necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary
absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that he is
sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting. Accordingly
as to things willed by God, we must observe that He wills something of
absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the
divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that
is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily,
even as we will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty
has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for instance
the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God
wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His
own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily
will things that conduce to it, unless they are such that the end
cannot be attained without them; as, we will to take food to preserve
life, or to take ship in order to cross the sea. But we do not
necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a
horse for a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the
journey without one. The same applies to other means. Hence, since the
goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch
as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His
willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it
can be necessary by supposition, for supposing that He wills a thing,
then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change.
Reply to Objection 1: From the fact that God wills from eternity
whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily;
except by supposition.
Reply to Objection 2: Although God necessarily wills His own goodness,
He does not necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness;
for it can exist without other things.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not natural to God to will any of those
other things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not
unnatural or contrary to His nature, but voluntary.
Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary
relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in
the cause. Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation to
some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the
solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the
cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily will some of the
things that He wills, does not result from defect in the divine will,
but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed, namely,
that the perfect goodness of God can be without it; and such defect
accompanies all created good.
Reply to Objection 5: A naturally contingent cause must be determined
to act by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is
necessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no
necessary relation.
Reply to Objection 6: As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so
is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge
has a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the
thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as
they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they
exist in themselves. Since then all other things have necessary
existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute necessity so
as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they exist in
themselves; it follows that God knows necessarily whatever He wills,
but does not will necessarily whatever He wills.
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Whether the will of God is the cause of things?
Objection 1: It seems that the will of God is not the cause of things.
For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "As our sun, not by reason nor by
pre-election, but by its very being, enlightens all things that can
participate in its light, so the divine good by its very essence pours
the rays of goodness upon everything that exists. " But every voluntary
agent acts by reason and pre-election. Therefore God does not act by
will; and so His will is not the cause of things.
Objection 2: Further, The first in any order is that which is
essentially so, thus in the order of burning things, that comes first
which is fire by its essence. But God is the first agent. Therefore He
acts by His essence; and that is His nature. He acts then by nature,
and not by will. Therefore the divine will is not the cause of things.
Objection 3: Further, Whatever is the cause of anything, through being
"such" a thing, is the cause by nature, and not by will. For fire is
the cause of heat, as being itself hot; whereas an architect is the
cause of a house, because he wills to build it. Now Augustine says (De
Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because God is good, we exist. " Therefore God
is the cause of things by His nature, and not by His will.
Objection 4: Further, Of one thing there is one cause. But the created
things is the knowledge of God, as said before ([131]Q[14], A[8]).
Therefore the will of God cannot be considered the cause of things.
On the contrary, It is said (Wis. 11:26), "How could anything endure,
if Thou wouldst not? "
I answer that, We must hold that the will of God is the cause of
things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed,
by a necessity of His nature.
This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of active
causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an end, as proved in
Phys. ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary
means predetermined for it by some higher intellect; as the end and
definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer. Hence
the intellectual and voluntary agent must precede the agent that acts
by nature. Hence, since God is first in the order of agents, He must
act by intellect and will.
This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of
which the property is to produce one and the same effect; for nature
operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is
because the nature of the act is according to the nature of the agent;
and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance
with that nature; for every natural agent has a determinate being.
Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself
the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity
of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined and
indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown
([132]Q[7], A[2]). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His
nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection
according to the determination of His will and intellect.
Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For
effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so far as they
pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now
effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode of the cause. Wherefore
since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him
after the mode of intellect, and therefore proceed from Him after the
same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will,
for His inclination to put in act what His intellect has conceived
appertains to the will. Therefore the will of God is the cause of
things.
Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius in these words does not intend to
exclude election from God absolutely; but only in a certain sense, in
so far, that is, as He communicates His goodness not merely to certain
things, but to all; and as election implies a certain distinction.
Reply to Objection 2: Because the essence of God is His intellect and
will, from the fact of His acting by His essence, it follows that He
acts after the mode of intellect and will.
Reply to Objection 3: Good is the object of the will. The words,
therefore, "Because God is good, we exist," are true inasmuch as His
goodness is the reason of His willing all other things, as said before
(A[2], ad 2).
Reply to Objection 4: Even in us the cause of one and the same effect
is knowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is
conceived, and will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the
intellect only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the
effect, except by the will. Hence, the speculative intellect has
nothing to say to operation. But the power is cause, as executing the
effect, since it denotes the immediate principle of operation. But in
God all these things are one.
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Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?
Objection 1: It seems that some cause can be assigned to the divine
will. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46): "Who would venture to say
that God made all things irrationally? " But to a voluntary agent, what
is the reason of operating, is the cause of willing. Therefore the will
of God has some cause.
Objection 2: Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and
whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned
except by the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause
of all things, as has been already shown [133](A[4]). If, then, there
is no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any
cause, except the divine will alone. Thus all science would be in vain,
since science seeks to assign causes to effects. This seems
inadmissible, and therefore we must assign some cause to the divine
will.
Objection 3: Further, what is done by the willer, on account of no
cause, depends simply on his will. If, therefore, the will of God has
no cause, it follows that all things made depend simply on His will,
and have no other cause. But this also is not admissible.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 28): "Every efficient
cause is greater than the thing effected. " But nothing is greater than
the will of God. We must not then seek for a cause of it.
I answer that, In no wise has the will of God a cause. In proof of
which we must consider that, since the will follows from the intellect,
there is cause of the will in the person who wills, in the same way as
there is a cause of the understanding, in the person that understands.
The case with the understanding is this: that if the premiss and its
conclusion are understood separately from each other, the understanding
the premiss is the cause that the conclusion is known. If the
understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss itself,
apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance, in this
case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by understanding
the premisses, since a thing cannot be its own cause; and yet, it would
be true that the thinker would understand the premisses to be the cause
of the conclusion. It is the same with the will, with respect to which
the end stands in the same relation to the means to the end, as do the
premisses to the conclusion with regard to the understanding.
Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means
to that end, his willing the end will be the cause of his willing the
means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and
means; for a thing cannot be its own cause. Yet it will be true to say
that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as God by
one act understands all things in His essence, so by one act He wills
all things in His goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the cause is
not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the
effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an end is not the cause of His
willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to the end.
Therefore, He wills this to be as means to that; but does not will this
on account of that.
Reply to Objection 1: The will of God is reasonable, not because
anything is to God a cause of willing, but in so far as He wills one
thing to be on account of another.
Reply to Objection 2: Since God wills effects to proceed from definite
causes, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not
unreasonable to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. It would,
however, be unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as primary,
and not as dependent on the will of God. In this sense Augustine says
(De Trin. iii, 2): "Philosophers in their vanity have thought fit to
attribute contingent effects to other causes, being utterly unable to
perceive the cause that is shown above all others, the will of God. "
Reply to Objection 3: Since God wills effects to come from causes, all
effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the
will of God, but on something else besides: but the first effect
depends on the divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say that
God willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work, and
intellect, that he might be man; and willed him to be man that he might
enjoy Him, or for the completion of the universe. But this cannot be
reduced to other created secondary ends. Hence such things depend on
the simple will of God; but the others on the order of other causes.
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Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?
Objection 1: It seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled. For
the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:4): "God will have all men to be saved, and
to come to the knowledge of the truth. " But this does not happen.
Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.
Objection 2: Further, as is the relation of knowledge to truth, so is
that of the will to good. Now God knows all truth. Therefore He wills
all good. But not all good actually exists; for much more good might
exist. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.
Objection 3: Further, since the will of God is the first cause, it does
not exclude intermediate causes. But the effect of a first cause may be
hindered by a defect of a secondary cause; as the effect of the motive
power may be hindered by the weakness of the limb. Therefore the effect
of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of the secondary causes.
The will of God, therefore, is not always fulfilled.
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 113:11): "God hath done all things,
whatsoever He would. "
I answer that, The will of God must needs always be fulfilled. In proof
of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to the
agent according to its form, the rule is the same with active causes as
with formal causes. The rule in forms is this: that although a thing
may fall short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of the
universal form. For though a thing may fail to be, for example, a man
or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence the same
must happen in active causes. Something may fall outside the order of
any particular active cause, but not outside the order of the universal
cause; under which all particular causes are included: and if any
particular cause fails of its effect, this is because of the hindrance
of some other particular cause, which is included in the order of the
universal cause. Therefore an effect cannot possibly escape the order
of the universal cause. Even in corporeal things this is clearly seen.
For it may happen that a star is hindered from producing its effects;
yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal things, from this
hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred through intermediate
causes to the universal influence of the first heaven. Since, then, the
will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that
the divine will should not produce its effect. Hence that which seems
to depart from the divine will in one order, returns into it in another
order; as does the sinner, who by sin falls away from the divine will
as much as lies in him, yet falls back into the order of that will,
when by its justice he is punished.
Reply to Objection 1: The words of the Apostle, "God will have all men
to be saved," etc. can be understood in three ways. First, by a
restricted application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine
says (De praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "God wills all men to be
saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish
saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not
will. " Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every class of
individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case they
mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved,
males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of
every condition. Thirdly, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii,
29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the
consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as applying to the
divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor
consequent, but to the things willed.
To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is
good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and
absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some
additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent
consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should
live is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely
considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer
or dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an
evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he wills
all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In
the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but
consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we
will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a
qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in
themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular
qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it
when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is
meant by willing consequently.
Thus it may be said that a just judge
wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he
would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a
qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute
will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills takes place;
although what He wills antecedently may not take place.
Reply to Objection 2: An act of the cognitive faculty is according as
the thing known is in the knower; while an act of the appetite faculty
is directed to things as they exist in themselves. But all that can
have the nature of being and truth virtually exists in God, though it
does not all exist in created things. Therefore God knows all truth;
but does not will all good, except in so far as He wills Himself, in
Whom all good virtually exists.
Reply to Objection 3: A first cause can be hindered in its effect by
deficiency in the secondary cause, when it is not the universal first
cause, including within itself all causes; for then the effect could in
no way escape its order. And thus it is with the will of God, as said
above.
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Whether the will of God is changeable?
Objection 1: It seems that the Will of God is changeable. For the Lord
says (Gn. 6:7): "It repenteth Me that I have made man. " But whoever
repents of what he has done, has a changeable will. Therefore God has a
changeable will.
Objection 2: Further, it is said in the person of the Lord: "I will
speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull
down, and to destroy it; but if that nation shall repent of its evil, I
also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them" (Jer.
18:7,8) Therefore God has a changeable will.
Objection 3: Further, whatever God does, He does voluntarily. But God
does not always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the law
to be observed, and at another time forbade it. Therefore He has a
changeable will.
Objection 4: Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as
said before [134](A[3]). Therefore He can both will and not will the
same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is
changeable substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not in
that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable as
regards His will.
On the contrary, It is said: "God is not as a man, that He should lie,
nor as the son of man, that He should be changed" (Num. 23:19).
I answer that, The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this point
we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that
certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a
thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for the will
to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if
one should begin to will what before he had not willed; or cease to
will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless we
presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the
substance of the willer. For since the will regards good, a man may in
two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be
good for him, and this does not take place without a change in him.
Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire;
though it was not so before. In another way when he knows for the first
time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before;
hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it has
already been shown that both the substance of God and His knowledge are
entirely unchangeable ([135]Q[9], A[1]; [136]Q[14], A[15]). Therefore
His will must be entirely unchangeable.
Reply to Objection 1: These words of the Lord are to be understood
metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when
we repent, we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so
without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at the
same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have
repented, by way of comparison with our mode of acting, in so far as by
the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom He had
made.
Reply to Objection 2: The will of God, as it is the first and universal
cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce
certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in
power to the first cause, there are many things in the divine power,
knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior
causes. Thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus, one who looked only
on inferior causes might have said: "Lazarus will not rise again," but
looking at the divine first cause might have said: "Lazarus will rise
again. " And God wills both: that is, that in the order of the inferior
cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of the higher cause
it shall not happen; or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that
God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls
under the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet
does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine and higher
cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: "Take order with thy house, for
thou shalt die, and not live" (Is. 38:1). Yet this did not take place,
since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge
and will, which is unchangeable. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5):
"The sentence of God changes, but not His counsel"---that is to say,
the counsel of His will. When therefore He says, "I also will repent,"
His words must be understood metaphorically. For men seem to repent,
when they do not fulfill what they have threatened.
Reply to Objection 3: It does not follow from this argument that God
has a will that changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should
change.
Reply to Objection 4: Although God's willing a thing is not by absolute
necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the
unchangeableness of the divine will, as has been said above
[137](A[3]).
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Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?
Objection 1: It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the
things willed. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved,
except whom God has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to
will it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be. "
Objection 2: Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its
effect necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 84)
"Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder
it. " But the will of God cannot be hindered. For the Apostle says (Rom.
9:19): "Who resisteth His will? " Therefore the will of God imposes
necessity on the things willed.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is
necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should die,
being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are
related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they have
necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a
thing, it comes to pass; and every true conditional statement is
necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is necessary
absolutely.
On the contrary, All good things that exist God wills to be. If
therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that
all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will,
counsel, and all other such things.
I answer that, The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed
but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to
intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes
is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes contingent.
This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons.
First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of
the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause
is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun's power is
hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause
can hinder God's will from producing its effect. Secondly, because if
the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be
referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the
divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is better
therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the
divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows
upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its
manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power in
the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in
accidental points, that belong to its manner of being. Since then the
divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things
are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in
the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done
necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for
the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has
attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible
and contingent causes, from which arise contingent effects. Hence it is
not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed
by God happen contingently, but because God prepared contingent causes
for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently.
Reply to Objection 1: By the words of Augustine we must understand a
necessity in things willed by God that is not absolute, but
conditional. For the conditional statement that if God wills a thing it
must necessarily be, is necessarily true.
Reply to Objection 2: From the very fact that nothing resists the
divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that God
wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently
according to His will.
Reply to Objection 3: Consequents have necessity from their antecedents
according to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by the
divine will have that kind of necessity that God wills them to have,
either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore, are absolute
necessities.
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Whether God wills evils?
Objection 1: It seems that God wills evils. For every good that exists,
God wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For Augustine says
(Enchiridion 95): "Although evil in so far as it is evil is not a good,
yet it is good that not only good things should exist, but also evil
things. " Therefore God wills evil things.
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): "Evil would
conduce to the perfection of everything," i. e. the universe. And
Augustine says (Enchiridion 10,11): "Out of all things is built up the
admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is called
evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more evidently
in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with
evil. " But God wills all that appertains to the perfection and beauty
of the universe, for this is what God desires above all things in His
creatures. Therefore God wills evil.
Objection 3: Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are
contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should not
exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not
always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil should exist.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man is the cause
of another man becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom.
Much less therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when He
is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will it. " Therefore
it is not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that
every evil makes a thing worse. Therefore God wills not evil things.
I answer that, Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as
said before ([138]Q[5], A[1]), and since evil is opposed to good, it is
impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the
appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite
which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far
as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a
natural agent intends not privation or corruption, but the form to
which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation
of one thing, which implies the corruption of another. Also when a lion
kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the
animal is only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure
for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. Now
the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good.
Never therefore would evil be sought after, not even accidentally,
unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the
good of which the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good more
than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than
another. Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the
privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural
defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which
such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment;
and in willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some
things to be naturally corrupted.
Reply to Objection 1: Some have said that although God does not will
evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although
evil is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This
they said because things evil in themselves are ordered to some good
end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words "that evil
should be or be done. " This, however, is not correct; since evil is not
of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is beside the
intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from his sin; as
it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience of the martyrs
should shine forth from all their persecutions. It cannot therefore be
said that such an ordering to good is implied in the statement that it
is a good thing that evil should be or be done, since nothing is judged
of by that which appertains to it accidentally, but by that which
belongs to it essentially.
Reply to Objection 2: Evil does not operate towards the perfection and
beauty of the universe, except accidentally, as said above (ad 1).
Therefore Dionysius in saying that "evil would conduce to the
perfection of the universe," draws a conclusion by reduction to an
absurdity.
Reply to Objection 3: The statements that evil exists, and that evil
exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet the statements that
anyone wills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be, are not so
opposed; since either is affirmative. God therefore neither wills evil
to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be
done; and this is a good.
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Whether God has free-will?
Objection 1: It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in a
homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146, ad Damas. ]; "God alone is He who
is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having
free-will, can be inclined to either side. "
Objection 2: Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will,
by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil, as has
been said [139](A[9]). Therefore there is not free-will in God.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit
divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice
of the will, not in obedience to necessity. "
I answer that, We have free-will with respect to what we will not of
necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not
appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals,
that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by
free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other
things not necessarily, as shown above [140](A[3]), He has free will
with respect to what He does not necessarily will.
Reply to Objection 1: Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply,
but only as regards the inclination to sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Since the evil of sin consists in turning away
from the divine goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown
(De Fide ii, 3), it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil
of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He
can will a thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves,
without sin, can will to sit down, and not will to sit down.
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Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?
Objection 1: It seems that the will of expression is not to be
distinguished in God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so
is His wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine wisdom.
Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the divine will.
Objection 2: Further, every expression that is not in agreement with
the mind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the
expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that
will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are superfluous. No
expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine will.
On the contrary, The will of God is one, since it is the very essence
of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words of Ps.
110:2: "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all
His wills. " Therefore sometimes the sign must be taken for the will.
I answer that, Some things are said of God in their strict sense;
others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before
([141]Q[13], A[3]). When certain human passions are predicated of the
Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the
effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is
signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus
with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that punishment
becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is
signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed to God. In the
same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes
metaphorically called will in God; just as when anyone lays down a
precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a
divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of God, as in
the words: "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven" (Mat. 6:10).
There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that anger
is never attributed to God properly, since in its primary meaning it
includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly. Therefore
in God there are distinguished will in its proper sense, and will as
attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the
will of good pleasure; and will metaphorically taken is the will of
expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called will.
Reply to Objection 1: Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done,
unless through the will. For we do not put into act what we know,
unless we will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to
knowledge, but to will.
Reply to Objection 2: Expressions of will are called divine wills, not
as being signs that God wills anything; but because what in us is the
usual expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus
punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it is called
anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in
ourselves.
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Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?
Objection 1: It seems that five expressions of will---namely,
prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission---are not
rightly assigned to the divine will. For the same things that God bids
us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates in us, and
the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes permits. They
ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct.
Objection 2: Further, God works nothing unless He wills it, as the
Scripture says (Wis. 11:26). But the will of expression is distinct
from the will of good pleasure. Therefore operation ought not to be
comprehended in the will of expression.
Objection 3: Further, operation and permission appertain to all
creatures in common, since God works in them all, and permits some
action in them all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition belong to
rational creatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly under one
division, not being of one order.
Objection 4: Further, evil happens in more ways than good, since "good
happens in one way, but evil in all kinds of ways," as declared by the
Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), and Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). It is not
right therefore to assign one expression only in the case of
evil---namely, prohibition---and two---namely, counsel and precept---in
the case of good.
I answer that, By these signs we name the expression of will by which
we are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may show that
he wills something, either by himself or by means of another. He may
show it by himself, by doing something either directly, or indirectly
and accidentally. He shows it directly when he works in his own person;
in that way the expression of his will is his own working. He shows it
indirectly, by not hindering the doing of a thing; for what removes an
impediment is called an accidental mover. In this respect the
expression is called permission. He declares his will by means of
another when he orders another to perform a work, either by insisting
upon it as necessary by precept, and by prohibiting its contrary; or by
persuasion, which is a part of counsel. Since in these ways the will of
man makes itself known, the same five are sometimes denominated with
regard to the divine will, as the expression of that will. That
precept, counsel, and prohibition are called the will of God is clear
from the words of Mat.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Thess. 4:3): "This is the will of
God, your sanctification. "
I answer that, God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from
Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above
[128](A[1]). For natural things have a natural inclination not only
towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, if
possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good
amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that every agent, in
so far as it is perfect and in act, produces its like. It pertains,
therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible
to others the good possessed; and especially does this pertain to the
divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of
likeness. Hence, if natural things, in so far as they are perfect,
communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the
divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much
as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to be, and other things
to be; but Himself as the end, and other things as ordained to that
end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that other things should
be partakers therein.
Reply to Objection 1: The divine will is God's own existence
essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways
of understanding them and expressing them, as is clear from what has
already been said ([129]Q[13], A[4]). For when we say that God exists,
no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say
that God wills. Therefore, although He is not anything apart from
Himself, yet He does will things apart from Himself.
Reply to Objection 2: In things willed for the sake of the end, the
whole reason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves
the will, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of
the end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing so wills
nothing else than health; and this alone moves his will. It is
different with one who takes a draught that is pleasant, which anyone
may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for its own
sake. Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself only for the
sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it does not follow that
anything else moves His will, except His goodness. So, as He
understands things apart from Himself by understanding His own essence,
so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own goodness.
Reply to Objection 3: From the fact that His own goodness suffices the
divine will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from
itself, but rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its
goodness. Thus, too, the divine intellect, though its perfection
consists in its very knowledge of the divine essence, yet in that
essence knows other things.
Reply to Objection 4: As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the
many only in the one, in the same way the divine will is one and
simple, as willing the many only through the one, that is, through its
own goodness.
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Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?
Objection 1: It seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily. For
everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills from
eternity, for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever
He wills, He wills necessarily.
Objection 2: Further, God wills things apart from Himself, inasmuch as
He wills His own goodness. Now God wills His own goodness necessarily.
Therefore He wills things apart from Himself necessarily.
Objection 3: Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is
necessary, for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of
all necessity, as above shown ([130]Q[2], A[3]). But it belongs to His
nature to will whatever He wills; since in God there can be nothing
over and above His nature as stated in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever
He wills, He wills necessarily.
Objection 4: Further, being that is not necessary, and being that is
possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore, God does
not necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible for Him not
to will it, and therefore possible for Him to will what He does not
will. And so the divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two
things, and imperfect, since everything contingent is imperfect and
mutable.
Objection 5: Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one
or the other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined to
one or the other by some other power, as the Commentator [*Averroes]
says in Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent with regard
to anything, it follows that His determination to act comes from
another; and thus He has some cause prior to Himself.
Objection 6: Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as
the divine knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore
whatever God wills, He wills necessarily.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 1:11): "Who worketh all things
according to the counsel of His will. " Now, what we work according to
the counsel of the will, we do not will necessarily. Therefore God does
not will necessarily whatever He wills.
I answer that, There are two ways in which a thing is said to be
necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to
be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the
predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: thus it is
absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the
subject forms part of the notion of the predicate; thus it is
absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it
is not necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary
absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that he is
sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting. Accordingly
as to things willed by God, we must observe that He wills something of
absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the
divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that
is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily,
even as we will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty
has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for instance
the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God
wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His
own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily
will things that conduce to it, unless they are such that the end
cannot be attained without them; as, we will to take food to preserve
life, or to take ship in order to cross the sea. But we do not
necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a
horse for a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the
journey without one. The same applies to other means. Hence, since the
goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch
as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His
willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it
can be necessary by supposition, for supposing that He wills a thing,
then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change.
Reply to Objection 1: From the fact that God wills from eternity
whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily;
except by supposition.
Reply to Objection 2: Although God necessarily wills His own goodness,
He does not necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness;
for it can exist without other things.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not natural to God to will any of those
other things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not
unnatural or contrary to His nature, but voluntary.
Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary
relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in
the cause. Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation to
some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the
solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the
cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily will some of the
things that He wills, does not result from defect in the divine will,
but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed, namely,
that the perfect goodness of God can be without it; and such defect
accompanies all created good.
Reply to Objection 5: A naturally contingent cause must be determined
to act by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is
necessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no
necessary relation.
Reply to Objection 6: As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so
is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge
has a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the
thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as
they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they
exist in themselves. Since then all other things have necessary
existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute necessity so
as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they exist in
themselves; it follows that God knows necessarily whatever He wills,
but does not will necessarily whatever He wills.
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Whether the will of God is the cause of things?
Objection 1: It seems that the will of God is not the cause of things.
For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "As our sun, not by reason nor by
pre-election, but by its very being, enlightens all things that can
participate in its light, so the divine good by its very essence pours
the rays of goodness upon everything that exists. " But every voluntary
agent acts by reason and pre-election. Therefore God does not act by
will; and so His will is not the cause of things.
Objection 2: Further, The first in any order is that which is
essentially so, thus in the order of burning things, that comes first
which is fire by its essence. But God is the first agent. Therefore He
acts by His essence; and that is His nature. He acts then by nature,
and not by will. Therefore the divine will is not the cause of things.
Objection 3: Further, Whatever is the cause of anything, through being
"such" a thing, is the cause by nature, and not by will. For fire is
the cause of heat, as being itself hot; whereas an architect is the
cause of a house, because he wills to build it. Now Augustine says (De
Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because God is good, we exist. " Therefore God
is the cause of things by His nature, and not by His will.
Objection 4: Further, Of one thing there is one cause. But the created
things is the knowledge of God, as said before ([131]Q[14], A[8]).
Therefore the will of God cannot be considered the cause of things.
On the contrary, It is said (Wis. 11:26), "How could anything endure,
if Thou wouldst not? "
I answer that, We must hold that the will of God is the cause of
things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed,
by a necessity of His nature.
This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of active
causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an end, as proved in
Phys. ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary
means predetermined for it by some higher intellect; as the end and
definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer. Hence
the intellectual and voluntary agent must precede the agent that acts
by nature. Hence, since God is first in the order of agents, He must
act by intellect and will.
This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of
which the property is to produce one and the same effect; for nature
operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is
because the nature of the act is according to the nature of the agent;
and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance
with that nature; for every natural agent has a determinate being.
Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself
the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity
of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined and
indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown
([132]Q[7], A[2]). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His
nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection
according to the determination of His will and intellect.
Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For
effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so far as they
pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now
effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode of the cause. Wherefore
since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him
after the mode of intellect, and therefore proceed from Him after the
same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will,
for His inclination to put in act what His intellect has conceived
appertains to the will. Therefore the will of God is the cause of
things.
Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius in these words does not intend to
exclude election from God absolutely; but only in a certain sense, in
so far, that is, as He communicates His goodness not merely to certain
things, but to all; and as election implies a certain distinction.
Reply to Objection 2: Because the essence of God is His intellect and
will, from the fact of His acting by His essence, it follows that He
acts after the mode of intellect and will.
Reply to Objection 3: Good is the object of the will. The words,
therefore, "Because God is good, we exist," are true inasmuch as His
goodness is the reason of His willing all other things, as said before
(A[2], ad 2).
Reply to Objection 4: Even in us the cause of one and the same effect
is knowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is
conceived, and will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the
intellect only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the
effect, except by the will. Hence, the speculative intellect has
nothing to say to operation. But the power is cause, as executing the
effect, since it denotes the immediate principle of operation. But in
God all these things are one.
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Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?
Objection 1: It seems that some cause can be assigned to the divine
will. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46): "Who would venture to say
that God made all things irrationally? " But to a voluntary agent, what
is the reason of operating, is the cause of willing. Therefore the will
of God has some cause.
Objection 2: Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and
whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned
except by the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause
of all things, as has been already shown [133](A[4]). If, then, there
is no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any
cause, except the divine will alone. Thus all science would be in vain,
since science seeks to assign causes to effects. This seems
inadmissible, and therefore we must assign some cause to the divine
will.
Objection 3: Further, what is done by the willer, on account of no
cause, depends simply on his will. If, therefore, the will of God has
no cause, it follows that all things made depend simply on His will,
and have no other cause. But this also is not admissible.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 28): "Every efficient
cause is greater than the thing effected. " But nothing is greater than
the will of God. We must not then seek for a cause of it.
I answer that, In no wise has the will of God a cause. In proof of
which we must consider that, since the will follows from the intellect,
there is cause of the will in the person who wills, in the same way as
there is a cause of the understanding, in the person that understands.
The case with the understanding is this: that if the premiss and its
conclusion are understood separately from each other, the understanding
the premiss is the cause that the conclusion is known. If the
understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss itself,
apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance, in this
case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by understanding
the premisses, since a thing cannot be its own cause; and yet, it would
be true that the thinker would understand the premisses to be the cause
of the conclusion. It is the same with the will, with respect to which
the end stands in the same relation to the means to the end, as do the
premisses to the conclusion with regard to the understanding.
Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means
to that end, his willing the end will be the cause of his willing the
means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and
means; for a thing cannot be its own cause. Yet it will be true to say
that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as God by
one act understands all things in His essence, so by one act He wills
all things in His goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the cause is
not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the
effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an end is not the cause of His
willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to the end.
Therefore, He wills this to be as means to that; but does not will this
on account of that.
Reply to Objection 1: The will of God is reasonable, not because
anything is to God a cause of willing, but in so far as He wills one
thing to be on account of another.
Reply to Objection 2: Since God wills effects to proceed from definite
causes, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not
unreasonable to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. It would,
however, be unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as primary,
and not as dependent on the will of God. In this sense Augustine says
(De Trin. iii, 2): "Philosophers in their vanity have thought fit to
attribute contingent effects to other causes, being utterly unable to
perceive the cause that is shown above all others, the will of God. "
Reply to Objection 3: Since God wills effects to come from causes, all
effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the
will of God, but on something else besides: but the first effect
depends on the divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say that
God willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work, and
intellect, that he might be man; and willed him to be man that he might
enjoy Him, or for the completion of the universe. But this cannot be
reduced to other created secondary ends. Hence such things depend on
the simple will of God; but the others on the order of other causes.
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Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?
Objection 1: It seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled. For
the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:4): "God will have all men to be saved, and
to come to the knowledge of the truth. " But this does not happen.
Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.
Objection 2: Further, as is the relation of knowledge to truth, so is
that of the will to good. Now God knows all truth. Therefore He wills
all good. But not all good actually exists; for much more good might
exist. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.
Objection 3: Further, since the will of God is the first cause, it does
not exclude intermediate causes. But the effect of a first cause may be
hindered by a defect of a secondary cause; as the effect of the motive
power may be hindered by the weakness of the limb. Therefore the effect
of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of the secondary causes.
The will of God, therefore, is not always fulfilled.
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 113:11): "God hath done all things,
whatsoever He would. "
I answer that, The will of God must needs always be fulfilled. In proof
of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to the
agent according to its form, the rule is the same with active causes as
with formal causes. The rule in forms is this: that although a thing
may fall short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of the
universal form. For though a thing may fail to be, for example, a man
or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence the same
must happen in active causes. Something may fall outside the order of
any particular active cause, but not outside the order of the universal
cause; under which all particular causes are included: and if any
particular cause fails of its effect, this is because of the hindrance
of some other particular cause, which is included in the order of the
universal cause. Therefore an effect cannot possibly escape the order
of the universal cause. Even in corporeal things this is clearly seen.
For it may happen that a star is hindered from producing its effects;
yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal things, from this
hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred through intermediate
causes to the universal influence of the first heaven. Since, then, the
will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that
the divine will should not produce its effect. Hence that which seems
to depart from the divine will in one order, returns into it in another
order; as does the sinner, who by sin falls away from the divine will
as much as lies in him, yet falls back into the order of that will,
when by its justice he is punished.
Reply to Objection 1: The words of the Apostle, "God will have all men
to be saved," etc. can be understood in three ways. First, by a
restricted application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine
says (De praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "God wills all men to be
saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish
saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not
will. " Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every class of
individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case they
mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved,
males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of
every condition. Thirdly, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii,
29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the
consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as applying to the
divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor
consequent, but to the things willed.
To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is
good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and
absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some
additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent
consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should
live is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely
considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer
or dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an
evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he wills
all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In
the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but
consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we
will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a
qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in
themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular
qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it
when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is
meant by willing consequently.
Thus it may be said that a just judge
wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he
would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a
qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute
will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills takes place;
although what He wills antecedently may not take place.
Reply to Objection 2: An act of the cognitive faculty is according as
the thing known is in the knower; while an act of the appetite faculty
is directed to things as they exist in themselves. But all that can
have the nature of being and truth virtually exists in God, though it
does not all exist in created things. Therefore God knows all truth;
but does not will all good, except in so far as He wills Himself, in
Whom all good virtually exists.
Reply to Objection 3: A first cause can be hindered in its effect by
deficiency in the secondary cause, when it is not the universal first
cause, including within itself all causes; for then the effect could in
no way escape its order. And thus it is with the will of God, as said
above.
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Whether the will of God is changeable?
Objection 1: It seems that the Will of God is changeable. For the Lord
says (Gn. 6:7): "It repenteth Me that I have made man. " But whoever
repents of what he has done, has a changeable will. Therefore God has a
changeable will.
Objection 2: Further, it is said in the person of the Lord: "I will
speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull
down, and to destroy it; but if that nation shall repent of its evil, I
also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them" (Jer.
18:7,8) Therefore God has a changeable will.
Objection 3: Further, whatever God does, He does voluntarily. But God
does not always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the law
to be observed, and at another time forbade it. Therefore He has a
changeable will.
Objection 4: Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as
said before [134](A[3]). Therefore He can both will and not will the
same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is
changeable substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not in
that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable as
regards His will.
On the contrary, It is said: "God is not as a man, that He should lie,
nor as the son of man, that He should be changed" (Num. 23:19).
I answer that, The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this point
we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that
certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a
thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for the will
to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if
one should begin to will what before he had not willed; or cease to
will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless we
presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the
substance of the willer. For since the will regards good, a man may in
two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be
good for him, and this does not take place without a change in him.
Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire;
though it was not so before. In another way when he knows for the first
time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before;
hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it has
already been shown that both the substance of God and His knowledge are
entirely unchangeable ([135]Q[9], A[1]; [136]Q[14], A[15]). Therefore
His will must be entirely unchangeable.
Reply to Objection 1: These words of the Lord are to be understood
metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when
we repent, we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so
without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at the
same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have
repented, by way of comparison with our mode of acting, in so far as by
the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom He had
made.
Reply to Objection 2: The will of God, as it is the first and universal
cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce
certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in
power to the first cause, there are many things in the divine power,
knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior
causes. Thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus, one who looked only
on inferior causes might have said: "Lazarus will not rise again," but
looking at the divine first cause might have said: "Lazarus will rise
again. " And God wills both: that is, that in the order of the inferior
cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of the higher cause
it shall not happen; or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that
God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls
under the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet
does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine and higher
cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: "Take order with thy house, for
thou shalt die, and not live" (Is. 38:1). Yet this did not take place,
since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge
and will, which is unchangeable. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5):
"The sentence of God changes, but not His counsel"---that is to say,
the counsel of His will. When therefore He says, "I also will repent,"
His words must be understood metaphorically. For men seem to repent,
when they do not fulfill what they have threatened.
Reply to Objection 3: It does not follow from this argument that God
has a will that changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should
change.
Reply to Objection 4: Although God's willing a thing is not by absolute
necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the
unchangeableness of the divine will, as has been said above
[137](A[3]).
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Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?
Objection 1: It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the
things willed. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved,
except whom God has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to
will it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be. "
Objection 2: Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its
effect necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 84)
"Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder
it. " But the will of God cannot be hindered. For the Apostle says (Rom.
9:19): "Who resisteth His will? " Therefore the will of God imposes
necessity on the things willed.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is
necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should die,
being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are
related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they have
necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a
thing, it comes to pass; and every true conditional statement is
necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is necessary
absolutely.
On the contrary, All good things that exist God wills to be. If
therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that
all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will,
counsel, and all other such things.
I answer that, The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed
but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to
intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes
is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes contingent.
This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons.
First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of
the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause
is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun's power is
hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause
can hinder God's will from producing its effect. Secondly, because if
the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be
referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the
divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is better
therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the
divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows
upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its
manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power in
the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in
accidental points, that belong to its manner of being. Since then the
divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things
are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in
the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done
necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for
the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has
attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible
and contingent causes, from which arise contingent effects. Hence it is
not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed
by God happen contingently, but because God prepared contingent causes
for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently.
Reply to Objection 1: By the words of Augustine we must understand a
necessity in things willed by God that is not absolute, but
conditional. For the conditional statement that if God wills a thing it
must necessarily be, is necessarily true.
Reply to Objection 2: From the very fact that nothing resists the
divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that God
wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently
according to His will.
Reply to Objection 3: Consequents have necessity from their antecedents
according to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by the
divine will have that kind of necessity that God wills them to have,
either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore, are absolute
necessities.
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Whether God wills evils?
Objection 1: It seems that God wills evils. For every good that exists,
God wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For Augustine says
(Enchiridion 95): "Although evil in so far as it is evil is not a good,
yet it is good that not only good things should exist, but also evil
things. " Therefore God wills evil things.
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): "Evil would
conduce to the perfection of everything," i. e. the universe. And
Augustine says (Enchiridion 10,11): "Out of all things is built up the
admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is called
evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more evidently
in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with
evil. " But God wills all that appertains to the perfection and beauty
of the universe, for this is what God desires above all things in His
creatures. Therefore God wills evil.
Objection 3: Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are
contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should not
exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not
always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil should exist.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man is the cause
of another man becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom.
Much less therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when He
is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will it. " Therefore
it is not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that
every evil makes a thing worse. Therefore God wills not evil things.
I answer that, Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as
said before ([138]Q[5], A[1]), and since evil is opposed to good, it is
impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the
appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite
which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far
as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a
natural agent intends not privation or corruption, but the form to
which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation
of one thing, which implies the corruption of another. Also when a lion
kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the
animal is only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure
for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. Now
the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good.
Never therefore would evil be sought after, not even accidentally,
unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the
good of which the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good more
than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than
another. Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the
privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural
defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which
such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment;
and in willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some
things to be naturally corrupted.
Reply to Objection 1: Some have said that although God does not will
evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although
evil is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This
they said because things evil in themselves are ordered to some good
end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words "that evil
should be or be done. " This, however, is not correct; since evil is not
of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is beside the
intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from his sin; as
it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience of the martyrs
should shine forth from all their persecutions. It cannot therefore be
said that such an ordering to good is implied in the statement that it
is a good thing that evil should be or be done, since nothing is judged
of by that which appertains to it accidentally, but by that which
belongs to it essentially.
Reply to Objection 2: Evil does not operate towards the perfection and
beauty of the universe, except accidentally, as said above (ad 1).
Therefore Dionysius in saying that "evil would conduce to the
perfection of the universe," draws a conclusion by reduction to an
absurdity.
Reply to Objection 3: The statements that evil exists, and that evil
exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet the statements that
anyone wills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be, are not so
opposed; since either is affirmative. God therefore neither wills evil
to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be
done; and this is a good.
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Whether God has free-will?
Objection 1: It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in a
homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146, ad Damas. ]; "God alone is He who
is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having
free-will, can be inclined to either side. "
Objection 2: Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will,
by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil, as has
been said [139](A[9]). Therefore there is not free-will in God.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit
divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice
of the will, not in obedience to necessity. "
I answer that, We have free-will with respect to what we will not of
necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not
appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals,
that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by
free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other
things not necessarily, as shown above [140](A[3]), He has free will
with respect to what He does not necessarily will.
Reply to Objection 1: Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply,
but only as regards the inclination to sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Since the evil of sin consists in turning away
from the divine goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown
(De Fide ii, 3), it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil
of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He
can will a thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves,
without sin, can will to sit down, and not will to sit down.
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Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?
Objection 1: It seems that the will of expression is not to be
distinguished in God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so
is His wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine wisdom.
Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the divine will.
Objection 2: Further, every expression that is not in agreement with
the mind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the
expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that
will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are superfluous. No
expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine will.
On the contrary, The will of God is one, since it is the very essence
of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words of Ps.
110:2: "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all
His wills. " Therefore sometimes the sign must be taken for the will.
I answer that, Some things are said of God in their strict sense;
others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before
([141]Q[13], A[3]). When certain human passions are predicated of the
Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the
effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is
signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus
with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that punishment
becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is
signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed to God. In the
same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes
metaphorically called will in God; just as when anyone lays down a
precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a
divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of God, as in
the words: "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven" (Mat. 6:10).
There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that anger
is never attributed to God properly, since in its primary meaning it
includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly. Therefore
in God there are distinguished will in its proper sense, and will as
attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the
will of good pleasure; and will metaphorically taken is the will of
expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called will.
Reply to Objection 1: Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done,
unless through the will. For we do not put into act what we know,
unless we will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to
knowledge, but to will.
Reply to Objection 2: Expressions of will are called divine wills, not
as being signs that God wills anything; but because what in us is the
usual expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus
punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it is called
anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in
ourselves.
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Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?
Objection 1: It seems that five expressions of will---namely,
prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission---are not
rightly assigned to the divine will. For the same things that God bids
us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates in us, and
the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes permits. They
ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct.
Objection 2: Further, God works nothing unless He wills it, as the
Scripture says (Wis. 11:26). But the will of expression is distinct
from the will of good pleasure. Therefore operation ought not to be
comprehended in the will of expression.
Objection 3: Further, operation and permission appertain to all
creatures in common, since God works in them all, and permits some
action in them all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition belong to
rational creatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly under one
division, not being of one order.
Objection 4: Further, evil happens in more ways than good, since "good
happens in one way, but evil in all kinds of ways," as declared by the
Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), and Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). It is not
right therefore to assign one expression only in the case of
evil---namely, prohibition---and two---namely, counsel and precept---in
the case of good.
I answer that, By these signs we name the expression of will by which
we are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may show that
he wills something, either by himself or by means of another. He may
show it by himself, by doing something either directly, or indirectly
and accidentally. He shows it directly when he works in his own person;
in that way the expression of his will is his own working. He shows it
indirectly, by not hindering the doing of a thing; for what removes an
impediment is called an accidental mover. In this respect the
expression is called permission. He declares his will by means of
another when he orders another to perform a work, either by insisting
upon it as necessary by precept, and by prohibiting its contrary; or by
persuasion, which is a part of counsel. Since in these ways the will of
man makes itself known, the same five are sometimes denominated with
regard to the divine will, as the expression of that will. That
precept, counsel, and prohibition are called the will of God is clear
from the words of Mat.
