The three great naïvetés :-
Knowledge as a means of happiness (as if .
Knowledge as a means of happiness (as if .
Nietzsche - v14 - Will to Power - a
.
.
He was the seducer of the nobles :
he himself seduces through the roturier Socrates.
. . . He denied all the first principles of the
“noble Greek” of sterling worth; he made
dialectics an everyday practice, conspired with
the tyrants, dabbled in politics for the future, and
was the example of a man whose instincts were
most perfectly separated from tradition. He is
profound and passionate in everything that is
anti-Hellenic. .
One after the other, these great philosophers
represent the typical forms of decadence: the
moral and religious idiosyncrasy, anarchy, nihilism,
(ådıápopa), cynicism, hardening principles, hedon-
ism, and reaction.
The question of "happiness," of "virtue," and
“
of the “salvation of the soul,” is the expression of
physiological contradictoriness in these declining
natures: their instincts lack all balance and
purpose.
1
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CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
436.
To what extent do dialectics and the faith in
reason rest upon moral prejudices ? With Plato
we are as the temporary inhabitants of an in-
telligible world of goodness, still in possession of
a bequest from former times: divine dialectics
taking its root in goodness leads to everything
good (it follows, therefore, that it must lead
" backwards "). Even Descartes had a notion of
the fact that, according to a thoroughly Christian
and moral attitude of mind, which includes a
belief in a good God as the Creator of all things,
the truthfulness of God guarantees the judgments
of our senses for us. But for this religious sanction
and warrant of our senses and our reason, whence
should we obtain our right to trust in existence ?
That thinking must be a measure of reality,—that
what cannot be the subject of thought, cannot
exist is a coarse non plus ultra of a moral blind
confidence (in the essential principle of truth at
the root of all things); this in itself is a mad
assumption which our experience contradicts every
minute. We cannot think of anything precisely
as it is. .
437.
The real philosophers of Greece are those which
came before Socrates (with Socrates something
changes). They are all distinguished men, they
take their stand away from the people and from
usage; they have travelled; they are earnest to
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tie pint of ssbreness, their eyes are calm, and
they are not usacquaisted with the business of
state and diplomacy. They anticipated all the
great concepts which coming sages were to have
concerning things in general: they themselves re-
presented these concepts, they made systems out
of themselves. Nothing can give a higher idea
of Greek intellect thar this sudden fruitfulness in
types, than this invo'untary completeness in the
drawing up of all the great possibilities of the
philsophical ideal. I can see only one original
figure in those that came afterwards: a late
arrival, but necessarily the last-Pyrrho the
nihilist. His instincts were opposed to the in-
fluences which had become ascendant in the mean-
time: the Socratic school, Plato, and the artistic
optimism of Heraclitus. (Pyrrho goes back to
Democritus via Protagoras. . . . )
.
Wise weariness: Pyrrho. To live humbly
among the humble. Devoid of pride. To live
in the vulgar way; to honour and believe what
every one believes. To be on one's guard against
science and intellect, and against everything that
puff's one out. . . . To be simply patient in the
extreme, careless and mild ;-årádela, or, better
still, mpactns. A Buddhist for Greece, bred amid
πραύτης.
the tumult of the Schools; born after his time;
weary; an example of the protest of weariness
against the eagerness of dialecticians; the in-
credulity of the tired man in regard to the im-
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CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
361
.
portance of everything. He had seen Alexander;
he had seen the Indian penitents. To such late-
arrivals and creatures of great subtlety, every-
thing lowly, poor, and idiotic, is seductive. It
narcoticises : it gives them relaxation (Pascal).
On the other hand, by mixing with the crowd,
and getting confounded with the rest, they get
a little warmth. These weary creatures need
warmth. . . . To overcome contradiction; to do
away with contests ; to have no will to excel in
any way: to deny the Greek instincts. (Pyrrho
lived with his sister, who was a midwife. ) To rig
out wisdom in such a way that it no longer dis-
tinguishes; to give it the ragged mantle of poverty ;
to perform the lowest offices, and to go to market
and sell sucking-pigs. . . Sweetness, clearness,
indifference; no need of virtues that require atti-
tudes; to be equal to all even in virtue : final
conquest of one's self, final indifference,
Pyrrho and Epicurus :two forms of Greek
decadence: they are related in their hatred of
dialectics and all theatrical virtues. These two
things together were then called philosophy;
Pyrrho and Epicurus intentionally held that which
they loved in low esteem; they chose common and
even contemptible names for it, and they re-
presented a state in which one is neither ill,
healthy, lively, nor dead. . . . Epicurus was more
naif, more idyllic, more grateful; Pyrrho had more
experience of the world, had travelled more, and
was more nihilistic.
His life was a protest against
the great doctrine of Identity (Happiness = Virtue
·
= Knowledge). The proper way of living is not
promoted by science: wisdom does not make
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362
THE WILL TO POWER.
"wise. " . . . The proper way of living does not desire
happiness, it turns away from happiness.
438.
"
The war against the “old faith,” as Epicurus
waged it, was, strictly speaking, a struggle against
pre-existing Christianity—the struggle against a
world then already gloomy, moralised, acidified
throughout with feelings of guilt, and grown old
and sick.
Not the "moral corruption" of antiquity, but
precisely its moral infectedness was the prerequisite
which enabled Christianity to become its master.
Moral fanaticism (in short: Plato) destroyed
paganism by transvaluing its values and poisoning
its innocence. We ought at last to understand
that what was then destroyed was higher than what
prevailed! Christianity grew on the soil of
psychological corruption, and could only take
root in rotten ground.
439.
Science : as a disciplinary measure or as an
instinct. --I see a decline of the instincts in Greek
philosophers : otherwise they could not have been
guilty of the profound error of regarding the
conscious state as the more valuable state. The
intensity of consciousness stands in the inverse
ratio to the ease and speed of cerebral transmis-
sion. Greek philosophy upheld the opposite view,
which is always the sign of weakened instincts.
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CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
363
We must, in sooth, seek perfect life there where
it is least conscious (that is to say, there where it is
least aware of its logic, its reasons, its means, its
intentions, and its utility). The return to the
facts of common sense, the facts of the common
man and of “paltry people. ” Honesty and intelli-
gence stored up for generations by people who are
quite unconscious of their principles, and who
even have some fear of principles. It is not
reasonable to desire a reasoning virtue. . . . A А
philosopher is compromised by such a desire.
.
.
440.
When morality—that is to say, refinement,
prudence, bravery, and equity-have been stored
up in the same way, thanks to the moral efforts
of a whole succession of generations, the collec-
tive power of this hoard of virtue projects its
rays even into that sphere where honesty is most
seldom present—the sphere of intellect. When
a thing becomes conscious, it is the sign of a
state of ill-ease in the organism; something new
has got to be found, the organism is not satisfied
or adapted, it is subject to distress, suspense, and
it is hypersensitive-precisely all this is con-
sciousness.
Genius lies in the instincts; goodness does
too. One only acts perfectly when one acts in-
stinctively. Even from the moral point of view
.
all thinking which is conscious is merely a process
of groping, and in the majority of cases an attack
on morality. Scientific honesty is always sacrificed
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364
THE WILL TO POWER.
.
when a thinker begins to reason: let any one try
the experiment: put the wisest man in the
balance, and
then let him discourse upon
morality.
It could also be proved that the whole of a
man's conscious thinking shows a much lower
standard of morality than the thoughts of the
same man would show if they were led by his
instincts.
441.
The struggle against Socrates, Plato, and all
the Socratic schools, proceeds from the profound
instinct that man is not made better when he is
shown that virtue may be demonstrated or based
upon reason. . . . This in the end is the nig-
gardly fact, it was the agonal instinct in all these
born dialecticians, which drove them to glorify
their personal abilities as the highest of all qualities,
and to represent every other form of goodness as
conditioned by them. The anti-scientific spirit
of all this "philosophy”: it will never admit that
it is not right.
442.
This is extraordinary. From its very earliest
beginnings, Greek philosophy carries on a struggle
against science with the weapons of a theory of
knowledge, especially of scepticism: and why is
this ? . It is always in favour of morality.
(Physicists and medical men are hated. ) Socrates,
Aristippus, the Megarian school, the Cynics,
Epicurus, and Pyrrhoma general onslaught upon
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CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
365
.
knowledge in favour of morality. (Hatred of
dialectics also. ) There is still a problem to be
solved: they approach sophistry in order to be
rid of science. On the other hand, the physicists
are subjected to such an extent that, among
their first principles, they include the theory of
truth and of real being: for instance, the atom,
the four elements (juxtaposition of being, in order
to explain its multiformity and its transformations).
Contempt of objectivity in interests is taught:
return to practical interest, and to the personal
utility of all knowledge.
The struggle against science is directed at:
(1) its pathos (objectivity); (2) its means (that is
to say, at its utility); (3) its results (which are
considered childish). It is the same struggle
which is taken up later on by the Church in the
name of piety: the Church inherited the whole
arsenal of antiquity for her war with science.
The theory of knowledge played the same part
in the affair as it did in Kant's or the Indians'
case. There is no desire whatever to be troubled
with it, a free hand is wanted for the "purpose
that is envisaged.
Against what powers are they actually defend-
ing themselves ? Against dutifulness, against
obedience to law, against the compulsion of going
hand in hand—I believe this is what is called
Freedom. . . .
.
This is how decadence manifests itself: the
instinct of solidarity is so degenerate that solidarity
itself gets to be regarded as tyranny: no authority
or solidarity is brooked, nobody any longer
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366
THE WILL TO POWER.
desires to fall in with the rank and file, and to
adopt its ignobly slow pace. The slow move-
ment which is the tempo of science is generally
hated, as are also the scientific man's indifference
in regard to getting on, his long breath, and his
impersonal attitude.
443.
At bottom, morality is hostile to science:
Socrates was so already too—and the reason is,
that science considers certain things important
which have no relation whatsoever to “good”
and “evil," and which therefore reduce the gravity
of our feelings concerning “good” and “evil. "
What morality requires is that the whole of a
man should serve it with all his power: it
considers it waste on the part of a creature that
can ill afford waste, when a man earnestly troubles
his head about stars or plants.
or plants. That is why
science very quickly declined in Greece, once
Socrates had inoculated scientific work with the
disease of morality.
The mental altitudes
reached by a Democritus, a Hippocrates, and a
Thucydides, have not been reached a second
time.
444.
The problem of the philosopher and of the
scientific man. -The influence of age; depressing
habits (sedentary study à la Kant; over-work;
inadequate nourishment of the brain; reading).
A more essential question still: is it not already
perhaps a symptom of decadence when thinking
tends to establish generalities ?
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CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
367
as
Objectivity regarded as the disintegration of the
will (to be able to remain detached as
possible . . . . This presupposes a tremendous
adiaphora in regard to the strong passions : a
kind of isolation, an exceptional position, opposi-
tion to the normal passions.
Type: desertion of home-country; emigrants go
ever greater distances afield; growing exoticism;
the voice of the old imperative dies away ;-and
the continual question “whither? ” (“happiness')
is a sign of emancipation from forms of organisa-
tion, a sign of breaking loose from everything.
Problem: is the man of science more of a
decadent symptom than the philosopher ? —as a
whole the scientific man is not cut loose from
everything, only a part of his being is consecrated
exclusively to the service of knowledge and
disciplined to maintain a special attitude and
point of view; in his department he is in need
of all the virtues of a strong race, of robust
health, of great severity, manliness, and intelli-
gence. He is rather a symptom of the great
multiformity of culture than of the effeteness of
the latter. The decadent scholar is a
a bad
scholar. Whereas the decadent philosopher has
always been reckoned hitherto as the typical
philosopher.
445
Among philosophers, nothing is more rare than
intellectual uprightness: they perhaps say the very
reverse, and even believe it.
But the prerequisite
of all their work is, that they can only admit of
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certain truths; they know what they have to
prove; and the fact that they must be agreed as to
these “ truths” is almost what makes them recog-
nise one another as philosophers. There are, for
instance, the truths of morality. But belief in
morality is not a proof of morality: there are
cases—and the philosopher's case is one in point
—when a belief of this sort is simply a piece of
immorality.
446.
What is the retrograde factor in a philosopher ?
--He teaches that the qualities which he happens
to possess are the only qualities that exist, that
they are indispensable to those who wish to attain
to the “highest good” (for instance, dialectics with
Plato). He would have all men raise themselves,
gradatim, to his type as the highest. He de-
spises what is generally esteemed—by him a gulf
is cleft between the highest priestly values and the
values of the world. He knows what is true, who
God is, what every one's goal should be, and the
way thereto. . . . The typical philosopher is
thus an absolute dogmatist ;-if he requires scepti-
cism at all it is only in order to be able to speak
dogmatically of his principal purpose.
447.
When the philosopher is confronted with his
rival-science, for instance, he becomes a sceptic;
then he appropriates a form of knowledge which
he denies to the man of science; he goes hand in
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CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
369
hand with the priest so that he may not be sus-
pected of atheism or materialism; he considers
an attack made upon himself as an attack upon
morals, religion, virtue, and order-he knows how
to bring his opponents into ill repute by calling
them seducers and “underminers”: then he
marches shoulder to shoulder with power.
The philosopher at war with other philosophers:
-he does his best to compel them to appear like
anarchists, disbelievers, opponents of authority.
In short, when he fights, he fights exactly like a
priest and like the priesthood.
3. THE TRUTHS AND ERRORS OF
PHILOSOPHERS.
448.
Philosophy defined by Kant: “ The science of
the limitations of reason”! !
449.
According to Aristotle, Philosophy is the art
of discovering truth. On the other hand, the
Epicureans, who availed themselves of Aristotle's
sensual theory of knowledge, retorted in ironical
opposition to the search for truth : “Philosophy is
the art of Life. "
450.
The three great naïvetés :-
Knowledge as a means of happiness (as if .
. );
VOL. I.
2 A
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THE WILL TO POWER.
Knowledge as a means to virtue (as if . . . );
Knowledge as a means to the “ denial of Life"
-inasmuch as it leads to disappointment-(as
if . . . ).
451.
As if there were one“ truth" which one could
by some means approach!
452.
.
.
Error and ignorance are fatal. —The assump-
tion that truth has been found and that ignorance
and error are at an end, constitutes one of the
most seductive thoughts in the world. Granted
that it be generally accepted, it paralyses the will
to test, to investigate, to be cautious, and to
gather experience: it may even be regarded as
criminal-that is to say, as a doubt concerning
truth.
“ Truth” is therefore more fatal than error and
ignorance, because it paralyses the forces which
lead to enlightenment and knowledge. The
passion for idleness now stands up for “truth "
(“ Thought is pain and misery! "), as also do order,
rule, the joy of possession, the pride of wisdom-
in fact, vanity :-it is easier to obey than to
examine ; it is more gratifying to think “I possess
the truth," than to see only darkness in all direc-
tions; . . . but, above all, it is reassuring, it lends
confidence, and alleviates life-it" improves” the
character inasmuch as it reduces mistrust. “Spirit-
ual peace," "a quiet conscience"-these things
>
"
"
>
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CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY,
371
66
.
>
are inventions which are only possible provided
“Truth be found. ”—“By their fruits ye shall know
*
them. " . . *Truth” is the truth because it
makes men better. The process goes on:
all goodness and all success is placed to the credit
of “truth. ”
This is the proof by success: the happiness,
contentment, and the welfare of a community or
of an individual, are now understood to be the
result of the belief in morality. . . . Conversely :
failure is ascribed to a lack of faith.
453.
-
The causes of error lie just as much in the good
as in the bad will of man:-in an incalculable
number of cases he conceals reality from himself,
he falsifies it, so that he may not suffer from his
good or bad will. God, for instance, is considered
the shaper of man's destiny; he interprets his
little lot as though everything were intentionally
sent to him for the salvation of his soul,--this
act of ignorance in “philology," which to a more
subtle intellect would seem unclean and false, is
done, in the majority of cases, with perfect good
faith. Goodwill, “noble feelings,” and “lofty
states of the soul” are just as underhand and
deceptive in the means they use as are the passions
love, hatred, and revenge, which morality has
repudiated and declared to be egotistic.
Errors are what mankind has had to pay for
most dearly: and taking them all in all, the errors
which have resulted from goodwill are those which
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372
THE WILL TO POWER.
have wrought the most harm. The illusion which
makes people happy is more harmful than the
illusion which is immediately followed by evil
results: the latter increases keenness and mistrust,
and purifies the understanding ; the former
merely narcoticises. . . .
Fine feelings and noble impulses ought, speak-
ing physiologically, to be classified with the
narcotics: their abuse is followed by precisely the
same results as the abuse of any other opiate-
weak nerves.
454.
Error is the most expensive luxury that man
can indulge in: and if the error happen to be a
physiological one, it is fatal to life. What has
mankind paid for most dearly hitherto ? For its
“ truths”: for every one of these were errors in
physiologicis.
455.
Psychological confusions: the desire for belief
is confounded with the “will to truth” (for instance,
in Carlyle). But the desire for disbelief has also
been confounded with the “will to truth" (a
need of ridding one's self of a belief for a hundred
reasons: in order to carry one's point against
certain "believers "). What is it that inspires
Sceptics? The hatred of dogmatists—or a need
of repose, weariness as in Pyrrho's case.
The advantages which were expected to come
from truth, were the advantages resulting from
a belief in it: for, in itself, truth could have been
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CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
373
thoroughly painful, harmful, and even fatal.
Likewise truth was combated only on account
of the advantages which a victory over it would
provide—for instance, emancipation from the
yoke of the ruling powers.
The method of truth was not based upon
motives of truthfulness, but upon motives of power,
upon the desire to be superior.
How is truth proved? By means of the feeling
of increased power,—by means of utility,—by
means of indispensability,-in short, by means of
its advantages (that is to say, hypotheses con-
cerning what truth should be like in order that
it may be embraced by us). But this involves
prejudice: it is a sign that truth does not enter the
question at all. . .
What is the meaning of the “will to truth,"
for instance in the Goncourts? and in the
naturalists ? -A criticism of “objectivity. "
Why should we know: why should we not
prefer to be deceived ? . . . But what
needed was always belief--and not truth.
Belief is created by means which are quite
opposed to the method of investigation: it even
depends upon the exclusion of the latter.
was
456.
A certain degree of faith suffices to-day to
give us an objection to what is believed—it does
more, it makes us question the spiritual healthi-
ness of the believer.
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THE WILL TO POWER.
.
.
457.
Martyrs. -To combat anything that is based
upon reverence, opponents must be possessed of
both daring and recklessness, and be hindered
by no scruples. . . . Now, if one considers that
for thousands of years man has sanctified as
truths only those things which were in reality
errors, and that he has branded any criticism of
them with the hall-mark of badness, one will
have to acknowledge, however reluctantly, that
a goodly amount of immoral deeds were necessary
in order to give the initiative to an attack-I
mean to reason. . . . That these immoralists have
always posed as the “martyrs of truth” should
be forgiven them : the truth of the matter is that
they did not stand up and deny owing to an
instinct for truth; but because of a love of dis-
solution, criminal scepticism, and the love of
adventure, In other cases it is personal rancour
which drives them into the province of problems
—they only combat certain points of view in
order to be able to carry their point against
certain people. But, above all, it is revenge
which has become scientifically useful — the
revenge of the oppressed, those who, thanks to
the truth that happens to be ruling, have been
pressed aside and even smothered. . .
Truth, that is to say the scientific method,
was grasped and favoured by such as recognised
that it was useful weapon of war-an instru-
ment of destruction.
In order to be honoured as opponents, they
.
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CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
375
use
>
“ truth
were moreover obliged to an apparatus
similar to that used by those whom they were
attacking: they therefore brandished the concept
as absolutely as their adversaries did-
they became fanatics at least in their poses,
because no other pose could be expected to be
taken seriously. What still remained to be done
was left to persecution, to passion, and the un-
certainty of the persecuted—hatred waxed great,
and the first impulse began to die away and to
leave the field entirely to science. Ultimately
all of them wanted to be right in the same absurd
way as their opponents. . . . The word “ con-
viction," "faith," the pride of martyrdom—these
things are most unfavourable to knowledge. The
adversaries of truth finally adopt the whole
subjective manner of deciding about truth, that
is to say, by means of poses, sacrifices, and heroic
resolutions,—and thus prolong the dominion of the
anti-scientific method, As martyrs they com-
promise their very own deed.
»
. السر -
458.
The dangerous distinction between " theoretical
and "practical,” in Kant for instance, but also
in the ancient philosophers :—they behave as if
pure intellectuality presented them with the prob-
lems of science and metaphysics ;-they behave
as if practice should be judged by a measure
of its own, whatever the judgment of theory
may be.
Against the first tendency I set up my
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376
THE WILL TO POWER.
"
psychology of philosophers: their strangest calcula.
tions and “intellectuality” are still but the last
pallid impress of a physiological fact; spontaneity
is absolutely lacking in them, everything is instinct,
everything is intended to follow a certain direction
a
from the first.
Against the second tendency I put my question:
whether we know another method of acting
correctly, besides that of thinking correctly; the
last case is action, the first presupposes thought.
Are we possessed of a means whereby we can
judge of the value of a method of life differently
from the value of a theory: through induction or
comparison ? . . . Guileless people imagine that
in this respect we are better equipped, we know
what is "good"-and the philosophers are content
to repeat this view. We conclude that some sort
of faith is at work in this matter, and nothing
.
more.
.
.
“Men must act; consequently rules of conduct
are necessary”- this is what even the ancient
Sceptics thought. The urgent need of a definite
decision in this department of knowledge is used
as an argument in favour of regarding something
as true! . . .
“ Men must not act”-said their more con-
sistent brothers, the Buddhists, and then thought
out a mode of conduct which would deliver man
from the yoke of action.
To adapt one's self, to live as the "common man”
lives, and to regard as right and proper what
he regards as right: this is submission to the
gregarious instinct. One must carry one's courage
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CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
377
and severity so far as to learn to consider such
submission a disgrace. One should not live
according to two standards! . . . One should
not separate theory and practice! . . .
459.
Of all that which was formerly held to be true,
not one word is to be credited. Everything
which was formerly disdained as unholy, for-
bidden, contemptible, and fatal-all these
flowers now bloom on the most charming paths
of truth.
The whole of this old morality concerns us no
longer : it contains not one idea which is still
worthy of respect. We have outlived it-we
are no longer sufficiently coarse and guileless to
be forced to allow ourselves to be lied to in this
way. . . . In more polite language : we are too
virtuous for it. . . . And if truth in the old sense
true” only because the old morality said
"yea” to it, and had a right to say "yea” to it:
it follows that no truth of the past can any longer
be of use to us. . . . Our criterion of truth is
certainly not morality: we refute an assertion
when we show that it is dependent upon morality
and is inspired by noble feelings.
were
460.
All these values are empirical and conditioned,
But he who believes in them and who honours
them, refuses to acknowledge this aspect of them.
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THE WILL TO POWER.
All philosophers believe in these values, and one
form their reverence takes is the endeavour to
make a priori truths out of them. The falsifying
nature of reverence.
Reverence is the supreme test of intellectual
honesty: but in the whole history of philosophy
there is no such thing as intellectual honesty,—but
the “ love of goodness. .
On the one hand, there is an absolute lack of
method in testing the value of these values ;
secondly, there is a general disinclination either
to test them or to regard them as conditioned at
all. —All anti-scientific instincts assembled round
moral values in order to keep science out of this
department.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS IN THE CRITICISM
OF PHILOSOPHY.
461.
Why philosophers are slanderers. The artful
and blind hostility of philosophers towards the
senses—what an amount of mob and middle-class
qualities lie in all this hatred !
The crowd always believes that an abuse of
which it feels the harmful results, constitutes an
objection to the thing which happens to be abused :
all insurrectionary movements against principles,
whether in politics or agriculture, always follow
a line of argument suggested by this ulterior
motive: the abuse must be shown to be necessary
to, and inherent in, the principle.
## p. 379 (#403) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
379
It is a woeful history: mankind looks for a
principle, from the standpoint of which he will be
able to contemn man-he invents a world in
order to be able to slander and throw mud at
this world : as a matter of fact, he snatches every
time at nothing, and construes this nothing as
“God," as “Truth," and, in any case, as judge
and detractor of this existence.
If one should require a proof of how deeply
and thoroughly the actually barbarous needs of
man, even in his present state of tameness and
“civilisation," still seek gratification, one should
contemplate the “leitmotifs ” of the whole of the
evolution of philosophy a sort of revenge upon
reality, a surreptitious process of destroying the
values by means of which men live, a dissatisfied
soul to which the conditions of discipline is one
of torture, and which takes a particular pleasure in
morbidly severing all the bonds that bind it to
such a condition.
The history of philosophy is the story of a secret
and mad hatred of the prerequisities of Life, of
the feelings which make for the real values of
Life, and of all partisanship in favour of Life.
Philosophers have never hesitated to affirm a
fanciful world, provided it contradicted this world,
and furnished them with a weapon wherewith
they could calumniate this world. Up to the
present, philosophy has been the grand school of
slander: and its power has been so great, that
even to-day our science, which pretends to be the
advocate of Life, has accepted the fundamental
position of slander, and treats this world
## p. 380 (#404) ############################################
380
THE WILL TO POWER.
1
1
1
.
!
1
1
1
appearance," and this chain of causes as though
it were only phenomenal. What is the hatred
which is active here?
I fear that it is still the Circe of philosophers-
Morality, which plays them the trick of compelling
them to be ever slanderers. . . . They believed in
moral “truths,” in these they thought they had
found the highest values; what alternative had
they left, save that of denying existence ever
more emphatically the more they got to know
about it? . . . For this life is immoral.
he himself seduces through the roturier Socrates.
. . . He denied all the first principles of the
“noble Greek” of sterling worth; he made
dialectics an everyday practice, conspired with
the tyrants, dabbled in politics for the future, and
was the example of a man whose instincts were
most perfectly separated from tradition. He is
profound and passionate in everything that is
anti-Hellenic. .
One after the other, these great philosophers
represent the typical forms of decadence: the
moral and religious idiosyncrasy, anarchy, nihilism,
(ådıápopa), cynicism, hardening principles, hedon-
ism, and reaction.
The question of "happiness," of "virtue," and
“
of the “salvation of the soul,” is the expression of
physiological contradictoriness in these declining
natures: their instincts lack all balance and
purpose.
1
## p. 359 (#383) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
436.
To what extent do dialectics and the faith in
reason rest upon moral prejudices ? With Plato
we are as the temporary inhabitants of an in-
telligible world of goodness, still in possession of
a bequest from former times: divine dialectics
taking its root in goodness leads to everything
good (it follows, therefore, that it must lead
" backwards "). Even Descartes had a notion of
the fact that, according to a thoroughly Christian
and moral attitude of mind, which includes a
belief in a good God as the Creator of all things,
the truthfulness of God guarantees the judgments
of our senses for us. But for this religious sanction
and warrant of our senses and our reason, whence
should we obtain our right to trust in existence ?
That thinking must be a measure of reality,—that
what cannot be the subject of thought, cannot
exist is a coarse non plus ultra of a moral blind
confidence (in the essential principle of truth at
the root of all things); this in itself is a mad
assumption which our experience contradicts every
minute. We cannot think of anything precisely
as it is. .
437.
The real philosophers of Greece are those which
came before Socrates (with Socrates something
changes). They are all distinguished men, they
take their stand away from the people and from
usage; they have travelled; they are earnest to
## p. 360 (#384) ############################################
360
THE WILL TO POWER
tie pint of ssbreness, their eyes are calm, and
they are not usacquaisted with the business of
state and diplomacy. They anticipated all the
great concepts which coming sages were to have
concerning things in general: they themselves re-
presented these concepts, they made systems out
of themselves. Nothing can give a higher idea
of Greek intellect thar this sudden fruitfulness in
types, than this invo'untary completeness in the
drawing up of all the great possibilities of the
philsophical ideal. I can see only one original
figure in those that came afterwards: a late
arrival, but necessarily the last-Pyrrho the
nihilist. His instincts were opposed to the in-
fluences which had become ascendant in the mean-
time: the Socratic school, Plato, and the artistic
optimism of Heraclitus. (Pyrrho goes back to
Democritus via Protagoras. . . . )
.
Wise weariness: Pyrrho. To live humbly
among the humble. Devoid of pride. To live
in the vulgar way; to honour and believe what
every one believes. To be on one's guard against
science and intellect, and against everything that
puff's one out. . . . To be simply patient in the
extreme, careless and mild ;-årádela, or, better
still, mpactns. A Buddhist for Greece, bred amid
πραύτης.
the tumult of the Schools; born after his time;
weary; an example of the protest of weariness
against the eagerness of dialecticians; the in-
credulity of the tired man in regard to the im-
## p. 361 (#385) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
361
.
portance of everything. He had seen Alexander;
he had seen the Indian penitents. To such late-
arrivals and creatures of great subtlety, every-
thing lowly, poor, and idiotic, is seductive. It
narcoticises : it gives them relaxation (Pascal).
On the other hand, by mixing with the crowd,
and getting confounded with the rest, they get
a little warmth. These weary creatures need
warmth. . . . To overcome contradiction; to do
away with contests ; to have no will to excel in
any way: to deny the Greek instincts. (Pyrrho
lived with his sister, who was a midwife. ) To rig
out wisdom in such a way that it no longer dis-
tinguishes; to give it the ragged mantle of poverty ;
to perform the lowest offices, and to go to market
and sell sucking-pigs. . . Sweetness, clearness,
indifference; no need of virtues that require atti-
tudes; to be equal to all even in virtue : final
conquest of one's self, final indifference,
Pyrrho and Epicurus :two forms of Greek
decadence: they are related in their hatred of
dialectics and all theatrical virtues. These two
things together were then called philosophy;
Pyrrho and Epicurus intentionally held that which
they loved in low esteem; they chose common and
even contemptible names for it, and they re-
presented a state in which one is neither ill,
healthy, lively, nor dead. . . . Epicurus was more
naif, more idyllic, more grateful; Pyrrho had more
experience of the world, had travelled more, and
was more nihilistic.
His life was a protest against
the great doctrine of Identity (Happiness = Virtue
·
= Knowledge). The proper way of living is not
promoted by science: wisdom does not make
## p. 362 (#386) ############################################
362
THE WILL TO POWER.
"wise. " . . . The proper way of living does not desire
happiness, it turns away from happiness.
438.
"
The war against the “old faith,” as Epicurus
waged it, was, strictly speaking, a struggle against
pre-existing Christianity—the struggle against a
world then already gloomy, moralised, acidified
throughout with feelings of guilt, and grown old
and sick.
Not the "moral corruption" of antiquity, but
precisely its moral infectedness was the prerequisite
which enabled Christianity to become its master.
Moral fanaticism (in short: Plato) destroyed
paganism by transvaluing its values and poisoning
its innocence. We ought at last to understand
that what was then destroyed was higher than what
prevailed! Christianity grew on the soil of
psychological corruption, and could only take
root in rotten ground.
439.
Science : as a disciplinary measure or as an
instinct. --I see a decline of the instincts in Greek
philosophers : otherwise they could not have been
guilty of the profound error of regarding the
conscious state as the more valuable state. The
intensity of consciousness stands in the inverse
ratio to the ease and speed of cerebral transmis-
sion. Greek philosophy upheld the opposite view,
which is always the sign of weakened instincts.
## p. 363 (#387) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
363
We must, in sooth, seek perfect life there where
it is least conscious (that is to say, there where it is
least aware of its logic, its reasons, its means, its
intentions, and its utility). The return to the
facts of common sense, the facts of the common
man and of “paltry people. ” Honesty and intelli-
gence stored up for generations by people who are
quite unconscious of their principles, and who
even have some fear of principles. It is not
reasonable to desire a reasoning virtue. . . . A А
philosopher is compromised by such a desire.
.
.
440.
When morality—that is to say, refinement,
prudence, bravery, and equity-have been stored
up in the same way, thanks to the moral efforts
of a whole succession of generations, the collec-
tive power of this hoard of virtue projects its
rays even into that sphere where honesty is most
seldom present—the sphere of intellect. When
a thing becomes conscious, it is the sign of a
state of ill-ease in the organism; something new
has got to be found, the organism is not satisfied
or adapted, it is subject to distress, suspense, and
it is hypersensitive-precisely all this is con-
sciousness.
Genius lies in the instincts; goodness does
too. One only acts perfectly when one acts in-
stinctively. Even from the moral point of view
.
all thinking which is conscious is merely a process
of groping, and in the majority of cases an attack
on morality. Scientific honesty is always sacrificed
## p. 364 (#388) ############################################
364
THE WILL TO POWER.
.
when a thinker begins to reason: let any one try
the experiment: put the wisest man in the
balance, and
then let him discourse upon
morality.
It could also be proved that the whole of a
man's conscious thinking shows a much lower
standard of morality than the thoughts of the
same man would show if they were led by his
instincts.
441.
The struggle against Socrates, Plato, and all
the Socratic schools, proceeds from the profound
instinct that man is not made better when he is
shown that virtue may be demonstrated or based
upon reason. . . . This in the end is the nig-
gardly fact, it was the agonal instinct in all these
born dialecticians, which drove them to glorify
their personal abilities as the highest of all qualities,
and to represent every other form of goodness as
conditioned by them. The anti-scientific spirit
of all this "philosophy”: it will never admit that
it is not right.
442.
This is extraordinary. From its very earliest
beginnings, Greek philosophy carries on a struggle
against science with the weapons of a theory of
knowledge, especially of scepticism: and why is
this ? . It is always in favour of morality.
(Physicists and medical men are hated. ) Socrates,
Aristippus, the Megarian school, the Cynics,
Epicurus, and Pyrrhoma general onslaught upon
## p. 365 (#389) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
365
.
knowledge in favour of morality. (Hatred of
dialectics also. ) There is still a problem to be
solved: they approach sophistry in order to be
rid of science. On the other hand, the physicists
are subjected to such an extent that, among
their first principles, they include the theory of
truth and of real being: for instance, the atom,
the four elements (juxtaposition of being, in order
to explain its multiformity and its transformations).
Contempt of objectivity in interests is taught:
return to practical interest, and to the personal
utility of all knowledge.
The struggle against science is directed at:
(1) its pathos (objectivity); (2) its means (that is
to say, at its utility); (3) its results (which are
considered childish). It is the same struggle
which is taken up later on by the Church in the
name of piety: the Church inherited the whole
arsenal of antiquity for her war with science.
The theory of knowledge played the same part
in the affair as it did in Kant's or the Indians'
case. There is no desire whatever to be troubled
with it, a free hand is wanted for the "purpose
that is envisaged.
Against what powers are they actually defend-
ing themselves ? Against dutifulness, against
obedience to law, against the compulsion of going
hand in hand—I believe this is what is called
Freedom. . . .
.
This is how decadence manifests itself: the
instinct of solidarity is so degenerate that solidarity
itself gets to be regarded as tyranny: no authority
or solidarity is brooked, nobody any longer
## p. 366 (#390) ############################################
366
THE WILL TO POWER.
desires to fall in with the rank and file, and to
adopt its ignobly slow pace. The slow move-
ment which is the tempo of science is generally
hated, as are also the scientific man's indifference
in regard to getting on, his long breath, and his
impersonal attitude.
443.
At bottom, morality is hostile to science:
Socrates was so already too—and the reason is,
that science considers certain things important
which have no relation whatsoever to “good”
and “evil," and which therefore reduce the gravity
of our feelings concerning “good” and “evil. "
What morality requires is that the whole of a
man should serve it with all his power: it
considers it waste on the part of a creature that
can ill afford waste, when a man earnestly troubles
his head about stars or plants.
or plants. That is why
science very quickly declined in Greece, once
Socrates had inoculated scientific work with the
disease of morality.
The mental altitudes
reached by a Democritus, a Hippocrates, and a
Thucydides, have not been reached a second
time.
444.
The problem of the philosopher and of the
scientific man. -The influence of age; depressing
habits (sedentary study à la Kant; over-work;
inadequate nourishment of the brain; reading).
A more essential question still: is it not already
perhaps a symptom of decadence when thinking
tends to establish generalities ?
## p. 367 (#391) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
367
as
Objectivity regarded as the disintegration of the
will (to be able to remain detached as
possible . . . . This presupposes a tremendous
adiaphora in regard to the strong passions : a
kind of isolation, an exceptional position, opposi-
tion to the normal passions.
Type: desertion of home-country; emigrants go
ever greater distances afield; growing exoticism;
the voice of the old imperative dies away ;-and
the continual question “whither? ” (“happiness')
is a sign of emancipation from forms of organisa-
tion, a sign of breaking loose from everything.
Problem: is the man of science more of a
decadent symptom than the philosopher ? —as a
whole the scientific man is not cut loose from
everything, only a part of his being is consecrated
exclusively to the service of knowledge and
disciplined to maintain a special attitude and
point of view; in his department he is in need
of all the virtues of a strong race, of robust
health, of great severity, manliness, and intelli-
gence. He is rather a symptom of the great
multiformity of culture than of the effeteness of
the latter. The decadent scholar is a
a bad
scholar. Whereas the decadent philosopher has
always been reckoned hitherto as the typical
philosopher.
445
Among philosophers, nothing is more rare than
intellectual uprightness: they perhaps say the very
reverse, and even believe it.
But the prerequisite
of all their work is, that they can only admit of
## p. 368 (#392) ############################################
368
THE WILL TO POWER.
certain truths; they know what they have to
prove; and the fact that they must be agreed as to
these “ truths” is almost what makes them recog-
nise one another as philosophers. There are, for
instance, the truths of morality. But belief in
morality is not a proof of morality: there are
cases—and the philosopher's case is one in point
—when a belief of this sort is simply a piece of
immorality.
446.
What is the retrograde factor in a philosopher ?
--He teaches that the qualities which he happens
to possess are the only qualities that exist, that
they are indispensable to those who wish to attain
to the “highest good” (for instance, dialectics with
Plato). He would have all men raise themselves,
gradatim, to his type as the highest. He de-
spises what is generally esteemed—by him a gulf
is cleft between the highest priestly values and the
values of the world. He knows what is true, who
God is, what every one's goal should be, and the
way thereto. . . . The typical philosopher is
thus an absolute dogmatist ;-if he requires scepti-
cism at all it is only in order to be able to speak
dogmatically of his principal purpose.
447.
When the philosopher is confronted with his
rival-science, for instance, he becomes a sceptic;
then he appropriates a form of knowledge which
he denies to the man of science; he goes hand in
## p. 369 (#393) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
369
hand with the priest so that he may not be sus-
pected of atheism or materialism; he considers
an attack made upon himself as an attack upon
morals, religion, virtue, and order-he knows how
to bring his opponents into ill repute by calling
them seducers and “underminers”: then he
marches shoulder to shoulder with power.
The philosopher at war with other philosophers:
-he does his best to compel them to appear like
anarchists, disbelievers, opponents of authority.
In short, when he fights, he fights exactly like a
priest and like the priesthood.
3. THE TRUTHS AND ERRORS OF
PHILOSOPHERS.
448.
Philosophy defined by Kant: “ The science of
the limitations of reason”! !
449.
According to Aristotle, Philosophy is the art
of discovering truth. On the other hand, the
Epicureans, who availed themselves of Aristotle's
sensual theory of knowledge, retorted in ironical
opposition to the search for truth : “Philosophy is
the art of Life. "
450.
The three great naïvetés :-
Knowledge as a means of happiness (as if .
. );
VOL. I.
2 A
## p. 370 (#394) ############################################
370
THE WILL TO POWER.
Knowledge as a means to virtue (as if . . . );
Knowledge as a means to the “ denial of Life"
-inasmuch as it leads to disappointment-(as
if . . . ).
451.
As if there were one“ truth" which one could
by some means approach!
452.
.
.
Error and ignorance are fatal. —The assump-
tion that truth has been found and that ignorance
and error are at an end, constitutes one of the
most seductive thoughts in the world. Granted
that it be generally accepted, it paralyses the will
to test, to investigate, to be cautious, and to
gather experience: it may even be regarded as
criminal-that is to say, as a doubt concerning
truth.
“ Truth” is therefore more fatal than error and
ignorance, because it paralyses the forces which
lead to enlightenment and knowledge. The
passion for idleness now stands up for “truth "
(“ Thought is pain and misery! "), as also do order,
rule, the joy of possession, the pride of wisdom-
in fact, vanity :-it is easier to obey than to
examine ; it is more gratifying to think “I possess
the truth," than to see only darkness in all direc-
tions; . . . but, above all, it is reassuring, it lends
confidence, and alleviates life-it" improves” the
character inasmuch as it reduces mistrust. “Spirit-
ual peace," "a quiet conscience"-these things
>
"
"
>
## p. 371 (#395) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY,
371
66
.
>
are inventions which are only possible provided
“Truth be found. ”—“By their fruits ye shall know
*
them. " . . *Truth” is the truth because it
makes men better. The process goes on:
all goodness and all success is placed to the credit
of “truth. ”
This is the proof by success: the happiness,
contentment, and the welfare of a community or
of an individual, are now understood to be the
result of the belief in morality. . . . Conversely :
failure is ascribed to a lack of faith.
453.
-
The causes of error lie just as much in the good
as in the bad will of man:-in an incalculable
number of cases he conceals reality from himself,
he falsifies it, so that he may not suffer from his
good or bad will. God, for instance, is considered
the shaper of man's destiny; he interprets his
little lot as though everything were intentionally
sent to him for the salvation of his soul,--this
act of ignorance in “philology," which to a more
subtle intellect would seem unclean and false, is
done, in the majority of cases, with perfect good
faith. Goodwill, “noble feelings,” and “lofty
states of the soul” are just as underhand and
deceptive in the means they use as are the passions
love, hatred, and revenge, which morality has
repudiated and declared to be egotistic.
Errors are what mankind has had to pay for
most dearly: and taking them all in all, the errors
which have resulted from goodwill are those which
## p. 372 (#396) ############################################
372
THE WILL TO POWER.
have wrought the most harm. The illusion which
makes people happy is more harmful than the
illusion which is immediately followed by evil
results: the latter increases keenness and mistrust,
and purifies the understanding ; the former
merely narcoticises. . . .
Fine feelings and noble impulses ought, speak-
ing physiologically, to be classified with the
narcotics: their abuse is followed by precisely the
same results as the abuse of any other opiate-
weak nerves.
454.
Error is the most expensive luxury that man
can indulge in: and if the error happen to be a
physiological one, it is fatal to life. What has
mankind paid for most dearly hitherto ? For its
“ truths”: for every one of these were errors in
physiologicis.
455.
Psychological confusions: the desire for belief
is confounded with the “will to truth” (for instance,
in Carlyle). But the desire for disbelief has also
been confounded with the “will to truth" (a
need of ridding one's self of a belief for a hundred
reasons: in order to carry one's point against
certain "believers "). What is it that inspires
Sceptics? The hatred of dogmatists—or a need
of repose, weariness as in Pyrrho's case.
The advantages which were expected to come
from truth, were the advantages resulting from
a belief in it: for, in itself, truth could have been
## p. 373 (#397) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
373
thoroughly painful, harmful, and even fatal.
Likewise truth was combated only on account
of the advantages which a victory over it would
provide—for instance, emancipation from the
yoke of the ruling powers.
The method of truth was not based upon
motives of truthfulness, but upon motives of power,
upon the desire to be superior.
How is truth proved? By means of the feeling
of increased power,—by means of utility,—by
means of indispensability,-in short, by means of
its advantages (that is to say, hypotheses con-
cerning what truth should be like in order that
it may be embraced by us). But this involves
prejudice: it is a sign that truth does not enter the
question at all. . .
What is the meaning of the “will to truth,"
for instance in the Goncourts? and in the
naturalists ? -A criticism of “objectivity. "
Why should we know: why should we not
prefer to be deceived ? . . . But what
needed was always belief--and not truth.
Belief is created by means which are quite
opposed to the method of investigation: it even
depends upon the exclusion of the latter.
was
456.
A certain degree of faith suffices to-day to
give us an objection to what is believed—it does
more, it makes us question the spiritual healthi-
ness of the believer.
## p. 374 (#398) ############################################
374
THE WILL TO POWER.
.
.
457.
Martyrs. -To combat anything that is based
upon reverence, opponents must be possessed of
both daring and recklessness, and be hindered
by no scruples. . . . Now, if one considers that
for thousands of years man has sanctified as
truths only those things which were in reality
errors, and that he has branded any criticism of
them with the hall-mark of badness, one will
have to acknowledge, however reluctantly, that
a goodly amount of immoral deeds were necessary
in order to give the initiative to an attack-I
mean to reason. . . . That these immoralists have
always posed as the “martyrs of truth” should
be forgiven them : the truth of the matter is that
they did not stand up and deny owing to an
instinct for truth; but because of a love of dis-
solution, criminal scepticism, and the love of
adventure, In other cases it is personal rancour
which drives them into the province of problems
—they only combat certain points of view in
order to be able to carry their point against
certain people. But, above all, it is revenge
which has become scientifically useful — the
revenge of the oppressed, those who, thanks to
the truth that happens to be ruling, have been
pressed aside and even smothered. . .
Truth, that is to say the scientific method,
was grasped and favoured by such as recognised
that it was useful weapon of war-an instru-
ment of destruction.
In order to be honoured as opponents, they
.
## p. 375 (#399) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
375
use
>
“ truth
were moreover obliged to an apparatus
similar to that used by those whom they were
attacking: they therefore brandished the concept
as absolutely as their adversaries did-
they became fanatics at least in their poses,
because no other pose could be expected to be
taken seriously. What still remained to be done
was left to persecution, to passion, and the un-
certainty of the persecuted—hatred waxed great,
and the first impulse began to die away and to
leave the field entirely to science. Ultimately
all of them wanted to be right in the same absurd
way as their opponents. . . . The word “ con-
viction," "faith," the pride of martyrdom—these
things are most unfavourable to knowledge. The
adversaries of truth finally adopt the whole
subjective manner of deciding about truth, that
is to say, by means of poses, sacrifices, and heroic
resolutions,—and thus prolong the dominion of the
anti-scientific method, As martyrs they com-
promise their very own deed.
»
. السر -
458.
The dangerous distinction between " theoretical
and "practical,” in Kant for instance, but also
in the ancient philosophers :—they behave as if
pure intellectuality presented them with the prob-
lems of science and metaphysics ;-they behave
as if practice should be judged by a measure
of its own, whatever the judgment of theory
may be.
Against the first tendency I set up my
## p. 376 (#400) ############################################
376
THE WILL TO POWER.
"
psychology of philosophers: their strangest calcula.
tions and “intellectuality” are still but the last
pallid impress of a physiological fact; spontaneity
is absolutely lacking in them, everything is instinct,
everything is intended to follow a certain direction
a
from the first.
Against the second tendency I put my question:
whether we know another method of acting
correctly, besides that of thinking correctly; the
last case is action, the first presupposes thought.
Are we possessed of a means whereby we can
judge of the value of a method of life differently
from the value of a theory: through induction or
comparison ? . . . Guileless people imagine that
in this respect we are better equipped, we know
what is "good"-and the philosophers are content
to repeat this view. We conclude that some sort
of faith is at work in this matter, and nothing
.
more.
.
.
“Men must act; consequently rules of conduct
are necessary”- this is what even the ancient
Sceptics thought. The urgent need of a definite
decision in this department of knowledge is used
as an argument in favour of regarding something
as true! . . .
“ Men must not act”-said their more con-
sistent brothers, the Buddhists, and then thought
out a mode of conduct which would deliver man
from the yoke of action.
To adapt one's self, to live as the "common man”
lives, and to regard as right and proper what
he regards as right: this is submission to the
gregarious instinct. One must carry one's courage
## p. 377 (#401) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
377
and severity so far as to learn to consider such
submission a disgrace. One should not live
according to two standards! . . . One should
not separate theory and practice! . . .
459.
Of all that which was formerly held to be true,
not one word is to be credited. Everything
which was formerly disdained as unholy, for-
bidden, contemptible, and fatal-all these
flowers now bloom on the most charming paths
of truth.
The whole of this old morality concerns us no
longer : it contains not one idea which is still
worthy of respect. We have outlived it-we
are no longer sufficiently coarse and guileless to
be forced to allow ourselves to be lied to in this
way. . . . In more polite language : we are too
virtuous for it. . . . And if truth in the old sense
true” only because the old morality said
"yea” to it, and had a right to say "yea” to it:
it follows that no truth of the past can any longer
be of use to us. . . . Our criterion of truth is
certainly not morality: we refute an assertion
when we show that it is dependent upon morality
and is inspired by noble feelings.
were
460.
All these values are empirical and conditioned,
But he who believes in them and who honours
them, refuses to acknowledge this aspect of them.
## p. 378 (#402) ############################################
378
THE WILL TO POWER.
All philosophers believe in these values, and one
form their reverence takes is the endeavour to
make a priori truths out of them. The falsifying
nature of reverence.
Reverence is the supreme test of intellectual
honesty: but in the whole history of philosophy
there is no such thing as intellectual honesty,—but
the “ love of goodness. .
On the one hand, there is an absolute lack of
method in testing the value of these values ;
secondly, there is a general disinclination either
to test them or to regard them as conditioned at
all. —All anti-scientific instincts assembled round
moral values in order to keep science out of this
department.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS IN THE CRITICISM
OF PHILOSOPHY.
461.
Why philosophers are slanderers. The artful
and blind hostility of philosophers towards the
senses—what an amount of mob and middle-class
qualities lie in all this hatred !
The crowd always believes that an abuse of
which it feels the harmful results, constitutes an
objection to the thing which happens to be abused :
all insurrectionary movements against principles,
whether in politics or agriculture, always follow
a line of argument suggested by this ulterior
motive: the abuse must be shown to be necessary
to, and inherent in, the principle.
## p. 379 (#403) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
379
It is a woeful history: mankind looks for a
principle, from the standpoint of which he will be
able to contemn man-he invents a world in
order to be able to slander and throw mud at
this world : as a matter of fact, he snatches every
time at nothing, and construes this nothing as
“God," as “Truth," and, in any case, as judge
and detractor of this existence.
If one should require a proof of how deeply
and thoroughly the actually barbarous needs of
man, even in his present state of tameness and
“civilisation," still seek gratification, one should
contemplate the “leitmotifs ” of the whole of the
evolution of philosophy a sort of revenge upon
reality, a surreptitious process of destroying the
values by means of which men live, a dissatisfied
soul to which the conditions of discipline is one
of torture, and which takes a particular pleasure in
morbidly severing all the bonds that bind it to
such a condition.
The history of philosophy is the story of a secret
and mad hatred of the prerequisities of Life, of
the feelings which make for the real values of
Life, and of all partisanship in favour of Life.
Philosophers have never hesitated to affirm a
fanciful world, provided it contradicted this world,
and furnished them with a weapon wherewith
they could calumniate this world. Up to the
present, philosophy has been the grand school of
slander: and its power has been so great, that
even to-day our science, which pretends to be the
advocate of Life, has accepted the fundamental
position of slander, and treats this world
## p. 380 (#404) ############################################
380
THE WILL TO POWER.
1
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appearance," and this chain of causes as though
it were only phenomenal. What is the hatred
which is active here?
I fear that it is still the Circe of philosophers-
Morality, which plays them the trick of compelling
them to be ever slanderers. . . . They believed in
moral “truths,” in these they thought they had
found the highest values; what alternative had
they left, save that of denying existence ever
more emphatically the more they got to know
about it? . . . For this life is immoral.
