No More Learning

v. p. 216, c. ; A. Gellius, N. A. ji. 17; comp.
Socrales sanctus paederasta, Traj. ad Rhen. 1769), Ch. A. Brandis, Ueber die Grundlinien der Lehre des
we do not hesitate, supported by his unambiguous Socrates, in the Rhein. Museum, 1827, i. p. 120, &c. )
expressions respecting the essence of true, spi- | In this way arose two essentially different represen-
ritual love in Xenophon (Symp. 8. $ 2, 19, 32, &contations of Socrates, and in antiquity it was already
Mem. i. 2. § 29, &c. , 3. $ 8, &c. ) and Plato (Symp. disputed whether Plato or Xenophon (Sext. Emp.
p. 222, &c. ), to reject as a calumny. Also the adv. Math. vii. 8), or even whether Plato or Aes-
account that in consequence of a resolution of the chines (Aristid. Orat. Plat. ii. p. 367, comp. 474)
people allowing bigamy, which was passed during had sketched the more accurate picture of the man.
the Peloponnesian war, he was married to two He himself left either absolutely nothing in a
women at the same time (Plut. Aristid. p. 335 ; written form (Cic. de Orat. iii. 16; Plut. de Alex.
Athen. xii. p. 555, &c. ; Diog. Laërt. , &c. ), is to fort. p. 328 ; Diog. Laërt. i. 16), or only a rhyth-
be set aside as unfounded, since the existence of mical version of some of Aesop's fables and the
any such resolution of the people cannot be proved, introduction to a hymn to Apollo, which he had
while the Socratics know of only one wife, Xan- composed during his imprisonment, when for the
thippe, and the account itself is not free from first time in bis life he made any attempts in
contradictions. J. Luzac, following Bentley and verse (Plat. Phaed. p. 61). The quotations that
others, completely refutes it (Lect. Att. de Bigamia antiquity possessed of it were of doubtful authen-
Socratis, Lugd. Bat. 1809).
ticity (Diog. Laërt. ii. 42; Themist. Orat. xiv.
Whether, and how soon after the death of So- p. 321). What we possess from Aeschines, that
crates, repentance seized the Athenians, and his is well authenticated, is limited to fragments. We
accusers met with contempt and punishment; and have therefore only to decide for Xenophon, who
further whether and when, to expiate the crime, exhibited considerable mental affinity with Socrates,
a brazen statue, the work of Lysippus, was dedi- or for Plato. Now Plato manifestly makes Socra-
cated to his memory (Plut. de Invid. et Odio, p. tes occupy his own place, and transfers to him the
537, &c. ; Diog. Laërt. ii. 43. ib. Menag. ), it is not doctrines that were peculiar to himself. Xeno
easy to determine with any certainty, in conse- phon on the contrary exhibits no other intention
quence of the indefiniteness of the statements. than that of communicating information with fide-
Five years after his execution, Xenophon found lity, and refrains from mixing up with his repre-
himself obliged to compose the Memorabilia, in sentation anything that was peculiar to himself.
vindication of Socrates. (Comp. A. Boeckh, de Sö- This was so much the easier for him, as it was


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861
SOCRATES.
not his purpose to develope the Socratic doctrine, But, on the other hand, in Xenophon we miss
and as he was not capable of penetrating into the every thing like a penetrating comprehension of
peculiarity of a philosophic mode of thinking. But the fundamental ideas of the Socratic doctrine to
for that very reason his representation, with all which he himself makes reference. The repre-
Its fidelity, is not adapted to give us a sufficient sentations of Plato and Xenophon however may
picture of the man whom all antiquity regarded as be very well harmonised with each other, partly
the originator of a new era in philosophy, and by the assumption that Socrates, as the originator
whose life each of his disciples, especially Plato of a new era of philosophical development, must
the most distinguished of them, regarded as a have made the first steps in that which was its
model. Moreover it was the object of Xenophon, distinctive direction, and the immediate mani-
by way of defence against the accusers of Socmtes, festation of which consisted in bringing into more
merely to paint him as the morally spotless, pious, distinct and prominent relief the idea and form
upright, temperate, clear-sighted, unjustly con- of scientific knowledge (see Schleiermacher in the
demned man, not as the founder of new philoso- above quoted treatise); partly by the careful em-
phical inquiry. It may easily be understood there-ployment of the remarks made by Aristotle re-
fore that there were various opinions in antiquity specting the Socratic doctrine and the points of
as to whether the more satisfactory picture of distinction between it and that of Plato (Ch. A.
Socrates was to be found in Plato, in Xenophon, Brandis, in the above-mentioned treatise ; comp.
or in Acschines. Since the time of Brucker how-Geschichte der griechisch-römischen Philosophie, ii.
ever it had become usual to go back to Xenophon, 1. p. 20, &c. ). These remarks, though not nume-
to the exclusion of the other authorities, as the rous, are decisive on account of their acuteness
source of the only authentic delineation of the and precision, as well as by their referring to the
personal characteristics and philosophy of Socrates, most important points in the philosophy of So-
or to fill up the gaps left by him by means of the crates.
accounts of Plato (Meiners, Geschichte der Wissen- III. The philosophy of the Greeks before So-
schaften, ii. p. 420, &c. ), till Schleiermacher started crates had sought first (among the Ionians) after
the inquiry, " What can Socrates have been, be- the inherent foundation of generated existence
sides what Xenophon tells us of him, without con- and changing phenomena, and then (among the
tradicting that authority, and what must he have Eleatics) after the idea of absolute existence.
been, to have justified Plato in bringing him for- Afterwards, when the ideas of being and coming
ward as he does in his dialogues ? " (Ueber den into being had come into hostile opposition to each
Werth des Sokrates als Philosophen, in the Ab- other, it had made trial of various insufficient
handlungen der Berliner Akademie, iii. p. 50, modes of reconciling them ; and lastly, raising the
&c. , 1818, reprinted in Schleiermacher's Werke, inquiry after the absolutely true and certain in our
vol. iii. pt. 2, p. 293, &c. ; translated in the Phi- knowledge, had arrived at the assumption that
p
lological Museum, vol. ii. p. 538, &c. ) Dissen, too, numbers and their relations are not only the abso-
had already pointed out some not inconsiderable lutely true and certain, but the foundation of
contradictions in the doctrines of the Xenophontic things. Its efforts, which had been pervaded by a
Socrates (de Philosophia morali in Xenophontis de pure appreciation of truth, were then exposed to
Socrate Commentariis tradita, Gotting. 1812 ; re- the attacks of a sophistical system, which con-
printed in Dissen's Kleine Schriften, p. 87, &c. ). cerned itself only about securing an appearance of
Now we know indeed that Socrates, the teacher knowledge, and which in the first instance indeed
of buman wisdom, who, without concerning him- applied itself to the diametrically opposite theories
self with the investigation of the secrets of nature, of eternal, perpetual coming into existence, and
wished to bring philosophy back from heaven to of unchangeable, absolutely simple and single
earth (Cic. Acud. i. 4, Tusc. v. 4; comp. Aristot. existence, but soon directed its most dangerous
Metaph. i. 6, de Part Anim. i. p. 642. 28), was weapons against the ethico-religious consciousness,
far from intending to introduce a regularly or- which in the last ten years before the Pelopon-
ganised system of philosophy ; but that he made nesian war had already been so much shaken.
no endeavours to go back to the ultimate founda- Whoever intended to oppose that sophistical sys.
tions of his doctrine, or that that doctrine was vacil- tem with any success would have, at the same
lating and not without contradictions, as Wiggers time, at least to lay the foundation for a removal
(in his Life of Socrates, p. 184, &c. ) and others of the contradictions, which, having been left
assume, we cannot possibly regard as a well by the earlier philosophy without any tenable
founded view, unless his almost unexampled in mode of reconciling them, had been employed by
fluence opon the most distinguished men of his the sophists with so much skill for their own
time is to become an inexplicable riddle, and the purposes. In order to establish, in confutation of
conviction of a Plato, a Eucleides, and others, that the sophists, that the human mind sees itself com-
they were indebted to him for the fruits of their pelled to press on to truth and certainty, not only
own investigations, is to be regarded as a mere in the general but also in reference to the rules and
illusion. Now we fully admit that in the repre- laws of our actions, and is capable of doing so, it
sentation of the personal character of Socrates was necessary first of all that to the inquiries pre-
Plato and Xenophon coincide (see Ed. Zeller's viously dealt with there should be added a new
Philosophie der Griechen, vol. ii. p. 16, &c. ); and one, that after knowledge, as such. It was a new
further, that Socrates adjusted his treatment of inquiry, inasmuch as previously the mind, being
the subject of his conversation according as those entirely directed towards the objective universe,
with whom he had to do entertained such or such had regarded knowledge respecting it as a neces-
views, were more or less endowed, and had made sary reflection of it, without paying any closer
more or less progress; and therefore did not al- regard to that element of knowledge which is
ways say the same on the same subject (Xenophon, essentially subjective. Even the Pythagoreans,
by F. Delbrück, Bonn, 1829. pp. 64, &c. 132, &c. ). ' who came the nearest to that inquiry, had per-
1
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852
SOCRATES.
SOCRATES.
ceived indeed that the existence of something abso- | sight into this or that one of them, not so much by
lutely true and certain must be presupposed, but the end in view as by the necessity for calling forth
without investigating further what knowledge is self-knowledge and self-understanding. For this
and how it may be developed. It was the end he endeavoured in the first place, and chiefly,
awakening of the idea of knowledge, and the first 10 awaken the consciousness of ignorance ; and in-
utterances of it, which made the philosophy of asmuch as the impulse towards the development
Socrates the turning-point of a new period, and of knowledge is already contained in this, he
gave to it its fructifying power. Before we inquire maintnins that he had been declared by the
after the existence of things we must establish in Delphic god to be the wisest of men, because he
our own minds the idea of them (Xen. Níem. iv. did not delude himself with the idea that he knew
6. § 1, 13, iv. 5. § 12; Plat. Apol
. p. 21, &c. ; what he did not know, and did not arrogate to
Arist. Mctaplı
. i. 6, de Parl. Anim. i. 1, p. 642. 28); himself any wisdom (Plat. Apol. pp. 21, 25, Theuet.
and for that reason we must come to an under. p. 150).
To call forth distrust in pretended
standing with ourselves respecting what belongs to knowledge he used to exercise his peculiar irony,
man, before we inquire after the nature of things which, directed against himself as against others,
in general (Xen. Mem. i. l. § 11, comp. 4. § 7; lost all offensive poignancy (Plat. de lirp. i. p. 337,
Arist. Metaph. i. 6, de Part. Anim. i. 1). Socrates Samp. p. 216, Theaet. p. 150, Aleno, p. 80; Xen.
accordingly takes up the inquiry respecting know- Men. iv. 2). Convinced that he could obtain his
ledge in the first instance, and almost exclusively, object only by leading to the spontaneous search
in reference to moral action ; but he is so penetrated after truth, he throughout made use of the dialogical
with a sense of the power of knowledge, that he form (which passed froin him to the most different
maintains that where it is attained to, there moral ramifications of his school), and designates the
action will of necessity be found ; or, as he ex- inclination to supply one's deficiencies in one's own
presses it, all virtue is knowledge (Xen. Mcm. iii. investigation by association with others striving to-
9. § 4, iv. 6 ; Plat. Protag. p. 329, &c. 349, &c. ; wards the same end, as true love (Brandis, Gesch.
Arist. Eth. Nic. vi. 13, iii. 11, Eth. Eudem. i. 5, der griechisch-römischen Philos. ii. p. 64). But how-
iii. 1, Mugn. Mor. i. 1, 35); for knowledge is ever deeply Socrates felt the need of advancing
always the strongest, and cannot be overpowered in self-development with others, and by means of
by appetite (Arist. Eth. Nicom. vii. 3, Eudem. them, the inclination and the capability for wrap-
vii. 13; Plat. Protag. p. 352, &c. ). Therefore no ping himself up in the abstraction of solitary medita-
man willingly acts wickedly (Arist
. Magn. Mor. i. tion and diving into the depths of his own mind, was
9, comp. Xen. Mem. iii. 9. § 4, iv. 6. $6,11; Plat. equally to be found in hiin (Plat. Symp. pp. 174,
Apol. p. 25, e. &c. ); for will appeared to him to 220). And again, side by side with his incessant
be inseparably connected with knowledge. But endeavour thoroughly to understand himself there
just as knowledge, as such, that is without regard stood the sense of the need of illumination by a
to the diversity of the objects to which it is higher inspiration. This he was convinced was
directed, is something single, so also he could imparted to him from time to time
the mo-
admit only a single virtue (Xen. Mem. iii. 9. & 2; nitions or warnings of an internal voice, which he
Arist. Eth. Nic. iii. 1, Eudem, ii. 1); and as little designated his daluóriov. By this we are not to
could he recognise an essential diversity in the understand a personal genius, as Plutarch (de
directions which virtue took, as in the practice of Genio Socratis, c. 20), Apuleius (de Deo Socrat.
it by persons of different station and sex (Arist. p. 111, &c. ed. Basil. ), and others, and probably
Polit. i. 13). It may easily be conceived, therefore, also the accusers of Socrates, assumed ; as little
that he did not venture to separate happiness from was it the offspring of an enthusiastic phantasy, as
virtue, and that he expressly defined the former moderns have thought, or the production of the
more accurately as good conduct (empatía) in dis- Socratic irony, or of cunning political calculation.
tinction from good fortune (evruxla, Xen. Mem. It was rather the yet indefinitely developed idea
iii. 9. § 14); a distinction in which is expressed of a divine revelation. (See especially Schleier-
the most important diversity in all later treatment macher, in his translation of the works of Plato, i.
of ethics, which sets down either a certain mode 2, p. 432, &c. ) On that accour it is always
being or acting, as such, or else the mere enjoy- described only as a divine something, or a divine
ment that results therefrom, as that which is in sign, a divine voice (onuciov, owrń, Plat. Phaedr.
itself valuable.
p. 212, de Rep. vi. p. 406, Apol. p. 3), &c. ).
But how does knowledge develope itself in us? | This voice had reference to actions the issue
In this way: the idea, obtained by means of in- of which could not be anticipated by calculation,
duction, as that which is general, out of the indi- whether it manifested itself, at least immediately,
vidual facts of consciousness, is settled and fixed only in the way of warning against certain actions
by means of definition. Those are the two scientific (Plat. Apol. p. 31), or even now and then as
processes, which, according to the most express urging him to their performance (Xen. Mem. i. 4,
testimonies of Aristotle and others, Socrates first iv. 3. § 12, &c. ). On the other hand this daemo-
discovered, or rather first pointed out (Arist. Met. nium was to be perceived as little in reference to
xiii. 4 ; comp. Xen. Mem. iv. 6. $ 1; Plat. Apol. the moral value of actions as in reference to sub-
p. 22, &c. ); and although he did not attempt to jects of knowledge. Socrates on the contrary ex-
develope a logical theory of them, but rather con- pressly forbids the having recourse to oracles on a
tented himself with the masterly practice of them, level with which he places his daemonium, in
he may with good reason be regarded as the reference to that which the gods have enabled men
founder of the theory of scientific knowledge. to find by means of reflection. (Xen. Mem. i 1. §
Socrates, however, always setting out from what 6, &c. )
was immediately admitted (Xen. Mlem. iv. 6. $ 15), Thus far the statements of Xenophon and Plato
exercised this twofold process on the most different admit of being very well reconciled both with one
subjects, and in doing so was led to obtain an in- ' another and with those of Aristotle. But this is
}


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SOCRATES.
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SOCRATES.
not the case with reference to the more exact I enjoynient ; and it is quite conceivable that Xeno-
definition and carrying out of the idea of that phon's unphilosophical mind may on the one hand
knowledge which should have moral action as its have confounded sensual enjoyment and utility with
immediate and necessary consequence. What is that of a more exalted and real kind, and on the
comprised in, and what is the source of, this know- other comprehended and preserved the externals and
ledge? Is it to be derived merely from custom introductions of the conversations of Socrates rather
and the special ends and interests of the subject than their internal connection and objects. Besides,
which acts ? Every thing, according to the Xeno- his purpose was to reſute the prejudice that Socrates
phontic Socrates, is good and beautiful merely for aspired after a hidden wisdom, and for that very
that to which it stands in a proper relation (Nem. reason he might have found himself still more in-
iii. 8. & 3, 7). The good is nothing else than the duced to bring prominently forward every thing
useful, the beautiful nothing else than the service by which Socrates appeared altogether to fall in
able (Mem. 6. § 8, &c. , Symp. 5. $ 3, &c. ), and with the ordinary conceptions of the Athenians.
almost throughout, moral precepts are referred to Whether and how Socrates endeavoured to
the motives of utility and enjoyment (Nem. i. 5, connect the moral with the religious cousciousness,
$ 6, ii. 1. § 1, iv. 3. & 9, &c. ; comp. ii. 1. & 27. and how and how far he had developed his con-
&c. , i. 6. § 9, iv. 8. $ 6); while on the contrary victions respecting a divine spirit arranging and
the Platonic Socrates never makes use of an argu- guiding the universe, respecting the immortality of
ment founded on the identity of the good and the the soul, the essential nature of love, of the state,
agreeable. In the passages which have been &c. , we cannot here inquire. (Ch. A.