in l2 31, 723/612 Hegel mentions
explicitly
friedrich schlegel's thesis that fragments of ?
Hegels Philosophy of the Historical Religions
The spirit then moves on to europe, leaving behind the achieve- ments of the orient as empty shells on the shores of time.
For each of the participants the clock of history only strikes once.
17
Concurrence with Leibniz. only in passing is leibniz' interest in China mentioned. Yet there is congruence on an important point. leibniz' Dis- course on the Natural Theology of the Chinese (1716) was prompted by the criticism of an Anti-Riccian group levelled against the legacy of Ricci. The point the critics wanted to make was that Ricci and friends had been nai? ve in their attitude towards China: the so-called natural theology of the Chinese being in fact a form of pantheism, if not atheism. 18 This criti- cism is strikingly similar to the attacks on spinozism. so Hegel would have answered the anti-Riccian faction in much the same way as he answered the anti-spinozists, i. e. by arguing that the orient and spinoza developed an understanding of substantiality that as such is neither pantheistic or
16 on this revolution, see Karl loewith, Meaning in History. The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History, Chicago: 1949, Chapter 5.
17 'Die Uhr der Philosophien, die bei Hegel dieselbe wie die des Weltgeistes ist, schla? gt nicht zweimal dieselbe stunde . . . ' see ernst Bloch, Subjekt-Objekt. Erla? uterungen zu Hegel, Frankfurt: suhrkamp 1962, p. 366.
18 see Van der leeuw, Leibniz, pp. 43-47; Daniel J. Cook & Henry Rosemont, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Writings on China, Chicago: open Court 1994, pp. 5-10.
? 30 sander griffioen
atheistic but adequately articulates Divine omnipotence. 19 Thus he would agree with the gist of leibniz' defence of the Riccians.
In line with the anti-Riccians. A great difference vis-a`-vis leibniz is that natural theology for Hegel has to be (negated and) further developed in order to lead to true knowledge. leibniz' rather eclectic method of looking for strong points in both cultures is anathema to Hegel. Therefore, with Hegel the distance to China vastly increases. leibniz envisaged a fruitful exchange based on a win-win situation. He argued that they are stronger in perceiving, we in thinking. 20 We may conclude that such an exchange between equals would be incongruent with Hegelian historicism. This same historicism also explains why the Voltairean revolution fails to gain momentum. Although following Voltaire in granting China a primal posi- tion in the history of civilization, he also makes clear that it represents a stage to be overcome.
? 19 Cf. Vorl. 12, 160, where Hegel deals with the state religion: 'Die gelehrten Chinesen, welche die Missionare Atheisten in der staatsreligion nennen, nehmen dieses Abstrakte Wesen als . . . . das innerste Wesen der Welt . . . '
20 From a letter to Father grimaldi, 1692, cf. Van der leeuw, Leibniz, p. 51. similar: Cook & Rosemont, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, p. 46 (Preface to the novissima sinica).
Hinduism:
a Religion of fantasy
Paul Cruysberghs
1. introduction
at the end of the 18th century, eastern religions became quite popular in the Western world. Romanticism was in search of alternatives for the typi- cally rationalistic approach of both dogmatic and natural theology by the enlightenment philosophers and theologians. in Hinduism in particular, it discovered a religion that seemed to be free from both rigid dogmatism and abstract rationalism. the very fact that this religion was older than Christianity gave it an aura of originality that made it the more attrac- tive. the sacred texts were initially translated into english and later on into other languages as well. in germany august schlegel published an Indische Bibliothek series. 1 His brother friedrich, who had learned sanskrit during his stay in Paris, wrote a book on The Language and Wisdom of the Indians to which he added a nice selection of indian texts that he had translated on his own. 2 in his most important writings Herder showed an everlasting love for what he called "dieses land der sehnsucht". georg forster translated William Jones's translation of Kalidasa's sakuntula and Wilhelm von Humboldt introduced and translated the Bhagavad-gi^ta^, a crucial episode from the maha^-Bha^rata. 3
Hegel paid close attention to the Hindu religion as well; more than to Buddhism as a matter of fact. in our survey we will refer to the four ver- sions of the lectures on the philosophy of determinate religion as they have been edited by Walter Jaeschke: the manuscript, being the basis of the 1821 lectures (l2 m), the lectures of 1824 (l2 24), those of 1827 (l2 27),
1 see in particular a. W. schlegel (ed. ), Indische Bibliothek, Bd. 2, H. 4, Bonn: 1827.
2 f. schlegel, ? ueber die sprache und Weisheit der inder. ein Beitrag zur Begru? ndung der althertumskunde. nebst metrischen uebersetzungen indischer gedichte? , Heidelberg: 1808. --Kritische friedrich schlegel-ausgabe, ed. by e. Behler, 1. abt. Bd. 8, 1975.
3 W. von Humboldt, ? U? ber die unter dem namen Bhagavad-gi^ta^ bekannte episode des maha^-Bha^rata. gelesen in der akademie der Wissenschaften am 30. Juni 1825 und am 15. Juni 1826, Berlin, 1826? . --W. von Humboldt, Gesammelte Schriften, abt. 1: Werke, Bd. 5, Berlin: 1906.
? 32 paul cruysberghs
and those of 1831 (l2 31). 4 the manuscript is rather restricted as far as Hin- duism is concerned, but the student notes of the 1824 and 1827 lectures are quite extensive. the 1824 lectures are the most elaborate, stressing the metaphysical dimension of Hinduism; but they are, alas, less clear than the 1827 lectures. the 1827 lectures, while being shorter, are indeed more perspicuous and concrete. of the 1831 lectures, no complete transcript seems to be extant anymore, but we have at our disposal some excerpts passed down to us by david strauss. Considering the dominant role of cat- egories and thought determinations (Gedankenbestimmungen) in Hegel's philosophy in general and in the philosophy of religion in particular, we will focus mainly on what he called the metaphysical dimension of Hindu religion (l2 m, 100/5) and to a lesser extent on the concrete representa- tion of the gods and the cultic aspects of Hinduism.
in addition to the lectures, we must also take into consideration Hegel's extensive review of Humboldt's book about the Bhagavad-gi^ta^ (H, 19ff ). 5 in this review, published in the Jahrbu? cher fu? r wissenschaftliche Kritik, Hegel does not just refer to Humboldt, but also to august schlegel's Indian Library and to some important english sources as well. it focuses more on the (subjective) cultic and ethical aspects than on the (objec- tive) metaphysical ones and, accordingly, it shows how eager Hegel was to improve his acquaintance with the Hindu religion, wrestling with its complexities and incoherencies, and comparing it with the Christian reli- gion and, quite remarkably, with recent, romantic, tendencies in philoso- phy as well. Hegel's interpretation of the Hindu religion remains basically the same in the different versions of his lectures, and hence we will not focus on what are, after all, minor differences between them. However, one important modification that Hegel carries out, will require our atten- tion: the treatment of Buddhism which preceded Hinduism in the 1824 and 1827 lectures, was moved in the 1831 lectures to a position following Hinduism. However, as for the internal treatment of Hinduism, Hegel's interpretations do not seem to have changed that much.
4 the english translations of the german text of the lectures are mine (PC); except for those of 1827, that refer to the translation in the Hodgson edition of Hegel's Lectures. in either case, also where my translation diverts from that of the Hodgson edition, a reference to this (standard) edition is added to the text.
5 g. W. f. Hegel, ? Humboldt-Rezension. ueber die unter den nahmen Baghavad-gita bekannte episode des mahabharata; von Wilhelm von Humboldt? , Berlin 1826. --Gesam- melte Werke, Bd. 16, Schriften und Entwu? rfe II (1826-1831), frankfurt am main: meiner, 2001, pp. 19-75 (H).
? hinduism: a religion of fantasy 33
in what follows i will first introduce the general context in which Hegel dealt with the Hindu religion, then i will discuss Hegel's endeavour to interpret its basic content with the help of typically logical categories; and finally i will focus on the cultic aspects of the Hindu religion.
2. the general Context: nature Religion
in the manuscript and in the 1824 and 1827 lectures Hegel deals with Hin- duism in the context of what he terms 'immediate', or 'natural', or 'nature religion' (unmittelbare Religion, natu? rliche Religion, Naturreligion). 6 these terms refer to african and eskimo religions, but also, and even primarily to oriental religions such as the traditional Chinese, mongolian, indian, and Persian religions. all these religions, Hegel claims, present a 'natu- ral unity of the spiritual and the natural' (l2 24, 233-234/139-140). in the nature religions, indeed spirit has not yet separated itself from nature, and is still identical with it. Consequently, natural and spiritual elements are mixed up with each other. the situation can be compared to what Hegel terms the natural soul in his anthropology:7 on an elementary pre-conscious level the soul, though possessing already a certain level of ideality, is still permeated of nature, without taking a distance from it.
the basic notion in nature religion is that of (immediate) being or of substantiality (l2 m, 95/2). natural objects like the sun do not function as symbolic representations (presupposing a distinction between meaning and immediate existence) of the god; they are themselves the "immedi- ately present god" (l2 m, 106/13). in that sense, we can consider nature religions as being pantheistic: god is all things in them: ? `? ? ? ? ` ? ? ? ? . Heaven, stars, earth, plants, animals, and the human being constitute "one King- dom of Heaven". in so far as these objects merely are, they are immediate manifestations of "one single divine life" (l2 m, 100/5). of course, people do not adore finite natural things as they are as such, in the prosaic sense, but only in so far as they are the expressions of a universal power imma- nent in the things themselves, in the same sense as spinoza considered
6 strictly speaking, Hegel distinguishes 'natu? rliche Religion' and 'naturreligion', the first being identical to the latter, but only in so far as in it 'thought (der Gedanke) is brought to the fore' (144). 'natu? rliche Religion' thus refers primarily to the way religion is considered by authors like david Hume (cf. his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion). together with the english translators of the 27 lectures, we translate 'naturreligion' as 'nature religion'.
7 g. W. f. Hegel, Enzyklopa? die der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830), Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 20, ? 391 ff.
? 34 paul cruysberghs
the finite modifications to be the expressions of nature or god. in fact, Hegel interpreted nature religion as a pre-metaphysical form of spinozism (l2 m, 104/10). Just as in spinoza, there is only one substance that must be defined as nature or god. the objects of adoration are not finite things as such, but the power of nature that manifests itself as a 'natural subject' (l2 m, 105/11). only in so far as that universal power of nature integrates its other in itself and animates it, people can adore animals (elephants, apes, cows) and human beings (dalai lama, kings, Brahmans) as gods. these are not symbols in fact, they are this particular animal or human being, in its or his actuality, but that actuality is precisely conditioned by the immanent presence of the vital power in it.
in spite of Hegel appreciating the tendency of these religions to give the absolute a further determination of subjectivity, concreteness and singu- larity, he still considers them to be at quite a low level of religiosity. they recognize the presence of the absolute in singular beings, but they reduce, so Hegel says, the singularity of these beings themselves to a merely imme- diate singularity in which spirit is lacking (einer [. . . ] geistlosen Einzelheit) (l2 m, 108/14). on the one hand, Hegel applauds the fact that animals as objects of religion have drives, desires, power of life, that they have an instinct, "that secret, suitable doing from within" (l2 m, 108/14). yet the fact that the instinct exists in the form of absolute, i. e. mere singularity and finiteness, is its weakness. instead of this singularity being a point of departure for sublimation and idealisation of itself, it loses itself in its determinateness, in 'the now' of its naturality and finitude.
We mentioned already that it was part of Hegel's strategy to compare other religions with the Christian one. He did this not just because his students and readers were Christians, but also because he considered the Christian religion, both logically and historically, as the highest form of religion. Religions considered to be hierarchically lower can be made understandable not just by discerning in them the hidden dialectics of logical categories and concepts, but also by contrasting them to the higher forms. therefore, Hegel could not refrain from comparing e. g. the Hindu incarnations of the divine in human beings with the Christian incarnation. in the Christian religion, god also became man, but Jesus, so he argued, was never adored as a god when he was alive. only after he had ascended into heaven and was seated at the right hand of the father, was he adored as divine. it is only as spirit, not in his immediacy, that a human being can be considered as an incarnation of the divine. this spiritual dimen- sion, however, appears to be absent in Hinduism and in nature religions in general (l2 m, 108/15).
hinduism: a religion of fantasy 35
still, Hegel was well aware of how seductive nature religions were for a certain kind of romanticism. thanks to their primitive and immedi- ate character, the spiritual and the natural not yet having fallen apart, nature religions had the aura of being the oldest and most original ones, not yet contaminated by the influences of culture and reflection. they were considered as reminiscences of a paradisiacal situation of harmony, beauty and innocence, in which the human being, possessing a kind of wisdom, which it is suggested, is subsequently lost, was still in a natural unity with nature and with god. thus nature religion was presented as "the true, mostly outstanding, actually divine religion" (l2 24, 238/144),8 whereas Hegel himself rather considered it as "the most contemptuous of all religions" (l2 m, 108/15). With all his sympathy for the wisdom present in these forms of religion, Hegel, sticking to the superiority of the Chris- tian religion, strongly condemned any exaltation of what was presented as being 'original' or 'primitive'. a zealous enthusiasm for eastern or even more 'primitive' religions is completely foreign to Hegel.
3. the Hindu Religion: a Religion of fantasy
in the manuscript, Hegel deals with immediate religion without making any further distinctions. it is clear, however, that, for the most part, he has the Hindu religion in mind.
When discussing the immediate or nature religions in the 1824 lec- tures Hegel distinguishes: 1) the religion of magic (encompassing african (negro), eskimo, and Chinese religions, but also Buddhism), 2) the reli- gion of fantasy, which is actually the Hindu religion, 3) the religion of the good (the Persian light religion) and 4) the religion of riddle (the egyptian religion).
in the 1827 lectures the Chinese religion of the state is explicitly men- tioned as a transitional form between the religion of magic and Bud- dhism, which receives a separate treatment (presented as the religion of
8 in his commentary Jaeschke refers to both schelling (Vorlesungen u? ber die Methode des academischen Studium) and friedrich schlegel (Sprache und Weisheit der Inder) as typical devotees of such an old religion and wisdom (see note to 146, 170-172 in 4b 688). Complaining about the low level of education in 19th century germany, people critical of their own culture had a tendency to contrast the former wisdom of the indians to it (l2 24, 249/154).
in l2 31, 723/612 Hegel mentions explicitly friedrich schlegel's thesis that fragments of ? this primitive, true religion of the human spirit' can be found in all other religions.
? 36 paul cruysberghs
being-within-self ), preceding the religion of fantasy which is now charac- terised as the indian religion. 9
i have already mentioned the important modification carried out in the 1831 lectures and taken up by marheineke in the first and second editions of the Werke, in which Hegel moves the Buddhist religion from its inferior position before the indian religion to a hierarchically higher position after it. the part on determinate religion is divided now in three chapters, the first of them being natural religion, which now encompasses exclusively the eskimo, mongolian and african religions (the religions of magic in l2 27). the second chapter introduces a new principle of division: 'the splitting up (Entzweiung) of the Religious Consciousness in itself '. in this chapter, both the Chinese and the indian religions find a place of their own, followed by the lamaic-Buddhist religions. the third chapter, which is not our concern here, deals with the religion of freedom, which refers to the greek and the Roman religions, but they are preceded by so-called forms of transition, to which the religions of the good (the Persian and the Jewish religions), the religion of pain (the Phoenix and adonis cults), and the egyptian religion belong.
in order to understand what happened here, we must first turn to Hegel's analysis of the religions of magic in the 1824 lectures. there are two ele- ments that Hegel considers characteristic of the religions of magic. the first element is a practical one: that of power. a magic relation to the world presupposes a spiritual self-consciousness manifesting its overall power over nature in all its concrete forms. for example, the magic practices we find in african religions, hardly merit the name of religion, since there is no explicit reference to any divinity, but the exercise of magic power is manifestly present. the second element, which Hegel distinguishes in his 1824 lectures, is a theoretical one. it can be found in the Chinese fo tradition, the tibetan lama and other Buddhist traditions. Here the god is present in human shapes like the dalai lama or the Buddha. thanks to metempsychosis however, the god shows his being-within-self, his iden- tity with himself independently of the particular human or animal bodies it reincarnates in. this absolute reflection of the divine in itself, in which all distinctions are dissolved (l2 24, 316-317/219), is considered by Hegel
9 the english edition of the 27 lectures translates 'indian religion' as 'Hindu religion'. -- it is remarkable that in the first and second editions of the Werke, edited by Hegel's friends, the Buddhist religion (religion of being-within-itself) is dealt with after the Hindu religion (religion of fantasy). marheineke, the editor of the lectures on philosophy of religion, might have found evidence for this intervention in the 31 lectures.
? hinduism: a religion of fantasy 37
as the basic idea of divinity in general and thus of all religions worthy of that name. (l2 24, 316/218)
according to the 1824 lectures, the Hindu religion, qualified as the reli- gion of fantasy, brings the two moments present in the religion of magic, that of power and that of being-within-self, together. in both fo religion and Buddhism the being-within-self is indefinite and therefore qualified as nothingness (nirvana). in contrast with the essentially negative per- spective of nirvana fostered by Buddhism, Hinduism endows the divine with the determinateness that was part of the concrete exercise of magic power in merely magic religions. in the Hindu religion, Hegel contends, "divinity is objective with all its plenitude of content". (l2 24, 317/220) Whereas the Buddhist world is empty, a concrete divine world arises in Hinduism. Constituting a unity of the infinite essence and the finite shape, the divine develops into a concrete form;--and from a Hegelian point of view this is the considerable kind of progress we are supposed to encounter in all higher religions.
in comparison to the 1824 lectures, the 1827 lectures place a different accent to the treatment of Buddhism, giving it a separate treatment in the first place (cf. supra). this is quite understandable when we take into consideration that Buddhism, at least in its essence, can hardly be con- sidered as a form of magic. nonetheless, Hegel confirms that Hinduism is further developing the substantiality and the being-within-self that fo, lama and Buddhist religions stand for, "in the totality of its externality". (l2 27, 579/475) and, as in l2 24, he considers this particularisation of the universal substance, this adding of "the richness of the world" (l2 27, 581/476) as substantial progress when compared to the Buddhist position. 10 thanks to this concretisation of substantiality both natural and spiritual powers, as they manifest themselves in the concrete world, are recognized as belonging to the absolute; a belonging that has a double side: on the one hand, they appear in their particularity and independency; on the other hand, they appear as vanishing and being consumed by the univer- sal being-within-self of the first substantiality. (l2 27, 581/477)
as a matter of fact, Hegel argues, Hinduism expresses--in its own way, "according to the instinct of the concept" ("nach dem instinkt des Be- griffs") (l2 27, 586/482), the general structure of the (logical) idea: in the first place it is "one, immediate and identical with itself " (l2 27, 581/478);
10 "Here, therefore, the horizon is enlarged; we have here the totality. the viewpoint is concrete; that is the necessary progress. " (l2 27, 581/477)
? 38 paul cruysberghs
secondly, the idea differentiates itself internally, particularizes itself into different, particular shapes and powers; thirdly, the particular powers have to return to the one, to the one universal substance, insofar as they are contained by it. (l2 27, 581/478) Precisely because Hinduism makes room for the second moment of concreteness, it must be considered as a richer form of religion than Buddhism. the third moment however, is presented in a deficient way--and that is the conclusion of both the 1824 and 1827 lectures (l2 24, 326/229; l2 27, 581-584/478-479) (see infra)-- and therefore the Hindu religion itself is deficient. still, in both versions Hegel recognizes that the Hindu religion contains "the three basic deter- minations of the concept" (l2 24, 326/229), i. e. "the basics of the reason- able development, though only in its most general determinations". (l2 27, 582/478)
as for the 1831 lectures, here Hegel also recognizes the three moments of the concept, accusing especially the third moment of offering only a determination in which spirit is absent (geistlose Bestimmung). (l2 31, 734/622) more important, however, is that, as we mentioned earlier, Hegel modified quite drastically the general structure of his lectures. He reduced the natural religions to the eskimo, the mongolian and the afri- can ones, i. e. the former magic religions, which are now, more explicitly than before, denied the status of being religions in the strict sense. more important for us, however, is the introduction of a new perspective: that of the internal splitting up (Entzweiung) of the religious consciousness into a substance, on the one hand (god), and the transitory accidents (the subjects), on the other. in a way this perspective was already present in the former lectures, in which substantiality was considered as a general perspective of nature religion as such. now, the internal splitting up of the religious consciousness into a substantial and an accidental side becomes the common characteristic of the Chinese, indian, and Buddhist religions and separates them from the merely natural religions. in the Chinese reli- gion, the substance is recognized as the foundation (Grundlage) which is determined in itself. it is thought fundamentally as measure, to which human beings have to conform their actions (cf. Confucianism). the indian religion considers the substance as an abstract unity, akin to the human spirit, to which the human being has to elevate itself. the lamaic- Buddhist religion for its part is now--fundamentally different from the previous interpretations--a more concrete form of religion as compared to Hinduism, in so far as the substance becomes concrete in it: it takes the form of a particular individual (the dalai lama, Buddha gautama), to which other human beings have to raise themselves, which is supposed
hinduism: a religion of fantasy 39
to result ultimately in the complete annihilation of the self (nirvana). Concreteness remains the hierarchical criterion to evaluate the different religions of substantiality. yet instead of stressing the concreteness of the relationship to the world, as Hegel did in the 1824 and 1827 lectures, he now focuses on the concreteness of the particular individuals in which the substance finds (as in the dalai lama) or found (as in Buddha) its concrete incarnation. However, apart from the evidence that Buddhism is a histori- cally later development than Hinduism, Hegel's reasons for changing the hierarchical order of eastern religions are not very clear. His analysis of Hinduism remains substantially the same as in the former lectures and, as for the transition, Hegel just stresses the fact that "these [lamaism and Buddhism] religions are very akin to the indian one". (l2 31, 735/623) the sole argument remains the one he mentions when dealing with lamaism: "the general presence of the substance already stands down in favour of the concrete presence of the individual, which is worshipped as absolute power" (ibid. ). the incarnation of power in one (Buddha) or more (the three lamas) particular individuals, who are worshipped as such, seems to be a progress over against a worship of an endless plurality of more or less independent gods.
What might necessitate an upgrade of Buddhism is in fact that, after all, in the Hindu religion the concreteness of its form remains essentially natural: the moments of the divine fall asunder (falling asunder is typical of nature) as if they were independent entities. true religion, Hegel sug- gests, i. e. a religion of spirit in contrast to nature religion, asks for the con- crete resuming of itself into itself. it requires that the concrete not just be posited as such, but that it be posited as ideal as well--and that it be rec- ognized as such. this is not the case in Hinduism yet, whereas Buddhism, in spite of or thanks to its nirvana perspective, might be interpreted as a concrete unification of these moments. the Hindu world consists of a variegated multiplicity of gods, of powers, spiritual distinctions and sensa- tions, all of which appear as isolated and as independent, taking the form of separate human beings or even animals (l2 24, 318-319/221). 11 this mul- tiplicity of human beings and animals constitutes the "realm of fantasy" (l2 24, 319/222), in which arbitrariness appears to be the general rule: "an unrestrained flush (Taumel) of all this content" (l2 24, 323/226), a "jumble (Wirrwarr)"! (l2 24, 323/226-7) fantasy indeed can master any content
11 it might be considered as significant that the Buddha himself is worshipped as a god, as an incarnation of Vishnu in particular. (l2 31, 736/623)
? 40 paul cruysberghs
whatsoever and link freely and arbitrarily representations together. thus, the richness of fantasy has its reverse side as well: the forms appear to lose their initial independency and end up by being totally at the mercy of the arbitrariness of imagination (see also H, 74). 12
insofar as imagination is done justice to in the religion of fantasy Hegel appreciates it undeniably. still, because of the appearance of arbi- trariness and of the keeping apart of the different representations of the divine, without any definite structure, he considers it as a degradation of the basic (read: logical or conceptual) determinations instinctually and unconsciously present in Hinduism. as a consequence of these determi- nations having a "wild, disgusting shape" (l2 24, 324/228), they appear to be "baroque" (l2 24, 324/228) and even "horrifying" (greuelhaft). still, it is precisely in the conceptual determinations, and not so much in the fanci- ful shapes or representations, that Hegel as a philosopher is interested in.
4. the Conceptual determinations
in line with what we have hitherto developed, Hegel distinguishes two moments in the conceptual framework of the Hindu religion: 1) that of the substantiality of the reflection-within-self and 2) that of the form the substantiality is manifesting itself in: the determinations of the absolute. (l2 24, 325/228) We will deal with these moments first, before considering the concrete shape they take in the deities of Brahma (1) and shiva (2).
1) the moment of universal substantiality is the eternal rest of being- within-self. it is defined as a power that is not directed towards anything else, in the way that desire is, but as a power that, still and quiet, being simply reflected in itself, is enclosed in itself. (l2 24, 325/228) it thus remains isolated from the multiplicity of things, from its own concrete particularisations: "this being-within-self [. . . ] remains abstractly inward, purely by itself, as abstract power" (l2 27, 583/478). nonetheless, it needs an existence anyway, although it is supposed to have it outside the par- ticularity of the second moment. it rather takes existence in the "con-
12 Hegel thus contrasts the 'fanciful' (phantastisch) powers of the Hindu religion with the 'images of a beautiful fantasy' (einer scho? nen Phantasie) that he finds in the greek religion: "they are particular powers, although it is a wild particularity in which there is no system but only intimations of what is understandable and necessary, echoed of understood moments but still no understandable totality or systematization, much less a rational one; instead only a multiplicity in a colorful throng" (cf. infra) (l2 27, 584/479).
? hinduism: a religion of fantasy 41
crete existing (daseienden),13 immediate human mind"14 (l2 27, 583/478). How this is to be understood more concretely, we will make clear below, when dealing with the concrete shape the logical determinations take in Hinduism.
2) the substantial power, even when having its existence in the con- sciousness of concrete human beings, is to be distinguished from its mani- festation, from the moments as they have been posited by the substantial power itself. these moments have a double status. they are independent beings and, at the same time, they are perishing and vanishing in the power of the one substance. on the one hand, they in fact appear as inde- pendent persons, as divine persons who are the whole itself, so that the first moment, the moment of substantiality, as a matter of fact, disappears in the particular figures (gestalten)15 in which it manifests itself. Hegel has in mind the multiplicity of natural objects and processes that are deified and personified such as "sun, moon, mountains, or rivers; or [. . . ] greater abstractions such as generation, perishing, change of shape" . . . (l2 27, 583/479). one the one hand, these gods are totalities by themselves which do not need anything beyond themselves. on the other hand, they disap- pear again, being absorbed in the one power. "the power [indeed] is the ideal, the negative, for which everything else is only as sublated, negated" (l2 24, 325/228). thus both moments are alternating perpetually: once the one is presented, then the distinction, and then the one again, etc. as a matter of fact, the one presents itself as a continuous alternating of the one and its manifestations. (l2 24, 325/228; l2 27, 585/481)
therefore, in a way, there are three, not just two moments that inter- play. (l2 24, 326/229) there is 1) the one, the universal. it must be con- ceived as manifesting itself into objectivity (Gegensta? ndlichkeit). 16 2) Being itself divine, however, the manifestation itself becomes the whole god. over against this [determinate] god, who is the manifestation of the first one, the latter, the first power that is in itself, the one as such, necessarily
13 'daseienden' has been translated in the english translation as 'concrete existing'.
14 the english translator says: 'spirit'; however, i would rather translate 'geist' here by 'mind', since it refers to the consciousness of a particular individual.
15 this multiplicity of powers is described by Hegel in his 27 lecture as 'an unbridled polytheism' (l2 27, 583/479). He thus contrasts it with the greek religion in which the gods have reached 'the beauty of figure'.
16 as in Christian theology, it can also be termed 'eternal goodness': the one grants the determinate, which is intrinsically only apparent, momentary being, though it still remains absorbed in the absolute power of the one. the one allows the finite to have a shape of its own, without having any right of its own.
? 42 paul cruysberghs
opposes itself. as such, however, it is reduced into a particular moment, so that beyond that an absolute one, a higher one, is to be posited, which can or must be called god as well. 3) thirdly, there is the alternation of both moments. this is to be termed Change as such (Vishnu). 17 it is the process of genesis and corruption, of being brought forth and being anni- hilated: to be being as not-Being. at the same time, these three moments must be considered as being one totality, a whole or a unity of its own.
these are the basic conceptual determinations Hegel distinguished both in the 1824 and in the 1827 lectures. 18 in spite of the triadic struc- ture of the one, which is referring to what we might consider as a truly dialectical structure, Hegel stresses the fundamental deficiency of the way it takes shape in the Hindu religion. (l2 24, 326/229) it is lacking a basic element that every truly spiritual religion, i. e. the Christian religion, is supposed to have. the third moment indeed is determined in Hinduism as mere becoming or change. However, that is not good enough. in the absolute idea, Hegel says, this third moment is determined as spirit. and spirit cannot be thought of in terms of mere transition. it must be con- ceived as a true return into itself, which is quite different from a continu- ous transition of being into non-being and vice versa. the third moment of Hinduism actually does not merit the status of being a third moment. that explains why the 1824 lectures initially started the development of the metaphysical structure of Hinduism with only two moments, the third one being introduced (and criticised at once) only in the end.
17 Hegel compares this third moment with what the milesian philosophers used to call ? ? ? ? ? or Justice.
18 in l27 however the content is introduced in a slightly different way. Hegel suggests that in spite of Brahm representing the simple (einfache) substance, some (three) distinc- tions are introduced according to "the instinct of the concept" (l2 27, 586/482). 1) there is the totality as such: the abstract oneness. it is considered here as one of three--thus it is distinguished from and subordinated to the oneness that encompasses the three of them. 2) the second moment is the determinateness, the distinction as such; and 3) the third moment is the concrete unity of the distinctions. Brahm is the formless unity; according to its determinateness it is tri(u)nity. thus we have two distinct powers: the triunity on the one hand (eternal goodness); then justice: that the being is not, but that it reaches its right to change, to become a particular determinateness. these three as a totality, being a whole and a unity, is called trimurti: the three essences.
? hinduism: a religion of fantasy 43 5. the Concrete Representations
as for the way the three basic determinations of the concept find expres- sion more concretely in the Hindu mythology (l2 24, 327/230), we can be relatively brief. the triadic structure as such is represented as trimurti. murti means soul in general: all emanations of the absolute, all particular manifestations must be interpreted as souls. the three essences or shapes we distinguished up to now, and which we must identify as respectively Brahm, Vishnu or Krishna, and shiva or mahadeva, are trimurti. from this perspective, the first moment, the one (Brahm), as an abstract unity, presents itself not as the unity of the other moments, but rather as just one of three: thus it is inferior to trimurti (ist heruntergesetzt), in so far as the unity of the three (trimurti itself as oneness) is represented as different from the first oneness. still, we must firstly take into account that in the ancient texts, in the Vedas, neither Vishnu nor shiva has yet appeared. they are both later developments, Hegel suggests. (l2 24, 334/236) secondly, there are many other gods besides the three that con- stitute trimurti; and there are many sects, each being a particular cult of a particular god or gods: mahadeva (male) and yoni (female), and further indra, the god of heaven, fire, cattle such as cows, elephants, horses, etc. ). Hegel characterises this multitude of gods and goddesses as the sphere of mere imagination (Einbildungskraft), and, as connected with this, of confusion (Verwirrung) (l2 24, 335/237; cf. l2 27, 595/490). nevertheless, in spite of the inevitable confusion, Hegel tries to make sense of at least the three highest gods.
1. the god Brahm, Brahma, or Brahman represents the first oneness we referred to (l2 24, 327/230; 27, 585/481): it is the absolute one and is to be conceived as a neutrum. the Hindu god, differently from the Jewish one, who is conceived as a subject, is 'das eine', not 'der eine' (l2 24, 339/242). it is "the eternal in itself with itself " (l2 24, 328/231), "pure being, pure uni- versality, supreme being [in english], the highest being" (H, 62). in so far as Brahm is a particular god, being one of the three persons of trimurti, (it is mostly called Brahma then), Brahm is conceived as 'der eine', as a per- son, as a (masculine) subject. as soon as the one is one of the three, it is made into something particular, and, as a consequence, a higher instance is needed: that is Brahm (in contrast to Brahma). 19 at the same time we
19 in so far as Brahma is considered as one of the three gods that constitute trimurti, he is subordinated to the universal soul, which, in that context, is sometimes called Parabrahma,
? 44 paul cruysberghs
must take into consideration that all the particular gods, in so far as they are further determinations of Brahm, are Brahm themselves. so, in a way, Brahm is reduced to the epitheton of oneness. But if this is the case, then Brahm runs the risk of becoming an empty epitheton, just an epitheton of praise, as the englishman James mill in his History of British India had suggested. (l2 24, 328-329/231-232; H, 66) thus both Vishnu and Krishna (cf. infra) are to be called respectively the highest and the great Brahm. and shiva (or mahadeva or Rudra) is called Brahm as well. But so too the natural elements such as the water, the sun, the air, respiration, and human faculties such as love and consciousness, understanding, or happi- ness: they are all Brahm. thus Brahm, the one, is all oneness: everything that has any form of independency, of identity with itself, is Brahm. 20
But Brahm is not just conceived as the oneness in all that is one, it is also the substance from which everything proceeds or is begotten. thus, it is presented as a creator. 21 at the same time, however, it appears as inert, formless matter. from this perspective Brahm, the one substance, is both the masculine, formative activity, and the feminine, passive attitude. therefore Vishnu, appearing as a creator in his turn, can say that Brahma is his uterus, in which he sowed his seed so that everything is procreated. (l2 27, 588/84)
the last remark i want to make about Hegel's examination of Brahm concerns his position in the pantheism polemics, which already comes to the surface in the 1824 lectures (l2 24, 259-262/165-167), but more domi- nantly in the Humboldt review. Hegel agrees with Colebrooke's assertion that the old Hindu religion recognizes only one god, but that it does not sufficiently distinguish between the creator and his creation. (H, 64) in so far as Brahm is presented as oneness, the Hindu religion can be consid- ered as a form of monotheism. at the same time it is essentially panthe- istic: being the essence of all things, Brahm is immanent in and identical with all things, though it should not be identified with the concrete and
that which is above Brahma (l2 24, 328/231). in l2 27, consoling his students and apologiz- ing for his own lack of understanding i guess, Hegel remarks that "one cannot say in what determinate relation such forms stand to one another" (l2 27, 588/483).
20 Brahm, conceived under the category of pure being in which all particularity is dis- solved, constitutes, according to Hegel, the sublime dimension of the Hindu religion, which does not mean that it is beautiful or true (H, 64). Because of its abstract character, pure being instead of being truly infinite is, as a matter of fact, in line with the beginning of Hegel's logic, a finite category.
21 Hegel spends some time reporting the story, or rather one of the many stories, about the creation of the world. (l2 24, 330-334/233-236; l2 27, 588-589/484-485)
? hinduism: a religion of fantasy 45
empirical things as such. it is "the being of their being-there (dasein)", not their being there as such that is considered as divine.
Concurrence with Leibniz. only in passing is leibniz' interest in China mentioned. Yet there is congruence on an important point. leibniz' Dis- course on the Natural Theology of the Chinese (1716) was prompted by the criticism of an Anti-Riccian group levelled against the legacy of Ricci. The point the critics wanted to make was that Ricci and friends had been nai? ve in their attitude towards China: the so-called natural theology of the Chinese being in fact a form of pantheism, if not atheism. 18 This criti- cism is strikingly similar to the attacks on spinozism. so Hegel would have answered the anti-Riccian faction in much the same way as he answered the anti-spinozists, i. e. by arguing that the orient and spinoza developed an understanding of substantiality that as such is neither pantheistic or
16 on this revolution, see Karl loewith, Meaning in History. The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History, Chicago: 1949, Chapter 5.
17 'Die Uhr der Philosophien, die bei Hegel dieselbe wie die des Weltgeistes ist, schla? gt nicht zweimal dieselbe stunde . . . ' see ernst Bloch, Subjekt-Objekt. Erla? uterungen zu Hegel, Frankfurt: suhrkamp 1962, p. 366.
18 see Van der leeuw, Leibniz, pp. 43-47; Daniel J. Cook & Henry Rosemont, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Writings on China, Chicago: open Court 1994, pp. 5-10.
? 30 sander griffioen
atheistic but adequately articulates Divine omnipotence. 19 Thus he would agree with the gist of leibniz' defence of the Riccians.
In line with the anti-Riccians. A great difference vis-a`-vis leibniz is that natural theology for Hegel has to be (negated and) further developed in order to lead to true knowledge. leibniz' rather eclectic method of looking for strong points in both cultures is anathema to Hegel. Therefore, with Hegel the distance to China vastly increases. leibniz envisaged a fruitful exchange based on a win-win situation. He argued that they are stronger in perceiving, we in thinking. 20 We may conclude that such an exchange between equals would be incongruent with Hegelian historicism. This same historicism also explains why the Voltairean revolution fails to gain momentum. Although following Voltaire in granting China a primal posi- tion in the history of civilization, he also makes clear that it represents a stage to be overcome.
? 19 Cf. Vorl. 12, 160, where Hegel deals with the state religion: 'Die gelehrten Chinesen, welche die Missionare Atheisten in der staatsreligion nennen, nehmen dieses Abstrakte Wesen als . . . . das innerste Wesen der Welt . . . '
20 From a letter to Father grimaldi, 1692, cf. Van der leeuw, Leibniz, p. 51. similar: Cook & Rosemont, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, p. 46 (Preface to the novissima sinica).
Hinduism:
a Religion of fantasy
Paul Cruysberghs
1. introduction
at the end of the 18th century, eastern religions became quite popular in the Western world. Romanticism was in search of alternatives for the typi- cally rationalistic approach of both dogmatic and natural theology by the enlightenment philosophers and theologians. in Hinduism in particular, it discovered a religion that seemed to be free from both rigid dogmatism and abstract rationalism. the very fact that this religion was older than Christianity gave it an aura of originality that made it the more attrac- tive. the sacred texts were initially translated into english and later on into other languages as well. in germany august schlegel published an Indische Bibliothek series. 1 His brother friedrich, who had learned sanskrit during his stay in Paris, wrote a book on The Language and Wisdom of the Indians to which he added a nice selection of indian texts that he had translated on his own. 2 in his most important writings Herder showed an everlasting love for what he called "dieses land der sehnsucht". georg forster translated William Jones's translation of Kalidasa's sakuntula and Wilhelm von Humboldt introduced and translated the Bhagavad-gi^ta^, a crucial episode from the maha^-Bha^rata. 3
Hegel paid close attention to the Hindu religion as well; more than to Buddhism as a matter of fact. in our survey we will refer to the four ver- sions of the lectures on the philosophy of determinate religion as they have been edited by Walter Jaeschke: the manuscript, being the basis of the 1821 lectures (l2 m), the lectures of 1824 (l2 24), those of 1827 (l2 27),
1 see in particular a. W. schlegel (ed. ), Indische Bibliothek, Bd. 2, H. 4, Bonn: 1827.
2 f. schlegel, ? ueber die sprache und Weisheit der inder. ein Beitrag zur Begru? ndung der althertumskunde. nebst metrischen uebersetzungen indischer gedichte? , Heidelberg: 1808. --Kritische friedrich schlegel-ausgabe, ed. by e. Behler, 1. abt. Bd. 8, 1975.
3 W. von Humboldt, ? U? ber die unter dem namen Bhagavad-gi^ta^ bekannte episode des maha^-Bha^rata. gelesen in der akademie der Wissenschaften am 30. Juni 1825 und am 15. Juni 1826, Berlin, 1826? . --W. von Humboldt, Gesammelte Schriften, abt. 1: Werke, Bd. 5, Berlin: 1906.
? 32 paul cruysberghs
and those of 1831 (l2 31). 4 the manuscript is rather restricted as far as Hin- duism is concerned, but the student notes of the 1824 and 1827 lectures are quite extensive. the 1824 lectures are the most elaborate, stressing the metaphysical dimension of Hinduism; but they are, alas, less clear than the 1827 lectures. the 1827 lectures, while being shorter, are indeed more perspicuous and concrete. of the 1831 lectures, no complete transcript seems to be extant anymore, but we have at our disposal some excerpts passed down to us by david strauss. Considering the dominant role of cat- egories and thought determinations (Gedankenbestimmungen) in Hegel's philosophy in general and in the philosophy of religion in particular, we will focus mainly on what he called the metaphysical dimension of Hindu religion (l2 m, 100/5) and to a lesser extent on the concrete representa- tion of the gods and the cultic aspects of Hinduism.
in addition to the lectures, we must also take into consideration Hegel's extensive review of Humboldt's book about the Bhagavad-gi^ta^ (H, 19ff ). 5 in this review, published in the Jahrbu? cher fu? r wissenschaftliche Kritik, Hegel does not just refer to Humboldt, but also to august schlegel's Indian Library and to some important english sources as well. it focuses more on the (subjective) cultic and ethical aspects than on the (objec- tive) metaphysical ones and, accordingly, it shows how eager Hegel was to improve his acquaintance with the Hindu religion, wrestling with its complexities and incoherencies, and comparing it with the Christian reli- gion and, quite remarkably, with recent, romantic, tendencies in philoso- phy as well. Hegel's interpretation of the Hindu religion remains basically the same in the different versions of his lectures, and hence we will not focus on what are, after all, minor differences between them. However, one important modification that Hegel carries out, will require our atten- tion: the treatment of Buddhism which preceded Hinduism in the 1824 and 1827 lectures, was moved in the 1831 lectures to a position following Hinduism. However, as for the internal treatment of Hinduism, Hegel's interpretations do not seem to have changed that much.
4 the english translations of the german text of the lectures are mine (PC); except for those of 1827, that refer to the translation in the Hodgson edition of Hegel's Lectures. in either case, also where my translation diverts from that of the Hodgson edition, a reference to this (standard) edition is added to the text.
5 g. W. f. Hegel, ? Humboldt-Rezension. ueber die unter den nahmen Baghavad-gita bekannte episode des mahabharata; von Wilhelm von Humboldt? , Berlin 1826. --Gesam- melte Werke, Bd. 16, Schriften und Entwu? rfe II (1826-1831), frankfurt am main: meiner, 2001, pp. 19-75 (H).
? hinduism: a religion of fantasy 33
in what follows i will first introduce the general context in which Hegel dealt with the Hindu religion, then i will discuss Hegel's endeavour to interpret its basic content with the help of typically logical categories; and finally i will focus on the cultic aspects of the Hindu religion.
2. the general Context: nature Religion
in the manuscript and in the 1824 and 1827 lectures Hegel deals with Hin- duism in the context of what he terms 'immediate', or 'natural', or 'nature religion' (unmittelbare Religion, natu? rliche Religion, Naturreligion). 6 these terms refer to african and eskimo religions, but also, and even primarily to oriental religions such as the traditional Chinese, mongolian, indian, and Persian religions. all these religions, Hegel claims, present a 'natu- ral unity of the spiritual and the natural' (l2 24, 233-234/139-140). in the nature religions, indeed spirit has not yet separated itself from nature, and is still identical with it. Consequently, natural and spiritual elements are mixed up with each other. the situation can be compared to what Hegel terms the natural soul in his anthropology:7 on an elementary pre-conscious level the soul, though possessing already a certain level of ideality, is still permeated of nature, without taking a distance from it.
the basic notion in nature religion is that of (immediate) being or of substantiality (l2 m, 95/2). natural objects like the sun do not function as symbolic representations (presupposing a distinction between meaning and immediate existence) of the god; they are themselves the "immedi- ately present god" (l2 m, 106/13). in that sense, we can consider nature religions as being pantheistic: god is all things in them: ? `? ? ? ? ` ? ? ? ? . Heaven, stars, earth, plants, animals, and the human being constitute "one King- dom of Heaven". in so far as these objects merely are, they are immediate manifestations of "one single divine life" (l2 m, 100/5). of course, people do not adore finite natural things as they are as such, in the prosaic sense, but only in so far as they are the expressions of a universal power imma- nent in the things themselves, in the same sense as spinoza considered
6 strictly speaking, Hegel distinguishes 'natu? rliche Religion' and 'naturreligion', the first being identical to the latter, but only in so far as in it 'thought (der Gedanke) is brought to the fore' (144). 'natu? rliche Religion' thus refers primarily to the way religion is considered by authors like david Hume (cf. his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion). together with the english translators of the 27 lectures, we translate 'naturreligion' as 'nature religion'.
7 g. W. f. Hegel, Enzyklopa? die der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830), Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 20, ? 391 ff.
? 34 paul cruysberghs
the finite modifications to be the expressions of nature or god. in fact, Hegel interpreted nature religion as a pre-metaphysical form of spinozism (l2 m, 104/10). Just as in spinoza, there is only one substance that must be defined as nature or god. the objects of adoration are not finite things as such, but the power of nature that manifests itself as a 'natural subject' (l2 m, 105/11). only in so far as that universal power of nature integrates its other in itself and animates it, people can adore animals (elephants, apes, cows) and human beings (dalai lama, kings, Brahmans) as gods. these are not symbols in fact, they are this particular animal or human being, in its or his actuality, but that actuality is precisely conditioned by the immanent presence of the vital power in it.
in spite of Hegel appreciating the tendency of these religions to give the absolute a further determination of subjectivity, concreteness and singu- larity, he still considers them to be at quite a low level of religiosity. they recognize the presence of the absolute in singular beings, but they reduce, so Hegel says, the singularity of these beings themselves to a merely imme- diate singularity in which spirit is lacking (einer [. . . ] geistlosen Einzelheit) (l2 m, 108/14). on the one hand, Hegel applauds the fact that animals as objects of religion have drives, desires, power of life, that they have an instinct, "that secret, suitable doing from within" (l2 m, 108/14). yet the fact that the instinct exists in the form of absolute, i. e. mere singularity and finiteness, is its weakness. instead of this singularity being a point of departure for sublimation and idealisation of itself, it loses itself in its determinateness, in 'the now' of its naturality and finitude.
We mentioned already that it was part of Hegel's strategy to compare other religions with the Christian one. He did this not just because his students and readers were Christians, but also because he considered the Christian religion, both logically and historically, as the highest form of religion. Religions considered to be hierarchically lower can be made understandable not just by discerning in them the hidden dialectics of logical categories and concepts, but also by contrasting them to the higher forms. therefore, Hegel could not refrain from comparing e. g. the Hindu incarnations of the divine in human beings with the Christian incarnation. in the Christian religion, god also became man, but Jesus, so he argued, was never adored as a god when he was alive. only after he had ascended into heaven and was seated at the right hand of the father, was he adored as divine. it is only as spirit, not in his immediacy, that a human being can be considered as an incarnation of the divine. this spiritual dimen- sion, however, appears to be absent in Hinduism and in nature religions in general (l2 m, 108/15).
hinduism: a religion of fantasy 35
still, Hegel was well aware of how seductive nature religions were for a certain kind of romanticism. thanks to their primitive and immedi- ate character, the spiritual and the natural not yet having fallen apart, nature religions had the aura of being the oldest and most original ones, not yet contaminated by the influences of culture and reflection. they were considered as reminiscences of a paradisiacal situation of harmony, beauty and innocence, in which the human being, possessing a kind of wisdom, which it is suggested, is subsequently lost, was still in a natural unity with nature and with god. thus nature religion was presented as "the true, mostly outstanding, actually divine religion" (l2 24, 238/144),8 whereas Hegel himself rather considered it as "the most contemptuous of all religions" (l2 m, 108/15). With all his sympathy for the wisdom present in these forms of religion, Hegel, sticking to the superiority of the Chris- tian religion, strongly condemned any exaltation of what was presented as being 'original' or 'primitive'. a zealous enthusiasm for eastern or even more 'primitive' religions is completely foreign to Hegel.
3. the Hindu Religion: a Religion of fantasy
in the manuscript, Hegel deals with immediate religion without making any further distinctions. it is clear, however, that, for the most part, he has the Hindu religion in mind.
When discussing the immediate or nature religions in the 1824 lec- tures Hegel distinguishes: 1) the religion of magic (encompassing african (negro), eskimo, and Chinese religions, but also Buddhism), 2) the reli- gion of fantasy, which is actually the Hindu religion, 3) the religion of the good (the Persian light religion) and 4) the religion of riddle (the egyptian religion).
in the 1827 lectures the Chinese religion of the state is explicitly men- tioned as a transitional form between the religion of magic and Bud- dhism, which receives a separate treatment (presented as the religion of
8 in his commentary Jaeschke refers to both schelling (Vorlesungen u? ber die Methode des academischen Studium) and friedrich schlegel (Sprache und Weisheit der Inder) as typical devotees of such an old religion and wisdom (see note to 146, 170-172 in 4b 688). Complaining about the low level of education in 19th century germany, people critical of their own culture had a tendency to contrast the former wisdom of the indians to it (l2 24, 249/154).
in l2 31, 723/612 Hegel mentions explicitly friedrich schlegel's thesis that fragments of ? this primitive, true religion of the human spirit' can be found in all other religions.
? 36 paul cruysberghs
being-within-self ), preceding the religion of fantasy which is now charac- terised as the indian religion. 9
i have already mentioned the important modification carried out in the 1831 lectures and taken up by marheineke in the first and second editions of the Werke, in which Hegel moves the Buddhist religion from its inferior position before the indian religion to a hierarchically higher position after it. the part on determinate religion is divided now in three chapters, the first of them being natural religion, which now encompasses exclusively the eskimo, mongolian and african religions (the religions of magic in l2 27). the second chapter introduces a new principle of division: 'the splitting up (Entzweiung) of the Religious Consciousness in itself '. in this chapter, both the Chinese and the indian religions find a place of their own, followed by the lamaic-Buddhist religions. the third chapter, which is not our concern here, deals with the religion of freedom, which refers to the greek and the Roman religions, but they are preceded by so-called forms of transition, to which the religions of the good (the Persian and the Jewish religions), the religion of pain (the Phoenix and adonis cults), and the egyptian religion belong.
in order to understand what happened here, we must first turn to Hegel's analysis of the religions of magic in the 1824 lectures. there are two ele- ments that Hegel considers characteristic of the religions of magic. the first element is a practical one: that of power. a magic relation to the world presupposes a spiritual self-consciousness manifesting its overall power over nature in all its concrete forms. for example, the magic practices we find in african religions, hardly merit the name of religion, since there is no explicit reference to any divinity, but the exercise of magic power is manifestly present. the second element, which Hegel distinguishes in his 1824 lectures, is a theoretical one. it can be found in the Chinese fo tradition, the tibetan lama and other Buddhist traditions. Here the god is present in human shapes like the dalai lama or the Buddha. thanks to metempsychosis however, the god shows his being-within-self, his iden- tity with himself independently of the particular human or animal bodies it reincarnates in. this absolute reflection of the divine in itself, in which all distinctions are dissolved (l2 24, 316-317/219), is considered by Hegel
9 the english edition of the 27 lectures translates 'indian religion' as 'Hindu religion'. -- it is remarkable that in the first and second editions of the Werke, edited by Hegel's friends, the Buddhist religion (religion of being-within-itself) is dealt with after the Hindu religion (religion of fantasy). marheineke, the editor of the lectures on philosophy of religion, might have found evidence for this intervention in the 31 lectures.
? hinduism: a religion of fantasy 37
as the basic idea of divinity in general and thus of all religions worthy of that name. (l2 24, 316/218)
according to the 1824 lectures, the Hindu religion, qualified as the reli- gion of fantasy, brings the two moments present in the religion of magic, that of power and that of being-within-self, together. in both fo religion and Buddhism the being-within-self is indefinite and therefore qualified as nothingness (nirvana). in contrast with the essentially negative per- spective of nirvana fostered by Buddhism, Hinduism endows the divine with the determinateness that was part of the concrete exercise of magic power in merely magic religions. in the Hindu religion, Hegel contends, "divinity is objective with all its plenitude of content". (l2 24, 317/220) Whereas the Buddhist world is empty, a concrete divine world arises in Hinduism. Constituting a unity of the infinite essence and the finite shape, the divine develops into a concrete form;--and from a Hegelian point of view this is the considerable kind of progress we are supposed to encounter in all higher religions.
in comparison to the 1824 lectures, the 1827 lectures place a different accent to the treatment of Buddhism, giving it a separate treatment in the first place (cf. supra). this is quite understandable when we take into consideration that Buddhism, at least in its essence, can hardly be con- sidered as a form of magic. nonetheless, Hegel confirms that Hinduism is further developing the substantiality and the being-within-self that fo, lama and Buddhist religions stand for, "in the totality of its externality". (l2 27, 579/475) and, as in l2 24, he considers this particularisation of the universal substance, this adding of "the richness of the world" (l2 27, 581/476) as substantial progress when compared to the Buddhist position. 10 thanks to this concretisation of substantiality both natural and spiritual powers, as they manifest themselves in the concrete world, are recognized as belonging to the absolute; a belonging that has a double side: on the one hand, they appear in their particularity and independency; on the other hand, they appear as vanishing and being consumed by the univer- sal being-within-self of the first substantiality. (l2 27, 581/477)
as a matter of fact, Hegel argues, Hinduism expresses--in its own way, "according to the instinct of the concept" ("nach dem instinkt des Be- griffs") (l2 27, 586/482), the general structure of the (logical) idea: in the first place it is "one, immediate and identical with itself " (l2 27, 581/478);
10 "Here, therefore, the horizon is enlarged; we have here the totality. the viewpoint is concrete; that is the necessary progress. " (l2 27, 581/477)
? 38 paul cruysberghs
secondly, the idea differentiates itself internally, particularizes itself into different, particular shapes and powers; thirdly, the particular powers have to return to the one, to the one universal substance, insofar as they are contained by it. (l2 27, 581/478) Precisely because Hinduism makes room for the second moment of concreteness, it must be considered as a richer form of religion than Buddhism. the third moment however, is presented in a deficient way--and that is the conclusion of both the 1824 and 1827 lectures (l2 24, 326/229; l2 27, 581-584/478-479) (see infra)-- and therefore the Hindu religion itself is deficient. still, in both versions Hegel recognizes that the Hindu religion contains "the three basic deter- minations of the concept" (l2 24, 326/229), i. e. "the basics of the reason- able development, though only in its most general determinations". (l2 27, 582/478)
as for the 1831 lectures, here Hegel also recognizes the three moments of the concept, accusing especially the third moment of offering only a determination in which spirit is absent (geistlose Bestimmung). (l2 31, 734/622) more important, however, is that, as we mentioned earlier, Hegel modified quite drastically the general structure of his lectures. He reduced the natural religions to the eskimo, the mongolian and the afri- can ones, i. e. the former magic religions, which are now, more explicitly than before, denied the status of being religions in the strict sense. more important for us, however, is the introduction of a new perspective: that of the internal splitting up (Entzweiung) of the religious consciousness into a substance, on the one hand (god), and the transitory accidents (the subjects), on the other. in a way this perspective was already present in the former lectures, in which substantiality was considered as a general perspective of nature religion as such. now, the internal splitting up of the religious consciousness into a substantial and an accidental side becomes the common characteristic of the Chinese, indian, and Buddhist religions and separates them from the merely natural religions. in the Chinese reli- gion, the substance is recognized as the foundation (Grundlage) which is determined in itself. it is thought fundamentally as measure, to which human beings have to conform their actions (cf. Confucianism). the indian religion considers the substance as an abstract unity, akin to the human spirit, to which the human being has to elevate itself. the lamaic- Buddhist religion for its part is now--fundamentally different from the previous interpretations--a more concrete form of religion as compared to Hinduism, in so far as the substance becomes concrete in it: it takes the form of a particular individual (the dalai lama, Buddha gautama), to which other human beings have to raise themselves, which is supposed
hinduism: a religion of fantasy 39
to result ultimately in the complete annihilation of the self (nirvana). Concreteness remains the hierarchical criterion to evaluate the different religions of substantiality. yet instead of stressing the concreteness of the relationship to the world, as Hegel did in the 1824 and 1827 lectures, he now focuses on the concreteness of the particular individuals in which the substance finds (as in the dalai lama) or found (as in Buddha) its concrete incarnation. However, apart from the evidence that Buddhism is a histori- cally later development than Hinduism, Hegel's reasons for changing the hierarchical order of eastern religions are not very clear. His analysis of Hinduism remains substantially the same as in the former lectures and, as for the transition, Hegel just stresses the fact that "these [lamaism and Buddhism] religions are very akin to the indian one". (l2 31, 735/623) the sole argument remains the one he mentions when dealing with lamaism: "the general presence of the substance already stands down in favour of the concrete presence of the individual, which is worshipped as absolute power" (ibid. ). the incarnation of power in one (Buddha) or more (the three lamas) particular individuals, who are worshipped as such, seems to be a progress over against a worship of an endless plurality of more or less independent gods.
What might necessitate an upgrade of Buddhism is in fact that, after all, in the Hindu religion the concreteness of its form remains essentially natural: the moments of the divine fall asunder (falling asunder is typical of nature) as if they were independent entities. true religion, Hegel sug- gests, i. e. a religion of spirit in contrast to nature religion, asks for the con- crete resuming of itself into itself. it requires that the concrete not just be posited as such, but that it be posited as ideal as well--and that it be rec- ognized as such. this is not the case in Hinduism yet, whereas Buddhism, in spite of or thanks to its nirvana perspective, might be interpreted as a concrete unification of these moments. the Hindu world consists of a variegated multiplicity of gods, of powers, spiritual distinctions and sensa- tions, all of which appear as isolated and as independent, taking the form of separate human beings or even animals (l2 24, 318-319/221). 11 this mul- tiplicity of human beings and animals constitutes the "realm of fantasy" (l2 24, 319/222), in which arbitrariness appears to be the general rule: "an unrestrained flush (Taumel) of all this content" (l2 24, 323/226), a "jumble (Wirrwarr)"! (l2 24, 323/226-7) fantasy indeed can master any content
11 it might be considered as significant that the Buddha himself is worshipped as a god, as an incarnation of Vishnu in particular. (l2 31, 736/623)
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whatsoever and link freely and arbitrarily representations together. thus, the richness of fantasy has its reverse side as well: the forms appear to lose their initial independency and end up by being totally at the mercy of the arbitrariness of imagination (see also H, 74). 12
insofar as imagination is done justice to in the religion of fantasy Hegel appreciates it undeniably. still, because of the appearance of arbi- trariness and of the keeping apart of the different representations of the divine, without any definite structure, he considers it as a degradation of the basic (read: logical or conceptual) determinations instinctually and unconsciously present in Hinduism. as a consequence of these determi- nations having a "wild, disgusting shape" (l2 24, 324/228), they appear to be "baroque" (l2 24, 324/228) and even "horrifying" (greuelhaft). still, it is precisely in the conceptual determinations, and not so much in the fanci- ful shapes or representations, that Hegel as a philosopher is interested in.
4. the Conceptual determinations
in line with what we have hitherto developed, Hegel distinguishes two moments in the conceptual framework of the Hindu religion: 1) that of the substantiality of the reflection-within-self and 2) that of the form the substantiality is manifesting itself in: the determinations of the absolute. (l2 24, 325/228) We will deal with these moments first, before considering the concrete shape they take in the deities of Brahma (1) and shiva (2).
1) the moment of universal substantiality is the eternal rest of being- within-self. it is defined as a power that is not directed towards anything else, in the way that desire is, but as a power that, still and quiet, being simply reflected in itself, is enclosed in itself. (l2 24, 325/228) it thus remains isolated from the multiplicity of things, from its own concrete particularisations: "this being-within-self [. . . ] remains abstractly inward, purely by itself, as abstract power" (l2 27, 583/478). nonetheless, it needs an existence anyway, although it is supposed to have it outside the par- ticularity of the second moment. it rather takes existence in the "con-
12 Hegel thus contrasts the 'fanciful' (phantastisch) powers of the Hindu religion with the 'images of a beautiful fantasy' (einer scho? nen Phantasie) that he finds in the greek religion: "they are particular powers, although it is a wild particularity in which there is no system but only intimations of what is understandable and necessary, echoed of understood moments but still no understandable totality or systematization, much less a rational one; instead only a multiplicity in a colorful throng" (cf. infra) (l2 27, 584/479).
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crete existing (daseienden),13 immediate human mind"14 (l2 27, 583/478). How this is to be understood more concretely, we will make clear below, when dealing with the concrete shape the logical determinations take in Hinduism.
2) the substantial power, even when having its existence in the con- sciousness of concrete human beings, is to be distinguished from its mani- festation, from the moments as they have been posited by the substantial power itself. these moments have a double status. they are independent beings and, at the same time, they are perishing and vanishing in the power of the one substance. on the one hand, they in fact appear as inde- pendent persons, as divine persons who are the whole itself, so that the first moment, the moment of substantiality, as a matter of fact, disappears in the particular figures (gestalten)15 in which it manifests itself. Hegel has in mind the multiplicity of natural objects and processes that are deified and personified such as "sun, moon, mountains, or rivers; or [. . . ] greater abstractions such as generation, perishing, change of shape" . . . (l2 27, 583/479). one the one hand, these gods are totalities by themselves which do not need anything beyond themselves. on the other hand, they disap- pear again, being absorbed in the one power. "the power [indeed] is the ideal, the negative, for which everything else is only as sublated, negated" (l2 24, 325/228). thus both moments are alternating perpetually: once the one is presented, then the distinction, and then the one again, etc. as a matter of fact, the one presents itself as a continuous alternating of the one and its manifestations. (l2 24, 325/228; l2 27, 585/481)
therefore, in a way, there are three, not just two moments that inter- play. (l2 24, 326/229) there is 1) the one, the universal. it must be con- ceived as manifesting itself into objectivity (Gegensta? ndlichkeit). 16 2) Being itself divine, however, the manifestation itself becomes the whole god. over against this [determinate] god, who is the manifestation of the first one, the latter, the first power that is in itself, the one as such, necessarily
13 'daseienden' has been translated in the english translation as 'concrete existing'.
14 the english translator says: 'spirit'; however, i would rather translate 'geist' here by 'mind', since it refers to the consciousness of a particular individual.
15 this multiplicity of powers is described by Hegel in his 27 lecture as 'an unbridled polytheism' (l2 27, 583/479). He thus contrasts it with the greek religion in which the gods have reached 'the beauty of figure'.
16 as in Christian theology, it can also be termed 'eternal goodness': the one grants the determinate, which is intrinsically only apparent, momentary being, though it still remains absorbed in the absolute power of the one. the one allows the finite to have a shape of its own, without having any right of its own.
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opposes itself. as such, however, it is reduced into a particular moment, so that beyond that an absolute one, a higher one, is to be posited, which can or must be called god as well. 3) thirdly, there is the alternation of both moments. this is to be termed Change as such (Vishnu). 17 it is the process of genesis and corruption, of being brought forth and being anni- hilated: to be being as not-Being. at the same time, these three moments must be considered as being one totality, a whole or a unity of its own.
these are the basic conceptual determinations Hegel distinguished both in the 1824 and in the 1827 lectures. 18 in spite of the triadic struc- ture of the one, which is referring to what we might consider as a truly dialectical structure, Hegel stresses the fundamental deficiency of the way it takes shape in the Hindu religion. (l2 24, 326/229) it is lacking a basic element that every truly spiritual religion, i. e. the Christian religion, is supposed to have. the third moment indeed is determined in Hinduism as mere becoming or change. However, that is not good enough. in the absolute idea, Hegel says, this third moment is determined as spirit. and spirit cannot be thought of in terms of mere transition. it must be con- ceived as a true return into itself, which is quite different from a continu- ous transition of being into non-being and vice versa. the third moment of Hinduism actually does not merit the status of being a third moment. that explains why the 1824 lectures initially started the development of the metaphysical structure of Hinduism with only two moments, the third one being introduced (and criticised at once) only in the end.
17 Hegel compares this third moment with what the milesian philosophers used to call ? ? ? ? ? or Justice.
18 in l27 however the content is introduced in a slightly different way. Hegel suggests that in spite of Brahm representing the simple (einfache) substance, some (three) distinc- tions are introduced according to "the instinct of the concept" (l2 27, 586/482). 1) there is the totality as such: the abstract oneness. it is considered here as one of three--thus it is distinguished from and subordinated to the oneness that encompasses the three of them. 2) the second moment is the determinateness, the distinction as such; and 3) the third moment is the concrete unity of the distinctions. Brahm is the formless unity; according to its determinateness it is tri(u)nity. thus we have two distinct powers: the triunity on the one hand (eternal goodness); then justice: that the being is not, but that it reaches its right to change, to become a particular determinateness. these three as a totality, being a whole and a unity, is called trimurti: the three essences.
? hinduism: a religion of fantasy 43 5. the Concrete Representations
as for the way the three basic determinations of the concept find expres- sion more concretely in the Hindu mythology (l2 24, 327/230), we can be relatively brief. the triadic structure as such is represented as trimurti. murti means soul in general: all emanations of the absolute, all particular manifestations must be interpreted as souls. the three essences or shapes we distinguished up to now, and which we must identify as respectively Brahm, Vishnu or Krishna, and shiva or mahadeva, are trimurti. from this perspective, the first moment, the one (Brahm), as an abstract unity, presents itself not as the unity of the other moments, but rather as just one of three: thus it is inferior to trimurti (ist heruntergesetzt), in so far as the unity of the three (trimurti itself as oneness) is represented as different from the first oneness. still, we must firstly take into account that in the ancient texts, in the Vedas, neither Vishnu nor shiva has yet appeared. they are both later developments, Hegel suggests. (l2 24, 334/236) secondly, there are many other gods besides the three that con- stitute trimurti; and there are many sects, each being a particular cult of a particular god or gods: mahadeva (male) and yoni (female), and further indra, the god of heaven, fire, cattle such as cows, elephants, horses, etc. ). Hegel characterises this multitude of gods and goddesses as the sphere of mere imagination (Einbildungskraft), and, as connected with this, of confusion (Verwirrung) (l2 24, 335/237; cf. l2 27, 595/490). nevertheless, in spite of the inevitable confusion, Hegel tries to make sense of at least the three highest gods.
1. the god Brahm, Brahma, or Brahman represents the first oneness we referred to (l2 24, 327/230; 27, 585/481): it is the absolute one and is to be conceived as a neutrum. the Hindu god, differently from the Jewish one, who is conceived as a subject, is 'das eine', not 'der eine' (l2 24, 339/242). it is "the eternal in itself with itself " (l2 24, 328/231), "pure being, pure uni- versality, supreme being [in english], the highest being" (H, 62). in so far as Brahm is a particular god, being one of the three persons of trimurti, (it is mostly called Brahma then), Brahm is conceived as 'der eine', as a per- son, as a (masculine) subject. as soon as the one is one of the three, it is made into something particular, and, as a consequence, a higher instance is needed: that is Brahm (in contrast to Brahma). 19 at the same time we
19 in so far as Brahma is considered as one of the three gods that constitute trimurti, he is subordinated to the universal soul, which, in that context, is sometimes called Parabrahma,
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must take into consideration that all the particular gods, in so far as they are further determinations of Brahm, are Brahm themselves. so, in a way, Brahm is reduced to the epitheton of oneness. But if this is the case, then Brahm runs the risk of becoming an empty epitheton, just an epitheton of praise, as the englishman James mill in his History of British India had suggested. (l2 24, 328-329/231-232; H, 66) thus both Vishnu and Krishna (cf. infra) are to be called respectively the highest and the great Brahm. and shiva (or mahadeva or Rudra) is called Brahm as well. But so too the natural elements such as the water, the sun, the air, respiration, and human faculties such as love and consciousness, understanding, or happi- ness: they are all Brahm. thus Brahm, the one, is all oneness: everything that has any form of independency, of identity with itself, is Brahm. 20
But Brahm is not just conceived as the oneness in all that is one, it is also the substance from which everything proceeds or is begotten. thus, it is presented as a creator. 21 at the same time, however, it appears as inert, formless matter. from this perspective Brahm, the one substance, is both the masculine, formative activity, and the feminine, passive attitude. therefore Vishnu, appearing as a creator in his turn, can say that Brahma is his uterus, in which he sowed his seed so that everything is procreated. (l2 27, 588/84)
the last remark i want to make about Hegel's examination of Brahm concerns his position in the pantheism polemics, which already comes to the surface in the 1824 lectures (l2 24, 259-262/165-167), but more domi- nantly in the Humboldt review. Hegel agrees with Colebrooke's assertion that the old Hindu religion recognizes only one god, but that it does not sufficiently distinguish between the creator and his creation. (H, 64) in so far as Brahm is presented as oneness, the Hindu religion can be consid- ered as a form of monotheism. at the same time it is essentially panthe- istic: being the essence of all things, Brahm is immanent in and identical with all things, though it should not be identified with the concrete and
that which is above Brahma (l2 24, 328/231). in l2 27, consoling his students and apologiz- ing for his own lack of understanding i guess, Hegel remarks that "one cannot say in what determinate relation such forms stand to one another" (l2 27, 588/483).
20 Brahm, conceived under the category of pure being in which all particularity is dis- solved, constitutes, according to Hegel, the sublime dimension of the Hindu religion, which does not mean that it is beautiful or true (H, 64). Because of its abstract character, pure being instead of being truly infinite is, as a matter of fact, in line with the beginning of Hegel's logic, a finite category.
21 Hegel spends some time reporting the story, or rather one of the many stories, about the creation of the world. (l2 24, 330-334/233-236; l2 27, 588-589/484-485)
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empirical things as such. it is "the being of their being-there (dasein)", not their being there as such that is considered as divine.
