On the contrary, The
Philosopher
says (Ethic.
Summa Theologica
Now, as stated above ([3154]FS, Q[7], A[2]; [3155]FS, Q[18], A[3]), the
act of every virtue is limited by the circumstances due thereto, and if
it overstep them it will be an act no longer of virtue but of vice.
Hence it belongs to piety to pay duty and homage to one's parents
according to the due mode. But it is not the due mode that man should
tend to worship his father rather than God, but, as Ambrose says on Lk.
12:52, "the piety of divine religion takes precedence of the claims of
kindred. "
Accordingly, if the worship of one's parents take one away from the
worship of God it would no longer be an act of piety to pay worship to
one's parents to the prejudice of God. Hence Jerome says (Ep. ad
Heliod. ): "Though thou trample upon thy father, though thou spurn thy
mother, turn not aside, but with dry eyes hasten to the standard of the
cross; it is the highest degree of piety to be cruel in this matter. "
Therefore in such a case the duties of piety towards one's parents
should be omitted for the sake of the worship religion gives to God.
If, however, by paying the services due to our parents, we are not
withdrawn from the service of God, then will it be an act of piety, and
there will be no need to set piety aside for the sake of religion.
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory expounding this saying of our Lord says
(Hom. xxxvii in Ev. ) that "when we find our parents to be a hindrance
in our way to God, we must ignore them by hating and fleeing from
them. " For if our parents incite us to sin, and withdraw us from the
service of God, we must, as regards this point, abandon and hate them.
It is in this sense that the Levites are said to have not known their
kindred, because they obeyed the Lord's command, and spared not the
idolaters (Ex. 32). James and John are praised for leaving their
parents and following our Lord, not that their father incited them to
evil, but because they deemed it possible for him to find another means
of livelihood, if they followed Christ.
Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord forbade the disciple to bury his father
because, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxviii in Matth. ), "Our Lord by
so doing saved him from many evils, such as the sorrows and worries and
other things that one anticipates under these circumstances. For after
the burial the will had to be read, the estate had to be divided, and
so forth: but chiefly, because there were others who could see to the
funeral. " Or, according to Cyril's commentary on Lk. 9, "this
disciple's request was, not that he might bury a dead father, but that
he might support a yet living father in the latter's old age, until at
length he should bury him. This is what Our Lord did not grant, because
there were others, bound by the duties of kindred, to take care of
him. "
Reply to Objection 3: Whatever we give our parents out of piety is
referred by us to God; just as other works of mercy which we perform
with regard to any of our neighbors are offered to God, according to
Mat. 25:40: "As long as you did it to one of . . . My least . . . you
did it to Me. " Accordingly, if our carnal parents stand in need of our
assistance, so that they have no other means of support, provided they
incite us to nothing against God, we must not abandon them for the sake
of religion. But if we cannot devote ourselves to their service without
sin, or if they can be supported without our assistance, it is lawful
to forego their service, so as to give more time to religion.
Reply to Objection 4: We must speak differently of one who is yet in
the world, and of one who has made his profession in religion. For he
that is in the world, if he has parents unable to find support without
him, he must not leave them and enter religion, because he would be
breaking the commandment prescribing the honoring of parents. Some say,
however, that even then he might abandon them, and leave them in God's
care. But this, considered aright, would be to tempt God: since, while
having human means at hand, he would be exposing his parents to danger,
in the hope of God's assistance. on the other hand, if the parents can
find means of livelihood without him, it is lawful for him to abandon
them and enter religion, because children are not bound to support
their parents except in cases of necessity, as stated above. He that
has already made his profession in religion is deemed to be already
dead to the world: wherefore he ought not, under pretext of supporting
his parents, to leave the cloister where he is buried with Christ, and
busy himself once more with worldly affairs. Nevertheless he is bound,
saving his obedience to his superiors, and his religious state withal,
to make points efforts for his parents' support.
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OF OBSERVANCE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF, AND OF ITS PARTS (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider observance and its parts, the considerations of
which will manifest the contrary vices.
Under the head of observance there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct from other
virtues?
(2) What does observance offer?
(3) Of its comparison with piety.
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Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues?
Objection 1: It seems that observance is not a special virtue, distinct
from other virtues. For virtues are distinguished by their objects. But
the object of observance is not distinct from the object of piety: for
Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "it is by observance that we pay
worship and honor to those who excel in some kind of dignity. " But
worship and honor are paid also by piety to our parents, who excel in
dignity. Therefore observance is not a distinct virtue from piety.
Objection 2: Further, just as honor and worship are due to those that
are in a position of dignity, so also are they due to those who excel
in science and virtue. But there is no special virtue whereby we pay
honor and worship to those who excel in science and virtue. Therefore
observance, whereby we pay worship and honor to those who excel in
dignity, is not a special virtue distinct from other virtues.
Objection 3: Further, we have many duties towards those who are in a
position of dignity, the fulfilment of which is required by law,
according to Rom. 13:7, "Render . . . to all men their dues: tribute to
whom tribute is due," etc. Now the fulfilment of the requirements of
the law belongs to legal justice, or even to special justice. Therefore
observance is not by itself a special virtue distinct from other
virtues.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons observance along
with the other parts of justice, which are special virtues.
I answer that, As explained above ([3156]Q[101], AA[1],3;[3157] Q[80]),
according to the various excellences of those persons to whom something
is due, there must needs be a corresponding distinction of virtues in a
descending order. Now just as a carnal father partakes of the character
of principle in a particular way, which character is found in God in a
universal way, so too a person who, in some way, exercises providence
in one respect, partakes of the character of father in a particular
way, since a father is the principle of generation, of education, of
learning and of whatever pertains to the perfection of human life:
while a person who is in a position of dignity is as a principle of
government with regard to certain things: for instance, the governor of
a state in civil matters, the commander of an army in matters of
warfare, a professor in matters of learning, and so forth. Hence it is
that all such persons are designated as "fathers," on account of their
being charged with like cares: thus the servants of Naaman said to him
(4 Kings 5:13): "Father, if the prophet had bid thee do some great
thing," etc.
Therefore, just as, in a manner, religion, whereby worship is given to
find piety, whereby we worship our so under piety we find observance,
whereby worship and honor are paid to persons in positions of dignity.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3158]Q[101], A[3], ad 2),
religion goes by the name of piety by way of supereminence, although
piety properly so called is distinct from religion; and in the same way
piety can be called observance by way of excellence, although
observance properly speaking is distinct from piety.
Reply to Objection 2: By the very fact of being in a position of
dignity a man not only excels as regards his position, but also has a
certain power of governing subjects, wherefore it is fitting that he
should be considered as a principle inasmuch as he is the governor of
others. On the other hand, the fact that a man has perfection of
science and virtue does not give him the character of a principle in
relation to others, but merely a certain excellence in himself.
Wherefore a special virtue is appointed for the payment of worship and
honor to persons in positions of dignity. Yet, forasmuch as science,
virtue and all like things render a man fit for positions of dignity,
the respect which is paid to anyone on account of any excellence
whatever belongs to the same virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to special justice, properly speaking,
to pay the equivalent to those to whom we owe anything. Now this cannot
be done to the virtuous, and to those who make good use of their
position of dignity, as neither can it be done to God, nor to our
parents. Consequently these matters belong to an annexed virtue, and
not to special justice, which is a principal virtue.
Legal justice extends to the acts of all the virtues, as stated above
([3159]Q[58], A[6]).
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Whether it belongs to observance to pay worship and honor to those who are
in positions of dignity?
Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to observance to pay
worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity. For according to
Augustine (De Civ. Dei x), we are said to worship those persons whom we
hold in honor, so that worship and honor would seem to be the same.
Therefore it is unfitting to define observance as paying worship and
honor to persons in positions of dignity.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to justice that we pay what we owe:
wherefore this belongs to observance also, since it is a part of
justice. Now we do not owe worship and honor to all persons in
positions of dignity, but only to those who are placed over us.
Therefore observance is unfittingly defined as giving worship and honor
to all.
Objection 3: Further, not only do we owe honor to persons of dignity
who are placed over us; we owe them also fear and a certain payment of
remuneration, according to Rom. 13:7, "Render . . . to all men their
dues; tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to
whom fear; honor to whom honor. " Moreover, we owe them reverence and
subjection, according to Heb. 13:17, "Obey your prelates, and be
subject to them. " Therefore observance is not fittingly defined as
paying worship and honor.
On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "it is by
observance that we pay worship and honor to those who excel in some
kind of dignity. "
I answer that, It belongs to persons in positions of dignity to govern
subjects. Now to govern is to move certain ones to their due end: thus
a sailor governs his ship by steering it to port. But every mover has a
certain excellence and power over that which is moved. Wherefore, a
person in a position of dignity is an object of twofold consideration:
first, in so far as he obtains excellence of position, together with a
certain power over subjects: secondly, as regards the exercise of his
government. In respect of his excellence there is due to him honor,
which is the recognition of some kind of excellence; and in respect of
the exercise of his government, there is due to him worship, consisting
in rendering him service, by obeying his commands, and by repaying him,
according to one's faculty, for the benefits we received from him.
Reply to Objection 1: Worship includes not only honor, but also
whatever other suitable actions are connected with the relations
between man and man.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3160]Q[80]), debt is twofold.
One is legal debt, to pay which man is compelled by law; and thus man
owes honor and worship to those persons in positions of dignity who are
placed over him. The other is moral debt, which is due by reason of a
certain honesty: it is in this way that we owe worship and honor to
persons in positions of dignity even though we be not their subjects.
Reply to Objection 3: Honor is due to the excellence of persons in
positions of dignity, on account of their higher rank: while fear is
due to them on account of their power to use compulsion: and to the
exercise of their government there is due both obedience, whereby
subjects are moved at the command of their superiors, and tributes,
which are a repayment of their labor.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether observance is a greater virtue than piety?
Objection 1: It seems that observance is a greater virtue than piety.
For the prince to whom worship is paid by observance is compared to a
father who is worshiped by piety, as a universal to a particular
governor; because the household which a father governs is part of the
state which is governed by the prince. Now a universal power is
greater, and inferiors are more subject thereto. Therefore observance
is a greater virtue than piety.
Objection 2: Further, persons in positions of dignity take care of the
common good. Now our kindred pertain to the private good, which we
ought to set aside for the common good: wherefore it is praiseworthy to
expose oneself to the danger of death for the sake of the common good.
Therefore observance, whereby worship is paid to persons in positions
of dignity, is a greater virtue than piety, which pays worship to one's
kindred.
Objection 3: Further honor and reverence are due to the virtuous in the
first place after God. Now honor and reverence are paid to the virtuous
by the virtue of observance, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Therefore
observance takes the first place after religion.
On the contrary, The precepts of the Law prescribe acts of virtue. Now,
immediately after the precepts of religion, which belong to the first
table, follows the precept of honoring our parents which refers to
piety. Therefore piety follows immediately after religion in the order
of excellence.
I answer that, Something may be paid to persons in positions of dignity
in two ways. First, in relation to the common good, as when one serves
them in the administration of the affairs of the state. This no longer
belongs to observance, but to piety, which pays worship not only to
one's father but also to one's fatherland. Secondly, that which is paid
to persons in positions of dignity refers specially to their personal
usefulness or renown, and this belongs properly to observance, as
distinct from piety. Therefore in comparing observance with piety we
must needs take into consideration the different relations in which
other persons stand to ourselves, which relations both virtues regard.
Now it is evident that the persons of our parents and of our kindred
are more substantially akin to us than persons in positions of dignity,
since birth and education, which originate in the father, belong more
to one's substance than external government, the principle of which is
seated in those who are in positions of dignity. For this reason piety
takes precedence of observance, inasmuch as it pays worship to persons
more akin to us, and to whom we are more strictly bound.
Reply to Objection 1: The prince is compared to the father as a
universal to a particular power, as regards external government, but
not as regards the father being a principle of generation: for in this
way the father should be compared with the divine power from which all
things derive their being.
Reply to Objection 2: In so far as persons in positions of dignity are
related to the common good, their worship does not pertain to
observance, but to piety, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: The rendering of honor or worship should be
proportionate to the person to whom it is paid not only as considered
in himself, but also as compared to those who pay them. Wherefore,
though virtuous persons, considered in themselves, are more worthy of
honor than the persons of one's parents, yet children are under a
greater obligation, on account of the benefits they have received from
their parents and their natural kinship with them, to pay worship and
honor to their parents than to virtuous persons who are not of their
kindred.
__________________________________________________________________
OF DULIA (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the parts of observance. We shall consider (1)
dulia, whereby we pay honor and other things pertaining thereto to
those who are in a higher position; (2) obedience, whereby we obey
their commands.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether honor is a spiritual or a corporal thing?
(2) Whether honor is due to those only who are in a higher position?
(3) Whether dulia, which pays honor and worship to those who are above
us, is a special virtue, distinct from latria?
(4) Whether it contains several species?
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Whether honor denotes something corporal?
Objection 1: It seems that honor does not denote something corporal.
For honor is showing reverence in acknowledgment of virtue, as may be
gathered from the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5). Now showing reverence is
something spiritual, since to revere is an act of fear, as stated above
([3161]Q[81], A[2], ad 1). Therefore honor is something spiritual.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3),
"honor is the reward of virtue. " Now, since virtue consists chiefly of
spiritual things, its reward is not something corporal, for the reward
is more excellent than the merit. Therefore honor does not consist of
corporal things.
Objection 3: Further, honor is distinct from praise, as also from
glory. Now praise and glory consist of external things. Therefore honor
consists of things internal and spiritual.
On the contrary, Jerome in his exposition of 1 Tim. 5:3, "Honor widows
that are widows indeed," and (1 Tim. 5:17), "let the priests that rule
well be esteemed worthy of double honor" etc. says (Ep. ad Ageruch. ):
"Honor here stands either for almsgiving or for remuneration. " Now both
of these pertain to spiritual things. Therefore honor consists of
corporal things.
I answer that, Honor denotes a witnessing to a person's excellence.
Therefore men who wish to be honored seek a witnessing to their
excellence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5; viii, 8). Now
witness is borne either before God or before man. Before God, Who is
the searcher of hearts, the witness of one's conscience suffices.
wherefore honor, so far as God is concerned, may consist of the mere
internal movement of the heart, for instance when a man acknowledges
either God's excellence or another man's excellence before God. But, as
regards men, one cannot bear witness, save by means of signs, either by
words, as when one proclaims another's excellence by word of mouth, or
by deeds, for instance by bowing, saluting, and so forth, or by
external things, as by offering gifts, erecting statues, and the like.
Accordingly honor consists of signs, external and corporal.
Reply to Objection 1: Reverence is not the same as honor: but on the
one hand it is the primary motive for showing honor, in so far as one
man honors another out of the reverence he has for him; and on the
other hand, it is the end of honor, in so far as a person is honored in
order that he may be held in reverence by others.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3),
honor is not a sufficient reward of virtue: yet nothing in human and
corporal things can be greater than honor, since these corporal things
themselves are employed as signs in acknowledgment of excelling virtue.
It is, however, due to the good and the beautiful, that they may be
made known, according to Mat. 5:15, "Neither do men light a candle, and
put it under a bushel, but upon a candlestick, that it may shine to all
that are in the house. " In this sense honor is said to be the reward of
virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Praise is distinguished from honor in two ways.
First, because praise consists only of verbal signs, whereas honor
consists of any external signs, so that praise is included in honor.
Secondly, because by paying honor to a person we bear witness to a
person's excelling goodness absolutely, whereas by praising him we bear
witness to his goodness in reference to an end: thus we praise one that
works well for an end. On the other hand, honor is given even to the
best, which is not referred to an end, but has already arrived at the
end, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5).
Glory is the effect of honor and praise, since the result of our
bearing witness to a person's goodness is that his goodness becomes
clear to the knowledge of many. The word "glory" signifies this, for
"glory" is the same as {kleria}, wherefore a gloss of Augustine on Rom.
16:27 observes that glory is "clear knowledge together with praise. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether honor is properly due to those who are above us?
Objection 1: It seems that honor is not properly due to those who are
above us. For an angel is above any human wayfarer, according to Mat.
11:11, "He that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than John
the Baptist. " Yet an angel forbade John when the latter wished to honor
him (Apoc. 22:10). Therefore honor is not due to those who are above
us.
Objection 2: Further, honor is due to a person in acknowledgment of his
virtue, as stated above [3162](A[1]; Q[63], A[3]). But sometimes those
who are above us are not virtuous. Therefore honor is not due to them,
as neither is it due to the demons, who nevertheless are above us in
the order of nature.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 12:10): "With honor
preventing one another," and we read (1 Pet. 2:17): "Honor all men. "
But this would not be so if honor were due to those alone who are above
us. Therefore honor is not due properly to those who are above us.
Objection 4: Further, it is written (Tob. 1:16) that Tobias "had ten
talents of silver of that which he had been honored by the king": and
we read (Esther 6:11) that Assuerus honored Mardochaeus, and ordered it
to be proclaimed in his presence: "This honor is he worthy of whom the
king hath a mind to honor. " Therefore honor is paid to those also who
are beneath us, and it seems, in consequence, that honor is not due
properly to those who are above us.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 12) that "honor is due
to the best. "
I answer that, As stated above [3163](A[1]), honor is nothing but an
acknowledgment of a person's excelling goodness. Now a person's
excellence may be considered, not only in relation to those who honor
him, in the point of his being more excellent than they, but also in
itself, or in relation to other persons, and in this way honor is
always due to a person, on account of some excellence or superiority.
For the person honored has no need to be more excellent than those who
honor him; it may suffice for him to be more excellent than some
others, or again he may be more excellent than those who honor him in
some respect and not simply.
Reply to Objection 1: The angel forbade John to pay him, not any kind
of honor, but the honor of adoration and latria, which is due to God.
Or again, he forbade him to pay the honor of dulia, in order to
indicate the dignity of John himself, for which Christ equaled him to
the angels "according to the hope of glory of the children of God":
wherefore he refused to be honored by him as though he were superior to
him.
Reply to Objection 2: A wicked superior is honored for the excellence,
not of his virtue but of his dignity, as being God's minister, and
because the honor paid to him is paid to the whole community over which
he presides. As for the demons, they are wicked beyond recall, and
should be looked upon as enemies, rather than treated with honor.
Reply to Objection 3: In every man is to be found something that makes
it possible to deem him better than ourselves, according to Phil. 2:3,
"In humility, let each esteem others better than themselves," and thus,
too, we should all be on the alert to do honor to one another.
Reply to Objection 4: Private individuals are sometimes honored by
kings, not that they are above them in the order of dignity but on
account of some excellence of their virtue: and in this way Tobias and
Mardochaeus were honored by kings.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether dulia is a special virtue distinct from latria?
Objection 1. It seems that dulia is not a special virtue distinct from
latria. For a gloss on Ps. 7:1, "O Lord my God, in Thee have I put my
trust," says: "Lord of all by His power, to Whom dulia is due; God by
creation, to Whom we owe latria. " Now the virtue directed to God as
Lord is not distinct from that which is directed to Him as God.
Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 8),
"to be loved is like being honored. " Now the charity with which we love
God is the same as that whereby we love our neighbor. Therefore dulia
whereby we honor our neighbor is not a distinct virtue from latria with
which we honor God.
Objection 3: Further, the movement whereby one is moved towards an
image is the same as the movement whereby one is moved towards the
thing represented by the image. Now by dulia we honor a man as being
made to the image of God. For it is written of the wicked (Wis.
2:22,23) that "they esteemed not the honor of holy souls, for God
created man incorruptible, and to the image of His own likeness He made
him. " Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria whereby God
is honored.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), that "the homage due
to man, of which the Apostle spoke when he commanded servants to obey
their masters and which in Greek is called dulia, is distinct from
latria which denotes the homage that consists in the worship of God. "
I answer that, According to what has been stated above ([3164]Q[101],
A[3]), where there are different aspects of that which is due, there
must needs be different virtues to render those dues. Now servitude is
due to God and to man under different aspects: even as lordship is
competent to God and to man under different aspects. For God has
absolute and paramount lordship over the creature wholly and singly,
which is entirely subject to His power: whereas man partakes of a
certain likeness to the divine lordship, forasmuch as he exercises a
particular power over some man or creature. Wherefore dulia, which pays
due service to a human lord, is a distinct virtue from latria, which
pays due service to the lordship of God. It is, moreover, a species of
observance, because by observance we honor all those who excel in
dignity, while dulia properly speaking is the reverence of servants for
their master, dulia being the Greek for servitude.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as religion is called piety by way of
excellence, inasmuch as God is our Father by way of excellence, so
again latria is called dulia by way of excellence, inasmuch as God is
our Lord by way of excellence. Now the creature does not partake of the
power to create by reason of which latria is due to God: and so this
gloss drew a distinction, by ascribing latria to God in respect of
creation, which is not communicated to a creature, but dulia in respect
of lordship, which is communicated to a creature.
Reply to Objection 2: The reason why we love our neighbor is God, since
that which we love in our neighbor through charity is God alone.
Wherefore the charity with which we love God is the same as that with
which we love our neighbor. Yet there are other friendships distinct
from charity, in respect of the other reasons for which a man is loved.
In like manner, since there is one reason for serving God and another
for serving man, and for honoring the one or the other, latria and
dulia are not the same virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Movement towards an image as such is referred to
the thing represented by the image: yet not every movement towards an
image is referred to the image as such, and consequently sometimes the
movement to the image differs specifically from the movement to the
thing. Accordingly we must reply that the honor or subjection of dulia
regards some dignity of a man absolutely. For though, in respect of
that dignity, man is made to the image or likeness of God, yet in
showing reverence to a person, one does not always refer this to God
actually.
Or we may reply that the movement towards an image is, after a fashion,
towards the thing, yet the movement towards the thing need not be
towards its image. Wherefore reverence paid to a person as the image of
God redounds somewhat to God: and yet this differs from the reverence
that is paid to God Himself, for this in no way refers to His image.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether dulia has various species?
Objection 1: It seems that dulia has various species. For by dulia we
show honor to our neighbor. Now different neighbors are honored under
different aspects, for instance king, father and master, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 2). Since this difference of aspect in
the object differentiates the species of virtue, it seems that dulia is
divided into specifically different virtues.
Objection 2: Further, the mean differs specifically from the extremes,
as pale differs from white and black. Now hyperdulia is apparently a
mean between latria and dulia: for it is shown towards creatures having
a special affinity to God, for instance to the Blessed Virgin as being
the mother of God. Therefore it seems that there are different species
of dulia, one being simply dulia, the other hyperdulia.
Objection 3: Further, just as in the rational creature we find the
image of God, for which reason it is honored, so too in the irrational
creature we find the trace of God. Now the aspect of likeness denoted
by an image differs from the aspect conveyed by a trace. Therefore we
must distinguish a corresponding difference of dulia: and all the more
since honor is shown to certain irrational creatures, as, for instance,
to the wood of the Holy Cross.
On the contrary, Dulia is condivided with latria. But latria is not
divided into different species. Neither therefore is dulia.
I answer that, Dulia may be taken in two ways. In one way it may be
taken in a wide sense as denoting reverence paid to anyone on account
of any kind of excellence, and thus it comprises piety and observance,
and any similar virtue whereby reverence is shown towards a man. Taken
in this sense it will have parts differing specifically from one
another. In another way it may be taken in a strict sense as denoting
the reverence of a servant for his lord, for dulia signifies servitude,
as stated above [3165](A[3]). Taken in this sense it is not divided
into different species, but is one of the species of observance,
mentioned by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii), for the reason that a servant
reveres his lord under one aspect, a soldier his commanding officer
under another, the disciple his master under another, and so on in
similar cases.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes dulia in a wide sense.
Reply to Objection 2: Hyperdulia is the highest species of dulia taken
in a wide sense, since the greatest reverence is that which is due to a
man by reason of his having an affinity to God.
Reply to Objection 3: Man owes neither subjection nor honor to an
irrational creature considered in itself, indeed all such creatures are
naturally subject to man. As to the Cross of Christ, the honor we pay
to it is the same as that which we pay to Christ, just as the king's
robe receives the same honor as the king himself, according to
Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv).
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OF OBEDIENCE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider obedience, under which head there are six points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether one man is bound to obey another?
(2) Whether obedience is a special virtue?
(3) Of its comparison with other virtues;
(4) Whether God must be obeyed in all things?
(5) Whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things?
(6) Whether the faithful are bound to obey the secular power?
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Whether one man is bound to obey another?
Objection 1: It seems that one man is not bound to obey another. For
nothing should be done contrary to the divine ordinance. Now God has so
ordered that man is ruled by his own counsel, according to Ecclus.
15:14, "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of
his own counsel. " Therefore one man is not bound to obey another.
Objection 2: Further, if one man were bound to obey another, he would
have to look upon the will of the person commanding him, as being his
rule of conduct. Now God's will alone, which is always right, is a rule
of human conduct. Therefore man is bound to obey none but God.
Objection 3: Further, the more gratuitous the service the more is it
acceptable. Now what a man does out of duty is not gratuitous.
Therefore if a man were bound in duty to obey others in doing good
deeds, for this very reason his good deeds would be rendered less
acceptable through being done out of obedience. Therefore one man is
not bound to obey another.
On the contrary, It is prescribed (Heb. 13:17): "Obey your prelates and
be subject to them. "
I answer that, Just as the actions of natural things proceed from
natural powers, so do human actions proceed from the human will. In
natural things it behooved the higher to move the lower to their
actions by the excellence of the natural power bestowed on them by God:
and so in human affairs also the higher must move the lower by their
will in virtue of a divinely established authority. Now to move by
reason and will is to command. Wherefore just as in virtue of the
divinely established natural order the lower natural things need to be
subject to the movement of the higher, so too in human affairs, in
virtue of the order of natural and divine law, inferiors are bound to
obey their superiors.
Reply to Objection 1: God left man in the hand of his own counsel, not
as though it were lawful to him to do whatever he will, but because,
unlike irrational creatures, he is not compelled by natural necessity
to do what he ought to do, but is left the free choice proceeding from
his own counsel. And just as he has to proceed on his own counsel in
doing other things, so too has he in the point of obeying his
superiors. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxv), "When we humbly give way to
another's voice, we overcome ourselves in our own hearts. "
Reply to Objection 2: The will of God is the first rule whereby all
rational wills are regulated: and to this rule one will approaches more
than another, according to a divinely appointed order. Hence the will
of the one man who issues a command may be as a second rule to the will
of this other man who obeys him.
Reply to Objection 3: A thing may be deemed gratuitous in two ways. In
one way on the part of the deed itself, because, to wit, one is not
bound to do it; in another way, on the part of the doer, because he
does it of his own free will. Now a deed is rendered virtuous,
praiseworthy and meritorious, chiefly according as it proceeds from the
will. Wherefore although obedience be a duty, if one obey with a prompt
will, one's merit is not for that reason diminished, especially before
God, Who sees not only the outward deed, but also the inward will.
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Whether obedience is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that obedience is not a special virtue. For
disobedience is contrary to obedience. But disobedience is a general
sin, because Ambrose says (De Parad. viii) that "sin is to disobey the
divine law. " Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.
Objection 2: Further, every special virtue is either theological or
moral. But obedience is not a theological virtue, since it is not
comprised under faith, hope or charity. Nor is it a moral virtue, since
it does not hold the mean between excess and deficiency, for the more
obedient one is the more is one praised. Therefore obedience is not a
special virtue.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is the
more meritorious and praiseworthy, the less it holds its own. " But
every special virtue is the more to be praised the more it holds its
own, since virtue requires a man to exercise his will and choice, as
stated in Ethic. ii, 4. Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.
Objection 4: Further, virtues differ in species according to their
objects. Now the object of obedience would seem to be the command of a
superior, of which, apparently, there are as many kinds as there are
degrees of superiority. Therefore obedience is a general virtue,
comprising many special virtues.
On the contrary, obedience is reckoned by some to be a part of justice,
as stated above ([3166]Q[80]).
I answer that, A special virtue is assigned to all good deeds that have
a special reason of praise: for it belongs properly to virtue to render
a deed good. Now obedience to a superior is due in accordance with the
divinely established order of things, as shown above [3167](A[1]), and
therefore it is a good, since good consists in mode, species and order,
as Augustine states (De Natura Boni iii) [*Cf. [3168]FP, Q[5], A[5]].
Again, this act has a special aspect of praiseworthiness by reason of
its object. For while subjects have many obligations towards their
superiors, this one, that they are bound to obey their commands, stands
out as special among the rest. Wherefore obedience is a special virtue,
and its specific object is a command tacit or express, because the
superior's will, however it become known, is a tacit precept, and a
man's obedience seems to be all the more prompt, forasmuch as by
obeying he forestalls the express command as soon as he understands his
superior's will.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing prevents the one same material object
from admitting two special aspects to which two special virtues
correspond: thus a soldier, by defending his king's fortress, fulfils
both an act of fortitude, by facing the danger of death for a good end,
and an act of justice, by rendering due service to his lord.
Accordingly the aspect of precept, which obedience considers, occurs in
acts of all virtues, but not in all acts of virtue, since not all acts
of virtue are a matter of precept, as stated above ([3169]FS, Q[96],
A[3]). Moreover, certain things are sometimes a matter of precept, and
pertain to no other virtue, such things for instance as are not evil
except because they are forbidden. Wherefore, if obedience be taken in
its proper sense, as considering formally and intentionally the aspect
of precept, it will be a special virtue, and disobedience a special
sin: because in this way it is requisite for obedience that one perform
an act of justice or of some other virtue with the intention of
fulfilling a precept; and for disobedience that one treat the precept
with actual contempt. On the other hand, if obedience be taken in a
wide sense for the performance of any action that may be a matter of
precept, and disobedience for the omission of that action through any
intention whatever, then obedience will be a general virtue, and
disobedience a general sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Obedience is not a theological virtue, for its
direct object is not God, but the precept of any superior, whether
expressed or inferred, namely, a simple word of the superior,
indicating his will, and which the obedient subject obeys promptly,
according to Titus 3:1, "Admonish them to be subject to princes, and to
obey at a word," etc.
It is, however, a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and it
observes the mean between excess and deficiency. Excess thereof is
measured in respect, not of quantity, but of other circumstances, in so
far as a man obeys either whom he ought not, or in matters wherein he
ought not to obey, as we have stated above regarding religion
([3170]Q[92], A[2]). We may also reply that as in justice, excess is in
the person who retains another's property, and deficiency in the person
who does not receive his due, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v,
4), so too obedience observes the mean between excess on the part of
him who fails to pay due obedience to his superior, since he exceeds in
fulfilling his own will, and deficiency on the part of the superior,
who does not receive obedience. Wherefore in this way obedience will be
a mean between two forms of wickedness, as was stated above concerning
justice ([3171]Q[58], A[10]).
Reply to Objection 3: Obedience, like every virtue requires the will to
be prompt towards its proper object, but not towards that which is
repugnant to it. Now the proper object of obedience is a precept, and
this proceeds from another's will. Wherefore obedience make a man's
will prompt in fulfilling the will of another, the maker, namely, of
the precept. If that which is prescribed to him is willed by him for
its own sake apart from its being prescribed, as happens in agreeable
matters, he tends towards it at once by his own will and seems to
comply, not on account of the precept, but on account of his own will.
But if that which is prescribed is nowise willed for its own sake, but,
considered in itself, repugnant to his own will, as happens in
disagreeable matters, then it is quite evident that it is not fulfilled
except on account of the precept. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that
"obedience perishes or diminishes when it holds its own in agreeable
matters," because, to wit, one's own will seems to tend principally,
not to the accomplishment of the precept, but to the fulfilment of
one's own desire; but that "it increases in disagreeable or difficult
matters," because there one's own will tends to nothing beside the
precept. Yet this must be understood as regards outward appearances:
for, on the other hand, according to the judgment of God, Who searches
the heart, it may happen that even in agreeable matters obedience,
while holding its own, is nonetheless praiseworthy, provided the will
of him that obeys tend no less devotedly [*Cf. [3172] Q[82], A[2]] to
the fulfilment of the precept.
Reply to Objection 4: Reverence regards directly the person that
excels: wherefore it admits a various species according to the various
aspects of excellence. Obedience, on the other hand, regards the
precept of the person that excels, and therefore admits of only one
aspect. And since obedience is due to a person's precept on account of
reverence to him, it follows that obedience to a man is of one species,
though the causes from which it proceeds differ specifically.
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Whether obedience is the greatest of the virtues?
Objection 1: It seems that obedience is the greatest of the virtues.
For it is written (1 Kings 15:22): "Obedience is better than
sacrifices. " Now the offering of sacrifices belongs to religion, which
is the greatest of all moral virtues, as shown above ([3173]Q[81],
A[6]). Therefore obedience is the greatest of all virtues.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is the
only virtue that ingrafts virtues in the soul and protects them when
ingrafted. " Now the cause is greater than the effect. Therefore
obedience is greater than all the virtues.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "evil should
never be done out of obedience: yet sometimes for the sake of obedience
we should lay aside the good we are doing. " Now one does not lay aside
a thing except for something better. Therefore obedience, for whose
sake the good of other virtues is set aside, is better than other
virtues.
On the contrary, obedience deserves praise because it proceeds from
charity: for Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience should be
practiced, not out of servile fear, but from a sense of charity, not
through fear of punishment, but through love of justice. " Therefore
charity is a greater virtue than obedience.
I answer that, Just as sin consists in man contemning God and adhering
to mutable things, so the merit of a virtuous act consists in man
contemning created goods and adhering to God as his end. Now the end is
greater than that which is directed to the end. Therefore if a man
contemns created goods in order that he may adhere to God, his virtue
derives greater praise from his adhering to God than from his
contemning earthly things. And so those, namely the theological,
virtues whereby he adheres to God in Himself, are greater than the
moral virtues, whereby he holds in contempt some earthly thing in order
to adhere to God.
Among the moral virtues, the greater the thing which a man contemns
that he may adhere to God, the greater the virtue. Now there are three
kinds of human goods that man may contemn for God's sake. The lowest of
these are external goods, the goods of the body take the middle place,
and the highest are the goods of the soul; and among these the chief,
in a way, is the will, in so far as, by his will, man makes use of all
other goods. Therefore, properly speaking, the virtue of obedience,
whereby we contemn our own will for God's sake, is more praiseworthy
than the other moral virtues, which contemn other goods for the sake of
God.
Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is rightly preferred
to sacrifices, because by sacrifices another's body is slain whereas by
obedience we slay our own will. " Wherefore even any other acts of
virtue are meritorious before God through being performed out of
obedience to God's will. For were one to suffer even martyrdom, or to
give all one's goods to the poor, unless one directed these things to
the fulfilment of the divine will, which pertains directly to
obedience, they could not be meritorious: as neither would they be if
they were done without charity, which cannot exist apart from
obedience. For it is written (1 Jn. 2:4,5): "He who saith that he
knoweth God, and keepeth not His commandments, is a liar . . . but he
that keepeth His word, in him in very deed the charity of God is
perfected": and this because friends have the same likes and dislikes.
Reply to Objection 1: Obedience proceeds from reverence, which pays
worship and honor to a superior, and in this respect it is contained
under different virtues, although considered in itself, as regarding
the aspect of precept, it is one special virtue. Accordingly, in so far
as it proceeds from reverence for a superior, it is contained, in a
way, under observance; while in so far as it proceeds from reverence
for one's parents, it is contained under piety; and in so far as it
proceeds from reverence for God, it comes under religion, and pertains
to devotion, which is the principal act of religion. Wherefore from
this point of view it is more praiseworthy to obey God than to offer
sacrifice, as well as because, "in a sacrifice we slay another's body,
whereas by obedience we slay our own will," as Gregory says (Moral.
xxxv). As to the special case in which Samuel spoke, it would have been
better for Saul to obey God than to offer in sacrifice the fat animals
of the Amalekites against the commandment of God.
Reply to Objection 2: All acts of virtue, in so far as they come under
a precept, belong to obedience. Wherefore according as acts of virtue
act causally or dispositively towards their generation and
preservation, obedience is said to ingraft and protect all virtues. And
yet it does not follow that obedience takes precedence of all virtues
absolutely, for two reasons. First, because though an act of virtue
come under a precept, one may nevertheless perform that act of virtue
without considering the aspect of precept. Consequently, if there be
any virtue, whose object is naturally prior to the precept, that virtue
is said to be naturally prior to obedience. Such a virtue is faith,
whereby we come to know the sublime nature of divine authority, by
reason of which the power to command is competent to God. Secondly,
because infusion of grace and virtues may precede, even in point of
time, all virtuous acts: and in this way obedience is not prior to all
virtues, neither in point of time nor by nature.
Reply to Objection 3: There are two kinds of good.
