No More Learning

self-understanding at a time when the victory of inhibitions over impulses, depression over initiatives, comparison of lifestyles over the decision to choose one is almost complete. This is precisely Nietzsche’s moment. He positions his thinking at the lowest point of universal historical decadence on the assumption of having reached a turning point at the same time. He understood that historicism and nihilism are allies insofar as a historical reflection that is thought through to its inevitable end can be about nothing other than the history of an unstoppable nihilistic inhibition of life which enforces itself out of Europe onto the entire world in the name of high religion, morality, and civilization.
For Nietzsche, the history of the Christian West unfolds as that of a slow-moving suicide. In it, life-denying impulses permeate all forms of thought, sensations, arts, and institutions with fearsome thoroughness. The psychological term for this process is the seizure of the power of resentment; the biological term, decadence; the religious term, Christianity; the philosophical term, nihilism. For Nietzsche, the world history of Christian resentment is the story of an immeasurably consequential devaluation of life and world. This devaluation is the aggressive spike in negation that emerges from the feelings of resentment of an already denied, inhibited, mutilated life. In the Christian rejection of the world, a whiff blows over to us of the suicidal depths of Asia. For Nietzsche, Western nihilism is the world history-making enactment of a radical negation of all that he calls the vital “values”; in it, he sees a will to nothingness at work that empowers negative stirrings instead of vital self-affirmations. What our nihilism wants would be nothingness as the highest value. This is a nothingness in the form of an absence of valuing life as worthwhile, an absence of the motivation to exist; in short, a depressed nothingness rooted in the refusal to accept life as it is. The exploration of motivational nihilism runs through Nietzsche’s entire body of work. With angry lucidity, he works out the mecha- nisms of the inhibited and inhibiting negation that has acquired a theoretical, moral, and psychological monopoly in the modern age. Disguised as Christian mission, philanthropy, and civilizational progress, Western nihilism has gained the power to move the world and bring it down at the same time. Talk of nihilism forced itself upon the waking spirits of the nineteenth century because they understood how powerlessness had established itself as a world power. The inability to reach a comprehending affirmation of life gained favor in institutions that constitute a disguised denial of life. Nihilistic modernity is the world realm of resentment in the form of a will to break life. With this diagnosis, Nietzsche has issued the moral death certificate to the West and its heirs in the East and West.
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With outrage, he reminded us that the word “world” is a Christian expletive. Seeing the world be dominated by the Christian “no” that was masked itself as post-Christianity, he felt justified in taking the side of denied life and disdaining his age as an era of consummate nihilism. Instead, he taught a Dionysian law of nature – the right of life to follow motivations other than moral ones. His utopia was a heroic positivism by way of which a positive, noble self-affirmation without consequences could dissociate itself from any origin that consisted of poisoned emotions.
All this is well known and only sketched out here as a background for what comes later. Of course, no one will deny the combat value of Nietzsche’s diagnoses, nor cast doubt on the strategic reach of his religion-critical gaze. Nevertheless, in order to talk about the dynamics of nothingness today, we can no longer continue directly in the tradition of Nietzsche’s theorems. Strange as it sounds, his conception of nihilism remains philosophically too innocuous, to the extent that it stops at motivational nothingness and its “overcoming. ”
“We are tired of man . . . ” – this sentence, more than its author knew, succumbs to a process where the increasing effort of human existence triggers a wave of life fatigue. This process also includes Nietzsche’s escape from fatigue into violent affirmations and walks right past the Dionysian revivals as if bored by them. After its misleading upswings, thinking has to come to the decision to perceive its own gravity, fatigue, and vested depression in positive terms. We will show that a meditation on gravity is needed to enliven philosophical talk about nothingness and nihilism. Nietzsche’s genealogy of morality and his analysis of the feelings of resentment are not enough to understand gravity. At best, they elucidate the will to nothingness but they fail before the (perhaps more sophisticated? ) task of locating nothingness in a prehistory of negation and in an archeology of life fatigue. Depression as an existential experience of gravity is in the last instance not a psychiatric issue but a philo- sophical one.
Nietzsche himself has occasionally looked beyond the horizon of motivational nihilism. His gaze went furthest in the famous formu- lation that describes modern nihilism as an uncanny guest – the most uncanny of all guests. The metaphor of the guest points to the idea that nothingness is more than just a product or goal of the denial of life by those who live poorly. It suggests that conscious life must, in principle, be prepared for terrible visitors. Human existence itself has an uncanniness to it that does not only then emerge when humans say no to the given. More powerful and older than any yes or no we speak, the uncanny is already present in the medium of that
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yes or no. The eerie guest who haunts the moderns is a descendant of the uncanny where we are always already a guest owing to the sheer fact that we exist. Thus, nothingness is not so much the guest as it is the host. However, Nietzsche was of the opinion that the uncanny comes to us rather than vice versa, and thus lapsed into the heroic key. He led us to believe that “living dangerously” was an ethos of the more noble self and not a common situation that precedes every effort and achievement.
With the reference to the uncanny, a new – say anthropological or fundamental ontological – tone enters into the discussion of nothingness. Now, talk is no longer of motivations and valuations but of the structure of existence into which the imprints of the negative are engraved. At the height of the recent philosophical discussion about existence, it could even have been said that it ended up in nothingness; in other words, in the ungiven and the ungrounded. Such formulations demonstrate the movement that entered the analytics of nothingness during the twentieth century. At the same time, nothingness has made itself an ontologically popular career and has risen to stardom in novels, films, and children’s books. Just how far one can go in this direction is shown by Michael Ende’s fantasy cult fairy tale The Neverending Story, where nothingness turns into something that grows in massiveness by absorbing the most tangible realities. Of course, the book will be accused of translating metaphysics and myth into kitsch, but the level of popularization of metaphysical ideas that it reaches is itself a fact of intellectual history that deserves attention. With Ende, nothingness achieves a concreteness that would make a sworn Heideggerian blanch. For those on whom the book has not made an indelible impression, we will remind them of the passage where the young hero Atreyu encounters three forest spirits on his exodus – strange bark trolls who warn him to continue on his way, for if he were to take the path straight ahead, he would walk directly into nothingness:
A cold shiver ran down his spine at the sight of them. The first, having no legs or haunches, was obliged to walk on his hands. The second had a hole in his chest, so big you could see through it. The third hopped on his right foot, because the whole left half of him was missing, as if he had been cut through the middle. 3
The three characters who are gnawed at by nothingness play a role that myth research refers to as that of the adjuvant, the helper who first appears in a warning function and then to show the way. As Atreyu asks what happened to them, the first answers:
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“The Nothing is spreading. . . . It’s growing and growing, there’s more of it every day, if it’s possible to speak of more nothing. All the others fled from Howling Forest in time, but we didn’t want to leave our home. The Nothing caught us in our sleep and this is what it did to us. ”
“Is it very painful? ” Atreyu asked.
“No,” said the second bark troll, the one with the hole in his chest. “You don’t feel a thing. There’s just something missing. And once it gets hold of you, something more is missing every day. Soon there won’t be anything left of us. ”4
Then Atreyu asks – curious, as all saviors are – where in the forest it had begun, and after hearing the trolls’ answer, he climbs a tall tree to look at the nothingness:
When at last he reached the crown, he turned toward the sunrise. And then he saw it: The tops of the trees nearest him were still green, but the leaves of those farther away seemed to have lost all color; they were gray. A little farther on, the foliage seemed to become strangely transparent, misty, or, better still, unreal. And farther still there was nothing, absolutely nothing. Not a bare stretch, not darkness, not some lighter color; no, it was something the eyes could not bear, something that made you feel you had gone blind. For no eye can bear the sight of utter nothingness. Atreyu held his hand before his face and nearly fell off his branch. He clung tight for a moment, then climbed down as fast as he could. He had seen enough. At last he really understood the horror that was spreading through Fantastica. 5
Rarely does one find such a complete description of “actually present” nothingness. It is only through such a description that we truly see how talk of nothingness has spread within new-metaphysical phantasms as a code word for the horrifying. It gnaws on the characters like an ontological leprosy, turning trees transparent like a metaphysical forest extinction. It is as if the illuminating light operated as a secret agent of nothingness and, as in negative theology – it can ultimately only be spoken of in negations – always in such a way that it is determined by its unbearableness to the human eye. Taken together with the hint that this nothingness raids the forest from “sunrise” on, this brings to the fore the idea that the triumphant march of nothingness could be related to the development of a certain Western metaphysics of light. Ende’s portrait of nothingness is thus not entirely without resemblance to
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the original, and some claim it to have poetic charm. Despite this, it plunges the poor creatures whose job it is to do philosophy into a spirited dilemma. They don’t know whether to pull their hair out from envy at such vividness, or whether they should throw the book into the corner out of anger at such raw concretism. This dilemma can only be brought to an end by discovering another form of visual clarity that takes up the concept with the charms of a children’s book but without assuming a regression in thinking. Is it possible to speak of nothingness in an engaging way without depicting it as a discoloring agent and omnivorous animal?
So let us follow the tracks of nothingness with philosophical means. On our way to a different kind of vividness, we begin to tell of the movements of the children of men that go from the lawful to the appalling and from the domestic into the uncanny. One more step, and we write the opening chapter of a philosophical novel that tells of human birth and the further adventures of the subject. It would not be a philosophical novel if it did not try to claim to be a general autobiography in which all that says “I” has recorded its story. This novel of the subject has a Pantagruelian mix of genres. It combines equal parts of the history of philosophy as well as the ghost story, the heroic epic as well the Picaresque novel, and must also include something of hagiography. It is the novel of birth, written as the prototype for all stories that tell of the excursion, odyssey, heroic path, and education in the labyrinth of the world. We will see how a coming into the world and coming to naught echo each other. As a by-product of this natural history of the uncanny, a summary social history of human over-exertion and a small world history of life fatigue emerges. It is a book of the human being as a questionable child of the world – not a book for children.
The Miscarried Animal and the Self-Birth of the Subject
Man is the great —— in the book of nature.
Jean Paul, “Selections from the Papers to the Devil”6
If we follow the footsteps of the uncanny all the way back to the origin, we encounter the human drama of birth. The way that humans come into the world presumably contains the complete key to the code of the problem of nothingness. If the word “nothing” is supposedly more than a pretext for charlatanism, then it is the indication that for humans it does not suffice to be born in order to arrive in the world: the physical birth of a human is the opposite of a coming-into-the-world; it is the dropping out from all that is
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“familiar,” a plunge into the uncanny, finding yourself exposed in a frightening location. This is true in three ways. First, for the human child, being born means bidding farewell to its intra-uterine life, which is probably the only stage of its reception in the world that has a truly hidden, homey character – provided that the foothills of the predatory outside world do not encroach on it; in any case, the birth exodus into the world is an adventure ride through uncanny forests that render the spookiness of Atreyu’s forest7 rather bourgeois by comparison. Second, coming into the world means arriving in uncertainty – because for humans more than any other beings, the world is something that does not get defined from the outset, that is not a foregone conclusion, but something that has to be deter- mined and established. The place of arrival itself is made uncertain and set in motion by the arrival of the human, that constructive animal; anyone who had the bad idea to fall out of the womb straight into Tokyo, Mexico City, New York, or Cairo will soon have a song to sing about the uncanny life in the thicket of cities. And, third, for humans, giving birth always means getting there way too early and finding oneself in a state that is absolutely unsuitable for a successful arrival in reality, a state of total disorientation, helplessness, and embarrassment. The only thing that helps us in this exposed situation is the fact that in the beginning, the world to which we come is identical, with one small exception, to the mother from whom we come. This small exception is precisely the measure of ontological difference. Because as soon as we are old enough to get to know our mother from the outside, we begin to get to know a “world” that is not our mother. It may be said that the strange difference between mother and non-mother preoccupies humans for the rest of their lives, because they can never quite understand how the world that at first felt like the mother could transform into the world that looks the way we know it to look now – we will not say how, to avoid summoning panic into the room.
If we want to start from a reflected concept of the world, we can no longer seriously claim that humans come into the world via their birth. A nameless something is put in a position of which it cannot promise itself anything certain or good unless it had arrived to a mother and people who promise it a certain and good world. This has a far-reaching consequence for the philosophical concept of the world: the world in which the human newcomer arrives is, by its very nature, nothing more than a promise that the older inhabitants of the world make to the newcomers, a promise predestined to be broken owing to the liability of worldly conditions. With this, the question of nothingness takes on a new form. Nothingness can now either mean that nothing is promised to those who come into the world,
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so that they cannot promise themselves much from their own human existence either, and consequently develop an inclination to return from whence they came, into the womb, to death, into the monist all-nothingness – a motif that has its place in all redemptive religions and all doctrines of all-in-one unity. Or it suggests that nothing will come of the great promises that were made and that none of the expectations of the world that have been roused in us by mothers will be fulfilled in a world as non-mother – a motif that all versions of worldly-wise skepticisms, cynicisms, and nihilisms deal with. The uncanniness of the human coming into the world therefore has its grounds in the unreliability of human promises. Does this stem from individual recklessness, from irresponsibility, from the moods of the unpredictable bipeds? No – it stems from the fact that the world given as a promise has something untenable in itself, or, if tenable, then only with luck and effort. In the uncanny, the unstoppable tendency of promises appeals to us to the point of untenability. That is why our coming-into-the-world has a pull into nothingness from the outset. Even though every birth is also inherently a promise to the world, in every promising birth a succumbing to the untenable is also at play because the promised world is marked by untenability. It even has to be said that a hint of miscarriage adheres to every birth. Humans do not arrive as solid subjects into robust worlds; rather the world emerges for them through the fact that they are born slightly to the side and exposed to the ungiven, the uncanny. Nietzsche only half-formulated this relationship when he spoke of nihilism as the uncanny visitor who haunts modern existence. It is not that an otherwise saddle-proof life receives terrible visits in rare crises – it is already a visit into the uncanny of its own accord. We always run off course, we always drift a little bit further away; in the great chain of being, humans are an open link.
As a living being, the human is therefore a pure problem, a chronic miscarriage. From the outset, there is a gap between each newly born individual and previous life up to that point – this gap opens up each time insofar as the forced displacement that the newly born endure at their arrival reaches into the uncanny. This gap is the space where we experience nothingness as something that can be “present” and into which we have been placed. The world is built into this gap; earth can rise and arrive in it; the ropes of promises stretch across it as people venture out onto them like tightrope walkers.
In the shadow of these considerations, it becomes apparent that the human is not simply a “living being” endowed with reason, but a being who must “lead” their life. Without a way of life, human life is nothing in the double sense, neither life nor human. But
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people have to promise their lives to themselves before they can lead them. As for us, the decisive thing is done under the guidance of life-giving promises, and thus we depend on them from our first to our last day. Without the inflow of affirmations that promise and validate our lives, we cannot keep ourselves alive psychologi- cally or biologically – according to paleoanthropological findings, people who are cut off from all promises die a psychogenic death within forty-eight hours. The human standard of living is always disputed by promises. If human beings are not living beings, but life-leading beings, then the source of a specifically human fragility is here laid bare: the leading of their lives depends on the keeping of promises that tend towards the untenable of their own accord. When mothers take their crying children into their arms and assure them that everything will be ok, they promise them more than can be kept – but they also cannot not promise it to them if they do not wish to let their children sink prematurely into untenability. Each individual learns early enough that the hard shadow of untenable promises falls upon human life and that existence entails not only standards of living and leading a life on the basis of kept promises, but also substandard living and the misleading of life because of promises not kept.
These circumstances help explain why life comes to account for its primary uncanniness only involuntarily and under the utmost duress. It is, after all, the usual point of “accounting” to present life as something predictable, meaningful, familiar, and reliable. The primordial promise of life, philosophically called reason, is to object to the failure to keep promises and to insist that reason delivers what it promises – was reason not at one time also an expression for the influx of auspicious reasons to live for our already ever-endangered existence? That is why reason has the structure of a self-sustaining promise for us, and the invasion of the unreasonable is generally perceived as scandalous and devastating because when the promise of reason is broken, it may seem that there is ultimately nothing to the promises of the world and of life.
These considerations make it clear why an anthropology that has not worked its way through a theory of birth must remain insipid: only philosophy of birth can become so attentive to the abyssal side of human coming-into-the-world that it fuses the term “world” together with the drama of arriving in it. From a birth- philosophical point of view, the human is the being who had the power not to be an animal and to venture out into a world that is only “given” by promise. In this respect, anthropology is nothing more than the science of recklessness – of human beings’ frivolity in establishing ways of life upon promises. Who could deny that the
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Book of History contains a great variety of impostures generated by promises? And who can escape the impression that the people of the highly cultural, that is, promising era have promised themselves something that will probably not be possible to be kept in the long run; that the psychologico-cultural and technical apparatuses that were built to keep the wrong promises are themselves approaching collapse by now in order to keep up with the untenability of what was promised?
Anthropology as a science of such recklessness becomes the central discipline of philosophy as soon as it elaborates a general concept of the subject as a holder of untenable positions. What the subject and what subjectivity is can therefore no longer be adequately grasped with conventional philosophical formulas – it is neither a substrate in the sense of the Greek Hypokeimenon, nor a pure acting or bringing forth in the sense of the modern philosophies of activity, but an ensemble of behaviors that can be grouped around the basic gestures of carrying, making, and keeping. If the world already has the form of a promise for humans in its given condition, then the human being is – insofar as it is “in” the world and has “come” to it – as the subject and receiver of the promise also already its carrier and keeper. Even the famous “self-preservation,” which has been philosophically often determined as the foundational aspiration of subjectivity, is in turn a descendant of that holding by which the world is kept and carried on as a promise through subjective efforts. The fact that modern philosophy has placed its principle in active subjectivity of course already suggests that it has found the courage to embark on a history-making adventure in order to promise itself the utmost from its own actions in the world. What else is the philosophy of subjectivity other than a logical machine that believes it has identified the keeper of all possible promises in the free-thinking and -acting subject? As free-thinking and acting, the human is regarded from the ground up as the self-preserving, auspicious being. As subject, the human is the guarantor of the promises with which the miscarried animal gives itself its world. Only where the subject renders its stabilizing contribution does the world get held up as “given” for human beings. By means of this contribution alone, the arrival of newborns does not immediately lead to a fall into bottomlessness. The subject as self-keeper of the promises given to it delays its fall at a tolerable stage. This delay or holding up is the effort-that-I-am. Subjectivity as an act of self- preservation is therefore not a calm substrate but a self-exertion. It is no coincidence that the philosophies of subjectivity at their highest level lead to theories of work – after all, the term “work” (even after
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its deceptive career at the firm of Hegel and Marx) still preserves a memory of the archaic efforts to keep the promises of the world, and if we know today that the equation of subject and “worker” is based on a productivist short-circuit, there are still good reasons to point out their relationship of origin in terms of subjectivity and exertion.
Funnily enough, the philosophies of the subject have made a lot of fuss about the subject’s spontaneity – people wanted to sniff out the tracks of freedom within it. In truth, the philosophy of the subject is not so much interested in freedom as in the priming of possible outlets for the effort-that-I-am. What is called spontaneity is basically the self-imposed exertion towards effort, which drifts and ferments in the subject as kinetic energy. It is hardly surprising that the freedom-impassioned philosophies of the subject could not uncover the reason for exertion in the subject itself. In all of the talk of activity, spontaneity, obligation, and desire together with the source metaphorical indulgence in the “arising from within oneself,” it was misunderstood that the basic exertion or effort that flows into spontaneity stems from a trace of miscarriage on the human. The human becomes subject only because of and to the extent that it does not come into the world only by leaving its mother’s womb, but has to offer up enormous additional efforts to establish and maintain the world into which it comes. Although subjectivity is, as idealism has taught us, only understandable from the omen of pure activity, this in turn is not a “deed,” neither a Fichtean self-positing nor Sartre’s self-choosing, but rather one with the already exerted effort in contrast to the pre-subjective abandonment into the uncanny, to bring oneself by means of self-birth into the world and gain status in it through one’s own self-stance. A subject is everything that tries to become and be its own world for itself – how? By sticking to itself, its “principles” and its concern for itself. This self-stance has several faces: it appears as abstinence, as a holding oneself to chosen norms, as self-reliance, as self-preservation, as self-justification.
Therefore it is not surprising that the history of the subject has been a history of stances since the very beginning. From the Stoics to existentialism, from the glowing desert saints to the cool young city dwellers, the subject always steps in front of us as a self-composed center of effort, as the active principle of an exerted stance against the sluggish, shapeless, and depressing outside world. Whether the subject holds itself up as an ascetic self by abstaining from all seductive, disruptive, and frightening influences; whether it stands up to the hopeless and untenable world by holding on to the belief in God or godliness; whether it constitutes itself as an autonomous self, sustained by a philosophizing reason, which is,
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in turn, appointed as the self-guardian of its laws; whether it tries to maintain itself as a conqueror of life fatigue in order to make itself heroically and self-extravagantly a gift to the world; whether it knows itself, gloomily resigned to self-acceptance, to be held out into nothingness; whether it rides the waves on the surfboard of its desire in anti-oedipal exhilaration; whether it angrily sticks to the style of its terribly splintered way of writing before sovereignty, and watches from the corners of its eyes as it eludes itself: the subject is always there to give itself a firm foothold in a stance through efforts that resemble a self-birth. Through its inevitably monstrous position, the subject is “spontaneously” condemned to the effort to stabilize its hold by means of its own promises in a world taken over on revocation.
According to their purpose, stances are always expectations of the world’s continued existence and of the keeping of its promises – not least also expectations of the repeatability of once acquired programs. Even those who are committed to the Stoic doctrine of nil admirari and no longer promise themselves anything from the world at least expect that the world will no longer agitate them out of their stance through some kind of a surprise. Then the house of cards of external conditions may by all means collapse as long as one’s stance musters the power to persevere, as long as the subject’s status remains unaffected by the upheavals of external holdings. As self-holder and self-carrier, the subject cannot help but become set on tendentially world-less or at least counter-worldly attitudes – after all, it lives, as we have seen, only on the effort to bring itself forth and outward through a self-birth like the keeping of its own promises or those it has appropriated.
Thus, the self-sustaining activity of the subject is inseparable from a certain counter-worldly self-breeding – Foucault would say self-care – which serves a heightened coming-into-the-world.
Nietzsche is more responsible for this than other, newer thinkers. It was he who, in his Genealogy of Morality, elevated the subject’s autogenesis to a philosophical agenda.
To breed an animal with the prerogative to promise – is that not precisely the paradoxical task which nature has set herself with regard to humankind? is it not the real problem of humankind? . . . That is precisely what constitutes the long history of the origins of responsibility. That particular task of breeding an animal with the prerogative to promise includes . . . the . . . task of . . . making man . . . predictable. Let us place ourselves . . . at the end of this immense process where . . . we then find the sovereign individual . . . a man with his own, independent,
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enduring will, whose prerogative it is to promise . . . the possessor of an enduring, unbreakable will. 8
How does nature come to take on such a demanding task with regard to humans? How does it lapse into the idea of creating beings who have to plunge into the adventure of self-generation so that they can live? Nietzsche leaves these questions unanswered – but his way of speaking of nature’s self-posed task invites us to think of an ambitious mother who celebrates herself in her children. In Nietzsche’s rhetoric of increase and breeding, the self-generating process of increased life in the wake of highest promises comes very clearly to prominence. The clear text version of this idea can be found – one would like to say: of course – in Karl Marx, who in Nietzsche’s year of birth in 1844 identified man as a born self- generator: “Because socialist man understands the whole of what is called world history as nothing but man’s creation through human labor . . . he has the observable, irrefutable proof of his birth through himself. ”9 Of the triumphs and torments of self-generating effort, however, it is only Nietzsche, not Marx, who can convey a term because he, unlike the thinker of socialism, knows that in the self- birthing of the self, it is not “work” that is at stake, but burdens of pregnancy, birth pains, suffering, labors in the English language, the struggle for existence, ponos in the Greek language, the inevitable self-generating expropriations of life to which no reappropriation corresponds, and at best the euphoria of taking a deep breath outside.
What do I find absolutely intolerable? Something which I just cannot cope alone with and which suffocates me and makes me feel faint? . . . That something failed comes near me. . . . Apart from that, what cannot be borne in the way of need, depri- vation, bad weather, disease, toil, solitude? Basically we can cope with everything else, born as we are to an underground and battling existence; again and again we keep coming up to the light, again and again we experience our golden hour of victory, – and then there we stand, the way we were born, unbreakable, tense, ready for new, more difficult and distant things. 10
The subject’s self-birth, Nietzsche’s formulas say, is a birth into standing. Marx also provides the consonant second voice: “A being only counts itself as independent when it stands on its own two feet and it stands on its own two feet as long as it owes its existence to itself. ”11 Thus, this type of birth leads directly into the vertical,
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that is, to standing thanks to one’s own erection, without sidelong glances for possibilities of tolerably lying down or fundamentally being carried. Because it is about immediate self-establishment, the self-born and increasing subject for Nietzsche is also not the same as the passively born, misguided subjects who – because they themselves are reduced, poisoned, suffocated – can’t help but spread an atmosphere of asphyxiation and reduction around them, much to the agony of those who still carry the sting of success in their flesh. That is why the determined self-birthers must repel the obscenely comfortable, mediocre, and atrophied.
. . . but who would not, a hundred times over, prefer to fear if he can admire at the same time, rather than not fear, but thereby permanently retain the disgusting spectacle of the failed, the stunted, the wasted away and the poisoned? 12
The willingness to face what is frightening is given to the self-birther as a sign of election, that is, as a spur of self-intensification. The intensity of the subject is synonymous with the urge of its being pregnant with itself. What the subject can bring forth from itself through the force of its exertion is always only itself, and the world, into which it will come, can never be any other than its own, self- designed, self-generated. By energetically bringing itself to its own world, the subject opens up an unbridgeable distance to the world of others. From this distance – maintained by the self-care of the self-producing subject – the abstinent stances arise for which the Greeks coined the word “askesis,” and the moderns the term “individuality. ” If the self-emphasizing subject displays a brittle stance towards foreign-worldly seductions – talk, fame, topicality, women, princes, careers – it is not from morbid or self-torturous inclinations (as befits a corrupt notion of asceticism), but out of the clear instinct of wanting to serve only a single effort.
His “motherly” instinct, that secret love towards what is growing inside him, shows him places where he can be relieved of the necessity of thinking about himself . . . not . . . out of virtue, out of a creditable will to moderation and simplicity, but because their supreme master so demands . . . it is [his] dominating instinct, at least during periods when they are pregnant with something great. 13
What Nietzsche discovers here is the birth of asceticism from the requirements of self-birth. Asceticism in the fundamental sense does not reject the will; it is, on the contrary, an expression of a
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strong pooling of will, an energetic summary of all partial drives in a single ray of will. Nietzsche’s discourse on the will to power is also latently at the service of this thought and remains incompre- hensible without this discovery. In it, the idea of the possibility of a univocal existence of language inches forward – it is the idea of the possibility of a monothematic will. Only the monothematics of the will steers the will towards itself and thus onto the self-bearing track. All that an ultimately pooled-together will to oneself can possibly want is eo ipso self-making, self-reliance, self-birth, self- realization. To the extent that asceticism is an exercise of the will to abstain from parasitic auxiliary drives and stray impulses, it serves the self-bearing erection of the subject. 14 Through it, it becomes its own content – because only those who know to abstain can contain themselves, find themselves to be enough, keep themselves upright, and become those who stand, hold, carry, set up, give, and found from their “own efforts. ”
In this program of a self-upright-holding stance, it is impos- sible not to hear the masculinist tenor. The suspicion arises that the subject of the philosophers is perhaps nothing more than a logically encoded fantasy about the possibility of permanent erection from cradle to grave. In the self-born formation of the subject, the dynamics of masculinity as an urge to one’s own standing are actually at work. Masculinity in the narrowest sense of the word exists only in connection with the history-making illusion of the independent erection – the philosophical code word for this is subject autonomy. Since the days of Plato, the phenomena of vocation to self-birth, male high-feeling, and existential self-intensi- fication in thought have been intimately interwoven; an impetus of Eros into the vertical pulses through all of them. Can it be a coinci- dence that in Socrates the metaphysics got under way as Maieutic, that is, as an obstetrics for a subjectivity that has to fight its way out of the womb-grave of the body in order to keep itself upright in the heights of ideas? This peculiarly masculine obstetrics has created a historical precedent. What has been promoted to the light of the world by the art of philosophical midwifery in Greek antiquity has consequently continued to develop the metaphysics of work and technology as a mechanical uterus of human self-fabrication over the course of more than two thousand years. The Maieutic of the subject, metaphysics, and technology are each only aspects of the same phenomenon, which, with its grandeur as with its riskiness, has the historical world holding its breath: aspects of the self-birth of the man-human. This takes place as a conquest of the vertical, as a revolution of self-born sovereignty against the humiliation of the old way of birthing, thus as a repulsion against old nature and as
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the establishment of a phallic will of its own against the dictatorship of mothers. Through a colossal tearing away of oneself, the andro- logical subject has begun to be self-interested and has mobilized as the commissioner of its own worlds. But it is precisely through its mobilization that it is finally confronted with the questions of how, after all, it intends to deal with nature as its origin, and whether it really believes it will escape its first birth via its second.
Among those who have let this question be asked, Martin Heidegger stands out in a twilight greatness with his attempt at a new thinking of being. This is to be understood quite literally – because what constitutes Heidegger’s meaning is inseparable from the threefold problem that is incarnated in him; the problem of preeminence, of greatness, and of twilight.
Heidegger looms – to engage with his thought, we have to begin from this perception. Because for most, dealing with what looms is annoying or overwhelming; there is usually no engaging, but either aversions or subjugations. But when dealing with Heidegger, it is a question of recognizing in the looming itself the problem to which his thinking bears witness. In fact it is like this: Heidegger not only looms “forth,” he is also the thinker of looming, of standing out, of erecting oneself, of bringing forward. By emphasizing within the event of truth its moments of unconcealment, emergence, opening, and clearing, he grasps – like no metaphysician before him – the kinetics of being as a coming forward, a placing into the open, and a being challenged to the open expression of presence-ing. 15 It is fair to say without exaggeration that Heidegger, instructed by his own outstanding dynamism, was the only thinker of the philosophical tradition able to conceptualize what placing means according to its onto-kinetic nature. For him, it is the visible (and, through excessive visibility, equally hidden) gesture of the “occurrences of being” – insofar as the equation of being and being brought forth is valid. The taste of being, as he notes, adheres only to what is capable of “existing,” which also takes part in the ecstasy of being brought forth. Being is the ontological aroma of that which is in front, up high, and spoken out loud. To attain it, entities must have been brought forward natally, brought upward phallically, and evocatively come up for discussion. Only in an austere decision-making climate, where nothing lies around or stands there undecided, but everything is taken up decisively, does human existence know itself as “great. ” By letting itself be challenged, it accepts its emergence into the arena of being, and by assuming only important things as a challenger, it rises up to the level of that by which it has been “enframed. ”16 It is great through standing up to the enormous; greatness becomes its
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aura by the fact that the having-been-placed-upright has nothing to do with anything less than with the “fate of being” itself. Heidegger’s looming corresponds to the self-consciousness of a being-there that sees itself as the location of a Titans’ battle for being. Its atmosphere of greatness is the shiver of the air over the ontological battlefield. There is something of a metaphysical priapism in it – painfully heaved up towards the most important thing, it rises up with a heroic positioning into the bald skies of being and nothingness. In these erections, however, it is true that the subject, who has been necessarily forced to greatness, does not stand upright of its own accord. Heidegger knows that the grammar of placing upright is imbued with an irony: precisely that which stands itself upright is the most upright-placed. The new thinking of being can subvert subjectivity and its game of placing because – in a more or less explicit way – it sees all self-births from the point of view of the first birth, understands all phallic installations from the point of view of an exciting-challenging other, and hears all of the subject’s own statements through the “reception” and address of the other.
It is only because he strives for nothing more than to think through the deadly seriousness of ontologically ironic subjectivity that Heidegger can, as the outstanding upriser among philoso- phers, feel his way towards a different ontological gesture, one that reclaims the uprising. By looking for the not-rising-up in his thinking in a towering way, he becomes a thinker who “stands” completely in the dubious twilight. One will have to accept that he – to greatness obliged – does not accept responsibility for this twilight as a personal dubiousness or logical ambiguity, but elevates it back into the great text of the happenings of being. If the enframing, the placing upright, was also not our doing, but the destiny of being, so a possible dis-stance will again remain wholly a thing of being and only from out of “this itself” can the page be turned, if that is really necessary. With pride and sorrow, Heidegger’s twilight of metaphysics mingles with the dusk of metaphysics that he defined, which probably thinks of itself as the appropriate working environment for the dismantling of the world-historical framing structure that demanded subject dominion, metaphysics, and technology all at the same time. Both gloomy and serene, this thinking takes its solitary exemplary position. It is gloomy because it still carries with it in a forceful gesture the legacy of the history of metaphysical exertion and armament; it is serene because it has repeated and overtaken the huge wave of erecting installations to which it itself belongs, and has already reached a point of détente, at which others can let themselves be intuited as erecting stances. These other stances promise to be restrained and unassuming, but
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by promising that, they multiply the twilight because they need to emphasize the unemphasized and want the unwanted. Heidegger’s ambivalence leaves open the question of whether his thinking continues or ends metaphysics; yes, according to his gesture, it almost parodically and gaudily repeats the metaphysical rising up to prepare its overcoming. There is little concern about whether this overcoming will be thwarted by the pathetic preparation for it. Twilight-like to the core, it conjures up a Titanism of inconspicu- ousness and opens the horizon with thunder, from which the other approaches on “the feet of doves. ”17
Meanwhile, it seems, the gun smoke over the philosophical battlefield has cleared. After the wound that was Heidegger, the time has come to also perceive the matter that is Heidegger. If it is taken up again, it already pushes beyond the formulation in which the master from the Black Forest left it. I hope we have left no doubt about the direction in which the “question of being,” once newly set in motion, strives: towards a theory of birth, a phenomenology of the coming-into- the-world – a new Maieutic, an onto-topology, an onto-kinetics, an onto-politics. From these tendencies one thing becomes clear: it is a revenge on Heidegger since he considered psychology unnecessary and anthropology beneath him. As soon as a psychologically and anthropologically grounded philosophy enters into a meditation of self-born structures, it arrives at a more radical destruction and a more substantive salvation of metaphysical discourses about being and nothingness than Heidegger’s memory of being was able to accomplish. For what the history-making intrusion of subjectivity was and is can, according to Heidegger, be sharply reconstructed in a grammar of dramas of self-birth,18 and the interlocutors who inform us about the categories of self-bringing-forth are the great birth theorists of tradition and current research: Plato and Bloch, Schelling and Rank, Patanjali and Marx, Johannes Climax and Nietzsche, Maine de Biran and Stanislav Grof.
Practical knowledge is provided by the mothers, the midwives, the phenomenologists of bringing forth and carrying. The task of moderating this conversation, of course, can rest with none other than the Master Lao Tzu, the Old Child, who had lived through the risks of becoming to the end, before he, after eighty-one years, as white-haired as an elder and as profound as the world itself, emerged from his mother’s womb to take on life on the outside, in the certainty of being, even in the outside world, the same as he was while inside. In his world-superior serenity, the question for us is what else are the self-birthing struggles of historical humanity other than efforts to compensate for the disadvantage of all disadvantages,
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the “disadvantage of having being born. ” (Emil Cioran is the most eloquent witness of this in the twentieth century, alongside Beckett. ) As a school of coming-into-the-world, philosophy really enters into the post-metaphysical “basic position,” which it has been demanding for two hundred years with great noise and insufficient arguments. From this new (even pre-Socratic and gynecological) basic position, philosophy is at the end and the beginning at the same time; it has its story behind it and at the same time before it; it has both failed as an attempt to come into the world, and has not even seriously begun with it. In vain and unceasingly, it remains
thrown back to the effort-that-it-is. Because effort is at the core of subjectivity, philosophy as a phenomenon of exertion can never get away from subjectivity, no matter what denying, subversive, or suicidal strategies it may still come up with. Its only chance lies in the rise to serenity – but serenity begins with the willingness to allow oneself to be exerted by the real. According to metaphysics, it can take philosophy all the way to humor, the democratic version of divine madness. Beyond exertion, there remains only exertion to overcome exertion. Philosophy, for now, can do nothing better than confront its destiny of being the logical pinnacle of subjectivity at the most exciting, exhausting, and crazy places. It must reenact its history in order to understand what it was and is, and in this way stand, in solidarity with its hybrids as well as its tragic stances, its misguided and its inevitable gestures. If rigor still has a purpose in this questionable discipline, then it is to think oneself into the surge of the most extreme exertion in order to ascertain the limits of exertion.
Subjectivity, we said, is kinetically the effort-that-I-am. The limits of my effort are the limits of my stance, the limits of my standing of my ground, my persevering, enduring, maintaining, entertaining. Where the effort ends, there the standing upright comes to its limit on its own, that is where that which “lies otherwise than this” begins. Perhaps “the other” in that sense is just a term for what lies down while we stand upright – even possibly what we need to actively make to underlie in order to have something for our standing upright to stand on. For the subject there lies behind its limit at first only that which falls victim to exhaustion: the subject self – in the mode of collapse. Overtired, overwhelmed, devastated, it encounters itself yet again beyond its own limit. There, its stances prove untenable and its promises baseless. The uncanny place in the forest from which the hero on his tree sees nothingness eating itself forward is none other than the place the sight of which is unbearable to the eye of the subject, because it shows that, with all its efforts, the
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subject is literally nothing in the end. Nothingness is the manifestly progressive untenability of the promised, it is the leaching of every- thing that exists into a holding device for stances long recognized as untenable. This is the surge of life fatigue that rolls over the dams of broken promises, making the bodies as heavy as their own burial plates. This nothingness protrudes into the self-experience of the overexerted subject when it comes to the limits of its standing its ground. It is only through the fully endured overload that the subject gets to where it can see through its Great Orthopedics. What no external criticism can tell it, it learns of the symptoms of its own overexertion. Only too late does it understand that it has set up the world as a device for keeping untenable promises, and from then on it finds itself in danger of being slain by the collapse of these buildings that are as enormous as they are unstable. Even greater is the danger of drowning in one’s “adult” stance – that’s Neo-Stoicism – or, at the first regressive liberalization, exploding into murderous disinhibitions – that’s fascism.
In the disintegration of its stances, the subject comprehends how all its self-birthing stances depend on guidelines that elude its independence. In collapse, it approaches the “ground” that underlies all installations. In this approach, it makes acquaintance with what psychiatrists call the chance of depression. The remark that even an upright stance is just a lying down in an unlikely bed corresponds to this. Lying down, however, is another term for the kinetic pattern of serenity: letting oneself be carried. What Heidegger lamented with enormous effort as “forgetting of being” corresponds to a forgetting of letting oneself be carried within the kinetic consciousness, which is a precondition of every rage of self-reliance. However, this forgetting is not an actual forgetting; it springs from the memory of the body in the real episodes where it experienced itself as being not carried, abandoned, forgotten, and imprisoned in its own despair – of the moments in which it accumulated the most unforgettable motivations to stand on its own. But however deep the forgetting of letting oneself be carried and its recoil towards self-uprising, even the most extreme rage of self-birth can make of itself no more than what the first birth has already made of it: a being who always hovers in danger, even if it is a self-created one. The first and second births agree that they bring into the world living beings who, as beings who exert themselves, strive for self-protection, but who, at the end of the day, can achieve nothing better than to accept themselves as the hovering beings that they have always been and still are. This is the chance of depression. You have to get on the ground to learn that it has a double bottom. Those who come from untenable standing to lying down cannot be far from learning that lying down is just another kind of hovering.
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At the turning point between the subject’s extreme self-estab- lishment and its plunge into a carried hovering lies a passage for which Heidegger introduced the ominous word “turn,” a word supposed to form a common denominator for both the giganto- mania of Meßkirch and the history of the European spirit – how could it not if, after millennia of self-forgetfulness, being was in the mood to choose the musings of this man as the stage of its own self-remembrance.
There is nothing to the word “turn” and its religious reverber- ation. What is essential about it is the reference to the movement through which the wave of the subject’s force runs back into itself. This movement would be impossible without the gentle counter- violence of failure. But anyone who speaks of a “turn” thinks of failure not as a mere collapse, not just as entropy, which puts an end to an unlikely state, but as a “sign” from the other side. Those who hear it and look in its direction have already allowed themselves to be turned around and made a movement away from the wrong movement. Such a turnaround is more than a mechanical change of direction, nor does it have anything to do with what the installation technicians of the New Age call switching to “complex thinking. ” The turning process would precisely not be a future- greedy continued muddling under new auspices, but an ontological ebb of subjectivity; but the ebb is not made, it only occurs when the tide changes its mind. If we take the tide as an image for the exertion- that-we-are which we cannot refrain from, it becomes clear that a returning tide kinetically remains a thing of impossibility as long as the waves of exertion have not dissipated of their own accord and been used up. Here, the thrill of the danger into which the project of modernity has led us makes itself palpable on an ontological level: anything less than a change in the meaning of “being” will not suffice for our “salvation. ” Because modernity is in its process nothing other than being-towards-movement, movement towards movement in increasing loops of self-intensification, our survival is tied to a self-withdrawal of the kinetic tidal wave “within us. ” This cannot be changed with external canalization and decelerations.