(3) Whether a sacrament is a sign of one thing only, or of
several?
Summa Theologica
"
Reply to Objection 1: Judgment belongs to truth as its standard, while
it belongs to the man imbued with truth, according as he is as it were
one with truth, as a kind of law and "living justice" [*Aristotle,
Ethic. v]. Hence Augustine quotes (De Verb. Dom. , Serm. cxxvii) the
saying of 1 Cor. 2:15: "The spiritual man judgeth all things. " But
beyond all creatures Christ's soul was more closely united with truth,
and more full of truth; according to Jn. 1:14: "We saw Him . . . full
of grace and truth. " And according to this it belongs principally to
the soul of Christ to judge all things.
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to God alone to bestow beatitude upon
souls by a participation with Himself; but it is Christ's prerogative
to bring them to such beatitude, inasmuch as He is their Head and the
author of their salvation, according to Heb. 2:10: "Who had brought
many children into glory, to perfect the author of their salvation by
His Passion. "
Reply to Objection 3: To know and judge the secrets of hearts, of
itself belongs to God alone; but from the overflow of the Godhead into
Christ's soul it belongs to Him also to know and to judge the secrets
of hearts, as we stated above ([4332]Q[10], A[2]), when dealing with
the knowledge of Christ. Hence it is written (Rom. 2:16): "In the day
when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ. "
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Whether Christ acquired His judiciary power by His merits?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not acquire His judiciary
power by His merits. For judiciary power flows from the royal dignity:
according to Prov. 20:8: "The king that sitteth on the throne of
judgment, scattereth away all evil with his look. " But it was without
merits that Christ acquired royal power, for it is His due as God's
Only-begotten Son: thus it is written (Lk. 1:32): "The Lord God shall
give unto Him the throne of David His father, and He shall reign in the
house of Jacob for ever. " Therefore Christ did not obtain judiciary
power by His merits.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above [4333](A[2]), judiciary power is
Christ's due inasmuch as He is our Head. But the grace of headship does
not belong to Christ by reason of merit, but follows the personal union
of the Divine and human natures: according to Jn. 1:14, 16: "We saw His
glory . . . as of the Only-Begotten of the Father, full of grace and
truth . . . and of His fulness we all have received": and this pertains
to the notion of headship. Consequently, it seems that Christ did not
have judiciary power from merits.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:15): "The spiritual
man judgeth all things. " But a man becomes spiritual through grace,
which is not from merits; otherwise it is "no more grace," as is said
in Rom. 11:6. Therefore it seems that judiciary power belongs neither
to Christ nor to others from any merits, but from grace alone.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 36:17): "Thy cause hath been judged
as that of the wicked, cause and judgment thou shalt recover. " And
Augustine says (Serm. cxxvii): "The Judge shall sit, who stood before a
judge; He shall condemn the truly wicked, who Himself was falsely
reputed wicked. "
I answer that, There is nothing to hinder one and the same thing from
being due to some one from various causes: as the glory of the body in
rising was due to Christ not only as befitting His Godhead and His
soul's glory, but likewise "from the merit of the lowliness of His
Passion" [*Cf. Augustine, Tract. civ in Joan. ]. And in the same way it
must be said that judiciary power belongs to the Man Christ on account
of both His Divine personality, and the dignity of His headship, and
the fulness of His habitual grace: and yet He obtained it from merit,
so that, in accordance with the Divine justice, He should be judge who
fought for God's justice, and conquered, and was unjustly condemned.
Hence He Himself says (Apoc. 3:21): "I have overcome and am set down in
My Father's throne [Vulg. : 'with My Father in His throne']. " Now
judiciary power is understood by "throne," according to Ps. 9:5: "Thou
hast sat on the throne, who judgest justice. "
Reply to Objection 1: This argument holds good of judiciary power
according as it is due to Christ by reason of the union with the Word
of God.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument is based on the ground of His grace
as Head.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument holds good in regard to habitual
grace, which perfects Christ's soul. But although judiciary power be
Christ's due in these ways, it is not hindered from being His due from
merit.
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Whether judiciary power belongs to Christ with respect to all human affairs?
Objection 1: It would seem that judiciary power concerning all human
affairs does not belong to Christ. For as we read in Lk. 12:13,14, when
one of the crowd said to Christ: "Speak to my brother that he divide
the inheritance with me; He said to him: Man, who hath appointed Me
judge, or divider over you? " Consequently, He does not exercise
judgment over all human affairs.
Objection 2: Further, no one exercises judgment except over his own
subjects. But, according to Heb. 2:8, "we see not as yet all things
subject to" Christ. Therefore it seems that Christ has not judgment
over all human affairs.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx) that it is part
of Divine judgment for the good to be afflicted sometimes in this
world, and sometimes to prosper, and in like manner the wicked. But the
same was the case also before the Incarnation. Consequently, not all
God's judgments regarding human affairs are included in Christ's
judiciary power.
On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 5:22): "The Father hath given all
judgment to the Son. "
I answer that, If we speak of Christ according to His Divine Nature, it
is evident that every judgment of the Father belongs to the Son; for,
as the Father does all things through His Word, so He judges all things
through His Word.
But if we speak of Christ in His human nature, thus again is it evident
that all things are subject to His judgment. This is made clear if we
consider first of all the relationship subsisting between Christ's soul
and the Word of God; for, if "the spiritual man judgeth all things," as
is said in 1 Cor. 2:15, inasmuch as his soul clings to the Word of God,
how much more Christ's soul, which is filled with the truth of the Word
of God, passes judgment upon all things.
Secondly, the same appears from the merit of His death; because,
according to Rom. 14:9: "To this end Christ died and rose again; that
He might be Lord both of the dead and of the living. " And therefore He
has judgment over all men; and on this account the Apostle adds (Rom.
14:10): "We shall all stand before the judgment seat of Christ": and
(Dan. 7:14) it is written that "He gave Him power, and glory, and a
kingdom; and all peoples, tribes, and tongues shall serve Him. "
Thirdly, the same thing is evident from comparison of human affairs
with the end of human salvation. For, to whomsoever the substance is
entrusted, the accessory is likewise committed. Now all human affairs
are ordered for the end of beatitude, which is everlasting salvation,
to which men are admitted, or from which they are excluded by Christ's
judgment, as is evident from Mat. 25:31,40. Consequently, it is
manifest that all human affairs are included in Christ's judiciary
power.
Reply to Objection 1: As was said above (A[3], OBJ[1]), judiciary power
goes with royal dignity. Now Christ, although established king by God,
did not wish while living on earth to govern temporarily an earthly
kingdom; consequently He said (Jn. 18:36): "My kingdom is not of this
world. " In like fashion He did not wish to exercise judiciary power
over temporal concerns, since He came to raise men to Divine things.
Hence Ambrose observes on this passage in Luke: "It is well that He who
came down with a Divine purpose should hold Himself aloof from temporal
concerns; nor does He deign to be a judge of quarrels and an arbiter of
property, since He is judge of the quick and the dead, and the
arbitrator of merits. "
Reply to Objection 2: All things are subject to Christ in respect of
that power, which He received from the Father, over all things,
according to Mat. 28:18: "All power is given to Me in heaven and in
earth. " But as to the exercise of this power, all things are not yet
subject to Him: this will come to pass in the future, when He shall
fulfil His will regarding all things, by saving some and punishing
others.
Reply to Objection 3: Judgments of this kind were exercised by Christ
before His Incarnation, inasmuch as He is the Word of God: and the soul
united with Him personally became a partaker of this power by the
Incarnation.
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Whether after the Judgment that takes place in the present time, there
remains yet another General Judgment?
Objection 1: It would seem that after the Judgment that takes place in
the present time, there does not remain another General Judgment. For a
judgment serves no purpose after the final allotment of rewards and
punishments. But rewards and punishments are allotted in this present
time: for our Lord said to the thief on the cross (Lk. 23:43): "This
day thou shalt be with Me in paradise": and (Lk. 16:22) it is said that
"the rich man died and was buried in hell. " Therefore it is useless to
look forward to a final Judgment.
Objection 2: Further, according to another (the Septuagint) version of
Nahum 1:9, "God shall not judge the same thing a second time. " But in
the present time God judges both temporal and spiritual matters.
Therefore, it does not seem that another final judgment is to be
expected.
Objection 3: Further, reward and punishment correspond with merit and
demerit. But merit and demerit bear relation to the body only in so far
as it is the instrument of the soul. Therefore reward or punishment is
not due to the body save as the soul's instrument. Therefore no other
Judgment is called for at the end (of the world) to requite man with
reward or punishment in the body, besides that Judgment in which souls
are now punished or rewarded.
On the contrary, It is said in Jn. 12:48: "The word that I have spoken,
the same shall judge you [Vulg. : 'him'] in the last day. " Therefore
there will be a Judgment at the last day besides that which takes place
in the present time.
I answer that, Judgment cannot be passed perfectly upon any changeable
subject before its consummation: just as judgment cannot be given
perfectly regarding the quality of any action before its completion in
itself and in its results: because many actions appear to be
profitable, which in their effects prove to be hurtful. And in the same
way perfect judgment cannot be passed upon any man before the close of
his life, since he can be changed in many respects from good to evil,
or conversely, or from good to better, or from evil to worse. Hence the
Apostle says (Heb. 9:27): "It is appointed unto men once to die, and
after this the Judgment. "
But it must be observed that although man's temporal life in itself
ends with death, still it continues dependent in a measure on what
comes after it in the future. In one way, as it still lives on in men's
memories, in which sometimes, contrary to the truth, good or evil
reputations linger on. In another way in a man's children, who are so
to speak something of their parent, according to Ecclus. 30:4: "His
father is dead, and he is as if he were not dead, for he hath left one
behind him that is like himself. " And yet many good men have wicked
sons, and conversely. Thirdly, as to the result of his actions: just as
from the deceit of Arius and other false leaders unbelief continues to
flourish down to the close of the world; and even until then faith will
continue to derive its progress from the preaching of the apostles. In
a fourth way, as to the body, which is sometimes buried with honor and
sometimes left unburied, and finally falls to dust utterly. In a fifth
way, as to the things upon which a man's heart is set, such as temporal
concerns, for example, some of which quickly lapse, while others endure
longer.
Now all these things are submitted to the verdict of the Divine
Judgment; and consequently, a perfect and public Judgment cannot be
made of all these things during the course of this present time.
Wherefore, there must be a final Judgment at the last day, in which
everything concerning every man in every respect shall be perfectly and
publicly judged.
Reply to Objection 1: Some men have held the opinion that the souls of
the saints shall not be rewarded in heaven, nor the souls of the lost
punished in hell, until the Judgment-day. That this is false appears
from the testimony of the Apostle (2 Cor. 5:8), where he says: "We are
confident and have a good will to be absent rather from the body, and
to be present with the Lord": that is, not to "walk by faith" but "by
sight," as appears from the context. But this is to see God in His
Essence, wherein consists "eternal life," as is clear from Jn. 17:3.
Hence it is manifest that the souls separated from bodies are in
eternal life.
Consequently, it must be maintained that after death man enters into an
unchangeable state as to all that concerns the soul: and therefore
there is no need for postponing judgment as to the reward of the soul.
But since there are some other things pertaining to a man which go on
through the whole course of time, and which are not foreign to the
Divine judgment, all these things must be brought to judgment at the
end of time. For although in regard to such things a man neither merits
nor demerits, still in a measure they accompany his reward or
punishment. Consequently all these things must be weighed in the final
judgment.
Reply to Objection 2: "God shall not judge twice the same thing," i. e.
in the same respect; but it is not unseemly for God to judge twice
according to different respects.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the reward or punishment of the body
depends upon the reward or punishment of the soul, nevertheless, since
the soul is changeable only accidentally, on account of the body, once
it is separated from the body it enters into an unchangeable condition,
and receives its judgment. But the body remains subject to change down
to the close of time: and therefore it must receive its reward or
punishment then, in the last Judgment.
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Whether Christ's judiciary power extends to the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's judiciary power does not
extend to the angels, because the good and wicked angels alike were
judged in the beginning of the world, when some fell through sin while
others were confirmed in bliss. But those already judged have no need
of being judged again. Therefore Christ's judiciary power does not
extend to the angels.
Objection 2: Further, the same person cannot be both judge and judged.
But the angels will come to judge with Christ, according to Mat. 25:31:
"When the Son of Man shall come in His majesty, and all the angels with
Him. " Therefore it seems that the angels will not be judged by Christ.
Objection 3: Further, the angels are higher than other creatures. If
Christ, then, be judge not only of men but likewise of angels, then for
the same reason He will be judge of all creatures; which seems to be
false, since this belongs to God's providence: hence it is written (Job
34:13): "What other hath He appointed over the earth? or whom hath He
set over the world which He made? " Therefore Christ is not the judge of
the angels.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:3): "Know you not that we
shall judge angels? " But the saints judge only by Christ's authority.
Therefore, much more does Christ possess judiciary power over the
angels.
I answer that, The angels are subjects of Christ's judiciary power, not
only with regard to His Divine Nature, as He is the Word of God, but
also with regard to His human nature. And this is evident from three
considerations. First of all, from the closeness of His assumed nature
to God; because, according to Heb. 2:16: "For nowhere doth He take hold
of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold. "
Consequently, Christ's soul is more filled with the truth of the Word
of God than any angel: for which reason He also enlightens the angels,
as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), and so He has power to judge them.
Secondly, because by the lowliness of His Passion, human nature in
Christ merited to be exalted above the angels; so that, as is said in
Phil. 2:10: "In the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those that
are in heaven, on earth, and under the earth. " And therefore Christ has
judiciary power even over the good and wicked angels: in token whereof
it is said in the Apocalypse (7:11) that "all the angels stood round
about the throne. " Thirdly, on account of what they do for men, of whom
Christ is the Head in a special manner. Hence it is written (Heb.
1:14): "They are [Vulg. : 'Are they not'] all ministering spirits, sent
to minister for them, who shall receive the inheritance of salvation
(? ). " But they are submitted to Christ's judgment, first, as regards
the dispensing of those things which are done through them; which
dispensing is likewise done by the Man Christ, to whom the angels
ministered, as related (Mat. 4:11), and from whom the devils besought
that they might be sent into the swine, according to Mat. 8:31.
Secondly, as to other accidental rewards of the good angels, such as
the joy which they have at the salvation of men, according to Lk.
15:10: "There shall be joy before the angels of God upon one sinner
doing penance": and furthermore as to the accidental punishments of the
devils wherewith they are either tormented here, or are shut up in
hell; and this also belongs to the Man Christ: hence it is written (Mk.
1:24) that the devil cried out: "What have we to do with thee, Jesus of
Nazareth? art Thou come to destroy us? " Thirdly, as to the essential
reward of the good angels, which is everlasting bliss; and as to the
essential punishment of the wicked angels, which is everlasting
damnation. But this was done by Christ from the beginning of the world,
inasmuch as He is the Word of God.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers judgment as to the
essential reward and chief punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi):
"Although the spiritual man judgeth all things, still he is judged by
Truth Itself. " Consequently, although the angels judge, as being
spiritual creatures, still they are judged by Christ, inasmuch as He is
the Truth.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ judges not only the angels, but also the
administration of all creatures. For if, as Augustine says (De Trin.
iii) the lower things are ruled by God through the higher, in a certain
order, it must be said that all things are ruled by Christ's soul,
which is above every creature. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 2:5): "For
God hath not subjected unto angels the world to come"---subject namely
to Christ---"of whom we speak" [Douay: 'whereof we speak'] [*The words
"subject namely to Christ" are from a gloss]. Nor does it follow that
God set another over the earth; since one and the same Person is God
and Man, our Lord Jesus Christ.
Let what has been said of the Mystery of His Incarnation suffice for
the present.
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TREATISE ON THE SACRAMENTS (QQ[60]-90)
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WHAT IS A SACRAMENT? (EIGHT ARTICLES)
After considering those things that concern the mystery of the
incarnate Word, we must consider the sacraments of the Church which
derive their efficacy from the Word incarnate Himself. First we shall
consider the sacraments in general; secondly, we shall consider
specially each sacrament.
Concerning the first our consideration will be fivefold: (1) What is a
sacrament? (2) Of the necessity of the sacraments; (3) of the effects
of the sacraments; (4) Of their cause; (5) Of their number.
Under the first heading there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a sacrament is a kind of sign?
(2) Whether every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament?
(3) Whether a sacrament is a sign of one thing only, or of several?
(4) Whether a sacrament is a sign that is something sensible?
(5) Whether some determinate sensible thing is required for a
sacrament?
(6) Whether signification expressed by words is necessary for a
sacrament?
(7) Whether determinate words are required?
(8) Whether anything may be added to or subtracted from these words?
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Whether a sacrament is a kind of sign?
Objection 1: It seems that a sacrament is not a kind of sign. For
sacrament appears to be derived from "sacring" [sacrando]; just as
medicament, from "medicando" [healing]. But this seems to be of the
nature of a cause rather than of a sign. Therefore a sacrament is a
kind of cause rather than a kind of sign.
Objection 2: Further, sacrament seems to signify something hidden,
according to Tob. 12:7: "It is good to hide the secret [sacramentum] of
a king"; and Eph. 3:9: "What is the dispensation of the mystery
[sacramenti] which hath been hidden from eternity in God. " But that
which is hidden, seems foreign to the nature of a sign; for "a sign is
that which conveys something else to the mind, besides the species
which it impresses on the senses," as Augustine explains (De Doctr.
Christ. ii). Therefore it seems that a sacrament is not a kind of sign.
Objection 3: Further, an oath is sometimes called a sacrament: for it
is written in the Decretals (Caus. xxii, qu. 5): "Children who have not
attained the use of reason must not be obliged to swear: and whoever
has foresworn himself once, must no more be a witness, nor be allowed
to take a sacrament," i. e. an oath. But an oath is not a kind of sign,
therefore it seems that a sacrament is not a kind of sign.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x): "The visible sacrifice
is the sacrament, i. e. the sacred sign, of the invisible sacrifice. "
I answer that, All things that are ordained to one, even in different
ways, can be denominated from it: thus, from health which is in an
animal, not only is the animal said to be healthy through being the
subject of health: but medicine also is said to be healthy through
producing health; diet through preserving it; and urine, through being
a sign of health. Consequently, a thing may be called a "sacrament,"
either from having a certain hidden sanctity, and in this sense a
sacrament is a "sacred secret"; or from having some relationship to
this sanctity, which relationship may be that of a cause, or of a sign
or of any other relation. But now we are speaking of sacraments in a
special sense, as implying the habitude of sign: and in this way a
sacrament is a kind of sign.
Reply to Objection 1: Because medicine is an efficient cause of health,
consequently whatever things are denominated from medicine are to be
referred to some first active cause: so that a medicament implies a
certain causality. But sanctity from which a sacrament is denominated,
is not there taken as an efficient cause, but rather as a formal or a
final cause. Therefore it does not follow that a sacrament need always
imply causality.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers sacrament in the sense of
a "sacred secret. " Now not only God's but also the king's, secret, is
said to be sacred and to be a sacrament: because according to the
ancients, whatever it was unlawful to lay violent hands on was said to
be holy or sacrosanct, such as the city walls, and persons of high
rank. Consequently those secrets, whether Divine or human, which it is
unlawful to violate by making them known to anybody whatever, are
called "sacred secrets or sacraments. "
Reply to Objection 3: Even an oath has a certain relation to sacred
things, in so far as it consists in calling a sacred thing to witness.
And in this sense it is called a sacrament: not in the sense in which
we speak of sacraments now; the word "sacrament" being thus used not
equivocally but analogically, i. e. by reason of a different relation to
the one thing, viz. something sacred.
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Whether every sign of a holy thing is a sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that not every sign of a sacred thing is a
sacrament. For all sensible creatures are signs of sacred things;
according to Rom. 1:20: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen
being understood by the things that are made. " And yet all sensible
things cannot be called sacraments. Therefore not every sign of a
sacred thing is a sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, whatever was done under the Old Law was a figure
of Christ Who is the "Holy of Holies" (Dan. 9:24), according to 1 Cor.
10:11: "All (these) things happened to them in figure"; and Col. 2:17:
"Which are a shadow of things to come, but the body is Christ's. " And
yet not all that was done by the Fathers of the Old Testament, not even
all the ceremonies of the Law, were sacraments, but only in certain
special cases, as stated in the [4334]FS, Q[101], A[4]. Therefore it
seems that not every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, even in the New Testament many things are done in
sign of some sacred thing; yet they are not called sacraments; such as
sprinkling with holy water, the consecration of an altar, and such
like. Therefore not every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament.
On the contrary, A definition is convertible with the thing defined.
Now some define a sacrament as being "the sign of a sacred thing";
moreover, this is clear from the passage quoted above [4335](A[1]) from
Augustine. Therefore it seems that every sign of a sacred thing is a
sacrament.
I answer that, Signs are given to men, to whom it is proper to discover
the unknown by means of the known. Consequently a sacrament properly so
called is that which is the sign of some sacred thing pertaining to
man; so that properly speaking a sacrament, as considered by us now, is
defined as being the "sign of a holy thing so far as it makes men
holy. "
Reply to Objection 1: Sensible creatures signify something holy, viz.
Divine wisdom and goodness inasmuch as these are holy in themselves;
but not inasmuch as we are made holy by them. Therefore they cannot be
called sacraments as we understand sacraments now.
Reply to Objection 2: Some things pertaining to the Old Testament
signified the holiness of Christ considered as holy in Himself. Others
signified His holiness considered as the cause of our holiness; thus
the sacrifice of the Paschal Lamb signified Christ's Sacrifice whereby
we are made holy: and such like are properly styled sacraments of the
Old Law.
Reply to Objection 3: Names are given to things considered in reference
to their end and state of completeness. Now a disposition is not an
end, whereas perfection is. Consequently things that signify
disposition to holiness are not called sacraments, and with regard to
these the objection is verified: only those are called sacraments which
signify the perfection of holiness in man.
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Whether a sacrament is a sign of one thing only?
Objection 1: It seems that a sacrament is a sign of one thing only. For
that which signifies many things is an ambiguous sign, and consequently
occasions deception: this is clearly seen in equivocal words. But all
deception should be removed from the Christian religion, according to
Col. 2:8: "Beware lest any man cheat you by philosophy and vain
deceit. " Therefore it seems that a sacrament is not a sign of several
things.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above [4336](A[2]), a sacrament
signifies a holy thing in so far as it makes man holy. But there is
only one cause of man's holiness, viz. the blood of Christ; according
to Heb. 13:12: "Jesus, that He might sanctify the people by His own
blood, suffered without the gate. " Therefore it seems that a sacrament
does not signify several things.
Objection 3: Further, it has been said above (A[2], ad 3) that a
sacrament signifies properly the very end of sanctification. Now the
end of sanctification is eternal life, according to Rom. 6:22: "You
have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end life everlasting. "
Therefore it seems that the sacraments signify one thing only, viz.
eternal life.
On the contrary, In the Sacrament of the Altar, two things are
signified, viz. Christ's true body, and Christ's mystical body; as
Augustine says (Liber Sent. Prosper. ).
I answer that, As stated above [4337](A[2]) a sacrament properly
speaking is that which is ordained to signify our sanctification. In
which three things may be considered; viz. the very cause of our
sanctification, which is Christ's passion; the form of our
sanctification, which is grace and the virtues; and the ultimate end of
our sanctification, which is eternal life. And all these are signified
by the sacraments. Consequently a sacrament is a sign that is both a
reminder of the past, i. e. the passion of Christ; and an indication of
that which is effected in us by Christ's passion, i. e. grace; and a
prognostic, that is, a foretelling of future glory.
Reply to Objection 1: Then is a sign ambiguous and the occasion of
deception, when it signifies many things not ordained to one another.
But when it signifies many things inasmuch as, through being mutually
ordained, they form one thing, then the sign is not ambiguous but
certain: thus this word "man" signifies the soul and body inasmuch as
together they form the human nature. In this way a sacrament signifies
the three things aforesaid, inasmuch as by being in a certain order
they are one thing.
Reply to Objection 2: Since a sacrament signifies that which
sanctifies, it must needs signify the effect, which is implied in the
sanctifying cause as such.
Reply to Objection 3: It is enough for a sacrament that it signify that
perfection which consists in the form, nor is it necessary that it
should signify only that perfection which is the end.
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Whether a sacrament is always something sensible?
Objection 1: It seems that a sacrament is not always something
sensible. Because, according to the Philosopher (Prior. Anal. ii),
every effect is a sign of its cause. But just as there are some
sensible effects, so are there some intelligible effects; thus science
is the effect of a demonstration. Therefore not every sign is sensible.
Now all that is required for a sacrament is something that is a sign of
some sacred thing, inasmuch as thereby man is sanctified, as stated
above [4338](A[2]). Therefore something sensible is not required for a
sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, sacraments belong to the kingdom of God and the
Divine worship. But sensible things do not seem to belong to the Divine
worship: for we are told (Jn. 4:24) that "God is a spirit; and they
that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in truth"; and (Rom.
14:17) that "the kingdom of God is not meat and drink. " Therefore
sensible things are not required for the sacraments.
Objection 3: Further. Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii) that "sensible
things are goods of least account, since without them man can live
aright. " But the sacraments are necessary for man's salvation, as we
shall show farther on ([4339]Q[61], A[1]): so that man cannot live
aright without them. Therefore sensible things are not required for the
sacraments.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. lxxx super Joan. ): "The word is
added to the element and this becomes a sacrament"; and he is speaking
there of water which is a sensible element. Therefore sensible things
are required for the sacraments.
I answer that, Divine wisdom provides for each thing according to its
mode; hence it is written (Wis. 8:1) that "she . . . ordereth all
things sweetly": wherefore also we are told (Mat. 25:15) that she "gave
to everyone according to his proper ability. " Now it is part of man's
nature to acquire knowledge of the intelligible from the sensible. But
a sign is that by means of which one attains to the knowledge of
something else. Consequently, since the sacred things which are
signified by the sacraments, are the spiritual and intelligible goods
by means of which man is sanctified, it follows that the sacramental
signs consist in sensible things: just as in the Divine Scriptures
spiritual things are set before us under the guise of things sensible.
And hence it is that sensible things are required for the sacraments;
as Dionysius also proves in his book on the heavenly hierarchy (Coel.
Hier. i).
Reply to Objection 1: The name and definition of a thing is taken
principally from that which belongs to a thing primarily and
essentially: and not from that which belongs to it through something
else. Now a sensible effect being the primary and direct object of
man's knowledge (since all our knowledge springs from the senses) by
its very nature leads to the knowledge of something else: whereas
intelligible effects are not such as to be able to lead us to the
knowledge of something else, except in so far as they are manifested by
some other thing, i. e. by certain sensibles. It is for this reason that
the name sign is given primarily and principally to things which are
offered to the senses; hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) that
a sign "is that which conveys something else to the mind, besides the
species which it impresses on the senses. " But intelligible effects do
not partake of the nature of a sign except in so far as they are
pointed out by certain signs. And in this way, too, certain things
which are not sensible are termed sacraments as it were, in so far as
they are signified by certain sensible things, of which we shall treat
further on ([4340]Q[63], A[1], ad 2; A[3], ad 2;[4341] Q[73],
A[6];[4342] Q[74], A[1], ad 3).
Reply to Objection 2: Sensible things considered in their own nature do
not belong to the worship or kingdom of God: but considered only as
signs of spiritual things in which the kingdom of God consists.
Reply to Objection 3: Augustine speaks there of sensible things,
considered in their nature; but not as employed to signify spiritual
things, which are the highest goods.
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Whether determinate things are required for a sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that determinate things are not required for a
sacrament. For sensible things are required in sacraments for the
purpose of signification, as stated above [4343](A[4]). But nothing
hinders the same thing being signified by divers sensible things: thus
in Holy Scripture God is signified metaphorically, sometimes by a stone
(2 Kings 22:2; Zech. 3:9; 1 Cor. 10:4; Apoc. 4:3); sometimes by a lion
(Is. 31:4; Apoc. 5:5); sometimes by the sun (Is. 60:19,20; Mal. 4:2),
or by something similar. Therefore it seems that divers things can be
suitable to the same sacrament. Therefore determinate things are not
required for the sacraments.
Objection 2: Further, the health of the soul is more necessary than
that of the body. But in bodily medicines, which are ordained to the
health of the body, one thing can be substituted for another which
happens to be wanting. Therefore much more in the sacraments, which are
spiritual remedies ordained to the health of the soul, can one thing be
substituted for another when this happens to be lacking.
Objection 3: Further, it is not fitting that the salvation of men be
restricted by the Divine Law: still less by the Law of Christ, Who came
to save all. But in the state of the Law of nature determinate things
were not required in the sacraments, but were put to that use through a
vow, as appears from Gn. 28, where Jacob vowed that he would offer to
God tithes and peace-offerings. Therefore it seems that man should not
have been restricted, especially under the New Law, to the use of any
determinate thing in the sacraments.
On the contrary, our Lord said (Jn. 3:5): "Unless a man be born again
of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. "
I answer that, In the use of the sacraments two things may be
considered, namely, the worship of God, and the sanctification of man:
the former of which pertains to man as referred to God, and the latter
pertains to God in reference to man. Now it is not for anyone to
determine that which is in the power of another, but only that which is
in his own power. Since, therefore, the sanctification of man is in the
power of God Who sanctifies, it is not for man to decide what things
should be used for his sanctification, but this should be determined by
Divine institution. Therefore in the sacraments of the New Law, by
which man is sanctified according to 1 Cor. 6:11, "You are washed, you
are sanctified," we must use those things which are determined by
Divine institution.
Reply to Objection 1: Though the same thing can be signified by divers
signs, yet to determine which sign must be used belongs to the
signifier. Now it is God Who signifies spiritual things to us by means
of the sensible things in the sacraments, and of similitudes in the
Scriptures. And consequently, just as the Holy Ghost decides by what
similitudes spiritual things are to be signified in certain passages of
Scripture, so also must it be determined by Divine institution what
things are to be employed for the purpose of signification in this or
that sacrament.
Reply to Objection 2: Sensible things are endowed with natural powers
conducive to the health of the body: and therefore if two of them have
the same virtue, it matters not which we use. Yet they are ordained
unto sanctification not through any power that they possess naturally,
but only in virtue of the Divine institution. And therefore it was
necessary that God should determine the sensible things to be employed
in the sacraments.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix), diverse
sacraments suit different times; just as different times are signified
by different parts of the verb, viz. present, past, and future.
Consequently, just as under the state of the Law of nature man was
moved by inward instinct and without any outward law, to worship God,
so also the sensible things to be employed in the worship of God were
determined by inward instinct. But later on it became necessary for a
law to be given (to man) from without: both because the Law of nature
had become obscured by man's sins; and in order to signify more
expressly the grace of Christ, by which the human race is sanctified.
And hence the need for those things to be determinate, of which men
have to make use in the sacraments. Nor is the way of salvation
narrowed thereby: because the things which need to be used in the
sacraments, are either in everyone's possession or can be had with
little trouble.
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Whether words are required for the signification of the sacraments?
Objection 1: It seems that words are not required for the signification
of the sacraments. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix): "What else
is a corporeal sacrament but a kind of visible word? " Wherefore to add
words to the sensible things in the sacraments seems to be the same as
to add words to words. But this is superfluous. Therefore words are not
required besides the sensible things in the sacraments .
Objection 2: Further, a sacrament is some one thing, but it does not
seem possible to make one thing of those that belong to different
genera. Since, therefore, sensible things and words are of different
genera, for sensible things are the product of nature, but words, of
reason; it seems that in the sacraments, words are not required besides
sensible things.
Objection 3: Further, the sacraments of the New Law succeed those of
the Old Law: since "the former were instituted when the latter were
abolished," as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix).
Reply to Objection 1: Judgment belongs to truth as its standard, while
it belongs to the man imbued with truth, according as he is as it were
one with truth, as a kind of law and "living justice" [*Aristotle,
Ethic. v]. Hence Augustine quotes (De Verb. Dom. , Serm. cxxvii) the
saying of 1 Cor. 2:15: "The spiritual man judgeth all things. " But
beyond all creatures Christ's soul was more closely united with truth,
and more full of truth; according to Jn. 1:14: "We saw Him . . . full
of grace and truth. " And according to this it belongs principally to
the soul of Christ to judge all things.
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to God alone to bestow beatitude upon
souls by a participation with Himself; but it is Christ's prerogative
to bring them to such beatitude, inasmuch as He is their Head and the
author of their salvation, according to Heb. 2:10: "Who had brought
many children into glory, to perfect the author of their salvation by
His Passion. "
Reply to Objection 3: To know and judge the secrets of hearts, of
itself belongs to God alone; but from the overflow of the Godhead into
Christ's soul it belongs to Him also to know and to judge the secrets
of hearts, as we stated above ([4332]Q[10], A[2]), when dealing with
the knowledge of Christ. Hence it is written (Rom. 2:16): "In the day
when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ. "
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Whether Christ acquired His judiciary power by His merits?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not acquire His judiciary
power by His merits. For judiciary power flows from the royal dignity:
according to Prov. 20:8: "The king that sitteth on the throne of
judgment, scattereth away all evil with his look. " But it was without
merits that Christ acquired royal power, for it is His due as God's
Only-begotten Son: thus it is written (Lk. 1:32): "The Lord God shall
give unto Him the throne of David His father, and He shall reign in the
house of Jacob for ever. " Therefore Christ did not obtain judiciary
power by His merits.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above [4333](A[2]), judiciary power is
Christ's due inasmuch as He is our Head. But the grace of headship does
not belong to Christ by reason of merit, but follows the personal union
of the Divine and human natures: according to Jn. 1:14, 16: "We saw His
glory . . . as of the Only-Begotten of the Father, full of grace and
truth . . . and of His fulness we all have received": and this pertains
to the notion of headship. Consequently, it seems that Christ did not
have judiciary power from merits.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:15): "The spiritual
man judgeth all things. " But a man becomes spiritual through grace,
which is not from merits; otherwise it is "no more grace," as is said
in Rom. 11:6. Therefore it seems that judiciary power belongs neither
to Christ nor to others from any merits, but from grace alone.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 36:17): "Thy cause hath been judged
as that of the wicked, cause and judgment thou shalt recover. " And
Augustine says (Serm. cxxvii): "The Judge shall sit, who stood before a
judge; He shall condemn the truly wicked, who Himself was falsely
reputed wicked. "
I answer that, There is nothing to hinder one and the same thing from
being due to some one from various causes: as the glory of the body in
rising was due to Christ not only as befitting His Godhead and His
soul's glory, but likewise "from the merit of the lowliness of His
Passion" [*Cf. Augustine, Tract. civ in Joan. ]. And in the same way it
must be said that judiciary power belongs to the Man Christ on account
of both His Divine personality, and the dignity of His headship, and
the fulness of His habitual grace: and yet He obtained it from merit,
so that, in accordance with the Divine justice, He should be judge who
fought for God's justice, and conquered, and was unjustly condemned.
Hence He Himself says (Apoc. 3:21): "I have overcome and am set down in
My Father's throne [Vulg. : 'with My Father in His throne']. " Now
judiciary power is understood by "throne," according to Ps. 9:5: "Thou
hast sat on the throne, who judgest justice. "
Reply to Objection 1: This argument holds good of judiciary power
according as it is due to Christ by reason of the union with the Word
of God.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument is based on the ground of His grace
as Head.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument holds good in regard to habitual
grace, which perfects Christ's soul. But although judiciary power be
Christ's due in these ways, it is not hindered from being His due from
merit.
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Whether judiciary power belongs to Christ with respect to all human affairs?
Objection 1: It would seem that judiciary power concerning all human
affairs does not belong to Christ. For as we read in Lk. 12:13,14, when
one of the crowd said to Christ: "Speak to my brother that he divide
the inheritance with me; He said to him: Man, who hath appointed Me
judge, or divider over you? " Consequently, He does not exercise
judgment over all human affairs.
Objection 2: Further, no one exercises judgment except over his own
subjects. But, according to Heb. 2:8, "we see not as yet all things
subject to" Christ. Therefore it seems that Christ has not judgment
over all human affairs.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx) that it is part
of Divine judgment for the good to be afflicted sometimes in this
world, and sometimes to prosper, and in like manner the wicked. But the
same was the case also before the Incarnation. Consequently, not all
God's judgments regarding human affairs are included in Christ's
judiciary power.
On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 5:22): "The Father hath given all
judgment to the Son. "
I answer that, If we speak of Christ according to His Divine Nature, it
is evident that every judgment of the Father belongs to the Son; for,
as the Father does all things through His Word, so He judges all things
through His Word.
But if we speak of Christ in His human nature, thus again is it evident
that all things are subject to His judgment. This is made clear if we
consider first of all the relationship subsisting between Christ's soul
and the Word of God; for, if "the spiritual man judgeth all things," as
is said in 1 Cor. 2:15, inasmuch as his soul clings to the Word of God,
how much more Christ's soul, which is filled with the truth of the Word
of God, passes judgment upon all things.
Secondly, the same appears from the merit of His death; because,
according to Rom. 14:9: "To this end Christ died and rose again; that
He might be Lord both of the dead and of the living. " And therefore He
has judgment over all men; and on this account the Apostle adds (Rom.
14:10): "We shall all stand before the judgment seat of Christ": and
(Dan. 7:14) it is written that "He gave Him power, and glory, and a
kingdom; and all peoples, tribes, and tongues shall serve Him. "
Thirdly, the same thing is evident from comparison of human affairs
with the end of human salvation. For, to whomsoever the substance is
entrusted, the accessory is likewise committed. Now all human affairs
are ordered for the end of beatitude, which is everlasting salvation,
to which men are admitted, or from which they are excluded by Christ's
judgment, as is evident from Mat. 25:31,40. Consequently, it is
manifest that all human affairs are included in Christ's judiciary
power.
Reply to Objection 1: As was said above (A[3], OBJ[1]), judiciary power
goes with royal dignity. Now Christ, although established king by God,
did not wish while living on earth to govern temporarily an earthly
kingdom; consequently He said (Jn. 18:36): "My kingdom is not of this
world. " In like fashion He did not wish to exercise judiciary power
over temporal concerns, since He came to raise men to Divine things.
Hence Ambrose observes on this passage in Luke: "It is well that He who
came down with a Divine purpose should hold Himself aloof from temporal
concerns; nor does He deign to be a judge of quarrels and an arbiter of
property, since He is judge of the quick and the dead, and the
arbitrator of merits. "
Reply to Objection 2: All things are subject to Christ in respect of
that power, which He received from the Father, over all things,
according to Mat. 28:18: "All power is given to Me in heaven and in
earth. " But as to the exercise of this power, all things are not yet
subject to Him: this will come to pass in the future, when He shall
fulfil His will regarding all things, by saving some and punishing
others.
Reply to Objection 3: Judgments of this kind were exercised by Christ
before His Incarnation, inasmuch as He is the Word of God: and the soul
united with Him personally became a partaker of this power by the
Incarnation.
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Whether after the Judgment that takes place in the present time, there
remains yet another General Judgment?
Objection 1: It would seem that after the Judgment that takes place in
the present time, there does not remain another General Judgment. For a
judgment serves no purpose after the final allotment of rewards and
punishments. But rewards and punishments are allotted in this present
time: for our Lord said to the thief on the cross (Lk. 23:43): "This
day thou shalt be with Me in paradise": and (Lk. 16:22) it is said that
"the rich man died and was buried in hell. " Therefore it is useless to
look forward to a final Judgment.
Objection 2: Further, according to another (the Septuagint) version of
Nahum 1:9, "God shall not judge the same thing a second time. " But in
the present time God judges both temporal and spiritual matters.
Therefore, it does not seem that another final judgment is to be
expected.
Objection 3: Further, reward and punishment correspond with merit and
demerit. But merit and demerit bear relation to the body only in so far
as it is the instrument of the soul. Therefore reward or punishment is
not due to the body save as the soul's instrument. Therefore no other
Judgment is called for at the end (of the world) to requite man with
reward or punishment in the body, besides that Judgment in which souls
are now punished or rewarded.
On the contrary, It is said in Jn. 12:48: "The word that I have spoken,
the same shall judge you [Vulg. : 'him'] in the last day. " Therefore
there will be a Judgment at the last day besides that which takes place
in the present time.
I answer that, Judgment cannot be passed perfectly upon any changeable
subject before its consummation: just as judgment cannot be given
perfectly regarding the quality of any action before its completion in
itself and in its results: because many actions appear to be
profitable, which in their effects prove to be hurtful. And in the same
way perfect judgment cannot be passed upon any man before the close of
his life, since he can be changed in many respects from good to evil,
or conversely, or from good to better, or from evil to worse. Hence the
Apostle says (Heb. 9:27): "It is appointed unto men once to die, and
after this the Judgment. "
But it must be observed that although man's temporal life in itself
ends with death, still it continues dependent in a measure on what
comes after it in the future. In one way, as it still lives on in men's
memories, in which sometimes, contrary to the truth, good or evil
reputations linger on. In another way in a man's children, who are so
to speak something of their parent, according to Ecclus. 30:4: "His
father is dead, and he is as if he were not dead, for he hath left one
behind him that is like himself. " And yet many good men have wicked
sons, and conversely. Thirdly, as to the result of his actions: just as
from the deceit of Arius and other false leaders unbelief continues to
flourish down to the close of the world; and even until then faith will
continue to derive its progress from the preaching of the apostles. In
a fourth way, as to the body, which is sometimes buried with honor and
sometimes left unburied, and finally falls to dust utterly. In a fifth
way, as to the things upon which a man's heart is set, such as temporal
concerns, for example, some of which quickly lapse, while others endure
longer.
Now all these things are submitted to the verdict of the Divine
Judgment; and consequently, a perfect and public Judgment cannot be
made of all these things during the course of this present time.
Wherefore, there must be a final Judgment at the last day, in which
everything concerning every man in every respect shall be perfectly and
publicly judged.
Reply to Objection 1: Some men have held the opinion that the souls of
the saints shall not be rewarded in heaven, nor the souls of the lost
punished in hell, until the Judgment-day. That this is false appears
from the testimony of the Apostle (2 Cor. 5:8), where he says: "We are
confident and have a good will to be absent rather from the body, and
to be present with the Lord": that is, not to "walk by faith" but "by
sight," as appears from the context. But this is to see God in His
Essence, wherein consists "eternal life," as is clear from Jn. 17:3.
Hence it is manifest that the souls separated from bodies are in
eternal life.
Consequently, it must be maintained that after death man enters into an
unchangeable state as to all that concerns the soul: and therefore
there is no need for postponing judgment as to the reward of the soul.
But since there are some other things pertaining to a man which go on
through the whole course of time, and which are not foreign to the
Divine judgment, all these things must be brought to judgment at the
end of time. For although in regard to such things a man neither merits
nor demerits, still in a measure they accompany his reward or
punishment. Consequently all these things must be weighed in the final
judgment.
Reply to Objection 2: "God shall not judge twice the same thing," i. e.
in the same respect; but it is not unseemly for God to judge twice
according to different respects.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the reward or punishment of the body
depends upon the reward or punishment of the soul, nevertheless, since
the soul is changeable only accidentally, on account of the body, once
it is separated from the body it enters into an unchangeable condition,
and receives its judgment. But the body remains subject to change down
to the close of time: and therefore it must receive its reward or
punishment then, in the last Judgment.
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Whether Christ's judiciary power extends to the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's judiciary power does not
extend to the angels, because the good and wicked angels alike were
judged in the beginning of the world, when some fell through sin while
others were confirmed in bliss. But those already judged have no need
of being judged again. Therefore Christ's judiciary power does not
extend to the angels.
Objection 2: Further, the same person cannot be both judge and judged.
But the angels will come to judge with Christ, according to Mat. 25:31:
"When the Son of Man shall come in His majesty, and all the angels with
Him. " Therefore it seems that the angels will not be judged by Christ.
Objection 3: Further, the angels are higher than other creatures. If
Christ, then, be judge not only of men but likewise of angels, then for
the same reason He will be judge of all creatures; which seems to be
false, since this belongs to God's providence: hence it is written (Job
34:13): "What other hath He appointed over the earth? or whom hath He
set over the world which He made? " Therefore Christ is not the judge of
the angels.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:3): "Know you not that we
shall judge angels? " But the saints judge only by Christ's authority.
Therefore, much more does Christ possess judiciary power over the
angels.
I answer that, The angels are subjects of Christ's judiciary power, not
only with regard to His Divine Nature, as He is the Word of God, but
also with regard to His human nature. And this is evident from three
considerations. First of all, from the closeness of His assumed nature
to God; because, according to Heb. 2:16: "For nowhere doth He take hold
of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold. "
Consequently, Christ's soul is more filled with the truth of the Word
of God than any angel: for which reason He also enlightens the angels,
as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), and so He has power to judge them.
Secondly, because by the lowliness of His Passion, human nature in
Christ merited to be exalted above the angels; so that, as is said in
Phil. 2:10: "In the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those that
are in heaven, on earth, and under the earth. " And therefore Christ has
judiciary power even over the good and wicked angels: in token whereof
it is said in the Apocalypse (7:11) that "all the angels stood round
about the throne. " Thirdly, on account of what they do for men, of whom
Christ is the Head in a special manner. Hence it is written (Heb.
1:14): "They are [Vulg. : 'Are they not'] all ministering spirits, sent
to minister for them, who shall receive the inheritance of salvation
(? ). " But they are submitted to Christ's judgment, first, as regards
the dispensing of those things which are done through them; which
dispensing is likewise done by the Man Christ, to whom the angels
ministered, as related (Mat. 4:11), and from whom the devils besought
that they might be sent into the swine, according to Mat. 8:31.
Secondly, as to other accidental rewards of the good angels, such as
the joy which they have at the salvation of men, according to Lk.
15:10: "There shall be joy before the angels of God upon one sinner
doing penance": and furthermore as to the accidental punishments of the
devils wherewith they are either tormented here, or are shut up in
hell; and this also belongs to the Man Christ: hence it is written (Mk.
1:24) that the devil cried out: "What have we to do with thee, Jesus of
Nazareth? art Thou come to destroy us? " Thirdly, as to the essential
reward of the good angels, which is everlasting bliss; and as to the
essential punishment of the wicked angels, which is everlasting
damnation. But this was done by Christ from the beginning of the world,
inasmuch as He is the Word of God.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers judgment as to the
essential reward and chief punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi):
"Although the spiritual man judgeth all things, still he is judged by
Truth Itself. " Consequently, although the angels judge, as being
spiritual creatures, still they are judged by Christ, inasmuch as He is
the Truth.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ judges not only the angels, but also the
administration of all creatures. For if, as Augustine says (De Trin.
iii) the lower things are ruled by God through the higher, in a certain
order, it must be said that all things are ruled by Christ's soul,
which is above every creature. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 2:5): "For
God hath not subjected unto angels the world to come"---subject namely
to Christ---"of whom we speak" [Douay: 'whereof we speak'] [*The words
"subject namely to Christ" are from a gloss]. Nor does it follow that
God set another over the earth; since one and the same Person is God
and Man, our Lord Jesus Christ.
Let what has been said of the Mystery of His Incarnation suffice for
the present.
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TREATISE ON THE SACRAMENTS (QQ[60]-90)
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WHAT IS A SACRAMENT? (EIGHT ARTICLES)
After considering those things that concern the mystery of the
incarnate Word, we must consider the sacraments of the Church which
derive their efficacy from the Word incarnate Himself. First we shall
consider the sacraments in general; secondly, we shall consider
specially each sacrament.
Concerning the first our consideration will be fivefold: (1) What is a
sacrament? (2) Of the necessity of the sacraments; (3) of the effects
of the sacraments; (4) Of their cause; (5) Of their number.
Under the first heading there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a sacrament is a kind of sign?
(2) Whether every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament?
(3) Whether a sacrament is a sign of one thing only, or of several?
(4) Whether a sacrament is a sign that is something sensible?
(5) Whether some determinate sensible thing is required for a
sacrament?
(6) Whether signification expressed by words is necessary for a
sacrament?
(7) Whether determinate words are required?
(8) Whether anything may be added to or subtracted from these words?
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Whether a sacrament is a kind of sign?
Objection 1: It seems that a sacrament is not a kind of sign. For
sacrament appears to be derived from "sacring" [sacrando]; just as
medicament, from "medicando" [healing]. But this seems to be of the
nature of a cause rather than of a sign. Therefore a sacrament is a
kind of cause rather than a kind of sign.
Objection 2: Further, sacrament seems to signify something hidden,
according to Tob. 12:7: "It is good to hide the secret [sacramentum] of
a king"; and Eph. 3:9: "What is the dispensation of the mystery
[sacramenti] which hath been hidden from eternity in God. " But that
which is hidden, seems foreign to the nature of a sign; for "a sign is
that which conveys something else to the mind, besides the species
which it impresses on the senses," as Augustine explains (De Doctr.
Christ. ii). Therefore it seems that a sacrament is not a kind of sign.
Objection 3: Further, an oath is sometimes called a sacrament: for it
is written in the Decretals (Caus. xxii, qu. 5): "Children who have not
attained the use of reason must not be obliged to swear: and whoever
has foresworn himself once, must no more be a witness, nor be allowed
to take a sacrament," i. e. an oath. But an oath is not a kind of sign,
therefore it seems that a sacrament is not a kind of sign.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x): "The visible sacrifice
is the sacrament, i. e. the sacred sign, of the invisible sacrifice. "
I answer that, All things that are ordained to one, even in different
ways, can be denominated from it: thus, from health which is in an
animal, not only is the animal said to be healthy through being the
subject of health: but medicine also is said to be healthy through
producing health; diet through preserving it; and urine, through being
a sign of health. Consequently, a thing may be called a "sacrament,"
either from having a certain hidden sanctity, and in this sense a
sacrament is a "sacred secret"; or from having some relationship to
this sanctity, which relationship may be that of a cause, or of a sign
or of any other relation. But now we are speaking of sacraments in a
special sense, as implying the habitude of sign: and in this way a
sacrament is a kind of sign.
Reply to Objection 1: Because medicine is an efficient cause of health,
consequently whatever things are denominated from medicine are to be
referred to some first active cause: so that a medicament implies a
certain causality. But sanctity from which a sacrament is denominated,
is not there taken as an efficient cause, but rather as a formal or a
final cause. Therefore it does not follow that a sacrament need always
imply causality.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers sacrament in the sense of
a "sacred secret. " Now not only God's but also the king's, secret, is
said to be sacred and to be a sacrament: because according to the
ancients, whatever it was unlawful to lay violent hands on was said to
be holy or sacrosanct, such as the city walls, and persons of high
rank. Consequently those secrets, whether Divine or human, which it is
unlawful to violate by making them known to anybody whatever, are
called "sacred secrets or sacraments. "
Reply to Objection 3: Even an oath has a certain relation to sacred
things, in so far as it consists in calling a sacred thing to witness.
And in this sense it is called a sacrament: not in the sense in which
we speak of sacraments now; the word "sacrament" being thus used not
equivocally but analogically, i. e. by reason of a different relation to
the one thing, viz. something sacred.
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Whether every sign of a holy thing is a sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that not every sign of a sacred thing is a
sacrament. For all sensible creatures are signs of sacred things;
according to Rom. 1:20: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen
being understood by the things that are made. " And yet all sensible
things cannot be called sacraments. Therefore not every sign of a
sacred thing is a sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, whatever was done under the Old Law was a figure
of Christ Who is the "Holy of Holies" (Dan. 9:24), according to 1 Cor.
10:11: "All (these) things happened to them in figure"; and Col. 2:17:
"Which are a shadow of things to come, but the body is Christ's. " And
yet not all that was done by the Fathers of the Old Testament, not even
all the ceremonies of the Law, were sacraments, but only in certain
special cases, as stated in the [4334]FS, Q[101], A[4]. Therefore it
seems that not every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, even in the New Testament many things are done in
sign of some sacred thing; yet they are not called sacraments; such as
sprinkling with holy water, the consecration of an altar, and such
like. Therefore not every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament.
On the contrary, A definition is convertible with the thing defined.
Now some define a sacrament as being "the sign of a sacred thing";
moreover, this is clear from the passage quoted above [4335](A[1]) from
Augustine. Therefore it seems that every sign of a sacred thing is a
sacrament.
I answer that, Signs are given to men, to whom it is proper to discover
the unknown by means of the known. Consequently a sacrament properly so
called is that which is the sign of some sacred thing pertaining to
man; so that properly speaking a sacrament, as considered by us now, is
defined as being the "sign of a holy thing so far as it makes men
holy. "
Reply to Objection 1: Sensible creatures signify something holy, viz.
Divine wisdom and goodness inasmuch as these are holy in themselves;
but not inasmuch as we are made holy by them. Therefore they cannot be
called sacraments as we understand sacraments now.
Reply to Objection 2: Some things pertaining to the Old Testament
signified the holiness of Christ considered as holy in Himself. Others
signified His holiness considered as the cause of our holiness; thus
the sacrifice of the Paschal Lamb signified Christ's Sacrifice whereby
we are made holy: and such like are properly styled sacraments of the
Old Law.
Reply to Objection 3: Names are given to things considered in reference
to their end and state of completeness. Now a disposition is not an
end, whereas perfection is. Consequently things that signify
disposition to holiness are not called sacraments, and with regard to
these the objection is verified: only those are called sacraments which
signify the perfection of holiness in man.
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Whether a sacrament is a sign of one thing only?
Objection 1: It seems that a sacrament is a sign of one thing only. For
that which signifies many things is an ambiguous sign, and consequently
occasions deception: this is clearly seen in equivocal words. But all
deception should be removed from the Christian religion, according to
Col. 2:8: "Beware lest any man cheat you by philosophy and vain
deceit. " Therefore it seems that a sacrament is not a sign of several
things.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above [4336](A[2]), a sacrament
signifies a holy thing in so far as it makes man holy. But there is
only one cause of man's holiness, viz. the blood of Christ; according
to Heb. 13:12: "Jesus, that He might sanctify the people by His own
blood, suffered without the gate. " Therefore it seems that a sacrament
does not signify several things.
Objection 3: Further, it has been said above (A[2], ad 3) that a
sacrament signifies properly the very end of sanctification. Now the
end of sanctification is eternal life, according to Rom. 6:22: "You
have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end life everlasting. "
Therefore it seems that the sacraments signify one thing only, viz.
eternal life.
On the contrary, In the Sacrament of the Altar, two things are
signified, viz. Christ's true body, and Christ's mystical body; as
Augustine says (Liber Sent. Prosper. ).
I answer that, As stated above [4337](A[2]) a sacrament properly
speaking is that which is ordained to signify our sanctification. In
which three things may be considered; viz. the very cause of our
sanctification, which is Christ's passion; the form of our
sanctification, which is grace and the virtues; and the ultimate end of
our sanctification, which is eternal life. And all these are signified
by the sacraments. Consequently a sacrament is a sign that is both a
reminder of the past, i. e. the passion of Christ; and an indication of
that which is effected in us by Christ's passion, i. e. grace; and a
prognostic, that is, a foretelling of future glory.
Reply to Objection 1: Then is a sign ambiguous and the occasion of
deception, when it signifies many things not ordained to one another.
But when it signifies many things inasmuch as, through being mutually
ordained, they form one thing, then the sign is not ambiguous but
certain: thus this word "man" signifies the soul and body inasmuch as
together they form the human nature. In this way a sacrament signifies
the three things aforesaid, inasmuch as by being in a certain order
they are one thing.
Reply to Objection 2: Since a sacrament signifies that which
sanctifies, it must needs signify the effect, which is implied in the
sanctifying cause as such.
Reply to Objection 3: It is enough for a sacrament that it signify that
perfection which consists in the form, nor is it necessary that it
should signify only that perfection which is the end.
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Whether a sacrament is always something sensible?
Objection 1: It seems that a sacrament is not always something
sensible. Because, according to the Philosopher (Prior. Anal. ii),
every effect is a sign of its cause. But just as there are some
sensible effects, so are there some intelligible effects; thus science
is the effect of a demonstration. Therefore not every sign is sensible.
Now all that is required for a sacrament is something that is a sign of
some sacred thing, inasmuch as thereby man is sanctified, as stated
above [4338](A[2]). Therefore something sensible is not required for a
sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, sacraments belong to the kingdom of God and the
Divine worship. But sensible things do not seem to belong to the Divine
worship: for we are told (Jn. 4:24) that "God is a spirit; and they
that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in truth"; and (Rom.
14:17) that "the kingdom of God is not meat and drink. " Therefore
sensible things are not required for the sacraments.
Objection 3: Further. Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii) that "sensible
things are goods of least account, since without them man can live
aright. " But the sacraments are necessary for man's salvation, as we
shall show farther on ([4339]Q[61], A[1]): so that man cannot live
aright without them. Therefore sensible things are not required for the
sacraments.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. lxxx super Joan. ): "The word is
added to the element and this becomes a sacrament"; and he is speaking
there of water which is a sensible element. Therefore sensible things
are required for the sacraments.
I answer that, Divine wisdom provides for each thing according to its
mode; hence it is written (Wis. 8:1) that "she . . . ordereth all
things sweetly": wherefore also we are told (Mat. 25:15) that she "gave
to everyone according to his proper ability. " Now it is part of man's
nature to acquire knowledge of the intelligible from the sensible. But
a sign is that by means of which one attains to the knowledge of
something else. Consequently, since the sacred things which are
signified by the sacraments, are the spiritual and intelligible goods
by means of which man is sanctified, it follows that the sacramental
signs consist in sensible things: just as in the Divine Scriptures
spiritual things are set before us under the guise of things sensible.
And hence it is that sensible things are required for the sacraments;
as Dionysius also proves in his book on the heavenly hierarchy (Coel.
Hier. i).
Reply to Objection 1: The name and definition of a thing is taken
principally from that which belongs to a thing primarily and
essentially: and not from that which belongs to it through something
else. Now a sensible effect being the primary and direct object of
man's knowledge (since all our knowledge springs from the senses) by
its very nature leads to the knowledge of something else: whereas
intelligible effects are not such as to be able to lead us to the
knowledge of something else, except in so far as they are manifested by
some other thing, i. e. by certain sensibles. It is for this reason that
the name sign is given primarily and principally to things which are
offered to the senses; hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) that
a sign "is that which conveys something else to the mind, besides the
species which it impresses on the senses. " But intelligible effects do
not partake of the nature of a sign except in so far as they are
pointed out by certain signs. And in this way, too, certain things
which are not sensible are termed sacraments as it were, in so far as
they are signified by certain sensible things, of which we shall treat
further on ([4340]Q[63], A[1], ad 2; A[3], ad 2;[4341] Q[73],
A[6];[4342] Q[74], A[1], ad 3).
Reply to Objection 2: Sensible things considered in their own nature do
not belong to the worship or kingdom of God: but considered only as
signs of spiritual things in which the kingdom of God consists.
Reply to Objection 3: Augustine speaks there of sensible things,
considered in their nature; but not as employed to signify spiritual
things, which are the highest goods.
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Whether determinate things are required for a sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that determinate things are not required for a
sacrament. For sensible things are required in sacraments for the
purpose of signification, as stated above [4343](A[4]). But nothing
hinders the same thing being signified by divers sensible things: thus
in Holy Scripture God is signified metaphorically, sometimes by a stone
(2 Kings 22:2; Zech. 3:9; 1 Cor. 10:4; Apoc. 4:3); sometimes by a lion
(Is. 31:4; Apoc. 5:5); sometimes by the sun (Is. 60:19,20; Mal. 4:2),
or by something similar. Therefore it seems that divers things can be
suitable to the same sacrament. Therefore determinate things are not
required for the sacraments.
Objection 2: Further, the health of the soul is more necessary than
that of the body. But in bodily medicines, which are ordained to the
health of the body, one thing can be substituted for another which
happens to be wanting. Therefore much more in the sacraments, which are
spiritual remedies ordained to the health of the soul, can one thing be
substituted for another when this happens to be lacking.
Objection 3: Further, it is not fitting that the salvation of men be
restricted by the Divine Law: still less by the Law of Christ, Who came
to save all. But in the state of the Law of nature determinate things
were not required in the sacraments, but were put to that use through a
vow, as appears from Gn. 28, where Jacob vowed that he would offer to
God tithes and peace-offerings. Therefore it seems that man should not
have been restricted, especially under the New Law, to the use of any
determinate thing in the sacraments.
On the contrary, our Lord said (Jn. 3:5): "Unless a man be born again
of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. "
I answer that, In the use of the sacraments two things may be
considered, namely, the worship of God, and the sanctification of man:
the former of which pertains to man as referred to God, and the latter
pertains to God in reference to man. Now it is not for anyone to
determine that which is in the power of another, but only that which is
in his own power. Since, therefore, the sanctification of man is in the
power of God Who sanctifies, it is not for man to decide what things
should be used for his sanctification, but this should be determined by
Divine institution. Therefore in the sacraments of the New Law, by
which man is sanctified according to 1 Cor. 6:11, "You are washed, you
are sanctified," we must use those things which are determined by
Divine institution.
Reply to Objection 1: Though the same thing can be signified by divers
signs, yet to determine which sign must be used belongs to the
signifier. Now it is God Who signifies spiritual things to us by means
of the sensible things in the sacraments, and of similitudes in the
Scriptures. And consequently, just as the Holy Ghost decides by what
similitudes spiritual things are to be signified in certain passages of
Scripture, so also must it be determined by Divine institution what
things are to be employed for the purpose of signification in this or
that sacrament.
Reply to Objection 2: Sensible things are endowed with natural powers
conducive to the health of the body: and therefore if two of them have
the same virtue, it matters not which we use. Yet they are ordained
unto sanctification not through any power that they possess naturally,
but only in virtue of the Divine institution. And therefore it was
necessary that God should determine the sensible things to be employed
in the sacraments.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix), diverse
sacraments suit different times; just as different times are signified
by different parts of the verb, viz. present, past, and future.
Consequently, just as under the state of the Law of nature man was
moved by inward instinct and without any outward law, to worship God,
so also the sensible things to be employed in the worship of God were
determined by inward instinct. But later on it became necessary for a
law to be given (to man) from without: both because the Law of nature
had become obscured by man's sins; and in order to signify more
expressly the grace of Christ, by which the human race is sanctified.
And hence the need for those things to be determinate, of which men
have to make use in the sacraments. Nor is the way of salvation
narrowed thereby: because the things which need to be used in the
sacraments, are either in everyone's possession or can be had with
little trouble.
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Whether words are required for the signification of the sacraments?
Objection 1: It seems that words are not required for the signification
of the sacraments. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix): "What else
is a corporeal sacrament but a kind of visible word? " Wherefore to add
words to the sensible things in the sacraments seems to be the same as
to add words to words. But this is superfluous. Therefore words are not
required besides the sensible things in the sacraments .
Objection 2: Further, a sacrament is some one thing, but it does not
seem possible to make one thing of those that belong to different
genera. Since, therefore, sensible things and words are of different
genera, for sensible things are the product of nature, but words, of
reason; it seems that in the sacraments, words are not required besides
sensible things.
Objection 3: Further, the sacraments of the New Law succeed those of
the Old Law: since "the former were instituted when the latter were
abolished," as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix).
