Without this theology it would be an unexplainable historical fact that at some point one started to speak of laws or imperatives with ref- erence to material things; from this comes
undoubtedly
the use of the word law that is nowadays common in sciences, although the scien- tists would desire that its meaning were different; the fulfillment of this wish would only happen once they can give the word law an empirical meaning.
Hegel Was Right_nodrm
Therefore, one cannot put forward against determination a concept whose only meaning is self- determination.
A disturbing but logically unavoidable conclusion is that if we attri- bute causality to other kinds of processes and realities, we only do this in a derived, deficient and diminished way. And even this softened attribution is probably not entirely justified.
Since they did not venture to read Hegel, both the enemies and the champions of free will believed --as an undisputable fact-- that free will is incompatible with causal processes. The first ones denied the existence of free will because they thought that the entire universe consisted in causal processes; the second ones affirmed it by saying that there are free processes in the world besides causal ones. But all the controversy rested on a concept of cause that does not exist. The only true cause is that which determines itself, i. e. the free will.
No one in fact thinks something defined when one uses the word 'cause' in reference to material phenomena, not even in the case in which a moving body collides with another and the latter starts to move. One says 'cause' as if it were some sort of 'hocus pocus'. When vulgar or professional philosophers and scientists believe to have ex- plained an event only by saying that it was 'caused' by some other
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event, they are really explaining obscurum per obscuris. What could it possibly mean that a being 'makes being' another being? How is it pos- sible that the property or characteristic of a being 'transmigrates' and suddenly becomes the property or the characteristic of another object? What kind of metaphysical monster is that which was first an accident, then a substance for a moment of transmigration migration, and finally becomes an accident of another substance?
"The relation called influx belongs to vulgar philosophy. Since one cannot understand how material particles and immaterial qualities can pass from one substance to the other, one must abandon such a repre- sentation" (GP III 240).
The evidently mysterious and magical character of the transmigra- tions mentioned above did not prevent Hobbes and Huygens in the 17th century, Lord Kevin in the 19th century, and the molecular biologists of our century, from playing with billiard balls, as if the movement of the first could explain the movement of the second only because there was 'contact' between them. Furthermore, this illusion of the explana- tory force of something that is in fact more mysterious than that which was being explained underlies the grounding of the entire corpuscu- lar theory of matter, which tried to reduce everything to the clashes between marbles. And all the present efforts from the General Rela- tivity onwards of abolishing Newtonian actions by substituting them with different kinds of 'contact' are still trapped within the disastrous Kelvinian framework; meanwhile, the scientists stubbornly persist to explain the obscure with the darker.
If one replies that the property which first was in one being and then in another is not numerically the same, the magical character and the lack of all explanation become all the more clear: from the fact that a be- ing has some characteristics one invalidly proceeds to say that the other being has such characteristics only by mentioning the word 'cause'. How does this marvel occur is something that remains unexplained; one thinks it is enough to say that one is the cause of the other.
And if it is numerically the same property, the circumstance of the contact does not make more comprehensible the mysterious fact that the characteristic of an object --despite the fact that we are talking of the individual entity itself of that object -- becomes a property and the indi- vidual entity itself of an object that is different from the former one. We must remember: contiguity is not a synonym of causality. Hume had already remarked this: "Motion in the second billiard-ball is a quite
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distinct event from motion in the first; nor is there anything in the one to suggest the smallest hint of the other. " (Enquiry IV, I)
Despite the degree of contiguity of two beings, everything remains unexplained unless one says how one acts upon the other. Therefore, the contact itself is not decisive. And if it does act, then that causality would be what builds up the explanation. For that purpose, contact itself is completely irrelevant.
But precisely this term of causation lacks all intelligible meaning without the reference to self-determination; as we saw with Kant (III 2), self-determination is the most intelligible of all the contents that the mind can understand. What happens to a billiard ball is by no means explained by reference to what happens in some other ball. To say that what happens in a material object is the cause of what happens in an- other object equals to pronounce a spell without providing any intel- ligible content.
The root of this widespread Kelvinian mistake is twofold: first, one believes that what is frequent (everything that simply occurs), does not need an explanation; second, one incurs completely in the sophism de- nounced by Hume: post hoc, ergo propter hoc.
Since the ball always moves after a contact, one believes that this fact, only because it always occurs, does not need an explanation. But true science is characterized by the search of the most ordinary and common facts, that is to say, the facts that always occur. For instance, the theory of gravitation tries to explain the fact that a stone falls to the ground when we drop it. Likewise, the tides are always shifting, but only geology tries strenuously to explain that movement. We already pointed out that if we ask 'why are there black clouds when it thun- ders? ', and one answers us that 'every time that thunders there are black clouds', no one has explained anything.
But what is decisive is that the Kelvinian mentality incurs in the tre- mendous sophism denounced by Hume. Since the second ball moves after the contact, the Kelvinian mind affirms: it moves due to the con- tact. We do not need to repeat that such procedure is as illegitimate as saying that an ant is an elephant, nor that with such a justification we would have to affirm that the night is cause of the day, nor that it is pointless to say that, if the second ball moves after the contact, it would be too much coincidence that this was not provoked by the contact; for we could also say that, if the day succeeds the night, it would be too much coincidence that this did not happen due to the night.
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As if the previous examples were not enough, modern physics has provided us with another argument against the explanation by con- tact: the contact does not exist. This is a thesis worth looking at more closely .
The fields of repulsive force prevent that two bodies touch between them, and this happens even when the vulgar mind believes to be wit- nessing a clash. I quote the mechanical engineer Malcolm McChesney:
In any real gas, even a binary collision --one between two particles only-- is a complicated process, because each particle is surrounded by a force field that varies in space. This force field is such that it attracts another par- ticle when that other particle is relatively far away but repels it when the other particle comes relatively close. That these intermolecular forces exist is evident from the fact that gases do condense into liquids, a phenomenon that cannot be explained except as a consequence of attractive forces at work between the particles. (EB 23, 697, 2)
McChesney even says this in regard of the explanations of clashes between bodkins:
"The particle description of gases grew from ideas in the 17th and 18th centuries concerning special aspects of the collective behavior of structureless gas particles that were supposed to have no surrounding force fields. " (EB 23, 699, 1)
In Physics one cannot speak of contact anymore, except only when this consists of the forces of a body that act on the other, i. e. one exerts causality upon the other. But then, something very disappointing hap- pens: they wanted to explain causality by means of contact, when in fact contact is explained by causality. One employed supposedly a con- cept in order to make causality intelligible, when in fact the only pos- sible contact would be intelligible if causality was intelligible. This is a bold circularity that confirms what we have been saying; one does not think in something definite when one uses the word cause.
There is another conclusion in regard to the efforts of General Rela- tivity mentioned before --and the more recent ones, based on spaces of eleven dimensions-- which aim to overcome the Newtonian action at distance. If they conceive distance as the negation of contact, that equals the negation of causality, in other words, the negation of the action of a body upon another body. Therefore, the action at a distance turns out to be a strictly contradictory term that lacks content, for that content
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 128 Hegel was right
would be action without action. What the relativists are challenging is nothing more than a ghost.
The true problem is not --as the Scholastic philosophers also be- lieved-- the action at a distance, but rather action in itself and causality. And in that regard, physics have nothing substantial to say, because it is impossible to define causality on the physical level. The only causality that we know is the self-determination of the spirit, which really pro- duces new experiences and determinations that did not previously exist. To use the term causality with this point of reference is only to be juggling with words.
For that reason, spirit is the only possible meaning of the word time, since as we saw in Aristotle, there cannot be time where there is no real change, i. e. , the production of something new, and this is why Physics --which lacks the concept of causality-- had no other option than to misunderstand time, confusing it with space.
One could vaguely foresee this when Einstein tried to reduce time to causation. His unexpressed principle was: Propter hoc, ergo post hoc. But since in Einstein --as in all Physics-- causation is not really causa- tion or production of something new, this utterance remained barren. As we saw, the time of Einstein is even reversible because it is nothing more than space. That Einstein does not understand by causation the production of something new is seen in his quest for some sort of contact, suppressing distance by the curvature of space and the false mathematical continuity of the field. One must say emphatically that the Kelvinian explanation by contact presupposes that nothing new is produced: the movement of the first billiard ball is simply transmitted to the second one. Parmenides ho! Nihil fit, nihil movetur!
All the 'explanations' of Physics converge in some conservation principle: everything is conserved; there is nothing new.
As we saw, the subsequent mistake is that --following Parmenides-- they have confounded being with nothingness. Nothingness, indeed, does not change. It neither increases nor diminishes. On the contrary, the true being, which is the constant self-determination of the spirit, consists in producing genuinely new determinations because it only exists in doing that.
This is why Aristotle said that the atomists lacked the 'origin of movement'. As many commentators have noted, the atoms of Leucip- pus and Democritus aim primarily to be the being of Parmenides in miniature, which is tantamount to say that nothing changes. Now, the
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same thing has happened to all physics. All what the Parmenidian 'ex- planations' by conservation --that is to say, by identity-- do is to deny that there is something to explain: nothing changes, there is nothing new. Thus there is no time or causality which can be properly called as such. Physics can use the word causality; since they do not need the real causality, they do not give this word any meaning at all.
In balance, thus, causality without content cannot help to challenge self-determination; whether it has content or not, this causality not only does not challenge self-determination: they are identical.
9. naturaL Law
Consequently, in order to keep denying the concept of self-determina- tion, what some scientists have done is to renounce de facto to the concept of causality and instead they brandish the notion of natural laws.
All modern sciences entrench themselves in the caste of natural law; all the efforts aim 'to discover' this law, and they lay in that the en- tire scientificity of their disciplines. But they do not manage to define by empirical means what a law or a nomological proposition is, and hence no one knows what they are taking about. Now, if the meaning of this word is not empirical, then it must come from self-conscious- ness, which leads us directly to the moral imperative described by our third characterization of spirit, and is precisely what the empirical disciplines wanted to avoid.
To tell the truth, it is a perfectly documented fact that the word law --I refer, evidently, to ancient tongues-- was employed in a moral and juridical sense a millennium before it was being used by Physics. The code of Hammurabi, which dates back to the 18TH century b. C. , says in its introductory paragraph that the law chisels the stony walls of the royal palace so that all the population has knowledge of it. What is really questionable is whether the word law can obtain a meaning that is independent from its original moral and juridical sense. For that to be possible, it would be necessary that an empirical data builds up a new meaning. However, none of the keywords that must be employed to define or enounce a law has an empirical meaning.
It is amazing that a word, whose original meaning is the imperative directed toward rational beings capable of being responsible, was ever someday used in reference to irrational things, beings and phenomena.
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Evidently, this second use had to be derived and with a deficient mean- ing, as it happened with the word causality. Now, transfer or apparent moving away from its original sense is real and is documented; it was a fact of a clearly theological nature and its result does not have the slightest empirical trace. It happened when humanity thought that God gave laws to the entire universe, not only to rational beings; this mo- ment is documented in the Hebrew word huq, because it is undoubtedly a very common idea among the ancient tribes. We read in the Bible: "When he gave to the sea his decree, that the waters should not pass his commandment: when he appointed the foundations of the earth" (Proverbs, 8, 29). The same meaning can be corroborated in Jeremiah, 5, 24; 31, 35; 33, 25; Job 38, 33.
Without this theology it would be an unexplainable historical fact that at some point one started to speak of laws or imperatives with ref- erence to material things; from this comes undoubtedly the use of the word law that is nowadays common in sciences, although the scien- tists would desire that its meaning were different; the fulfillment of this wish would only happen once they can give the word law an empirical meaning. They will never be able to do this.
But the above mentioned documented historical fact has also re- percussions of huge transcendence backwards; it sheds intense light on the nature of the original meaning itself of the law as an imperative that regulated interhuman relationships and that made society pos- sible (cfr. III, 7) for the first time; this fact shows that this imperative --constitutive of the self and self-consciousness-- was perceived as the law and voice of divinity. As the Phenomenology says: "It is the moral genius which knows the inner voice of what it immediately knows to be a divine voice" (PG 460) This is why Hegel says: "Religion is the first way of self-consciousness" (VG 125).
Any anthropologist knows that, in the origins of mankind, "the civil and state laws were completely identical to the religious laws" (PR I 270). "We know from God's existence, and this knowledge is present in us in a way so immediate that it becomes authority, the intrinsic authority
of conscience" (EGP 195).
"It is certainly true that men must be educated towards religion, but
not towards that which is not there yet" (VG 128).
If the original meaning of the word law had nothing to do with God,
it would have been impossible that somebody else thought that mate- rial things also have law.
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The Anthropology of our century corroborates widely what Hegel just told us. Summing up numerous field investigations, Paul Schebesta affirms: "Up to now it has not been possible to find a people without religion" (Ko? nig, I, 1960, 599). In the same line, Wilhelm Koppers says: "There is a lack of the remembrances and signs of an atheistic or pre- religious state of mankind" (ibid. 130).
Likewise, Ino Rossi makes his the result of Redfield investigations: ". . . in preliterate societies people are united by 'moral ties', that is, by the fact that they share the same moral and religious principles and that these principles are the source of motivation for daily behavior" (Rossi, 1977, 243s). On this account, Redfield himself adduces the words of atheist anthropologist Arthur Kroeber: "The members of these soci- eties 'believe in the sacred things'" (ibid. 291). It is well known that even Comte recognizes that the first stage of humanity was theological.
One should notice that what is here at stake is something more than the 'interesting' and subjective folkloric way in which the primi- tive man perceived the imperative that made him being what he is. Paleonthologists have demonstrated that what is properly human does not date back that long ago if one considers integrally the history of life in this planet; in order to do without some problems, science cannot go back to a past of the human race which is not limited. Since we saw (III 7) that it is impossible that man exists if somebody else does not address him --because "without a thou the I cannot exist" (JS 378), it would be dogmatism not to ask who made the first man by addressing him. The atheist Leslie White plays with the text of Saint John by say- ing 'in the beginning was the Word". But this is a serious matter. It is comical to declare as Kroeber does (1969, 2) that science is not interested in the origins, when all modern anthropology is inspired on a book titled The Origin of Species. Leslie White himself affirms the scientific character of the following question:
If mathematical ideas enter the mind of the individual mathematician from the outside, from the stream of culture into which he was born and reared, the question arises, where did culture in general, and mathemati- cal culture in particular, come from in the first place? How did it arise and acquire its content? (1964, 278)
Let us move forward. We said that some scientists remain attached to the natural laws and to their inherent necessity of denying the
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 132 Hegel was right
self-determination of the subject, but they do not manage to clarify what they are saying because none of the keywords required to de- fine or to enounce a law have an empirical meaning. I have sufficiently demonstrated this in Appeal to Reason, but it seems inevitable to sum- marize this in a very concise way.
An example: every acid reacts with a base and forms salt. It is obvious that the word 'every' goes beyond empirical data. We can only perceive some acids: who knows what the meaning of the term 'every' might be! The question here is not to determine whether it is legitimate to infer from some particular cases that all acid behaves in the above mentioned way; this is other problem, the problem of induction, and Hume already demonstrated that the inference is logically unsustainable. What I say is the following: even if we were to suppose that the inference was legitimate, the meaning itself of the word 'every' does not coincide with any of the empirical data nor with the whole of the really empirical data; this is why it is would be necessary to infer it, because we do no experience it. Although they might argue that 'in principle' all cases are perceptible, this statement would lack sense, since they have not defined 'every'. Instead of an empirical data, what they are delivering us is a statement that is not understood. Furthermore: instead of an empirical data they are deliv- ering us a supposition, and a supposition is in essence unverifiable and, most probably, false. Since the acts of observation would be carried out in the future, that supposition would imply this principle: 'The fu- ture is similar to the present', which is unverifiable and most probably not true. It supposes that the conditions of observation would not be modified in the future, that the sensorial organs will not be modified, etcetera. None of these speculations gives the word 'every' an empiri- cal meaning.
Another example: always that an acid is added a base it makes a reaction and forms salt. It is evident that no empirical data matches the word 'always'. What we can experiment is not an 'always' but some or many particular instants; the always is not sensible; even if we dedi- cated our lives to experience particular instants, we would never have the experience of an 'always'.
Another example: law is a presupposition that describes the constant way in which some things behave. The reader is able to realize that the word 'constant' could not be defined without the intervention of the word 'always' or the word 'all'.
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Another example: the only behavior that can have an acid if one adds a base to it is to make a reaction and form salt. It is obvious that the word 'only' does not have an empirical meaning. If there is only one object in the visual field, the data is that object; the idea that there could be others but that we only have this one is a speculation of the intellect based en- tirely on unreal conditions; those other possible objects are not empirical data, precisely because they are not present, but the present object could only be called unique in contrast to the non-present ones. To say that this objet is unique amounts to saying that other objects are not present, but a 'no' is not an empirical data: in order to interpret the vacuum as absence or as negation of something, one requires an act of the mind that denies, because senses are not able to deny. If the senses deliver me something in blank, that blank is not a negation of anything whatsoever; it is simply blank; it could turn into a negation only if one added a con- sideration of the intellect that compared that vacuum with some of the objects that are not empirical data because they are not present.
Another example: if one adds a base to an acid, it reacts with it and makes salt. It is clear that no empirical data can be qualified as the meaning of the conditional particle 'if'. One cannot smell, see, or touch an 'if'. It is reflection the one that brings up the 'if'; therefore, it is not an empirical data but something intelligible, although it is legitimate that intelligence introduces it. As I have pointed out before, it would be an inference. With more virulence that other logical particles, the condi- tional particle 'if' is particularly indefinable by means of empirical data, for all the definitions carried out by logical atomism employ it; i. e. the make it appear on the definer; that is why we would have circularity in our case and, in the last instance, nothing would be defined. The at- tempt of atomism could be defined thus: the proposition 'if A then B' means that B cannot exist if A exists. The reader can already see that the 'if' reappears in the definer and that the circularity is shameless.
Another example, an acid cannot react with a base and form salt. We said that 'no' is not an empirical data. If there is an object within the vi- sual field, this object is what it is and it does not constitute the negation of anything whatsoever; if there is nothing in the visual field, there is no empirical data either; there is not sensation at that moment; therefore, it is false that sensation perceives the 'no', for that cannot be perceived.
In addition, the nomologic formulation that we are considering contains the word 'can'. But no sensible data deserves to be called 'can'. At best, the senses witness that something is this or that way; they do
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 134 Hegel was right
not say that they can be this or that way. If it pleases us, we will infer from what they are what they can be (ex facto ad posse valet illation), but this demonstrates that 'can' is not being perceived empirically, because it needs to be inferred. For the inference in question one requires a premise that says: everything that is can be. In this premise the 'can' appears for the first time, and does not correspond to any empirical data; it is rather the discursive intelligence the one that introduces it. I do not doubt that it introduces it legitimately; that is another question. But it is something intelligible, not something sensible, for it was not in the mere sensation; it only appeared for the first time in the premise brought up by intelligence.
The 'no' and the 'can', each on their own, are enough to turn unem- pirical the formulation of the law that we are dealing with. But if they are brought together in a 'cannot' the unempiricity becomes sordid. In that case, not even the inference is valid, not to mention the experience. From an 'it is not' no one can extract an 'it cannot be' (ex non facto ad non posse non valet illation), and the senses do not even deliver us the 'it is not', since as we already see, 'no' is not an empirical data.
It would be superfluous to stop in nai? ve formulations of the law, which boast they do not need an 'all' and say: an acid reacts with a base forming salt. It is obvious that if the 'an' has the intention of a singular, the formulation in question is not a law; and if it has a universal inten- tion, the formulators wanted us to understand it as an 'all' and their attempt of concealing this was in vain.
To tell the truth, we do not need to lengthen our journey. The example that we have mentioned shows that, if a formulation of the law really becomes a law, it would necessarily be the logical equivalent of any other formulation of the law. Now, if we have demonstrated that one of them is unempirical, that also applies to the others, because they are the logical equivalent of the first one. This is why all the attempts in the future of formulating empirically a law are doomed to failure. The reader sees immediately that 'an acid cannot' means the same as 'always that acid. . . ' or that 'every acid. . . ' etcetera.
10. neceSSary
The only formulation that deserves a closer look is this one: 'an acid necessarily reacts with a base forming salt'.
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The reader notices immediately that it is the logical equivalent of 'an acid cannot no. . . ' Therefore, it is as unempirical as this and all the former ones.
A symptom of intellectual despair has been the critical acclaim that Saul Kripke's attempt at defining 'necessary' and 'necessarily' obtained. It first defines 'possible', for he thinks that what all possible worlds have in common will be a good definition of 'necessary'. He says that an M world is possible if it is logically compatible with the natural laws that govern our real natural world M. Here again the 'if' particle reap- pears --a particle which we have seen is unempirical. That very thing frustrates the whole enterprise. Afterwards, Kripke considers all pos- sible worlds M1, M2, M3. . . and triumphantly exclaims: what they have as a common denominator is the content of the word 'necessary'.
This illustrious theorem has so many deficiencies that one can hardly believe that it has been taken seriously at all. We have already pointed out its gratuitous 'if'. But it also assumes an 'all', whose unem- piricy we have already proved. If it is not the common denominator of all possible words, a common denominator cannot be called necessary, for some world could be possible without it. Besides, logical compatibil- ity also is not an empirical data. It is evident that Kripke forgot that necessity --that by means of which he tried to define 'law'-- needed to be defined. Kripke wants to define the necessary going through the possible, but he defines the possible as that which is compatible with the law. And there is the law again, which was just the origin of the entire problem. The circularity is manifest, and at the end of the day nothing has been defined.
I do not know why one would want to deceive someone by concealing the fact that when some processes started to be called 'material', this was in contrast with what is 'free'. Men would have not come up with the idea of calling these processes 'necessary' if it were not by contrast- ing this with his freedom, which is continuously experimented in self- consciousness This was done precisely with the purpose of denying that stones, rivers and stars are free. The only meaning of 'necessary' is 'not free'. In fact, we saw here (III, 2) and also in Kant that self-determi- nation is the most intelligible concept that exists. But that is, necessary means not free; this implies not only that freedom is more intelligible that this necessity that scientists look for, but also that this big neces- sity lacks all intelligible content whatsoever and can only be alluded negatively without us understanding what kind of fixed point this is.
A disturbing but logically unavoidable conclusion is that if we attri- bute causality to other kinds of processes and realities, we only do this in a derived, deficient and diminished way. And even this softened attribution is probably not entirely justified.
Since they did not venture to read Hegel, both the enemies and the champions of free will believed --as an undisputable fact-- that free will is incompatible with causal processes. The first ones denied the existence of free will because they thought that the entire universe consisted in causal processes; the second ones affirmed it by saying that there are free processes in the world besides causal ones. But all the controversy rested on a concept of cause that does not exist. The only true cause is that which determines itself, i. e. the free will.
No one in fact thinks something defined when one uses the word 'cause' in reference to material phenomena, not even in the case in which a moving body collides with another and the latter starts to move. One says 'cause' as if it were some sort of 'hocus pocus'. When vulgar or professional philosophers and scientists believe to have ex- plained an event only by saying that it was 'caused' by some other
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Science and Literature 125
event, they are really explaining obscurum per obscuris. What could it possibly mean that a being 'makes being' another being? How is it pos- sible that the property or characteristic of a being 'transmigrates' and suddenly becomes the property or the characteristic of another object? What kind of metaphysical monster is that which was first an accident, then a substance for a moment of transmigration migration, and finally becomes an accident of another substance?
"The relation called influx belongs to vulgar philosophy. Since one cannot understand how material particles and immaterial qualities can pass from one substance to the other, one must abandon such a repre- sentation" (GP III 240).
The evidently mysterious and magical character of the transmigra- tions mentioned above did not prevent Hobbes and Huygens in the 17th century, Lord Kevin in the 19th century, and the molecular biologists of our century, from playing with billiard balls, as if the movement of the first could explain the movement of the second only because there was 'contact' between them. Furthermore, this illusion of the explana- tory force of something that is in fact more mysterious than that which was being explained underlies the grounding of the entire corpuscu- lar theory of matter, which tried to reduce everything to the clashes between marbles. And all the present efforts from the General Rela- tivity onwards of abolishing Newtonian actions by substituting them with different kinds of 'contact' are still trapped within the disastrous Kelvinian framework; meanwhile, the scientists stubbornly persist to explain the obscure with the darker.
If one replies that the property which first was in one being and then in another is not numerically the same, the magical character and the lack of all explanation become all the more clear: from the fact that a be- ing has some characteristics one invalidly proceeds to say that the other being has such characteristics only by mentioning the word 'cause'. How does this marvel occur is something that remains unexplained; one thinks it is enough to say that one is the cause of the other.
And if it is numerically the same property, the circumstance of the contact does not make more comprehensible the mysterious fact that the characteristic of an object --despite the fact that we are talking of the individual entity itself of that object -- becomes a property and the indi- vidual entity itself of an object that is different from the former one. We must remember: contiguity is not a synonym of causality. Hume had already remarked this: "Motion in the second billiard-ball is a quite
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 126 Hegel was right
distinct event from motion in the first; nor is there anything in the one to suggest the smallest hint of the other. " (Enquiry IV, I)
Despite the degree of contiguity of two beings, everything remains unexplained unless one says how one acts upon the other. Therefore, the contact itself is not decisive. And if it does act, then that causality would be what builds up the explanation. For that purpose, contact itself is completely irrelevant.
But precisely this term of causation lacks all intelligible meaning without the reference to self-determination; as we saw with Kant (III 2), self-determination is the most intelligible of all the contents that the mind can understand. What happens to a billiard ball is by no means explained by reference to what happens in some other ball. To say that what happens in a material object is the cause of what happens in an- other object equals to pronounce a spell without providing any intel- ligible content.
The root of this widespread Kelvinian mistake is twofold: first, one believes that what is frequent (everything that simply occurs), does not need an explanation; second, one incurs completely in the sophism de- nounced by Hume: post hoc, ergo propter hoc.
Since the ball always moves after a contact, one believes that this fact, only because it always occurs, does not need an explanation. But true science is characterized by the search of the most ordinary and common facts, that is to say, the facts that always occur. For instance, the theory of gravitation tries to explain the fact that a stone falls to the ground when we drop it. Likewise, the tides are always shifting, but only geology tries strenuously to explain that movement. We already pointed out that if we ask 'why are there black clouds when it thun- ders? ', and one answers us that 'every time that thunders there are black clouds', no one has explained anything.
But what is decisive is that the Kelvinian mentality incurs in the tre- mendous sophism denounced by Hume. Since the second ball moves after the contact, the Kelvinian mind affirms: it moves due to the con- tact. We do not need to repeat that such procedure is as illegitimate as saying that an ant is an elephant, nor that with such a justification we would have to affirm that the night is cause of the day, nor that it is pointless to say that, if the second ball moves after the contact, it would be too much coincidence that this was not provoked by the contact; for we could also say that, if the day succeeds the night, it would be too much coincidence that this did not happen due to the night.
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As if the previous examples were not enough, modern physics has provided us with another argument against the explanation by con- tact: the contact does not exist. This is a thesis worth looking at more closely .
The fields of repulsive force prevent that two bodies touch between them, and this happens even when the vulgar mind believes to be wit- nessing a clash. I quote the mechanical engineer Malcolm McChesney:
In any real gas, even a binary collision --one between two particles only-- is a complicated process, because each particle is surrounded by a force field that varies in space. This force field is such that it attracts another par- ticle when that other particle is relatively far away but repels it when the other particle comes relatively close. That these intermolecular forces exist is evident from the fact that gases do condense into liquids, a phenomenon that cannot be explained except as a consequence of attractive forces at work between the particles. (EB 23, 697, 2)
McChesney even says this in regard of the explanations of clashes between bodkins:
"The particle description of gases grew from ideas in the 17th and 18th centuries concerning special aspects of the collective behavior of structureless gas particles that were supposed to have no surrounding force fields. " (EB 23, 699, 1)
In Physics one cannot speak of contact anymore, except only when this consists of the forces of a body that act on the other, i. e. one exerts causality upon the other. But then, something very disappointing hap- pens: they wanted to explain causality by means of contact, when in fact contact is explained by causality. One employed supposedly a con- cept in order to make causality intelligible, when in fact the only pos- sible contact would be intelligible if causality was intelligible. This is a bold circularity that confirms what we have been saying; one does not think in something definite when one uses the word cause.
There is another conclusion in regard to the efforts of General Rela- tivity mentioned before --and the more recent ones, based on spaces of eleven dimensions-- which aim to overcome the Newtonian action at distance. If they conceive distance as the negation of contact, that equals the negation of causality, in other words, the negation of the action of a body upon another body. Therefore, the action at a distance turns out to be a strictly contradictory term that lacks content, for that content
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would be action without action. What the relativists are challenging is nothing more than a ghost.
The true problem is not --as the Scholastic philosophers also be- lieved-- the action at a distance, but rather action in itself and causality. And in that regard, physics have nothing substantial to say, because it is impossible to define causality on the physical level. The only causality that we know is the self-determination of the spirit, which really pro- duces new experiences and determinations that did not previously exist. To use the term causality with this point of reference is only to be juggling with words.
For that reason, spirit is the only possible meaning of the word time, since as we saw in Aristotle, there cannot be time where there is no real change, i. e. , the production of something new, and this is why Physics --which lacks the concept of causality-- had no other option than to misunderstand time, confusing it with space.
One could vaguely foresee this when Einstein tried to reduce time to causation. His unexpressed principle was: Propter hoc, ergo post hoc. But since in Einstein --as in all Physics-- causation is not really causa- tion or production of something new, this utterance remained barren. As we saw, the time of Einstein is even reversible because it is nothing more than space. That Einstein does not understand by causation the production of something new is seen in his quest for some sort of contact, suppressing distance by the curvature of space and the false mathematical continuity of the field. One must say emphatically that the Kelvinian explanation by contact presupposes that nothing new is produced: the movement of the first billiard ball is simply transmitted to the second one. Parmenides ho! Nihil fit, nihil movetur!
All the 'explanations' of Physics converge in some conservation principle: everything is conserved; there is nothing new.
As we saw, the subsequent mistake is that --following Parmenides-- they have confounded being with nothingness. Nothingness, indeed, does not change. It neither increases nor diminishes. On the contrary, the true being, which is the constant self-determination of the spirit, consists in producing genuinely new determinations because it only exists in doing that.
This is why Aristotle said that the atomists lacked the 'origin of movement'. As many commentators have noted, the atoms of Leucip- pus and Democritus aim primarily to be the being of Parmenides in miniature, which is tantamount to say that nothing changes. Now, the
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same thing has happened to all physics. All what the Parmenidian 'ex- planations' by conservation --that is to say, by identity-- do is to deny that there is something to explain: nothing changes, there is nothing new. Thus there is no time or causality which can be properly called as such. Physics can use the word causality; since they do not need the real causality, they do not give this word any meaning at all.
In balance, thus, causality without content cannot help to challenge self-determination; whether it has content or not, this causality not only does not challenge self-determination: they are identical.
9. naturaL Law
Consequently, in order to keep denying the concept of self-determina- tion, what some scientists have done is to renounce de facto to the concept of causality and instead they brandish the notion of natural laws.
All modern sciences entrench themselves in the caste of natural law; all the efforts aim 'to discover' this law, and they lay in that the en- tire scientificity of their disciplines. But they do not manage to define by empirical means what a law or a nomological proposition is, and hence no one knows what they are taking about. Now, if the meaning of this word is not empirical, then it must come from self-conscious- ness, which leads us directly to the moral imperative described by our third characterization of spirit, and is precisely what the empirical disciplines wanted to avoid.
To tell the truth, it is a perfectly documented fact that the word law --I refer, evidently, to ancient tongues-- was employed in a moral and juridical sense a millennium before it was being used by Physics. The code of Hammurabi, which dates back to the 18TH century b. C. , says in its introductory paragraph that the law chisels the stony walls of the royal palace so that all the population has knowledge of it. What is really questionable is whether the word law can obtain a meaning that is independent from its original moral and juridical sense. For that to be possible, it would be necessary that an empirical data builds up a new meaning. However, none of the keywords that must be employed to define or enounce a law has an empirical meaning.
It is amazing that a word, whose original meaning is the imperative directed toward rational beings capable of being responsible, was ever someday used in reference to irrational things, beings and phenomena.
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Evidently, this second use had to be derived and with a deficient mean- ing, as it happened with the word causality. Now, transfer or apparent moving away from its original sense is real and is documented; it was a fact of a clearly theological nature and its result does not have the slightest empirical trace. It happened when humanity thought that God gave laws to the entire universe, not only to rational beings; this mo- ment is documented in the Hebrew word huq, because it is undoubtedly a very common idea among the ancient tribes. We read in the Bible: "When he gave to the sea his decree, that the waters should not pass his commandment: when he appointed the foundations of the earth" (Proverbs, 8, 29). The same meaning can be corroborated in Jeremiah, 5, 24; 31, 35; 33, 25; Job 38, 33.
Without this theology it would be an unexplainable historical fact that at some point one started to speak of laws or imperatives with ref- erence to material things; from this comes undoubtedly the use of the word law that is nowadays common in sciences, although the scien- tists would desire that its meaning were different; the fulfillment of this wish would only happen once they can give the word law an empirical meaning. They will never be able to do this.
But the above mentioned documented historical fact has also re- percussions of huge transcendence backwards; it sheds intense light on the nature of the original meaning itself of the law as an imperative that regulated interhuman relationships and that made society pos- sible (cfr. III, 7) for the first time; this fact shows that this imperative --constitutive of the self and self-consciousness-- was perceived as the law and voice of divinity. As the Phenomenology says: "It is the moral genius which knows the inner voice of what it immediately knows to be a divine voice" (PG 460) This is why Hegel says: "Religion is the first way of self-consciousness" (VG 125).
Any anthropologist knows that, in the origins of mankind, "the civil and state laws were completely identical to the religious laws" (PR I 270). "We know from God's existence, and this knowledge is present in us in a way so immediate that it becomes authority, the intrinsic authority
of conscience" (EGP 195).
"It is certainly true that men must be educated towards religion, but
not towards that which is not there yet" (VG 128).
If the original meaning of the word law had nothing to do with God,
it would have been impossible that somebody else thought that mate- rial things also have law.
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The Anthropology of our century corroborates widely what Hegel just told us. Summing up numerous field investigations, Paul Schebesta affirms: "Up to now it has not been possible to find a people without religion" (Ko? nig, I, 1960, 599). In the same line, Wilhelm Koppers says: "There is a lack of the remembrances and signs of an atheistic or pre- religious state of mankind" (ibid. 130).
Likewise, Ino Rossi makes his the result of Redfield investigations: ". . . in preliterate societies people are united by 'moral ties', that is, by the fact that they share the same moral and religious principles and that these principles are the source of motivation for daily behavior" (Rossi, 1977, 243s). On this account, Redfield himself adduces the words of atheist anthropologist Arthur Kroeber: "The members of these soci- eties 'believe in the sacred things'" (ibid. 291). It is well known that even Comte recognizes that the first stage of humanity was theological.
One should notice that what is here at stake is something more than the 'interesting' and subjective folkloric way in which the primi- tive man perceived the imperative that made him being what he is. Paleonthologists have demonstrated that what is properly human does not date back that long ago if one considers integrally the history of life in this planet; in order to do without some problems, science cannot go back to a past of the human race which is not limited. Since we saw (III 7) that it is impossible that man exists if somebody else does not address him --because "without a thou the I cannot exist" (JS 378), it would be dogmatism not to ask who made the first man by addressing him. The atheist Leslie White plays with the text of Saint John by say- ing 'in the beginning was the Word". But this is a serious matter. It is comical to declare as Kroeber does (1969, 2) that science is not interested in the origins, when all modern anthropology is inspired on a book titled The Origin of Species. Leslie White himself affirms the scientific character of the following question:
If mathematical ideas enter the mind of the individual mathematician from the outside, from the stream of culture into which he was born and reared, the question arises, where did culture in general, and mathemati- cal culture in particular, come from in the first place? How did it arise and acquire its content? (1964, 278)
Let us move forward. We said that some scientists remain attached to the natural laws and to their inherent necessity of denying the
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self-determination of the subject, but they do not manage to clarify what they are saying because none of the keywords required to de- fine or to enounce a law have an empirical meaning. I have sufficiently demonstrated this in Appeal to Reason, but it seems inevitable to sum- marize this in a very concise way.
An example: every acid reacts with a base and forms salt. It is obvious that the word 'every' goes beyond empirical data. We can only perceive some acids: who knows what the meaning of the term 'every' might be! The question here is not to determine whether it is legitimate to infer from some particular cases that all acid behaves in the above mentioned way; this is other problem, the problem of induction, and Hume already demonstrated that the inference is logically unsustainable. What I say is the following: even if we were to suppose that the inference was legitimate, the meaning itself of the word 'every' does not coincide with any of the empirical data nor with the whole of the really empirical data; this is why it is would be necessary to infer it, because we do no experience it. Although they might argue that 'in principle' all cases are perceptible, this statement would lack sense, since they have not defined 'every'. Instead of an empirical data, what they are delivering us is a statement that is not understood. Furthermore: instead of an empirical data they are deliv- ering us a supposition, and a supposition is in essence unverifiable and, most probably, false. Since the acts of observation would be carried out in the future, that supposition would imply this principle: 'The fu- ture is similar to the present', which is unverifiable and most probably not true. It supposes that the conditions of observation would not be modified in the future, that the sensorial organs will not be modified, etcetera. None of these speculations gives the word 'every' an empiri- cal meaning.
Another example: always that an acid is added a base it makes a reaction and forms salt. It is evident that no empirical data matches the word 'always'. What we can experiment is not an 'always' but some or many particular instants; the always is not sensible; even if we dedi- cated our lives to experience particular instants, we would never have the experience of an 'always'.
Another example: law is a presupposition that describes the constant way in which some things behave. The reader is able to realize that the word 'constant' could not be defined without the intervention of the word 'always' or the word 'all'.
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Another example: the only behavior that can have an acid if one adds a base to it is to make a reaction and form salt. It is obvious that the word 'only' does not have an empirical meaning. If there is only one object in the visual field, the data is that object; the idea that there could be others but that we only have this one is a speculation of the intellect based en- tirely on unreal conditions; those other possible objects are not empirical data, precisely because they are not present, but the present object could only be called unique in contrast to the non-present ones. To say that this objet is unique amounts to saying that other objects are not present, but a 'no' is not an empirical data: in order to interpret the vacuum as absence or as negation of something, one requires an act of the mind that denies, because senses are not able to deny. If the senses deliver me something in blank, that blank is not a negation of anything whatsoever; it is simply blank; it could turn into a negation only if one added a con- sideration of the intellect that compared that vacuum with some of the objects that are not empirical data because they are not present.
Another example: if one adds a base to an acid, it reacts with it and makes salt. It is clear that no empirical data can be qualified as the meaning of the conditional particle 'if'. One cannot smell, see, or touch an 'if'. It is reflection the one that brings up the 'if'; therefore, it is not an empirical data but something intelligible, although it is legitimate that intelligence introduces it. As I have pointed out before, it would be an inference. With more virulence that other logical particles, the condi- tional particle 'if' is particularly indefinable by means of empirical data, for all the definitions carried out by logical atomism employ it; i. e. the make it appear on the definer; that is why we would have circularity in our case and, in the last instance, nothing would be defined. The at- tempt of atomism could be defined thus: the proposition 'if A then B' means that B cannot exist if A exists. The reader can already see that the 'if' reappears in the definer and that the circularity is shameless.
Another example, an acid cannot react with a base and form salt. We said that 'no' is not an empirical data. If there is an object within the vi- sual field, this object is what it is and it does not constitute the negation of anything whatsoever; if there is nothing in the visual field, there is no empirical data either; there is not sensation at that moment; therefore, it is false that sensation perceives the 'no', for that cannot be perceived.
In addition, the nomologic formulation that we are considering contains the word 'can'. But no sensible data deserves to be called 'can'. At best, the senses witness that something is this or that way; they do
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not say that they can be this or that way. If it pleases us, we will infer from what they are what they can be (ex facto ad posse valet illation), but this demonstrates that 'can' is not being perceived empirically, because it needs to be inferred. For the inference in question one requires a premise that says: everything that is can be. In this premise the 'can' appears for the first time, and does not correspond to any empirical data; it is rather the discursive intelligence the one that introduces it. I do not doubt that it introduces it legitimately; that is another question. But it is something intelligible, not something sensible, for it was not in the mere sensation; it only appeared for the first time in the premise brought up by intelligence.
The 'no' and the 'can', each on their own, are enough to turn unem- pirical the formulation of the law that we are dealing with. But if they are brought together in a 'cannot' the unempiricity becomes sordid. In that case, not even the inference is valid, not to mention the experience. From an 'it is not' no one can extract an 'it cannot be' (ex non facto ad non posse non valet illation), and the senses do not even deliver us the 'it is not', since as we already see, 'no' is not an empirical data.
It would be superfluous to stop in nai? ve formulations of the law, which boast they do not need an 'all' and say: an acid reacts with a base forming salt. It is obvious that if the 'an' has the intention of a singular, the formulation in question is not a law; and if it has a universal inten- tion, the formulators wanted us to understand it as an 'all' and their attempt of concealing this was in vain.
To tell the truth, we do not need to lengthen our journey. The example that we have mentioned shows that, if a formulation of the law really becomes a law, it would necessarily be the logical equivalent of any other formulation of the law. Now, if we have demonstrated that one of them is unempirical, that also applies to the others, because they are the logical equivalent of the first one. This is why all the attempts in the future of formulating empirically a law are doomed to failure. The reader sees immediately that 'an acid cannot' means the same as 'always that acid. . . ' or that 'every acid. . . ' etcetera.
10. neceSSary
The only formulation that deserves a closer look is this one: 'an acid necessarily reacts with a base forming salt'.
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The reader notices immediately that it is the logical equivalent of 'an acid cannot no. . . ' Therefore, it is as unempirical as this and all the former ones.
A symptom of intellectual despair has been the critical acclaim that Saul Kripke's attempt at defining 'necessary' and 'necessarily' obtained. It first defines 'possible', for he thinks that what all possible worlds have in common will be a good definition of 'necessary'. He says that an M world is possible if it is logically compatible with the natural laws that govern our real natural world M. Here again the 'if' particle reap- pears --a particle which we have seen is unempirical. That very thing frustrates the whole enterprise. Afterwards, Kripke considers all pos- sible worlds M1, M2, M3. . . and triumphantly exclaims: what they have as a common denominator is the content of the word 'necessary'.
This illustrious theorem has so many deficiencies that one can hardly believe that it has been taken seriously at all. We have already pointed out its gratuitous 'if'. But it also assumes an 'all', whose unem- piricy we have already proved. If it is not the common denominator of all possible words, a common denominator cannot be called necessary, for some world could be possible without it. Besides, logical compatibil- ity also is not an empirical data. It is evident that Kripke forgot that necessity --that by means of which he tried to define 'law'-- needed to be defined. Kripke wants to define the necessary going through the possible, but he defines the possible as that which is compatible with the law. And there is the law again, which was just the origin of the entire problem. The circularity is manifest, and at the end of the day nothing has been defined.
I do not know why one would want to deceive someone by concealing the fact that when some processes started to be called 'material', this was in contrast with what is 'free'. Men would have not come up with the idea of calling these processes 'necessary' if it were not by contrast- ing this with his freedom, which is continuously experimented in self- consciousness This was done precisely with the purpose of denying that stones, rivers and stars are free. The only meaning of 'necessary' is 'not free'. In fact, we saw here (III, 2) and also in Kant that self-determi- nation is the most intelligible concept that exists. But that is, necessary means not free; this implies not only that freedom is more intelligible that this necessity that scientists look for, but also that this big neces- sity lacks all intelligible content whatsoever and can only be alluded negatively without us understanding what kind of fixed point this is.
