No More Learning

• Idem, 1, 192, 194; Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp. 412, 428 599.
• Wolf, Life of Ripon, 11, 40, 48.
° Idem, 11, 12, 19.
• Memorandum of conversations, 31 July-1 August, 1880 (F. O. 65-1104).


## p. 422 (#462) ############################################

422
CENTRAL ASIA, 1858–1918
given evidence of his real desire for English friendship. When in July,
1880, Ayub Khan, Sher 'Ali's son, had attacked Burrows, commanding
the English force at Kandahar, inflicting on him a severe defeat at
Maiwand, the amir had promptly dispatched letters to all the chiefs
on the route by which Roberts was to march from Kabul to retrieve
the situation, directing them to afford the English all possible as-
sistance; and this explains at least in part the case with which Roberts
effected his famous march from Kabul to Kandahar, leading to the
complete defeat of Ayub Khan's forces. When, therefore, Ripon was
called upon to give effect to the declared policy of the liberal cabinet,
he told Hartington bluntly that it would lead in ten years' time to
another Afghan war, and broadly hinted that he would rather resign
than overrule his council in order to carry out what he regarded as
a mistaken policy. The cabinet accordingly permitted its declara-
tions to fall into a convenient if dishonest oblivion.
The settlement thus reached brought to a close a most dangerous
phase of the Central Asian question. Lytton may be blamed for his
provocative handling of the proposal to establish an Afghan mission
and for his selection at a later time of a too sanguine agent to conduct
British relations with the amir Yakub. But he had inherited a position
of extreme difficulty. Argyll's decision of 1873 had already convinced
Sher 'Ali that he had nothing to hope for from the English; while he
fancied from their previous conduct that he had nothing to fear from
them either. Accordingly he had turned to Russia. Lytton had to
disabuse him of his error. Probably Lytton was right in thinking that
nothing short of war would do so. In any case war was made in-
evitable by the Russian action in the crisis of 1878. Stolietoff's
embassy imperatively demanded the submission or destruction of
Sher 'Ali. In view of the developments of the following ten years, the
policy adopted by Salisbury and Lytton was justified in its broad
outlines. Nor does the second Afghan War afford a parallel with the
first except in superficial aspects. Both, of course, illustrate the ease
with which Afghanistan may be occupied and the difficulty with
which it can be held. But the first ended with the mere restoration
of the ruler whom the British had dethroned, with no advantage
military or political or diplomatic. The second replaced a hostile by
a friendly amir; it brought to a decisive end the disastrous policy of
Lawrence and Argyll; and it provided India, for the first time since
the collapse of the Moghul Empire, with a position from which the
north-west frontier could easily be defended.
Up to this time the Russian frontier had not pressed too closely on
Afghanistan. But now Russia, taking advantage of the numerous
external difficulties of the Gladstone government, and fortified by a
1 Cf. Kabul Diary, week ending 8 August, 1880 (F. O. 65-1104).
2 Wolf, op. cit. II, 39;
: Cf. Davies, The North-West Frontier, pp. 10 599.


## p. 423 (#463) ############################################

RUSSIA AND GLADSTONE
423
secret treaty with Germany, thought the time had come for abandoning
intentions which had been the subject in the past of repeated declara-
tions. The Merv oasis afforded the first example. It is likely that the
strategic importance of this region had been greatly exaggerated by
persons suffering from what the Duke of Argyll (with school-boy
humour) was pleased to call "mervousness”. ? It was, however, in
disagreeable proximity to Herat, and on several occasions the British
Foreign Office had sought reassurances regarding its future. In 1882
these were repeated. De Giers assured the British ambassador in a
conversation, not once but repeatedly, that the mission of Russia was
one of peace and that she had no intention whatever of occupying
fresh territory3 Within three months British agents were possessed
of documents showing that the Russians were seeking the submission
of the Meiv chiefs, and in fact, at the moment when the Russian
foreign minister was soothing the British ambassador, the Merv
chieftains were being urged and bribed to submit. Finally, early in
1884, when Mr Gladstone was embarrassed by the Mahdi in the
Sudan, the chiefs were beguiled and coerced into tendering allegiance
to the emperor, while the War Office at St Petersburg prepared a map
showing the Merv boundaries stretching southwards and touching
the Hari-rud near Herat. As Curzon said, “the flame of diplomatic
protest blazed fiercely forth in England; but, after a momentary
combustion, was as usual extinguished by a flood of excuses from the
inexhaustible reservoirs of the Neva”. ?
This event created such general uneasiness that the liberal govern-
ment could not leave matters where they stood. Conversations,
which had been begun in London as early as 1882,8 led to a reference
to St Petersburg. ' But although the imperial government regarded
Gladstone with a singular benevolence, 10 the operation of that senti-
ment was certainly limited by the need of taking the utmost advantage
of his tenure of office. While, therefore, it was willing enough to approve
the idea of formally defining the northern boundary of Afghanistan,
it also began to refer casually to Panjdeh and the need of establishing
peace in that area. 11 Granville eagerly took up the idea of a joint
delimitation; an Indiaiofficial, Sir Peter Lumsden, was appointed
to conduct the British mission, the amir was invited to provide
qualified officers, and Granville proposed that the British and Russian
missions should meet at Saraks on 1 October, 1884. 12 He thus
assumed that Russia really intended to co-operate. But for that the
Russian leaders did not yet deem the time to be ripe. They certainly
1 Curzon, op. cit. p. 120.
2 The Eastern Question, II, 371.
• Parl. Papers, 1884, LXXXVII, 77.
• Idem, p. 95; cf. Baddeley, Russia in the Eighties, p. 129.
• Curzon, op. cit. p. 111.
• Parl. Papers, 1884, LXXXVII, 183; 1884-5, LXXXVII, 38, 40, 41, 47, 49.
? Curzon, op. cit. p. 111.
& Parl. Papers, 1884, LXXXVII, 66.
10 Meyendorff, Correspondance de M. de Staal, i, 27.
11 Parl. Papers, 1884-5, LXXXVII, 60, 63, 75. 12 Idem, pp. 78, 96, 111.
• Idem, p. 70.


## p. 424 (#464) ############################################

424
CENTRAL ASIA, 1858–1918
aimed at securing positions which would place under their control
the entire body of nomad Turkoman tribes. Therefore, while they
named General Zelenoi head of the Russian boundary mission, they
also smote him with illness and insisted that on his recovery he must
have a prolonged period in which to study his instructions and gather
information. By that time climatic conditions would make surveying
impossible, so that nothing could be done till February, 1885, at
soonest. In December, as time was passing, the Russian ambassador
was ordered to seek British assent to the essential points of the Russian
proposals, which now claimed Panjdeh as independent of the amir.
At the same time, in order to cover the Russian movements, complaints
were made of aggressive Afghan concentrations. 2 Granville claimed
that the definition of Afghan territory should be left to the commission. 3
To this De Giers would not agree, and claimed districts which the
British declared to belong to Afghanistan. “ By April the discussions
had reached a deadlock. Lumsden, who had gone with his mission
into north-western Afghanistan, had already reported repeated ag-
gressions on the part of the Russian rilitary forces. Then when the
telegraph line from Meshed was conveniently interrupted, belated
news reached London on 9 April that the Russians on 30 March had
attacked a body of Afghan troops and driven them out of Panjdeh. 8
Mr Gladstone's position was most difficult. Gordon's death at
Khartum had cast great odium upon his policy. The Irish question
was looming up ominous and unsettled. A new humiliation would
certainly terminate his tenure of office. So, though personally desiring
war no more than Disraeli had done in 1878, he was driven by circum-
stances into assuming a defiant attitude. He called up the reserves
and moved a vote of credit for special military preparations. De Giers
had contemplated carrying his point by bluff. He had even wired the
Russian ambassador for the information of the English cabinet that
the Afghan commandant at Panjdeh had lamented his inability to
comply with the Russian demands because the English officers forbade
him. But on the news of the vote of credit he withdrew his telegram. '
The ambassador, de Staal, who laboured for peace at this crisis, made
unofficial proposals which would, he hoped, assist the liberals to retain
office at the cost of something less than war. 10 Nor did the Russian
Government desire war-if it could attain its objects without. On the
English side it was proposed that even if Abd-ur-rahman had to give
up Panjdeh, he should at least retain Zulfikar. As the Russians set
a high value upon the first and none upon the second," and as the
English public was completely ignorant of Central Asian geography,
1 Parl. Papers, 1884-5, LXXXVII, p. 121.
2 Idem, p. 149.
3 Idem, p. 151.
• Idem, pp. 175. 599.
6 Idem, p. 230.
& Idem, pp. 184, 198; cf. his dispatches, ap. F. 0, 65-1235, 1236, 1237, 1238.
? Parl. Papers, 1884-5, LXXXVII, p. 231.
8 Cf. Holdich, The Indian Borderland, pp. 127 899.
• Meyendorff, op. cit. I, 200, 201.
10 Idem, i, 189 399.
11 Idem, 1, 191.
1


## p. 425 (#465) ############################################

PANJDEH
425
the ministry was able to represent this as a graceful concession to
English wishes. As regards the attack upon Panjdeh, which in the
first flush of resentment and alarm Gladstone had characterised as
"an unprovoked aggression”,1 the emperor refused emphatically to
admit the least enquiry into the conduct of the commander, General
Kumarof;a but suggestions were put about that the question whether
Russia had violated her understanding with Great Britain might be
referred to the head of a friendly state. The arbitrator Granville had
in mind was the German emperor, since his character and experience
would give great weight to his decision. Russia, perhaps for the same
reasons, insisted that the choice must fall on no one but the King of
Denmark. 5 This too was conceded, and Gladstone was thus freed
to apply his supple tongue to soothing the passions which his political
position had for the moment compelled him to encourage and even
to simulate. ? But all his dexterity could not completely hide the
natyre of his settlement, even from his own countrymen. The Russian
Foreign Office became of course yet more exigent. When Granville
accepted the general principles laid down by Russia earlier in the year,
he found himself confronted by new and more stringent demands,
inspired by the Russian War Office. In June the Gladstone ministry
fell, and Lord Salisbury then took over the negotiations. After pro-
longed and difficult discussions regarding the area which was covered
by the name “Zulfikar”, a protocol was at last signed on 10 Septem-
ber, and the projected arbitration, which had served Gladstone's turn
well enough, was allowed to lapse. 10
As a result of the discussions initiated in 1884 regarding the Afghan
boundaries and the appointment of a commission of delimitation,
Amir Abd-ur-rahman had been invited to confer with the new
governor-general, Lord Dufferin, at Rawulpindi; and he was actually
there when the Panjdeh crisis emerged. Even before the incident the
English ministry had anxiously sought to moderate his claims, 11 and
he then seemed to regard the Pass of Zulfikar, Gulran and Maruchak
as the only places of vital importance. 12 News of the Panjdeh affair
arrived on 8 April, and Dufferin at once promised him assistance in
arms, ammunition and possibly money, should war with Russia
follow. 18 He had received the news with a greater appearance of calm
than Dufferin had expected. 14 But he was in fact far from indifferent
to what was going forward. The English mission had assured him
that the Russians never would dare to attack his forces an idea that
must have been confirmed by the Russian treatment of Sher 'Ali in
1 Hansard, 3rd series, CCXCVI, 1159. 399,
: De Giers to de Staal, 28 April, 1885 (Meyendorff, op. cit. I, 204).
• Granville to de Staal, 24 April, 1885 (F. 0. 65-1241); Hansard, 3rd series, ccxcvII, 657.
• Granville to Thornton, 9 May, 1885 (F. 0. 65-1242).
• Meyendorff, op. cit. 1, 215.
Fitzmaurice, op. cit. 11, 442.
? Cf. Meyendorff, op. cit. 1, 211.
8 Idem, 1, 2:6-19, 222-4.
• Idem, I, 260
10 Cf. idem, I, 237.
.
1,
11 Pari. Papers, 1884-5, LXXXVII, 239
13 Idem, LXXXVII, 242.
11 Idem.
'14 Idem.


## p. 426 (#466) ############################################

426
CENTRAL ASIA, 1858–1918
>
1878. But the Russians had attacked, the English mission had hur-
riedly withdrawn, Great Britain had not declared war on Russia,
Though Abd-ur-rahman “was not a man to get excited, and therefore
took the matter calmly as a lesson for the future”, it must have been
clear to him that neither empire was ever likely to fight on behalf of
Afghan interests, and that it would be wholly wrong to base his policy
on such expectations.
In the following year, 1886, the Afghan boundary from the Oxus
westwards to Zulfikar was at last formally laid down. This was
followed by six years of comparative quiet, until the revival of dis-
putes regarding the Pamirs. British officers were arrested in territory
which they averred was not Russian. Russian agents visited Chitral;
and Russian detachments entered territory in the actual occupation
of the Afghans. In the middle of 1892 the Russian Foreign Office and
War Office agreed to seek to establish Russian dominion over the
whole of the Pamirs. The appointment of a commission of delimita-
tion had already been proposed, and discussions were going forward.
These were therefore deliberately slackened off, mainly in consequence
of the demands of the Russian War Office, 5 and no agreement was
reached till 1895, when on 11 March an agreement was signed by
which Afghanistan was to surrender territory north of the Panjah
while Bokhara surrendered that part of Darwaz lying south of the
Oxus.
This settlement left no further room for disputes concerning the
Afghan boundaries, and the years that followed were marked by a
gradual relaxation of the Anglo-Russian tension, though this was
more perceptible in Europe than in Asia, and was accompanied by
spasms of vehement distrust at Tashkent and Calcutta. The far-
Eastern ambitions which Russia now displayed did not provoke in
English minds the intimate alarm which had been created by her
earlier activity in Central Asia, so that the clashes of policy revealed
in connection with the Treaty of Simonoseki, the Russo-Japanese
War, and the Anglo-Japanese alliance, hardly carried those possi-
bilities of war which had been implicit in the incident of Panjdeh.
Nevertheless, the representatives of both nations in Central Asia long
continued to believe the worst of the other's designs and vehemently
strove to counteract them.
Relations with Kashmir, with Tibet, and with Afghanistan therefore
still provided ready, but less serious, subjects of contention. Of
Kashmir what can usefully be said has been given elsewhere; but
Tibet afforded ground for an animated struggle between the home
and Indian governments, regarding the proper action to be taken
1 Abd-ur-rahman, op. cit. I, 243:
: Holdich, The Indian Borderland, pp. 169 599.
• Meyendorff, op. cit. 11, 157; Abd-ur-rahman, op. cit. 1, 285; Roberts, op. cit. 11, 446.
• Meyendorff, op. cit. 11, 176.
6 Idem, 11, 209, 224.
. Parl. Papers, 1895, cix, 159; 1905, LVII, 457.


## p. 427 (#467) ############################################

TIBET
427
a
upon the alleged Russian intrigue. At the close of the nineteenth
century the internal position of Tibet was unstable. The chief
authority of the state (a nominal dependency of China) was vested
in the Darai Lama of Lhasa, but for a prolonged period no Dalai
Lama had reached years of maturity, each in turn perishing at a
convenient age which permitted the Council of Regency to continue
unbroken the exercise of its temporary powers. At last, however,
a Dalai Lama, under the artful guidance of a Russian subject, a Buriat
named Dorjieff, succeeded in growing up and assuming the tradi.
tional
powers
of his office. This revolution demanded external support
for its maintenance. In 1898, 1900 and 1901 Dorjieff was sent on
special missions to Russia, ostensibly to collect money from the
Buddhists of that empire, but probably with political designs as well;
and though the Russian foreign minister denied Dorjieff's diplo-
matic character, he was received in audience by the emperor as an
envoy extraordinary. In the following year stories spread abroad
that a treaty had been signed by which China ceded to Russia her
rights over Tibet. " These reports were the more alarming because the
Government of India had no means of testing their accuracy. The
Tibetans were preventing all intercourse, both diplomatic and com-
mercial, with India. In 1890 and 1893 a convention and regulations
had been negotiated with the Chinese authorities; but the Tibetans
had blocked the road leading to the place which had been selected
as a trading-post. Direct negotiations had beer tried, but the governor-
general's letters had been returned unread. 3 In 1902, therefore, the
Government of India, under Lord Curzon, was eager for definite
action in order to clear up the position. The home authorities seem
to have hung back until, on a report that a military expedition was
about to set out, the Russian ambassador produced a memorandum,
stating that such an expedition "would force the imperial government
to take measures to protect its interests in those regions”. ! Lord
Lansdowne, then at the Foreign Office, replied firmly to what he
called a gratuitous complaint, and it was agreed that a mission under
a
Colonel Younghusband should be sent into Tibetan territory, to
Khamba Jong, and if no envoys appeared there to Gyangtse, to oblige
the Tibetans to come to an agreement. After a nine-months' pause
at Khamba Jong, the mission began to advance in March, 1904. In
a vain attempt to check it the Tibetans lost 600 men killed and
wounded. ? Further attacks were made upon the mission at Gyangtse,
and so the advance was continued to Lhasa which was reached on
3 August. Finally an agreement was signed at Lhasa, by which marts
for the exchange of goods were to be opened, an indemnity, greatly
1 Pari. Papers, 1904, C. 1920, pp. 113, 116, 117, 140-1.
· Idem, pp. 7, 22-3.
: Idem, pp. 74, 99, 118, 125.
• Idem, p. 178.
s Idem, p. 180.
• Idem, pp. 198, 209, 213. ' Idem, 1904, C. 2054, p. 11.
* Idem, 1905, C. 2370, pp. 3, 32, 49.


## p. 428 (#468) ############################################

428
CENTRAL ASIA, 1858–1918
reduced by the home government, to be paid, and the Chumbi
valley occupied for three years as a temporary pledge.
These events in themselves had small importance. But they illus-
trate the ever-growing interaction of policy. As St John Brodrick
declared, "the course of affairs on the Indian frontiers cannot be
decided without reference to imperial exigencies elsewhere”. 2 The
improvement of British relations with Russia was already under
consideration. It was difficult to deny the force of the Russian con-
tention that the establishment of British supremacy at Lhasa would
alter the position in Central Asia at the very moment when Russia
seemed disposed amicably to discuss the questions about which the
two empires had been quarrelling 3 Lansdowne therefore became
more conciliatory. On 2 June, 1904, he assured the Russian ambassa-
dor that, so long as no other European power intervened, Great
Britain would neither annex Tibet, nor establish a protectorate over
it, nor attempt to control its internal affairs. Hence the limitation
of the demands made upon Tibet when the settlement was reached.
With Afghanistan during the same period—1898–1904—Indian
policy pursued a similar course. In this direction the Russian
successes of 1884-5 had been followed by an active railway policy
which at last united the Trans-Caspian and the Orenburg-Tashkent
lines at Kuskh on the Afghan frontier. In 1900 the Russians demanded
that the governor-general of Turkestan should be placed in direct
communication with the authorities of Kabul. In 1902 Count
Lamsdorff observed “that he had never quite understood why the
external relations of Afghanistan were in the exclusive charge of His
Majesty's Government”. In 1903 the demand for direct communica-
tion was repeated, in language which the British Government
deeply resented”. 5 Russian failures against Japan in Manchuria led
to a disposition noticed at the close of 1904 to recover the lost Russian
prestige by a campaign in Central Asia. s
In 1901 the old amir, Abd-ur-rahman, had died and been suc-
ceeded by his elder son Habib-ullah. The relations of the old amir
with India had not latterly been very cordial, even though Durand
had settled the Indo-Afghan boundary. ? Abd-ur-rahman had been
specially anxious to be admitted to direct relations with the govern-
ment in London; but the proposal, which was put forward when
Nasr-ullah, his second son, visited England in 1895, was refused. 8
The new amir, though milder and more amiable than his father, was
at first hardly more tractable. Disputes arose over the treaty with
Abd-ur-rahman, which the Government of India claimed (in ac-
cordance with Oriental use) had been personal to the late amir and
i Parl. Papers, 1905, C. 2370, pp. 77 599.
• Idell. , p. 46.
• Idem, 1904, C. 1920, pp. 298-9.
• Idem, 1905, C. 2370, p. 15; cf. Gooch and Temperley, op. cit. iv, 320.
6 Gooch and Temperley, op. cit. iv, 512 599. , 621, 186.
6 Idem, p. 34
? Vide p. 462, infra. & Abd-ur-rahman, op. cit. 11, 139.
.


## p. 429 (#469) ############################################

ANGLO-RUSSIAN ENTENTE
429
therefore stood in need of revival, but which Habib-ullah claimed to
be still in full force. Not until 1904 would he agree to receive a
mission, and at last on 21 March, 1905, Sir Louis Dane signed a
treaty at Kabul renewing all the engagements between the Govern-
ment of India and his father. At one time Curzon had thought him
on the verge of throwing himself into the arms of Russia, and when,
in 1906, he visited Curzon's successor, Lord Minto, in India, he was
reported on good authority to have written to the governor-general
of Turkestan, explaining that there would be no political discussions,
and adding, "if the British government. . . attempt to introduce their
influence into Afghanistan, the Afghans will resist and in that case
would look to the emperor of Russia for help”. 3
These Russian leanings seem to have been the result of circum-
stances rather than inclination. Habib-ullah himself was disposed
to social reform. He dressed, and made his wives dress, in European
fashion; his palace was filled with European furniture; he ate with
knife and fork instead of his God-given fingers. He was, therefore,
suspect amidst an orthodox, fanatical people. Nasr-ullah, his brother,
“a religious bigot of the narrowest type and violently anti-British",
had a much stronger hold on Afghan affections. Though Habib-ullah
was personally well disposed to the Government of India, he could not
afford to offend his northern neighbours, lest their intrigues should
strengthen the position of his brother.
In March, 1906, Morley raised the question of what guarantees
would be advisable should an agreement be framed with Russia. 5
Minto and his advisers felt strongly that the whole proposal was full
of danger. Minto especially deprecated three points in the scheme as
originally communicated to him. One was that Russia and Great
Britain should suspend railway construction for ten years. He pointed
out that the Russian system already was complete and would not in
any case be extended except into Afghanistan in the event of war.
Another was the concession of direct communication between Russia
and Afghanistan. “We are”, he wrote, “to open a very dangerous
door to intrigue and to sacrifice the power which the amir has agreed
with us to exercise to check such intrigue. "? The third was that the
proposed agreement should not be signed without a previous arrange-
ment with Afghanistan.
The present situation has been agreed on between the amir and ourselves, and
. . . we are not entitled to cancel it without his consent. . . . To me it seems infinitely
more important to keep on friendly and controlling terms with him than to enter
into any bargain with Russia which might lessen our influence with him or alienate
him from us.
· Parl. Papers, 1905, LVII, 459.
· Ronaldshay, Life of Curzon, 11, 266, 267.
• Encl. in Minto to Morley, 16 January, 1907 (unpub. ).
• Minto to Morley, 17 October, 1907, and 19 March, 1908 (unpub. ); cf. Abdul Ghani,
Political Situation in Asia.
Morley, Recollections, 11, 167.
• Minto to Morley, 12 June, 1906 (Buchan, Lord Minto, p. 226).
1 Idem.
6
& Idem.


## p. 430 (#470) ############################################

430
CENTRAL ASIA, 1858-1918
The first of these points seems to have been abandoned without
further discussion. The second occasioned long arguments at St Peters-
burg,' but was at last abandoned. On the third, although opinion
at the Foreign Office favoured Minto's view, Morley insisted that, as
the agreement would involve no departure from the Afghan Treaty
of 1905, the terms should only be communicated to the amir as a
settled thing.
The convention with Russia was therefore signed on 31 August,
1907. As regarded Afghanistan Great Britain declared that she had
no intention of modifying the amir's political status, while Russia
recognised the country as beyond her sphere of influence and declared
she would conduct her relations with the amir through the British
Government, but Russian and Afghan frontier officials might settle
matters of a local and non-political character. As regarded Tibet both
parties agreed to conduct their political relations through China, not
to send agents to Lhasa, and not to seek concessions in Tibetan
territory.
The clauses concerning Afghanistan were to take effect when the
amir signified his assent. When it was sought, the coercive attitude
which Morley had assumed despite Minto's warnings proved its folly.
On being warned by the Foreign Office that Russia might ignore the
convention unless the amir acceded to it, Morley told Minto to put
the screw on him. But it could not be done. The amir evidently felt
that his acceptance would imperil his position in Afghanistan, and
never could be brought to agree. It was humiliating “to admit that
although we decline to permit Russia to have any direct relations
with the amir, we are ourselves incapable of exercising any effective
influence over that potentate”. 5 But that was due to Morley's refusal
to allow Minto to begin his discussions at the proper time. Nor after
all did the amir's refusal matter much. So long as the entente between
his neighbours lasted, neither he nor his people could venture far.
This was shown clearly by the events of the war. Various German
agents at Kabul strove to provoke Habib-ullah into breaking with the
Government of India; but without success. The Russian revolution,
however, transformed the situation. The Anglo-Russian alliance
vanished. The orthodox party, enemies alike of Habib-ullah and of
Great Britain, no longer found themselves hemmed in on either side.
They gained in strength and daring. At last on 20 February, 1919,
the amir was murdered in camp near Jalalabad, and the new amir,
Habib-ullah's son, Aman-ullah, soon found himself thrust into the
attack on India which led to the third Afghan War. By the treaty
1 Cf. Gooch and Temperley, op. cit. iv, 527, 549.
Morley to Minto, 13 June, 1907 (unpub. ).
: Parl. Papers, 1907, cxxv, 478.
• Morley to Minto, 30 April, 1908 (unpub. ).
5 Gooch and Temperley, op. cit. IV, 275.
• Cf. Moral and Material Progress Report, 1919, pp. 7 599.


## p. 431 (#471) ############################################

AMAN-ULLAH
431
concluded in 1921, the Afghan kingdom resumed its freedom of
managing its external affairs. The logic of events has demanded this
brief excursion beyond the chronological limits of the volume. The
situation as it stood in 1921 closely resembled that which existed
before the second Afghan War. Bolshevik, like imperial, Russia once
more aimed at striking Great Britain through India. The weapons of
the new empire were keener and more subtle than those of the old-
propaganda in place of intrigue; but the purpose and the policy which
they served were little changed from those of the days of Alexander
and Nicholas; while Afghanistan itself, divided between the old world
and the new, was once more precariously balanced between India
and Turkestan.
i India in 1921-2, pp. 319 599.


## p. 432 (#472) ############################################

CHAPTER XXIV
THE CONQUEST OF UPPER BURMA
The KINGDOM OF UPPER BURMA, 1852–1885
KING PAGAN'S brother Mindon, fearing for his life, fled from
court in December, 1852, and after several weeks' petty fighting
deposed Pagan, keeping him in captivity for the rest of his life.