Whilst
institutions
directly repugnant to good,
management are suffered to remain, no effectual or
lasting reform can be introduced.
management are suffered to remain, no effectual or
lasting reform can be introduced.
Edmund Burke
274 SPEECH ON THE PLAN
possible that the French minister of finance could go
through that year with a loan of but seventeen hundred thousand pounds, and that he should be able
to fund that loan without any tax. The second year,
however, opens the very same scene. A small loan,
a loan of no more than two millions five hundred
thousand pounds, is to carry our enemies through the
service of this year also. No tax is raised to fund
that debt; no tax is raised for the current services.
I am credibly informed that there is no anticipation whatsoever. Compensations * are correctly made.
Old debts continue to be sunk as in the time of profound peace. Even payments which their treasury
had been authorized to suspend during the time of
war are not suspended.
A general reform, executed through every department of the revenue, creates an annual income of more
than half a million, whilst it facilitates and simplifies
all the functions of administration. The king's household - at the remotest avenues to which all reformation has been hitherto stoipped, that household which has been the stronghold of prodigality, the virgin fortress which was never before attacked -- has
been not only not defended, but it has, even in the
forms, been surrendered by the king to the economy
of his minister. No capitulation; no reserve. Economy has entered in triumph into the public splendor
of the monarch, into his private amusements, into
the appointments of his nearest and highest relations.
Economy and public spirit have made a beneficent
and an honest spoil: they have plundered from ex* This term comprehends various retributions made to persons
whose offices are taken away, or who in any other way suffer by the
new arrangements that are made.
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travagance and luxury, for the use of substantial
service, a revenue of near four hundred thousand
pounds. The reform of the finances, joined to this
reform of the court, gives to the public nine hundred
thousand pounds a year, and upwards.
The minister who does these things is a great
man; but the king who desires that they should be
done is a far greater. We must do justice to our
enemies: these are the acts of a patriot king. I am
not in dread of the vast armies of France; I am not
in dread of the gallant spirit of its brave and numerous nobility; I am not alarmed even at the great navy which has been so miraculously created. All these
thiings Louis the Fourteenth had before. With all
these things, the French monarchy has more than
once fallen prostrate at the feet of the public faith of
Great Britain. It was the want of public credit which
disabled France from recovering after her defeats, or
recovering even from her victories and triumphs.
It was a prodigal court, it was an ill-ordered revenue,
that sapped the foundations of all her greatness.
Credit cannot exist under the arm of necessity. Necessity strikes at credit, I allow, with a heavier and quicker blow under an arbitrary monarchy than
under a limited and balanced government; but still
necessity and credit are natural enemies, and cannot
be long reconciled in any situation. From necessity
and corruption, a free state may lose the spirit of that
complex constitution which is the foundation of confidence. On the other hand, I am far from being sure that a monarchy, when once it is properly regulated,
may not for a long time furnish a foundation for
credit upon the solidity of its maxims, though it
affords no ground of trust in its institutions. I am
? ? ? ? 27T6 SPEECH ON THE PLAN
afraid I see in England, and in France, something
like a beginning of both these things. I wish I may
be found in a mistake.
This very short and very imperfect state of what is
now going on in France (the last circumstances of
which I received in about eight days after the registry of the edict *) I do not, Sir, lay before you for any invidious purpose. It is in order to excite in us the
spirit of a noble emulation. Let the nations make
war upon each other, (since we must make war,) not
with a low and vulgar malignity, but by a competition
of virtues. This is the only way by which both parties
can gain by war. The French have imitated us: let
us, through them, imitate ourselves,- ourselves in
our better and happier days. If public frugality,
under whatever men, or in whatever mode of government, is national strength, it is a strength which our enemies are in possession of before us.
Sir, I am well aware that the state and the result
of the French economy which I have laid before you
are even now lightly treated by some who ought
never to speak but from information. Pains have not
been spared to represent them as impositions on the
public. Let me tell you, Sir, that the creation of a
navy, and a two years' war without taxing, are a very
singular species of imposture. But be it so. For
what end does Necker carry on this delusion? Is it to
lower the estimation of the crown he serves, and to
render his own administration contemptible? No!
No! He is conscious that the sense of mankind is so
clear and decided in favor of economy, and of the
weight and value of its resources, that he turns himself to every species of fraud and artifice to obtain the * Edict registered 29th January, 1780.
? ? ? ? FOR ECONOMICAL REFORM. 277
mere reputation of it. Men do not affect a conduct
that tends to their discredit. Let us, then, get the
better of Monsieur Necker in his own way; let us do
in reality what he does only in pretence; let us turn
his French tinsel into English gold. Is, then, the
mere opinion and appearance of frugality and good
management of such use to France, and is the substance to be so mischievous to England? Is the very
constitution of Nature so altered by a sea of twenty
miles, that economy should give power on the Continent, and that profusion should give it here? For
God's sake, let not this be the only fashion of France
which we refuse to copy!
To the last kind of necessity, the desires of the people, I have but a very few words to say. The ministers seem to contest this point, and affect to doubt whether the people do really desire a plan of economy
in the civil government. Sir, this is too ridiculous.
It is impossible that they should not desire it. It is
impossible that a prodigality which draws its resources from their indigence should be pleasing to them.
Little factions of pensioners, and their dependants,
may talk another language. But the voice of Nature
is against them, and it will be heard. The people of
England will not, they cannot, take it kindly, that
representatives should refuse to their constituents
what an absolute sovereign voluntarily offers to his
subjects. The expression of the petitions is, that,
" before any new burdens are laid upon this country,
effectual measures be taken by this House to inquire into and correct the gross abuses in the expenditure of public money. "
This has been treated by the noble lord in the
blue ribbon as a wild, factious language. It happens,
? ? ? ? 278 SPEECH ON THE PLAN
however, that the people, in their address to us, use,
almost word for word, the same terms as the king of
France uses in addressing himself to his people; and
it differs only as it falls short of the French king's
idea of what is due to his subjects. "To convince,"
says he, " our faithful subjects of the desire we enter. .
tain not to recur to new impositions, until we have
first exhausted all the resources which order and
economy can possibly supply," &c. , &c.
These desires of the people of England, which come
far short of the voluntary concessions of the king of
France, are moderate indeed. They only contend that
we should interweave some economy with the taxes
with which we have chosen to begin the war. They
request, not that you should rely upon economy exclusively, but that you should give it rank and precedence, in the order of the ways and means of this single session.
But if it were possible that the desires of our constituents, desires which are at once so natural and so
very much tempered and subdued, should have no
weight with an House of Commons which has its eye
elsewhere, I would turn my eyes to the very quarter
to which theirs are directed. I would reason this
matter with the House on the mere policy of the
question; and I would undertake to prove that an
early dereliction of abuse is the direct interest of government, of government taken abstractedly from
its duties, and considered merely as a system intending its own conservation.
If there is any one eminent criterion which above
all the rest distinguishes a wise government from
an administration weak and improvident, it is this:
"well to know the best time and manner of yielding
? ? ? ? FOR ECONOMICAL REFORM. 279
what it is impossible to keep. " There have been, Sir,
and there are, many who choose to chicane with their
situation rather than be instructed by it. Those
gentlemen argue against every desire of reformation
upon the principles of a criminal prosecution. It is
enough for them to justify their adherence to a pernicious system, that it is not of their contrivance, -- that it is an inheritance of absurdity, derived to them
from their ancestors,-that they can make out a long
and unbroken pedigree of mismanagers that have
gone before them. They are proud of the antiquity
of their house; and they defend their errors as if
they were defending their inheritance, afraid of derogating from their nobility, and carefully avoiding a sort of blot in their scutcheon, which they think would
degrade them forever.
]it was thus that the unfortunate Charles the First
defended himself on the practice of the Stuart who
went before him, and of all the Tudors. His partisans
might have gone to the Plantagenets. They might
have found bad examples enough, both abroad and
at home, that could have shown an ancient and illustrious descent. But there is a time when men will not suffer bad things because their ancestors have
suffered worse. There is a time when the hoary
head of inveterate abuse will neither draw reverence
nor obtain protection. If the noble lord in the blue
ribbon pleads, " Not guilty," to the charges brought
against the present system of public economy, it is
not possible to give a fair verdict by which he will not
stand acquitted. But pleading is not our present business. His plea or his traverse may be allowed as an answer to a charge, when a charge is made. But if he
puts himself in the way to obstruct reformation, then
? ? ? ? 280 SPEECH- ON THE PLAN
the faults of his office instantly become his own. Instead of a public officer in an abusive department,
whose province is an object to be regulated, he becomes a criminal who is to be punished. I do most
seriously put it to administration to consider' the
wisdom of a timely reform. Early reformations are
amicable arrangements with a friend in power; late
reformations are terms imposed upon a conquered
enemy: early reformations are made in cool blood;
late reformations are made under a state of ilflammation. In that state of things the people behold in
government nothing that is respectable. They see the
abuse, and they will see nothing else. They fall'into
the temper of a furious populace provoked at the disorder of a house of ill-fame; they never attempt to correct or regulate; they go to work by the shortest way: they abate the nuisance, they pull down the house.
This is my opinion with regard to the true interest
of government. But as it is the interest of government that reformation should be early, it is the interest of the people that it should be temperate. It is
their interest, because a temperate reform is permanent, and because it has a principle of growth.
Whenever we improve, it is right to leave room for
a further improvement. It is right to consider, to
look about us, to examine the effect of what we have
done. Then we can proceed with confidence, because we can proceed with intelligence. Whereas
in hot reformations, in what men more zealous'than
considerate call making clear work, the whole is gelerally so crude, so harsh, so indigested, mixed with
so much imprudence and so much injustice, so contrary to the whole course of human nature and human institutions, that the very people who are most
? ? ? ? FOR ECONOMICAL REFORM. 281
eager for it are among the first to grow disgusted at
what they have done. Then some, part of the abdicated grievance is recalled from its exile in order to
become a corrective of the correction. Then the
abuse assumes all the credit and popularity of a reform. The very idea of purity and disinterestedness
in politics falls into disrepute, and is considered as a
vision of hot and inexperienced men; and thus disorders become incurable, not by the virulence of their
own quality, but by the unapt and violent nature of
the remedies. A great part, therefore, of my idea of
reform is meant to operate gradually: some benefits
will come at a nearer, some at a more remote period.
We must no more make haste to be rich by parsimony than by intemperate acquisition.
In my opinion, it is our duty, when we have the desires of the people before us, to pursue them, not in
the spirit of literal obedience, which may militate with
their very principle, --much less to treat them with a
peevish and contentious litigation, as if we were adverse parties in a suit. It would, Sir, be most dishonorable for a faithful representative of the Commons to take advantage of any inartificial expression of the
people's wishes, in order to frustrate their attainment
of what they have an undoubted right to expect. We
are under infinite obligations to our constituents, who
have raised us to so distinguished a trust, and have
imparted such a degree of sanctity to common characters. We ought to walk before them with purity,
plainness, and integrity of heart,- with filial love, and
not with slavish fear, which is always a low and tricking thing. For my own part, in what I have meditated upon that subject, I cannot, indeed, take upon me to::ay I have the honor to follow the sense of the
? ? ? ? v282 SPEECH ON THE PLAN
people. The truth is, Imnet it on the way, while I was
pursuing their interest according to my own ideas. I
am happy beyond expression to find that my intentions have so'far coincided with theirs, that I have
not had cause to be in the least scrupulous to sign
their petition, conceiving it to express my own opinions, as nearly as general terms can express the object of particular arrangements. I am therefore satisfied to act as a fair mediator
between government and the people, endeavoring to
form a plan which should have both an early and a
temperate operation. I mean, that it should be substantial, that it should be systematic, that it should
rather strike at the first cause of prodigality and corrupt influence than attempt to follow them in all
their effects.
It was to fulfil the first of these objects (the proposal of something substantial) that I found myself
obliged, at the outset, to reject a plan proposed by an
honorable and attentive member of Parliament,* with
very good intentions on his part, about a year or two
ago. Sir, the plan I speak of was the tax of twentyfive per cent moved upon places and pensions during
the continuance of the American war. Nothing, Sir,
could have met my ideas more than such a tax, if it
was considered as a practical satire on that war, and
as a penalty upon those who led us into it; but in
any other view it appeared to me very liable to objections. I considered the scheme as neither substantial,
nor permanent, nor systematical, nor likely to be a
corrective of evil influence. I have always thought
employments a very proper subject of regulation, but
a very ill-chosen subject for a tax. An equal tax
* Thomas Gilbert, Esq. , member for Lichfield.
? ? ? ? FOR ECONOMICAL REFORM. 283
upon property is reasonable; because the object is
of the same quality throughout. . The species is the
same; it differs only in its quantity. But a tax upon
salaries is totally of a different nature; there can be
no equality, and consequently no justice, in taxing
them by the hundred in the gross.
We have, Sir, on our establishment several offices
which perform real service: we have also places that
provide large rewards for no service at all. We have
stations which are made for the public decorum, made
for preserving the grace and majesty of a great people: we have likewise expensive formalities, which. tend rather to the disgrace than the ornament of the
state and the court. This, Sir, is the real condition of
our establishments. To fall with the same severity on
objects so perfectly dissimilar is the very reverse of a
reformation,-I mean a reformation framed, as all
serious things ought to be, in number, weight, and
measure. - Suppose, for instance, that two men receive a salary of 8001. a year each. In the office
of one there is nothing at all to be done; in the
other, the occupier is oppressed by its duties. Strike
off twenty-five per cent from these two offices, you
take from one man 2001. which in justice he ought to
have, and you give in effect to the other 6001. which
he ought not to receive. The public robs the former,
and the latter robs the public; and this mode of
mutual robbery is the only way in which the office
and the public can make up their accounts.
But the balance, in settling the account of this
double injustice, is much against the state. The
result is short. You purchase a saving\ of two hundred pounds by a profusion of six. Besides, Sir,
whilst you leave a supply of unsecured money behind,
? ? ? ? 284 SPEECH ON THE PLAN
wholly at the discretion of ministers, they make up
the tax to such places as they wish to favor, or in such
new places as they may choose to create. Thus the
civil list becomes oppressed with debt; and the public is obliged to repay, and to repay with an heavy
interest, what it has taken by an injudicious tax.
Such has been the effect of the taxes hitherto laid on
pensions and employments, and it is no encouragement to recur again to the same expedient.
In effect, such a scheme is not calculated to produce, but to prevent reformation. It holds out a
shadow of present gain to a greedy and necessitous
public, to divert their attention from those abuses
which in reality are the great causes of their wants.
It is a composition to stay inquiry; it is a fine paid
by mismanagement for the renewal of its lease; what
is worse, it is a fine paid-by industry and merit for
an indemnity to the idle and the worthless. But I
shall say no more upon this topic, because (whatever
may be given out to the contrary) I know that the
noble lord in the blue ribbon perfectly agrees with
me in these sentiments.
After all that I have said on this subject, I am so
sensible that it is our duty to try everything which
may contribute to the relief of the nation, that I do
not attempt wholly to reprobate the idea even of a
tax. Whenever, Sir, the incumbrance of useless office
(which lies no less a dead weight upon the service of
the state than upon its revenues) shall be removed,
- when tile remaining offices shall be classed according to the just proportion of their rewards and services, so as to admit the application of an equal rule to their taxation, - when the discretionary power over
the civil list cash shall be so regulated that a minis
? ? ? ? FOR ECONOMICAL REFORM. 285
ter shall no longer have the means of repaying with a
private what is taken by a public hand, -- if, after all
these preliminary regulations, it should be thought
that a tax on places is an object worthy of the public
attention, I shall be very ready to lend my hand to a
reduction of their emoluments.
Having thus, Sir, not so much absolutely rejected
as postponed the plan of a taxation of office, my next
business was to find something which might be really
substantial and effectual. I am quite clear, that, if
we do not go to the very origin and first ruling cause
of grievances, we do nothing. What does it signify
to turn abuses out of one door, if we are to let them
in at another? What does it signify to promote economy upon a measure, and to suffer it to be subverted
in the principle? Our ministers are far from being
wholly to blame for the present ill order which prevails.
Whilst institutions directly repugnant to good,
management are suffered to remain, no effectual or
lasting reform can be introduced.
I therefore thought it necessary, as soon as I conceived thoughts of submitting to you some plan of
reform, to take a comprehensive view of the state of
this country,-to make a sort of survey of its jurisdictions, its estates, and its establishments. Something in every one of them seemed to me to stand in the way of all economy in their administration, and
prevented every possibility of methodizing the system.
But being, as I ought to be, doubtful of myself, I was
resolved not to proceed in an arbitrary manner in
any particular which tended to. change the settled
state of things, or in any degree to affect the fortune
or situation, the interest or the importance, of, any
individual By an arbitrary proceeding I mean one
? ? ? ? 286 SPEECH ON THE PLAN
conducted by the private opinions, tastes, or feelings
of the man who attempts to regulate. These private
measures are not standards of the exchequer, nor
balances of the sanctuary. General principles cannot
be debauched or corrupted by interest or caprice; and
by those principles I was resolved to work.
Sir, before I proceed further, I will lay these principles fairly before you, that afterwards you may be
in a condition to judge whether every object of regulation, as I propose it, comes fairly under its rule.
This will exceedingly shorten all discussion between
us, if we are perfectly in earnest in establishing a system of good management. I therefore lay down to myself seven fundamental rules: they might, indeed,
be reduced to two or three simple maxims; but they
would be too general, and their application to the several heads of the business before us would not be so distinct and visible. I conceive, then,
First, That all jurisdictions which furnish more
matter of expense, more temptation to oppression, or more means and instruments of corrupt
influence, than advantage to justice or political
administration, ought to be abolished.
Secondly, That all public estates which are more
subservient to the purposes of vexing, overawing, and influencing those who hold under them,
and to the expense of perception and management, than of benefit to the revenue, ought, upon
every principle both of revenue and of freedom,
to be disposed of.
Thirdly, That all offices which bring more charge
than proportional advantage to the state, that all
offices which may be engrafted on others, uniting
and simplifying their duties, ought, in the first.
? ? ? ? FOR ECONOMICAL REFORM. 287
case, to be taken away, and, in the'second, to be
consolidated.
Fourthly, That all such offices ought to be abolished
as obstruct the prospect of the general superintendent of finance, which destroy his superintendency, which disable him from foreseeing and providing for charges as they may occur, from
preventing expense in its'origin, checking it in
its progress, or securing its application to its
proper purposes. A minister, under whom expenses can be made without his knowledge, can
never say what it is that he can spend, or what
it is that he can save.
Jifthly, That it is proper to establish an invariable
order in all payments, which will prevent partiality, which will give preference to services,
not according to the importunity of the demandant, but the rank and order of their utility or.
their justice.
Sixthly, That it is right to reduce every establishment and every part of an establishment (as
nearly as possible) to certainty, the life of all
order and good management.
Seventhly, That all subordinate treasuries, as the
nurseries of mismanagement, and as naturally
drawing to themselves as much money as they
can, keeping it as long as they can, and accounting for it as late as they can, ought to be dissolved. They have a tendency to perplex and distract the public accounts, and to excite a suspicion of government even beyond the extent of
their abuse.
Under the authority and with the guidance of those
principles I proceed, -- wishing that nothing in any
? ? ? ? 288. SPEECH ON THE PLAN
establishment may be changed, where I am not able
to make a strong, direct, and solid application of
those principles, or of some one of them. An economical- constitution is a necessary basis for an economical administration. First, with regard to the sovereign jurisdictions, I
must observe, Sir, that whoever takes a view of this
kingdom in a cursory manner will imagine that he
beholds a solid, compacted, uniform system of monarchy, in which all inferior jurisdictions are but as
rays diverging from one centre. But on examining
it more nearly, you find much eccentricity and confusion. It is not a monarchy in strictness. But, as in
the Saxon times this country was, an heptarchy, it is
now a strange sort of pentarchy. It is divided into
five several distinct principalities, besides the supreme.
There is, indeed, this difference from the Saxon times,
-that, as in the itinerant exhibitions of the stage,
for want of a complete company, they are obliged to
throw a variety of parts on their chief performer, so
our sovereign condescends himself to act not only the
principal, but all the subordinate parts in the play.
He condescends to dissipate the royal character, and
to trifle with those light, subordinate, lacquered sceptres in those hands that sustain the ball representing
the world, or which wield the trident that commands
the ocean. Cross a brook, and you lose the King
of England; but you have some comfort in coming again under his Majesty, though " shorn of his
beams," and no more than Prince of Wales. Go to
the north, and you find him dwindled to a Duke of
Lancaster; turn to the west of that north, and he
pops upon you in the humble character of Earl of
Chester. Travel a few miles on, the Earl of Chester
? ? ? ? FOR ECONOMICAL REFORM. 289
disappears, and the king surprises you again as
Count Palatine of Lancaster. If you travel beyond
Mount Edgecombe, you find him once more in his incognito, and he is Duke of Cornwall. So that, quite
fatigued and satiated with this dull variety, you are
infinitely refreshed when you return to the sphere of
his proper splendor, and behold your amiable sovereign in his true, simple, undisguised, native character of Majesty. In every one of these five principalities, duchies,
palatinates, there is a regular establishment of considerable expense and most domineering influence.
As his Majesty submits to appear in this state of subordination to himself, his loyal peers and faithful
commons attend his royal transformations, and are
not so nice as to refuse to nibble at those crumbs
of emoluments which console their petty metamorphoses. Thus every one of those principalities has
the apparatus of a kingdom for the jurisdiction over
a few private estates, and the formality and charge
of the Exchequer of Great Britain for collecting the
rents of a country squire. Cornwall is the best of
them; but when you compare the charge with the
receipt, you will find that it furnishes no exception
to the general rule. The Duchy and County Palatine
of Lancaster do not yield, as I have reason to believe,
on an average of twenty years, four thousand pounds
a year clear to the crown. As to Wales, and the County Palatine of Chester, I have my doubts whether
their productive exchequer yields any returns at all.
Yet one may say, that this revenue is more faithfully
applied to its purposes than any of the rest; as it
exists for the sole purpose of multiplying offices and
extending influence.
VOL. II. 19
? ? ? ? 290 SPEECH ON THE PLAN
An attempt was lately made to improve this branch
of local influence, and to transfer it to the fund of
general corruption. I have on the seat behind me
the constitution of Mr. John Probert, a knight-errant
dubbed by the noble lord in the blue ribbon, and
sent to search for revenues and adventures upon the
mountains of Wales. The commission is remarkable, and the event not less so. The commission
sets forth, that, "upon a report of the deputy-auditor"
(for there is a deputy-auditor) " of the Principality of
Wales, it appeared that his Majesty's land revenues
in the said principality are greatly diminished"; --
and " that upon a report of the surveyor-general of his
Majesty's land revenues, upon a memorial of the auditor of his Majesty's revenues, within the said principality, that his mines and forests have produced very
little profit either to the public revenue or to individuals ";
- and therefore they appoint Mr. Probert, with a pension of three hundred pounds a year from the said
principality, to try whether he can make anything
more of that very little which is stated to be so greatly
diminished. "A beggarly account of empty boxes. "
And yet, Sir, you will remark, that this diminution
from littleness (which serves only to prove the infinite
divisibility of matter) was not for want of the tender
and officious care (as we see) of surveyors general
and surveyors particular, of auditors and deputyauditors, -not for want of memorials, and remonstrances, and reports, and commissions, and constitutions, and inquisitions, and pensions. Probert, thus armed, and accoutred, --and paid,proceeded on his adventure; but lie was no sooner
arrived on the confines of Wales than all Wales was
in arms to meet him. That nation is brave and full
? ? ? ? FOR ECONOMICAL REFORM. 291
of spirit. Since the invasion of King Edward, and
the massacre of the bards, there never was such a
tumult and alarm and uproar through the region of
Prestatyn. Snowdon shook to its base; Cader-Idris
was loosened from its foundations. The fury of li
tigious war blew her horn on the mountains. The
rocks poured down their goatherds, and the deep caverns vomited out their miners. Everything above ground and everything under ground was in arms.
In short, Sir, to alight from my Welsh Pegasus,
and to come to level ground, the Preux Chevalier Probert went to look for, revenue, like his masters upon other occasions, and, like his masters; he found rebellion. But we were grown cautious by experience.
A civil war of paper might end in a more serious
war; for now remonstrance met remonstrance, and
memorial was opposed to memorial. The wise Britons thought it more reasonable that the poor, wasted, decrepit revenue of the principality should die a natural than a violent death. In truth, Sir, the attempt was no less an affront upon the understanding of that
respectable people than it was an attack on their
property. They chose rather that their ancient, mossgrown castles should moulder into decay, under the silent touches of time, and the slow formality of an oblivious and drowsy exchequer, than that they should be battered down all at once by the lively efforts of a
pensioned engineer. As it is the fortune of the noble
lord to whom the auspices of this campaign belonged
frequently to provoke resistance, so it is his rule and
nature to yield to that resistance in all cases whatsoever. He was true to himself on this occasion. He submitted with spirit to the spirited remonstrances of
the Welsh. Mr. Probert gave up his adventure, and
? ? ? ? 292 SPEECH ON THE PLAN
keeps his pension; and so ends " the famous history
of the revenue adventures of the bold Baron North
and the good Knight Probert upon the mountains
of: Venodotia. "
In such a state is the. exchequer of Wales at pres*ent, that, upon thereport of the Treasury itself, its littie revenue is greatly diminished; and we see, by the whole of this strange transaction, that an attempt
to improve it produces, resistance, the resistance produces submission, and the whole ends in pension. *
It is nearly the same with the revenues of the
Duchy of Lancaster. To do nothing with them is
extinction; to. improve them is oppression. Indeed,
the whole of the estates which support these minor
principalities is made up, not of revenues, and rents,
and profitable fines, but of claims, of pretensions, of,
vexations, of litigations. They are exchequers of unfrequent receipt and constant charge: a system of
finances not fit for an economist who would be rich,
not fit for a prince: who would govern his subjects
with equity and justice.
It is not. only between prince and subject that
these mock jurisdictions and mimic revenues produce great mischief. They excite among the people: a
spirit of informing and delating, a spirit of supplant.
ing and undermining one another: so that many, in
such circumstances, conceive it advantageous to them
rather to continue subject to vexation themselves
than to give up the means and chance of vexing oth* Here Lord North shook his head, and told those who sat near
him that Mr. Probert's pension was to depend on his success. It
may be so. Mr. Probert's pension was, however, no essential part
of the question; nor did Mr. B. care whether he still possessed it or
not. His point was, to show the ridicule of attempting an improve
ment of the Welsh revenue under its present establishment.
? ? ? ? FOR ECONOMICAL REFORM. 293
ers. It is exceedingly common for men to contract
their love to their country into an attachment to its
petty subdivisions; and they sometimes even cling to
their provincial abuses, as if they were franchises and
local privileges. Accordingly, in places where there
is much of this kind of estate, persons will be always
found who would rather trust to their talents in
recommending themselves to power for the renewal
of their interests, than to incumber their purses,
though never so lightly, in order to transmit independence to their posterity. It is a great mistake,
that the desire of securing property is universal
among mankind. Gaming is a principle inherent in
human nature. It belongs to us all. I would therefore break those tables; I would furnish no evil occupation for that spirit. I would make every man look everywhere, except to the intrigue of a court, for the
improvement of his circumstances or the security of
his fortune. I have in my eye a very strong case in
the Duchy of Lancaster (which lately occupied Westminster Hall and the House of Lords) as my voucher
for many of these reflections. *
For what plausible reason are these principalities
suffered to exist? When a government is rendered
complex, (which in itself is no desirable thing,) it
ought to be for some political end which cannot be
answered otherwise. Subdivisions in government
are only admissible in favor of the dignity of inferior
princes and high nobility, or for the support of an
aristocratic confederacy under some head, or for the
conservation of the franchises of the people in some
privileged province. For the two former of these
* Case of Richard Lee, Esq. , appellant, against George Venables
Lord Vernon, respondent, in the year 1776.
? ? ? ? 294 SPEECH ON THE PLAN
ends, such are the subdivisions in favor of the electoral and other princes in the Empire; for the latter
of these purposes are the jurisdictions of the Imperial
cities and the ianse towns. For the latter of these
ends are also the countries of the States (Pays
d'EJtats) and certain cities and orders in France.
These are all regulations with'an object, and some
of them with a very good object. But how are the
principles of any of these subdivisions applicable in
the case before us?
Do they answer any purpose to the king? The
Principality of Wales was given by patent to Edward
the Black Prince on the ground on which it has
since stood. Lord Coke sagaciously observes upon
it, " That in the charter of creating the Black Prince
Edward Prince of Wales there is a great mystery: for
less than an estate of inheritance so great a prince
could not have, and an absolute estate of inheritance in
so great a principality as Wales (this principality
being so dear to him) he should not have; and therefore it was made sibi et heredibus suis regibus Anglice, that by his, decease, or attaining to the crown, it
might be extinguished in the crown. "
For the sake of this foolish mystery, of what a great
prince could not have less and should not have so much,
of a principality which was too dear to be given and
too great to be kept, -and for no other cause that
ever I could find, - this form and shadow of a principality, without any substance, has been maintained. That you may judge in this instance (and it serves
for the rest) of'the difference between a great and a
little economy, you will please to recollect, Sir, that
Wales may be about the tenth part of England in
size and population, and certainly not a hundredth
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part in opulence. Twelve judges perform the whole
of the business, both of the stationary and the itinerant justice of this kingdom; but for Wales there are
eight judges. There is in Wales an exchequer, as
well as in all the duchies, according to the very best
and most authentic absurdity of form. There are in
all of them a hundred more difficult trifles and laborious fooleries, which serve no other purpose than to
keep alive corrupt hope and servile dependence.
These principalities are so far from contributing to
the ease of the king, to his wealth, or his dignity,
that they render both his supreme and his subordinate authority perfectly ridiculous. It was but the
other day, that that pert, factious fellow, the Duke of
Lancaster, presumed to fly in the face of his liege
lord, our gracious sovereign, and, associating with a
parcel of lawyers as factious as himself, to the destruction of all law and order, and in committees leading directly to rebellion, presumed to go to law with the king. The object is neither your business nor
mine. Which of the parties got the better I really
forget. I think it was (as it ought to be) the king.
The material point is, that the suit cost about fifteen
thousand pounds. But as the Duke of Lancaster is
but a sort of -Duke Humphrey, and not worth a groat,
our sovereign was obliged to pay the costs of both.
Indeed, this art of converting a great monarch into a
little prince, this royal masquerading, is a very dangerous and expensive amusement, and one of the
king's menus plaisirs, which ought to be reformed.
This duchy, which is not worth four thousand pounds
a year at best to revenue, is worth forty or fifty thousand to influence.
The Duchy of Lancaster and the County Palatine
? ? ? ? 296 SPEECH ON THE PLAN
of Lancaster answered, I admit, some purpose in their
original creation. They tended to make a subject
imitate a prince. When Henry the Fourth from
that stair ascended the throne, high-minded as he
was, he was not willing to kick away the ladder. To
prevent that principality from being extinguished in
the crown, he severed it by act of Parliament. He
had a motive, such as it was: he thought his title to
the crown unsound, and his possession insecure. He
therefore managed a retreat in his duchy, which
Lord Coke calls (I do not know why) "par multis
regnis. " He flattered himself that it was practicable
to make a projecting point half way down, to break his
fall from the precipice of royalty; as if it were possible for one who had lost a kingdom to keep anything else. However, it is evident that he thought so.
When Henry the Fifth united, by act of Parliament,
the estates of his mother to the duchy, he had the
same predilection with his father to the root of his
family honors, and the same policy in enlarging the
sphere of a possible retreat from the slippery royalty of the two great crowns he held. All this was changed by Edward the Fourth. He had no such
family partialities, and his policy was the reverse of
that of Henry the Fourth and Henry the Fifth. He
accordingly again united the Duchy of Lancaster to
the crown. But when Henry the Seventh, who chose
to consider himself as of the House of Lancaster,
came to the throne, he brought with him the old pretensions and the old politics of that house. A new act of Parliament, a second time, dissevered the
Duchy of Lancaster from the crown; and in that line
things continued until the subversion of the monarchy, when principalities and powers fell along with
? ? ? ? FOR ECONOMICAL REFORM. 297
the throne. The Duchy of Lancaster must have been
extinguished, if Cromwell, who. began to form ideas
of aggrandizing his house and raising the several
branches of it, had not caused the duchy to be again
separated from the commonwealth, by an act of the
Parliament of those times.
What partiality, what objects of the politics of the
House of Lancaster, or of Cromwell, has his present
Majesty, or his Majesty's family? What power have
they within any of these principalities, which they have
not within their kingdom? In what manner is the
dignity of the nobility concerned in these principalities? What rights have. the subject there, which they have not at least equally in every other part of the
nation? These distinctions exist for no good end to
the king, to the nobility, or to the people. They
ought not to exist at all.
possible that the French minister of finance could go
through that year with a loan of but seventeen hundred thousand pounds, and that he should be able
to fund that loan without any tax. The second year,
however, opens the very same scene. A small loan,
a loan of no more than two millions five hundred
thousand pounds, is to carry our enemies through the
service of this year also. No tax is raised to fund
that debt; no tax is raised for the current services.
I am credibly informed that there is no anticipation whatsoever. Compensations * are correctly made.
Old debts continue to be sunk as in the time of profound peace. Even payments which their treasury
had been authorized to suspend during the time of
war are not suspended.
A general reform, executed through every department of the revenue, creates an annual income of more
than half a million, whilst it facilitates and simplifies
all the functions of administration. The king's household - at the remotest avenues to which all reformation has been hitherto stoipped, that household which has been the stronghold of prodigality, the virgin fortress which was never before attacked -- has
been not only not defended, but it has, even in the
forms, been surrendered by the king to the economy
of his minister. No capitulation; no reserve. Economy has entered in triumph into the public splendor
of the monarch, into his private amusements, into
the appointments of his nearest and highest relations.
Economy and public spirit have made a beneficent
and an honest spoil: they have plundered from ex* This term comprehends various retributions made to persons
whose offices are taken away, or who in any other way suffer by the
new arrangements that are made.
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travagance and luxury, for the use of substantial
service, a revenue of near four hundred thousand
pounds. The reform of the finances, joined to this
reform of the court, gives to the public nine hundred
thousand pounds a year, and upwards.
The minister who does these things is a great
man; but the king who desires that they should be
done is a far greater. We must do justice to our
enemies: these are the acts of a patriot king. I am
not in dread of the vast armies of France; I am not
in dread of the gallant spirit of its brave and numerous nobility; I am not alarmed even at the great navy which has been so miraculously created. All these
thiings Louis the Fourteenth had before. With all
these things, the French monarchy has more than
once fallen prostrate at the feet of the public faith of
Great Britain. It was the want of public credit which
disabled France from recovering after her defeats, or
recovering even from her victories and triumphs.
It was a prodigal court, it was an ill-ordered revenue,
that sapped the foundations of all her greatness.
Credit cannot exist under the arm of necessity. Necessity strikes at credit, I allow, with a heavier and quicker blow under an arbitrary monarchy than
under a limited and balanced government; but still
necessity and credit are natural enemies, and cannot
be long reconciled in any situation. From necessity
and corruption, a free state may lose the spirit of that
complex constitution which is the foundation of confidence. On the other hand, I am far from being sure that a monarchy, when once it is properly regulated,
may not for a long time furnish a foundation for
credit upon the solidity of its maxims, though it
affords no ground of trust in its institutions. I am
? ? ? ? 27T6 SPEECH ON THE PLAN
afraid I see in England, and in France, something
like a beginning of both these things. I wish I may
be found in a mistake.
This very short and very imperfect state of what is
now going on in France (the last circumstances of
which I received in about eight days after the registry of the edict *) I do not, Sir, lay before you for any invidious purpose. It is in order to excite in us the
spirit of a noble emulation. Let the nations make
war upon each other, (since we must make war,) not
with a low and vulgar malignity, but by a competition
of virtues. This is the only way by which both parties
can gain by war. The French have imitated us: let
us, through them, imitate ourselves,- ourselves in
our better and happier days. If public frugality,
under whatever men, or in whatever mode of government, is national strength, it is a strength which our enemies are in possession of before us.
Sir, I am well aware that the state and the result
of the French economy which I have laid before you
are even now lightly treated by some who ought
never to speak but from information. Pains have not
been spared to represent them as impositions on the
public. Let me tell you, Sir, that the creation of a
navy, and a two years' war without taxing, are a very
singular species of imposture. But be it so. For
what end does Necker carry on this delusion? Is it to
lower the estimation of the crown he serves, and to
render his own administration contemptible? No!
No! He is conscious that the sense of mankind is so
clear and decided in favor of economy, and of the
weight and value of its resources, that he turns himself to every species of fraud and artifice to obtain the * Edict registered 29th January, 1780.
? ? ? ? FOR ECONOMICAL REFORM. 277
mere reputation of it. Men do not affect a conduct
that tends to their discredit. Let us, then, get the
better of Monsieur Necker in his own way; let us do
in reality what he does only in pretence; let us turn
his French tinsel into English gold. Is, then, the
mere opinion and appearance of frugality and good
management of such use to France, and is the substance to be so mischievous to England? Is the very
constitution of Nature so altered by a sea of twenty
miles, that economy should give power on the Continent, and that profusion should give it here? For
God's sake, let not this be the only fashion of France
which we refuse to copy!
To the last kind of necessity, the desires of the people, I have but a very few words to say. The ministers seem to contest this point, and affect to doubt whether the people do really desire a plan of economy
in the civil government. Sir, this is too ridiculous.
It is impossible that they should not desire it. It is
impossible that a prodigality which draws its resources from their indigence should be pleasing to them.
Little factions of pensioners, and their dependants,
may talk another language. But the voice of Nature
is against them, and it will be heard. The people of
England will not, they cannot, take it kindly, that
representatives should refuse to their constituents
what an absolute sovereign voluntarily offers to his
subjects. The expression of the petitions is, that,
" before any new burdens are laid upon this country,
effectual measures be taken by this House to inquire into and correct the gross abuses in the expenditure of public money. "
This has been treated by the noble lord in the
blue ribbon as a wild, factious language. It happens,
? ? ? ? 278 SPEECH ON THE PLAN
however, that the people, in their address to us, use,
almost word for word, the same terms as the king of
France uses in addressing himself to his people; and
it differs only as it falls short of the French king's
idea of what is due to his subjects. "To convince,"
says he, " our faithful subjects of the desire we enter. .
tain not to recur to new impositions, until we have
first exhausted all the resources which order and
economy can possibly supply," &c. , &c.
These desires of the people of England, which come
far short of the voluntary concessions of the king of
France, are moderate indeed. They only contend that
we should interweave some economy with the taxes
with which we have chosen to begin the war. They
request, not that you should rely upon economy exclusively, but that you should give it rank and precedence, in the order of the ways and means of this single session.
But if it were possible that the desires of our constituents, desires which are at once so natural and so
very much tempered and subdued, should have no
weight with an House of Commons which has its eye
elsewhere, I would turn my eyes to the very quarter
to which theirs are directed. I would reason this
matter with the House on the mere policy of the
question; and I would undertake to prove that an
early dereliction of abuse is the direct interest of government, of government taken abstractedly from
its duties, and considered merely as a system intending its own conservation.
If there is any one eminent criterion which above
all the rest distinguishes a wise government from
an administration weak and improvident, it is this:
"well to know the best time and manner of yielding
? ? ? ? FOR ECONOMICAL REFORM. 279
what it is impossible to keep. " There have been, Sir,
and there are, many who choose to chicane with their
situation rather than be instructed by it. Those
gentlemen argue against every desire of reformation
upon the principles of a criminal prosecution. It is
enough for them to justify their adherence to a pernicious system, that it is not of their contrivance, -- that it is an inheritance of absurdity, derived to them
from their ancestors,-that they can make out a long
and unbroken pedigree of mismanagers that have
gone before them. They are proud of the antiquity
of their house; and they defend their errors as if
they were defending their inheritance, afraid of derogating from their nobility, and carefully avoiding a sort of blot in their scutcheon, which they think would
degrade them forever.
]it was thus that the unfortunate Charles the First
defended himself on the practice of the Stuart who
went before him, and of all the Tudors. His partisans
might have gone to the Plantagenets. They might
have found bad examples enough, both abroad and
at home, that could have shown an ancient and illustrious descent. But there is a time when men will not suffer bad things because their ancestors have
suffered worse. There is a time when the hoary
head of inveterate abuse will neither draw reverence
nor obtain protection. If the noble lord in the blue
ribbon pleads, " Not guilty," to the charges brought
against the present system of public economy, it is
not possible to give a fair verdict by which he will not
stand acquitted. But pleading is not our present business. His plea or his traverse may be allowed as an answer to a charge, when a charge is made. But if he
puts himself in the way to obstruct reformation, then
? ? ? ? 280 SPEECH- ON THE PLAN
the faults of his office instantly become his own. Instead of a public officer in an abusive department,
whose province is an object to be regulated, he becomes a criminal who is to be punished. I do most
seriously put it to administration to consider' the
wisdom of a timely reform. Early reformations are
amicable arrangements with a friend in power; late
reformations are terms imposed upon a conquered
enemy: early reformations are made in cool blood;
late reformations are made under a state of ilflammation. In that state of things the people behold in
government nothing that is respectable. They see the
abuse, and they will see nothing else. They fall'into
the temper of a furious populace provoked at the disorder of a house of ill-fame; they never attempt to correct or regulate; they go to work by the shortest way: they abate the nuisance, they pull down the house.
This is my opinion with regard to the true interest
of government. But as it is the interest of government that reformation should be early, it is the interest of the people that it should be temperate. It is
their interest, because a temperate reform is permanent, and because it has a principle of growth.
Whenever we improve, it is right to leave room for
a further improvement. It is right to consider, to
look about us, to examine the effect of what we have
done. Then we can proceed with confidence, because we can proceed with intelligence. Whereas
in hot reformations, in what men more zealous'than
considerate call making clear work, the whole is gelerally so crude, so harsh, so indigested, mixed with
so much imprudence and so much injustice, so contrary to the whole course of human nature and human institutions, that the very people who are most
? ? ? ? FOR ECONOMICAL REFORM. 281
eager for it are among the first to grow disgusted at
what they have done. Then some, part of the abdicated grievance is recalled from its exile in order to
become a corrective of the correction. Then the
abuse assumes all the credit and popularity of a reform. The very idea of purity and disinterestedness
in politics falls into disrepute, and is considered as a
vision of hot and inexperienced men; and thus disorders become incurable, not by the virulence of their
own quality, but by the unapt and violent nature of
the remedies. A great part, therefore, of my idea of
reform is meant to operate gradually: some benefits
will come at a nearer, some at a more remote period.
We must no more make haste to be rich by parsimony than by intemperate acquisition.
In my opinion, it is our duty, when we have the desires of the people before us, to pursue them, not in
the spirit of literal obedience, which may militate with
their very principle, --much less to treat them with a
peevish and contentious litigation, as if we were adverse parties in a suit. It would, Sir, be most dishonorable for a faithful representative of the Commons to take advantage of any inartificial expression of the
people's wishes, in order to frustrate their attainment
of what they have an undoubted right to expect. We
are under infinite obligations to our constituents, who
have raised us to so distinguished a trust, and have
imparted such a degree of sanctity to common characters. We ought to walk before them with purity,
plainness, and integrity of heart,- with filial love, and
not with slavish fear, which is always a low and tricking thing. For my own part, in what I have meditated upon that subject, I cannot, indeed, take upon me to::ay I have the honor to follow the sense of the
? ? ? ? v282 SPEECH ON THE PLAN
people. The truth is, Imnet it on the way, while I was
pursuing their interest according to my own ideas. I
am happy beyond expression to find that my intentions have so'far coincided with theirs, that I have
not had cause to be in the least scrupulous to sign
their petition, conceiving it to express my own opinions, as nearly as general terms can express the object of particular arrangements. I am therefore satisfied to act as a fair mediator
between government and the people, endeavoring to
form a plan which should have both an early and a
temperate operation. I mean, that it should be substantial, that it should be systematic, that it should
rather strike at the first cause of prodigality and corrupt influence than attempt to follow them in all
their effects.
It was to fulfil the first of these objects (the proposal of something substantial) that I found myself
obliged, at the outset, to reject a plan proposed by an
honorable and attentive member of Parliament,* with
very good intentions on his part, about a year or two
ago. Sir, the plan I speak of was the tax of twentyfive per cent moved upon places and pensions during
the continuance of the American war. Nothing, Sir,
could have met my ideas more than such a tax, if it
was considered as a practical satire on that war, and
as a penalty upon those who led us into it; but in
any other view it appeared to me very liable to objections. I considered the scheme as neither substantial,
nor permanent, nor systematical, nor likely to be a
corrective of evil influence. I have always thought
employments a very proper subject of regulation, but
a very ill-chosen subject for a tax. An equal tax
* Thomas Gilbert, Esq. , member for Lichfield.
? ? ? ? FOR ECONOMICAL REFORM. 283
upon property is reasonable; because the object is
of the same quality throughout. . The species is the
same; it differs only in its quantity. But a tax upon
salaries is totally of a different nature; there can be
no equality, and consequently no justice, in taxing
them by the hundred in the gross.
We have, Sir, on our establishment several offices
which perform real service: we have also places that
provide large rewards for no service at all. We have
stations which are made for the public decorum, made
for preserving the grace and majesty of a great people: we have likewise expensive formalities, which. tend rather to the disgrace than the ornament of the
state and the court. This, Sir, is the real condition of
our establishments. To fall with the same severity on
objects so perfectly dissimilar is the very reverse of a
reformation,-I mean a reformation framed, as all
serious things ought to be, in number, weight, and
measure. - Suppose, for instance, that two men receive a salary of 8001. a year each. In the office
of one there is nothing at all to be done; in the
other, the occupier is oppressed by its duties. Strike
off twenty-five per cent from these two offices, you
take from one man 2001. which in justice he ought to
have, and you give in effect to the other 6001. which
he ought not to receive. The public robs the former,
and the latter robs the public; and this mode of
mutual robbery is the only way in which the office
and the public can make up their accounts.
But the balance, in settling the account of this
double injustice, is much against the state. The
result is short. You purchase a saving\ of two hundred pounds by a profusion of six. Besides, Sir,
whilst you leave a supply of unsecured money behind,
? ? ? ? 284 SPEECH ON THE PLAN
wholly at the discretion of ministers, they make up
the tax to such places as they wish to favor, or in such
new places as they may choose to create. Thus the
civil list becomes oppressed with debt; and the public is obliged to repay, and to repay with an heavy
interest, what it has taken by an injudicious tax.
Such has been the effect of the taxes hitherto laid on
pensions and employments, and it is no encouragement to recur again to the same expedient.
In effect, such a scheme is not calculated to produce, but to prevent reformation. It holds out a
shadow of present gain to a greedy and necessitous
public, to divert their attention from those abuses
which in reality are the great causes of their wants.
It is a composition to stay inquiry; it is a fine paid
by mismanagement for the renewal of its lease; what
is worse, it is a fine paid-by industry and merit for
an indemnity to the idle and the worthless. But I
shall say no more upon this topic, because (whatever
may be given out to the contrary) I know that the
noble lord in the blue ribbon perfectly agrees with
me in these sentiments.
After all that I have said on this subject, I am so
sensible that it is our duty to try everything which
may contribute to the relief of the nation, that I do
not attempt wholly to reprobate the idea even of a
tax. Whenever, Sir, the incumbrance of useless office
(which lies no less a dead weight upon the service of
the state than upon its revenues) shall be removed,
- when tile remaining offices shall be classed according to the just proportion of their rewards and services, so as to admit the application of an equal rule to their taxation, - when the discretionary power over
the civil list cash shall be so regulated that a minis
? ? ? ? FOR ECONOMICAL REFORM. 285
ter shall no longer have the means of repaying with a
private what is taken by a public hand, -- if, after all
these preliminary regulations, it should be thought
that a tax on places is an object worthy of the public
attention, I shall be very ready to lend my hand to a
reduction of their emoluments.
Having thus, Sir, not so much absolutely rejected
as postponed the plan of a taxation of office, my next
business was to find something which might be really
substantial and effectual. I am quite clear, that, if
we do not go to the very origin and first ruling cause
of grievances, we do nothing. What does it signify
to turn abuses out of one door, if we are to let them
in at another? What does it signify to promote economy upon a measure, and to suffer it to be subverted
in the principle? Our ministers are far from being
wholly to blame for the present ill order which prevails.
Whilst institutions directly repugnant to good,
management are suffered to remain, no effectual or
lasting reform can be introduced.
I therefore thought it necessary, as soon as I conceived thoughts of submitting to you some plan of
reform, to take a comprehensive view of the state of
this country,-to make a sort of survey of its jurisdictions, its estates, and its establishments. Something in every one of them seemed to me to stand in the way of all economy in their administration, and
prevented every possibility of methodizing the system.
But being, as I ought to be, doubtful of myself, I was
resolved not to proceed in an arbitrary manner in
any particular which tended to. change the settled
state of things, or in any degree to affect the fortune
or situation, the interest or the importance, of, any
individual By an arbitrary proceeding I mean one
? ? ? ? 286 SPEECH ON THE PLAN
conducted by the private opinions, tastes, or feelings
of the man who attempts to regulate. These private
measures are not standards of the exchequer, nor
balances of the sanctuary. General principles cannot
be debauched or corrupted by interest or caprice; and
by those principles I was resolved to work.
Sir, before I proceed further, I will lay these principles fairly before you, that afterwards you may be
in a condition to judge whether every object of regulation, as I propose it, comes fairly under its rule.
This will exceedingly shorten all discussion between
us, if we are perfectly in earnest in establishing a system of good management. I therefore lay down to myself seven fundamental rules: they might, indeed,
be reduced to two or three simple maxims; but they
would be too general, and their application to the several heads of the business before us would not be so distinct and visible. I conceive, then,
First, That all jurisdictions which furnish more
matter of expense, more temptation to oppression, or more means and instruments of corrupt
influence, than advantage to justice or political
administration, ought to be abolished.
Secondly, That all public estates which are more
subservient to the purposes of vexing, overawing, and influencing those who hold under them,
and to the expense of perception and management, than of benefit to the revenue, ought, upon
every principle both of revenue and of freedom,
to be disposed of.
Thirdly, That all offices which bring more charge
than proportional advantage to the state, that all
offices which may be engrafted on others, uniting
and simplifying their duties, ought, in the first.
? ? ? ? FOR ECONOMICAL REFORM. 287
case, to be taken away, and, in the'second, to be
consolidated.
Fourthly, That all such offices ought to be abolished
as obstruct the prospect of the general superintendent of finance, which destroy his superintendency, which disable him from foreseeing and providing for charges as they may occur, from
preventing expense in its'origin, checking it in
its progress, or securing its application to its
proper purposes. A minister, under whom expenses can be made without his knowledge, can
never say what it is that he can spend, or what
it is that he can save.
Jifthly, That it is proper to establish an invariable
order in all payments, which will prevent partiality, which will give preference to services,
not according to the importunity of the demandant, but the rank and order of their utility or.
their justice.
Sixthly, That it is right to reduce every establishment and every part of an establishment (as
nearly as possible) to certainty, the life of all
order and good management.
Seventhly, That all subordinate treasuries, as the
nurseries of mismanagement, and as naturally
drawing to themselves as much money as they
can, keeping it as long as they can, and accounting for it as late as they can, ought to be dissolved. They have a tendency to perplex and distract the public accounts, and to excite a suspicion of government even beyond the extent of
their abuse.
Under the authority and with the guidance of those
principles I proceed, -- wishing that nothing in any
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establishment may be changed, where I am not able
to make a strong, direct, and solid application of
those principles, or of some one of them. An economical- constitution is a necessary basis for an economical administration. First, with regard to the sovereign jurisdictions, I
must observe, Sir, that whoever takes a view of this
kingdom in a cursory manner will imagine that he
beholds a solid, compacted, uniform system of monarchy, in which all inferior jurisdictions are but as
rays diverging from one centre. But on examining
it more nearly, you find much eccentricity and confusion. It is not a monarchy in strictness. But, as in
the Saxon times this country was, an heptarchy, it is
now a strange sort of pentarchy. It is divided into
five several distinct principalities, besides the supreme.
There is, indeed, this difference from the Saxon times,
-that, as in the itinerant exhibitions of the stage,
for want of a complete company, they are obliged to
throw a variety of parts on their chief performer, so
our sovereign condescends himself to act not only the
principal, but all the subordinate parts in the play.
He condescends to dissipate the royal character, and
to trifle with those light, subordinate, lacquered sceptres in those hands that sustain the ball representing
the world, or which wield the trident that commands
the ocean. Cross a brook, and you lose the King
of England; but you have some comfort in coming again under his Majesty, though " shorn of his
beams," and no more than Prince of Wales. Go to
the north, and you find him dwindled to a Duke of
Lancaster; turn to the west of that north, and he
pops upon you in the humble character of Earl of
Chester. Travel a few miles on, the Earl of Chester
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disappears, and the king surprises you again as
Count Palatine of Lancaster. If you travel beyond
Mount Edgecombe, you find him once more in his incognito, and he is Duke of Cornwall. So that, quite
fatigued and satiated with this dull variety, you are
infinitely refreshed when you return to the sphere of
his proper splendor, and behold your amiable sovereign in his true, simple, undisguised, native character of Majesty. In every one of these five principalities, duchies,
palatinates, there is a regular establishment of considerable expense and most domineering influence.
As his Majesty submits to appear in this state of subordination to himself, his loyal peers and faithful
commons attend his royal transformations, and are
not so nice as to refuse to nibble at those crumbs
of emoluments which console their petty metamorphoses. Thus every one of those principalities has
the apparatus of a kingdom for the jurisdiction over
a few private estates, and the formality and charge
of the Exchequer of Great Britain for collecting the
rents of a country squire. Cornwall is the best of
them; but when you compare the charge with the
receipt, you will find that it furnishes no exception
to the general rule. The Duchy and County Palatine
of Lancaster do not yield, as I have reason to believe,
on an average of twenty years, four thousand pounds
a year clear to the crown. As to Wales, and the County Palatine of Chester, I have my doubts whether
their productive exchequer yields any returns at all.
Yet one may say, that this revenue is more faithfully
applied to its purposes than any of the rest; as it
exists for the sole purpose of multiplying offices and
extending influence.
VOL. II. 19
? ? ? ? 290 SPEECH ON THE PLAN
An attempt was lately made to improve this branch
of local influence, and to transfer it to the fund of
general corruption. I have on the seat behind me
the constitution of Mr. John Probert, a knight-errant
dubbed by the noble lord in the blue ribbon, and
sent to search for revenues and adventures upon the
mountains of Wales. The commission is remarkable, and the event not less so. The commission
sets forth, that, "upon a report of the deputy-auditor"
(for there is a deputy-auditor) " of the Principality of
Wales, it appeared that his Majesty's land revenues
in the said principality are greatly diminished"; --
and " that upon a report of the surveyor-general of his
Majesty's land revenues, upon a memorial of the auditor of his Majesty's revenues, within the said principality, that his mines and forests have produced very
little profit either to the public revenue or to individuals ";
- and therefore they appoint Mr. Probert, with a pension of three hundred pounds a year from the said
principality, to try whether he can make anything
more of that very little which is stated to be so greatly
diminished. "A beggarly account of empty boxes. "
And yet, Sir, you will remark, that this diminution
from littleness (which serves only to prove the infinite
divisibility of matter) was not for want of the tender
and officious care (as we see) of surveyors general
and surveyors particular, of auditors and deputyauditors, -not for want of memorials, and remonstrances, and reports, and commissions, and constitutions, and inquisitions, and pensions. Probert, thus armed, and accoutred, --and paid,proceeded on his adventure; but lie was no sooner
arrived on the confines of Wales than all Wales was
in arms to meet him. That nation is brave and full
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of spirit. Since the invasion of King Edward, and
the massacre of the bards, there never was such a
tumult and alarm and uproar through the region of
Prestatyn. Snowdon shook to its base; Cader-Idris
was loosened from its foundations. The fury of li
tigious war blew her horn on the mountains. The
rocks poured down their goatherds, and the deep caverns vomited out their miners. Everything above ground and everything under ground was in arms.
In short, Sir, to alight from my Welsh Pegasus,
and to come to level ground, the Preux Chevalier Probert went to look for, revenue, like his masters upon other occasions, and, like his masters; he found rebellion. But we were grown cautious by experience.
A civil war of paper might end in a more serious
war; for now remonstrance met remonstrance, and
memorial was opposed to memorial. The wise Britons thought it more reasonable that the poor, wasted, decrepit revenue of the principality should die a natural than a violent death. In truth, Sir, the attempt was no less an affront upon the understanding of that
respectable people than it was an attack on their
property. They chose rather that their ancient, mossgrown castles should moulder into decay, under the silent touches of time, and the slow formality of an oblivious and drowsy exchequer, than that they should be battered down all at once by the lively efforts of a
pensioned engineer. As it is the fortune of the noble
lord to whom the auspices of this campaign belonged
frequently to provoke resistance, so it is his rule and
nature to yield to that resistance in all cases whatsoever. He was true to himself on this occasion. He submitted with spirit to the spirited remonstrances of
the Welsh. Mr. Probert gave up his adventure, and
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keeps his pension; and so ends " the famous history
of the revenue adventures of the bold Baron North
and the good Knight Probert upon the mountains
of: Venodotia. "
In such a state is the. exchequer of Wales at pres*ent, that, upon thereport of the Treasury itself, its littie revenue is greatly diminished; and we see, by the whole of this strange transaction, that an attempt
to improve it produces, resistance, the resistance produces submission, and the whole ends in pension. *
It is nearly the same with the revenues of the
Duchy of Lancaster. To do nothing with them is
extinction; to. improve them is oppression. Indeed,
the whole of the estates which support these minor
principalities is made up, not of revenues, and rents,
and profitable fines, but of claims, of pretensions, of,
vexations, of litigations. They are exchequers of unfrequent receipt and constant charge: a system of
finances not fit for an economist who would be rich,
not fit for a prince: who would govern his subjects
with equity and justice.
It is not. only between prince and subject that
these mock jurisdictions and mimic revenues produce great mischief. They excite among the people: a
spirit of informing and delating, a spirit of supplant.
ing and undermining one another: so that many, in
such circumstances, conceive it advantageous to them
rather to continue subject to vexation themselves
than to give up the means and chance of vexing oth* Here Lord North shook his head, and told those who sat near
him that Mr. Probert's pension was to depend on his success. It
may be so. Mr. Probert's pension was, however, no essential part
of the question; nor did Mr. B. care whether he still possessed it or
not. His point was, to show the ridicule of attempting an improve
ment of the Welsh revenue under its present establishment.
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ers. It is exceedingly common for men to contract
their love to their country into an attachment to its
petty subdivisions; and they sometimes even cling to
their provincial abuses, as if they were franchises and
local privileges. Accordingly, in places where there
is much of this kind of estate, persons will be always
found who would rather trust to their talents in
recommending themselves to power for the renewal
of their interests, than to incumber their purses,
though never so lightly, in order to transmit independence to their posterity. It is a great mistake,
that the desire of securing property is universal
among mankind. Gaming is a principle inherent in
human nature. It belongs to us all. I would therefore break those tables; I would furnish no evil occupation for that spirit. I would make every man look everywhere, except to the intrigue of a court, for the
improvement of his circumstances or the security of
his fortune. I have in my eye a very strong case in
the Duchy of Lancaster (which lately occupied Westminster Hall and the House of Lords) as my voucher
for many of these reflections. *
For what plausible reason are these principalities
suffered to exist? When a government is rendered
complex, (which in itself is no desirable thing,) it
ought to be for some political end which cannot be
answered otherwise. Subdivisions in government
are only admissible in favor of the dignity of inferior
princes and high nobility, or for the support of an
aristocratic confederacy under some head, or for the
conservation of the franchises of the people in some
privileged province. For the two former of these
* Case of Richard Lee, Esq. , appellant, against George Venables
Lord Vernon, respondent, in the year 1776.
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ends, such are the subdivisions in favor of the electoral and other princes in the Empire; for the latter
of these purposes are the jurisdictions of the Imperial
cities and the ianse towns. For the latter of these
ends are also the countries of the States (Pays
d'EJtats) and certain cities and orders in France.
These are all regulations with'an object, and some
of them with a very good object. But how are the
principles of any of these subdivisions applicable in
the case before us?
Do they answer any purpose to the king? The
Principality of Wales was given by patent to Edward
the Black Prince on the ground on which it has
since stood. Lord Coke sagaciously observes upon
it, " That in the charter of creating the Black Prince
Edward Prince of Wales there is a great mystery: for
less than an estate of inheritance so great a prince
could not have, and an absolute estate of inheritance in
so great a principality as Wales (this principality
being so dear to him) he should not have; and therefore it was made sibi et heredibus suis regibus Anglice, that by his, decease, or attaining to the crown, it
might be extinguished in the crown. "
For the sake of this foolish mystery, of what a great
prince could not have less and should not have so much,
of a principality which was too dear to be given and
too great to be kept, -and for no other cause that
ever I could find, - this form and shadow of a principality, without any substance, has been maintained. That you may judge in this instance (and it serves
for the rest) of'the difference between a great and a
little economy, you will please to recollect, Sir, that
Wales may be about the tenth part of England in
size and population, and certainly not a hundredth
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part in opulence. Twelve judges perform the whole
of the business, both of the stationary and the itinerant justice of this kingdom; but for Wales there are
eight judges. There is in Wales an exchequer, as
well as in all the duchies, according to the very best
and most authentic absurdity of form. There are in
all of them a hundred more difficult trifles and laborious fooleries, which serve no other purpose than to
keep alive corrupt hope and servile dependence.
These principalities are so far from contributing to
the ease of the king, to his wealth, or his dignity,
that they render both his supreme and his subordinate authority perfectly ridiculous. It was but the
other day, that that pert, factious fellow, the Duke of
Lancaster, presumed to fly in the face of his liege
lord, our gracious sovereign, and, associating with a
parcel of lawyers as factious as himself, to the destruction of all law and order, and in committees leading directly to rebellion, presumed to go to law with the king. The object is neither your business nor
mine. Which of the parties got the better I really
forget. I think it was (as it ought to be) the king.
The material point is, that the suit cost about fifteen
thousand pounds. But as the Duke of Lancaster is
but a sort of -Duke Humphrey, and not worth a groat,
our sovereign was obliged to pay the costs of both.
Indeed, this art of converting a great monarch into a
little prince, this royal masquerading, is a very dangerous and expensive amusement, and one of the
king's menus plaisirs, which ought to be reformed.
This duchy, which is not worth four thousand pounds
a year at best to revenue, is worth forty or fifty thousand to influence.
The Duchy of Lancaster and the County Palatine
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of Lancaster answered, I admit, some purpose in their
original creation. They tended to make a subject
imitate a prince. When Henry the Fourth from
that stair ascended the throne, high-minded as he
was, he was not willing to kick away the ladder. To
prevent that principality from being extinguished in
the crown, he severed it by act of Parliament. He
had a motive, such as it was: he thought his title to
the crown unsound, and his possession insecure. He
therefore managed a retreat in his duchy, which
Lord Coke calls (I do not know why) "par multis
regnis. " He flattered himself that it was practicable
to make a projecting point half way down, to break his
fall from the precipice of royalty; as if it were possible for one who had lost a kingdom to keep anything else. However, it is evident that he thought so.
When Henry the Fifth united, by act of Parliament,
the estates of his mother to the duchy, he had the
same predilection with his father to the root of his
family honors, and the same policy in enlarging the
sphere of a possible retreat from the slippery royalty of the two great crowns he held. All this was changed by Edward the Fourth. He had no such
family partialities, and his policy was the reverse of
that of Henry the Fourth and Henry the Fifth. He
accordingly again united the Duchy of Lancaster to
the crown. But when Henry the Seventh, who chose
to consider himself as of the House of Lancaster,
came to the throne, he brought with him the old pretensions and the old politics of that house. A new act of Parliament, a second time, dissevered the
Duchy of Lancaster from the crown; and in that line
things continued until the subversion of the monarchy, when principalities and powers fell along with
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the throne. The Duchy of Lancaster must have been
extinguished, if Cromwell, who. began to form ideas
of aggrandizing his house and raising the several
branches of it, had not caused the duchy to be again
separated from the commonwealth, by an act of the
Parliament of those times.
What partiality, what objects of the politics of the
House of Lancaster, or of Cromwell, has his present
Majesty, or his Majesty's family? What power have
they within any of these principalities, which they have
not within their kingdom? In what manner is the
dignity of the nobility concerned in these principalities? What rights have. the subject there, which they have not at least equally in every other part of the
nation? These distinctions exist for no good end to
the king, to the nobility, or to the people. They
ought not to exist at all.
