They claimed that, by holding in contempt the ignoble things in this very
transitory
life, they could attain a life similar to the gods even while in this mortal body.
Bruno-Cause-Principle-and-Unity
27 In ?
?
?
?
, Bruno wrote a commentary on this Aristotelian treatise under the title Explicatio rhetoricae Aristotelis ad Alexandrum.
28 Virgil, Eclogues, ? ? ? , ? ? ? .
? ? ? ?
On magic
? disturbed by things which do not affect or disturb us. And sometimes we are touched and injured more significantly by those things whose assaults we are not aware of than we are by things which we do perceive. As a result, many things which are seen, and forms which are absorbed through the eyes, do not arouse any consciousness in our direct and external sensory powers. Nevertheless, they do penetrate more deeply and lethally, so that the internal spirit is immediately conscious of them, as if it were a foreign sense or living thing. Thus, it would not be easy to refute some of the Platonists and all of the Pythagoreans, who believe that one human person of himself lives in many animals, and when one of these animals dies, even the most important one, the others survive for a long time.
Hence, it would obviously be stupid to think that we are affected and injured only by those visible forms which generate clear awareness in the senses and the soul. That would not be much different from someone who thinks that he is injured more or less only by blows of which he is more or less conscious. However, we experience more discomfort and suffering by being pricked by a needle or by a thorn irritating the skin than we do by a sword thrust through from one side of the body to the other, whose effect is later felt a great deal more, but at the time we are unaware of the injury caused by its penetration of parts of the body.
So, indeed, there are many things which stealthily pass through the eyes and capture and continuously intrude upon the spirit up to the point of the death of the soul, even though they do not cause as much awareness as do less significant things. For example, seeing certain gestures or emotions or actions can move us to tears. And the souls of some faint at the sight of the spilling of another's blood or in observing the dissection of a cadaver. There is no other cause of this than a feeling which binds through vision.
Fourthly, the bondings arising from imagination
The role of the imagination is to receive images derived from the senses and to preserve, combine and divide them. This happens in two ways. First, it occurs by the free creative choice of the person who imagines, for example, poets, painters, story writers and all who combine images in some organized way. Second, it occurs without such deliberate choice. The latter also happens in two ways: either through some other cause which chooses and selects, or through an external agent. The latter, again, is
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On magic
? twofold. Sometimes the agent is mediated, as when a man uses sounds or appearances to bring about stimulations through the eyes or ears. And some- times the agent is unmediated, as when a spirit, rational soul or demon acts on the imagination of someone, asleep or awake, to produce internal images in such a way that something seems to have been apprehended by the external senses.
Consequently,somepossessedpeopleseemtoseecertainsightsandhear certain sounds and words which they truly think are caused by external subjects. Hence, they strongly and persistently assert that what they have seen and heard is true, when it is their reason which is deceived, and not their senses, for they do hear what they hear, and they do see what they see. But the very same thing which they think they see as derived from exter- nal sounds in their ears and from external sights absorbed by their vision are fantasy images presented to their internal sense. However, they think that these impressions of the internal sense are the real things. Thus, it hap- pens that they refuse to be recalled to a healthier point of view by actual witnesses, whom they prefer to reject in favour of their own imagination, and who they truly think are deaf and dumb. Medically these matters are cases of mania and melancholy, and are called 'the dreams of the wakeful'.
Further, this type of bonding is not due simply to a material principle, as is believed by certain well-known medical people with an obstinacy which is most crude and oppressive. Nor is it due simply to demonic or dia- bolical efficient causes, as is believed on their part by some theologians. Rather, both causes co-operate. The material factor is a melancholic humour, which we call the kitchen or the bathhouse of the saturnalian demons. But the efficient cause and moving spirit is a demon who does not have a completely immaterial substance, because these demons seem to be endowed with many animal affections and have definite properties of denseness. Although they are spiritual substances, nature has given them a body which is very thin and is not endowed with senses. They belong to that genus of animal which, as was said, has more species than do living, composite and sensory animals.
Now, a specific soul comes to a specific seed which has been properly deposited in a specific place, or conversely, a body makes or produces from itself, as it were, a specific animal form or living thing. For example, from one seed the olive is born, from another a dog, from another a human, and in general one thing or another is suited to be born from a body which is structured in one way or another. As the poet says, 'The eggs come more
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On magic
? readily to where the seed is sown'. 29 As a result, like the proper seed being sown in the proper field, good and evil spirits and the beginnings of con- sciousness are born from a proper mixture and combination of specific hearts or brains or animal spirits, and conversely, improper mixtures pro- duce disturbances. These results are mutual: certain souls bring certain bodies into existence, and certain bodies bring certain souls into existence, in accordance with what are called the substantial and the specific difference and subsistence.
When two spirits approach and come near to each other, either because of an accidental combination or because of objects attached to the body, then the dominance of a raging spirit can be removed safely and methodi- cally. This is done either by incantations, that is, by rhetorical and friendly and curing persuasions which restore the besieged spirit; or by the expul- sion and evacuation of noxious material with purgative medicines; or by foods and a happy, sunny atmosphere which are agreeable to human life, and which introduce better matter for the spirit; or by soothing and moderating the harmful materials which sometimes enter into the mix.
As a result, the spirit alone does not produce these living animal opera- tions, nor does the body do this without the spirit. Rather, for these things to occur, whether they be good or bad, or in accord with or in opposition to the nature of the species, what is required is both a material principle and a formal or efficient cause of the needed type. Further, it is reasonable to say that a simple purgation of humours and a simple diet are adequate to cure disturbed images and to free the internal senses which are bound in this way.
However, from this, one cannot accept the conclusion drawn by a most stupid and dull-witted medical man in his book De occultis naturae mirac- ulis30 (On the Hidden Miracles of Nature), which presents more nonsense than words and sentences can describe. He concludes that spirits are the same thing as humours because the expulsion and evacuation of humours also expels and evacuates these spirits with their marvellously independent and structured powers. In this way, with equal justice, one could say that, because the excellence of the soul forces it to leave the body and be many souls in succession, he should think that the soul, itself, is a humour or excrement. Or if he himself were to decide to abandon his house and coun- try because a shortage of food and water made him ignorant of medicine and of the obvious colours and sounds of nature, we should conclude that
29 Virgil, Georgics, ? , ? ? . 30 Levinus Lemnius, De miraculis occultis naturae (Anterpiae, ? ? ? ? ). ? ? ?
? On magic
? he himself belongs to the same species as the things which expelled him. Since the senses happen to be bound and obligated in all these ways, magic and medicine must pay very special attention to the workings of the imagination. For this is the doorway and entrance for all the actions and passions and feelings of animals. And to that linkage is tied the more
profound power of thought.
Fifthly, the bondings arising from thought
The bondings of the imagination would not be very significant in them- selves if they did not duplicate the powers of thought, for those appear- ances which bind and obligate the souls of those who are simple-minded, stupid, credulous and superstitious, are derided and condemned as empty shadows by those who have a sober, disciplined and well-bred mind. As a result, all practitioners of magic, medicine and prophesy produce no results without a pre-given faith,31 and unless they act according to the rules of that faith. (We use the word 'faith' here in the more general sense in which it is used by these people, individually and as a group. )
This faith arises in some people from their pre-given powers, which are well disposed and organized, and in others, it comes from a disturbance of their powers. Indeed, great results are produced by those bonds which come from the words of a man of eloquence, by which a certain disposition arises and flourishes in the imagination, which is the only entrance for all inter- nal feelings and is the bond of bonds. This is the point of Hippocrates' say- ing, 'The most effective doctor is the one whom most believe'. The reason for this is that he binds many people with his eloquence or presence or fame. This applies not only to medicine but to any type of magic or to any power identified by a different title, for, in the act of binding, the imagination must be stimulated or else one can hardly motivate anyone by other means.
In regard to the notion that it is possible for a person to do everything on his own, the theologians believe, agree and state publicly that it is impossible to help those who do not believe the minister. The reason for their lack of power lies in the imagination which they cannot bind. Indeed, kinsmen reject and laugh at physicians and divines because they know about their humble origins and education. As the well-known adage states, 'No one is a prophet in his own land'.
31 In his De magia mathematica, ? , Bruno claims that even Christ could not cause miracles when the disciples around him had too little faith. See Matthew, ? ? :? ? .
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On magic
? Thus, someone who is less well-known can bind people more easily. Given a good general impression and a disposition to be believed, he can somehow use the power of his soul to arrange, disclose and explain things for them, as if windows which had been closed are opened to receive the light of the sun. This opens the door to those other impressions which the art of binding seeks in order to establish further bonds, namely, hope, com- passion, fear, love, hate, indignation, anger, joy, patience, disdain for life, for death, for fate, and all of the powers which cross over from the soul to change the body.
There is no need for a more detailed investigation and consideration of the changes which occur to the types of bondings which follow upon faith and a good impression, and which were just listed above. Further, it is not our business at present to examine the more spiritual powers of the soul which follow next: namely, memory, reason, experience, intellect and mind, because the acts of these powers do not flow over into the body and change it. Rather, all physical changes originate from the powers which are prior to thought and which are its principal and efficient causes.
As a result, all magical powers, active and passive, and their species are dependent upon magical bondings. As Plotinus has asserted, both the wise man and the fool can be bound by the natural principles residing in them, unless the subject also contains some principle which can reject and dis- miss magical influences. For as was said above, not everything enters into everything else, and not everything mixes with everything else, as, for example, water and oil do not mix. As Plotinus himself has stated, and as Porphyry confirms in his Vita Plotini [Life of Plotinus], the evil spells with which a certain Egyptian tried to bind and injure Plotinus were turned back against him. 32 These things are discussed in our De vinculis in genere [A General Account of Bonding].
? 32 The incident related here can be found in Porphyry's On the Life of Plotinus and the Arrangement of his Work, ? ? ? , in Plotinus, The Enneads, translated by Stephen MacKenna, Third Edition (London: Faber and Faber Ltd. , ? ? ? ? ) ? .
? ? ?
A General Account of Bonding
A general account of bonding
Anyone who has the power to bind must to some degree have a universal theory of things in order to be able to bind humans (who are, indeed, the culmination of all things). As we have said elsewhere, in this highest species, it is possible to see, and especially to rank, the species of all things. For example, some humans are like fish, others like birds, others like snakes, and still others like reptiles, whether it be in the latters' species or in their genera. Also, different people have different functions, habits, pur- poses, inclinations, understandings and eras. And so, as was imagined by Proteus and Achelous, the same material object can be changed into different forms and figures, such that to bind them continuously one should always use differing kinds of knots. In addition to this, let us notice the conditions of human life: being young and then old; being of a moder- ate station, or noble, or rich, or powerful, or happy, or, indeed, even envi- ous and ambitious; or being a soldier or a merchant, or one of the many other officials who play a role in different ways in the administration of a state, and thus who must be bonded to each other because they function as agents and instruments of the state. In effect, it seems that nothing can fall outside of an examination of civil life when it is considered in this way (whether it be bonding, or being bonded, or the bonds themselves, or their circumstances). This is the reason why we have assembled the following considerations, which are entitled A general account of bonding.
On bonding agents in general
? . Types of bonding agents. Taken universally, bonding agents are God,
demons, souls, animals, nature, chance, luck and, finally, fate. This universal
? ? ?
A general account of bonding
? force of bonding, which cannot be designated by one name, does not bind because of the nature or the sensitivity of matter. A body does not have any feeling on its own, but only because of a certain force which resides in it and which emanates from it. This force is called, metaphorically, the 'hand which binds', and it is oriented and adapted to bonding in multiple ways.
? . Effects of the bonding agent. As the Platonists say, it is this bonding agency which adorns the mind with orderly ideas; which fills the soul with sequen- tial arguments and harmonious discourse; which makes nature fertile for various seeds; which structures matter in innumerable ways; which vivi- fies, soothes, caresses and activates all things; which orders, generates, rules, attracts and inflames all things; and which moves, reveals, illuminates, purifies, pleases and completes all things.
? . How art binds. An artisan binds with his art, for art is the excellence of the artisan. Even someone who is stupid and dull witted will see the beauty of natural and artificial things, even though he cannot at the same time grasp and admire the talent which has generated all things. For him, 'the stars do not speak of the glory of God'. 1 Rather, like a brute animal, he will shower his affections not on God but on His effects.
? . Humans are bound in many ways. Of all the things which bind, certainly more of them bind humans than brute animals, and more of them bind those who have an active character than those who are dull witted; those who are well endowed in their faculties and powers are aware of more details, circumstances and purposes, and thus, they are moved by more desires.
? . How the senses are panderers for the bonding agent. Dull witted people are bound by lusts, which are aroused infrequently and by natural impulses, and which are few in number and limited to base nourishments. Such peo- ple are not soothed by eloquent speech, nor are they won over by beauty, music, painting or by any of the other attractions of nature.
? . Why only one bond is not enough. As I am bound by more things, I become aware of the many things which bind me, for there are many different kinds of beauty. Thus, I am inflamed and bound in a relationship by one thing in one way and by other things in other ways. If every relationship were reduced to one, then perhaps one thing would be welcomed for all purposes
1 This is the first line of Psalm ? ? , to which Bruno has added the negative. ? ? ?
? A general account of bonding
? and for all occasions. But up to now, this has not happened in nature, which has spread about many bonds of beauty, happiness, goodness, and the var- ious contraries of these dispositions, and which widely distributes them separately according to the numerous types of matter. But it does some- times happen that a person is so tied to one object that his awareness of other things is weakened, overwhelmed and suppressed, either because of the dullness of the senses which are blind to and neglectful of all other things, or because one bond is so strong that it weakens and distorts him. But this is extraordinary and happens rarely and in only a few cases. For example, there are some whose souls seem to be so carried away by the hope of eternal life and by a vivid faith and credulousness, and seem to be so sep- arated from the body in some way, and so strongly bound and controlled by some object in their fantasies and in their opinions, that they do not seem to be aware of the most horrible torments. This clearly happened to the philosopher Anaxarchus, to Andrew2 the Galilean, to the priest Lawrence,3 and to others up to our own day, who were murdered by rulers and kings for the sake of their religion. This also happened for the sake of reason to Diogenes the Cynic and to Epicurus, who argued that they could banish all awareness of pain and pleasure by binding their souls, according to natural laws and principles, with a contempt of all things and of every type of opinion . . . They thought they would attain the highest good avail- able in this life to the human species by preserving their souls in a state of heroic pleasure above sorrow, fear, anger and other feelings.
They claimed that, by holding in contempt the ignoble things in this very transitory life, they could attain a life similar to the gods even while in this mortal body. They thought that they had actually attained this highest good and sublime virtue, and that they had shown this to others.
? . What power contributes to a bonding agent. There are those who say that a bonding agent of greater power binds something else which in turn does not bind it; if the powers are equal, then there is a reciprocal bond which consists in a balance of that quality. But it would follow from this opinion that bond- ing powers are continually changed and altered as forms, circumstances and natures are altered, for a young man does not bind the same things which he bound as a boy, and a woman does not bind the same things which she bound as a girl. Hence, a bonding power is not simple or reducible to only one thing, but is composite, variable in nature and composed of contraries.
2 St Andrew the Apostle, brother of Simon Peter. 3 St Laurentius, third-century Christian martyr.
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? ? . What is bound more easily. A person who is more truly human is bound most strongly by the most worthy things, and he prefers much more to seek out more worthy things than to possess base things, for certainly, we are easily irritated by base things and more ardently seek for things which we do not easily attain.
? . That the same thing bonds contraries in the same way. Bonding agents which pertain to the same type of bonding seem to be confusing, and in a sense even contradictory, when one considers the contrasting effects and circumstances of the bonds. Consider, for example, the bonds of physical love, which seem to be both a fire and snare at the same time, which drive one to shout and to be silent, to joy and to sorrow, to hope and to despera- tion, to fear and to boldness, to anger and to gentleness, to weeping and to laughter. Hence the verses:
I, who carry high the standard of love,
have frozen hopes and burning desires:
at the same time I tremble and freeze, burn and spark, I am mute and fill heaven with ardent cries.
From the heart I sparkle and from my eyes I shed water; I live and I die, laugh and lament.
The waters live and the fire does not die,
for in my eyes I have Thetis and in my heart, Vulcan. 4
? ? . A bonding agent does not bind different things with the same bond. A thing is not absolutely beautiful if it binds only playfully; it is not absolutely good if it binds only usefully; it is not absolutely large if it is limited. Regarding beauty, notice how monkeys and horses please each other; indeed, not even Venus pleases some types of humans and heroes. Regarding goodness, notice how all things contain contraries, and how different animals find what is good for them under the seas or on dry land, in mountains or in fields, in abysses or on summits.
? ? . He who binds. Therefore, he who knows how to bind needs to have an understanding of all things, or at least of the nature, inclination, habits, uses and purposes of the particular things that he is to bind.
? 4 The translation of these two quatrains is taken from John Charles Nelson, Renaissance Theory of Love (New York: Columbia University Press, ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? . Bruno quotes these verses, with slight variations, from his Eroici furori, Part ? , Dialogue ? , first paragraph.
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A general account of bonding
? ? ? . No one particular thing can bind everything. What is absolutely beautiful and good and large and true binds every feeling and every mind absolutely. It destroys nothing; it contains and seeks out all things; it is desired and pursued by many because it invigorates with different types of bonds. Hence, we abundantly acquire many skills, not to be able to act universally and simply, but rather to do this at one time, and that at another time. Thus, since no particular thing is absolutely beautiful, good, true, etc. , whether it be above all genera or in any particular genus or species, it follows that nothing can bind simply at any of these levels. Nevertheless, there is a desire for the beautiful, good, etc. , in all things, for everything seeks to exist and to be beautiful in every way, at least according as its species and genus allow. Beauty and goodness are one thing for one species, and another thing for another; in one thing one contrary dominates, and in another the other dominates. The total beauty and goodness of one species cannot be attained except through the whole species for all eternity and in each of its individ- ual members taken separately. Testimony to this in regard to human beauty is given by Zeuxis in his painting of Helena, whom he selected from among the young women of Crotona. Although he has given us a girl who is beau- tiful as a whole and in every detail, how could he have ever presented com- plete beauty in every way, since the different types of physical beauty in the female species are innumerable, and only some of them can be found in any one subject? For beauty, which consists of a special symmetry or of some other incorporeal aspect of physical nature, occurs in a myriad of forms and arises from innumerable ordered patterns. Thus, just as the rough surface of a stone does not meet, fit and adhere to the rough surface of any other stone, except when their folds and cavities correspond a great deal, likewise not every quality will reside in any soul. Therefore, different individuals are bonded by different objects. And even though the same object bonds both Socrates and Plato, it binds each of them in a different way. Some things excite the masses, other things affect only a few; some things affect the male and the manly, other things the female and the feminine.
? ? . The various instruments of the bonding agent. Nature has distinguished, dispersed and disseminated the objects of beauty, goodness, truth and value in its own way. And, as a result, different things can bind for various rea- sons and for different purposes. For example, a good farmer binds and becomes admirable for one reason, a cook for another reason, a soldier for another, and a musician, a painter, a philosopher, a boy, a girl, for different
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A general account of bonding
? reasons; one of them walks better, while another speaks better. No one of these alone possesses all things in all ways. Rather, the one who is found to be happy and skilful in more ways and at more levels will bind more things, will rule in more ways and will win out over more people of their own species.
? ? . The opportunities for the bonding agent. We experience various feelings at different times and on different occasions, and there is no one measure common to them all. Likewise, there is no one and simple factor which can please everyone or satisfy all things, much less does any one thing satisfy different persons or one person at different times. For example, neither the same food nor the same quantity or quality of food always satisfies. This principle applies to all things which bond our appetites.
? ? . The different types of bonding agents. Some things bond by their own power. Other things bond because of their quantity or because of one of their parts. Still other things bond because they are aided by something else to which they are attached or which properly disposes them, as when a beautiful building arises out of irregularly shaped parts.
? ? . The variable power of the bonding agent. There are many things which we judge to be beautiful but which nevertheless bind us as good, for exam- ple, a horse, a ship, a house, a statue, a dog or a bird. But a beautiful person does not bind us in order to be considered good, and a good person does not bind us in order to be thought to be beautiful. It could happen that crime and error are joined to the beautiful. Consider a beautiful but poor woman: the more disturbing she is, the more easily one tends to give her a gift. There are diverse reasons for diverse things, contrary reasons for contrary things, and similar reasons for similar things.
? ? . Where the bonding agent is located. Those who have not studied the mat- ter too deeply, like the Platonists, think that that which binds is the form of the thing, and crosses over from the thing to the mind, even though it does not leave the object itself. This is like fire which does not lessen when it communicates its form, and like an image which is in an object first, then in the mirror, then in the intervening space, and finally in the eye. But con- sidering the matter more profoundly, we find that, indeed, it does exist in the body, and it consists of a certain physical bond, but, like the soul whose powers reveal its condition, it does not occupy any specific part of the body. Indeed, even though the amorous effects of love may arise from the eyes or
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A general account of bonding
? the mouth or the complexion, nevertheless it is clear that it is not found in them alone, nor does it arise from them alone. For the eyes, considered sep- arately and by themselves, do not have the same force when they are not united with the other parts of the face. The same is true of the mouth, the nose and the complexion, which are not beautiful when depicted separately by a painter. As a result, the nature of beauty is indefinite and quite inde- scribable, and the same is true of the nature of goodness and cheerfulness. The complete nature of a bond is to be found not just in the object itself, but also in another equally important place, i. e. , in the one who is bound. Whether food is greedily consumed or is returned uneaten after a meal, this makes no difference at all as far as the substance and quality of the food is concerned. And the bonds of love, which were intense before sexual intercourse, become relaxed when the seed is ejaculated and the fire becomes moderated, even though the beautiful object remains the same. Therefore, the whole nature of a bond cannot be found in the object.
? ? . The predispositions of the bonding agent. The bonding agent is said to be predisposed to bonding in three ways: by its order; by its measure; and by its type. The order is the interrelation of its parts; the measure is its quan- tity; and its type is designated by its shapes, its outlines and its colours. For example, in a bonding of sounds the order consists of a rising and falling through high, low and intermediate notes; the measure is the use of thirds, fourths, fifths, sixths, etc. , and the progression of tones and semitones; the type is the harmony, softness and clarity. In all things which are predis- posed to bonding, whether they be simple or composite, all three of these factors are present in a proportional way.
? ? . The diversity of predispositions. Regarding the bonds themselves, there is another predisposition: the signs and vestiges which reveal how well developed the soul is. These move the soul to seek out only the enjoyment of another soul, to which it becomes attached and united. And also because of this predisposition, when there is a suitable ordering of the body and of its parts and of the garments which clothe it, the soul is then bound to reach out for the enjoyment of the body. When this predisposition is present in both the soul and the body, it impels each more strongly to the enjoyment of the other, or each is attracted by the other principle. Furthermore, there are some people who are so bound by the soul that they also desire the very same body which contains the soul. There are even a few people who are so focused on the soul that they look down upon certain features of the
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A general account of bonding
? body unless they are predisposed by the soul. Thus, the famous story is told about Socrates, who required that an attractive young boy first speak out before he would declare his love for him.
? ? . The condition of the bonding agent. Flatterers give high praise to ordinary virtues, downplay faults, excuse errors, transform evil deeds into virtues, and act very cautiously so as not to reveal their art of flattery. As a result, they bind to themselves people who are not very clever, for to be loved and honoured is the most pleasing and delightful thing for anyone, and to be able to bind someone requires a certain higher type of virtue.
? ? . How the bonding agent is bound. He who binds experiences joy and a cer- tain sense of glory, and this is greater and stronger insofar as the one who is bound is more noble, more worthy and more excellent. The strength of the bond by which he who binds is himself bound by the one who is bound is located in this sense of joy and glory. In praising the vanquished, the vic- tors extol their own victory, and sometimes they even deceive themselves more than others, both in their desires and in the other public conse- quences of bonding. On the other hand, someone must be of a worthless character if they are so unpleasant as not to reciprocate in spirit with some- one who loves them, when that person is honourable and distinguished, or with someone who is bound in spirit to them in some other way.
? ? . The types of bonding agents. There is one type of bonding in which we wish to become worthy, beautiful and good; there is another type in which we desire to take command of what is good, beautiful and worthy. The first type of bonding derives from an object which we lack, the second, from an object which we already have. These two types bind both what is good and what is thought to be good, although this bond always occurs in some pro- portional or suitable way. Also, fantasy and opinion bind more things than does reason, for the former are indeed stronger than the latter. To be sure, there are many who love without a reason, although there is some cause which motivates their love, and, as a result, they are bound but do not know what binds them.
? ? . The blindness of the bonding agent. The explanation of bonds is, for the most part, hidden, even from the wise, for what use is it to appeal to analo- gies, similarities, family traits and other such meaningless words when we see a person who hates nothing more than another person who is his genial companion, while at the same time and without reason, he also loves that
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? person more than anything else? A general explanation is useless in a case like this, because such an account does not distinguish between things which belong to the same genus or species, for example, between female and female, or male and female, as well as between other human conditions like being old or young. And what would you say about the love of things known only by hearsay, which is usually called 'devotion'? Are not humans bonded to higher and immaterial things, as well as to imaginary things, and especially to things beyond experience? I will pass over here any discussion of the specific types of binding powers, and especially of the power to bind through incantations. It is not true, as some have said, that the power of bonding is derived from what is good rather than from an opinion about what is good; nor is it derived from a known rather than from a hidden cause. We have already spoken above about the different types and species of goods.
? ? . The diligence of the bonding agent. Just as dull people are bound more easily by a shrewd flatterer than by a true friend, likewise, bonds and bond- ing powers are established and maintained in skillful ways. For example, a timid man recommends against joining the army; a strongly godless person recommends against becoming a priest; a cruel person recommends against caring for others.
28 Virgil, Eclogues, ? ? ? , ? ? ? .
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On magic
? disturbed by things which do not affect or disturb us. And sometimes we are touched and injured more significantly by those things whose assaults we are not aware of than we are by things which we do perceive. As a result, many things which are seen, and forms which are absorbed through the eyes, do not arouse any consciousness in our direct and external sensory powers. Nevertheless, they do penetrate more deeply and lethally, so that the internal spirit is immediately conscious of them, as if it were a foreign sense or living thing. Thus, it would not be easy to refute some of the Platonists and all of the Pythagoreans, who believe that one human person of himself lives in many animals, and when one of these animals dies, even the most important one, the others survive for a long time.
Hence, it would obviously be stupid to think that we are affected and injured only by those visible forms which generate clear awareness in the senses and the soul. That would not be much different from someone who thinks that he is injured more or less only by blows of which he is more or less conscious. However, we experience more discomfort and suffering by being pricked by a needle or by a thorn irritating the skin than we do by a sword thrust through from one side of the body to the other, whose effect is later felt a great deal more, but at the time we are unaware of the injury caused by its penetration of parts of the body.
So, indeed, there are many things which stealthily pass through the eyes and capture and continuously intrude upon the spirit up to the point of the death of the soul, even though they do not cause as much awareness as do less significant things. For example, seeing certain gestures or emotions or actions can move us to tears. And the souls of some faint at the sight of the spilling of another's blood or in observing the dissection of a cadaver. There is no other cause of this than a feeling which binds through vision.
Fourthly, the bondings arising from imagination
The role of the imagination is to receive images derived from the senses and to preserve, combine and divide them. This happens in two ways. First, it occurs by the free creative choice of the person who imagines, for example, poets, painters, story writers and all who combine images in some organized way. Second, it occurs without such deliberate choice. The latter also happens in two ways: either through some other cause which chooses and selects, or through an external agent. The latter, again, is
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? twofold. Sometimes the agent is mediated, as when a man uses sounds or appearances to bring about stimulations through the eyes or ears. And some- times the agent is unmediated, as when a spirit, rational soul or demon acts on the imagination of someone, asleep or awake, to produce internal images in such a way that something seems to have been apprehended by the external senses.
Consequently,somepossessedpeopleseemtoseecertainsightsandhear certain sounds and words which they truly think are caused by external subjects. Hence, they strongly and persistently assert that what they have seen and heard is true, when it is their reason which is deceived, and not their senses, for they do hear what they hear, and they do see what they see. But the very same thing which they think they see as derived from exter- nal sounds in their ears and from external sights absorbed by their vision are fantasy images presented to their internal sense. However, they think that these impressions of the internal sense are the real things. Thus, it hap- pens that they refuse to be recalled to a healthier point of view by actual witnesses, whom they prefer to reject in favour of their own imagination, and who they truly think are deaf and dumb. Medically these matters are cases of mania and melancholy, and are called 'the dreams of the wakeful'.
Further, this type of bonding is not due simply to a material principle, as is believed by certain well-known medical people with an obstinacy which is most crude and oppressive. Nor is it due simply to demonic or dia- bolical efficient causes, as is believed on their part by some theologians. Rather, both causes co-operate. The material factor is a melancholic humour, which we call the kitchen or the bathhouse of the saturnalian demons. But the efficient cause and moving spirit is a demon who does not have a completely immaterial substance, because these demons seem to be endowed with many animal affections and have definite properties of denseness. Although they are spiritual substances, nature has given them a body which is very thin and is not endowed with senses. They belong to that genus of animal which, as was said, has more species than do living, composite and sensory animals.
Now, a specific soul comes to a specific seed which has been properly deposited in a specific place, or conversely, a body makes or produces from itself, as it were, a specific animal form or living thing. For example, from one seed the olive is born, from another a dog, from another a human, and in general one thing or another is suited to be born from a body which is structured in one way or another. As the poet says, 'The eggs come more
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? readily to where the seed is sown'. 29 As a result, like the proper seed being sown in the proper field, good and evil spirits and the beginnings of con- sciousness are born from a proper mixture and combination of specific hearts or brains or animal spirits, and conversely, improper mixtures pro- duce disturbances. These results are mutual: certain souls bring certain bodies into existence, and certain bodies bring certain souls into existence, in accordance with what are called the substantial and the specific difference and subsistence.
When two spirits approach and come near to each other, either because of an accidental combination or because of objects attached to the body, then the dominance of a raging spirit can be removed safely and methodi- cally. This is done either by incantations, that is, by rhetorical and friendly and curing persuasions which restore the besieged spirit; or by the expul- sion and evacuation of noxious material with purgative medicines; or by foods and a happy, sunny atmosphere which are agreeable to human life, and which introduce better matter for the spirit; or by soothing and moderating the harmful materials which sometimes enter into the mix.
As a result, the spirit alone does not produce these living animal opera- tions, nor does the body do this without the spirit. Rather, for these things to occur, whether they be good or bad, or in accord with or in opposition to the nature of the species, what is required is both a material principle and a formal or efficient cause of the needed type. Further, it is reasonable to say that a simple purgation of humours and a simple diet are adequate to cure disturbed images and to free the internal senses which are bound in this way.
However, from this, one cannot accept the conclusion drawn by a most stupid and dull-witted medical man in his book De occultis naturae mirac- ulis30 (On the Hidden Miracles of Nature), which presents more nonsense than words and sentences can describe. He concludes that spirits are the same thing as humours because the expulsion and evacuation of humours also expels and evacuates these spirits with their marvellously independent and structured powers. In this way, with equal justice, one could say that, because the excellence of the soul forces it to leave the body and be many souls in succession, he should think that the soul, itself, is a humour or excrement. Or if he himself were to decide to abandon his house and coun- try because a shortage of food and water made him ignorant of medicine and of the obvious colours and sounds of nature, we should conclude that
29 Virgil, Georgics, ? , ? ? . 30 Levinus Lemnius, De miraculis occultis naturae (Anterpiae, ? ? ? ? ). ? ? ?
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? he himself belongs to the same species as the things which expelled him. Since the senses happen to be bound and obligated in all these ways, magic and medicine must pay very special attention to the workings of the imagination. For this is the doorway and entrance for all the actions and passions and feelings of animals. And to that linkage is tied the more
profound power of thought.
Fifthly, the bondings arising from thought
The bondings of the imagination would not be very significant in them- selves if they did not duplicate the powers of thought, for those appear- ances which bind and obligate the souls of those who are simple-minded, stupid, credulous and superstitious, are derided and condemned as empty shadows by those who have a sober, disciplined and well-bred mind. As a result, all practitioners of magic, medicine and prophesy produce no results without a pre-given faith,31 and unless they act according to the rules of that faith. (We use the word 'faith' here in the more general sense in which it is used by these people, individually and as a group. )
This faith arises in some people from their pre-given powers, which are well disposed and organized, and in others, it comes from a disturbance of their powers. Indeed, great results are produced by those bonds which come from the words of a man of eloquence, by which a certain disposition arises and flourishes in the imagination, which is the only entrance for all inter- nal feelings and is the bond of bonds. This is the point of Hippocrates' say- ing, 'The most effective doctor is the one whom most believe'. The reason for this is that he binds many people with his eloquence or presence or fame. This applies not only to medicine but to any type of magic or to any power identified by a different title, for, in the act of binding, the imagination must be stimulated or else one can hardly motivate anyone by other means.
In regard to the notion that it is possible for a person to do everything on his own, the theologians believe, agree and state publicly that it is impossible to help those who do not believe the minister. The reason for their lack of power lies in the imagination which they cannot bind. Indeed, kinsmen reject and laugh at physicians and divines because they know about their humble origins and education. As the well-known adage states, 'No one is a prophet in his own land'.
31 In his De magia mathematica, ? , Bruno claims that even Christ could not cause miracles when the disciples around him had too little faith. See Matthew, ? ? :? ? .
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? Thus, someone who is less well-known can bind people more easily. Given a good general impression and a disposition to be believed, he can somehow use the power of his soul to arrange, disclose and explain things for them, as if windows which had been closed are opened to receive the light of the sun. This opens the door to those other impressions which the art of binding seeks in order to establish further bonds, namely, hope, com- passion, fear, love, hate, indignation, anger, joy, patience, disdain for life, for death, for fate, and all of the powers which cross over from the soul to change the body.
There is no need for a more detailed investigation and consideration of the changes which occur to the types of bondings which follow upon faith and a good impression, and which were just listed above. Further, it is not our business at present to examine the more spiritual powers of the soul which follow next: namely, memory, reason, experience, intellect and mind, because the acts of these powers do not flow over into the body and change it. Rather, all physical changes originate from the powers which are prior to thought and which are its principal and efficient causes.
As a result, all magical powers, active and passive, and their species are dependent upon magical bondings. As Plotinus has asserted, both the wise man and the fool can be bound by the natural principles residing in them, unless the subject also contains some principle which can reject and dis- miss magical influences. For as was said above, not everything enters into everything else, and not everything mixes with everything else, as, for example, water and oil do not mix. As Plotinus himself has stated, and as Porphyry confirms in his Vita Plotini [Life of Plotinus], the evil spells with which a certain Egyptian tried to bind and injure Plotinus were turned back against him. 32 These things are discussed in our De vinculis in genere [A General Account of Bonding].
? 32 The incident related here can be found in Porphyry's On the Life of Plotinus and the Arrangement of his Work, ? ? ? , in Plotinus, The Enneads, translated by Stephen MacKenna, Third Edition (London: Faber and Faber Ltd. , ? ? ? ? ) ? .
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A General Account of Bonding
A general account of bonding
Anyone who has the power to bind must to some degree have a universal theory of things in order to be able to bind humans (who are, indeed, the culmination of all things). As we have said elsewhere, in this highest species, it is possible to see, and especially to rank, the species of all things. For example, some humans are like fish, others like birds, others like snakes, and still others like reptiles, whether it be in the latters' species or in their genera. Also, different people have different functions, habits, pur- poses, inclinations, understandings and eras. And so, as was imagined by Proteus and Achelous, the same material object can be changed into different forms and figures, such that to bind them continuously one should always use differing kinds of knots. In addition to this, let us notice the conditions of human life: being young and then old; being of a moder- ate station, or noble, or rich, or powerful, or happy, or, indeed, even envi- ous and ambitious; or being a soldier or a merchant, or one of the many other officials who play a role in different ways in the administration of a state, and thus who must be bonded to each other because they function as agents and instruments of the state. In effect, it seems that nothing can fall outside of an examination of civil life when it is considered in this way (whether it be bonding, or being bonded, or the bonds themselves, or their circumstances). This is the reason why we have assembled the following considerations, which are entitled A general account of bonding.
On bonding agents in general
? . Types of bonding agents. Taken universally, bonding agents are God,
demons, souls, animals, nature, chance, luck and, finally, fate. This universal
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A general account of bonding
? force of bonding, which cannot be designated by one name, does not bind because of the nature or the sensitivity of matter. A body does not have any feeling on its own, but only because of a certain force which resides in it and which emanates from it. This force is called, metaphorically, the 'hand which binds', and it is oriented and adapted to bonding in multiple ways.
? . Effects of the bonding agent. As the Platonists say, it is this bonding agency which adorns the mind with orderly ideas; which fills the soul with sequen- tial arguments and harmonious discourse; which makes nature fertile for various seeds; which structures matter in innumerable ways; which vivi- fies, soothes, caresses and activates all things; which orders, generates, rules, attracts and inflames all things; and which moves, reveals, illuminates, purifies, pleases and completes all things.
? . How art binds. An artisan binds with his art, for art is the excellence of the artisan. Even someone who is stupid and dull witted will see the beauty of natural and artificial things, even though he cannot at the same time grasp and admire the talent which has generated all things. For him, 'the stars do not speak of the glory of God'. 1 Rather, like a brute animal, he will shower his affections not on God but on His effects.
? . Humans are bound in many ways. Of all the things which bind, certainly more of them bind humans than brute animals, and more of them bind those who have an active character than those who are dull witted; those who are well endowed in their faculties and powers are aware of more details, circumstances and purposes, and thus, they are moved by more desires.
? . How the senses are panderers for the bonding agent. Dull witted people are bound by lusts, which are aroused infrequently and by natural impulses, and which are few in number and limited to base nourishments. Such peo- ple are not soothed by eloquent speech, nor are they won over by beauty, music, painting or by any of the other attractions of nature.
? . Why only one bond is not enough. As I am bound by more things, I become aware of the many things which bind me, for there are many different kinds of beauty. Thus, I am inflamed and bound in a relationship by one thing in one way and by other things in other ways. If every relationship were reduced to one, then perhaps one thing would be welcomed for all purposes
1 This is the first line of Psalm ? ? , to which Bruno has added the negative. ? ? ?
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? and for all occasions. But up to now, this has not happened in nature, which has spread about many bonds of beauty, happiness, goodness, and the var- ious contraries of these dispositions, and which widely distributes them separately according to the numerous types of matter. But it does some- times happen that a person is so tied to one object that his awareness of other things is weakened, overwhelmed and suppressed, either because of the dullness of the senses which are blind to and neglectful of all other things, or because one bond is so strong that it weakens and distorts him. But this is extraordinary and happens rarely and in only a few cases. For example, there are some whose souls seem to be so carried away by the hope of eternal life and by a vivid faith and credulousness, and seem to be so sep- arated from the body in some way, and so strongly bound and controlled by some object in their fantasies and in their opinions, that they do not seem to be aware of the most horrible torments. This clearly happened to the philosopher Anaxarchus, to Andrew2 the Galilean, to the priest Lawrence,3 and to others up to our own day, who were murdered by rulers and kings for the sake of their religion. This also happened for the sake of reason to Diogenes the Cynic and to Epicurus, who argued that they could banish all awareness of pain and pleasure by binding their souls, according to natural laws and principles, with a contempt of all things and of every type of opinion . . . They thought they would attain the highest good avail- able in this life to the human species by preserving their souls in a state of heroic pleasure above sorrow, fear, anger and other feelings.
They claimed that, by holding in contempt the ignoble things in this very transitory life, they could attain a life similar to the gods even while in this mortal body. They thought that they had actually attained this highest good and sublime virtue, and that they had shown this to others.
? . What power contributes to a bonding agent. There are those who say that a bonding agent of greater power binds something else which in turn does not bind it; if the powers are equal, then there is a reciprocal bond which consists in a balance of that quality. But it would follow from this opinion that bond- ing powers are continually changed and altered as forms, circumstances and natures are altered, for a young man does not bind the same things which he bound as a boy, and a woman does not bind the same things which she bound as a girl. Hence, a bonding power is not simple or reducible to only one thing, but is composite, variable in nature and composed of contraries.
2 St Andrew the Apostle, brother of Simon Peter. 3 St Laurentius, third-century Christian martyr.
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? ? . What is bound more easily. A person who is more truly human is bound most strongly by the most worthy things, and he prefers much more to seek out more worthy things than to possess base things, for certainly, we are easily irritated by base things and more ardently seek for things which we do not easily attain.
? . That the same thing bonds contraries in the same way. Bonding agents which pertain to the same type of bonding seem to be confusing, and in a sense even contradictory, when one considers the contrasting effects and circumstances of the bonds. Consider, for example, the bonds of physical love, which seem to be both a fire and snare at the same time, which drive one to shout and to be silent, to joy and to sorrow, to hope and to despera- tion, to fear and to boldness, to anger and to gentleness, to weeping and to laughter. Hence the verses:
I, who carry high the standard of love,
have frozen hopes and burning desires:
at the same time I tremble and freeze, burn and spark, I am mute and fill heaven with ardent cries.
From the heart I sparkle and from my eyes I shed water; I live and I die, laugh and lament.
The waters live and the fire does not die,
for in my eyes I have Thetis and in my heart, Vulcan. 4
? ? . A bonding agent does not bind different things with the same bond. A thing is not absolutely beautiful if it binds only playfully; it is not absolutely good if it binds only usefully; it is not absolutely large if it is limited. Regarding beauty, notice how monkeys and horses please each other; indeed, not even Venus pleases some types of humans and heroes. Regarding goodness, notice how all things contain contraries, and how different animals find what is good for them under the seas or on dry land, in mountains or in fields, in abysses or on summits.
? ? . He who binds. Therefore, he who knows how to bind needs to have an understanding of all things, or at least of the nature, inclination, habits, uses and purposes of the particular things that he is to bind.
? 4 The translation of these two quatrains is taken from John Charles Nelson, Renaissance Theory of Love (New York: Columbia University Press, ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? . Bruno quotes these verses, with slight variations, from his Eroici furori, Part ? , Dialogue ? , first paragraph.
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? ? ? . No one particular thing can bind everything. What is absolutely beautiful and good and large and true binds every feeling and every mind absolutely. It destroys nothing; it contains and seeks out all things; it is desired and pursued by many because it invigorates with different types of bonds. Hence, we abundantly acquire many skills, not to be able to act universally and simply, but rather to do this at one time, and that at another time. Thus, since no particular thing is absolutely beautiful, good, true, etc. , whether it be above all genera or in any particular genus or species, it follows that nothing can bind simply at any of these levels. Nevertheless, there is a desire for the beautiful, good, etc. , in all things, for everything seeks to exist and to be beautiful in every way, at least according as its species and genus allow. Beauty and goodness are one thing for one species, and another thing for another; in one thing one contrary dominates, and in another the other dominates. The total beauty and goodness of one species cannot be attained except through the whole species for all eternity and in each of its individ- ual members taken separately. Testimony to this in regard to human beauty is given by Zeuxis in his painting of Helena, whom he selected from among the young women of Crotona. Although he has given us a girl who is beau- tiful as a whole and in every detail, how could he have ever presented com- plete beauty in every way, since the different types of physical beauty in the female species are innumerable, and only some of them can be found in any one subject? For beauty, which consists of a special symmetry or of some other incorporeal aspect of physical nature, occurs in a myriad of forms and arises from innumerable ordered patterns. Thus, just as the rough surface of a stone does not meet, fit and adhere to the rough surface of any other stone, except when their folds and cavities correspond a great deal, likewise not every quality will reside in any soul. Therefore, different individuals are bonded by different objects. And even though the same object bonds both Socrates and Plato, it binds each of them in a different way. Some things excite the masses, other things affect only a few; some things affect the male and the manly, other things the female and the feminine.
? ? . The various instruments of the bonding agent. Nature has distinguished, dispersed and disseminated the objects of beauty, goodness, truth and value in its own way. And, as a result, different things can bind for various rea- sons and for different purposes. For example, a good farmer binds and becomes admirable for one reason, a cook for another reason, a soldier for another, and a musician, a painter, a philosopher, a boy, a girl, for different
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? reasons; one of them walks better, while another speaks better. No one of these alone possesses all things in all ways. Rather, the one who is found to be happy and skilful in more ways and at more levels will bind more things, will rule in more ways and will win out over more people of their own species.
? ? . The opportunities for the bonding agent. We experience various feelings at different times and on different occasions, and there is no one measure common to them all. Likewise, there is no one and simple factor which can please everyone or satisfy all things, much less does any one thing satisfy different persons or one person at different times. For example, neither the same food nor the same quantity or quality of food always satisfies. This principle applies to all things which bond our appetites.
? ? . The different types of bonding agents. Some things bond by their own power. Other things bond because of their quantity or because of one of their parts. Still other things bond because they are aided by something else to which they are attached or which properly disposes them, as when a beautiful building arises out of irregularly shaped parts.
? ? . The variable power of the bonding agent. There are many things which we judge to be beautiful but which nevertheless bind us as good, for exam- ple, a horse, a ship, a house, a statue, a dog or a bird. But a beautiful person does not bind us in order to be considered good, and a good person does not bind us in order to be thought to be beautiful. It could happen that crime and error are joined to the beautiful. Consider a beautiful but poor woman: the more disturbing she is, the more easily one tends to give her a gift. There are diverse reasons for diverse things, contrary reasons for contrary things, and similar reasons for similar things.
? ? . Where the bonding agent is located. Those who have not studied the mat- ter too deeply, like the Platonists, think that that which binds is the form of the thing, and crosses over from the thing to the mind, even though it does not leave the object itself. This is like fire which does not lessen when it communicates its form, and like an image which is in an object first, then in the mirror, then in the intervening space, and finally in the eye. But con- sidering the matter more profoundly, we find that, indeed, it does exist in the body, and it consists of a certain physical bond, but, like the soul whose powers reveal its condition, it does not occupy any specific part of the body. Indeed, even though the amorous effects of love may arise from the eyes or
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A general account of bonding
? the mouth or the complexion, nevertheless it is clear that it is not found in them alone, nor does it arise from them alone. For the eyes, considered sep- arately and by themselves, do not have the same force when they are not united with the other parts of the face. The same is true of the mouth, the nose and the complexion, which are not beautiful when depicted separately by a painter. As a result, the nature of beauty is indefinite and quite inde- scribable, and the same is true of the nature of goodness and cheerfulness. The complete nature of a bond is to be found not just in the object itself, but also in another equally important place, i. e. , in the one who is bound. Whether food is greedily consumed or is returned uneaten after a meal, this makes no difference at all as far as the substance and quality of the food is concerned. And the bonds of love, which were intense before sexual intercourse, become relaxed when the seed is ejaculated and the fire becomes moderated, even though the beautiful object remains the same. Therefore, the whole nature of a bond cannot be found in the object.
? ? . The predispositions of the bonding agent. The bonding agent is said to be predisposed to bonding in three ways: by its order; by its measure; and by its type. The order is the interrelation of its parts; the measure is its quan- tity; and its type is designated by its shapes, its outlines and its colours. For example, in a bonding of sounds the order consists of a rising and falling through high, low and intermediate notes; the measure is the use of thirds, fourths, fifths, sixths, etc. , and the progression of tones and semitones; the type is the harmony, softness and clarity. In all things which are predis- posed to bonding, whether they be simple or composite, all three of these factors are present in a proportional way.
? ? . The diversity of predispositions. Regarding the bonds themselves, there is another predisposition: the signs and vestiges which reveal how well developed the soul is. These move the soul to seek out only the enjoyment of another soul, to which it becomes attached and united. And also because of this predisposition, when there is a suitable ordering of the body and of its parts and of the garments which clothe it, the soul is then bound to reach out for the enjoyment of the body. When this predisposition is present in both the soul and the body, it impels each more strongly to the enjoyment of the other, or each is attracted by the other principle. Furthermore, there are some people who are so bound by the soul that they also desire the very same body which contains the soul. There are even a few people who are so focused on the soul that they look down upon certain features of the
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? body unless they are predisposed by the soul. Thus, the famous story is told about Socrates, who required that an attractive young boy first speak out before he would declare his love for him.
? ? . The condition of the bonding agent. Flatterers give high praise to ordinary virtues, downplay faults, excuse errors, transform evil deeds into virtues, and act very cautiously so as not to reveal their art of flattery. As a result, they bind to themselves people who are not very clever, for to be loved and honoured is the most pleasing and delightful thing for anyone, and to be able to bind someone requires a certain higher type of virtue.
? ? . How the bonding agent is bound. He who binds experiences joy and a cer- tain sense of glory, and this is greater and stronger insofar as the one who is bound is more noble, more worthy and more excellent. The strength of the bond by which he who binds is himself bound by the one who is bound is located in this sense of joy and glory. In praising the vanquished, the vic- tors extol their own victory, and sometimes they even deceive themselves more than others, both in their desires and in the other public conse- quences of bonding. On the other hand, someone must be of a worthless character if they are so unpleasant as not to reciprocate in spirit with some- one who loves them, when that person is honourable and distinguished, or with someone who is bound in spirit to them in some other way.
? ? . The types of bonding agents. There is one type of bonding in which we wish to become worthy, beautiful and good; there is another type in which we desire to take command of what is good, beautiful and worthy. The first type of bonding derives from an object which we lack, the second, from an object which we already have. These two types bind both what is good and what is thought to be good, although this bond always occurs in some pro- portional or suitable way. Also, fantasy and opinion bind more things than does reason, for the former are indeed stronger than the latter. To be sure, there are many who love without a reason, although there is some cause which motivates their love, and, as a result, they are bound but do not know what binds them.
? ? . The blindness of the bonding agent. The explanation of bonds is, for the most part, hidden, even from the wise, for what use is it to appeal to analo- gies, similarities, family traits and other such meaningless words when we see a person who hates nothing more than another person who is his genial companion, while at the same time and without reason, he also loves that
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? person more than anything else? A general explanation is useless in a case like this, because such an account does not distinguish between things which belong to the same genus or species, for example, between female and female, or male and female, as well as between other human conditions like being old or young. And what would you say about the love of things known only by hearsay, which is usually called 'devotion'? Are not humans bonded to higher and immaterial things, as well as to imaginary things, and especially to things beyond experience? I will pass over here any discussion of the specific types of binding powers, and especially of the power to bind through incantations. It is not true, as some have said, that the power of bonding is derived from what is good rather than from an opinion about what is good; nor is it derived from a known rather than from a hidden cause. We have already spoken above about the different types and species of goods.
? ? . The diligence of the bonding agent. Just as dull people are bound more easily by a shrewd flatterer than by a true friend, likewise, bonds and bond- ing powers are established and maintained in skillful ways. For example, a timid man recommends against joining the army; a strongly godless person recommends against becoming a priest; a cruel person recommends against caring for others.
