The only rationality that we
know is the small reason of man : he must exert
it to the utmost, and it invariably leaves him in
the lurch if he tries to place himself in the hands
of “Providence.
know is the small reason of man : he must exert
it to the utmost, and it invariably leaves him in
the lurch if he tries to place himself in the hands
of “Providence.
Nietzsche - v08 - The Case of Wagner
It is the same
all round, however: where are the historians who
can survey things and events without being hum-
bugged by stupid theories P I know of only one,
Burckhardt. Everywhere the widest possible opti-
---"
mism prevails in science. The question: “What
would have been the consequence if so and so had
not happened? ” is almost unanimously thrust aside,
and yet it is the cardinal question. Thus every-
thing becomes ironical. Let us only consider our
own lives. If we examine history in accordance
with a preconceived plan, let this plan be sought
in the purposes of a great man, or perhaps in those
of a sex, or of a party. Everything else is a chaos.
—Even in natural science we find this deification of
the necessary.
Germany has become the breeding-place of this
historical optimism ; Hegel is perhaps to blame
for this. Nothing, however, is more responsible for
## p. 171 (#207) ############################################
WE PHILOLOGISTS 171
the fatal influence of German culture. Everything
that has been kept down by success gradually rears
itself up : history as the scorn of the conqueror; a
servile sentiment and a kneeling down before
the actual fact—“a sense for the State,” they now
call it, as if that had still to be propagated He
who does not understand how brutal and unintelli-
gent history is will never understand the stimulus
to make it intelligent. Just think how rare it is to
find a man with as great an intelligent knowledge
of his own life as Goethe had : what amount of
rationality can we expect to find arising out of these
other veiled and blind existences as they work chao-
tically with and in opposition to each other ?
And it is especially naïve when Hellwald, the
author of a history of culture, warns us away from
all “ideals,” simply because history has killed them
off one after the other.
I56.
To bring to light without reserve the stupidity
and the want of reason in human things: that is |
the aim of our brethren and colleagues. People
will then have to distinguish what is essential in
them, what is incorrigible, and what is still suscep-
tible of further improvement. But “Providence”
must be kept out of the question, for it is a concep-
tion that enables people to take things too easily.
I wish to breathe the breath of this purpose into
science. Let us advance our knowledge of man-
kind | The good and rational in man is accidental
or apparent, or the contrary of something very irra-
tional. There will come a time when training will
be the only thought.
## p. 171 (#208) ############################################
I64 WE PHILOLOGISTS
I29
To live on mountains, to travel a great deal, and
to move quickly from one place to another: in these
ways we can now begin to compare ourselves with
the Greek gods. We know the past, too, and we
almost know the future. What would a Greek say,
if only he could see us!
I 30
The gods make men still more evil; this is the
nature of man. If we do not like a man, we wish
! that he may become worse than he is, and then we
are glad. This forms part of the obscure philosophy
of hate—a philosophy which has never yet been
written, because it is everywhere the pudendum that
every one feels.
I31
The pan-Hellenic Homer finds his delight in the
frivolity of the gods; but it is astounding how he
can also give them dignity again. This amazing
ability to raise one's self again, however, is Greek.
I 32
What, then, is the origin of the envy of the gods?
people did not believe in a calm, quiet happiness,
but only in an exuberant one. This must have
caused some displeasure to the Greeks; for their
soul was only too easily wounded: it embittered
them to see a happy man. That is Greek. If a
man of distinguished talent appeared, the flock of
envious people must have become astonishingly
large. If any one met with a misfortune, they
## p. 171 (#209) ############################################
WE PHILOLOGISTS 165
would say of him: “Ah! no wonder he was too
frivolous and too well off. ” And every one of them
would have behaved exuberantly if he had possessed
the requisite talent, and would willingly have played
the rôle of the god who sent the unhappiness to men.
I33
The Greek gods did not demand any complete
changes of character, and were, generally speaking,
by no means burdensome or importunate: it was
thus possible to take them seriously and to believe
in them. At the time of Homer, indeed, the nature
of the Greek was formed : flippancy of images and
imagination was necessary to lighten the weight of
its passionate disposition and to set it free.
I34
Every religion has for its highest images an analo-
gon in the spiritual condition of those who profess
it. The God of Mohammed : the solitariness of the
desert, the distant roar of the lion, the vision of a
formidable warrior. The God of the Christians:
everything that men and women think of when they
hear the word “love. ” The God of the Greeks: a
beautiful apparition in a dream.
I35
A great deal of intelligence must have gone to
the making up of a Greek polytheism: the expendi-
ture of intelligence is much less lavish when people
have only one God.
136
Greek morality is not based on religion, but on
the polis.
## p. 172 (#210) ############################################
172 WE PHILOLOGISTS
I 57
Surrender to necessity is exactly what I do not
teach—for one must first know this necessity to be
necessary. There may perhaps be many necessi-
ties; but in general this inclination is simply a bed
of idleness.
158
To know history now means: to recognise how
all those who believed in a Providence took things
too easily. There is no such thing. If human
affairs are seen to go forward in a loose and dis-
ordered way, do not think that a god has any pur-
pose in view by letting them do so or that he is
neglecting them. We can now see in a general
way that the history of Christianity on earth has
been one of the most dreadful chapters in history,
and that a stop must be put to it. True, the
influence of antiquity has been observed in Chris-
tianity even in our own time; and, as it diminishes,
so will our knowledge of antiquity diminish also to
an even greater extent. Now is the best time to
recognise it: we are no longer prejudiced in favour
of Christianity, but we still understand it, and also
the antiquity that forms part of it, so far as this anti-
quity stands in line with Christianity.
I59
Philosophic heads must occupy themselves one
day with the collective account of antiquity and
make up its balance-sheet. If we have this, anti-
quity will be overcome. All the shortcomings which
now vex us have their roots in antiquity, so that
we cannot continue to treat this account with
## p. 173 (#211) ############################################
WE PHILOLOGISTS 173
the mildness which has been customary up to the
present. The atrocious crime of mankind which
rendered Christianity possible, as it actually became |
possible, is the guilt of antiquity. With Christianity
antiquity will also be cleared away. —At the present
time it is not so very far behind us, and it is certainly
not possible to do justice to it. It has been availed
of in the most dreadful fashion for purposes of re-
pression, and has acted as a support for religious
oppression by disguising itself as “culture. ” It was
common to hear the saying, “Antiquity has been
conquered by Christianity. ”
This was a historical fact, and it was thus thought
that no harm could come of any dealings with
antiquity. Yes; it is so plausible to say that we
find Christian ethics “deeper” than Socrates 1 Plato
was easier to compete with ! We are at the present
time, so to speak, merely chewing the cud of the
very battle which was fought in the first centuries
of the Christian era—with the exception of the fact
that now, instead of the clearly perceptible antiquity
which then existed, we have merely its pale ghost;
and,indeed, even Christianity itself has become rather
ghostlike. It is a battle fought after the decisive
battle, a post-vibration. In the end, all the forces
of which antiquity consisted have reappeared in
Christianity in the crudest possible form: it is
nothing new, only quantitatively extraordinary.
I6O
What severs us for ever from the culture of anti-
quity is the fact that its foundations have become
too shaky for us. A criticism of the Greeks is at
## p. 174 (#212) ############################################
I74 WE PHILOLOGISTS
!
the same time a criticism of Christianity; for the
bases of the spirit of belief, the religious cult, and
witchcraft, are the same in both. -There are many
rudimentary stages still remaining; but they are by
this time almost ready to collapse.
This would be a task: to characterise Greek
antiquityas irretrievably lost, and with it Christianity
also and the foundations upon which, up to the
present time, our society and politics have been
based.
I6 I
Christianity has conquered antiquity—yes; that
is easily said. In the first place, it is itself a piece
of antiquity; in the second place, it has preserved
antiquity; in the third place, it has never been in
combat with the pure ages of antiquity. Or rather:
in order that Christianity itself might remain, it had
to let itself be overcome by the spirit of antiquity—
for example, the idea of empire, the community, and
so forth. We are suffering from the uncommon
want of clearness and uncleanliness of human things;
from the ingenious mendacity which Christianity has
brought among men.
I62
It is almost laughable to see how nearly all the
sciences and arts of modern times grow from the
scattered seeds which have been wafted towards us
from antiquity, and how Christianity seems to us
here to be merely the evil chill of a long night, a
night during which one is almost inclined to believe
that all is over with reason and honesty among men.
The battle waged against the natural man has given
rise to the unnatural man.
## p. 175 (#213) ############################################
WE PHILOLOGISTS I75
- 163
With the dissolution of Christianity a great part
of antiquity has become incomprehensible to us, for
instance, the entire religious basis of life. On this
account an imitation of antiquity is a false tendency:
the betrayers or the betrayed are the philologists
who still think of such a thing. We live in a period
when many different conceptions of life are to be
found: hence the present age is instructive to an
unusual degree; and hence also the reason why it
is so ill, since it suffers from the evils of all its ten-
dencies at once. The man of the future: the
European man.
I64
The German Reformation widened the gap be-
tween us and antiquity: was it necessary for it to
do so? It once again introduced the old contrast
of “Paganism” and “Christianity”; and it was at
the same time a protest against the decorative culture
of the Renaissance—it was a victory gained over the
same culture as had formerly been conquered by
early Christianity.
In regard to “worldly things,” Christianity pre-
served the grosser views of the ancients. All the
nobler elements in marriage, slavery, and the State
are unchristian. It required the distorting character-
istics of worldliness to prove itself.
I65
The connection between humanism and religious
rationalism was emphasised as a Saxonian trait by
Köchly: the type of this philologist is Gottfried
Hermann. ”
* Johann Gottfried Jakob Hermann (1772-1848), noted for
his works on metre and Greek grammar. —TR.
## p. 176 (#214) ############################################
176 WE PHILOLOGISTS
I66
I understand religions as narcotics: but when they
are given to such nations as the Germans, I think
they are simply rank poison.
167
All religions are, in the end, based upon certain
physical assumptions, which are already in existence
and adapt the religions to their needs: for example,
in Christianity, the contrast between body and soul,
the unlimited importance of the earth as the “world,”
the marvellous occurrences in nature. If once the
opposite views gain the mastery—for instance, a
strict law of nature, the helplessness and superfluous-
ness of all gods, the strict conception of the soul
as a bodily process—all is over. But all Greek
culture is based upon such views.
I68
When we look from the character and culture of
the Catholic Middle Ages back to the Greeks, we
see them resplendent indeed in the rays of higher
humanity; for, if we have anything to reproach these
Greeks with, we must reproach the Middle Ages
with it also to a much greater extent. The worship
of the ancients at the time of the Renaissance was
therefore quite honest and proper. We have carried
matters further in one particular point, precisely in
connection with that dawning ray of light. We
have outstripped the Greeks in the clarifying of the
world by our studies of nature and men. Our know-
ledge is much greater, and our judgments are more
moderate and just.
## p. 177 (#215) ############################################
WE PHILOLOGISTS 177
In addition to this, a more gentle spirit has be-
come widespread,thanks to the period of illumination
which has weakened mankind—but this weakness,
when turned into morality, leads to good results and
honours us. Man has now a great deal of freedom:
it is his own fault if he does not make more use of
it than he does; the fanaticism of opinions has,
become much milder. Finally, that we would much |
rather live in the present age than in any other is
due to science; and certainly no other race in the
history of mankind has had such a wide choice of
noble enjoyments as ours—even if our race has not
the palate and stomach to experience a great deal
i
|
|
s
of joy. But one can live comfortably amid all this |
“freedom” only when one merely understands it and
does not wish to participate in it—that is the
modern crux. The participants appear to be less
attractive than ever: how stupid they must bel
Thus the danger arises that knowledge may
avenge itself on us, just as ignorance avenged itself
on us during the Middle Ages. It is all over with
those religions which place their trust in gods, Pro-
vidences, rational orders of the universe, miracles,
and sacraments; as is also the case with certain
types of holy lives, such as ascetics; for we only too
easily conclude that such people are the effects of
sickness and an aberrant brain. There is no doubt
that the contrast between a pure, incorporeal soul
and a body has been almost set aside. Who now
believes in the immortality of the soul! Everything
connected with blessedness or damnation, which
was based upon certain erroneous physiological
assumptions, falls to the ground as soon as these
|
l
!
I 2
## p. 178 (#216) ############################################
178 WE PHILOLOGISTS
assumptions are recognised to be errors. Our
scientific assumptions admit just as much of an
interpretation and utilisation in favour of a besot-
ting philistinism—yea, in favour of bestiality—as
also in favour of “blessedness” and soul-inspiration.
As compared with all previous ages, we are now
standing on a new foundation, so that something
may still be expected from the human race.
As regards culture, we have hitherto been acquain-
ted with only one complete form of it, i. e. , the city-
culture of the Greeks, based as it was on their
mythical and social foundations; and one incom-
plete form, the Roman, which acted as an adornment
of life, derived from the Greek. Now all these bases,
the mythical and the politico-social, have changed;
our alleged culture has no stability, because it has
been erected upon insecure conditions and opinions
which are even now almost ready to collapse. —
When we thoroughly grasp Greek culture, then, we
see that it is all over with it. The philologist is thus
a great sceptic in the present conditions of our culture
and training: that is his mission. Happy is he if,
like Wagner and Schopenhauer, he has a dim pre-
sentiment of those auspicious powers amid which a
new culture is stirring.
169
Those who say: “But antiquity nevertheless re-
mains as a subject of consideration for pure science,
even though all its educational purposes may be
disowned,” must be answered by the words, What is
pure science here ! Actions and characteristics must
be judged; and those who judge them must stand
## p. 179 (#217) ############################################
WE PHILOLOGISTS 179
above them: so you must first devote your attention
to overcoming antiquity. If you do not do that, your
science is not pure, but impure and limited : as may
now be perceived.
17o
To overcome Greek antiquity through our own
deeds: this would be the right task. But before we can
do this we must first know it! —There is a thorough-
ness which is merely an excuse for inaction. Let it
be recollected how much Goethe knew of antiquity:
certainly not so much as a philologist, and yet suffi-
cient to contend with it in such a way as to bring
about fruitful results. One should not even know
more about a thing than one could create. More-
over, the only time when we can actually recognise
something is when we endeavour to make it. Let
people but attempt to live after the manner of anti-
quity; and they will at once come hundreds of miles
nearer to antiquity than they can do with all their
erudition. —Our philologists never show that they
strive to emulate antiquity in any way, and thus
their antiquity remains without any effect on the
schools.
The study of the spirit of emulation (Renaissance,
Goethe), and the study of despair.
The non-popular element in the new culture of
the Renaissance: a frightful fact!
171
The worship of classical antiquity, as it was to be
seen in Italy, may be interpreted as the only earnest,
disinterested, and fecund worship which has yet
fallen to the lot of antiquity. It is a splendid
## p. 180 (#218) ############################################
I8O WE PHILOLOGISTS
example of Don Quixotism; and philology at
best is such Don Quixotism. Already at the
time of the Alexandrian savants, as with all the
sophists of the first and second centuries, the Atti-
cists, &c. , the scholars are imitating something
purely and simply chimerical and pursuing a world
that never existed. The same trait is seen through-
out antiquity: the manner in which the Homeric
heroes were copied, and all the intercourse held
with the myths, show traces of it. Gradually all
Greek antiquity has become an object of Don
Quixotism. It is impossible to understand our
modern world if we do not take into account the
enormous influence of the purely fantastic. This is
now confronted by the principle: there can be no
imitation. Imitation, however, is merely an artistic
phenomenon, i. e. , it is based on appearance: we can
accept manners, thoughts, and so on through imita-
tion; but imitation can create nothing. True,
the creator can borrow from all sides and nourish
himself in that way. And it is only as creators
that we shall be able to take anything from the
Greeks. But in what respect can philologists be
said to be creators! There must be a few dirty
jobs, such as knackers' men, and also text-revisers:
are the philologists to carry out tasks of this nature?
172
What, then, is antiquity now, in the face of
modern art, science, and philosophy P. It is no
longer the treasure-chamber of all knowledge; for
in natural and historical science we have advanced
greatly beyond it. Oppression by the church has
## p. 181 (#219) ############################################
WE PHILOLOGISTS I8I
been stopped. A pure knowledge of antiquity is
now possible, but perhaps also a more ineffective
and weaker knowledge. —This is right enough, if
effect is known only as effect on the masses; but
for the breeding of higher minds antiquity is more
powerful than ever.
Goethe as a German poet-philologist; Wagner as
a still higher stage: his clear glance for the only
worthy position of art. No ancient work has ever
had so powerful an effect as the “Orestes” had on
Wagner. The objective, emasculated philologist,
who is but a philistine of culture and a worker in
“pure science,” is, however, a sad spectacle.
I73
Between our highest art and philosophy and that
which is recognised to be truly the oldest antiquity,
there is no contradiction: they support and har-
monise with one another. It is in this that I place
my hopes.
174
The main standpoints from which to consider the
importance of antiquity:
I. There is nothing about it for young people; for
it exhibits man with an entire freedom from shame.
2. It is not for direct imitation, but it teaches
by which means art has hitherto been perfected in
the highest degree.
3. It is accessible only to a few, and there
should be a police des maeurs in charge of it—as
there should be also in charge of bad pianists
who play Beethoven.
4. These few apply this antiquity to the judg-
## p. 182 (#220) ############################################
182 WE PHILOLOGISTS
ment of our own time, as critics of it; and they
judge antiquity by their own ideals and are thus
critics of antiquity.
5. The contrast between the Hellenic and the
Roman should be studied, and also the contrast
between the early Hellenic and the late Hellenic.
—Explanation of the different types of culture.
I75
The advancement of science at the expense of
man is one of the most permicious things in the
world. The stunted man is a retrogression in the
human race: he throws a shadow over all succeeding
generations. The tendencies and natural purpose
of the individual science become degenerate, and
science itself is finally shipwrecked: it has made
progress, but has either no effect at all on life or
else an immoral one.
176
Men not to be used like things
From the former very incomplete philology and
knowledge of antiquity there flowed out a stream
of freedom, while our own highly developed know-
ledge produces slaves and serves the idol of the
State.
177
There will perhaps come a time when scientific
work will be carried on by women, while the men
will have to create, using the word in a spiritual
sense: states, laws, works of art, &c.
People should study typical antiquity just as
they do typical men: i. e. , imitating what they under-
## p. 183 (#221) ############################################
WE PHILOLOGISTS 183
stand of it, and, when the pattern seems to lie far in
the distance, considering ways and means and pre-
liminary preparations, and devising stepping-stones.
178
The whole feature of study lies in this: that we
should study only what we feel we should like to
imitate; what we gladly take up and have the
desire to multiply. What is really wanted is a pro-
gressive canon of the ideal model, suited to boys,
youths, and men.
I79
Goethe grasped antiquity in the right way: in-
variably with an emulative soul. But who else did
so? One sees nothing of a well-thought-out peda-
gogics of this nature: who knows that there is a
certain knowledge of antiquity which cannot be
imparted to youths
The puerile character of philology: devised by
teachers for pupils.
I8O
The ever more and more common form of the
ideal: first men, then institutions, finally tendencies,
purposes, or the want of them. The highest form :
the conquest of the ideal by a backward movement
from tendencies to institutions, and from institutions
to men.
I8I
I will set down in writing what I no longer believe
—and also what I do believe. Man stands in the
midst of the great whirlpool of forces, and imagines
## p. 184 (#222) ############################################
184 WE PHILOLOGISTS
that this whirlpool is rational and has a rational
aim in view : error!
The only rationality that we
know is the small reason of man : he must exert
it to the utmost, and it invariably leaves him in
the lurch if he tries to place himself in the hands
of “Providence. ”
Our only happiness lies in reason; all the re-
mainder of the world is dreary. The highest reason,
however, is seen by me in the work of the artist, and
he can feel it to be such : there may be something
which, when it can be consciously brought forward,
may afford an even greater feeling of reason and
happiness: for example, the course of the solar
system, the breeding and education of a man.
Happiness lies in rapidity of feeling and thinking:
- everything else is slow, gradual, and stupid. The
man who could feel the progress of a ray of light
would be greatly enraptured, for it is very rapid.
Thinking of one's self affords little happiness. But
when we do experience happiness therein the reason
is that we are not thinking of ourselves, but of our
ideal. This lies far off; and only the rapid man
attains it and rejoices.
An amalgamation of a great centre of men for
the breeding of better men is the task of the future.
The individual must become familiarised with claims
that, when he says Yea to his own will, he also says
Yea to the will of that centre—for example, in refer-
ence to a choice, as among women for marriage,
and likewise as to the manner in which his child
shall be brought up. Until now no single individu-
ality, or only the very rarest, have been free: they
were influenced by these conceptions, but likewise
## p. 185 (#223) ############################################
WE PHILOLOGISTS 185
by the bad and contradictory organisation of the
individual purposes.
I82
Education is in the first place instruction in what
is necessary, and then in what is changing and in-
constant. The youth is introduced to nature, and
the sway of laws is everywhere pointed out to him ;
followed by an explanation of the laws of ordinary
society. Even at this early stage the question will
arise: was it absolutely necessary that this should
have been so? He gradually comes to need history
to ascertain how these things have been brought
about. He learns at the same time, however, that
they may be changed into something else. What
is the extent of man's power over things? This is
the question in connection with all education. To
show how things may become other than what they
are we may, for example, point to the Greeks. We
need the Romans to show how things became what
they were.
183
If, then, the Romans had spurned the Greek cul-
ture, they would perhaps have gone to pieces com-
pletely. When could this culture have once again
arisen P Christianity and Romans and barbarians:
this would have been an onslaught: it would have
entirely wiped out culture. We see the danger amid
which genius lives. Cicero was one of the greatest
benefactors of humanity, even in his own time.
There is no “Providence” for genius; it is only
for the ordinary run of people and their wants that
|
## p. 186 (#224) ############################################
186 WE PHILOLOGISTS
such a thing exists: they find their satisfaction, and
later on their justification.
184
Thesis: the death of ancient culture inevitable.
Greek culture must be distinguished as the arche-
type; and it must be shown how all culture rests
upon shaky conceptions.
The dangerous meaning of art: as the protectress
and galvanisation of dead and dying conceptions;
history, in so far as it wishes to restore to us feelings
which we have overcome. To feel “historically” or
“just” towards what is already past, is only possible
when we have risen above it. But the danger in
the adoption of the feelings necessary for this is
very great: let the dead bury their dead, so that we
ourselves may not come under the influence of the
smell of the corpses.
THE DEATH OF THE OLD CULTURE.
1. The signification of the studies of antiquity
hitherto pursued: obscure; mendacious.
2. As soon as they recognise the goal they con-
demn themselves to death : for their goal is to de-
scribe ancient culture itself as one to be demolished.
3. The collection of all the conceptions out of
which Hellenic culture has grown up. Criticism of
religion, art, society, state, morals.
4. Christianity is likewise denied.
5. Art and history—dangerous.
6. The replacing of the study of antiquity which
has become superfluous for the training of our youth.
Thus the task of the science of history is completed,
## p. 187 (#225) ############################################
WE PHILOLOGISTS 187
|
and it itself has become superfluous, if the entire
inward continuous circle of past efforts has been con-
demned. Its place must be taken by the science of
the future.
185
“Signs” and “miracles” are not believed; only
a “Providence” stands in need of such things.
There is no help to be found either in prayer or
asceticism or in “vision. ” If all these things con-
stitute religion, then there is no more religion for me.
My religion, if I can still apply this name to some-
thing, lies in the work of breeding genius: from such
training everything is to be hoped. All consolation
comes from art. Education is love for the offspring;
an excess of love over and beyond our self-love.
Religion is “love beyond ourselves. ” The work of
art is the model of such a love beyond ourselves, and
a perfect model at that.
I86
The stupidity of the willis Schopenhauer's greatest
thought, if thoughts be judged from the standpoint
of power. We can see in Hartmann how he juggled
away this thought. Nobody will ever call something
stupid—God.
187
This, then, is the new feature of all the future pro-
gress of the world: men must never again be ruled
over by religious conceptions. Will they be any
worse? It is not my experience that they behave
well and morally under the yoke of religion; I am
not on the side of Demopheles. ” The fear of a
* A type in Schopenhauer's Essay “On Religion. ” See
“Parerga and Paralipomena. ”—TR.
,
## p. 188 (#226) ############################################
I88 WE PHILOLOGISTS
beyond, and then again the fear of divine punish-
ments will hardly have made men better.
I88
Where something great makes its appearance and
lasts for a relatively long time, we may premise
a careful breeding, as in the case of the Greeks.
How did so many men become free among them P
Educate educators | But the first educators must
educate themselves | And it is for these that I
write.
189
The denial of life is no longer an easy matter: a
man may become a hermit or a monk—and what is
thereby denied This conception has now become
deeper: it is above all a discerning denial, a denial
based upon the will to be just; not an indiscriminate
and wholesale denial.
I90
The seer must be affectionate, otherwise men will
have no confidence in him : Cassandra.
I9 I
The man who to-day wishes to be good and saintly
has a more difficult task than formerly: in order to
be “good,” he must not be so unjust to knowledge
as earlier saints were. He would have to be a know-
ledge-saint: a man who would link love with know-
ledge, and who would have nothing to do with gods
or demigods or “Providence,” as the Indian saints
likewise had nothing to do with them. He should
## p. 189 (#227) ############################################
WE PHILOLOGISTS 189
/
also be healthy, and should keep himself so, other-
wise he would necessarily become distrustful of him-
self. And perhaps he would not bear the slightest
resemblance to the ascetic saint, but would be much
more like a man of the world.
I92
The better the state is organised, the duller will
humanity be.
To make the individual uncomfortable is my task!
The great pleasure experienced by the man who
liberates himself by fighting.
Spiritual heights have had their age in history;
inherited energy belongs to them. In the ideal
state all would be over with them.
I93
The highest judgment on life only arising from
the highest energy of life. The mind must be
removed as far as possible from exhaustion.
In the centre of the world-history judgment will
be the most accurate ; for it was there that the
greatest geniuses existed.
The breeding of the genius as the only man who
can truly value and deny life.
Save your genius ! shall be shouted unto the
people: set him freel Do all you can to unshackle
him.
The feeble and poor in spirit must not be
allowed to judge life.
I94
I dream of a combination of men who shall make
mo concessions, who shall show no consideration, and
## p. 190 (#228) ############################################
I90 WE PHILOLOGISTS
who shall be willing to be called “destroyers”: they
apply the standard of their criticism to everything and
sacrifice themselves to truth. The bad and the false
shall be brought to light / We will not build pre-
maturely: we do not know, indeed, whether we shall
ever be able to build, or if it would not be better not
to build at all. There are lazy pessimists and re-
signed ones in this world—and it is to their number
that we refuse to belong /
NOV 18 1915
FINIS.
Printed at The DARIEN Press, Edinburgh.
## p. (#229) ################################################
THE WORKS OF
FRIED RICH NIETZSCHE
First Complete and Authorised English Translation, in 18 Volumes
EDITED BY DR. OSCAR LEVY
I. THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY. Translated by WILLIAM
A. HAussMANN, B. A. , Ph. D. , with Biographical Introduction by
the Author's Sister, Portrait and Facsimile. Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. net.
Second Edition.
II. EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER
ESSAYS. Translated by M. A. MUGGE, Ph. D. 3s. 6d. net.
III. THE FUTURE OF OUR EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS. Translated by J. M. KENNEDv. 2s. 6d. net.
Second Edition.
IV. THOUGHTS OUT OF SEASON, Vol. I. Trans-
lated by A. M. LUDovici, with Editorial Note. 2s. 6d. net.
Second Edition.
V. THOUGHTS OUT OF SEASON, Vol. II. Trans-
lated, with Introduction, by ADRIAN Collins, M. A. 2s. 6d. net.
Second Edition.
VI. HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN, Vol. I. Translated by
HELEN ZIMMERN, with Introduction by J. M. KENNEDv. 5s. net.
Second Edition.
VII. HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN, Vol. II. Translated,
with Introduction, by PAUL V. Cohn, B. A. 5s. net.
VIII. THE CASE OF WAGNER: We Philologists, &c.
Translated by A. M. Ludovici. Cr. 8vo, 3s. 6d. net. Third Edition.
IX. THE DAWN OF DAY. Translated, with Intro-
duction, by J. M. KENNEDY. 5s. net.
X. THE JOYFUL WISDOM, Translated, with Intro-
duction, by THoMAs Common. 5s. net.
XI. THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA. Revised Trans-
lation by T. Common, with Introduction by Mrs. FoERstER-NIET-
zsche, and Commentary by A. M. LUDovici. 6s. net. Second Ed.
XII. BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL. Translated by HELEN
ZIMMERN, with Introduction by T. Common. 3s. 6d. net. Third Ed.
all round, however: where are the historians who
can survey things and events without being hum-
bugged by stupid theories P I know of only one,
Burckhardt. Everywhere the widest possible opti-
---"
mism prevails in science. The question: “What
would have been the consequence if so and so had
not happened? ” is almost unanimously thrust aside,
and yet it is the cardinal question. Thus every-
thing becomes ironical. Let us only consider our
own lives. If we examine history in accordance
with a preconceived plan, let this plan be sought
in the purposes of a great man, or perhaps in those
of a sex, or of a party. Everything else is a chaos.
—Even in natural science we find this deification of
the necessary.
Germany has become the breeding-place of this
historical optimism ; Hegel is perhaps to blame
for this. Nothing, however, is more responsible for
## p. 171 (#207) ############################################
WE PHILOLOGISTS 171
the fatal influence of German culture. Everything
that has been kept down by success gradually rears
itself up : history as the scorn of the conqueror; a
servile sentiment and a kneeling down before
the actual fact—“a sense for the State,” they now
call it, as if that had still to be propagated He
who does not understand how brutal and unintelli-
gent history is will never understand the stimulus
to make it intelligent. Just think how rare it is to
find a man with as great an intelligent knowledge
of his own life as Goethe had : what amount of
rationality can we expect to find arising out of these
other veiled and blind existences as they work chao-
tically with and in opposition to each other ?
And it is especially naïve when Hellwald, the
author of a history of culture, warns us away from
all “ideals,” simply because history has killed them
off one after the other.
I56.
To bring to light without reserve the stupidity
and the want of reason in human things: that is |
the aim of our brethren and colleagues. People
will then have to distinguish what is essential in
them, what is incorrigible, and what is still suscep-
tible of further improvement. But “Providence”
must be kept out of the question, for it is a concep-
tion that enables people to take things too easily.
I wish to breathe the breath of this purpose into
science. Let us advance our knowledge of man-
kind | The good and rational in man is accidental
or apparent, or the contrary of something very irra-
tional. There will come a time when training will
be the only thought.
## p. 171 (#208) ############################################
I64 WE PHILOLOGISTS
I29
To live on mountains, to travel a great deal, and
to move quickly from one place to another: in these
ways we can now begin to compare ourselves with
the Greek gods. We know the past, too, and we
almost know the future. What would a Greek say,
if only he could see us!
I 30
The gods make men still more evil; this is the
nature of man. If we do not like a man, we wish
! that he may become worse than he is, and then we
are glad. This forms part of the obscure philosophy
of hate—a philosophy which has never yet been
written, because it is everywhere the pudendum that
every one feels.
I31
The pan-Hellenic Homer finds his delight in the
frivolity of the gods; but it is astounding how he
can also give them dignity again. This amazing
ability to raise one's self again, however, is Greek.
I 32
What, then, is the origin of the envy of the gods?
people did not believe in a calm, quiet happiness,
but only in an exuberant one. This must have
caused some displeasure to the Greeks; for their
soul was only too easily wounded: it embittered
them to see a happy man. That is Greek. If a
man of distinguished talent appeared, the flock of
envious people must have become astonishingly
large. If any one met with a misfortune, they
## p. 171 (#209) ############################################
WE PHILOLOGISTS 165
would say of him: “Ah! no wonder he was too
frivolous and too well off. ” And every one of them
would have behaved exuberantly if he had possessed
the requisite talent, and would willingly have played
the rôle of the god who sent the unhappiness to men.
I33
The Greek gods did not demand any complete
changes of character, and were, generally speaking,
by no means burdensome or importunate: it was
thus possible to take them seriously and to believe
in them. At the time of Homer, indeed, the nature
of the Greek was formed : flippancy of images and
imagination was necessary to lighten the weight of
its passionate disposition and to set it free.
I34
Every religion has for its highest images an analo-
gon in the spiritual condition of those who profess
it. The God of Mohammed : the solitariness of the
desert, the distant roar of the lion, the vision of a
formidable warrior. The God of the Christians:
everything that men and women think of when they
hear the word “love. ” The God of the Greeks: a
beautiful apparition in a dream.
I35
A great deal of intelligence must have gone to
the making up of a Greek polytheism: the expendi-
ture of intelligence is much less lavish when people
have only one God.
136
Greek morality is not based on religion, but on
the polis.
## p. 172 (#210) ############################################
172 WE PHILOLOGISTS
I 57
Surrender to necessity is exactly what I do not
teach—for one must first know this necessity to be
necessary. There may perhaps be many necessi-
ties; but in general this inclination is simply a bed
of idleness.
158
To know history now means: to recognise how
all those who believed in a Providence took things
too easily. There is no such thing. If human
affairs are seen to go forward in a loose and dis-
ordered way, do not think that a god has any pur-
pose in view by letting them do so or that he is
neglecting them. We can now see in a general
way that the history of Christianity on earth has
been one of the most dreadful chapters in history,
and that a stop must be put to it. True, the
influence of antiquity has been observed in Chris-
tianity even in our own time; and, as it diminishes,
so will our knowledge of antiquity diminish also to
an even greater extent. Now is the best time to
recognise it: we are no longer prejudiced in favour
of Christianity, but we still understand it, and also
the antiquity that forms part of it, so far as this anti-
quity stands in line with Christianity.
I59
Philosophic heads must occupy themselves one
day with the collective account of antiquity and
make up its balance-sheet. If we have this, anti-
quity will be overcome. All the shortcomings which
now vex us have their roots in antiquity, so that
we cannot continue to treat this account with
## p. 173 (#211) ############################################
WE PHILOLOGISTS 173
the mildness which has been customary up to the
present. The atrocious crime of mankind which
rendered Christianity possible, as it actually became |
possible, is the guilt of antiquity. With Christianity
antiquity will also be cleared away. —At the present
time it is not so very far behind us, and it is certainly
not possible to do justice to it. It has been availed
of in the most dreadful fashion for purposes of re-
pression, and has acted as a support for religious
oppression by disguising itself as “culture. ” It was
common to hear the saying, “Antiquity has been
conquered by Christianity. ”
This was a historical fact, and it was thus thought
that no harm could come of any dealings with
antiquity. Yes; it is so plausible to say that we
find Christian ethics “deeper” than Socrates 1 Plato
was easier to compete with ! We are at the present
time, so to speak, merely chewing the cud of the
very battle which was fought in the first centuries
of the Christian era—with the exception of the fact
that now, instead of the clearly perceptible antiquity
which then existed, we have merely its pale ghost;
and,indeed, even Christianity itself has become rather
ghostlike. It is a battle fought after the decisive
battle, a post-vibration. In the end, all the forces
of which antiquity consisted have reappeared in
Christianity in the crudest possible form: it is
nothing new, only quantitatively extraordinary.
I6O
What severs us for ever from the culture of anti-
quity is the fact that its foundations have become
too shaky for us. A criticism of the Greeks is at
## p. 174 (#212) ############################################
I74 WE PHILOLOGISTS
!
the same time a criticism of Christianity; for the
bases of the spirit of belief, the religious cult, and
witchcraft, are the same in both. -There are many
rudimentary stages still remaining; but they are by
this time almost ready to collapse.
This would be a task: to characterise Greek
antiquityas irretrievably lost, and with it Christianity
also and the foundations upon which, up to the
present time, our society and politics have been
based.
I6 I
Christianity has conquered antiquity—yes; that
is easily said. In the first place, it is itself a piece
of antiquity; in the second place, it has preserved
antiquity; in the third place, it has never been in
combat with the pure ages of antiquity. Or rather:
in order that Christianity itself might remain, it had
to let itself be overcome by the spirit of antiquity—
for example, the idea of empire, the community, and
so forth. We are suffering from the uncommon
want of clearness and uncleanliness of human things;
from the ingenious mendacity which Christianity has
brought among men.
I62
It is almost laughable to see how nearly all the
sciences and arts of modern times grow from the
scattered seeds which have been wafted towards us
from antiquity, and how Christianity seems to us
here to be merely the evil chill of a long night, a
night during which one is almost inclined to believe
that all is over with reason and honesty among men.
The battle waged against the natural man has given
rise to the unnatural man.
## p. 175 (#213) ############################################
WE PHILOLOGISTS I75
- 163
With the dissolution of Christianity a great part
of antiquity has become incomprehensible to us, for
instance, the entire religious basis of life. On this
account an imitation of antiquity is a false tendency:
the betrayers or the betrayed are the philologists
who still think of such a thing. We live in a period
when many different conceptions of life are to be
found: hence the present age is instructive to an
unusual degree; and hence also the reason why it
is so ill, since it suffers from the evils of all its ten-
dencies at once. The man of the future: the
European man.
I64
The German Reformation widened the gap be-
tween us and antiquity: was it necessary for it to
do so? It once again introduced the old contrast
of “Paganism” and “Christianity”; and it was at
the same time a protest against the decorative culture
of the Renaissance—it was a victory gained over the
same culture as had formerly been conquered by
early Christianity.
In regard to “worldly things,” Christianity pre-
served the grosser views of the ancients. All the
nobler elements in marriage, slavery, and the State
are unchristian. It required the distorting character-
istics of worldliness to prove itself.
I65
The connection between humanism and religious
rationalism was emphasised as a Saxonian trait by
Köchly: the type of this philologist is Gottfried
Hermann. ”
* Johann Gottfried Jakob Hermann (1772-1848), noted for
his works on metre and Greek grammar. —TR.
## p. 176 (#214) ############################################
176 WE PHILOLOGISTS
I66
I understand religions as narcotics: but when they
are given to such nations as the Germans, I think
they are simply rank poison.
167
All religions are, in the end, based upon certain
physical assumptions, which are already in existence
and adapt the religions to their needs: for example,
in Christianity, the contrast between body and soul,
the unlimited importance of the earth as the “world,”
the marvellous occurrences in nature. If once the
opposite views gain the mastery—for instance, a
strict law of nature, the helplessness and superfluous-
ness of all gods, the strict conception of the soul
as a bodily process—all is over. But all Greek
culture is based upon such views.
I68
When we look from the character and culture of
the Catholic Middle Ages back to the Greeks, we
see them resplendent indeed in the rays of higher
humanity; for, if we have anything to reproach these
Greeks with, we must reproach the Middle Ages
with it also to a much greater extent. The worship
of the ancients at the time of the Renaissance was
therefore quite honest and proper. We have carried
matters further in one particular point, precisely in
connection with that dawning ray of light. We
have outstripped the Greeks in the clarifying of the
world by our studies of nature and men. Our know-
ledge is much greater, and our judgments are more
moderate and just.
## p. 177 (#215) ############################################
WE PHILOLOGISTS 177
In addition to this, a more gentle spirit has be-
come widespread,thanks to the period of illumination
which has weakened mankind—but this weakness,
when turned into morality, leads to good results and
honours us. Man has now a great deal of freedom:
it is his own fault if he does not make more use of
it than he does; the fanaticism of opinions has,
become much milder. Finally, that we would much |
rather live in the present age than in any other is
due to science; and certainly no other race in the
history of mankind has had such a wide choice of
noble enjoyments as ours—even if our race has not
the palate and stomach to experience a great deal
i
|
|
s
of joy. But one can live comfortably amid all this |
“freedom” only when one merely understands it and
does not wish to participate in it—that is the
modern crux. The participants appear to be less
attractive than ever: how stupid they must bel
Thus the danger arises that knowledge may
avenge itself on us, just as ignorance avenged itself
on us during the Middle Ages. It is all over with
those religions which place their trust in gods, Pro-
vidences, rational orders of the universe, miracles,
and sacraments; as is also the case with certain
types of holy lives, such as ascetics; for we only too
easily conclude that such people are the effects of
sickness and an aberrant brain. There is no doubt
that the contrast between a pure, incorporeal soul
and a body has been almost set aside. Who now
believes in the immortality of the soul! Everything
connected with blessedness or damnation, which
was based upon certain erroneous physiological
assumptions, falls to the ground as soon as these
|
l
!
I 2
## p. 178 (#216) ############################################
178 WE PHILOLOGISTS
assumptions are recognised to be errors. Our
scientific assumptions admit just as much of an
interpretation and utilisation in favour of a besot-
ting philistinism—yea, in favour of bestiality—as
also in favour of “blessedness” and soul-inspiration.
As compared with all previous ages, we are now
standing on a new foundation, so that something
may still be expected from the human race.
As regards culture, we have hitherto been acquain-
ted with only one complete form of it, i. e. , the city-
culture of the Greeks, based as it was on their
mythical and social foundations; and one incom-
plete form, the Roman, which acted as an adornment
of life, derived from the Greek. Now all these bases,
the mythical and the politico-social, have changed;
our alleged culture has no stability, because it has
been erected upon insecure conditions and opinions
which are even now almost ready to collapse. —
When we thoroughly grasp Greek culture, then, we
see that it is all over with it. The philologist is thus
a great sceptic in the present conditions of our culture
and training: that is his mission. Happy is he if,
like Wagner and Schopenhauer, he has a dim pre-
sentiment of those auspicious powers amid which a
new culture is stirring.
169
Those who say: “But antiquity nevertheless re-
mains as a subject of consideration for pure science,
even though all its educational purposes may be
disowned,” must be answered by the words, What is
pure science here ! Actions and characteristics must
be judged; and those who judge them must stand
## p. 179 (#217) ############################################
WE PHILOLOGISTS 179
above them: so you must first devote your attention
to overcoming antiquity. If you do not do that, your
science is not pure, but impure and limited : as may
now be perceived.
17o
To overcome Greek antiquity through our own
deeds: this would be the right task. But before we can
do this we must first know it! —There is a thorough-
ness which is merely an excuse for inaction. Let it
be recollected how much Goethe knew of antiquity:
certainly not so much as a philologist, and yet suffi-
cient to contend with it in such a way as to bring
about fruitful results. One should not even know
more about a thing than one could create. More-
over, the only time when we can actually recognise
something is when we endeavour to make it. Let
people but attempt to live after the manner of anti-
quity; and they will at once come hundreds of miles
nearer to antiquity than they can do with all their
erudition. —Our philologists never show that they
strive to emulate antiquity in any way, and thus
their antiquity remains without any effect on the
schools.
The study of the spirit of emulation (Renaissance,
Goethe), and the study of despair.
The non-popular element in the new culture of
the Renaissance: a frightful fact!
171
The worship of classical antiquity, as it was to be
seen in Italy, may be interpreted as the only earnest,
disinterested, and fecund worship which has yet
fallen to the lot of antiquity. It is a splendid
## p. 180 (#218) ############################################
I8O WE PHILOLOGISTS
example of Don Quixotism; and philology at
best is such Don Quixotism. Already at the
time of the Alexandrian savants, as with all the
sophists of the first and second centuries, the Atti-
cists, &c. , the scholars are imitating something
purely and simply chimerical and pursuing a world
that never existed. The same trait is seen through-
out antiquity: the manner in which the Homeric
heroes were copied, and all the intercourse held
with the myths, show traces of it. Gradually all
Greek antiquity has become an object of Don
Quixotism. It is impossible to understand our
modern world if we do not take into account the
enormous influence of the purely fantastic. This is
now confronted by the principle: there can be no
imitation. Imitation, however, is merely an artistic
phenomenon, i. e. , it is based on appearance: we can
accept manners, thoughts, and so on through imita-
tion; but imitation can create nothing. True,
the creator can borrow from all sides and nourish
himself in that way. And it is only as creators
that we shall be able to take anything from the
Greeks. But in what respect can philologists be
said to be creators! There must be a few dirty
jobs, such as knackers' men, and also text-revisers:
are the philologists to carry out tasks of this nature?
172
What, then, is antiquity now, in the face of
modern art, science, and philosophy P. It is no
longer the treasure-chamber of all knowledge; for
in natural and historical science we have advanced
greatly beyond it. Oppression by the church has
## p. 181 (#219) ############################################
WE PHILOLOGISTS I8I
been stopped. A pure knowledge of antiquity is
now possible, but perhaps also a more ineffective
and weaker knowledge. —This is right enough, if
effect is known only as effect on the masses; but
for the breeding of higher minds antiquity is more
powerful than ever.
Goethe as a German poet-philologist; Wagner as
a still higher stage: his clear glance for the only
worthy position of art. No ancient work has ever
had so powerful an effect as the “Orestes” had on
Wagner. The objective, emasculated philologist,
who is but a philistine of culture and a worker in
“pure science,” is, however, a sad spectacle.
I73
Between our highest art and philosophy and that
which is recognised to be truly the oldest antiquity,
there is no contradiction: they support and har-
monise with one another. It is in this that I place
my hopes.
174
The main standpoints from which to consider the
importance of antiquity:
I. There is nothing about it for young people; for
it exhibits man with an entire freedom from shame.
2. It is not for direct imitation, but it teaches
by which means art has hitherto been perfected in
the highest degree.
3. It is accessible only to a few, and there
should be a police des maeurs in charge of it—as
there should be also in charge of bad pianists
who play Beethoven.
4. These few apply this antiquity to the judg-
## p. 182 (#220) ############################################
182 WE PHILOLOGISTS
ment of our own time, as critics of it; and they
judge antiquity by their own ideals and are thus
critics of antiquity.
5. The contrast between the Hellenic and the
Roman should be studied, and also the contrast
between the early Hellenic and the late Hellenic.
—Explanation of the different types of culture.
I75
The advancement of science at the expense of
man is one of the most permicious things in the
world. The stunted man is a retrogression in the
human race: he throws a shadow over all succeeding
generations. The tendencies and natural purpose
of the individual science become degenerate, and
science itself is finally shipwrecked: it has made
progress, but has either no effect at all on life or
else an immoral one.
176
Men not to be used like things
From the former very incomplete philology and
knowledge of antiquity there flowed out a stream
of freedom, while our own highly developed know-
ledge produces slaves and serves the idol of the
State.
177
There will perhaps come a time when scientific
work will be carried on by women, while the men
will have to create, using the word in a spiritual
sense: states, laws, works of art, &c.
People should study typical antiquity just as
they do typical men: i. e. , imitating what they under-
## p. 183 (#221) ############################################
WE PHILOLOGISTS 183
stand of it, and, when the pattern seems to lie far in
the distance, considering ways and means and pre-
liminary preparations, and devising stepping-stones.
178
The whole feature of study lies in this: that we
should study only what we feel we should like to
imitate; what we gladly take up and have the
desire to multiply. What is really wanted is a pro-
gressive canon of the ideal model, suited to boys,
youths, and men.
I79
Goethe grasped antiquity in the right way: in-
variably with an emulative soul. But who else did
so? One sees nothing of a well-thought-out peda-
gogics of this nature: who knows that there is a
certain knowledge of antiquity which cannot be
imparted to youths
The puerile character of philology: devised by
teachers for pupils.
I8O
The ever more and more common form of the
ideal: first men, then institutions, finally tendencies,
purposes, or the want of them. The highest form :
the conquest of the ideal by a backward movement
from tendencies to institutions, and from institutions
to men.
I8I
I will set down in writing what I no longer believe
—and also what I do believe. Man stands in the
midst of the great whirlpool of forces, and imagines
## p. 184 (#222) ############################################
184 WE PHILOLOGISTS
that this whirlpool is rational and has a rational
aim in view : error!
The only rationality that we
know is the small reason of man : he must exert
it to the utmost, and it invariably leaves him in
the lurch if he tries to place himself in the hands
of “Providence. ”
Our only happiness lies in reason; all the re-
mainder of the world is dreary. The highest reason,
however, is seen by me in the work of the artist, and
he can feel it to be such : there may be something
which, when it can be consciously brought forward,
may afford an even greater feeling of reason and
happiness: for example, the course of the solar
system, the breeding and education of a man.
Happiness lies in rapidity of feeling and thinking:
- everything else is slow, gradual, and stupid. The
man who could feel the progress of a ray of light
would be greatly enraptured, for it is very rapid.
Thinking of one's self affords little happiness. But
when we do experience happiness therein the reason
is that we are not thinking of ourselves, but of our
ideal. This lies far off; and only the rapid man
attains it and rejoices.
An amalgamation of a great centre of men for
the breeding of better men is the task of the future.
The individual must become familiarised with claims
that, when he says Yea to his own will, he also says
Yea to the will of that centre—for example, in refer-
ence to a choice, as among women for marriage,
and likewise as to the manner in which his child
shall be brought up. Until now no single individu-
ality, or only the very rarest, have been free: they
were influenced by these conceptions, but likewise
## p. 185 (#223) ############################################
WE PHILOLOGISTS 185
by the bad and contradictory organisation of the
individual purposes.
I82
Education is in the first place instruction in what
is necessary, and then in what is changing and in-
constant. The youth is introduced to nature, and
the sway of laws is everywhere pointed out to him ;
followed by an explanation of the laws of ordinary
society. Even at this early stage the question will
arise: was it absolutely necessary that this should
have been so? He gradually comes to need history
to ascertain how these things have been brought
about. He learns at the same time, however, that
they may be changed into something else. What
is the extent of man's power over things? This is
the question in connection with all education. To
show how things may become other than what they
are we may, for example, point to the Greeks. We
need the Romans to show how things became what
they were.
183
If, then, the Romans had spurned the Greek cul-
ture, they would perhaps have gone to pieces com-
pletely. When could this culture have once again
arisen P Christianity and Romans and barbarians:
this would have been an onslaught: it would have
entirely wiped out culture. We see the danger amid
which genius lives. Cicero was one of the greatest
benefactors of humanity, even in his own time.
There is no “Providence” for genius; it is only
for the ordinary run of people and their wants that
|
## p. 186 (#224) ############################################
186 WE PHILOLOGISTS
such a thing exists: they find their satisfaction, and
later on their justification.
184
Thesis: the death of ancient culture inevitable.
Greek culture must be distinguished as the arche-
type; and it must be shown how all culture rests
upon shaky conceptions.
The dangerous meaning of art: as the protectress
and galvanisation of dead and dying conceptions;
history, in so far as it wishes to restore to us feelings
which we have overcome. To feel “historically” or
“just” towards what is already past, is only possible
when we have risen above it. But the danger in
the adoption of the feelings necessary for this is
very great: let the dead bury their dead, so that we
ourselves may not come under the influence of the
smell of the corpses.
THE DEATH OF THE OLD CULTURE.
1. The signification of the studies of antiquity
hitherto pursued: obscure; mendacious.
2. As soon as they recognise the goal they con-
demn themselves to death : for their goal is to de-
scribe ancient culture itself as one to be demolished.
3. The collection of all the conceptions out of
which Hellenic culture has grown up. Criticism of
religion, art, society, state, morals.
4. Christianity is likewise denied.
5. Art and history—dangerous.
6. The replacing of the study of antiquity which
has become superfluous for the training of our youth.
Thus the task of the science of history is completed,
## p. 187 (#225) ############################################
WE PHILOLOGISTS 187
|
and it itself has become superfluous, if the entire
inward continuous circle of past efforts has been con-
demned. Its place must be taken by the science of
the future.
185
“Signs” and “miracles” are not believed; only
a “Providence” stands in need of such things.
There is no help to be found either in prayer or
asceticism or in “vision. ” If all these things con-
stitute religion, then there is no more religion for me.
My religion, if I can still apply this name to some-
thing, lies in the work of breeding genius: from such
training everything is to be hoped. All consolation
comes from art. Education is love for the offspring;
an excess of love over and beyond our self-love.
Religion is “love beyond ourselves. ” The work of
art is the model of such a love beyond ourselves, and
a perfect model at that.
I86
The stupidity of the willis Schopenhauer's greatest
thought, if thoughts be judged from the standpoint
of power. We can see in Hartmann how he juggled
away this thought. Nobody will ever call something
stupid—God.
187
This, then, is the new feature of all the future pro-
gress of the world: men must never again be ruled
over by religious conceptions. Will they be any
worse? It is not my experience that they behave
well and morally under the yoke of religion; I am
not on the side of Demopheles. ” The fear of a
* A type in Schopenhauer's Essay “On Religion. ” See
“Parerga and Paralipomena. ”—TR.
,
## p. 188 (#226) ############################################
I88 WE PHILOLOGISTS
beyond, and then again the fear of divine punish-
ments will hardly have made men better.
I88
Where something great makes its appearance and
lasts for a relatively long time, we may premise
a careful breeding, as in the case of the Greeks.
How did so many men become free among them P
Educate educators | But the first educators must
educate themselves | And it is for these that I
write.
189
The denial of life is no longer an easy matter: a
man may become a hermit or a monk—and what is
thereby denied This conception has now become
deeper: it is above all a discerning denial, a denial
based upon the will to be just; not an indiscriminate
and wholesale denial.
I90
The seer must be affectionate, otherwise men will
have no confidence in him : Cassandra.
I9 I
The man who to-day wishes to be good and saintly
has a more difficult task than formerly: in order to
be “good,” he must not be so unjust to knowledge
as earlier saints were. He would have to be a know-
ledge-saint: a man who would link love with know-
ledge, and who would have nothing to do with gods
or demigods or “Providence,” as the Indian saints
likewise had nothing to do with them. He should
## p. 189 (#227) ############################################
WE PHILOLOGISTS 189
/
also be healthy, and should keep himself so, other-
wise he would necessarily become distrustful of him-
self. And perhaps he would not bear the slightest
resemblance to the ascetic saint, but would be much
more like a man of the world.
I92
The better the state is organised, the duller will
humanity be.
To make the individual uncomfortable is my task!
The great pleasure experienced by the man who
liberates himself by fighting.
Spiritual heights have had their age in history;
inherited energy belongs to them. In the ideal
state all would be over with them.
I93
The highest judgment on life only arising from
the highest energy of life. The mind must be
removed as far as possible from exhaustion.
In the centre of the world-history judgment will
be the most accurate ; for it was there that the
greatest geniuses existed.
The breeding of the genius as the only man who
can truly value and deny life.
Save your genius ! shall be shouted unto the
people: set him freel Do all you can to unshackle
him.
The feeble and poor in spirit must not be
allowed to judge life.
I94
I dream of a combination of men who shall make
mo concessions, who shall show no consideration, and
## p. 190 (#228) ############################################
I90 WE PHILOLOGISTS
who shall be willing to be called “destroyers”: they
apply the standard of their criticism to everything and
sacrifice themselves to truth. The bad and the false
shall be brought to light / We will not build pre-
maturely: we do not know, indeed, whether we shall
ever be able to build, or if it would not be better not
to build at all. There are lazy pessimists and re-
signed ones in this world—and it is to their number
that we refuse to belong /
NOV 18 1915
FINIS.
Printed at The DARIEN Press, Edinburgh.
## p. (#229) ################################################
THE WORKS OF
FRIED RICH NIETZSCHE
First Complete and Authorised English Translation, in 18 Volumes
EDITED BY DR. OSCAR LEVY
I. THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY. Translated by WILLIAM
A. HAussMANN, B. A. , Ph. D. , with Biographical Introduction by
the Author's Sister, Portrait and Facsimile. Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. net.
Second Edition.
II. EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER
ESSAYS. Translated by M. A. MUGGE, Ph. D. 3s. 6d. net.
III. THE FUTURE OF OUR EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS. Translated by J. M. KENNEDv. 2s. 6d. net.
Second Edition.
IV. THOUGHTS OUT OF SEASON, Vol. I. Trans-
lated by A. M. LUDovici, with Editorial Note. 2s. 6d. net.
Second Edition.
V. THOUGHTS OUT OF SEASON, Vol. II. Trans-
lated, with Introduction, by ADRIAN Collins, M. A. 2s. 6d. net.
Second Edition.
VI. HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN, Vol. I. Translated by
HELEN ZIMMERN, with Introduction by J. M. KENNEDv. 5s. net.
Second Edition.
VII. HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN, Vol. II. Translated,
with Introduction, by PAUL V. Cohn, B. A. 5s. net.
VIII. THE CASE OF WAGNER: We Philologists, &c.
Translated by A. M. Ludovici. Cr. 8vo, 3s. 6d. net. Third Edition.
IX. THE DAWN OF DAY. Translated, with Intro-
duction, by J. M. KENNEDY. 5s. net.
X. THE JOYFUL WISDOM, Translated, with Intro-
duction, by THoMAs Common. 5s. net.
XI. THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA. Revised Trans-
lation by T. Common, with Introduction by Mrs. FoERstER-NIET-
zsche, and Commentary by A. M. LUDovici. 6s. net. Second Ed.
XII. BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL. Translated by HELEN
ZIMMERN, with Introduction by T. Common. 3s. 6d. net. Third Ed.
