No More Learning

At Milan, and generally in Lombardy, distinctly class warfare was the
cause of change. In Milan itself we find the lesser traders, butchers,
bakers, and the like, forming a league, the Credenza di Sant'Ambrogio,
which combined with the Motta, or association of the wealthier traders,
to wrest a share of power from the Credenza dei Consoli in which the
capitanei, strengthened perhaps by the war with Barbarossa, were
dominant. The merchants of Milan seem still to have retained their
association. Elsewhere, the struggle is between milites, whether traders
or not, and the pedites, whose wealth, if yet acquired, was new. The
expulsion of the milites from the city, which had occurred in the pre-
communal age, began to reappear as a feature of class-warfare.
The immediate result of these broils and social changes, however
caused and carried on, was the institution of a new single executive, the
Podestà (Potestas). An occasional single ruler, called by the vague title
of Rector or Potestas, was no novelty. From 1151 to 1155 Guido da Sasso
so ruled Bologna, and during the foundation of the Roman commune
Jordan Pierleoni ruled with the title of Patrician. But after Barba-
rossa's institution of imperial Podestàs', evidences of a tendency to
1 Cf. infra, Chap. XII.
An official in each town to exercise and exact the
regalia recovered by the crown in 1158.
CH, V.


## p. 238 (#284) ############################################

238
The Podestà
munes.
supersede the board of consuls by a single man multiply. At Pisa a
rector is regarded as possible from 1169; at Milan the first known is of
1186, at Florence of 1193. At first an exceptional magistrate, as at
Piacenza in 1188, the Podestà grew to be a permanent institution. The
consuls who alternated with him were elected more and more rarely,
and about the year 1210 he had become the normal ruler in all com-
By then the office had acquired a definite character. Though
native Podestàs appear and are usually dangerous to liberty, the typical
Podestà is a foreigner, i. e. from another city. He must be a knight,
i. e. a noble; he brings with him his familia or household of knights and
jurists; he is held strictly to account by a syndicate at the close of his
year's or half-year's office, and is carefully segregated from the social
and faction life of the city. Nor, partly through the natural elabora-
tion of the State, partly from jealousy of power, was he allowed the full
functions of the native consuls, He led the army, summoned the
Councils, supervised police and criminal justice; but legislation, finance,
and foreign policy were withheld from him, while in his own sphere he
was surrounded by a Special Council, which often had direct connexion
with the Consulate, and he was guided by the Great Council, which had
now become the central organ of the commune. Even so the Podestà
had to be a man of great natural gifts for rule and of elaborate training
in law and affairs. A special tract, the Oculus Pastoralis, was written as
a guide to his duties. For a century it was a kind of profession for the
ablest city-nobles. They went from commune to commune, adminis-
tering, warring, judging among an infinite variety of routine, of debate,
and of emergencies, and such men as Brancaleone the Bolognese, and
Corso Donati the Florentine, give much of its brilliance to Italian
history in the thirteenth century.
It has been much debated what party had its way in the institution
of the Podestà in the later twelfth century. First of all, undoubtedly
the State: for the unity of the executive enabled the commune to survive
the feuds and amateurishness and dissensions of the board of consuls;
nor was self-government lessened, since the Great Council became the
directing body of the commune. Next, we may probably say, the pedites,
for affairs were no longer transacted by an oligarchic, quasi-hereditary
board, but by the single foreign official and a Council in which the
milites were no more than preponderant. It was in fact a step, like the
admission of the wealthier Arts to a share in government, towards a
wider basis for the State. But it was not a long step; the nobles were
still dominant, and their lesser members benefited, perhaps, most by the
supersession of the narrow ring of consular families. The further develop-
ment, by which the non-nobles (popolani), or the people (popolo), erected
a fresh organisation, the popolo, and secured power over the State, belongs
to a later volume.
The Peace of Constance and the niggardly diplomas of the Emperor


## p. 239 (#285) ############################################

Commerce and banking of the cities
239
Henry VI finally admitted the communes into the feudal chain, and it
continued for many generations to be their endeavour to express their
relations of territory and dominion according to the reigning feudal law.
But this should not conceal the fact that the cities by their very nature
were anti-feudal; they and their very nobles were trading, manufacturing,
not chivalrous, in a word they were bourgeois. Their trade, as we have seen,
long ante-dated the Crusades, which gave it so powerful a stimulus.
From the first the exchange of goods between East and West formed a
chief part of it. From Constantinople and the Levant the Italians
brought the much desired spices, sugar, silk and cotton, rare fabrics, dye-
woods, and wine, objects of art and luxury, and soon corn and fish from
the Black Sea. From Africa came gold, ivory, indigo, and lead. In
return they exported metal and building-woods, furs, linen, cloth, and
wool. To the Transalpines they handed on the Oriental and African
products, with a slowly increasing quantity of their own cloth', and
received cloth, wool, hides, and furs in exchange. The chief manufacture
of Italy was to be the finer qualities of dyed cloth. In the later twelfth
century the ascetic, half-heretical fraternity of the Umiliati gave a re-
markable impulse to the cloth industry in Lombardy, and they and their
methods were introduced farther south. In the next century the Art of
the Merchants of Calimala in Florence became specialists in dyeing and
dressing Transalpine cloth, and in almost every town the Arte della Lana
(Gild of Clothmakers) was among the wealthiest.
This trade was vigorously organised. From the seaports caravans
(merchant fleets, escorted by galleys) sailed twice a year to the Levant.
At Constantinople and the Syrian ports existed colonies of Venetians,
Pisans, and Genoese, governed in a fashion we should now call extra-
territorial by consuls or baili, with store-houses (fondachi) for wares
and ship-tackle. It was the aim of each city to gain exclusive privileges
and turn out its rivals, and much of their best energy was spent in these
bitterly-fought commercial wars. One rival they overcame; the Byzantines
faded from the sea and from their own export-trade. In the West, the
merchants trooped by road and river to the great fairs of Champagne, of
which six were held in the year. Here, too, men travelled in caravans;
but there was no question of extra-territoriality, though trade-concerns
might be settled by Law-merchant, the custom of traders. Security and
toll-freedom were the things aimed at, if only very partially obtained.
It was the Transalpine trade which gave the Italians their pre-eminence
and ill-fame in the thirteenth century as bankers and money-lenders.
Merchants whose business stretched from the Levant to England had a
natural advantage in the handling of money and the organisation of
credit. Partners in a firm would reside for long periods abroad; there
was always an agent at least, and money-values could pass from Paris to
Siena by note of hand. Almost all the great merchant houses took up
Salt was a staple export of Venice.
CH. V.


## p. 240 (#286) ############################################

240
Corporate life. The blood-feud
banking and with it usury, from which they reaped in the thirteenth
century enormous profits. The levying of the papal revenue fell into
their hands. They knew and dealt in the coinage of Europe in all its
varieties and degradations. It is a testimony to the inflow of the precious
metals into Italy that the Gild of Money-changers (Campsores, Arte del
Cambio), who dealt in banking in their native town, was next in wealth
to the Merchants. The Italian, or "Lombard," banker was indeed hated
abroad, and often at home, for his usury, both fair and unfair. The
risk was great, the monopoly hard to break through, the interest usuriously
high. Then, although a logical series of exceptions and relaxations was
gradually worked out, the trade of money-lending, the taking of interest,
was in principle forbidden by Canon Law. The perplexing limits within
which interest could be taken were always being overstepped, and we
have the curious spectacle of the merchant-class, the factors of the Papacy,
making their living by a mortal sin, as they thought it, and perhaps the
more extortionate because a reasonable profit on a loan was in theory for-
bidden.
The great firms might be either family businesses of many kinsmen,
or as time went on more frequently voluntary partnerships. The several
partners subscribed the capital, traded, travelled, served in the commune's
army, held state-office, met in their gild and religious confraternity,
co-operated in their consorzeria, and in the portae and vicinanze of their
city. It was a full life, and, when citizen and commercial organisation
grew more complicated in the thirteenth century, it is no wonder that
short terms of office and each man taking his turn on council and board
of officials were the rule. The drain on the citizen's time as well as civic
and class jealousy made it necessary. But the citizens also knew well
that unfettered power made the tyrant. The one true single official, the
Podestà, was fettered and supervised in a healthy state. The commune
had begun by association and it lived by corporate action and impersonal
decisions. Personal fame in it is a sign of disease and decay. At its best
we hear only of the commune, the milites and pedites, the consorzeria and
the gild.
These collective units, however, gave ample opportunity for broils,
which always hampered and eventually wrecked the communes. Class-
warfare and its early effects have already been mentioned; it was to
transform the commune. But it was partly caused and its method was
perniciously affected by the blood-feuds which existed from generation
to generation among the consormerie. The nobles, often of Germanic
descent, and always adopting feudal, Germanic traditions, were perhaps
somewhat antipathetic to the thrifty Latin plebeians, although this must
not be pressed far. But it was their turbulent, tyrannous habits that
became ever harder to bear. They rioted in the streets like Capulet and
Montague, they fought round their towers, they were fierce and insolent
to their inferiors. However given to commerce they might be, the


## p. 241 (#287) ############################################

Contrasts in the communes
241
vendetta was a sacred duty, and by its nature it could only end, if it did
end, with the extinction of a stock. Thus, whether the milites fought
among themselves for power or vengeance, or the plebeians took up
arms to tame them, the city was a victim of civil fighting. Now and
again the flimsy wooden houses would be destroyed over parts of the city
by accidental or wilful incendiarism. And these methods became normal.
There was no rage so furious as that of the Italian bourgeois intent on
restoring peace and order.
In fact the intensely strong family and group feeling of the citizens
is in strange contrast to their European trade and policy. Next to the
Roman Curia, they have the widest, most civilised outlook of the Middle
Ages. Strangers from all climes jostle in their streets. They themselves
have a cult of efficiency and energy. They are the most original devisers
of laws and constitutions, the acutest in jurisprudence and organisation,
innovators at last in literature and romance. It is hard to exaggerate
their devotion to their group or their commune. But on the other side
is their narrowness. For his consorzeria the citizen at his best will devote
everything; to his gild he will be staunch; to his city, if these allow,
well-meaning and fiercely loyal. But these associations are exclusive.
City wars down city with relentless rivalry; family, class, and gild
struggle mercilessly for dominion within them. It was only the danger
to the autonomy of all which produced the Lombard League, and in
that perhaps, as in other manifestations, it is the triumphant genius
loci, the immediate character and communal will of each city, which
dominates medieval Italian politics.
C. MED. H. VOL. V. CH. V.
16


## p. 242 (#288) ############################################

242
CHAPTER VI.
ISLĀM IN SYRIA AND EGYPT, 750-1100.
With the accession of the first of the Abbasid Caliphs (A. D. 750) it
became clear that the dominions of Islām would consist, henceforth, of a
number of separate and independent Islāmic states. Even in the time of
the Umayyad Caliphs the unity of the Muslim Empire was maintained
with difficulty and was never quite complete. In Arabia, the birthplace
and the original home of the new world-power, there was neither the
military strength nor the political organisation required for the rule of the
conquered lands. The movement of the seat of government to Damascus
under the Umayyads is, in one aspect, a practical acknowledgment of
this fact. For a time the Arabian families who ruled the subject provinces
were a connecting link and a partial bond of unity. But even they adopted
and so perpetuated the national governments of Persia and Syria and
Egypt, and thus the Muslim Empire was from the first a loosely-knit
federation of Muslim states. The superiority of Mesopotamia and Persia
over Syria and Arabia was declared by the triumph of the Abbasids. It
was symbolised by a further movement of the capital from Damascus to
Ambār and finally to Baghdad. But, inevitably, this movement of the
capital to the distant east weakened the control of the Abbasid Caliphs
over the lands of the far west. An Umayyad prince became ruler of
Muslim Spain in A. D. 755, and founded a dynasty which afterwards claimed
the Caliphate and assumed the much disputed title of “commander of the
fait! ul ” (A. D. 929). In Morocco Idrīs ibn `Abdallāh, a descendant of
'Ali, established in 788 the first Shitite Caliphate. The dynasty of the
Idrīsites, so established, maintained their power for about 200 years
(788–985). In Tunis Ibrāhīm ibn Aghlab (800–811) was the first of
another line of independent emirs with a brilliant history (800-909).
This process of disintegration continued in all parts of the Muslim
dominion. Every provincial governor was potentially an independent
ruler. National traditions and aspirations reinforced the drift to
separatism. Egypt and Syria and Arabia and Persia once more fell
apart. The Arab conquest created a permanent international brother-
hood of learning, literature, and religion; it achieved a spiritual
federation and affinity between much-divided races and nationalities ; it
encouraged and made easy the migration of individuals from one land to
another ; but it did not permanently obliterate national boundaries and
national rivalries.
Parallel to the development of Islām as a world-power went the


## p. 243 (#289) ############################################

Disintegration of the Caliphate
243
development of the Caliphate, its highest dignity. On the political side
this office was an adaptation to new conditions of the ancient city govern-
ments of Mecca and Medina. Yet its holder was, essentially, a successor of
the Prophet and so the supreme head of Islām. Local traditions and needs
were bound to yield to this pre-eminent fact. When the Caliphs ceased to
reside in Arabia, their local functions were soon practically abrogated.
Only the restriction that they must be descended from the ancient ruling
families of Mecca long remained to mark their political ancestry? The
sovereign power inherent in the Caliphate was most fully realised in the
case of the Umayyad princes. After them, in the Abbasid period, the
authority of the office was circumscribed and diminished by the existence
of rival Caliphates and by the disappearance of the political unity of Islām.
The Caliphs of Baghdad drifted towards the condition of being a line of
Muslim princes with a specially venerable ancestry. From this destiny
they were partly saved by a further transformation of their position.
They surrendered their political authority, even in their own territories
and capitals, first to Persian and then to Turkish sultans, whose mere
nominees they became. The Caliphate was now a dignity conferred by
certain Muslim princes upon the descendants of an old Arabian family,
which had formerly ruled Islām and still had a recognised hereditary
right to its position. Some forms of power remained to it, which ex-
pressed respect for an ancient tradition and occasionally decided the
course of events. The case of the Frankish kings of the seventh century,
who ruled by the grace of the mayors of the palace, may be referred to
as a parallel
. It may not be superfluous to add that in this phase the
Caliphate cannot be described as having been reduced to a purely spiritual
function. The office is not a kind of Papacy. In name, if not in fact, the
Caliphs have always been great Muslim sovereigns. The separation of
Egypt and of Syria from the jurisdiction of the Abbasid Caliphs and
the subsequent conflicts between them and their Fāțimite rivals, to be
narrated in this chapter, are essentially a sequence of military and
political events
The distinctive principles and the historical origin of the Shī'ite party,
who supported the exclusive claims of 'Alī to the Caliphate, have been
explained in a previous chapter. Having failed to secure the succession
for one of 'Ali's descendants when the Umayyads were overthrown, they
turned their intrigues and plots with increased energy against the Abbasid
usurpers. Two branches of this Shitite agitation, with apparently a
1 The restriction was observed until the Ottoman Sultans assumed the title of
Caliph (circa a. d. 1517). The legitimacy of their Caliphate has been challenged and
its authority widely rejected by Muslims on the ground that it did not possess this
hereditary qualification.
? It should be borne in mind that the successive phases through which the
Caliphate has passed make it difficult, perhaps impossible, to sum up its essential
character satisfactorily in any brief statement.
CH. VI.
16-2


## p. 244 (#290) ############################################

244
Shi'ite dynasties
or
common origin, have a notable influence on the history of Egypt and
Syria in the ninth and tenth centuries. One of the Shi'ite sects is known
as the Ismāʻīlian, because its adherents believed that the Mahdi, who was
to establish their cause and set the world right, would be a son
descendant of the seventh Imām, Ismāʻīl. About the middle of the ninth
century a certain 'Abdallāh ibn Maimūn, a Persian, gained a position of
great influence among these Ismāʻīlians, and directed a wide-spread pro-
paganda from Salamiyah, his headquarters in northern Syria. At least
two of his descendants, Aḥmad ibn 'Abdallāh and Sa'id ibn Husain,
succeeded him as the heads of the organisation which he established. In
the beginning of the tenth century the supporters of Sa'id gained
sufficient power in North Africa to enable them to overthrow and depose
the last of the Aghlabite emirs. In 909 they proclaimed a certain
'Ubaidallāh ibn Muḥammad as the Mahdi and the first of the Fāțimite
Caliphs (909–934)'. There is strong reason to believe that this personage
was actually Sa'id ibn Husain, who had disappeared from Salamīyah
some years previously. But his followers held that he was a descendant
of ‘Ali and of the Prophet's daughter Fāțimah. In 969 the fourth
Fāțimite Caliph conquered Egypt, and soon afterwards Egypt became the
seat of the dynasty, with Cairo as its capital.
The Qarmațians were another offshoot of the propaganda organised
by ‘Abdallāh ibn Maimûn. They became a political power in Bahrain and
amongst the Arabs on the borders of Syria and Mesopotamia, towards
the end of the ninth century. Their special name is derived from the
name (or nickname) of the agent whose preaching converted them to
Shīʻite doctrines. They are alleged to have been to some extent under
the secret control of the Fāțimite Caliphs, who are thus supposed to have
been the heirs of the authority of ‘Abdallāh ibn Maimūn and his successors
in Salamīyah. During the tenth century the Qarmațians were persistent
and formidable enemies of the Abbasid Caliphs. Their repeated attacks
on the pilgrim caravans to Mecca and their famous seizure of the Black
Stone, which they kept in Bahrain for 21 years (930-951), are evidence
of the looseness of their attachment to Islām.
Aḥmad ibn Tūlūn (870-884) was the first of the Abbasid governors
of Egypt to make himself practically independent of the Caliphs and to
transmit his emirate to his descendants. He invaded Syria in 878, and
joined it and a large part of Mesopotamia to his dominions. His territory
extended to the borders of the Greek Empire, with which he came into
conflict. His successor, Abu'l-jaish Khumārawaih (884–896), on the
1 His recognition may be dated from the capture of Sijilmāsa in August 909.
His Caliphate is usually made to commence on the day of his triumphal entry into
Raqqadah, which is dated by Jamāl-ad-Din al-ḥalabi on Thursday, 21 Rabi' ii A. H.
297 and treated as equivalent to 7 January 910. But the conflict between the day of
the week and the day of the month in this date demands the reading 21 Rabi' i
A. H. 297, i. e. 7 December 909 (see Stevenson's Chronology).


## p. 245 (#291) ############################################

Saif-ad-Daulah
Aleppo
245
whole maintained his authority in Syria and was confirmed in his position
by the Abbasid Caliph. Three other members of the Țūlūnite family
were also, at least nominally, rulers of Egypt. In 903 the first great
Qarmațian invasion of Syria took place. The governor of Damascus and
the army of Egypt were unable to save the province.
Help was asked
from Muktafī, the last of the Caliphs of Baghdad to exercise a measure
of independent political power. His troops defeated the Qarmațians
(903), put an end to the authority of the Țūlūnites (904–905), and then
repelled a second attack of the Qarmațians on Syria (906).
For thirty years Egypt and Syria were again ruled by a series of emirs
nominated by the court of Baghdad. Their brief terms of office reflect
the unstable condition of the central government. The first 'amir
al-'umarā to exercise supreme power in Baghdad, the eunuch Münis
(908–933), also effectively influenced the course of events in the pro-
vinces. It was he who saved Egypt from the first attacks of the Fāțimites.
Twice (914-915 and 919-920) an invading army captured Alexandria
and occupied part of the country for several months, but was in the
end repulsed. During the next fifty years the Fāțimite Caliphs had
little leisure to pursue their scheme of annexing Egypt. They made
one slight attempt in 935-936. In 935 the Emir of Damascus, Muḥam-
mad ibn Tughj al-Ikhshīd, obtained the governorship of Egypt. He
lost his Syrian possessions for a time to Muḥammad ibn Rā'iq of
Aleppo. But after the death of this rival (942) he reoccupied Syria and
obtained the governorship of Mecca and Medina on the nomination of
the Abbasid Caliph.
About this time the most powerful emirs in Upper Mesopotamia were
two rulers of the Arab house of Hamdān, Nāşir-ad-Daulah Hasan of
Mosul (936–967) and Saif-ad-Daulah ‘Ali of Diyārbakr (935-944). This
house now began to play an important part in the history of Syria. In
944 Saif-ad-Daulah seized Aleppo and became master of northern Syria.
An attempt to occupy Damascus was not permanently successful (spring of
945) and a battle fought with the army of Ikhshīd, near Qinnasrīn, was
indecisive. In the autumn of 945 peace was made between Saif-ad-Daulah
and Ikhshid, on the terms that the former should hold northern Syria
as far as Hims and the latter Damascus and southern Syria. The line thus
drawn is the usual line of division in the tenth and eleventh centuries
between the territory of Aleppo and the territory ruled by the sovereigns
of Egypt. Antioch and a large part of Cilicia were also dependencies of
Aleppo when the peace of 945 was made.
When Ikhshīd died (July 946), he was nominally succeeded first
by one son and then, after an interval, by another. But the real ruler of
Egypt in these two reigns was a native African, Abu 'l-mish Kāfür (946–
968). He defeated a second attempt of Saif-ad-Daulah to seize Damascus
(946), and then renewed with him the previously existing agreement,
modified somewhat to his own advantage (947). Henceforward Kāfür's
CH. .


## p. 246 (#292) ############################################

246
Greek attacks on Syria
rule was undisturbed by foreign attack. He successfully promoted the
internal development of his own dominions, and made no attempt to
encroach on the territory of his neighbours.
In northern Syria during the period of Kāfür's reign Saif-ad-Daulah
waged a desperate and continuous warfare with the Greek Empire (944–
967). First the Muslims, and then after some years the Greeks, were the
chief aggressors. But for nearly twenty years the character of the warfare
was substantially the same. Each year some raid or expedition was
launched far over the enemy's borders by one or both of the combatants,
and yet no decisive success was secured by either side. A notable victory
is sometimes ascribed to Saif-ad-Daulah (e. g. in the year 953), but more
often he seems to have suffered serious defeat (e. g. in November 950 and
November 960).
During these years Aleppo was the seat of a court which attracted to
it poets and men of learning from all the lands of Islām. Saif-ad-Daulah
was himself a poet and a man of letters, and also, literally, the hero of a
hundred fights. His character and his court are illuminated for us by the
poems of one of the most famous of Arabic writers, Ahmad ibn Husain,
al-Mutanabbi.
The first campaign of Nicephorus Phocas in 962 marks the commence-
ment of a change in the scene and character of Greek operations. The
most striking feature of the campaign was the sack of Aleppo and the
occupation of the city by a Greek army for six or eight days (December
962)'. But the most important and significant operations were those
which aimed at the conquest of Cilicia. Three years were needed to bring
them to a conclusion. In 965 Mamistra and Tarsus were both captured,
and the annexation of the province was virtually complete? .
During 965 and 966 Saif-ad-Daulah was engrossed by the distractions
of civil strife and Muslim war. His death, early in 967 (in January or
February)”, was a prelude to further dissensions in Aleppo. Rival princes
of the house of Hamdān and other emirs waged war with one another.
Nicephorus, now Emperor (963-969), seized his opportunity. In the
autumn of 968 he made a terrifying raid through the greater part of
northern Syria, burning and destroying and taking many prisoners from
the towns he passed. He marched up the valley of the Orontes, passed
1 Such partial and temporary occupations are frequently mistaken by modern
historians for complete captures or permanent conquests. It should not be said
without qualification of an oriental town in this period that it has been captured,
unless its citadel is known to have been surrendered or stormed. In 962 the citadel
of Aleppo remained intact and Saif-ad-Daulah and the best of his troops lay outside
the city undefeated.
2 The sources which relate the capture of these towns at an earlier date either
give the year wrongly or possibly refer to temporary occupations, such as those
referred to in last note.
3 The authorities vary curiously between Friday, 25 January (Kamāl-ad-Din),
and Friday, 8 February (Yahyà, Al-makin, Ibn Khalliqan).


## p. 247 (#293) ############################################

The Fațimites conquer Egypt
247
Hamāh and Hims, and then turned through Al-Buqai'ah to the sea. He
returned northwards along the coast by Jabalah and Lāțiqiyah to Antioch.
No territory was gained by this invasion, unless possibly the sea-coast
town of Lāțiqīyah. But the display of the Emperor's power contributed
to the success of his representative in the following year. Nicephorus, as
he withdrew to Cilicia, left a strong garrison in the castle of Baghrās, at
the Syrian gates. It was commanded by Michael Burtzes, who soon
learned that the people of Antioch, having declared their independence
of Aleppo, had no settled government. He secured an entrance into the
city by the help of traitors, and took possession on 28 October 969.
Two months later he imposed humiliating terms of peace on Aleppo,
which was again occupied by Greek troops, as it had been in 962. The
boundaries between the dukedom of Antioch and the emirate of Aleppo
were minutely defined and remained practically the same for the next
hundred years. Hārim was the farthest castle of the Greeks on the east
and Athārib the corresponding fortress of Aleppo on the west. On the
north the territory of Aleppo extended to the river Sajūr and included
Mambij. It was a condition of peace that the emirs of Aleppo should
pay an annual tribute to the Greeks'.
The fourth Fāțimite Caliph, Abu Tamīm Ma'add al-Mu'izz (953–975),
added much to the fame and power of the dynasty. His success was due
to his own qualities of statesmanship and to the talents of his most trusted
general, Jauhar ar-Rūmī, originally a Greek slave (ob. 992). When Abu 'l-
mish Kāfür died (April 968), Mu'izz, having established his supremacy in
Tunis and Morocco, had already commenced to prepare for the invasion
of Egypt. Kāfūr's death was followed by civil strife in Egypt and by
circumstances which caused wide-spread distress. A strong party was
ready to welcome the Fāțimite ruler. No one was much opposed to his
taking possession of the country. In the summer of 969 Jauhar's in-
vasion met with only slight opposition. Cairo was occupied on 6 July,
and the name of the Fățimite Caliph quietly supplanted that of his
Abbasid rival in the public prayers of the following Friday (9 July).
Jauhar's conciliatory policy and the practical benefits of his government
secured general acquiescence in the new regime. Mu'izz did not transfer
his residence to Egypt until the early summer of 973, but Jauhar's con-
quest marks the beginning of a new period in the history of Egypt and
of the Caliphate (969). For two centuries the governors of Egypt con-
tested the claim of the Abbasids to the obedience of all Islām. The
prestige of its rulers was equal and even superior to that of the Caliphs
of Baghdad. The emirs of Syria and Arabia had an alternative Caliph to
whom they might transfer their allegiance at choice. During the next
hundred years the rulers of Lower Mesopotamia were either too weak or
too much engaged elsewhere to exercise any effective control in Syria. The
1 Kamāl-ad-Din gives large extracts from the treaty, including a definition of
the boundaries on the north and north-west.
CH. VI.


## p. 248 (#294) ############################################

248
The Qarmațians in Syria
histories of Syria and Egypt thus run, for the most part, in one channel.
In the extreme north the emirs of Aleppo maintain a precarious in-
dependence. But southern and central Syria, which had been subject to
the Ikhshids and to Abu'l-mish Kāfūr, remained normally subject to
Egypt until the coming of the Turks.
The disaffection or rivalry of the Qarmațians was the chief obstacle
to the occupation of Damascus and southern Syria by the Fāțimites. It
seems probable that the Qarmațians of Bahrain had been up to this point
secret supporters and allies of the Fāțimites. It is therefore possible that
their invasions of Syria in 964 and 968 were instigated by the Caliph
Mu'izz as a step towards his conquest of Egypt and Syria. But now
a party held power in Bahrain whose policy was to oppose the Fāțimites
and to acknowledge the Abbasid Caliphs. Such a complete reversal of
the principles of the sect could not fail to shake the confidence of its
adherents, and it may be that the rapid decline of the Qarmațians from
this date onwards is due to the internal schism so introduced'. The new
policy had only a brief prospect of success. Syria was invaded by one of
Jauhar's lieutenants, Ja'far ibn Fallāh. He defeated the Ikhshid governor,
Husain ibn 'Ubaidallāh, at Ramlah in the autumn of 969 and entered
Damascus in the third week of November. The population of Damascus
was not disposed to acknowledge a Shi'ite Caliph, and Ja'far's position
as governor during two years was precarious and uneasy. On the other
hand Acre, Sidon, Beyrout, and Tripolis seem to have transferred their
allegiance to the Fātimites without resistance. The decisive factor in
their case was the command which the Egyptian fleet held of the sea.
In 971 the Qarmațian leader, Hasan al-'aşam (Hasan al-a-sham), in
agreement with the Emir of Aleppo and the Caliph of Baghdad, invaded
Syria. Ja'far was defeated and Damascus occupied (autumn 971), and the
Qarmațians became masters of the interior of southern Syria. During
the three years of their occupation they twice invaded Egypt without
success (October 971 and May 974). After their second repulse Damascus
was reoccupied by Fāțimite troops for a few months (June 974). But
the inhabitants were still opposed to the Fāțimites, and chose a Turkish
emir, Al-aftakin, to be their governor (spring 975). Al-aftakin, after an
unsuccessful attack on the Syrian coast-towns in 976, was besieged in
Damascus for six months by Jauhar (July-December). A Qarmațian army
came to his rescue, and the allies reoccupied southern Palestine with the
exception of Ascalon, which Jauhar held against them for fifteen months.
The loss of this city in the spring of 978 was counterbalanced by an
Egyptian victory near Ramlah (15 August 978). Al-aftakīn's career was
ended by his capture after the battle, but the Egyptians judged it ex-
pedient to buy off the Qarmațians by promising payment to them of an
annual sum of money. Damascus also maintained its independence.
1 So De Goeje.


## p. 249 (#295) ############################################

The Caliphate and the Empire
249
A Syrian emir named Qassām was chosen governor by the citizens, and
remained in power until July 983. During most of his emirate a large
part of southern Syria was ruled independently by the Arab chief, Mu-
farrij ibn Daghfal ibn Jarrāḥ. In 9821 this chief was driven out of the
country, and thus, finally, Palestine was reduced to obedience. In the
following year Qassām himself surrendered to an Egyptian army. The
Caliph, Abu manșūr Nizār al-^Azīz (975-996), then secured control of
Damascus by appointing as its governor Bakjūr, recently Emir of Hims,
who was a persona grata to the inhabitants (December 983). He ruled
five years and was then deposed for disloyalty (October 988). But the
series of governors who succeeded him, until the Turkish occupation,
were nearly all nominees of the Fāțimite Caliphs.
By the Fāțimite conquest of Egypt and the Greek occupation of
Aleppo in the same year (969), the way was opened for the clash of two
distant powers in Syria. The Syrian coast-towns as far as Tripolis quickly
became a portion of the Fāțimite dominions. In the early part of the year
971 an army sent by Ja'far ibn Fallāḥ unsuccessfully besieged Antioch
for some months. The attempt was not followed up because of the re-
sistance that the Fāțimites met with in Palestine. It was also the con-
dition of Palestine during the Fāțimite conquest and the Qarmatian
occupation that induced the Emperor John (969-976) to invade Syria in
975. Aleppo was already a humble tributary, and probably the Emperor
expected to reduce a large part of the country to the same condition.
The fullest description of his campaign is contained in a letter that he
wrote to an Armenian prince? . The expedition lasted from April to
October. The farthest point reached by the main army was the plain of
Esdraelon (Marj ibn 'Amir). From Antioch the Greeks marched past
Hamāh and Hims, then through the Biqā' and the valley of the Jordan
as far as Baisān. From Baisān they turned westward to Acre, and from
there along the coast back again to Antioch. No hostile army attempted
to stop their progress. Most of the Syrian emirs professed submission in
order to save themselves from attack. Al-aftakin of Damascus and others
purchased immunity by paying considerable sums of money. Baalbek
was besieged and captured, and Beyrout was successfully stormed. Tripolis
was besieged for forty days without success. The real gains of the ex-
pedition were made on the coast just to the south of Antioch and in the
hills facing Jabalah and Lāțiqiyah. From now onwards Jabalah was an
advanced post of the Greek Empire, facing Tripolis and the territory of
the Fāțimites. In the hills Şahyūn and Barzūyah became Greek strong-
holds. Beyond these limits nothing was gained. The southern emirs,
who promised to pay an annual tribute, and even signed treaties to
1 Possibly in the beginning of 983; at all events before the Egyptian attack on
Qassam.
? Matthew of Edessa (trans. by E. Dulaurier, 1858), pp. 16 sqq.
CH, ĐI.


## p. 250 (#296) ############################################

250
History of Aleppo
this effect, were beyond the reach of the Emperor's troops in ordinary
times and never fulfilled their promises'.
In Aleppo after the death of Saif-ad-Daulah (967) the authority of
government was usurped by Turkish slaves, of whom Farghūyah
(Qarghūyah) was the chief. In the following year Saif-ad-Daulah's son,
Sa'd-ad-Daulah Abu 'l-ma‘ālī, was expelled from the city (968). When
Farghūyah submitted to the Greeks (970), as previously described, Sa'd-
ad-Daulah was allowed to retain Hims. In 975 Farghūyah was thrown
into prison by an associate, the emir Bakjūr, part of whose later history
has already been narrated. This encouraged Sa'd-ad-Daulah to attempt
the recovery of his father's capital (976). Bakjūr was compelled to
come to terms, and received Hims in compensation for the surrender of
Aleppo (977).
The chief feature of the remainder of Sa'd-ad-Daulah's emirate is the
oscillation of Aleppo between dependence upon the Greeks and alliance
with the Egyptians. Sa'd-ad-Daulah wished to be quit of the burden of
tribute due to the Emperor, and was willing to make concessions to the
Caliph in return for his help. But ‘Azīz hoped to reduce northern Syria
to the same state of obedience as Palestine, and for this and other reasons
Sa'd-ad-Daulah was compelled at times to ask protection from the Greeks.
His first revolt, in 981, quickly collapsed owing to lack of support from
Egypt. In 983 Bakjūr of Himş, having quarrelled with Sa'd-ad-Daulah,
attacked Aleppo with the support of Fāțimite troops (September). The
siege was raised by a relief force from Antioch under Bardas Phocas.
Bakjūr fled to Damascus, and Hims was sacked by Greek soldiers
(October). Even in these circumstances there was friction between Sa'd-
ad-Daulah and his protectors. The dispute was settled by the payment
in one year of two years' tribute”. During 985 and 986 Sa'd-ad-Daulah
was again in revolt. The principal events were the capture of Killiz by
the Greeks (985) and their siege of Fāmīyah (986). Fāțimite troops
captured and held for a short time the castle of Bulunyās. Most likely
it was the determination of ‘Azīz to make peace with the Greeks that
led to Sa'd-ad-Daulah's submission to the Emperor on the same terms
as before. The amount of the annual tribute was 20,000 dinars (400,000
dirhems).
The career of Bakjūr, which is characteristic of the period, may here
be followed to its close. After ruling Damascus for five years in dependence
on ‘Azīz (983–988), he was deposed by his order. He fled to Raqqah, on
1 Gustave Schlumberger, who gives a brilliant account of all these events, over-
estimates the results of the campaign of 975, and misapprehends the position held
by the Greeks in Syria at this date and later.
2 There was fighting between the allies after the retreat of Bakjūr. The cause
is not mentioned by the sources. Possibly Bardas Phocas demanded payment for
his help either in money or in some other way. Kamāl-ad-Din is wrong in stating
that the Greeks were defeated and driven away from Aleppo by Sa'd-ad-Daulah. His
narrative under this year is confused, and includes events that happened in 986.


## p. 251 (#297) ############################################

The Emperor Basil II
251
the Euphrates, and from there once more plotted against Sa'd-ad- Daulah.
In April 991 he was defeated, captured, and executed by his former master
and rival. In this battle Greek troops from Antioch again assisted the
Emir of Aleppo.
In 987 or 988 (A. H. 377) the first of a series of treaties between the
Greek Emperors and the Egyptian Caliphs was made. The scanty details
which are preserved suggest that it followed the lines of the better-
known treaties of later date. If so, the outstanding feature is that the
Emperor exercises his influence on behalf of the Christian subjects of
the Caliph, and that the Caliph similarly acts as protector of the
Muslims of the Empire. It is significant that under this arrangement
the Fāțimite Caliph is recognised to the exclusion of his Abbasid rival.
Under the treaty there was an exchange of prisoners and the duration of
peace was fixed at seven years'.
Sa'd-ad-Daulah was succeeded nominally by his son Abu'l-faņā'il
Saʻīd-ad-Daulah (December 991). But the effective ruler throughout his
reign was the wazīr Abu Muḥammad Lūlū al-kabir (Lūlū the elder). It
was presumably hostility to him that drove a number of the mamlūks of
Aleppo about this time to seek refuge in Egypt. Their support encouraged
'Azīz to attempt again the conquest of Aleppo. This led to a renewal
of war with the Greek Empire also. The governor of Damascus, Man-
jūtakin (Banjūtakin), commanded the Egyptian army. He invaded the
territory of Aleppo and conducted operations there for thirteen months
(992–993). A Greek force from Antioch under Michael Burtzes was
repulsed (June 992). But Manjūtakīn's operations were not energetic, and
in the spring of 993 he returned to Damascus owing to lack of provisions.
Next spring (994) ‘Azīz sent reinforcements and supplies to Syria, and
with these at his service Manjūtakin attacked Aleppo early in June.
A relief force from Antioch was severely defeated on the banks of the
Orontes (14 September 994). Scarcity of food, caused by the closeness
of the blockade, now reduced the defenders of Aleppo to desperate straits.