Kruger ( Vertueh einer
erperimentalen
Seelenlehre, 1766), J.
Windelband - History of Philosophy
Morley, .
/.
J.
R.
( Loud.
1873) ; R.
Fester, R.
und die deutsche Ueschichtsphilosophie (Stuttgart, 1MX» ; [E.
Caird, R.
in Essays, Vol.
I.
|.
The philosophical theory of the Revolution was developed chiefly by Charles Francois de St. -Lambert (1716-1803 ; Principes des Marurs chez toutes les Nations ou Catechisme Universel, 1798), Const. Fr. C'hassebreuf Comte de Volney (1767-1820; Les Ruines, 1791; La Loi Naturelle ou Principes Phy siques de la Morale, diduits de F Organisation de V Homme el de V Vnicers ou
Catfchisme du Citoyen Francois, 1793), Marie Jean Ant. Nic. de Condorcet ( 1743-1794 ; Esquisse <Tun Tableau Historique du l*rogres de V Esprit Humain, 1796), Dominique Garat (1749-1833; cf. Conte Rendu des Stance* des Ecoles Normales, IL 1-40). Cf. L. Ferraz, La Philosophic de la Revolution (l*aris, 1800).
Gottfried WUhelm Leibnis, the many-sided founder of German philosophy, was born, 1640, in Lei pule, studied there and at Jena, received his decree in Altorf, and was then, through his acquaintance with Boyneburg, drawn into the diplomatic service of the Elector of Mayence. In this service, pursuing political and scientific plans of his own, he travelled as a member of an embassy to Paris and London, with an incidental visit to Spinoza in The Hague, and then entered the service of the court of Hanover and Brunswick as librarian and court his torian. In all these positions he was active in his public and diplomatic capacity
in the Interests of the German national spirit and of peace between the Confes sions. Later he lived at the court of the first Prussian (Jueen Sophie Charlotte, a Hanoverian princess, in Charlottenberg and Berlin, where the Academy was founded under his direction ; afterwards he lived for some time iu Vienna, to
444 Philotophy of the Enlightenment. [Part V.
consult archives. Here be gave the stimulus for the foundation of an academy, a project which was later carried out, and the St. Petersburg Academy was also due to his influence. He died, 1716, at Hanover. The manifold nature of his activity, and the way in which his life was split up, is shown also in the fact that his scientific views are, for the most part, deposited only in fragmentary essays, and in an incredibly extensive correspondence. The best edition of his philo sophical writings is the most recent by C. J. Gerhardt, 7 vols. (Berlin, 1876-90;. The metaphysical treatises have been cited above (p. 382). For bis influence upon the philosophy of the Enlightenment, the following come chiefly into con sideration, aside from the correspondence with Bayle and Clarke: Esaai* dt Thiodicee sur la Bonti de Dieu, la Liberti dt l'Homme et I'Origint du Mnl (Amsterdam, 1710), and the Xouceaux Essais sur I'EnUndrmi-nt Humain. first published in 1765, by Raspe. Cf. G. E. Guhrauer, G. W. Frhr. r. L. (Breslau. 1842) ; E. Pfleiderer, L. alt Patriot, Staatsmann und Bildungstrager (Leips. 1870); art. L. in Erich und Gruber's Enc. , by W. Windelband ; L. Feuer- bacb, Darstellung, Enttcicklung und Kritik der L. 'schen Phil. (Ansbacb, 184-1) ; E. Xourisson, La Philosophic dt L. (Paris, 1860) ; L. Grote, L. und stint Zeit
J. T. Men, L. (Lond. 1884); [J. Dewey, Leibniz's -Veto Essays, Chicago, 1888; art. Leibniz in Enc. Brit. , by Sorley ; Eng. tr. of Imp. Phil. Wonts, by G. M. Duncan, New
(Hanover, 1869); O. Caspari, L. 's Philosophit (Leips. 1870) ;
Haven, 1890 ; of the Sew Essays, by A. G. Langley, Lond. and N. Y. 1893]. Among the most influential " Enlighteners " in Germany was Leibniz's con
temporary and fellow-countryman, Christian Thomasius (1655-1728; Einlei- tung zur Vernunftlehre, Ausfuhrung der Vernunftlehre, both in 1691 ; F. inl. znr Sittenlfhre, 1692 ; Ausfuhrung d. Sittenlehre, 1696 ; Fundamenla Juris Xatutvt et Gentium ex Sensu Communi Deducta, 1705 ; cf. A. Luden. C. Th. , Berlin, 1805).
The centre of scientific life in Germany during the eighteenth century was formed by the teaching and school of Christian Wolff. He was born, 1679. in Breslau, studied at Jena, was Privat-docent at Leipsic, and taught in Halle until he was driven away in 1723 at the instigation of his orthodox opponents ; he then became Professor at Marburg. In 1740 Frederick the Great called him back to Halle with great honour, and he was active there until bis death in 1754. He treated the entire compass of philosophy in Latin and German text books ; the latter all bear the title VernSnftige Gedanken [" Rational Thoughts," treating psychology, metaphysics, physics, physiology, botany, astronomy, ethics, politics, etc. ] ; in detail: von den Kraflen des menschlichen Verstander, 1712 ; von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch alien Dingen uber- haupt, 1719; von der Menschen Thunund Lassen, 1720; torn gesellnchafllichen Leben der Menschen, 1721 ; von den Wirkungen der Natur, 1723 ; von den Absichten der natiirlichen Dinge, 1724; von den Theilen der Menschen, Thiert und Pfianzen, 1725. The Latin works, Philosophia Rationalis sive Logica. 1718; Philosophia Piima sive Ontologia, 1728; Cosmologia, 1731; Psychnlo- gia Empirica, 1732 ; Rationalis, 1734 ; Theologia Xaturalis, 1736 ; Philosophia Practica Universalis, 1738 ; Jus Xaturm, 1740 ff. ; Jus Gentium, 1749 ; Philo sophia Moralis, posthumously pub. , 1756. — Cf. K. G. Ludovici, Ausfiihrlicher Entwurfeiner vollstandigen Historieder Wolf schen Philosophic (Leips. 1736 ff. ). Also W. L. G. v. Eberstein, Versuch einer Geschichte der Logik und Metaphysik bei den Deutschen von Leibniz an (Halle, 1799).
Among the Wolffians may be named, perhaps, G. B. Bilfiiiger (1693-1750, Dilucidationes Philosophies de Deo, Anima Humana, Mundo, etc. , 1725) ; M. Knutzen (died 1751 ; Systema Causarum Efficientium, 1746 ; cf. B. Erd- mann, M. Kn. und seine, Zeit. Leips. 1876) ; J. Chr. Oottsched (1700-1766; Erste Grunde der yesammten Weltweissheit, 1734) ; Alex. Baumgarten (1714- 1762; Metaphysica, 1739; ^Esthetica, 1750-58).
As representatives of the geometrical method appear M. G. Hansen (1683- 1762; Ars Inveniendi, 1727) and G. Ploucquet (1716-1790; cf. A. F. Bock, Summlung von Schriften, toelche dem logisrhen Calciil des Hernn P. bttreffen, Frankfort and Leips. 1766) ; as opponents of the same, Pierre Crouaas (1663- 1748; Logik, 1712 and 1724; Lehre vom Schiinen, 1712), Andreas Rudiger (1071-1731 ; De Sensu Vert el Falsi, 1709; Philosophia Synthetica, 1707) ami Chr. A. Croatua (1712-1775 ; Enttcurf der nothwendigen Vernunfticahrheiten,
1745 ; Wey zur Geioissheit und Zuverlassiykeit der menschlichen Erkenntnist,
1747. )
An eclectic intermediate position is taken by J. Fi\,Budde (1667-1729;.
Philosophy of the Enlightenment. 445
Institution** Pkilo*ophioz Eclectics, 1706) and by the historians of philosophy, J. J. Bracket and D. Tiodmann, and also by Joh. Lossius (Die physiehen Ursachen des Wahren, 1776) ami A. Platner (1744-1818; Philoiophische Aphorismen, 1776 and 1782).
Of more independent importance are J. H. Lambert (born, 1728. at Miil- hausen. died, 1777, in Berlin ; Kosmologische Britfe, 1761 ; Neue* Organon, 1764; Arehitektonik, 1771) and Nic. Tetena (17. 36M806; Philotophisehe Ver- ntrhe iiber die Mentchliche A'atur und ihre Entwicklung, 1776 f. ; cf. Fr. Harms,
Ueber die Ptycholoyie dee N. T, Berlin, 1887). Both stand in literary connec tion with Kant (cf. l'art VI. ch. 1), whose pre-critical writings belong like wise in this setting ; these are principally Allgemeine Saturgetehiehte und
Theorir de* Himmel*, 1766 ; Principiorum Primortim Cognitioni* Melaphysicoz Xora Dilueidatio, 1765 ; Mohndologia Phytiea, 1756 ; Die falsehe Spitzfindig- keit der virr syllogistischen Figvren, 1762 ; Der einzig mogliche, Beieeitgrund zu einer Demonstration det Daseins Oottes, 1763 ; Versiteh. den Begriff der nega- tiren Griissen in die Welticeisheit einzufuhren, 1763 ; Ueber die Deutlichkeit der Grundsatze der naturliehen Theologie und Moral, 1764 ; Beobaehtungen iiber
da* fiefnhl de* Schtinen und Erhabenen, 1764 ; TrSume eine* Geistersehere, ertnutert durch TrSume der Metaphysik, 1766; De Mundi Sensibilis atque iHtelligibili* Forma et Principiis, 1770. CI. R. Zimmerman, Lambert der Vor- gUnger Kant'*, 1879. [On Lambert and Tetens, cf. A. Riehl, Der philoso- phiM-he Kritirirmut, Leips. 1876. For the pre-critical writings of Kant, K. Caird, The Critical Philonophy of Immanuel Kant, Glasgow, Lond. , and N. Y. 1889. Fischer's Kant; Cohen, Die *y*temati*chen Begriffe in Kant'* vorkrit- iachen Sehriften, and the works cited in first par. , p. 636. ]
Deism found a vigorous and instnictive support in Germany anions numer ous Wolffian*, though nothing new in principle was added. Characteristic of this was the translation of the Bible by Lorens Schmidt. The standpoint of historical criticism of the biblical writings was maintained by Salomon Semler
The sharpest consequences of the deistic criticism were drawn hy Samuel Reimarua (1699-1768; Abhamllungen eon den vornehmsten M'ahr- kriten der nnOirlirhen Religion, 1754 ; Brtrachtitng iiber die Triebe der Thiere, 1760, especially his Sehutzerhrift fur die verniinftigen Verehrrr (fotte*, 1767 [not pub. ], from which Leasing' edited the " Wolfenbiittler Fragmente," and, wi more recent time, Dav. Fr. Strauss edited an extract, Leipe. 1862). Joh. Chr. Rdelmann was a Spinozistic free-thinker (1698-1767). Cf. K. Monckeberg, Ilrimaru* und Edelmann (Hamburg, 1867).
The movement of the so-called Pietism, allied to Mysticism, which was begun by Spener (1635-1706), and carried forward with organising energy by Aug. Herm. Francke (1663-1727), had only an indirect influence upon phil osophy during this period ; at a still farther distance stand the more isolated members of mystic sect* such as Gottfried Arnold (1666-1714) and Conrad
IMppel (1673-1734).
Eaxtpixical psychology was represented among the Germans in the eigh
teenth century by numerous names, comprehensive collections, text-books, and •pecial investigations. There are C'asimir von Creuz (1724-1770), Joh. Gottl.
Kruger ( Vertueh einer erperimentalen Seelenlehre, 1766), J. J. Hentsch ( Ver- eweit fiber die Folge der Veranderung der Seele, 1726), J. Fr. Weiss (De Satura Animi et Poti**imum Cordis Humani, 1761), Fr. v. Irwing (Erfahrungen mnd UnUrturhuwjen liber den Mentrhen, 1777 ff. ) et of. The " Magazin zur ErfnhrungiwerlrnUhrr," edited by Morlts (1785-1793), formed a place for col lating contributions to this favourite science. Further literature in K. Fortlage, Syttem der ftyehologie, I. 42 f.
A theory of art upon the basis of empirical psychology is found in Baum- garten's pupil, O. K'r. Meier (1718-1777), and especially in Joh. Georg Bal sas (1720-1779; Theorie der angenehmen Empfindungen, 17(li ; Ycrmitthte
Srhriften, 1773 ff. ; Allgemeine Theorie der trhSnen Kiinnte, 1771-1774, s
lexicon of aesthetics).
<>f the Popular Philoaophera may be mentioned Mom's Mendelssohn
<1720-1786; Briefe iiber die Empjlndungen, 1765; Ueber die Eridens in den i/etaphyiisrnen Winsenthaften, 1764; Pha-don, 1767; M<>rgen*lunden, 1785; Werke, ed. by Branch, Leips. 1881). the bnok-dcale* Fr. Nlcolai (17X1-1811), who published successively the Bibliothek der wrhi'men H'itsentcnaften, the
(1726-1791).
446 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Question*. [Part V.
Briefe die neueste deutsche Literatur betreffend, the Allgtmeine deutsche Biblio- thek, and the Neue Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek; further J. Aug. Eberhaxd (1738-1809), Joh. Bernh. Basedow (1723-1790), Thomas Abbt (1738-1766), Joh. Jac. Engel (1741-1802; editor of the Philosoph fur die Welt), J. J. H. Feder (1740-1821), Chr. Meiners (1747-1810), Chr. Oarve (1742-1798).
A highly interesting position personally is occupied by Frederick the Great the Philosopher of Sanssouci. On him, cf. Ed. Zeller, Fr. d. Gr. als. Philosoph (Berlin, 1886).
Of Lessing's writings those of chief importance for the history of philosophy are the Hamburger Dramaturgie, the Erziehung des menschen Geschlechts. the Wolfenbiittler Fragmenle, and the theological controversial writings. Cf. Rob. Zimmerman, Leibniz und Leasing (Studien und Kritiken, I. 126 ff. ) ; E. Zirngiebl, Der . 1acobi- Mendelssohn' sche Streit fiber Lessing's Spinozismus
(Munich, 1861) ; C. Hebler, Leasing- Studien (Bern, 1862) ; W. Dilthey {Prevss. Jahrb. 1879). [Eng. tr. of the Ham. Dram, and Education of Human Race in Bohn Lib. ; of Laoccoon, by Phillimorc, Loud. 1875 ; cf. Sime, Lessing, Lond.
1873, 1879. ]
Among Herder's writings belong in this period, Ueber den Ursprung der
Sprache, 1772 ; Auch eine Philosophic der Geschichte der Menschheit, 1774 ; Vom Erkennen und Empftnden der menschlichen Seele, 1778 ; Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, 1784 ff. [Eng. tr. , Lond. 1800]; Gott, Gesprdche fiber Spinoza's System, 1787 ; Briefe zur Beforderung der Humanitat, 1793 ff. (on his later philosophical literary activity, cf. below, Part
VI. ch. 2). Cf. R. Haym, H. nach seinem Leben und seineh Werken (Berlin, 1877-85) ; E. Melzer, H. ate Geschichtsphilosoph (Neisse, 1872) ; M. Kronen- berg, H. 's Philosophie (Heidi. 1889) [art. Herder in Enc. Brit, by J. Sully].
Cf. also J. Witte, Die Philosophie unserer Dichterheroen (Bonn, 1880).
CHAPTER I.
THE THEORETICAL
QUESTIONS.
"The proper study of mankind is man. " This word of Pope's is characteristic of the whole philosophy of the Enlightenment, not only in the practical sense that this philosophy finds the ultimate end of all scientific investigation to be always man's "happiness," but also, in the theoretical point of view, in so far as this philosophy, as a whole, aims to base all knowledge upon the observation of the actual processes of the psychical life. After Locke had set up the principle,1 that prior to all metaphysical considerations and contro versies the general question must be decided of how far human insight reaches, and that this in turn is possible only by exact exhi bition of the sources from which knowledge derives, and of the course of development by which it is brought about, — from that time epistemology, the theory of knowledge, was brought into the
front rank of philosophical interests, and at the same time empirical psychology was recognised as the authoritative and decisive court of last resort for epistemology. The legitimate reach of human ideas
should be judged by the way in which they arise. Thus experiential psychology with all the tacit assumptions which are customary in it becomes at once the basis of the whole philosophical view of the world, and the favourite science of the age, and is at the same time the instrument of mediation between science and general literature. As in this latter field, the predominant characteristic among both Englishmen and Germans was that of depicting minds and reflect ing or viewing one's self in the literary looking-glass, so philosophy should draw only the image of man and of the activities of his con sciousness. Societies for the " observation of man " were founded, all sorts of dilettante accounts of remarkable experiences were gar nered in large "magazines," and the government of the French Republic in its official system of instruction,1 replaced "philoso phy " by the sounding title, "Analyse de l'entendeinent humain. "
1 Introduction to the Essay. CI. M. Drobisch, Locke, Der Vorlaufer Kant's (ZeiUehr. f. exaete Philosophic, 1861).
; Cl. the highly summing Stances de* f! coles Normal, first year. 447
448 Tlie Enlightenment: Theoretical Question*. [Part V
While accordingly among the theoretical questions of the Enlight enment philosophy, those as to the origin, development, and know ing power of human ideas stood uppermost, these were from the beginning placed beneath the presupposition of popular metaphysics, viz. that of notice realism. There, " without," is a world of things, of bodies or of who knows what else, — and here is a mind which is to know them. How do the ideas, which reproduce within the mind that world of things, get into it ? This way of stating the problem of knowledge, which is like that of the ancient Greeks, controls the theoretical philosophy of the eighteenth century completely, and attains in it both most perfect formulation and decisive disintegra tion. Just in this respect the Cartesian metaphysics with its dualism of conscious and corporeal substances takes a controlling position through the entire age of the Enlightenment, and the popular empirical mode of expression in which it was presented by Locke, made this author the leader of the new movement. The methodical and metaphysical considerations which had reached a great develop ment, and one full of character in Descartes' important disciples, were now translated into the language of empirical psychology, and so arranged for the comprehension of the ordinary mind.
In connection with this, however, the terminism which was in herent in all modern philosophy, and which had been fostered especially in England (Hobbes), forced its way victoriously to the surface ; the qualitative " separation of the content and forms of consciousness from the outer world," to which alone they were nevertheless held to relate, was carried farther and deeper, step by step, until it at last reached its extreme consequence in Humes positivism. To the scientific dissolution which metaphysics thus experienced, corresponded in turn a popularly practical and preten tiously modest turning away from all speculation of more than ordinary refinement, or an all the more express profession of adherence to the truths of sound common sense.
Whatever metaphysical interest remained vigorous in the En lightenment literature attached itself to the religious consciousness and to those endeavours which hoped to attain out of the strife of religious Confessions to a universal and rational conviction. In the deism which extended over Europe from the English free-thinking movement, the positive views of the world and of life of the En lightenment period became concentrated, and while these convic tions at the outset developed out of the connection with the natural science metaphysics of the preceding century, and in consequence of this devoted an especially lively interest to the problems of teleology, they became shifted with time more and more from the
Chap. 1, § 33. ] Innate Ideat: Cambridge Platonists. 449
metaphysical to the moral, from the theoretical to the practical domain.
§ 33. Innate Ideas.
With regard to the question as to the origin of ideas the philoso phy of the Enlightenment found already in the field the sharply pronounced antithesis of Sensualism and nationalism.
1. The first of these had been defended by Hobbes on the theo retical as also upon the practical domain, inasmuch as he held man, in so far as he is an object of scientific knowledge, to be an entirely sensuous being, bound to the sensations and impulses of the body. All ideas, in his view, have their origin in the activity of the senses, and the mechanism of association was held to explain the arising of all other psychical structures from these beginnings. Such doctrines seemed to bring in question the super-sensuous dignity of man, and
that not only in the eyes of the orthodox opponents of Hobbes ; the same motive determined the Neo-Platonists also to lively opposi tion. Cudworth especially had distinguished himself in this respect ; in his combating of atheism ' he had Hobbes in mind as one of his main opponents, and in opposition to the doctrine that all human ideas arise from the operation of the outer world upon the mind, he appeals especially to mathematical conceptions. The corporeal phenomena never completely correspond to these ; the most we can say is that they resemble them. 1 In treating the conception of God, on the other hand, he lays claim to the argument of the consensus gentium, and carries it out* in most extensive manner to show that this idea is innate. In like manner, Herbert of Cherbury had already grounded all the main doctrines of natural religion and morals by the aid of the Stoic and Ciceronian doctrine of the communes notitioz.
The doctrine of innate ideas was conceived in a somewhat differ ent sense by Descartes * and his disciples. Here the psychological question as to the origin of ideas was less in mind, although this question, too, at a decisive passage in the Meditations (Med. III. ) received the answer that the innateness of the idea of God was to be conceived of as a sign which the creator had imprinted upon his creature; but on the whole the great metaphysician had laid more weight upon the point that the criterion of innateness consists in immediate evidence or certainty. Hence he had finally extended the designation (almost stripped of the psychological meaning be
1 In the Sytrmn ItUetlertuale, especially at the close, V. 6, 28 tt.
*Il>. V. 1, 108 (I. (p. H0. 1 B. M<wh. ).
' The whole fourth chapter la devoted to this task.
* Cf. B. Grimm, Descartes' Lehre rondtn angtbortnen Idttn, Jena, 1873.
450 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Questions. [Part V.
longing to it at the outset) of the Latin idea innatoe to all that lumine naturali dare et distincte percipitur. Direct assent had been adduced by Herbert of Cherbury also as the characteristic mark of innate ideas. 1
2. Locke's polemical attitude toward the maintenance of innate ideas has, indeed, an epistemological purpose, but is really deter mined only by the psycho-genetic point of view. He asks primarily only whether the soul at its birth brings complete knowledge into the world with and finds this question deserving of negative answer. 2 In consequence of this the development of the thesis "No innate principles in the mind" in the first book of Locke's Essay directed less against Descartes than against the English Neo-Platonists. s It combats first of all the consensus gentium, by an appeal to the experience of the nursery and of ethnology finds that neither theoretical nor practical principles are universally known or acknowledged. Nor does except from this demonstra tion (with an express turn against Herbert) even the idea of God, since this not only very different among different men, but is even entirely lacking with some. Nor does Locke allow the evasion
suggested by Henry More,4 that innate ideas might be contained in the soul not actually, but implicitly this could only mean, accord ing to Locke, that the soul capable of forming and approving them, — mark which would then hold for all ideas. The imme diate assent, finally, which was held to characterise that which innate, does not apply in the case of the most general abstract truths, just where wanted and where this immediate assent
found rests upon the fact that the meaning of the words and of their connection has been already apprehended at an earlier time. *
Thus the soul again stripped of all its original possessions at birth like an unwritten sheet (cf. p. 203), — white paper void of all characters. 6 In order to prove this positively, Locke then pledges himself to show that all our "ideas "'arise from experience Here he distinguishes simple and complex ideas in the assumption that the latter arise out of the former for the simple ideas, how-
De Veritate (1656), p. 76.
In which, moreover, Descartes completely agreed with him, for was Des cartes' opinion also that was not to be assumed that the mind of the child pursues metaphysics in its mother's womb. Op. (C. ) VIII. 269.
Cf. (and also for the following) G. Geil, Die Abhangigkeit Locke's von Descartes (Strassburg, 1887).
H. More, Antidot. adv. Ath. and and Locke, 22. Cf. Geil, op.
cit. , p. 49.
Locke, " 23 " The term idea
lb. II.
had lost its Platonic sense already in later Scholasticism
and taken on the more general meaning of any mental modification whatever Vorstellung).
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Chap. 1, § 33. ] Innate Idea* : Locke. 451
ever, he announces two different sources : sensation and rejtection, outer and inner perception. Under sensation he understands the ideas of the corporeal world, brought about by the medium of the bodily senses ; under reflection, on the other hand, the knowledge of the activities of the soul itself called out by the above process. Psycho-genetically, therefore, these two kinds of perception are so related that sensation is the occasion and the presupposition for reflection, — as regards their matter or content the relation is, that all content of ideas arises from sensation, while reflection, on the contrary, contains the consciousness of the functions performed in connection with this content.
3.
The philosophical theory of the Revolution was developed chiefly by Charles Francois de St. -Lambert (1716-1803 ; Principes des Marurs chez toutes les Nations ou Catechisme Universel, 1798), Const. Fr. C'hassebreuf Comte de Volney (1767-1820; Les Ruines, 1791; La Loi Naturelle ou Principes Phy siques de la Morale, diduits de F Organisation de V Homme el de V Vnicers ou
Catfchisme du Citoyen Francois, 1793), Marie Jean Ant. Nic. de Condorcet ( 1743-1794 ; Esquisse <Tun Tableau Historique du l*rogres de V Esprit Humain, 1796), Dominique Garat (1749-1833; cf. Conte Rendu des Stance* des Ecoles Normales, IL 1-40). Cf. L. Ferraz, La Philosophic de la Revolution (l*aris, 1800).
Gottfried WUhelm Leibnis, the many-sided founder of German philosophy, was born, 1640, in Lei pule, studied there and at Jena, received his decree in Altorf, and was then, through his acquaintance with Boyneburg, drawn into the diplomatic service of the Elector of Mayence. In this service, pursuing political and scientific plans of his own, he travelled as a member of an embassy to Paris and London, with an incidental visit to Spinoza in The Hague, and then entered the service of the court of Hanover and Brunswick as librarian and court his torian. In all these positions he was active in his public and diplomatic capacity
in the Interests of the German national spirit and of peace between the Confes sions. Later he lived at the court of the first Prussian (Jueen Sophie Charlotte, a Hanoverian princess, in Charlottenberg and Berlin, where the Academy was founded under his direction ; afterwards he lived for some time iu Vienna, to
444 Philotophy of the Enlightenment. [Part V.
consult archives. Here be gave the stimulus for the foundation of an academy, a project which was later carried out, and the St. Petersburg Academy was also due to his influence. He died, 1716, at Hanover. The manifold nature of his activity, and the way in which his life was split up, is shown also in the fact that his scientific views are, for the most part, deposited only in fragmentary essays, and in an incredibly extensive correspondence. The best edition of his philo sophical writings is the most recent by C. J. Gerhardt, 7 vols. (Berlin, 1876-90;. The metaphysical treatises have been cited above (p. 382). For bis influence upon the philosophy of the Enlightenment, the following come chiefly into con sideration, aside from the correspondence with Bayle and Clarke: Esaai* dt Thiodicee sur la Bonti de Dieu, la Liberti dt l'Homme et I'Origint du Mnl (Amsterdam, 1710), and the Xouceaux Essais sur I'EnUndrmi-nt Humain. first published in 1765, by Raspe. Cf. G. E. Guhrauer, G. W. Frhr. r. L. (Breslau. 1842) ; E. Pfleiderer, L. alt Patriot, Staatsmann und Bildungstrager (Leips. 1870); art. L. in Erich und Gruber's Enc. , by W. Windelband ; L. Feuer- bacb, Darstellung, Enttcicklung und Kritik der L. 'schen Phil. (Ansbacb, 184-1) ; E. Xourisson, La Philosophic dt L. (Paris, 1860) ; L. Grote, L. und stint Zeit
J. T. Men, L. (Lond. 1884); [J. Dewey, Leibniz's -Veto Essays, Chicago, 1888; art. Leibniz in Enc. Brit. , by Sorley ; Eng. tr. of Imp. Phil. Wonts, by G. M. Duncan, New
(Hanover, 1869); O. Caspari, L. 's Philosophit (Leips. 1870) ;
Haven, 1890 ; of the Sew Essays, by A. G. Langley, Lond. and N. Y. 1893]. Among the most influential " Enlighteners " in Germany was Leibniz's con
temporary and fellow-countryman, Christian Thomasius (1655-1728; Einlei- tung zur Vernunftlehre, Ausfuhrung der Vernunftlehre, both in 1691 ; F. inl. znr Sittenlfhre, 1692 ; Ausfuhrung d. Sittenlehre, 1696 ; Fundamenla Juris Xatutvt et Gentium ex Sensu Communi Deducta, 1705 ; cf. A. Luden. C. Th. , Berlin, 1805).
The centre of scientific life in Germany during the eighteenth century was formed by the teaching and school of Christian Wolff. He was born, 1679. in Breslau, studied at Jena, was Privat-docent at Leipsic, and taught in Halle until he was driven away in 1723 at the instigation of his orthodox opponents ; he then became Professor at Marburg. In 1740 Frederick the Great called him back to Halle with great honour, and he was active there until bis death in 1754. He treated the entire compass of philosophy in Latin and German text books ; the latter all bear the title VernSnftige Gedanken [" Rational Thoughts," treating psychology, metaphysics, physics, physiology, botany, astronomy, ethics, politics, etc. ] ; in detail: von den Kraflen des menschlichen Verstander, 1712 ; von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch alien Dingen uber- haupt, 1719; von der Menschen Thunund Lassen, 1720; torn gesellnchafllichen Leben der Menschen, 1721 ; von den Wirkungen der Natur, 1723 ; von den Absichten der natiirlichen Dinge, 1724; von den Theilen der Menschen, Thiert und Pfianzen, 1725. The Latin works, Philosophia Rationalis sive Logica. 1718; Philosophia Piima sive Ontologia, 1728; Cosmologia, 1731; Psychnlo- gia Empirica, 1732 ; Rationalis, 1734 ; Theologia Xaturalis, 1736 ; Philosophia Practica Universalis, 1738 ; Jus Xaturm, 1740 ff. ; Jus Gentium, 1749 ; Philo sophia Moralis, posthumously pub. , 1756. — Cf. K. G. Ludovici, Ausfiihrlicher Entwurfeiner vollstandigen Historieder Wolf schen Philosophic (Leips. 1736 ff. ). Also W. L. G. v. Eberstein, Versuch einer Geschichte der Logik und Metaphysik bei den Deutschen von Leibniz an (Halle, 1799).
Among the Wolffians may be named, perhaps, G. B. Bilfiiiger (1693-1750, Dilucidationes Philosophies de Deo, Anima Humana, Mundo, etc. , 1725) ; M. Knutzen (died 1751 ; Systema Causarum Efficientium, 1746 ; cf. B. Erd- mann, M. Kn. und seine, Zeit. Leips. 1876) ; J. Chr. Oottsched (1700-1766; Erste Grunde der yesammten Weltweissheit, 1734) ; Alex. Baumgarten (1714- 1762; Metaphysica, 1739; ^Esthetica, 1750-58).
As representatives of the geometrical method appear M. G. Hansen (1683- 1762; Ars Inveniendi, 1727) and G. Ploucquet (1716-1790; cf. A. F. Bock, Summlung von Schriften, toelche dem logisrhen Calciil des Hernn P. bttreffen, Frankfort and Leips. 1766) ; as opponents of the same, Pierre Crouaas (1663- 1748; Logik, 1712 and 1724; Lehre vom Schiinen, 1712), Andreas Rudiger (1071-1731 ; De Sensu Vert el Falsi, 1709; Philosophia Synthetica, 1707) ami Chr. A. Croatua (1712-1775 ; Enttcurf der nothwendigen Vernunfticahrheiten,
1745 ; Wey zur Geioissheit und Zuverlassiykeit der menschlichen Erkenntnist,
1747. )
An eclectic intermediate position is taken by J. Fi\,Budde (1667-1729;.
Philosophy of the Enlightenment. 445
Institution** Pkilo*ophioz Eclectics, 1706) and by the historians of philosophy, J. J. Bracket and D. Tiodmann, and also by Joh. Lossius (Die physiehen Ursachen des Wahren, 1776) ami A. Platner (1744-1818; Philoiophische Aphorismen, 1776 and 1782).
Of more independent importance are J. H. Lambert (born, 1728. at Miil- hausen. died, 1777, in Berlin ; Kosmologische Britfe, 1761 ; Neue* Organon, 1764; Arehitektonik, 1771) and Nic. Tetena (17. 36M806; Philotophisehe Ver- ntrhe iiber die Mentchliche A'atur und ihre Entwicklung, 1776 f. ; cf. Fr. Harms,
Ueber die Ptycholoyie dee N. T, Berlin, 1887). Both stand in literary connec tion with Kant (cf. l'art VI. ch. 1), whose pre-critical writings belong like wise in this setting ; these are principally Allgemeine Saturgetehiehte und
Theorir de* Himmel*, 1766 ; Principiorum Primortim Cognitioni* Melaphysicoz Xora Dilueidatio, 1765 ; Mohndologia Phytiea, 1756 ; Die falsehe Spitzfindig- keit der virr syllogistischen Figvren, 1762 ; Der einzig mogliche, Beieeitgrund zu einer Demonstration det Daseins Oottes, 1763 ; Versiteh. den Begriff der nega- tiren Griissen in die Welticeisheit einzufuhren, 1763 ; Ueber die Deutlichkeit der Grundsatze der naturliehen Theologie und Moral, 1764 ; Beobaehtungen iiber
da* fiefnhl de* Schtinen und Erhabenen, 1764 ; TrSume eine* Geistersehere, ertnutert durch TrSume der Metaphysik, 1766; De Mundi Sensibilis atque iHtelligibili* Forma et Principiis, 1770. CI. R. Zimmerman, Lambert der Vor- gUnger Kant'*, 1879. [On Lambert and Tetens, cf. A. Riehl, Der philoso- phiM-he Kritirirmut, Leips. 1876. For the pre-critical writings of Kant, K. Caird, The Critical Philonophy of Immanuel Kant, Glasgow, Lond. , and N. Y. 1889. Fischer's Kant; Cohen, Die *y*temati*chen Begriffe in Kant'* vorkrit- iachen Sehriften, and the works cited in first par. , p. 636. ]
Deism found a vigorous and instnictive support in Germany anions numer ous Wolffian*, though nothing new in principle was added. Characteristic of this was the translation of the Bible by Lorens Schmidt. The standpoint of historical criticism of the biblical writings was maintained by Salomon Semler
The sharpest consequences of the deistic criticism were drawn hy Samuel Reimarua (1699-1768; Abhamllungen eon den vornehmsten M'ahr- kriten der nnOirlirhen Religion, 1754 ; Brtrachtitng iiber die Triebe der Thiere, 1760, especially his Sehutzerhrift fur die verniinftigen Verehrrr (fotte*, 1767 [not pub. ], from which Leasing' edited the " Wolfenbiittler Fragmente," and, wi more recent time, Dav. Fr. Strauss edited an extract, Leipe. 1862). Joh. Chr. Rdelmann was a Spinozistic free-thinker (1698-1767). Cf. K. Monckeberg, Ilrimaru* und Edelmann (Hamburg, 1867).
The movement of the so-called Pietism, allied to Mysticism, which was begun by Spener (1635-1706), and carried forward with organising energy by Aug. Herm. Francke (1663-1727), had only an indirect influence upon phil osophy during this period ; at a still farther distance stand the more isolated members of mystic sect* such as Gottfried Arnold (1666-1714) and Conrad
IMppel (1673-1734).
Eaxtpixical psychology was represented among the Germans in the eigh
teenth century by numerous names, comprehensive collections, text-books, and •pecial investigations. There are C'asimir von Creuz (1724-1770), Joh. Gottl.
Kruger ( Vertueh einer erperimentalen Seelenlehre, 1766), J. J. Hentsch ( Ver- eweit fiber die Folge der Veranderung der Seele, 1726), J. Fr. Weiss (De Satura Animi et Poti**imum Cordis Humani, 1761), Fr. v. Irwing (Erfahrungen mnd UnUrturhuwjen liber den Mentrhen, 1777 ff. ) et of. The " Magazin zur ErfnhrungiwerlrnUhrr," edited by Morlts (1785-1793), formed a place for col lating contributions to this favourite science. Further literature in K. Fortlage, Syttem der ftyehologie, I. 42 f.
A theory of art upon the basis of empirical psychology is found in Baum- garten's pupil, O. K'r. Meier (1718-1777), and especially in Joh. Georg Bal sas (1720-1779; Theorie der angenehmen Empfindungen, 17(li ; Ycrmitthte
Srhriften, 1773 ff. ; Allgemeine Theorie der trhSnen Kiinnte, 1771-1774, s
lexicon of aesthetics).
<>f the Popular Philoaophera may be mentioned Mom's Mendelssohn
<1720-1786; Briefe iiber die Empjlndungen, 1765; Ueber die Eridens in den i/etaphyiisrnen Winsenthaften, 1764; Pha-don, 1767; M<>rgen*lunden, 1785; Werke, ed. by Branch, Leips. 1881). the bnok-dcale* Fr. Nlcolai (17X1-1811), who published successively the Bibliothek der wrhi'men H'itsentcnaften, the
(1726-1791).
446 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Question*. [Part V.
Briefe die neueste deutsche Literatur betreffend, the Allgtmeine deutsche Biblio- thek, and the Neue Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek; further J. Aug. Eberhaxd (1738-1809), Joh. Bernh. Basedow (1723-1790), Thomas Abbt (1738-1766), Joh. Jac. Engel (1741-1802; editor of the Philosoph fur die Welt), J. J. H. Feder (1740-1821), Chr. Meiners (1747-1810), Chr. Oarve (1742-1798).
A highly interesting position personally is occupied by Frederick the Great the Philosopher of Sanssouci. On him, cf. Ed. Zeller, Fr. d. Gr. als. Philosoph (Berlin, 1886).
Of Lessing's writings those of chief importance for the history of philosophy are the Hamburger Dramaturgie, the Erziehung des menschen Geschlechts. the Wolfenbiittler Fragmenle, and the theological controversial writings. Cf. Rob. Zimmerman, Leibniz und Leasing (Studien und Kritiken, I. 126 ff. ) ; E. Zirngiebl, Der . 1acobi- Mendelssohn' sche Streit fiber Lessing's Spinozismus
(Munich, 1861) ; C. Hebler, Leasing- Studien (Bern, 1862) ; W. Dilthey {Prevss. Jahrb. 1879). [Eng. tr. of the Ham. Dram, and Education of Human Race in Bohn Lib. ; of Laoccoon, by Phillimorc, Loud. 1875 ; cf. Sime, Lessing, Lond.
1873, 1879. ]
Among Herder's writings belong in this period, Ueber den Ursprung der
Sprache, 1772 ; Auch eine Philosophic der Geschichte der Menschheit, 1774 ; Vom Erkennen und Empftnden der menschlichen Seele, 1778 ; Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, 1784 ff. [Eng. tr. , Lond. 1800]; Gott, Gesprdche fiber Spinoza's System, 1787 ; Briefe zur Beforderung der Humanitat, 1793 ff. (on his later philosophical literary activity, cf. below, Part
VI. ch. 2). Cf. R. Haym, H. nach seinem Leben und seineh Werken (Berlin, 1877-85) ; E. Melzer, H. ate Geschichtsphilosoph (Neisse, 1872) ; M. Kronen- berg, H. 's Philosophie (Heidi. 1889) [art. Herder in Enc. Brit, by J. Sully].
Cf. also J. Witte, Die Philosophie unserer Dichterheroen (Bonn, 1880).
CHAPTER I.
THE THEORETICAL
QUESTIONS.
"The proper study of mankind is man. " This word of Pope's is characteristic of the whole philosophy of the Enlightenment, not only in the practical sense that this philosophy finds the ultimate end of all scientific investigation to be always man's "happiness," but also, in the theoretical point of view, in so far as this philosophy, as a whole, aims to base all knowledge upon the observation of the actual processes of the psychical life. After Locke had set up the principle,1 that prior to all metaphysical considerations and contro versies the general question must be decided of how far human insight reaches, and that this in turn is possible only by exact exhi bition of the sources from which knowledge derives, and of the course of development by which it is brought about, — from that time epistemology, the theory of knowledge, was brought into the
front rank of philosophical interests, and at the same time empirical psychology was recognised as the authoritative and decisive court of last resort for epistemology. The legitimate reach of human ideas
should be judged by the way in which they arise. Thus experiential psychology with all the tacit assumptions which are customary in it becomes at once the basis of the whole philosophical view of the world, and the favourite science of the age, and is at the same time the instrument of mediation between science and general literature. As in this latter field, the predominant characteristic among both Englishmen and Germans was that of depicting minds and reflect ing or viewing one's self in the literary looking-glass, so philosophy should draw only the image of man and of the activities of his con sciousness. Societies for the " observation of man " were founded, all sorts of dilettante accounts of remarkable experiences were gar nered in large "magazines," and the government of the French Republic in its official system of instruction,1 replaced "philoso phy " by the sounding title, "Analyse de l'entendeinent humain. "
1 Introduction to the Essay. CI. M. Drobisch, Locke, Der Vorlaufer Kant's (ZeiUehr. f. exaete Philosophic, 1861).
; Cl. the highly summing Stances de* f! coles Normal, first year. 447
448 Tlie Enlightenment: Theoretical Question*. [Part V
While accordingly among the theoretical questions of the Enlight enment philosophy, those as to the origin, development, and know ing power of human ideas stood uppermost, these were from the beginning placed beneath the presupposition of popular metaphysics, viz. that of notice realism. There, " without," is a world of things, of bodies or of who knows what else, — and here is a mind which is to know them. How do the ideas, which reproduce within the mind that world of things, get into it ? This way of stating the problem of knowledge, which is like that of the ancient Greeks, controls the theoretical philosophy of the eighteenth century completely, and attains in it both most perfect formulation and decisive disintegra tion. Just in this respect the Cartesian metaphysics with its dualism of conscious and corporeal substances takes a controlling position through the entire age of the Enlightenment, and the popular empirical mode of expression in which it was presented by Locke, made this author the leader of the new movement. The methodical and metaphysical considerations which had reached a great develop ment, and one full of character in Descartes' important disciples, were now translated into the language of empirical psychology, and so arranged for the comprehension of the ordinary mind.
In connection with this, however, the terminism which was in herent in all modern philosophy, and which had been fostered especially in England (Hobbes), forced its way victoriously to the surface ; the qualitative " separation of the content and forms of consciousness from the outer world," to which alone they were nevertheless held to relate, was carried farther and deeper, step by step, until it at last reached its extreme consequence in Humes positivism. To the scientific dissolution which metaphysics thus experienced, corresponded in turn a popularly practical and preten tiously modest turning away from all speculation of more than ordinary refinement, or an all the more express profession of adherence to the truths of sound common sense.
Whatever metaphysical interest remained vigorous in the En lightenment literature attached itself to the religious consciousness and to those endeavours which hoped to attain out of the strife of religious Confessions to a universal and rational conviction. In the deism which extended over Europe from the English free-thinking movement, the positive views of the world and of life of the En lightenment period became concentrated, and while these convic tions at the outset developed out of the connection with the natural science metaphysics of the preceding century, and in consequence of this devoted an especially lively interest to the problems of teleology, they became shifted with time more and more from the
Chap. 1, § 33. ] Innate Ideat: Cambridge Platonists. 449
metaphysical to the moral, from the theoretical to the practical domain.
§ 33. Innate Ideas.
With regard to the question as to the origin of ideas the philoso phy of the Enlightenment found already in the field the sharply pronounced antithesis of Sensualism and nationalism.
1. The first of these had been defended by Hobbes on the theo retical as also upon the practical domain, inasmuch as he held man, in so far as he is an object of scientific knowledge, to be an entirely sensuous being, bound to the sensations and impulses of the body. All ideas, in his view, have their origin in the activity of the senses, and the mechanism of association was held to explain the arising of all other psychical structures from these beginnings. Such doctrines seemed to bring in question the super-sensuous dignity of man, and
that not only in the eyes of the orthodox opponents of Hobbes ; the same motive determined the Neo-Platonists also to lively opposi tion. Cudworth especially had distinguished himself in this respect ; in his combating of atheism ' he had Hobbes in mind as one of his main opponents, and in opposition to the doctrine that all human ideas arise from the operation of the outer world upon the mind, he appeals especially to mathematical conceptions. The corporeal phenomena never completely correspond to these ; the most we can say is that they resemble them. 1 In treating the conception of God, on the other hand, he lays claim to the argument of the consensus gentium, and carries it out* in most extensive manner to show that this idea is innate. In like manner, Herbert of Cherbury had already grounded all the main doctrines of natural religion and morals by the aid of the Stoic and Ciceronian doctrine of the communes notitioz.
The doctrine of innate ideas was conceived in a somewhat differ ent sense by Descartes * and his disciples. Here the psychological question as to the origin of ideas was less in mind, although this question, too, at a decisive passage in the Meditations (Med. III. ) received the answer that the innateness of the idea of God was to be conceived of as a sign which the creator had imprinted upon his creature; but on the whole the great metaphysician had laid more weight upon the point that the criterion of innateness consists in immediate evidence or certainty. Hence he had finally extended the designation (almost stripped of the psychological meaning be
1 In the Sytrmn ItUetlertuale, especially at the close, V. 6, 28 tt.
*Il>. V. 1, 108 (I. (p. H0. 1 B. M<wh. ).
' The whole fourth chapter la devoted to this task.
* Cf. B. Grimm, Descartes' Lehre rondtn angtbortnen Idttn, Jena, 1873.
450 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Questions. [Part V.
longing to it at the outset) of the Latin idea innatoe to all that lumine naturali dare et distincte percipitur. Direct assent had been adduced by Herbert of Cherbury also as the characteristic mark of innate ideas. 1
2. Locke's polemical attitude toward the maintenance of innate ideas has, indeed, an epistemological purpose, but is really deter mined only by the psycho-genetic point of view. He asks primarily only whether the soul at its birth brings complete knowledge into the world with and finds this question deserving of negative answer. 2 In consequence of this the development of the thesis "No innate principles in the mind" in the first book of Locke's Essay directed less against Descartes than against the English Neo-Platonists. s It combats first of all the consensus gentium, by an appeal to the experience of the nursery and of ethnology finds that neither theoretical nor practical principles are universally known or acknowledged. Nor does except from this demonstra tion (with an express turn against Herbert) even the idea of God, since this not only very different among different men, but is even entirely lacking with some. Nor does Locke allow the evasion
suggested by Henry More,4 that innate ideas might be contained in the soul not actually, but implicitly this could only mean, accord ing to Locke, that the soul capable of forming and approving them, — mark which would then hold for all ideas. The imme diate assent, finally, which was held to characterise that which innate, does not apply in the case of the most general abstract truths, just where wanted and where this immediate assent
found rests upon the fact that the meaning of the words and of their connection has been already apprehended at an earlier time. *
Thus the soul again stripped of all its original possessions at birth like an unwritten sheet (cf. p. 203), — white paper void of all characters. 6 In order to prove this positively, Locke then pledges himself to show that all our "ideas "'arise from experience Here he distinguishes simple and complex ideas in the assumption that the latter arise out of the former for the simple ideas, how-
De Veritate (1656), p. 76.
In which, moreover, Descartes completely agreed with him, for was Des cartes' opinion also that was not to be assumed that the mind of the child pursues metaphysics in its mother's womb. Op. (C. ) VIII. 269.
Cf. (and also for the following) G. Geil, Die Abhangigkeit Locke's von Descartes (Strassburg, 1887).
H. More, Antidot. adv. Ath. and and Locke, 22. Cf. Geil, op.
cit. , p. 49.
Locke, " 23 " The term idea
lb. II.
had lost its Platonic sense already in later Scholasticism
and taken on the more general meaning of any mental modification whatever Vorstellung).
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Chap. 1, § 33. ] Innate Idea* : Locke. 451
ever, he announces two different sources : sensation and rejtection, outer and inner perception. Under sensation he understands the ideas of the corporeal world, brought about by the medium of the bodily senses ; under reflection, on the other hand, the knowledge of the activities of the soul itself called out by the above process. Psycho-genetically, therefore, these two kinds of perception are so related that sensation is the occasion and the presupposition for reflection, — as regards their matter or content the relation is, that all content of ideas arises from sensation, while reflection, on the contrary, contains the consciousness of the functions performed in connection with this content.
3.
