--I see decline of the instincts Greek
philosophers: otherwise they could not have been guilty the profound error regarding the conscious state as the more valuable state.
philosophers: otherwise they could not have been guilty the profound error regarding the conscious state as the more valuable state.
Nietzsche - Works - v14 - Will to Power - a
exaggeration, eccentricity, caricature;
he is a buffoon with the blood of Voltaire in his veins,
VOL. I. Z
? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER.
354
He discovers a new form of agon; he is the first fencing-master in the superior classes of Athens;
he stands for nothing else than the highest form of cleverness: he calls it "virtue" (he regarded it as a means of salvation; he did not choose to be clever, cleverness was de rigueur); the proper
thing is to control one's self in suchwise that one
enters into a struggle not with passions but with reasons as one's weapons (Spinoza's stratagem
--the unravelment of the errors of passion);--it is desirable to discover how every one may be caught
once he is goaded into a passion, and to know how illogically passion proceeds; self-mockery is
practised in order to injure the very roots of the feelings of resentment.
It is my wish to understand which idiosyncratic
states form a part of the Socratic problem: its association of reason, virtue, and happiness. With
this absurd doctrine of the identity of these things it succeeded in charming the world: ancient philo sophy could not rid itself of this doctrine. . . .
Absolute lack of objective interest: hatred of science: the idiosyncrasy of considering one's self
a problem. Acoustic hallucinations in Socrates: morbid element. When the intellect is rich and
independent, it most strongly resists preoccupying
itself with morality. How is it that Socrates is a moral-maniac P--Every "practical" philosophy immediately steps into the foreground in times of
distress. When morality and religion become the
chief interests of a community, they are signs of a state of distress,
? ? ? ? CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY
433.
Intelligence, clearness, hardness, and logic as
weapons against
the wildness of the instincts.
The latter must be dangerous and must threaten
ruin, otherwise no purpose can be served by
developing intelligence to this degree of tyranny. In order to make a tyrant of intelligence the
instincts must first have proved themselves tyrants.
problem. very timely This is the Itwas a -one
in those days. Reason became virtue equalled happiness.
Solution ; Greek philosophers stand upon the same fundamental fact of their inner experiences as Socrates does; five feet from excess, from anarchy
They
regard him as a doctor: Logic as will to power, as
will to control self, as will to "happiness. " The
wildness and anarchy of Socrates' instincts is a
sign of decadence, as is also the superfoetation
of logic and clear reasoning in him. Both are abnormities, each belongs to the other.
Criticism. Decadence reveals itself in this con
cern about "happiness" (i. e. about the "salvation
of the soul"; i. e. to feel that one's condition is a
danger). Its fanatical interest in "happiness"
shows the pathological condition of the subcon scious self: it was a vital interest. The alternative
which faced them all was: to be reasonable or to perish. The morality of Greek philosophers shows that they felt they were in danger.
and from dissolution--all decadent men.
virtue
? ? ? ? 356
THE WILL TO POWER.
434.
Why everything resolved itself into mummery. -- Rudimentary psychology, which only considered
the conscious lapses of men (as causes), which re
garded "consciousness" as an attribute of the soul,
and which sought a will behind every action (i. e. an intention), could only answer "Happiness" to
the question: "What does man desire? " (it was
impossible to answer "Power," because that would have been immoral);--consequently behind all
men's actions there is the intention of attaining to happiness by means of them. Secondly: if
man as a matter of fact does not attain to happi ness, why is it? Because he mistakes the means
thereto. -- What is the unfailing means of acquiring happiness Answer: virtue. --Why virtue? Be
cause virtue is supreme rationalness, and rational ness makes mistakes in the choice of means
? impossible:
virtue in the form of reason is the
way to happiness. Dialectics is the constant occupation of virtue, because it does away with
passion and intellectual cloudiness.
As a matter of fact, man does not desire
"happiness. " Pleasure is a sensation of power:
if the passions are excluded, those states of the
mind are also excluded which afford the greatest
sensation of power and therefore of pleasure. The
highest rationalism is a state of cool clearness,
which is very far from being able to bring about
that feeling of power which every kind of exalta tion involves. . . .
The ancient philosophers combat everything
? ? ~ CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
-- >
-
that intoxicates and exalts--everything that im pairs the perfect coolness and impartiality of the
mind. . . . They were consistent with their first
false principle: that consciousness was the highest, the supreme state of mind, the prerequisite of
perfection--whereas the reverse is true. . .
Any kind of action is imperfect in proportion as
it has been willed or conscious. The philosophers of antiquity were the greatest duffers in practice,
because they condemned themselves theoretically to dufferdom. . . . In practice everything resolved itself into theatricalness: and he who saw through
Pyrrho did, for instance, thought every body did--that say, that goodness and uprightness "paltry people" were far superior philosophers.
All the deeper natures antiquity were dis gusted the philosophers virtue; all people
saw them was brawlers and actors. (This was the judgment passed on Plato by Epicurus and
Pyrrho)
* --- -~
- |
- --
? 357
? practical life, patience, goodness, and mutual assistance, paltry people were above
them:--this something like the judgment
Dostoiewsky Tolstoy claims for his muzhiks: they are more philosophical practice, they are
more courageous their way dealing with the
exigencies
criticism the philosopher. --Philosophers and moralists merely deceive themselves when they
Result:
life.
435.
? ? A
of
in
at
it, as
of
. in
or is
In
.
is to
of in
in
of of
in
as to
*
? 358
THE WILL TO POWER.
imagine that they escape from decadence by
opposing That lies beyond their wills: and however little they may be aware the fact,
generally discovered subsequently that they were among the most *powerful promoters of decadence.
Let examine the philosophers Greece--
Plato, for instance. He was who separated the
instincts from the polis, from the love contest, from military efficiency, from art, beauty, the
mysteries,
ancestors. He was the seducer of the nobles:
and the belief tradition and
? he himself seduces through the roturier Socrates.
He denied all the first principles the
"noble Greek" sterling worth; he made dialectics an everyday practice, conspired with
the tyrants, dabbled politics for the future, and
was the example man whose instincts were
most perfectly separated from tradition. He profound and passionate everything that anti-Hellenic.
One after the other, these great philosophers
represent the typical forms decadence: the moral and religious idiosyncrasy, anarchy, nihilism,
(a? 8wdhopa), cynicism, hardening principles, hedon ism, and reaction.
The question "happiness,"
the "salvation the soul,"
"virtue," and the expression
physiological contradictoriness ? urpose.
these declining natures: their instincts lack all balance and
? ? in is
of
of . .
ofof . of
a in
of
is is
in
it
of
. .
of in
it in
.
is us
. . .
it.
of of
of
of
? >~ 436.
To what extent do dialectics and the faith in
reason rest upon moral prejudices? With Plato we are as the temporary inhabitants of an in telligible world of goodness, still in possession of
a bequest from former times: divine dialectics taking its root in goodness leads to everything
--- CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
good follows, therefore,
that must lead
"backwards"). Even the fact that, according
Descartes had notion thoroughly Christian
mind, which includes the Creator all things,
and moral attitude
belief good God
the truthfulness God guarantees the judgments
~~~
? our senses for us. But for this religious sanction and warrant of our senses and our reason, whence should we obtain our right trust existence?
That thinking must be measure
what cannot be the subject
exist--is coarse non plus ultra
confidence (in the essential principle
the root all things); this itself mad assumption which our experience contradicts every
minute. We cannot think as is.
437.
The real philosophers of Greece are those which
came before Socrates (with Socrates
usage; they have travelled; they are earnest
changes). They are all distinguished men, they
take their stand away from the people and from
reality,-that thought, cannot moral blind
truth anything precisely
something
? ? to
at
a of
it
of
in (it . ofa a
.
of
in
of a
is of a
a
as of
to
to of
a
of
in
of
it a
of
? 36o
THE WILL TO POWEEL
the point of sombreness, their eyes are calm, and
they are not unacquainted with the business of state and diplomacy. They anticipated all the
great concepts which coming sages were to have
concerning things in general: they themselves re
presented these concepts, they made systems out
of themselves. Nothing can give a higher idea of Greek intellect than this sudden fruitfulness in
types, than this involuntary completeness in the drawing up of all the great possibilities of the philosophical ideal. I can see only one original figure
in those that came afterwards: a late arrival, but necessarily the last--Pyrrho the
nihilist. His instincts were opposed to the in fluences which had become ascendant in the mean
time: the Socratic school, Plato, and the artistic optimism of Heraclitus. (Pyrrho goes back to Democritus via Protagoras. . . . )
2k
Wise weariness: Pyrrho. To live humbly
among the humble. Devoid of pride. To live
in the vulgar way; to honour and believe what
every one believes. To be on one's guard against science and intellect, and against everything that
puffs one out. . . . To be simply patient in the extreme, careless and mild;--a? ta? 6eta, or, better
still, Tpairns. A Buddhist for Greece, bred amid the tumult of the Schools; born after his time; weary; an example of the protest of weariness against the eagerness of dialecticians; the in
credulity of the tired man in regard to the im
? ? ? ? CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
361
portance of everything. He had seen Alexander; he had seen the Indian penitents. To such late
arrivals and creatures of great subtlety, every thing lowly, poor, and idiotic, is seductive. It
narcoticises: it gives them relaxation (Pascal). On the other hand, by mixing with the crowd,
and getting confounded with the rest, they get
a little warmth. These weary creatures need
warmth. . . . To overcome contradiction; to do
away with contests; to have no will to excel in
any way: to deny the Greek instincts. (Pyrrho
lived with his sister, who was a midwife. ) To rig
out wisdom in such a way that it no longer dis tinguishes; to give it the ragged mantle of poverty;
to perform the lowest offices, and to go to market and sell sucking-pigs. . . . Sweetness, clearness,
indifference; no need of virtues that require atti
tudes; to be equal to all even in virtue: final conquest of one's self, final indifference,
Pyrrho and Epicurus:--two forms of Greek
decadence: they are related in their hatred of dialectics and all theatrical virtues. These two
things together were then called philosophy; Pyrrho and Epicurus intentionally held that which
they loved in low esteem; they chose common and even contemptible names for and they re presented state which one neither ill, healthy, lively, nor dead. Epicurus was more naif, more idyllic, more grateful; Pyrrho had more experience the world, had travelled more, and
? was more nihilistic. His life was
the great doctrine Knowledge).
promoted by
science: wisdom does not make
protest against Identity (Happiness Virtue The proper way living not
? ? =
of
a
it, is
= is
of
in
of
a
. . .
? 362
THE WILL TO POWER.
"wise. " . . . The proper way of living does not desire happiness, it turns away from happiness. . . .
438.
The war against the "old faith," as Epicurus waged was, strictly speaking, struggle against
Pre-existing Christianity--the struggle against world then already gloomy, moralised, acidified throughout with feelings guilt, and grown old and sick.
Not the "moral corruption antiquity, but
precisely moral infectedness was the prerequisite which enabled Christianity become its master.
? destroyed paganism by transvaluing its values and poisoning
Moral fanaticism (in short: Plato)
its innocence. We ought last understand that what was then destroyed was higher than what
prevailed Christianity grew
psychological corruption, and could only take
root rotten ground.
439.
Science disciplinary measure
instinct.
--I see decline of the instincts Greek
philosophers: otherwise they could not have been guilty the profound error regarding the conscious state as the more valuable state. The intensity
ratio sion. which
the ease and speed cerebral transmis Greek philosophy upheld the opposite view,
always the sign weakened instincts.
consciousness stands the inverse
on the soil
? ? is
to
in of; !
it,
of
of
of at to "
a
of
as
its
in
to
of
of
aa
in or as
an
of
a
? CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
363
We must, in sooth, seek perfect life there where it is least conscious (that is to say, there where it is least aware of its logic, its reasons, its means, its intentions, and its utility). The return to the facts of common sense, the facts of the common man and of "paltry people. " Honesty and intelli
gence stored up for generations by people who are
quite unconscious of their principles, and who even have some fear of principles. It is not reasonable to desire a reasoning virtue. . . . A philosopher is compromised by such a desire.
? 44O.
~.
When morality--that is to say, refinement,
prudence, bravery, and equity--have been stored
up in the same way, thanks to the moral efforts
of a whole succession of generations, the collec
tive power of this hoard of virtue projects
rays even into that sphere where honesty most
seldom present--the sphere intellect. When thing becomes conscious, the sign
state ill-ease the organism; something new has got be found, the organism not satisfied
adapted, subject distress, suspense, and
hypersensitive--precisely sciousness.
all this con
Genius lies the instincts; goodness does too. One only acts perfectly when one acts in stinctively. Even from the moral point view
all thinking which conscious groping, and the majority
morality. Scientific honesty
merely process cases an attack always sacrificed
? ? on of
it or is
a
in in. isin is
is is of
it of is
a
of
is
is
.
it
to
of to
is
of a
its
? THE WILL TO POWER.
when a thinker begins to reason: let any one try the experiment: put the wisest man in the
364
balance, and morality. . . .
then let him discourse upon
It could also be proved that the whole of a
man's conscious thinking shows a much lower
standard of morality than the thoughts of the
same man would show if they were led by his instincts.
44 I.
The struggle against Socrates, Plato, and all the Socratic schools, proceeds from the profound instinct that man is not made better when he is
shown that virtue may be demonstrated or based
upon reason. . . . This in the end is the nig gardly fact, it was the agonal instinct in all these born dialecticians, which drove them to glorify
their personal abilities as the highest of all qualities, and to represent every other form of goodness as conditioned by them. The anti-scientific spirit of all this "philosophy": it will never admit that it is not right.
442.
This is extraordinary. From its very earliest beginnings, Greek philosophy carries on a struggle
against science with the weapons of a theory of
knowledge, especially of scepticism: and why is
this? . It is always in favour of morality. . . .
(Physicists and medical men are hated. ) Socrates, Aristippus, the Megarian school, the Cynics,
Epicurus, and Pyrrho--a general onslaught upon
? ? ? ? which
name
arsenal
The theory
in the affair as case. There
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
365
knowledge in favour of morality. . . . (Hatred of
dialectics also. ) There is still a problem to be solved: they approach sophistry in order to be
rid of science. On the other hand, the physicists are subjected to such an extent that, among
their first principles, they include the theory of
truth and of real being: for instance, the atom,
the four elements (juxtaposition of being, in order
to explain Contempt
multiformity and transformations).
return utility
objectivity interests practical interest, and
taught: the personal
all knowledge.
The struggle against science
directed at: means (that
? (1) pathos (objectivity); (2)
say, its utility); (3) its results (which are
considered childish). the same
struggle
taken up later on by the Church the piety: the Church inherited the whole
antiquity for her war with science. knowledge played the same part did Kant's or the Indians'
no desire whatever to be troubled with free hand wanted for the "purpose. "
envisaged.
-
Against what powers are they actually defend
that
ing themselves? Against dutifulness, obedience law, against the compulsion hand in hand--I believe this what
against going called
Freedom. This
instinct itself gets
how decadence manifests itself: the solidarity degenerate that solidarity regarded tyranny: authority
solidarity brooked, nobody any longer
? ? or
to at
to is be
is
of
of its
of is . a . to
of to
is so
is
in
It
is it,
of of
is
its
it
.
as isin
no
is of
to
is
is
its its is
in
is
? THE WILL TO POWER.
366
desires to fall in with the rank and file, and to adopt its ignobly slow pace. The slow move
ment which is the tempo of science is generally hated, as are also the scientific man's indifference in regard to getting on, his long breath, and his impersonal
attitude.
443.
At bottom, morality is hostile to science:
Socrates was so already too--and the reason
that science considers certain things important
which have no relation whatsoever "good"
and "evil," and which therefore reduce the gravity our feelings concerning "good" and "evil. "
What morality requires that the whole of
science very quickly declined Greece, once Socrates had inoculated scientific work with the
? man should serve with all his
considers waste on the part creature that can afford waste, when man earnestly troubles his head about stars plants. That why
disease
reached by Thucydides,
time.
morality. The mental altitudes Democritus, Hippocrates, and
have not been reached second
444.
The problem the philosopher and the
age; depressing habits (sedentary study Kant; over-work; inadequate nourishment the brain; reading). more essential question still: not already
perhaps symptom decadence when thinking tends establish generalities
scientific man. --The influence
power:
? ? to
a
of
it
A
of ill
of
7 la a
it or a
of d
is
of is
in
of a
it
of
a
to
a of
a
it a
is,
is
? everything, exclusively disciplined point view;
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
367
Objectivity regarded as the disintegration of the
will (to be able to remain as detached as possible . . This presupposes tremendous
adiaphora regard the strong passions:
kind isolation, an exceptional position, opposi
tion the normal passions.
Type: desertion home-country; emigrants go
ever greater distances afield; growing exoticism; the voice the old imperative dies away;--and the continual question "whither? " ("happiness")
emancipation from forms organisa breaking loose from everything.
sign tion, sign
Problem:
decadent symptom than the philosopher? --as
whole the scientific man
the man of science more of
his department
all the virtues strong race, robust
health, great severity, manliness,
gence. He rather symptom the great
multiformity
the latter. The decadent scholar bad
culture than the effeteness
scholar. Whereas the decadent philosopher has
always been reckoned hitherto the typical philosopher.
445.
Among philosophers, nothing
intellectual uprightness: they perhaps say the very reverse, and even believe But the prerequisite
their work that they can only admit
and intelli
more rare than
*
? not cut loose from
being consecrated knowledge and
maintain special attitude and
only part his the service
need
? ? of of all
is a
is,
in
it.
is
as
of
of
of ofis
of
a
of
to of of
of is
he
is
a
aa
a
of
is
of
to
of is a in
of
of of aa a
to to
is of
in . ).
a of
? THE WILL TO POWER.
368
certain truths; they know what they have to prove; and the fact that they must be agreed as to these "truths" is almost what makes them recog nise one another as philosophers. There are, for instance, the truths of morality. But belief in morality is not a proof of morality: there are
cases--and the philosopher's case is one in point
--when a belief of this sort is simply a piece of immorality.
446.
What is the retrograde factor in a philosopher?
--He teaches that the qualities which he happens to possess are the only qualities that exist, that
they are indispensable to those who wish to attain
to the "highest good" (for instance, dialectics with
Plato). He would have all men raise themselves, gradatim, to his type as the highest. He de spises what is generally esteemed--by him a gulf
is cleft between the highest priestly values and the values of the world. He knows what is true, who
God what every one's goal should be, and the way thereto. The typical philosopher
thus an absolute dogmatist;--if requires scepti
? cism all only order dogmatically his principal purpose.
447.
able speak
When the philosopher confronted with his rival-science, for instance, he becomes sceptic;
then appropriates form knowledge which denies the man science; he goes hand
? ? he
he to
at
is,
of a of
in
in
is
a
is
it of is
. . .
to
be he
to
? CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
369
hand with the priest so that he may not be sus pected of atheism or materialism; he considers
an attack made upon himself as an attack upon morals, religion, virtue, and order--he knows how
to bring his opponents into repute by calling them "seducers" and "underminers": then he
shoulder with power.
war with other philosophers:
compel them appear like anarchists, disbelievers, opponents authority.
short, when he fights, he fights exactly like priest and like the priesthood.
THE TRUTHS AND ERRORS OF PHILOSOPHERS.
448.
Philosophy defined by Kant: "The science the limitations reason"! !
marches shoulder The philosopher
--he does his best
? 449.
According Aristotle, Philosophy
the art
discovering truth. On the other hand, the
Epicureans, who availed themselves Aristotle's
sensual theory knowledge, retorted ironical opposition the search for truth: "Philosophy
the art Life. " : 45O.
The three great naivete? s
Knowledge means happiness (as
VOL. A-
? ? I.
of to
3.
as a
of
to
of
2
of
if .
.
is
. );
is
of
a
of in
ill of to
of
In
to at to
? 370
THE WILL TO POWER.
Knowledge as a means to virtue (as if . . . );
Knowledge as a means to the "denial of Life" --inasmuch as it leads to disappointment--(as if . . ).
45 I.
As if there were one "truth" which one could by some means approach !
452.
Error and ignorance are fatal. --The assump tion that truth has been found and that ignorance and error are at an end, constitutes one of the most seductive thoughts in the world. Granted that it be generally accepted, it paralyses the will to test, to investigate, to be cautious, and to
gather experience: it may even be regarded as
criminal--that is to say, as a doubt concerning truth. . . .
"Truth" is therefore more fatal than error and
ignorance, because it paralyses the forces which lead to enlightenment and knowledge. The
passion for idleness now stands up for "truth. " ("Thought is pain and misery ! "), as also do order, rule, the joy of possession, the pride of wisdom-- in fact, vanity:--it is easier to obey than to examine; it is more gratifying to think "I possess the truth," than to see only darkness in all direc tions; . . . but, above all, it is reassuring, it lends
? confidence, and alleviates life--it "improves" the
"Spirit ual peace," "a quiet conscience"--these things
character inasmuch as it reduces mistrust.
? ? ? CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY,
ti 37I
are inventions which are only possible provided
"Truth be found. "--"By their fruits ye shall know them. " . . . "Truth" is the truth because it
makes men better. . . . The process goes on:
all goodness and all success is placed to the credit of "truth. "
This is the proof by success: the happiness, contentment, and the welfare of a community or
of an individual, are now understood to be the
result of the belief in morality. . . . Conversely: failure is ascribed to a lack of faith.
453.
The causes of error just much the good as the bad will of man :--in an incalculable
number cases he conceals reality from himself, he falsifies that he may not suffer from his
good bad will. God, for instance, considered the shaper man's destiny; interprets his
little lot though everything were intentionally
sent him for the salvation his soul,--this act ignorance "philology," which more
subtle intellect would seem unclean and false, done, the majority cases, with perfect good faith. Goodwill, "noble feelings," and "lofty states the soul" are just underhand and deceptive the means they use are the passions love, hatred, and revenge, which morality has repudiated and declared egotistic.
Errors are what mankind has had pay for most dearly; and taking them all, the errors which have resulted from goodwill are those which
?
he is a buffoon with the blood of Voltaire in his veins,
VOL. I. Z
? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER.
354
He discovers a new form of agon; he is the first fencing-master in the superior classes of Athens;
he stands for nothing else than the highest form of cleverness: he calls it "virtue" (he regarded it as a means of salvation; he did not choose to be clever, cleverness was de rigueur); the proper
thing is to control one's self in suchwise that one
enters into a struggle not with passions but with reasons as one's weapons (Spinoza's stratagem
--the unravelment of the errors of passion);--it is desirable to discover how every one may be caught
once he is goaded into a passion, and to know how illogically passion proceeds; self-mockery is
practised in order to injure the very roots of the feelings of resentment.
It is my wish to understand which idiosyncratic
states form a part of the Socratic problem: its association of reason, virtue, and happiness. With
this absurd doctrine of the identity of these things it succeeded in charming the world: ancient philo sophy could not rid itself of this doctrine. . . .
Absolute lack of objective interest: hatred of science: the idiosyncrasy of considering one's self
a problem. Acoustic hallucinations in Socrates: morbid element. When the intellect is rich and
independent, it most strongly resists preoccupying
itself with morality. How is it that Socrates is a moral-maniac P--Every "practical" philosophy immediately steps into the foreground in times of
distress. When morality and religion become the
chief interests of a community, they are signs of a state of distress,
? ? ? ? CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY
433.
Intelligence, clearness, hardness, and logic as
weapons against
the wildness of the instincts.
The latter must be dangerous and must threaten
ruin, otherwise no purpose can be served by
developing intelligence to this degree of tyranny. In order to make a tyrant of intelligence the
instincts must first have proved themselves tyrants.
problem. very timely This is the Itwas a -one
in those days. Reason became virtue equalled happiness.
Solution ; Greek philosophers stand upon the same fundamental fact of their inner experiences as Socrates does; five feet from excess, from anarchy
They
regard him as a doctor: Logic as will to power, as
will to control self, as will to "happiness. " The
wildness and anarchy of Socrates' instincts is a
sign of decadence, as is also the superfoetation
of logic and clear reasoning in him. Both are abnormities, each belongs to the other.
Criticism. Decadence reveals itself in this con
cern about "happiness" (i. e. about the "salvation
of the soul"; i. e. to feel that one's condition is a
danger). Its fanatical interest in "happiness"
shows the pathological condition of the subcon scious self: it was a vital interest. The alternative
which faced them all was: to be reasonable or to perish. The morality of Greek philosophers shows that they felt they were in danger.
and from dissolution--all decadent men.
virtue
? ? ? ? 356
THE WILL TO POWER.
434.
Why everything resolved itself into mummery. -- Rudimentary psychology, which only considered
the conscious lapses of men (as causes), which re
garded "consciousness" as an attribute of the soul,
and which sought a will behind every action (i. e. an intention), could only answer "Happiness" to
the question: "What does man desire? " (it was
impossible to answer "Power," because that would have been immoral);--consequently behind all
men's actions there is the intention of attaining to happiness by means of them. Secondly: if
man as a matter of fact does not attain to happi ness, why is it? Because he mistakes the means
thereto. -- What is the unfailing means of acquiring happiness Answer: virtue. --Why virtue? Be
cause virtue is supreme rationalness, and rational ness makes mistakes in the choice of means
? impossible:
virtue in the form of reason is the
way to happiness. Dialectics is the constant occupation of virtue, because it does away with
passion and intellectual cloudiness.
As a matter of fact, man does not desire
"happiness. " Pleasure is a sensation of power:
if the passions are excluded, those states of the
mind are also excluded which afford the greatest
sensation of power and therefore of pleasure. The
highest rationalism is a state of cool clearness,
which is very far from being able to bring about
that feeling of power which every kind of exalta tion involves. . . .
The ancient philosophers combat everything
? ? ~ CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
-- >
-
that intoxicates and exalts--everything that im pairs the perfect coolness and impartiality of the
mind. . . . They were consistent with their first
false principle: that consciousness was the highest, the supreme state of mind, the prerequisite of
perfection--whereas the reverse is true. . .
Any kind of action is imperfect in proportion as
it has been willed or conscious. The philosophers of antiquity were the greatest duffers in practice,
because they condemned themselves theoretically to dufferdom. . . . In practice everything resolved itself into theatricalness: and he who saw through
Pyrrho did, for instance, thought every body did--that say, that goodness and uprightness "paltry people" were far superior philosophers.
All the deeper natures antiquity were dis gusted the philosophers virtue; all people
saw them was brawlers and actors. (This was the judgment passed on Plato by Epicurus and
Pyrrho)
* --- -~
- |
- --
? 357
? practical life, patience, goodness, and mutual assistance, paltry people were above
them:--this something like the judgment
Dostoiewsky Tolstoy claims for his muzhiks: they are more philosophical practice, they are
more courageous their way dealing with the
exigencies
criticism the philosopher. --Philosophers and moralists merely deceive themselves when they
Result:
life.
435.
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of
in
at
it, as
of
. in
or is
In
.
is to
of in
in
of of
in
as to
*
? 358
THE WILL TO POWER.
imagine that they escape from decadence by
opposing That lies beyond their wills: and however little they may be aware the fact,
generally discovered subsequently that they were among the most *powerful promoters of decadence.
Let examine the philosophers Greece--
Plato, for instance. He was who separated the
instincts from the polis, from the love contest, from military efficiency, from art, beauty, the
mysteries,
ancestors. He was the seducer of the nobles:
and the belief tradition and
? he himself seduces through the roturier Socrates.
He denied all the first principles the
"noble Greek" sterling worth; he made dialectics an everyday practice, conspired with
the tyrants, dabbled politics for the future, and
was the example man whose instincts were
most perfectly separated from tradition. He profound and passionate everything that anti-Hellenic.
One after the other, these great philosophers
represent the typical forms decadence: the moral and religious idiosyncrasy, anarchy, nihilism,
(a? 8wdhopa), cynicism, hardening principles, hedon ism, and reaction.
The question "happiness,"
the "salvation the soul,"
"virtue," and the expression
physiological contradictoriness ? urpose.
these declining natures: their instincts lack all balance and
? ? in is
of
of . .
ofof . of
a in
of
is is
in
it
of
. .
of in
it in
.
is us
. . .
it.
of of
of
of
? >~ 436.
To what extent do dialectics and the faith in
reason rest upon moral prejudices? With Plato we are as the temporary inhabitants of an in telligible world of goodness, still in possession of
a bequest from former times: divine dialectics taking its root in goodness leads to everything
--- CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
good follows, therefore,
that must lead
"backwards"). Even the fact that, according
Descartes had notion thoroughly Christian
mind, which includes the Creator all things,
and moral attitude
belief good God
the truthfulness God guarantees the judgments
~~~
? our senses for us. But for this religious sanction and warrant of our senses and our reason, whence should we obtain our right trust existence?
That thinking must be measure
what cannot be the subject
exist--is coarse non plus ultra
confidence (in the essential principle
the root all things); this itself mad assumption which our experience contradicts every
minute. We cannot think as is.
437.
The real philosophers of Greece are those which
came before Socrates (with Socrates
usage; they have travelled; they are earnest
changes). They are all distinguished men, they
take their stand away from the people and from
reality,-that thought, cannot moral blind
truth anything precisely
something
? ? to
at
a of
it
of
in (it . ofa a
.
of
in
of a
is of a
a
as of
to
to of
a
of
in
of
it a
of
? 36o
THE WILL TO POWEEL
the point of sombreness, their eyes are calm, and
they are not unacquainted with the business of state and diplomacy. They anticipated all the
great concepts which coming sages were to have
concerning things in general: they themselves re
presented these concepts, they made systems out
of themselves. Nothing can give a higher idea of Greek intellect than this sudden fruitfulness in
types, than this involuntary completeness in the drawing up of all the great possibilities of the philosophical ideal. I can see only one original figure
in those that came afterwards: a late arrival, but necessarily the last--Pyrrho the
nihilist. His instincts were opposed to the in fluences which had become ascendant in the mean
time: the Socratic school, Plato, and the artistic optimism of Heraclitus. (Pyrrho goes back to Democritus via Protagoras. . . . )
2k
Wise weariness: Pyrrho. To live humbly
among the humble. Devoid of pride. To live
in the vulgar way; to honour and believe what
every one believes. To be on one's guard against science and intellect, and against everything that
puffs one out. . . . To be simply patient in the extreme, careless and mild;--a? ta? 6eta, or, better
still, Tpairns. A Buddhist for Greece, bred amid the tumult of the Schools; born after his time; weary; an example of the protest of weariness against the eagerness of dialecticians; the in
credulity of the tired man in regard to the im
? ? ? ? CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
361
portance of everything. He had seen Alexander; he had seen the Indian penitents. To such late
arrivals and creatures of great subtlety, every thing lowly, poor, and idiotic, is seductive. It
narcoticises: it gives them relaxation (Pascal). On the other hand, by mixing with the crowd,
and getting confounded with the rest, they get
a little warmth. These weary creatures need
warmth. . . . To overcome contradiction; to do
away with contests; to have no will to excel in
any way: to deny the Greek instincts. (Pyrrho
lived with his sister, who was a midwife. ) To rig
out wisdom in such a way that it no longer dis tinguishes; to give it the ragged mantle of poverty;
to perform the lowest offices, and to go to market and sell sucking-pigs. . . . Sweetness, clearness,
indifference; no need of virtues that require atti
tudes; to be equal to all even in virtue: final conquest of one's self, final indifference,
Pyrrho and Epicurus:--two forms of Greek
decadence: they are related in their hatred of dialectics and all theatrical virtues. These two
things together were then called philosophy; Pyrrho and Epicurus intentionally held that which
they loved in low esteem; they chose common and even contemptible names for and they re presented state which one neither ill, healthy, lively, nor dead. Epicurus was more naif, more idyllic, more grateful; Pyrrho had more experience the world, had travelled more, and
? was more nihilistic. His life was
the great doctrine Knowledge).
promoted by
science: wisdom does not make
protest against Identity (Happiness Virtue The proper way living not
? ? =
of
a
it, is
= is
of
in
of
a
. . .
? 362
THE WILL TO POWER.
"wise. " . . . The proper way of living does not desire happiness, it turns away from happiness. . . .
438.
The war against the "old faith," as Epicurus waged was, strictly speaking, struggle against
Pre-existing Christianity--the struggle against world then already gloomy, moralised, acidified throughout with feelings guilt, and grown old and sick.
Not the "moral corruption antiquity, but
precisely moral infectedness was the prerequisite which enabled Christianity become its master.
? destroyed paganism by transvaluing its values and poisoning
Moral fanaticism (in short: Plato)
its innocence. We ought last understand that what was then destroyed was higher than what
prevailed Christianity grew
psychological corruption, and could only take
root rotten ground.
439.
Science disciplinary measure
instinct.
--I see decline of the instincts Greek
philosophers: otherwise they could not have been guilty the profound error regarding the conscious state as the more valuable state. The intensity
ratio sion. which
the ease and speed cerebral transmis Greek philosophy upheld the opposite view,
always the sign weakened instincts.
consciousness stands the inverse
on the soil
? ? is
to
in of; !
it,
of
of
of at to "
a
of
as
its
in
to
of
of
aa
in or as
an
of
a
? CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
363
We must, in sooth, seek perfect life there where it is least conscious (that is to say, there where it is least aware of its logic, its reasons, its means, its intentions, and its utility). The return to the facts of common sense, the facts of the common man and of "paltry people. " Honesty and intelli
gence stored up for generations by people who are
quite unconscious of their principles, and who even have some fear of principles. It is not reasonable to desire a reasoning virtue. . . . A philosopher is compromised by such a desire.
? 44O.
~.
When morality--that is to say, refinement,
prudence, bravery, and equity--have been stored
up in the same way, thanks to the moral efforts
of a whole succession of generations, the collec
tive power of this hoard of virtue projects
rays even into that sphere where honesty most
seldom present--the sphere intellect. When thing becomes conscious, the sign
state ill-ease the organism; something new has got be found, the organism not satisfied
adapted, subject distress, suspense, and
hypersensitive--precisely sciousness.
all this con
Genius lies the instincts; goodness does too. One only acts perfectly when one acts in stinctively. Even from the moral point view
all thinking which conscious groping, and the majority
morality. Scientific honesty
merely process cases an attack always sacrificed
? ? on of
it or is
a
in in. isin is
is is of
it of is
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of
is
is
.
it
to
of to
is
of a
its
? THE WILL TO POWER.
when a thinker begins to reason: let any one try the experiment: put the wisest man in the
364
balance, and morality. . . .
then let him discourse upon
It could also be proved that the whole of a
man's conscious thinking shows a much lower
standard of morality than the thoughts of the
same man would show if they were led by his instincts.
44 I.
The struggle against Socrates, Plato, and all the Socratic schools, proceeds from the profound instinct that man is not made better when he is
shown that virtue may be demonstrated or based
upon reason. . . . This in the end is the nig gardly fact, it was the agonal instinct in all these born dialecticians, which drove them to glorify
their personal abilities as the highest of all qualities, and to represent every other form of goodness as conditioned by them. The anti-scientific spirit of all this "philosophy": it will never admit that it is not right.
442.
This is extraordinary. From its very earliest beginnings, Greek philosophy carries on a struggle
against science with the weapons of a theory of
knowledge, especially of scepticism: and why is
this? . It is always in favour of morality. . . .
(Physicists and medical men are hated. ) Socrates, Aristippus, the Megarian school, the Cynics,
Epicurus, and Pyrrho--a general onslaught upon
? ? ? ? which
name
arsenal
The theory
in the affair as case. There
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
365
knowledge in favour of morality. . . . (Hatred of
dialectics also. ) There is still a problem to be solved: they approach sophistry in order to be
rid of science. On the other hand, the physicists are subjected to such an extent that, among
their first principles, they include the theory of
truth and of real being: for instance, the atom,
the four elements (juxtaposition of being, in order
to explain Contempt
multiformity and transformations).
return utility
objectivity interests practical interest, and
taught: the personal
all knowledge.
The struggle against science
directed at: means (that
? (1) pathos (objectivity); (2)
say, its utility); (3) its results (which are
considered childish). the same
struggle
taken up later on by the Church the piety: the Church inherited the whole
antiquity for her war with science. knowledge played the same part did Kant's or the Indians'
no desire whatever to be troubled with free hand wanted for the "purpose. "
envisaged.
-
Against what powers are they actually defend
that
ing themselves? Against dutifulness, obedience law, against the compulsion hand in hand--I believe this what
against going called
Freedom. This
instinct itself gets
how decadence manifests itself: the solidarity degenerate that solidarity regarded tyranny: authority
solidarity brooked, nobody any longer
? ? or
to at
to is be
is
of
of its
of is . a . to
of to
is so
is
in
It
is it,
of of
is
its
it
.
as isin
no
is of
to
is
is
its its is
in
is
? THE WILL TO POWER.
366
desires to fall in with the rank and file, and to adopt its ignobly slow pace. The slow move
ment which is the tempo of science is generally hated, as are also the scientific man's indifference in regard to getting on, his long breath, and his impersonal
attitude.
443.
At bottom, morality is hostile to science:
Socrates was so already too--and the reason
that science considers certain things important
which have no relation whatsoever "good"
and "evil," and which therefore reduce the gravity our feelings concerning "good" and "evil. "
What morality requires that the whole of
science very quickly declined Greece, once Socrates had inoculated scientific work with the
? man should serve with all his
considers waste on the part creature that can afford waste, when man earnestly troubles his head about stars plants. That why
disease
reached by Thucydides,
time.
morality. The mental altitudes Democritus, Hippocrates, and
have not been reached second
444.
The problem the philosopher and the
age; depressing habits (sedentary study Kant; over-work; inadequate nourishment the brain; reading). more essential question still: not already
perhaps symptom decadence when thinking tends establish generalities
scientific man. --The influence
power:
? ? to
a
of
it
A
of ill
of
7 la a
it or a
of d
is
of is
in
of a
it
of
a
to
a of
a
it a
is,
is
? everything, exclusively disciplined point view;
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
367
Objectivity regarded as the disintegration of the
will (to be able to remain as detached as possible . . This presupposes tremendous
adiaphora regard the strong passions:
kind isolation, an exceptional position, opposi
tion the normal passions.
Type: desertion home-country; emigrants go
ever greater distances afield; growing exoticism; the voice the old imperative dies away;--and the continual question "whither? " ("happiness")
emancipation from forms organisa breaking loose from everything.
sign tion, sign
Problem:
decadent symptom than the philosopher? --as
whole the scientific man
the man of science more of
his department
all the virtues strong race, robust
health, great severity, manliness,
gence. He rather symptom the great
multiformity
the latter. The decadent scholar bad
culture than the effeteness
scholar. Whereas the decadent philosopher has
always been reckoned hitherto the typical philosopher.
445.
Among philosophers, nothing
intellectual uprightness: they perhaps say the very reverse, and even believe But the prerequisite
their work that they can only admit
and intelli
more rare than
*
? not cut loose from
being consecrated knowledge and
maintain special attitude and
only part his the service
need
? ? of of all
is a
is,
in
it.
is
as
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of
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a of
? THE WILL TO POWER.
368
certain truths; they know what they have to prove; and the fact that they must be agreed as to these "truths" is almost what makes them recog nise one another as philosophers. There are, for instance, the truths of morality. But belief in morality is not a proof of morality: there are
cases--and the philosopher's case is one in point
--when a belief of this sort is simply a piece of immorality.
446.
What is the retrograde factor in a philosopher?
--He teaches that the qualities which he happens to possess are the only qualities that exist, that
they are indispensable to those who wish to attain
to the "highest good" (for instance, dialectics with
Plato). He would have all men raise themselves, gradatim, to his type as the highest. He de spises what is generally esteemed--by him a gulf
is cleft between the highest priestly values and the values of the world. He knows what is true, who
God what every one's goal should be, and the way thereto. The typical philosopher
thus an absolute dogmatist;--if requires scepti
? cism all only order dogmatically his principal purpose.
447.
able speak
When the philosopher confronted with his rival-science, for instance, he becomes sceptic;
then appropriates form knowledge which denies the man science; he goes hand
? ? he
he to
at
is,
of a of
in
in
is
a
is
it of is
. . .
to
be he
to
? CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
369
hand with the priest so that he may not be sus pected of atheism or materialism; he considers
an attack made upon himself as an attack upon morals, religion, virtue, and order--he knows how
to bring his opponents into repute by calling them "seducers" and "underminers": then he
shoulder with power.
war with other philosophers:
compel them appear like anarchists, disbelievers, opponents authority.
short, when he fights, he fights exactly like priest and like the priesthood.
THE TRUTHS AND ERRORS OF PHILOSOPHERS.
448.
Philosophy defined by Kant: "The science the limitations reason"! !
marches shoulder The philosopher
--he does his best
? 449.
According Aristotle, Philosophy
the art
discovering truth. On the other hand, the
Epicureans, who availed themselves Aristotle's
sensual theory knowledge, retorted ironical opposition the search for truth: "Philosophy
the art Life. " : 45O.
The three great naivete? s
Knowledge means happiness (as
VOL. A-
? ? I.
of to
3.
as a
of
to
of
2
of
if .
.
is
. );
is
of
a
of in
ill of to
of
In
to at to
? 370
THE WILL TO POWER.
Knowledge as a means to virtue (as if . . . );
Knowledge as a means to the "denial of Life" --inasmuch as it leads to disappointment--(as if . . ).
45 I.
As if there were one "truth" which one could by some means approach !
452.
Error and ignorance are fatal. --The assump tion that truth has been found and that ignorance and error are at an end, constitutes one of the most seductive thoughts in the world. Granted that it be generally accepted, it paralyses the will to test, to investigate, to be cautious, and to
gather experience: it may even be regarded as
criminal--that is to say, as a doubt concerning truth. . . .
"Truth" is therefore more fatal than error and
ignorance, because it paralyses the forces which lead to enlightenment and knowledge. The
passion for idleness now stands up for "truth. " ("Thought is pain and misery ! "), as also do order, rule, the joy of possession, the pride of wisdom-- in fact, vanity:--it is easier to obey than to examine; it is more gratifying to think "I possess the truth," than to see only darkness in all direc tions; . . . but, above all, it is reassuring, it lends
? confidence, and alleviates life--it "improves" the
"Spirit ual peace," "a quiet conscience"--these things
character inasmuch as it reduces mistrust.
? ? ? CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY,
ti 37I
are inventions which are only possible provided
"Truth be found. "--"By their fruits ye shall know them. " . . . "Truth" is the truth because it
makes men better. . . . The process goes on:
all goodness and all success is placed to the credit of "truth. "
This is the proof by success: the happiness, contentment, and the welfare of a community or
of an individual, are now understood to be the
result of the belief in morality. . . . Conversely: failure is ascribed to a lack of faith.
453.
The causes of error just much the good as the bad will of man :--in an incalculable
number cases he conceals reality from himself, he falsifies that he may not suffer from his
good bad will. God, for instance, considered the shaper man's destiny; interprets his
little lot though everything were intentionally
sent him for the salvation his soul,--this act ignorance "philology," which more
subtle intellect would seem unclean and false, done, the majority cases, with perfect good faith. Goodwill, "noble feelings," and "lofty states the soul" are just underhand and deceptive the means they use are the passions love, hatred, and revenge, which morality has repudiated and declared egotistic.
Errors are what mankind has had pay for most dearly; and taking them all, the errors which have resulted from goodwill are those which
?
