No More Learning

III.
11


## p. 162 (#208) ############################################

162
The Diet of Würzburg
and a number of Saxon nobles, including Duke Lothar, were with him at
court. The bishops, obedient to the papal sentence, held aloof, but the
lay nobles were anxious above all for peace, though a peace of their own
making. Henry wisely took no steps to revenge himself for the excommuni-
cation, and, by withholding support from the anti-Pope, facilitated the
re-opening of negotiations. Adalbert alone was stubborn against recon-
ciliation, but his very obstinacy caused the German princes to take action.
When in June 1121 he marched with an army from Saxony to the relief
of Mayence, which was threatened by the Emperor, they intervened de-
cisively for peace, and a diet was summoned to meet at Würzburg.
The diet met on 29 September, and an armistice was arranged which,
besides re-establishing order in Germany, created the necessary conditions
precedent to a settlement of the issue between Pope and Emperor. Henry
was to recognise the Pope, and meanwhile king, churches, and individuals
were to be in undisturbed possession of their rights and lands; bishops
who had been canonically elected and consecrated were to be left in peace-
ful occupation of their sees, and the Bishops of Worms and Spires were
to be reinstated, though the town of Worms was to remain in royal
hands; prisoners and hostages were to be mutually restored. The princes
then bound themselves to use their mediation between Emperor and Pope
to bring about a settlement on the question of investiture which would
not impair the honour of the kingdom, and on the other hand to act in
concert against any attempt of the king to avenge himself on any of his
enemies. The Bavarian nobles, who were not present at Würzburg, gave
their assent to these conditions on 1 November. The princes had thus
taken affairs into their own hands, and by their unanimity had restored
peace and order to the kingdom. In this they rendered it a great service,
and probably the same result could have been achieved in no other way.
But it was a restoration of their control of the government, and was a
measure of the weakness of the royal authority. The king had no alter-
native but to acquiesce; and indeed he welcomed their intervention as a
means of extricating himself from the impasse in his relations with the
Pope. An embassy was sent at the beginning of 1122 to Rome, where it
was well received by Calixtus, and three cardinal-legates with full powers
were dispatched to Germany! Archbishop Adalbert alone, in spite of a
letter from the Pope expressing his earnest desire for peace, did his best
to prevent a reconciliation, and made what use he could of the disputed
election at Würzburg which followed on the death of Bishop Erlung.
But the papal legates resisted his attempts to promote discord, and by
their tactful management of the difficult preliminaries were able to get
general consent to the holding of a council. This was summoned by them
to meet at Mayence on 8 September. The place of meeting was, however,
naturally distasteful to Henry, and, as a concession to him, the Council
eventually took place at Worms on 23 September 1122.
1 Of these legates, two became Popes—Honorius II and Innocent II.


## p. 163 (#209) ############################################

The Concordat of Worms
163
The Concordat of Worms was a treaty for peace between the two
great powers, the spiritual and the temporal heads of Western Christendom.
As such it gave public recognition to the position the Papacy had
acquired in the course of the struggle. It gave recognition too to another
fact—the distinction between the spiritual and the temporal functions of
the episcopate. Over the bishops in Italy and Burgundy royal control
was appreciably diminished; in Germany it was in effect retained. The
king abandoned investiture with ring and staff, but he could now claim
papal sanction for his control of elections, and the grant of the regalia
was recognised as implying the performance of duties to the king-quae
ex his iure debet—in return. On 11 November a diet was held at Bamberg,
composed mainly of the princes who were not present at Worms. They
unanimously ratified the Concordat, which thereby became a constitution
of the kingdom. The relations of the king with the bishops and abbots
of Germany were thus put on a legal basis, and the election of Udalric as
Abbot of Fulda gave an immediate occasion to put the new practice into
effect. Even Adalbert had been constrained to subscribe at Worms, but
he immediately wrote to the Pope attempting to prejudice him against
the Emperor. He was quite unsuccessful, however. He saw his old
associates welcoming the Concordat at Bamberg; and finally the ratifica-
tion of the Church was given at the Lateran Council in March 1123, to
which the Pope, in anticipation of the greatness of the event, had issued
a general summons in June of the preceding year, and which ranks as
the First Ecumenical Council to be held in the West. The concord be-
tween Empire and Papacy was not to be broken again in Adalbert's
lifetime.
Peace without mastery was the conclusion of Henry's struggle with
the Pope. In Germany he achieved neither peace nor mastery. The
course of time had produced a great change in the relation of the nobles,
originally royal officials, with the king? . The counts had in many cases
ceased to hold directly from the king, and as a result of marriages,
divisions of the inheritance, and the like, their possessions often bore
little relation to their titles. Above all the dukes, whose power and in-
dependence the first two Salian kings had successfully combated, had
during the long civil wars and the Church schism recovered much of their
old authority. In Bavaria the Welfs were creating an almost independent
state: a hereditary duchy with the subordinate nobles-margraves and
even the count-palatine as well as ordinary counts—in a vassal relation-
ship to the duke. There was no hostility to Henry V who did not in-
terfere, but Bavaria seems to hold itself aloof and to act as a separate
unit; at the Diet of Würzburg in 1121 Bavaria was not represented, but
gave its assent later. The Hohenstaufen were working to the same end
in Swabia, but the influence of the Dukes of Zähringen prevented them
from achieving complete mastery, and their participation in the govern-
1 Cf. Giesebrecht, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 960 sqq.
CH. I.
11-2


## p. 164 (#210) ############################################

164 Independence of the duchies. Duke Lothar of Saxony
ment of the kingdom was more important to them than a policy of
isolation. But both Duke Frederick and his brother Conrad were
actively employed in increasing the Hohenstaufen domains, and in pro-
tecting their acquisitions by castles? . This was likely soon to conflict
with the similar policy of the Emperor in the neighbouring districts, and
perhaps it is for this reason that signs of friction between Henry and his
nephews began to appear towards the end of his reign. No such policy
was possible in Lorraine, where the division into two duchies, the weak-
ness of the dukes, and the strength of the other nobles, lay and eccle-
siastical, had destroyed all cohesion; in this region and in Franconia it
was more possible for royal authority to recover ground.
But the most important centre of particularism had always been
Saxony, and it became increasingly so under Duke Lothar. The son of a
petty count, he had acquired the allodial territories, and the consequent
prestige, of the two most powerful antagonists of Henry IV-Otto of
Nordheim and Ekbert of Brunswick. He held a position greatly superior
to that of his predecessors, the Billungs, and by his victory in 1115
became the acknowledged leader of the Saxons. His intention evidently
was to unite Saxony under his rule and to exclude the royal authority.
The Saxon nobles were by no means prepared to submit to the first part
of this programme, but Lothar vigorously encountered opposition and
usually with success; his activity extended to expeditions against the
Wends, and by these aggressive measures he protected the north-eastern
frontiers. His policy of isolation was indicated by his abstention from the
Diet of Würzburg and the Concordat of Worms. He departed from it
to some extent in 1123 when he supported, rather half-heartedly, his step-
sister Gertrude of Holland, who was allied with Bishop Godebald of
Utrecht against the Emperor. But he was quite determined to resist
royal interference within his duchy. On the death in 1123 of Henry,
Margrave of Meissen and the East Mark and step-brother to Lothar's
wife, the Emperor appointed Herman II of Winzenburg to Meissen and
Wiprecht of Groitsch (a former rebel, now tamed to loyalty by imprison-
ment) to the East Mark. Lothar treated these appointments as being
in his own gift, and gave Meissen to Conrad of Wettin and the East
Mark to Albert the Bear, son of Count Otto of Ballenstadt and grandson
of Duke Magnus. Henry V summoned Duke Vladislav of Bohemia to
support his candidates, but Lothar successfully resisted him and made
effective his claim to usurp a sovereign right. In 1124 Henry, victorious
over Gertrude and Godebald, assembled a diet at Bamberg before which
Lothar was summoned to appear. He did not obey the summons, but
the expedition decreed against him was deferred owing to Henry's pre-
occupations in the west. Lothar remained defiant, and no further action
was taken against him.
1 Frederick was famous as a builder of castles ; cf. Otto of Freising, Gesta Friderici
imperatoris, Bk. 1, c. 12, SGUS, p. 28.


## p. 165 (#211) ############################################

Last
years
and death of Henry V
165
Unsuccessful in the internal struggle, the king could not restore
imperial authority in the eastern states once subject to the Empire. In
the peaceful years at the beginning of his reign he had made a determined
effort. In Bohemia his suzerainty was recognised, and his decision was
effective in favour of Svatopluk who expelled his cousin Duke Bořivoi in
1107, and on Svatopluk's murder in 1109 in favour of Vladislav, Bořivoi's
son; from both he obtained the payment of tribute. But, like his father,
he had to be content with Bohemian allegiance. His intervention in
Hungary (1108) and in Poland (1109) ended in hopeless failure.
Immediately afterwards his attention was diverted to his Italian expedi-
tion, and he had no opportunity, even if he had the inclination, to
intervene again. But, in the north-east, German influence began to
spread by another agency. The great missionary work of Bishop Otto of
Bamberg in Pomerania started at the end of Henry V's reign; idols and
temples were overthrown, and eight churches built. This was a revival of
the old method of penetration by missionaries, and though Otto's work
was done by the invitation and under the protection of Duke Boleslav III
of Poland, who wished to Christianise where he had conquered, it was
German influence that permeated the country; the new churches were
closely attached to Bamberg, and the first bishop in Pomerania was Otto's
friend and helper, Adalbert. This was to be the beginning of a new
wave of German penetration among the Slavs.
Henry V, indeed, had no part in this. In the last year of his life he
was turning his attention to a novel foreign policy. He had come into
close touch, owing to his marriage, with the English king, and he was
induced by Henry I to enter into an alliance against King Louis VI of
France, from which he hoped perhaps to recoup himself by conquest for
his loss of authority in his own kingdom. But the expedition was
unpopular in Germany; he could only collect a small force, and he was
obliged to retire ignominiously before the large army which assembled
to defend France from invasion. In 1125 he is said to have conceived
the plan, also suggested by his father-in-law, of raising money by a
general tax on the English model; it would have made him independent
of the nobles, who strongly resisted the innovation'. The only result was
to add to his unpopularity, which was increased by a severe famine and
pestilence; though this was the natural result of two hard winters, the
common people attributed to him the responsibility for their sufferings.
It was in these circumstances that he fell ill and died in his forty-fourth
year on 23 May 1125. On his death-bed he made his nephew, Duke
Frederick of Swabia, his heir and named him as his successor; the royal
insignia were placed in the castle of Trifels under the charge of the
Empress Matilda. At Spires the last of the Salian house was given royal
burial beside his three predecessors, but there were few to mourn the
ruler who had been able to win the affection of none. Fear he had
1 Otto of Freising, Chronica, Bk. vii, c. 16, SGUS, p. 332.
CH, III,


## p. 166 (#212) ############################################

166
The election of his successor
inspired, and there were soon stories current that he was not dead, and a
pretender even arose in Burgundy claiming to be Henry V; no one
wished him back, but there was much popular apprehension of his
return.
His personality was such as to inspire fear but not affection. The one
was a useful attribute in dealing with the nobles, but without the other
he could not gain the support necessary to keep them in check. The
middle and lower classes in the towns, and the lower classes in the country-
side as well, had felt a regard for Henry IV which was not merely due to
privileges obtained from him. Henry V was never able to win this regard
despite his privileges, and the revolts of important towns were often a
serious handicap to him. So the nobles, whom he had used to defeat his
father and to defeat the Pope, had proved too strong for him in the end.
Only by their renewed participation in the government was peace restored
to Germany and the schism in the Church healed. And so particularism
prevailed, and ducal authority rose again even in Swabia and Bavaria,
but especially in Saxony, where Lothar had challenged an undoubtedly
royal right by his claims to appoint his subordinates. To the end he
was defiant, a rebel against royal authority. But the imperial idea was
still strong, and so too was the hereditary principle. Had Henry had a
son, he would doubtless have succeeded to the throne with fair chances of
success. That Henry died childless was a fact of the first importance in
the history of Germany, and incidentally in the history of England as
well. His bitterest enemy, the Archbishop of Mayence, was still alive, and
it was the Archbishop of Mayence who by prescriptive right had the first
voice in the election of a king. Skilfully Adalbert used his advantage to
get possession of the royal insignia and to defeat the candidature of
Henry's heir, Duke Frederick of Swabia. Led by him, the princes
triumphantly vindicated the claim they had vainly tried to assert at
Forchheim in 1077, and deliberately rejected the next-of-kin. The election
of Lothar was a step forward towards the eventual victory of the electoral
over the hereditary principle.


## p. 167 (#213) ############################################

167
CHAPTER IV.
(A)
THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH ITALY AND SICILY
BY THE NORMANS.
When the Normans made their appearance at the beginning of the
eleventh century, South Italy was divided into a large number of
small states. Sicily was occupied by the Saracens, Apulia and Calabria
by the Byzantines; Gaeta, Naples, and Amalfi were all three republics ;
Benevento, Capua, and Salerno were the capitals of three Lombard
principalities, which were bounded on the north by the Papal State.
In spite of this subdivision caused by the anarchy which had prevailed
throughout the south of the peninsula during the ninth and tenth
centuries, Byzantine historians imply that South Italy had not changed
in any particular and that the Greek Emperors still maintained their
predominance. It is indeed true that the continual warfare and constant
rivalries between the principal towns of South Italy often led one of
the combatants to have recourse to Byzantium; appeals thus made to
the sovereign authority of the Emperor no doubt contributed to the
maintenance in Constantinople of the idea that the imperial sovereignty
was still recognised by provinces which seem in fact to have been
absolutely independent. The Byzantine possessions properly so called
now consisted only of Apulia, the region of Otranto, and Calabria, and,
although the Greek Empire gained much prestige by the reconquest of
Italy undertaken by Basil II, yet—even in the territory under its
sway-it only exercised a somewhat feeble authority and its power was
by no means firmly established.
In spite of the attempt at Hellenisation made in the tenth century,
Byzantium only partially succeeded in its efforts to assimilate the in-
habitants of the territory taken from the Lombards. Only Calabria and
the district of Otranto really succumbed to Greek influence. There was
not the same result in Apulia, where Byzantium encountered a very
strong and persistent Lombard influence which could neither be crushed
nor undermined. It was thus that the Lombards retained the use of
Latin, and obliged the Greek Emperors to allow the maintenance of Latin
bishoprics in many towns, to tolerate the practice of Lombard law, and
to admit native officials into the local administration. Thus the links
which bound South Italy to Constantinople were very weak. Byzantium
had shewn itself incapable of defending the country and giving security.
The position arising from the strength of the native element and the
weakness of the central power favoured the development of autonomy in


## p. 168 (#214) ############################################

168
Condition of Byzantine Italy
the cities and led to the establishment of real communes. On the other
hand, there were many burdens on the inhabitants, and the country was
crushed under the weight of taxes and military levies. Thus the advan-
tages derived by the populations under Byzantine sway from their sub-
mission to the Empire did not seem commensurate with the burdens they
had to bear, and there arose a general state of discontent, which at the
close of the tenth century found expression in the frequent assassination
of Byzantine officials and in constant revolts; these were facilitated by the
organisation of local bands—the conterati. It was easy for Byzantium to
overcome the first isolated attempts, but her task became more difficult
when there arose leaders capable of attracting malcontents, organising
their forces, and directing the struggle with the Greeks in a firm
resolution to attain the freedom of their country. The first great revolt
was that of Melo.
Melo belonged to the Lombard aristocracy. He was a native of Bari,
and exerted considerable influence not only in his birthplace but through-
out Apulia. Openly hostile to the Byzantines whose yoke he wished to
cast off, Melo first sought to rouse his countrymen in 1009. He was
secretly supported by the Lombard Princes of Capua and Salerno. This
first attempt failed, and the Lombard leader, forced into exile, probably
betook himself to Germany, and besought the Emperor Henry II to
intervene in the affairs of South Italy. By 1016 he was back in his
own country. In that year he entered into negotiations with a band of
Norman pilgrims who had come on pilgrimage to the shrine of St Michael
on Monte Gargano, and begged for their help in driving out the Greeks.
The Norman knights did not accept the offers made to them, but promised
Melo that they would encourage their compatriots to join him.
The Norman knights of Monte Gargano may probably be identified
with the pilgrims spoken of by the chronicler Aimé of Monte Cassino.
According to him, at a time when Salerno was besieged by the
Saracens, a band of Norman knights returning from the Holy Land
disembarked there. Scarcely had they landed before they fell on the
infidels and put them to flight. Amazed at the courage of these
unexpected allies, Guaimar IV, Prince of Salerno, and the inhabitants of
the city begged them to remain, but the Normans refused. In view of
this refusal Guaimar thereupon decided to send back messengers with the
pilgrims to raise a body of Norman auxiliaries in Normandy itself.
If we admit the identity of the pilgrims of Salerno with the pilgrims
of Monte Gargano, which is almost inevitable, we are led to believe
that the meeting of Melo and the Normans was not accidental, but that
it was arranged by Guaimar IV, who had already supported the Lombard
leader in his rebellion. In any case the body of auxiliaries raised in
Normandy on the return of the Norman pilgrims was recruited on behalf
of both Melo and Guaimar.
The Lombard envoys easily succeeded in raising a sufficiently power-


## p. 169 (#215) ############################################

Arrival of the Normans
169
ful body of auxiliaries in Normandy. At this period, indeed, Normandy
was pre-eminently the land of adventurers. The frequent emigrations,
often referred to, were due not only to a natural tendency of the race
but to the existence of a population too dense for the country, part of
which was therefore obliged to expatriate itself. Moreover, as a result of
the violent quarrels and constant struggles between the nobles, there was
always a certain number of men who were obliged, by crime or misfor-
tune, to leave their country. There was no lack of this element in the
first band recruited for the Prince of Salerno. The leader who com-
manded it, Gilbert le Tonnelier (the Cooper, Buatere, Botericus), had
incurred the anger of Duke Richard by an assassination. He was accom-
panied by four of his brothers, Rainulf, Asclettin, Osmond, and Rodolf.
On their arrival in Italy, the Normans divided into two parties, one
of which joined Melo, while the other entered the service of the Prince
of Salerno. Melo was awaiting the coming of 'his Norman auxiliaries
before making a fresh attempt to drive out the Byzantines. In 1017,
supported by Guaimar IV and by Pandulf (Paldolf) III, ruler of Capua,
he attacked Apulia, and soon became master of all the country between
the Fortore and Trani. In October 1018, however, the Byzantines de-
stroyed the rebel army at Cannae, and the Catapan Boioannes re-estab-
lished imperial authority throughout Apulia.
While the vanquished Melo sought the support of Henry II and fed
to Germany, where he eventually died, the Normans who had come to
Italy entered the service of various nobles. Some remained with Guaimar
IV, others were engaged by Prince Pandulf of Benevento, others by
Atenolf, Abbot of Monte Cassino, and the rest by the Counts of Ariano.
Some of this last party entered the service of the Greeks a little later,
and were established at Troia by the Catapan Boioannes.
For some years the Normans played only a secondary part in Italy,
content to reap an advantage by turning to their own ends the rivalries
which sowed discord between the rulers of the Lombard states. After
the death of Henry II (1024), Pandulf III, Prince of Capua, who had
been made prisoner by the deceased Emperor, was set free by his suc-
cessor Conrad. With the help of the Greeks, Pandulf regained his
dominions, and soon took advantage of the death of Guaimar IV (1027)
and the succession of his son Guaimar V (still in his minority) to extend
his dominions at the expense of the neighbouring principalities. Sergius
IV, Duke of Naples, realising that his state was threatened by Pandulf,
whom Aimé refers to as the “ fortissime lupe” of the Abruzzi, called to his
aid the Normans under Rainulf's command. He took them into his service,
and conceded Aversa and its dependencies to their leader (about 1029).
This was not the first occasion on which the Normans had been
granted territory since their arrival in Italy, but none of the settlements
thus founded had ever developed. It was Rainulf's personality which
ensured the success of the county of Aversa. He had hitherto played
CH, TP.


## p. 170 (#216) ############################################

170
The sons of Tancred de Hauteville
only a secondary part in Italian affairs, but now shewed himself to be a
very shrewd and clever politician. He appears to have been the first
Norman capable of rising above his immediate personal interest to further
the attainment of some future political object. Devoid of scruples, guided
only by interested motives, in no way hampered by feelings of gratitude,
he possessed all the requisite qualities for arriving at a high political
position. Throughout his career he had a marvellous capacity for always
attaching himself to the stronger party. In 1034 Rainulf deserted
Sergius IV to enter the service of the Prince of Capua, whom he presently
forsook in 1037 to join the young Prince of Salerno, Guaimar V. The
last-named soon restored the earlier ascendency of the principality of
Salerno, thanks to the assistance of the Normans, and his success was
crowned in 1038 on the arrival of the Emperor Conrad, who reunited the
principality of Capua with Salerno.
The establishment of the Normans at Aversa was followed by a con-
siderable influx of their compatriots, a tendency always warmly encouraged
by Rainulf. The new arrivals were cordially received at his court, and
very soon Aversa became the centre where all adventurers coming from
Normandy could forgather; it was a kind of market where those in need
of soldiers could engage them.
Among the adventurers who came thither between 1034 and 1037
were the sons of a petty Norman noble, Tancred de Hauteville, whose
name was to receive enduring renown from the exploits of his descen-
dants. Tancred, who held a fief of ten men-at-arms at Hauteville-la-
Guicharde near Coutances, was not rich enough to bestow an inheritance
on all his numerous children. By his first wife, Muriella, he had five
sons, William, Drogo, Humphrey, Geoffrey, and Sarlo; by his second,
Fressenda, he had Robert Guiscard, Mauger, William, Auvrai, Tancred,
Humbert, and Roger, to say nothing of daughters. The two eldest sons,
William and Drogo, realising the modest future which awaited them if
they remained under the paternal roof, resolved to seek their fortunes
abroad, and started for Aversa.
Not all the Normans who came to Italy entered Rainulf's service,
numerous parties remaining either in the service of Salerno or in that of
Byzantium. The greater number flocked to join the army which the
Greek Empire, when threatened by the Sicilian Saracens, determined to
dispatch under the command of George Maniaces. During this expe-
dition (1038–1040) difficulties, either with reference to pay or to the
division of booty, arose between the Greek general and his Norman and
Scandinavian auxiliaries, who finally left the army. The leader of the
Norman forces, a Milanese adventurer named Ardoin, joined the Catapan
Michael Doceanus, while his troops dispersed, most of them returning
either to Salerno or to Aversa.
Ardoin, who was almost immediately appointed topoteretes, or
governor, of the district of Melfi, soon realised that the position of the


## p. 171 (#217) ############################################

Defeat of the Byzantines
171
Greeks in Apulia was very precarious, and that there was a magnificent
opportunity for bold adventurers such as those he had lately commanded.
At that time, indeed, discontent was rampant in Apulia because of the
levies in men and money necessitated by the war in Sicily. Profiting by
the reduction of the Byzantine forces due to the Sicilian expedition, the
Lombards had resumed their agitation, assassinations of Byzantine
officials were becoming multiplied, and Argyrus, Melo's son, was endea-
vouring to rouse his compatriots ; Ardoin therefore visited Rainulf, who
was then regarded as leader of the Normans, and raised a force of three
hundred men commanded by a dozen leaders, chief of whom were Pierron,
son of Amyas, and the two sons of Tancred de Hauteville, William of
the Iron Arm and Drogo, who had both become famous during the
Sicilian war. Half of the land to be conquered was to be reserved for
Ardoin, the other half to be given to the Normans.
With the help of the Normans, the Lombard rebels won a series of
victories, the most important being that of Montemaggiore (4 May 1041).
Atenolf, brother of the Prince of Benevento, was then chosen as leader
by the insurgents. This choice shews clearly that the Normans were not
yet masters, and proves the Lombard character of the insurrection.
After
the victory of Montepeloso in September 1041, Atenolf was superseded
by Argyrus, Melo's son, in spite of Guaimar's efforts to be elected as
leader (February 1042).
The rebellion came near to being crushed when Maniaces was
appointed governor of South Italy in the spring of 1042, but, when
he fell out of favour in September of the same year, the Byzantine
general crossed the Adriatic to march on Constantinople. He took with
him some of the Norman adventurers, who after his death entered the
service of the Greek Empire. They were the nucleus of the Norman
force which was formed in Byzantium, a force swelled every year by the
arrival of other adventurers from Italy. Soon Normans were chosen to
fill some of the highest offices at court, and a few years later one of
them, Roussel de Bailleul, even aspired to mount the throne of
Constantinople.
It was only after the departure of Maniaces that the Normans assumed
control of the insurrection. When Argyrus deserted to the Greeks, the
Normans took advantage of his treachery to choose the Prince of Salerno
as leader. At the same time they divided among their own chiefs the
territory at the conquest of which they aimed, and during the following
years, under the command of William of the Iron Arm, they pursued
the methodical subjugation of the Byzantine provinces. Henceforth
the struggle with the Greeks was incessant, and every year the Norman
conquest crept further south.
During this period Guaimar remained the ally of the Normans, but
his authority was no longer unquestioned. At the death of Rainulf
of Aversa in 1045, he was unsuccessful in imposing his candidate, and
CH. II.


## p. 172 (#218) ############################################

172
Robert Guiscard
was obliged to recognise Rainulf II Trincanocte. About the same time
William of the Iron Arm died, and his brother Drogo was recognised as
leader of the Apulian Normans (1048).
The position of the Normans was not affected by the visit of the
Emperor Henry III in 1047; but Guaimar was not so fortunate, as
Capua was taken from him and restored to Pandulf III. The years which
followed the coming of Henry III were the most active period of the
Norman conquest. We know nothing of the details of events, but we
can judge what this conquest meant to the unfortunate inhabitants of
southern Italy by the adventures of Robert Guiscard, one of the sons of
Tancred de Hauteville, a late arrival in Italy.
A fair giant of Herculean strength, with a ruddy complexion, broad
shoulders, and flashing eyes—such is the description given by Anna
Comnena of the hero who intimidated her father-Guiscard was coldly
received by his brothers, and he had an uphill struggle at first, as he
passed from the service of Pandulf to that of Drogo. The latter assigned
to him the conquest of one of the poorest parts of the country, Calabria,
where only a scanty profit could be made. Established first at Scribla in
the valley of Crati, subsequently at San Marco, Guiscard led the life of
a robber chief, pillaging, destroying the harvests, burning down houses
and olive-groves, laying waste the tracts he could not conquer, holding
up merchants to ransom, and robbing travellers. Unable to obtain food
or horses save by robbery, Guiscard shrank from no violence, and nothing
was sacred to him; he respected neither old age, nor women and children,
and on occasion he spared neither church nor monastery. In these cir-
cumstances Robert gained the reputation of a bold and resolute leader,
and his support was soon sought by Gerard, lord of Buonalbergo, who
joined him and brought with him two hundred knights. From that day
Robert's fortune was made, and he began to “devour” the earth.
The life led by other Norman chiefs differed in no way from that of
Guiscard; we can therefore easily imagine the unhappy lot of the
wretched population of South Italy while the Norman conquest was in
progress.
From their midst there soon arose a clamour of distress and
a cry of hate against the oppressors, which reached the Pope, Leo IX.
Touched by the complaints of the victims of Norman cruelty, the
Pope, who blamed the conquerors above all for making no distinction
between the property of God and the property of the laity, deter-
mined to intervene. His first visit to South Italy (1049) led to no result.
Leo IX then begged for the support of Henry III. On his return
from Germany, he received an embassy from the people of Benevento,
who, to save their city, handed it over to him (1051). Being therefore
more directly interested, and supported moreover by the Emperor,
the Pope henceforward intervened much more actively in the affairs of
southern Italy.
In these circumstances a wide-spread plot was organised to assassinate


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Defeat of Pope Leo IX
173
all the Normans on the same day. This attempt failed, only Drogo and
some sixty of his companions being massacred (1051). Drogo's death had
considerable importance, because by the position he had acquired he
stood for the type of Norman who had succeeded, who maintained a
degree of order in his territory and was no longer a mere brigand chief.
After his disappearance there was no one with whom the Pope could
negotiate. Henceforward anarchy increased, and for some time the
Normans were without a leader.
Leo IX determined to have recourse to arms, and collected around
him all the native nobles with the exception of Guaimar V, who refused
to fight against his allies. The situation was not changed by the assassi-
nation of Guaimar (June 1052), for the Normans, led by Humphrey,
established Gisulf, son of the dead prince, at Salerno, although their
support cost him very dear. The following year (1053), having recruited
troops even as far as Germany, Leo IX marched against the Normans,
after having come to terms with Argyrus, who represented the Greek
Emperor at Bari. His force was defeated at Civitate on the banks
of the Fortore, and he himself was taken prisoner (23 June 1053). The
conquerors knelt before their august prisoner, but did not release him
until he had agreed to all their demands. We know nothing of the agree-
ment thus signed.
The death of Leo IX (19 April 1054) was followed by a long period
of unrest. Richard, Count of Aversa, nephew of Rainulf I and son
of Asclettin, extended his possessions at the expense of Gisulf of Salerno,
of the Duke of Gaeta, and of the Counts of Aquino. The Normans still
advanced southward; they reached Otranto and Lecce; Guiscard took
Gallipoli, and laid the territory of Taranto waste. In Calabria he came
to terms with Cosenza, Bisignano, and Martirano. He also attacked the
principality of Salerno, and his brother William, appointed by Humphrey
as Count of the Principato, conquered the territory which had been
granted to him at the expense of the State of Salerno. In 1057 Hum-
phrey died, and Guiscard was called to be his successor (August 1057). He
at once appropriated the heritage of his nephews, Abelard and Herman;
then, resuming his victorious advance southward, he threatened Reggio.
In the region of Monteleone near Bivona he established his brother
Roger, who had just arrived to seek his fortune in Italy. Robert had
soon to return, because the Norman nobles of Apulia refused to recognise
him, and it was by force that the new count taught his rebellious
vassals that they had now a master who knew how to make his authority
respected.
In these early struggles Robert Guiscard was supported by his brother
Roger, who likewise assisted him in a new and vain attempt to take
Reggio in the winter of 1058. In the course of that year they quarrelled,
and Roger made an alliance with William of the Principato. Roger
settled at Scalea and in his turn led the life of a brigand chief, but it
CH, Y.


## p. 174 (#220) ############################################

174
Reconciliation with the Papacy
was his brother's territory which suffered most from his depredations.
The year 1058 was remarkable for a great famine in Calabria. This is
not surprising if we consider the systematic destruction of harvests, the
usual procedure of the Normans in war. The general misery caused a
revolt, and the Calabrians attempted to take advantage of the quarrel
between the two brothers to avoid military service and to refuse
tribute; they even came to open resistance and massacred the Norman
garrison of Nicastro. Guiscard realised that if the rebellion spread he
ran a great risk of losing Calabria, and determined to treat with Roger.
He conceded him the half of Calabria whether in his possession or to be
acquired, from Monte Intefoli and Squillace to Reggio. By this it must
be understood that the two brothers shared equally in each town. At
about the same time Gisulf of Salerno determined to treat with Guiscard.
The latter thereupon repudiated his wife Auberea, by whom he had a son
Bohemond, in order to marry Gisulf's sister Sykelgaita.
The year 1059 marks an important date in the history of the Normans
| in Italy—their reconciliation with the Papacy. This reconciliation was
due to a somewhat curious evolution in papal policy. The continuation
of the struggle with the Normans had been one of the articles of the
programme which the party of reform in the Church led by Hildebrand
aspired to realise. To attain this much-desired object, the successors of
Leo IX—Victor II and Stephen II, encouraged by the future Gregory VII
-had recourse to external aid, the former to the German Emperor,
the latter to his own brother, Duke Godfrey of Lorraine, on whom he
intended to bestow the imperial crown, when his pontifical career was
cut short by death. The party of the Roman aristocracy which was
hostile to reform now triumphed and proclaimed Benedict X as Pope,
while Hildebrand favoured the election of Nicholas II. The approval of
this election by the Empress Agnes soon confirmed the legitimacy of
Hildebrand's candidate, and Nicholas Il shortly afterwards obtained
possession of Rome. This double election deprived the party of reform
of all the ground so laboriously gained. Again the Papacy had found
itself between the Roman aristocracy and the Empire, and had only
triumphed over the former by placing itself in dependence on the latter,
and again the legitimacy of the Pope had been established by the
recognition of the imperial court. If the work of reform were to be
carried out, the Papacy must be rendered independent both of the
Emperor and of the Roman aristocracy. The Pope now risked a very
grave step: with remarkable political insight he realised the changes
which were beginning to appear in the various states of the southern
peninsula, and appealed to the only Italian power capable of supporting
him—the Normans. To appreciate the audacity of this policy we must
remember the reputation of the Normans, which was moreover richly
deserved ; they were regarded as freebooters and Saracens.
It seems, however, that the idea of this alliance, which was to lead to


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Treaty of Melfi
175
such grave results, did not occur immediately to Hildebrand. The Pope
required soldiers to oppose the partisans of Benedict X, who were in the
field, and, probably by the suggestion of Desiderius, Abbot of Monte
Cassino, he applied first to Richard of Aversa, now ruler of Capua. The
latter had already acquired a certain respectability, and had become
sufficiently powerful to act as the head of a state rather than as a
robber chief. He complied with the Pope's request. Nicholas II had full
cause for self-congratulation in his first dealings with the Normans,
who enabled him to restore order. Therefore, when in 1059 he pro-
mulgated his decree on papal elections, he sought for an ally in view of
the dissatisfaction which the proposed measures were certain to excite at
the imperial court, and appealed to the Normans. The interview between
the Pope and the two Norman chiefs, Richard of Capua and Robert
Guiscard, took place at Melfi in August. The Normans had already tried
to obtain from Leo IX the recognition of the states they had established;
this was now conceded by Nicholas II. The Pope received an oath of
fealty from Robert Guiscard and probably also from Richard of Capua; he
conferred on the latter the investiture of the principality of Capua, and
on the former that of the duchy of Apulia, Calabria, and Sicily. We
have no record of Richard's oath, but Guiscard in his undertook to
pay an annual tribute to the Pope, and to be faithful for the future
to the Pope and the Church. He promised to be the ally “of the Holy
Roman Church, so that she might preserve and acquire the rights of
St Peter and his dominions,” to help the Pope to retain the see of Rome,
and to respect the territory of St Peter. Finally, in the event of an
election he bound himself to see that the new Pope was elected and or-
dained according to the honour due to St Peter, as he should be required
by the better part of the cardinals and by the Roman clergy and laity.
By what title did the Pope bestow the investiture of territory which
had never belonged to his predecessors ? The terms used undoubtedly
imply that Nicholas II based his action partly on Charlemagne's Donation,
granting the duchy of Benevento to the Roman Church, and partly, as
regarded Sicily, on the theory shortly afterwards expressed by Urban II,
that all islands appertained to the domain of St Peter in virtue of
the (spurious) Donation of Constantine! .
After his recognition at Melfi as rightful Duke of Apulia, Robert
Guiscard had to defend himself during the ensuing years against the
other Norman chiefs, who at first refused to admit the supremacy of one
of their number. The opposition encountered by the new duke caused
him most serious difficulties and favoured the return of the Byzantines.
In 1060 Guiscard had taken Taranto, Brindisi, and Reggio from the
Greeks, and as soon as the last-named place had fallen, he and his
brother Roger were irresistibly attracted to Sicily; but events in Italy
detained the duke in Apulia. First, there was a revolt of the Norman
1 Jaffé-Löwenfeld, Regesta, No. 5449.
CH. IV.


## p. 176 (#222) ############################################

176
Capture of Bari
nobles in the north of Apulia, which favoured a resumption of hostilities
by the Greeks. Guiscard thereafter lost Brindisi, Oria, Taranto, and
Otranto, and the Byzantines laid siege to Melfi. The duke returned
from Sicily, and restored his ascendency during the early months of 1061,
finally recapturing Brindisi in 1062. Two years later (1064) some
Norman nobles-Geoffrey of Conversano, Robert of Montescaglioso,
Abelard (Humphrey's son), Amyas of Giovenazzo, and Joscelin-entered
into negotiations with a representative of the Greek Emperor at Durazzo.
With the help of the Byzantines they rose in the spring of 1064. For
four years it was with difficulty that Guiscard held his own. Finally, the
duke's victory was assured by the successive defeats of Amyas, Joscelin,
and Abelard, and the capture of Montepeloso from Geoffrey of Conver-
Robert now realised that he could only hope to complete the
conquest of Sicily when he had no cause to fear a revolt of his vassals in
Apulia ; consequently, to be sure of their absolute obedience, he must
above all deprive them of Greek assistance. The ensuing years were
therefore devoted to the task of wresting from the Byzantines their
remaining territory. This was more easily done because the Basileus,
Romanus Diogenes, was engaged in a bitter struggle with the Turks in
Asia. In 1068 Guiscard was victorious at Lecce, Gravina, and Obbiano,
and in the summer of the same year he laid siege to Bari. As supplies
reached this city by sea, it held out for three years ; finally the Norman
fleet overcame the Byzantine ships which were bringing reinforcements,
and the inhabitants entered into negotiations with Guiscard and sur-
rendered the town (April 1071). The capture of Bari marks the real
fall of Byzantine power in Italy; moreover it brought Guiscard another
advantage, ensuring him a fortified place of the first rank in the very
heart of Apulia, which assisted him greatly in maintaining his authority
over his vassals.
Relieved of anxiety regarding Apulia, Guiscard was now again free
to deal with Sicily. The capture of the island from the Saracens had
been the object of the Normans ever since their arrival at Reggio. Their
cupidity was excited by its riches and fertility, and, moreover, the
proximity of the Saracens constituted a permanent danger to their
possessions. Guiscard, however, was detained during the early years of
the conquest by events in Italy, and played a somewhat secondary part
in the conquest of Sicily, leaving the principal part to his brother
Roger.
The Norman conquest was further facilitated by the quarrels of the
Muslim emirs who shared the island ; ‘Abdallāh ibn Hauqal held Mazzara
and Trapani, Ibn al-Hawwās was in possession of Girgenti and Castrogio-
vanni, and Ibn ath-Thimnah was at Syracuse. Ibn ath-Thimnah, having
been defeated by the Emir of Girgenti, called for the help of the Normans,
who since 1060 had been vainly endeavouring to take Messina. At Mileto
the emir came to terms with Roger, who at a renewed attempt succeeded


## p. 177 (#223) ############################################

Conquest of Sicily L
177
in laying waste the region of Milazzo. The capture of Messina in the
summer of 1061 provided the Normans with a base of operations, but the
invaders failed to take Castrogiovanni, nor were they more successful at
Girgenti, although they succeeded in establishing themselves at Troina.
The death of Ibn ath-Thimnah in 1062 deprived the Normans of a valuable
ally, and they had to retire on Messina. In the same year Roger was
dissatisfied because Guiscard paid him in money instead of in land, and
quarrelled with his brother, so that another war began between them.
Only the fear of an insurrection in Calabria brought them to terms.
Threatened with the prospect of a revolt, Guiscard consented to share his
Calabrian territory with Roger, and the treaty then concluded established
a kind of condominium of the two brothers over every town and every
stronghold. The struggle with the Saracens was resumed at the end of 1062,
and continued during the following year. During this first period the
Normans only succeeded in establishing themselves at Messina and Troina,
the rest of the island remaining in the hands of the Saracens. In 1063 the
latter attacked Troina, but were overwhelmingly defeated near Cerami.
In 1064 Roger and Guiscard vainly attempted to take Palermo. The
following years the conquest advanced slowly towards the capital. At
Misilmeri in 1068 the Normans defeated Ayyüb, son of Tamīm, the Zairid
Emir of Africa, who had been summoned to help the Sicilian Saracens.
Ayyub had succeeded Ibn al-Hawwās. After his defeat Ayyūb returned
to Africa, and the Saracen party became disorganised.
The struggle was interrupted by the siege of Bari, but was resumed
immediately after the fall of that city. Guiscard, realising the necessity
of having a naval force, had succeeded in equipping a feet, by the help
of which the Normans occupied Catania and then proceeded to blockade
Palermo; on 10 January 1072 the city fell into their hands, and, as
a result of this success, the Saracens of Mazzara capitulated.
The first stage in this conquest of Sicily closed with the capture of
Palermo ; for the next twelve years the Normans, having but weak
forces at their disposal, could only advance very slowly. As they were
masters of Mazzàra, Messina, Catania, and Palermo, they encircled the
territory of the Emirs of Syracuse and Castrogiovanni in the north,
who, however, succeeded in prolonging the struggle for a considerable
time.
Sicily was divided by Guiscard as follows: for himself he retained
the suzerainty of the island, with Palermo, half Messina, and Val
Demone, while he assigned the rest to Roger. It must be noted that the
position in Sicily differed greatly from that of South Italy. In Italy the
leaders of the original Norman forces were at first equal among themselves,
and consequently they for long refused to recognise Guiscard's authority,
which had to be forcibly imposed. In Sicily, on the contrary, the conquest
was achieved by troops in the pay of Guiscard and his brother Roger ;
consequently, they possessed all rights over the conquered territory, and
C. MED. H. VOL. V. CH. IV.
12


## p. 178 (#224) ############################################

178
Estrangement from the Papacy
their vassals received the investiture of their fiefs from them; and both
were careful not to bestow too much land on their followers, whereby
they made sure that none of their vassals would be powerful enough to
rival them.
After the capture of Palermo, Robert Guiscard remained some months
there, consolidating his gains. In the autumn of 1072 he had to
return hurriedly to Italy, where his Apulian vassals had again taken
advantage of his absence to revolt. At the head of the movement were
Amyas, lord of Giovenazzo, Peter of Trani, and Abelard and Herman,
Humphrey's two sons; the rebels were upheld by Richard, Prince of Capua,
whose power had increased to a remarkable extent since the Treaty of
Melfi. He was the protector of Pope Alexander II, who had only been
able to maintain himself from 1061 to 1063 by Richard's aid, and
the latter had attempted to force recognition of his suzerainty over all the
petty nobles whose possessions surrounded his own. He had been ener-
getically supported by Desiderius, Abbot of Monte Cassino, who realised
that only a powerful state could restore the peace so incessantly broken by
wars between nobles. On the other hand, Alexander II was disturbed by
the growth of the Capuan state, which adjoined the papal dominions. He
actually came to an open rupture with Richard, who in 1066 revenged
himself by laying waste the Papal State up to the very gates of Rome.
For a while the Romans hostile to the Pope even thought of electing the
Prince of Capua as Emperor. But the latter became reconciled with
Alexander II when Godfrey of Lorraine took up arms; we know, how-
ever, nothing of the grounds of conciliation. Nevertheless the Pope did
not forgive Richard for his aggressive policy, and he tried to excite
disorders in the principality of Capua by means of another Norman,
William of Montreuil. Thereby Alexander II inaugurated a new policy,
to be hereafter pursued by the Papacy, which, not having reaped all
the expected advantages from the Norman alliance and being unable to
overcome the Normans by arms, applied itself henceforward to reducing
them to impotence by inciting one leader against another.
Such, therefore, was the position in the autumn of 1072 when Guiscard
returned to Italy. The duke very soon brought his vassals back to
obedience, but hardly had he dealt with them when he found himself in
difficulties with Gregory VII, the successor of Alexander II. The new
Pope, who had inspired the Norman policy adopted by his predecessors,
saw with irritation that the Papacy had not derived those benefits from
the Norman alliance which had been hoped for, and that as a whole it
was Richard and Robert who had reaped advantage from the Treaty
of Melfi. Moreover, Gregory VII was particularly annoyed to see the
Normans beginning to extend towards the north in the region of the
Abruzzi, near Amiterno and Fermo, where several chiefs had established
themselves-notably, Robert, Count of Loritello.
After the first interviews which he had with Robert Guiscard at


## p. 179 (#225) ############################################

Discord among the Normans
179
Benevento (August 1073), Gregory VII, who displayed his usual
stubbornness in the negotiations, came to an open breach with the Duke
of Apulia. It was probably on the question of the conquest of the
Abruzzi that the conference was wrecked. Having broken with Guiscard,
Gregory VII turned to the Prince of Capua, who accepted the proposed
alliance. Henceforward for some years war was resumed with great
energy throughout southern Italy. Guiscard fought in Calabria against
his nephew Abelard, in the neighbourhood of Capua with Richard, and
meanwhile succeeded in establishing himself at Amalfi (1073).
As a result of these violent conflicts, the anarchy prevailing through-
out South Italy reached such a height that the destruction of the
Normans became the first condition necessary for the realisation of all
the plans which Gregory VII had formed for the succour of the Greek
Empire, now threatened by the Muslims. In March 1074 Guiscard
and his partisans were excommunicated, and the Duke of Apulia must
have feared at the time of the expedition in June of that year that the
Pope would succeed in his plans, but the quarrels which arose between
the Pope's allies caused the enterprise to fail dismally. Cencius, the
leader of the Roman aristocracy and of the party hostile to the Pope,
now offered to make Guiscard Emperor if he would help them to expel
Gregory VII. The Duke of Apulia was too well aware how little he could
count on the Roman nobles, who were incapable of upholding their
candidates, and he did not accept their proposition.
After the agreement between the principality of Capua and the Pope,
the hostilities between Robert and Richard continued until 1075, when
Guiscard was invited by Henry IV to abandon the papal for a royal
alliance. He refused. This circumstance decided the two Normans to
combine against the common enemy, and their reconciliation was the
prelude to a general coalition between the Normans. Desiderius, Abbot
of Monte Cassino, who brought all his influence to the cause of peace,
tried to arrange a treaty between Gregory VII and Guiscard, but failed,
because the Pope, in spite of the critical position in which he was placed
by the breach with the king, refused all the concessions which the
Duke of Apulia, taking advantage of the papal necessities, impudently
demanded.
Without any further consideration for the Pope, Robert and Richard
took up arms and together besieged Salerno and Naples. They also com-
bined their forces to make some successful expeditions into papal territory.
At the very moment when Gregory VII was triumphing over Henry IV
and obliging him to come to Canossa, Gisulf, Prince of Salerno, the only
ally remaining to the Pope in South Italy, was deprived of his states
by Guiscard (1077), and in December of the same year the bold Duke of
Apulia laid siege to Benevento. This attack directed against a papal
possession must have exasperated Gregory VII, who was already indignant
with Robert, to whom fortune had never been kinder than since the day
CH, I,
12-2


## p. 180 (#226) ############################################

180
Alliance with the Papacy
he was excommunicated. At the Council of Rome in March 1078 the
Pope pronounced the excommunication of “those Normans who attack
the territory of St Peter, i. e. the March of Fermo and the duchy of
Spoleto, those who besiege Benevento and dare to lay waste the Campagna,
the Marittima, and Sabina. The Pope forbade any bishop or priest
to allow the Normans to attend the divine offices.
The excommunication pronounced by Gregory VII brought discord
between the Normans. When Jordan, son of Richard of Capua, found
that his father was seriously ill (Richard died on 5 April 1078), he feared
lest the Pope should raise obstacles to his succession, and went to make
his submission at Rome; as soon as his father died, he forced Guiscard
to raise the siege of Benevento; shortly afterwards the new Prince of
Capua played an important part in the preparation of the rebellion
which, towards the end of 1078, again set the duke and his Apulian vassals
at odds.
On the occasion of the marriage of one of his daughters, Guiscard for
the first time demanded from his vassals the levy due to the lord when
his daughters married. No one dared resist openly, but the duke's demand
excited great discontent. Probably inspired by Gregory VII, who visited
Capua in 1078, Jordan called Geoffrey of Conversano, Robert of
Montescaglioso, Henry, Count of Monte Sant'Angelo, and Peter, Count
of Taranto, to join him. The insurrection at once spread not only to
Apulia but to Calabria and Lucania; Bari, Trani, Bisceglie, Corato, and
Andria all revolted, and sent their troops to swell the ranks of the
insurgents (1079).
After Calabria had been pacified, Guiscard repaired to Apulia with
considerable forces and soon dispersed the rebels; he then at once
marched against Jordan. The Abbot of Monte Cassino succeeded in
inducing the two princes to make peace. Then returning to Apulia,
Guiscard recaptured the rebel towns one by one. Several of the revolt-
ing nobles fled to Greece to escape the punishment due to them; amongst
these was Abelard, the duke's nephew. After the suppression of the
revolt (1080), Guiscard was more powerful than ever, at the very moment
that Gregory VII finally excommunicated and deposed Henry and
recognised his rival, Rudolf, as King of Germany. As Gregory VII
feared that Guiscard might form an alliance with Henry, he deter-
mined himself to treat with the Duke of Apulia. The negotiations were
conducted by Abbot Desiderius, and ended in the compromise of Ceprano,
where on 29 June Guiscard took an oath of fealty to the Pope. He
swore to be the Pope's man, with a reservation as to the March of
Fermo, Salerno, and Amalfi.