No More Learning

But
it is simply this, that the teachers themselves have not got their
own notions clear, and when they endeavour to make up for this by
raking up motives of moral goodness from every quarter, trying to
make their physic right strong, they spoil it. For the commonest
understanding shows that if we imagine, on the one hand, an act of
honesty done with steadfast mind, apart from every view to advantage
of any kind in this world or another, and even under the greatest
temptations of necessity or allurement, and, on the other hand, a
similar act which was affected, in however low a degree, by a
foreign motive, the former leaves far behind and eclipses the
second; it elevates the soul, and inspires the wish to be able to
act in like manner oneself. Even moderately young children feel this
impression, and one should never represent duties to them in any
other light. ] which may be derived from the field of experience,
that in the consciousness of its worth, despises the latter, and can by
degrees become their master; whereas a mixed ethics, compounded
partly of motives drawn from feelings and inclinations, and partly also of
conceptions of reason, must make the mind waver between motives
which cannot be brought under any principle, which lead to good only
by mere accident, and very often also to evil.

From what has been said, it is clear that all moral conceptions have
their seat and origin completely a priori in the reason, and that,
moreover, in the commonest reason just as truly as in that which is
in the highest degree speculative; that they cannot be obtained by
abstraction from any empirical, and therefore merely contingent
knowledge; that it is just this purity of their origin that makes
them worthy to serve as our supreme practical principle, and that
just in proportion as we add anything empirical, we detract from
their genuine influence, and from the absolute value of actions;
that it is not only of the greatest necessity, in a purely
speculative point of view, but is also of the greatest practical
importance to derive these notions and laws from pure reason, to
present them pure and unmixed, and even to determine the compass of
this practical or pure rational knowledge, i. e. to determine the
whole faculty of pure practical reason; and, in doing so, we must
not make its principles dependent on the particular nature of human
reason, though in speculative philosophy this may be permitted, or
may even at times be necessary; but since moral laws ought to hold
good for every rational creature, we must derive them from the
general concept of a rational being. In this way, although for its
application to man morality has need of anthropology, yet, in the
first instance, we must treat it independently as pure philosophy,
i. e. as metaphysic, complete in itself (a thing which in such
distinct branches of science is easily done); knowing well that
unless we are in possession of this, it would not only be vain to
determine the moral element of duty in right actions for purposes of
speculative criticism, but it would be impossible to base morals on
their genuine principles, even for common practical purposes,
especially of moral instruction, so as to produce pure moral dispositions,
and to engraft them on men's minds to the promotion of the greatest
possible good in the world.

But in order that in this study we may not merely advance by the
natural steps from the common moral judgment (in this case very
worthy of respect) to the philosophical, as has been already done,
but also from a popular philosophy, which goes no further than it
can reach by groping with the help of examples, to metaphysic (which
does not allow itself to be checked by anything empirical, and as it
must measure the whole extent of this kind of rational knowledge,
goes as far as ideal conceptions, where even examples fail us), we
must follow and clearly describe the practical faculty of reason,
from the general rules of its determination to the point where the
notion of duty springs from it.

Everything in nature works according to laws. Rational beings alone
have the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws, that
is according to principles, i. e. , have a will. Since the deduction
of actions from principles requires reason, the will is nothing but
practical reason. If reason infallibly determines the will, then the
actions of such a being which are recognised as objectively
necessary are subjectively necessary also, i. e. , the will is a
faculty to choose that only which reason independent on inclination
recognises as practically necessary, i. e. , as good. But if reason
of itself does not sufficiently determine the will, if the latter is
subject also to subjective conditions (particular impulses) which do
not always coincide with the objective conditions; in a word, if the
will does not in itself completely accord with reason (which is
actually the case with men), then the actions which objectively are
recognised as necessary are subjectively contingent, and the
determination of such a will according to objective laws is
obligation, that is to say, the relation of the objective laws to a
will that is not thoroughly good is conceived as the determination
of the will of a rational being by principles of reason, but which
the will from its nature does not of necessity follow.

The conception of an objective principle, in so far as it is
obligatory for a will, is called a command (of reason); and the
formula of the command is called an Imperative.

All imperatives are expressed by the word OUGHT [or SHALL], and
thereby indicate the relation of an objective law of reason to a
will, which from its subjective constitution is not necessarily
determined by it (an obligation). They say that something would be
good to do or to forbear, but they say it to a will which does not
always do a thing because it is conceived to be good to do it. That
is practically GOOD, however, which determines the will by means of
the conceptions of reason, and consequently not from subjective
causes, but objectively, that is on principles which are valid for
every rational being as such. It is distinguished from the PLEASANT,
as that which influences the will only by means of sensation from
merely subjective causes, valid only for the sense of this or that
one, and not as a principle of reason, which holds for every one.
[Footnote 3: The dependence of the desires on sensations is called
inclination, and this accordingly always indicates a WANT. The
dependence of a contingently determinable will on principles of
reason is called an INTEREST. This therefore is found only in the
case of a dependent will, which does not always of itself conform to
reason; in the Divine will we cannot conceive any interest. But the
human will can also TAKE AN INTEREST in a thing without therefore
acting FROM INTEREST. The former signifies the PRACTICAL interest in
the action, the latter the PATHOLOGICAL in the object of the action.
The former indicates only dependence of the will or principles of
reason in themselves; the second, dependence on principles of reason
for the sake of inclination, reason supplying only the practical
rules how the requirement of the inclination may he satisfied. In
the first case the action interests me; in the second the object of
the action (because it is pleasant to me), We have seen in the first
section that in an action done from duty we must look not to the
interest in the object, but only to that in the action itself, and
in its rational principle (viz. the law). ]

A perfectly good will would therefore be equally subject to
objective laws (viz. laws of good), but could not be conceived as
OBLIGED thereby to act lawfully, because of itself from its
subjective constitution it can only be determined by the conception
of good. Therefore no imperatives hold for the Divine will, or in
general for a HOLY will; OUGHT is here out of place, because the
volition is already of itself necessarily in unison with the law.
Therefore imperatives are only formulae to express the relation of
objective laws of all volition to the subjective imperfection of the
will of this or that rational being, e. g. the human will.

Now all IMPERATIVES command either HYPOTHETICALLY or CATEGORICALLY.
The former represent the practical necessity of a possible action as
means to something else that is willed (or at least which one might
possibly will). The categorical imperative would be that which
represented an action as necessary of itself without reference to
another end, i. e. , as objectively necessary.

Since every practical law represents a possible action as good, and
on this account, for a subject who is practically determinable by
reason, necessary, all imperatives are formulae determining an
action which is necessary according to the principle of a will good
in some respects. If now the action is good only as a means TO
SOMETHING ELSE, then the imperative is HYPOTHETICAL; if it is
conceived as good IN ITSELF and consequently as being necessarily
the principle of a will which of itself conforms to reason, then it
is CATEGORICAL.

Thus the imperative declares what action possible by me would be
good, and presents the practical rule in relation to a will which
does not forthwith perform an action simply because it is good,
whether because the subject does not always know that it is good, or
because, even if it know this, yet its maxims might be opposed to
the objective principles of practical reason.

Accordingly the hypothetical imperative only says that the action is
good for some purpose, POSSIBLE or ACTUAL. In the first case it is a
Problematical, in the second an Assertorial practical principle. The
categorical imperative which declares an action to be objectively
necessary in itself without reference to any purpose, i. e. , without
any other end, is valid as an Apodictic (practical) principle.

Whatever is possible only by the power of some rational being may
also be conceived as a possible purpose of some will; and therefore
the principles of action as regards the means necessary to attain
some possible purpose are in fact infinitely numerous. All sciences
have a practical part, consisting of problems expressing that some
end is possible for us, and of imperatives directing how it may be
attained. These may, therefore, be called in general imperatives of
Skill. Here there is no question whether the end is rational and
good, but only what one must do in order to attain it. The precepts
for the physician to make his patient thoroughly healthy, and for a
poisoner to ensure certain death, are of equal value in this
respect, that each serves to effect its purpose perfectly. Since in
early youth it cannot be known what ends are likely to occur to us
in the course of life, parents seek to have their children taught a
great many things, and provide for their skill in the use of means
for all sorts of arbitrary ends, of none of which can they determine
whether it may not perhaps hereafter be an object to their pupil,
but which it is at all events possible that he might aim at; and
this anxiety is so great that they commonly neglect to form and
correct their judgment on the value of the things which may be
chosen as ends.

There is one end, however, which may be assumed to be actually such
to all rational beings (so far as imperatives apply to them, viz. as
dependent beings), and therefore, one purpose which they not merely
MAY have, but which we may with certainty assume that they all
actually HAVE by a natural necessity, and this is HAPPINESS. The
hypothetical imperative which expresses the practical necessity of
an action as means to the advancement of happiness is Assertorial.
We are not to present it as necessary for an uncertain and merely
possible purpose, but for a purpose which we may presuppose with
certainty and a priori in every man, because it belongs to his
being. Now skill in the choice of means to his own greatest well-
being may be called prudence [The word prudence is taken in two
senses; in the one it may bear the name of knowledge of the world,
in the other that of private prudence. The former is a man's ability
to influence others so as to use them for his own purposes. The
latter is the sagacity to combine all these purposes for his own
lasting benefit. This latter is properly that to which the value
even of the former is reduced, and when a man is prudent in the
former sense, but not in the latter, we might better say of him that
he is clever and cunning, but, on the whole, imprudent. Compare on
the difference between klug and gescheu here alluded to,
Anthropologie, 45, ed. Schubert, p. no. ] in the narrowest sense. And
thus the imperative which refers to the choice of means to one's own
happiness, i. e. , the precept of prudence, is still always
hypothetical; the action is not commanded absolutely, but only as
means to another purpose.

Finally, there is an imperative which commands a certain conduct
immediately, without having as its condition any other purpose to be
attained by it. This imperative is Categorical. It concerns not the
matter of the action, or its intended result, but its form and the
principle of which it is itself a result, and what is essentially
good in it consists in the mental disposition, let the consequence
be what it may. This imperative may be called that of Morality.

There is a marked distinction also between the volitions on these
three sorts of principles in the DISSIMILARITY of the obligation of
the will. In order to mark this difference more clearly, I think
they would be most suitably named in their order if we said they are
either RULES of skill, or COUNSELS of prudence, or COMMANDS (LAWS)
of morality. For it is LAW only that involves the conception of an
UNCONDITIONAL and objective necessity, which is consequently
universally valid; and commands are laws which must be obeyed, that
is, must be followed, even in opposition to inclination. COUNSELS,
indeed, involve necessity, but one which can only hold under a
contingent subjective condition, viz. they depend on whether this or
that man reckons this or that as part of his happiness; the
categorical imperative, on the contrary, is not limited by any
condition, and as being absolutely, although practically, necessary,
may be quite properly called a command. We might also call the first
kind of imperatives TECHNICAL (belonging to art), the second
PRAGMATIC (to welfare), [It seems to me that the proper
signification of the word pragmatic may be most accurately defined
in this way. For sanctions [see Cr. of Pract. Reas. , p. 271] are
called pragmatic which flow properly, not from the law of the states
as necessary enactments, but from precaution for the general
welfare. A history is composed pragmatically when it teaches
prudence, i. e. instructs the world how it can provide for its
interests better, or at least as well as the men of former time. ];
the third MORAL (belonging to free conduct generally, that is, to
morals).

Now arises the question, how are all these imperatives possible?
This question does not seek to know how we can conceive the
accomplishment of the action which the imperative ordains, but
merely how we can conceive the obligation of the will which the
imperative expresses. No special explanation is needed to show how
an imperative of skill is possible. Whoever wills the end, wills
also (so far as reason decides his conduct) the means in his power
which are indispensably necessary thereto. This proposition is, as
regards the volition, analytical; for, in willing an object as my
effect, there is already thought the causality of myself as an
acting cause, that is to say, the use of the means; and the
imperative educes from the conception of volition of an end the
conception of actions necessary to this end. Synthetical
propositions must no doubt be employed in denning the means to a
proposed end; but they do not concern the principle, the act of the
will, but the object and its realization. Ex. gr. , that in order to
bisect a line on an unerring principle I must draw from its
extremities two intersecting arcs; this no doubt is taught by
mathematics only in synthetical propositions; but if I know that it
is only by this process that the intended operation can be
performed, then to say that if I fully will the operation, I also
will the action required for it, is an analytical proposition; for
it is one and the same thing to conceive something as an effect
which I can produce in a certain way, and to conceive myself as
acting in this way.

If it were only equally easy to give a definite conception of
happiness, the imperatives of prudence would correspond exactly with
those of skill, and would likewise be analytical. For in this case
as in that, it could be said, whoever wills the end, wills also
(according to the dictate of reason necessarily) the indispensable
means thereto which are in his power. But, unfortunately, the notion
of happiness is so indefinite that although every man wishes to
attain it, yet he never can say definitely and consistently what it
is that he really wishes and wills. The reason of this is that all
the elements which belong to the notion of happiness are altogether
empirical, i. e. they must be borrowed from experience, and
nevertheless the idea of happiness requires an absolute whole, a
maximum of welfare in my present and all future circumstances. Now
it is impossible that the most clear-sighted, and at the same time
most powerful being (supposed finite), should frame to himself a
definite conception of what he really wills in this. Does he will
riches, how much anxiety, envy, and snares might he not thereby draw
upon his shoulders? Does he will knowledge and discernment, perhaps
it might prove to be only an eye so much the sharper to show him so
much the more fearfully the evils that are now concealed from him,
and that cannot be avoided, or to impose more wants on his desires,
which already give him concern enough. Would he have long life, who
guarantees to him that it would not be a long misery? would he at
least have health? how often has uneasiness of the body restrained
from excesses into which perfect health would have allowed one to
fall? and so on. In short he is unable, on any principle, to
determine with certainty what would make him truly happy; because to
do so he would need to be omniscient. We cannot therefore act on any
definite principles to secure happiness, but only on empirical
counsels, ex. gr. of regimen, frugality, courtesy, reserve, &c. ,
which experience teaches do, on the average, most promote well-
being. Hence it follows that the imperatives of prudence do not,
strictly speaking, command at all, that is, they cannot present
actions objectively as practically necessary; that they are rather
to be regarded as counsels (consilia) than precepts (praecepta) of
reason, that the problem to determine certainly and universally what
action would promote the happiness of a rational being is completely
insoluble, and consequently no imperative respecting it is possible
which should, in the strict sense, command to do what makes happy;
because happiness is not an ideal of reason but of imagination,
resting solely on empirical grounds, and it is vain to expect that
these should define an action by which one could attain the totality
of a series of consequences which is really endless. This imperative
of prudence would however be an analytical proposition if we assume
that the means to happiness could be certainly assigned; for it is
distinguished from the imperative of skill only by this, that in the
latter the end is merely possible, in the former it is given; as
however both only ordain the means to that which we suppose to be
willed as an end, it follows that the imperative which ordains the
willing of the means to him who wills the end is in both cases
analytical. Thus there is no difficulty in regard to the possibility
of an imperative of this kind either.

On the other hand the question, how the imperative of morality is
possible, is undoubtedly one, the only one? demanding a solution, as
this is not at all hypothetical, and the objective necessity which
it presents cannot rest on any hypothesis, as is the case with the
hypothetical imperatives. Only here we must never leave out of
consideration that we cannot make out by any example, in other words
empirically, whether there is such an imperative at all; but it is
rather to be feared that all those which seem to be categorical may
yet be at bottom hypothetical. For instance, when the precept is:
Thou shalt not promise deceitfully; and it is assumed that the
necessity of this is not a mere counsel to avoid some other evil, so
that it should mean: thou shalt not make a lying promise, lest if it
become known thou shouldst destroy thy credit, but that an action of
this kind must be regarded as evil in itself, so that the imperative
of the prohibition is categorical; then we cannot show with
certainty in any example that the will was determined merely by the
law, without any other spring of action, although it may appear to
be so. For it is always possible that fear of disgrace, perhaps also
obscure dread of other dangers, may have a secret influence on the
will. Who can prove by experience the non-existence of a cause when
all that experience tells us is that we do not perceive it? But in
such a case the so-called moral imperative, which as such appears to
be categorical and unconditional, would in reality be only a
pragmatic precept, drawing our attention to our own interests, and
merely teaching us to take these into consideration.

We shall therefore have to investigate a priori the possibility of a
categorical imperative, as we have not in this case the advantage of
its reality being given in experience, so that [the elucidation of]
its possibility should be requisite only for its explanation, not
for its establishment. In the mean-time it may be discerned
beforehand that the categorical imperative alone has the purport of
a practical law: all the rest may indeed be called principles of the
will but not laws, since whatever is only necessary for the
attainment of some arbitrary purpose may be considered as in itself
contingent, and we can at any time be free from the precept if we
give up the purpose: on the contrary, the unconditional command
leaves the will no liberty to choose the opposite; consequently it
alone carries with it that necessity which we require in a law.

Secondly, in the case of this categorical imperative or law of
morality, the difficulty (of discerning its possibility) is a very
profound one. It is an a priori synthetical practical proposition;
[Footnote: I connect the act with the will without presupposing any
condition resulting from any inclination, but d priori, and
therefore necessarily (though only objectively, i. e. assuming the
idea of a reason possessing full power over all subjective motives).
This is accordingly a practical proposition which does not deduce
the willing of an action by mere analysis from another already
presupposed (for we have not such a perfect will), but connects it
immediately with the conception of the will of a rational being, as
something not contained in it. ] and as there is so much difficulty
in discerning the possibility of speculative propositions of this
kind, it may readily be supposed that the difficulty will be no less
with the practical.

In this problem we will first inquire whether the mere conception of
a categorical imperative may not perhaps supply us also with the
formula of it, containing the proposition which alone can be a
categorical imperative; for even if we know the tenor of such
absolute command, yet how it is possible will require further
special and laborious study, which we postpone to the last section.

When I conceive a hypothetical imperative in general I do not know
beforehand what it will contain until I am given the condition. But
when I conceive a categorical imperative I know at once what it
contains. For as the imperative contains besides the law only the
necessity that the maxims [Footnote: A MAXIM is a subjective
principle of action, and must be distinguished from the objective
principle, namely, practical law. The former contains the practical
rule set by reason according to the conditions of the subject (often
its ignorance or its inclinations), so that it is the principle on
which the subject acts; but the law is the objective principle valid
for every rational being, and is the principle on which it ought to
act that is an imperative. ] shall conform to this law, while the law
contains no conditions restricting it, there remains nothing but the
general statement that the maxim of the action should conform to a
universal law, and it is this conformity alone that the imperative
properly represents as necessary. [Footnote: I have no doubt that
"den" in the original before "Imperativ" is a misprint for "der,"
and have translated accordingly. Mr. Semple has done the same. The
editions that I have seen agree in reading "den," and M. Barni so
translates. With this reading, it is the conformity that presents
the imperative as necessary. ]

There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely this: Act
only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it
should become a universal law.

Now if all imperatives of duty can be deduced from this one
imperative as from their principle, then, although it should remain
undecided whether what is called duty is not merely a vain notion,
yet at least we shall be able to show what we understand by it and
what this notion means.

Since the universality of the law according to which effects are
produced constiutes what is properly called nature in the most
general sense (as to form), that is the existence of things so far
as it is determined by general laws, the imperative of duty may be
expressed thus: Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by
thy will a Universal Law of Nature.

We will now enumerate a few duties, adopting the usual division of
them into duties to ourselves and to others, and into perfect and
imperfect duties. [Footnote: It must be noted here that I reserve
the division of duties for a future metaphysic of morals; so that I
give it here only as an arbitrary one (in order to arrange my
examples). For the rest, I understand by a perfect duty one that
admits no exception in favour of inclination, and then I have not
merely external, but also internal perfect duties. This is contrary
to the use of the word adopted in the schools; but I do not intend
to justify it here, as it is all one for my purpose whether it is
admitted or not. [Perfect duties are usually understood to be those
which can be enforced by external law; imperfect, those which cannot
be enforced. They are also called respectively determinate and
indeterminate, officia juris and officia virtutis. ]]

I. A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied
of life, but is still so far in possession of his reason that he can
ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself
to take his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim of his
action could become a universal law of nature. His maxim is: From
self-love I adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its
longer duration is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction. It
is asked then simply whether this principle founded on self-love can
become a universal law of nature. Now we see at once that a system
of nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of
the very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the
improvement of life would contradict itself, and therefore could not
exist as a system of nature; hence that maxim cannot possibly exist
as a universal law of nature, and consequently would be wholly
inconsistent with the supreme principle of all duty. [Footnote: On
suicide cf. further Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 274. ]

2. Another finds himself forced by necessity to borrow money. He
knows that he will not be able to repay it, but sees also that
nothing will be lent to him, unless he promises stoutly to repay it
in a definite time. He desires to make this promise, but he has
still so much conscience as to ask himself: Is it not unlawful and
inconsistent with duty to get out of a difficulty in this way?
Suppose, however, that he resolves to do so, then the maxim of his
action would be expressed thus: When I think myself in want of
money, I will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know
that I never can do so. Now this principle of self-love or of one's
own advantage may perhaps be consistent with my whole future
welfare; but the question now is, Is it right? I change then the
suggestion of self-love into a universal law, and state the question
thus: How would it be if my maxim were a universal law? Then I see
at once that it could never hold as a universal law of nature, but
would necessarily contradict itself. For supposing it to be a
universal law that everyone when he thinks himself in a difficulty
should be able to promise whatever he pleases, with the purpose of
not keeping his promise, the promise itself would become impossible,
as well as the end that one might have in view in it, since no one
would consider that anything was promised to him, but would ridicule
all such statements as vain pretences.

3. A third finds in himself a talent which with the help of some
culture might make him a useful man in many respects. But he finds
himself in comfortable circumstances, and prefers to indulge in
pleasure rather than to take pains in enlarging and improving his
happy natural capacities. He asks, however, whether his maxim of
neglect of his natural gifts, besides agreeing with his inclination
to indulgence, agrees also with what is called duty. He sees then
that a system of nature could indeed subsist with such a universal
law although men (like the South Sea islanders) should let their
talents rust, and resolve to devote their lives merely to idleness,
amusement, and propagation of their species--in a word, to
enjoyment; but he cannot possibly WILL that this should be a
universal law of nature, or be implanted in us as such by a natural
instinct. For, as a rational being, he necessarily wills that his
faculties be developed, since they serve him, and have been given
him, for all sorts of possible purposes.

4. A fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees that others have to
contend with great wretchedness and that he could help them, thinks:
What concern is it of mine? Let everyone be as happy as heaven
pleases, or as he can make himself; I will take nothing from him nor
even envy him, only I do not wish to contribute anything to his
welfare or to his assistance in distress! Now no doubt if such a
mode of thinking were a universal law, the human race might very
well subsist, and doubtless even better than in a state in which
everyone talks of sympathy and good-will, or even takes care
occasionally to put it into practice, but on the other side, also
cheats when he can, betrays the rights of men, or otherwise violates
them. But although it is possible that a universal law of nature
might exist in accordance with that maxim, it is impossible to WILL
that such a principle should have the universal validity of a law of
nature. For a will which resolved this would contradict itself,
inasmuch as many cases might occur in which one would have need of
the love and sympathy of others, and in which, by such a law of
nature, sprung from his own will, he would deprive himself of all
hope of the aid he desires.

These are a few of the many actual duties, or at least what we
regard as such, which obviously fall into two classes on the one
principle that we have laid down. We must be ABLE TO WILL that a
maxim of our action should be a universal law. This is the canon of
the moral appreciation of the action generally. Some actions are of
such a character that their maxim cannot without contradiction be
even CONCEIVED as a universal law of nature, far from it being
possible that we should WILL that it SHOULD be so. In others this
intrinsic impossibility is not found, but still it is impossible to
WILL THAT their maxim should be raised to the universality of a law
of nature, since such a will would contradict itself. It is easily
seen that the former violate strict or rigorous (inflexible) duty;
the latter only laxer (meritorious) duty. Thus it has been
completely shown by these examples how all duties depend as regards
the nature of the obligation (not the object of the action) on the
same principle.

If now we attend to ourselves on occasion of any transgression of
duty, we shall find that we in fact do not will that our maxim
should be a universal law, for that is impossible for us; on the
contrary we will that the opposite should remain a universal law,
only we assume the liberty of making an EXCEPTION in our own favour
or (just for this time only) in favour of our inclination.
Consequently if we considered all cases from one and the same point
of view, namely, that of reason, we should find a contradiction in
our own will, namely, that a certain principle should be objectively
necessary as a universal law, and yet subjectively should not be
universal, but admit of exceptions. As however we at one moment
regard our action from the point of view of a will wholly conformed
to reason, and then again look at the same action from the point of
view of a will affected by inclination, there is not really any
contradiction, but an antagonism of inclination to the precept of
reason, whereby the universality of the principle is changed into a
mere generality, so that the practical principle of reason shall
meet the maxim half way.
Now, although this cannot be justified in
our own impartial judgment, yet it proves that we do really
recognise the validity of the categorical imperative and (with all
respect for it) only allow ourselves a few exceptions, which we
think unimportant and forced from us.

We have thus established at least this much, that if duty is a
conception which is to have any import and real legislative
authority for our actions, it can only be expressed in categorical,
and not at all in hypothetical imperatives. We have also, which is
of great importance, exhibited clearly and definitely for every
practical application the content of the categorical imperative,
which must contain the principle of all duty if there is such a
thing at all. We have not yet, however, advanced so far as to prove
a priori that there actually is such an imperative, that there is a
practical law which commands absolutely of itself, and without any
other impulse, and that the following of this law is duty.

With the view of attaining to this it is of extreme importance to
remember that we must not allow ourselves to think of deducing the
reality of this principle from the particular attributes of human
nature. For duty is to be a practical, unconditional necessity of
action; it must therefore hold for all rational beings (to whom an
imperative can apply at all) and for this reason only be also a law
for all human wills. On the contrary, whatever is deduced from the
particular natural characteristics of humanity, from certain
feelings and propensions, [Footnote: Kant distinguishes "Hang
(propensio)" from "Neigung (inclinatio)" as follows:--"Hang" is a
predisposition to the desire of some enjoyment; in other words, it
is the subjective possibility of excitement of a certain desire,
which precedes the conception of its object. When the enjoyment has
been experienced, it produces a "Neigung" (inclination) to it, which
accordingly is defined "habitual sensible desire. "--Anthropologie,
72, 79; Religion, p. 31. ] nay even, if possible, from any particular
tendency proper to human reason, and which need not necessarily hold
for the will of every rational being; this may indeed supply us with
a maxim, but not with a law; with a subjective principle on which we
may have a propension and inclination to act, but not with an
objective principle on which we should be enjoined to act, even
though all our propensions, inclinations, and natural dispositions
were opposed to it. In fact the sublimity and intrinsic dignity of
the command in duty are so much the more evident, the less the
subjective impulses favour it and the more they oppose it, without
being able in the slightest degree to weaken the obligation of the
law or to distinguish its validity.

Here then we see philosophy brought to a critical position, since it
has to be firmly fixed, notwithstanding that it has nothing to
support it either in heaven or earth. Here it must show its purity
as absolute dictator of its own laws, not the herald of those which
are whispered to it by an implanted sense or who knows what tutelary
nature. Although these may be better than nothing, yet they can
never afford principles dictated by reason, which must have their
source wholly a priori and thence their commanding authority,
expecting everything from the supremacy of the law and the due
respect for it, nothing from inclination, or else condemning the man
to self-contempt and inward abhorrence.

Thus every empirical element is not only quite incapable of being an
aid to the principle of morality, but is even highly prejudicial to
the purity of morals, for the proper and inestimable worth of an
absolutely good will consists just in this, that the principle of
action is free, from all influence of contingent grounds, which
alone experience can furnish. We cannot too much or too often repeat
our warning against this lax and even mean habit of thought which
seeks for its principle amongst empirical motives and laws; for
human reason in its weariness is glad to rest on this pillow, and in
a dream of sweet illusions (in which, instead of Juno, it embraces a
cloud) it substitutes for morality a bastard patched up from limbs
of various derivation, which looks like anything one chooses to see
in it; only not like virtue to one who has once beheld her in her
true form. [Footnote: To behold virtue in her proper form is nothing
else but to contemplate morality stripped of all admixture of
sensible things and of every spurious ornament of reward or self-
love. How much she then eclipses everything else that appears
charming to the affections, every one may readily perceive with the
least exertion of his reason, if it be not wholly spoiled for
abstraction. ]

The question then is this: Is it a necessary law for all rational
beings that they should always judge of their actions by maxims of
which they can themselves will that they should serve as universal
laws? If it is so, then it must be connected (altogether a priori)
with the very conception of the will of a rational being generally.
But in order to discover this connexion we must, however
reluctantly, take a step into metaphysic, although into a domain of
it which is distinct from speculative philosophy, namely, the
metaphysic of morals. In a practical philosophy, where it is not the
reasons of what happens that we have to ascertain, but the laws of
what ought to happen, even although it never does, i. e. , objective
practical laws, there it is not necessary to inquire into the
reasons why anything pleases or displeases, how the pleasure of mere
sensation differs from taste, and whether the latter is distinct
from a general satisfaction of reason; on what the feeling of
pleasure or pain rests, and how from it desires and inclinations
arise, and from these again maxims by the co-operation of reason:
for all this belongs to an empirical psychology, which would
constitute the second part of physics, if we regard physics as the
philosophy of nature, so far as it is based on empirical laws. But
here we are concerned with objective practical laws, and
consequently with the relation of the will to itself so far as it is
determined by reason alone, in which case whatever has reference to
anything empirical is necessarily excluded; since if reason of
itself alone determines the conduct (and it is the possibility of
this that we are now investigating), it must necessarily do so a
priori.

The will is conceived as a faculty of determining oneself to action
in accordance with the conception of certain laws. And such a
faculty can be found only in rational beings. Now that which serves
the will as the objective ground of its self-determination is the
end, and if this is assigned by reason alone, it must hold for all
rational beings. On the other hand, that which merely contains the
ground of possibility of the action of which the effect is the end,
this is called the means. The subjective ground of the desire is the
spring, the objective ground of the volition is the motive; hence
the distinction between subjective ends which rest on springs and
objective ends which depend on motives valid for every rational
being. Practical principles are formal when they abstract from all
subjective ends, they are material when they assume these, and
therefore particular springs of action. The ends which a rational
being proposes to himself at pleasure as effects of his actions
(material ends) are all only relative, for it is only their relation
to the particular desires of the subject that gives them their
worth, which therefore cannot furnish principles universal and
necessary for all rational beings and for every volition, that is to
say practical laws. Hence all these relative ends can give rise only
to hypothetical imperatives.

Supposing, however, that there were something whose existence has in
itself an absolute worth, something which, being an end in itself,
could be a source of definite laws, then in this and this alone
would He the source of a possible categorical imperative, i. e. , a
practical law.

Now I say: man and generally any rational being exists as an end in
himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or
that will, but in all his actions, whether they concern himself or
other rational beings, must be always regarded at the same time as
an end. All objects of the inclinations have only a conditional
worth, for if the inclinations and the wants founded on them did not
exist, then their object would be without value. But the
inclinations themselves being sources of want, are so far from
having an absolute worth for which they should be desired, that on
the contrary it must be the universal wish of every rational being
to be wholly free from them. Thus the worth of any object which is
to be acquired by our action is always conditional. Beings whose
existence depends not on our will but on nature's, have
nevertheless, if they are irrational beings, only a relative value
as means, and are therefore called things; rational beings, on the
contrary, are called persons, because their very nature points them
out as ends in themselves, that is as something which must not be
used merely as means, and so far therefore restricts freedom of
action (and is an object of respect). These, therefore, are not
merely subjective ends whose existence has a worth for us as an
effect of our action but objective ends, that is things whose
existence is an end in itself: an end moreover for which no other
can be substituted, which they should subserve merely as means, for
otherwise nothing whatever would possess absolute worth; but if all
worth were conditioned and therefore contingent, then there would be
no supreme practical principle of reason whatever.

If then there is a supreme practical principle or, in respect of the
human will, a categorical imperative, it must be one which, being
drawn from the conception of that which is necessarily an end for
every one because it is an end in itself, constitutes an objective
principle of will, and can therefore serve as a universal practical
law. The foundation of this principle is: rational nature exists as
an end in itself. Man necessarily conceives his own existence as
being so; so far then this is a subjective principle of human
actions. But every other rational being regards its existence
similarly, just on the same rational principle that holds for me:
[Footnote: This proposition is here stated as a postulate. The
grounds of it will be found in the concluding section. ] so that it
is at the same time an objective principle, from which as a supreme
practical law all laws of the will must be capable of being deduced.
Accordingly the practical imperative will be as follows: So act as
to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any
other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only. We will
now inquire whether this can be practically carried out.

To abide by the previous examples:

Firstly, under the head of necessary duty to oneself: He who
contemplates suicide should ask himself whether his action can be
consistent with the idea of humanity as an end in itself. If he
destroys himself in order to escape from painful circumstances, he
uses a person merely as a mean to maintain a tolerable condition up
to the end of life. But a man is not a thing, that is to say,
something which can be used merely as means, but must in all his
actions be always considered as an end in himself. I cannot,
therefore, dispose in any way of a man in my own person so as to
mutilate him, to damage or kill him. (It belongs to ethics proper to
define this principle more precisely so as to avoid all
misunderstanding, e. g. , as to the amputation of the limbs in order
to preserve myself; as to exposing my life to danger with a view to
preserve it, &c. This question is therefore omitted here. )

Secondly, as regards necessary duties, or those of strict
obligation, towards others; he who is thinking of making a lying
promise to others will see at once that he would be using another
man merely as a mean, without the latter containing at the same time
the end in himself. For he whom I propose by such a promise to use
for my own purposes cannot possibly assent to my mode of acting
towards him, and therefore cannot himself contain the end of this
action. This violation of the principle of humanity in other men is
more obvious if we take in examples of attacks on the freedom and
property of others. For then it is clear that he who transgresses
the rights of men, intends to use the person of others merely as
means, without considering that as rational beings they ought always
to be esteemed also as ends, that is, as beings who must be capable
of containing in themselves the end of the very same action.
[Footnote: Let it not be thought that the common: quod tibi non vis
fieri, &c. , could serve here as the rule or principle. For it is
only a deduction from the former, though with several limitations;
it cannot be a universal law, for it does not contain the principle
of duties to oneself, nor of the duties of benevolence to others
(for many a one would gladly consent that others should not benefit
him, provided only that he might be excused from showing benevolence
to them), nor finally that of duties of strict obligation to one
another, for on this principle the criminal might argue against the
judge who punishes him, and so on. ]

Thirdly, as regards contingent (meritorious) duties to oneself; it
is not enough that the action does not violate humanity in our own
person as an end in itself, it must also harmonise with it. Now
there are in humanity capacities of greater perfection which belong
to the end that nature has in view in regard to humanity in
ourselves as the subject: to neglect these might perhaps be
consistent with the maintenance of humanity as an end in itself, but
not with the advancement of this end.

Fourthly, as regards meritorious duties towards others: the natural
end which all men have in their own happiness. Now humanity might
indeed subsist, although no one should contribute anything to the
happiness of others, provided he did not intentionally withdraw
anything from it; but after all, this would only harmonise
negatively not positively with humanity as an end in itself, if
everyone does not also endeavor, as far as in him lies, to forward
the ends of others. For the ends of any subject which is an end in
himself, ought as far as possible to be my ends also, if that
conception is to have its full effect with me.

This principle, that humanity and generally every rational nature is
an end in itself (which is the supreme limiting condition of every
man's freedom of action), is not borrowed from experience, firstly,
because it is universal, applying as it does to all rational beings
whatever, and experience is not capable of determining anything
about them; secondly, because it does not present humanity as an end
to men (subjectively), that is as an object which men do of
themselves actually adopt as an end; but as an objective end, which
must as a law constitute the supreme limiting condition of all our
subjective ends, let them be what we will; it must therefore spring
from pure, reason. In fact the objective principle of all practical
legislation lies (according to the first principle) in the rule and
its form of universality which makes it capable of being a law (say,
e. g. , a law of nature); but the subjective principle is in the end;
now by the second principle the subject of all ends is each rational
being, inasmuch as it is an end in itself. Hence follows the third
practical principle of the will, which is the ultimate condition of
its harmony with the universal practical reason, viz. : the idea of
the will of every rational being as a universally legislative will.

On this principle all maxims are rejected which are inconsistent
with the will being itself universal legislator. Thus the will is
not subject simply to the law, but so subject that it must be
regarded as itself giving the law, and on this ground only, subject
to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author).

In the previous imperatives, namely, that based on the conception of
the conformity of actions to general laws, as in a physical system
of nature, and that based on the universal prerogative of rational
beings as ends in themselves--these imperatives just because they
were conceived as categorical, excluded from any share in their
authority all admixture of any interest as a spring of action; they
were however only assumed to be categorical, because such an
assumption was necessary to explain the conception of duty. But we
could not prove independently that there are practical propositions
which command categorically, nor can it be proved in this section;
one thing however could be done, namely, to indicate in the
imperative itself by some determinate expression, that in the case
of volition from duty all interest is renounced, which is the
specific criterion of categorical as distinguished from hypothetical
imperatives. This is done in the present (third) formula of the
principle, namely, in the idea of the will of every rational being
as a universally legislating will.

For although a will which is subject to laws may be attached to this
law by means of an interest, yet a will which is itself a supreme
lawgiver so far as it is such cannot possibly depend on any
interest, since a will so dependent would itself still need another
law restricting the interest of its self-love by the condition that
it should be valid as universal law.

Thus the principle that every human will is a will which in all its
maxims gives universal laws [Footnote: I may be excused from
adducing examples to elucidate this principle, as those which have
already been used to elucidate the categorical imperative and its
formula would all serve for the like purpose here. ] provided it be
otherwise justified, would be very well adapted to be the
categorical imperative, in this respect, namely, that just because
of the idea of universal legislation it is not based on any
interest, and therefore it alone among all possible imperatives can
be unconditional. Or still better, converting the proposition, if
there is a categorical imperative (i. e. a law for the will of every
rational being), it can only command that everything be done from
maxims of one's will regarded as a will which could at the same time
will that it should itself give universal laws, for in that case
only the practical principle and the imperative which it obeys are
unconditional, since they cannot be based on any interest.

Looking back now on all previous attempts to discover the principle
of morality, we need not wonder why they all fail. It was seen that
man was bound to laws by duty, but it was not observed that the laws
to which he is subject are only those of his own giving, though at
the same time they are universal, and that he is only bound to act
in conformity with his own will; a will, however, which is designed
by nature to give universal laws. For when one has conceived man
only as subject to a law (no matter what), then this law required
some interest, either by way of attraction or constraint, since it
did not originate as a law from his own will, but this will was
according to a law obliged by something else to act in a certain
manner. Now by this necessary consequence all the labour spent in
finding a supreme principle of duty was irrevocably lost. For men
never elicited duty, but only a necessity of acting from a certain
interest. Whether this interest was private or otherwise, in any
case the imperative must be conditional, and could not by any means
be capable of being a moral command. I will therefore call this the
principle of Autonomy of the will, in contrast with every other
which I accordingly reckon as Heteronomy? [Footnote: Cp. "Critical
Examination of Practical Reason," p. 184. ]

The conception of every rational being as one which must consider
itself as giving in all the maxims of its will universal laws, so as
to judge itself and its actions from this point of view--this
conception leads to another which depends on it and is very
fruitful, namely, that of a kingdom of ends.

By a kingdom I understand the union of different rational beings in
a system by common laws. Now since it is by laws that ends are
determined as regards their universal validity, hence, if we
abstract from the personal differences of rational beings, and
likewise from all the content of their private ends, we shall be
able to conceive all ends combined in a systematic whole (including
both rational beings as ends in themselves, and also the special
ends which each may propose to himself), that is to say, we can
conceive a kingdom of ends, which on the preceding principles is
possible.

For all rational beings come under the law that each of them must
treat itself and all others never merely as means, but in every case
at the same time as ends in themselves. Hence results a systematic
union of rational beings by common objective laws, i. e. a kingdom
which may be called a kingdom of ends, since what these laws have in
view is just the relation of these beings to one another as ends and
means. It is certainly only an ideal.

A rational being belongs as a member to the kingdom of ends when,
although giving universal laws in it, he is also himself subject to
these laws. He belongs to it as sovereign when, while giving laws,
he is not subject to the will of any other.

A rational being must always regard himself as giving laws either as
member or as sovereign in a kingdom of ends which is rendered
possible by the freedom of will. He cannot, however, maintain the
latter position merely by the maxims of his will, but only in case
he is a completely independent being without wants and with
unrestricted power adequate to his will.

Morality consists then in the reference of all action to the
legislation which alone can render a kingdom of ends possible. This
legislation must be capable of existing in every rational being, and
of emanating from his will, so that the principle of this will is,
never to act on any maxim which could not without contradiction be
also a universal law, and accordingly always so to act that the will
could at the same time regard itself as giving in its maxims
universal laws. If now the maxims of rational beings are not by
their own nature coincident with this objective principle, then the
necessity of acting on it is called practical necessitation, i. e. ,
duty. Duty does not apply to the sovereign in the kingdom of ends,
but it does to every member of it and to all in the same degree.

The practical necessity of acting on this principle, i. e. , duty,
does not rest at all on feelings, impulses, or inclinations, but
solely on the relation of rational beings to one another, a relation
in which the will of a rational being must always be regarded as
legislative, since otherwise it could not be conceived as an end in
itself. Reason then refers every maxim of the will, regarding it as
legislating universally, to every other will and also to every
action towards oneself; and this not on account of any other
practical motive or any future advantage, but from the idea of the
dignity of a rational being, obeying no law but that which he
himself also gives.

In the kingdom of ends everything has either Value or Dignity.
Whatever has a value can be replaced by something else which is
equivalent; whatever, on the other hand, is above all value, and
therefore admits of no equivalent, has a dignity.

Whatever has reference to the general inclinations and wants of
mankind has a market value; whatever, without presupposing a want,
corresponds to a certain taste, that is to a satisfaction in the
mere purposeless play of our faculties, has a fancy value; but that
which constitutes the condition under which alone anything can be an
end in itself, this has not merely a relative worth, i. e. , value,
but an intrinsic worth, that is dignity.

Now morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can
be an end in himself, since by this alone it is possible that he
should be a legislating member in the kingdom of ends. Thus
morality, and humanity as capable of it, is that which alone has
dignity. Skill and diligence in labour have a market value; wit,
lively imagination, and humour, have fancy value; on the other hand,
fidelity to promises, benevolence from principle (not from
instinct), have an intrinsic worth. Neither nature nor art contains
anything which in default of these it could put in their place, for
their worth consists not in the effects which spring from them, not
in the use and advantage which they secure, but in the disposition
of mind, that is, the maxims of the will which are ready to manifest
themselves in such actions, even though they should not have the
desired effect. These actions also need no recommendation from any
subjective taste or sentiment, that they may be looked on with
immediate favour and satisfaction: they need no immediate propension
or feeling for them; they exhibit the will that performs them as an
object of an immediate respect, and nothing but reason is required
to IMPOSE them on the will; not to FLATTER it into them, which, in
the case of duties, would be a contradiction. This estimation
therefore shows that the worth of such a disposition is dignity, and
places it infinitely above all value, with which it cannot for a
moment be brought into comparison or competition without as it were
violating its sanctity.

What then is it which justifies virtue or the morally good
disposition, in making such lofty claims? It is nothing less than
the privilege it secures to the rational being of participating in
the giving of universal laws, by which it qualifies him to be a
member of a possible kingdom of ends, a privilege to which he was
already destined by his own nature as being an end in himself, and
on that account legislating in the kingdom of ends; free as regards
all laws of physical nature, and obeying those only which he himself
gives, and by which his maxims can belong to a system of universal
law, to which at the same time he submits himself. For nothing has
any worth except what the law assigns it. Now the legislation itself
which assigns the worth of everything, must for that very reason
possess dignity, that is an unconditional incomparable worth, and
the word RESPECT alone supplies a becoming expression for the esteem
which a rational being must have for it. AUTONOMY then is the basis
of the dignity of human and of every rational nature.

The three modes of presenting the principle of morality that have
been adduced are at bottom only so many formulae of the very same
law, and each of itself involves the other two. There is, however, a
difference in them, but it is rather subjectively than objectively
practical, intended namely to bring an idea of the reason nearer to
intuition (by means of a certain analogy), and thereby nearer to
feeling. All maxims, in fact, have--

1. A FORM, consisting in universality; and in this view the formula
of the moral imperative is expressed thus, that the maxims must be
so chosen as if they were to serve as universal laws of nature.

2. A MATTER [Footnote: The reading "Maxima," which is that both of
Rosenkranz and Hartenstein, is obviously an error for "Materie. "]
namely, an end, and here the formula says that the rational being,
as it is an end by its own nature and therefore an end in itself,
must in every maxim serve as the condition limiting all merely
relative and arbitrary ends.

3. A COMPLETE CHARACTERISATION of all maxims by means of that
formula, namely, that all maxims ought by their own legislation to
harmonise with a possible kingdom of ends as with a kingdom of
nature. [Footnote: Teleology considers nature as a kingdom of ends;
Ethics regards a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature. In
the first case, the kingdom of ends is a theoretical idea, adopted
to explain what actually is. In the latter it is a practical idea,
adopted to bring about that which is not yet, but which can be
realised by our conduct, namely, if it conforms to this idea. ] There
is a progress here in the order of the categories of UNITY of the
form of the will (its universality), PLURALITY of the matter (the
objects, i. e. the ends), and TOTALITY of the system of these. In
forming our moral JUDGMENT of actions it is better to proceed always
on the strict method, and start from the general formula of the
categorical imperative: ACT ACCORDING TO A MAXIM WHICH CAN AT THE
SAME TIME MAKE ITSELF A UNIVERSAL LAW. If, however, we wish to gain
an ENTRANCE for the moral law, it is very useful to bring one and
the same action under the three specified conceptions, and thereby
as far as possible to bring it nearer to intuition.

We can now end where we started at the beginning, namely, with the
conception of a will unconditionally good. THAT WILL is ABSOLUTELY
GOOD which cannot be evil, in other words, whose maxim, if made a
universal law, could never contradict itself. This principle then is
its supreme law: Act always on such a maxim as thou canst at the
same time will to be a universal law; this is the sole condition
under which a will can never contradict itself; and such an
imperative is categorical. Since the validity of the will as a
universal law for possible actions is analogous to the universal
connexion of the existence of things by general laws, which is the
formal notion of nature in general, the categorical imperative can
also be expressed thus: ACT ON MAXIMS WHICH CAN AT THE SAME TIME
HAVE FOR THEIR OBJECT THEMSELVES AS UNIVERSAL LAWS OF NATURE. Such
then is the formula of an absolutely good will.

Rational nature is distinguished from the rest of nature by this,
that it sets before itself an end. This end would be the matter of
every good will. But since in the idea of a will that is absolutely
good without being limited by any condition (of attaining this or
that end) we must abstract wholly from every end TO BE EFFECTED
(since this would make every will only relatively good), it follows
that in this case the end must be conceived, not as an end to be
effected, but as an INDEPENDENTLY existing end. Consequently it is
conceived only negatively, i. e. , as that which we must never act
against, and which, therefore, must never be regarded merely as
means, but must in every volition be esteemed as an end likewise.
Now this end can be nothing but the subject of all possible ends,
since this is also the subject of a possible absolutely good will;
for such a will cannot without contradiction be postponed to any
other object. The principle: So act in regard to every rational
being (thyself and others), that he may always have place in thy
maxim as an end in himself, is accordingly essentially identical
with this other: Act upon a maxim which, at the same time, involves
its own universal validity for every rational being. For that in
using means for every end I should limit my maxim by the condition
of its holding good as a law for every subject, this comes to the
same thing as that the fundamental principle of all maxims of action
must be that the subject of all ends, i. e. , the rational being
himself, be never employed merely as means, but as the supreme
condition restricting the use of all means, that is in every case as
an end likewise.

It follows incontestably that, to whatever laws any rational being
may be subject, he being an end in himself must be able to regard
himself as also legislating universally in respect of these same
laws, since it is just this fitness of his maxims for universal
legislation that distinguishes him as an end in himself; also it
follows that this implies his dignity (prerogative) above all mere
physical beings, that he must always take his maxims from the point
of view which regards himself, and likewise every other rational
being, as lawgiving beings (on which account they are called
persons). In this way a world of rational beings (mundus
intelligibilis) is possible as a kingdom of ends, and this by virtue
of the legislation proper to all persons as members. Therefore every
rational being must so act as if he were by his maxims in every case
a legislating member in the universal kingdom of ends. The formal
principle of these maxims is: So act as if thy maxim were to serve
likewise as the universal law (of all rational beings). A kingdom of
ends is thus only possible on the analogy of a kingdom of nature,
the former however only by maxims, that is self-imposed rules, the
latter only by the laws of efficient causes acting under
necessitation from without. Nevertheless, although the system of
nature is looked upon as a machine, yet so far as it has reference
to rational beings as its ends, it is given on this account the name
of a kingdom of nature. Now such a kingdom of ends would be actually
realised by means of maxims conforming to the canon which the
categorical imperative prescribes to all rational beings, IF THEY
WERE UNIVERSALLY FOLLOWED. But although a rational being, even if he
punctually follows this maxim himself, cannot reckon upon all others
being therefore true to the same, nor expect that the kingdom of
nature and its orderly arrangements shall be in harmony with him as
a fitting member, so as to form a kingdom of ends to which he
himself contributes, that is to say, that it shall favour his
expectation of happiness, still that law: Act according to the
maxims of a member of a merely possible kingdom of ends legislating
in it universally, remains in its full force, inasmuch as it
commands categorically. And it is just in this that the paradox
lies; that the mere dignity of a man as a rational creature, without
any other end or advantage to be attained thereby, in other words,
respect for a mere idea, should yet serve as an inflexible precept
of the will, and that it is precisely in this independence of the
maxim on all such springs of action that its sublimity consists; and
it is this that makes every rational subject worthy to be a
legislative member in the kingdom of ends: for otherwise he would
have to be conceived only as subject to the physical law of his
wants. And although we should suppose the kingdom of nature and the
kingdom of ends to be united under one sovereign, so that the latter
kingdom thereby ceased to be a mere idea and acquired true reality,
then it would no doubt gain the accession of a strong spring, but by
no means any increase of its intrinsic worth. For this sole absolute
lawgiver must, notwithstanding this, be always conceived as
estimating the worth of rational beings only by their disinterested
behaviour, as prescribed to themselves from that idea [the dignity
of man] alone. The essence of things is not altered by their
external relations, and that which abstracting from these, alone
constitutes the absolute worth of man, is also that by which he must
be judged, whoever the judge may be, and even by the Supreme Being.
MORALITY then is the relation of actions to the autonomy of the
will, that is, to the potential universal legislation by its maxims.
An action that is consistent with the autonomy of the will is
PERMITTED; one that does not agree therewith is FORBIDDEN. A will
whose maxims necessarily coincide with the laws of autonomy is a
HOLY will, good absolutely. The dependence of a will not absolutely
good on the principle of autonomy (moral necessitation) is
obligation. This then cannot be applied to a holy being. The
objective necessity of actions from obligation is called DUTY.

From what has just been said, it is easy to see how it happens that
although the conception of duty implies subjection to the law, we
yet ascribe a certain DIGNITY and sublimity to the person who
fulfills all his duties. There is not, indeed, any sublimity in him,
so far as he is subject to the moral law; but inasmuch as in regard
to that very law he is like-wise a legislator, and on that account
alone subject to it, he has sublimity. We have also shown above that
neither fear nor inclination, but simply respect for the law, is the
spring which can give actions a moral worth. Our own will, so far as
we suppose it to act only under the condition that its maxims are
potentially universal laws, this ideal will which is possible to us
is the proper object of respect, and the dignity of humanity
consists just in this capacity of being universally legislative,
though with the condition that it is itself subject to this same
legislation.

The Autonomy of the Will as the Supreme Principle of Morality

Autonomy of the will is that property of it by which it is a law to
itself (independently on any property of the objects of volition).
The principle of autonomy then is: Always so to choose that the same
volition shall comprehend the maxims of our choice as a universal
law. We cannot prove that this practical rule is an imperative,
i. e. , that the will of every rational being is necessarily bound to
it as a condition, by a mere analysis of the conceptions which occur
in it, since it is a synthetical proposition; we must advance beyond
the cognition of the objects to a critical examination of the
subject, that is of the pure practical reason, for this synthetic
proposition which commands apodictically must be capable of being
cognised wholly a priori. This matter, however, does not belong to
the present section. But that the principle of autonomy in question
is the sole principle of morals can be readily shown by mere
analysis of the conceptions of morality. For by this analysis we
find that its principle must be a categorical imperative, and that
what this commands is neither more nor less than this very autonomy.

Heteronomy of the Will as the Source of all spurious Principles of
Morality

If the will seeks the law which is to determine it anywhere else
than in the fitness of its maxims to be universal laws of its own
dictation, consequently if it goes out of itself and seeks this law
in the character of any of its objects, there always results
HETERONOMY. The will in that case does not give itself the law, but
it is given by the object through its relation to the will.