No More Learning

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Whether there is trinity in God?

Objection 1: It would seem there is not trinity in God. For every name
in God signifies substance or relation. But this name "Trinity" does
not signify the substance; otherwise it would be predicated of each one
of the persons: nor does it signify relation; for it does not express a
name that refers to another. Therefore the word "Trinity" is not to be
applied to God.

Objection 2: Further, this word "trinity" is a collective term, since
it signifies multitude. But such a word does not apply to God; as the
unity of a collective name is the least of unities, whereas in God
there exists the greatest possible unity. Therefore this word "trinity"
does not apply to God.

Objection 3: Further, every trine is threefold. But in God there is not
triplicity; since triplicity is a kind of inequality. Therefore neither
is there trinity in God.

Objection 4: Further, all that exists in God exists in the unity of the
divine essence; because God is His own essence. Therefore, if Trinity
exists in God, it exists in the unity of the divine essence; and thus
in God there would be three essential unities; which is heresy.

Objection 5: Further, in all that is said of God, the concrete is
predicated of the abstract; for Deity is God and paternity is the
Father. But the Trinity cannot be called trine; otherwise there would
be nine realities in God; which, of course, is erroneous. Therefore the
word trinity is not to be applied to God.

On the contrary, Athanasius says: "Unity in Trinity; and Trinity in
Unity is to be revered. "

I answer that, The name "Trinity" in God signifies the determinate
number of persons. And so the plurality of persons in God requires that
we should use the word trinity; because what is indeterminately
signified by plurality, is signified by trinity in a determinate
manner.

Reply to Objection 1: In its etymological sense, this word "Trinity"
seems to signify the one essence of the three persons, according as
trinity may mean trine-unity. But in the strict meaning of the term it
rather signifies the number of persons of one essence; and on this
account we cannot say that the Father is the Trinity, as He is not
three persons. Yet it does not mean the relations themselves of the
Persons, but rather the number of persons related to each other; and
hence it is that the word in itself does not express regard to another.

Reply to Objection 2: Two things are implied in a collective term,
plurality of the "supposita," and a unity of some kind of order. For
"people" is a multitude of men comprehended under a certain order. In
the first sense, this word "trinity" is like other collective words;
but in the second sense it differs from them, because in the divine
Trinity not only is there unity of order, but also with this there is
unity of essence.

Reply to Objection 3: "Trinity" is taken in an absolute sense; for it
signifies the threefold number of persons. "Triplicity" signifies a
proportion of inequality; for it is a species of unequal proportion,
according to Boethius (Arithm. i, 23). Therefore in God there is not
triplicity, but Trinity.

Reply to Objection 4: In the divine Trinity is to be understood both
number and the persons numbered. So when we say, "Trinity in Unity," we
do not place number in the unity of the essence, as if we meant three
times one; but we place the Persons numbered in the unity of nature; as
the "supposita" of a nature are said to exist in that nature. On the
other hand, we say "Unity in Trinity"; meaning that the nature is in
its "supposita. "

Reply to Objection 5: When we say, "Trinity is trine," by reason of the
number implied, we signify the multiplication of that number by itself;
since the word trine imports a distinction in the "supposita" of which
it is spoken. Therefore it cannot be said that the Trinity is trine;
otherwise it follows that, if the Trinity be trine, there would be
three "supposita" of the Trinity; as when we say, "God is trine," it
follows that there are three "supposita" of the Godhead.
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Whether the Son is other than the Father?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son is not other than the Father.
For "other" is a relative term implying diversity of substance. If,
then, the Son is other than the Father, He must be different from the
Father; which is contrary to what Augustine says (De Trin. vii), that
when we speak of three persons, "we do not mean to imply diversity. "

Objection 2: Further, whosoever are other from one another, differ in
some way from one another. Therefore, if the Son is other than the
Father, it follows that He differs from the Father; which is against
what Ambrose says (De Fide i), that "the Father and the Son are one in
Godhead; nor is there any difference in substance between them, nor any
diversity. "

Objection 3: Further, the term alien is taken from "alius" [other]. But
the Son is not alien from the Father, for Hilary says (De Trin. vii)
that "in the divine persons there is nothing diverse, nothing alien,
nothing separable. " Therefore the Son is not other that the Father.

Objection 4: Further, the terms "other person" and "other thing" [alius
et aliud] have the same meaning, differing only in gender. So if the
Son is another person from the Father, it follows that the Son is a
thing apart from the Father.

On the contrary, Augustine [*Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i. ] says:
"There is one essence of the Father and Son and Holy Ghost, in which
the Father is not one thing, the Son another, and the Holy Ghost
another; although the Father is one person, the Son another, and the
Holy Ghost another. "

I answer that, Since as Jerome remarks [*In substance, Ep. lvii. ], a
heresy arises from words wrongly used, when we speak of the Trinity we
must proceed with care and with befitting modesty; because, as
Augustine says (De Trin. i, 3), "nowhere is error more harmful, the
quest more toilsome, the finding more fruitful. " Now, in treating of
the Trinity, we must beware of two opposite errors, and proceed
cautiously between them---namely, the error of Arius, who placed a
Trinity of substance with the Trinity of persons; and the error of
Sabellius, who placed unity of person with the unity of essence.

Thus, to avoid the error of Arius we must shun the use of the terms
diversity and difference in God, lest we take away the unity of
essence: we may, however, use the term "distinction" on account of the
relative opposition. Hence whenever we find terms of "diversity" or
"difference" of Persons used in an authentic work, these terms of
"diversity" or "difference" are taken to mean "distinction. " But lest
the simplicity and singleness of the divine essence be taken away, the
terms "separation" and "division," which belong to the parts of a
whole, are to be avoided: and lest quality be taken away, we avoid the
use of the term "disparity": and lest we remove similitude, we avoid
the terms "alien" and "discrepant. " For Ambrose says (De Fide i) that
"in the Father and the Son there is no discrepancy, but one Godhead":
and according to Hilary, as quoted above, "in God there is nothing
alien, nothing separable. "

To avoid the heresy of Sabellius, we must shun the term "singularity,"
lest we take away the communicability of the divine essence. Hence
Hilary says (De Trin. vii): "It is sacrilege to assert that the Father
and the Son are separate in Godhead. " We must avoid the adjective
"only" [unici] lest we take away the number of persons. Hence Hilary
says in the same book: "We exclude from God the idea of singularity or
uniqueness. " Nevertheless, we say "the only Son," for in God there is
no plurality of Sons. Yet, we do not say "the only God," for the Deity
is common to several. We avoid the word "confused," lest we take away
from the Persons the order of their nature. Hence Ambrose says (De Fide
i): "What is one is not confused; and there is no multiplicity where
there is no difference. " The word "solitary" is also to be avoided,
lest we take away the society of the three persons; for, as Hilary says
(De Trin. iv), "We confess neither a solitary nor a diverse God. "

This word "other" [alius], however, in the masculine sense, means only
a distinction of "suppositum"; and hence we can properly say that "the
Son is other than the Father," because He is another "suppositum" of
the divine nature, as He is another person and another hypostasis.

Reply to Objection 1: "Other," being like the name of a particular
thing, refers to the "suppositum"; and so, there is sufficient reason
for using it, where there is a distinct substance in the sense of
hypostasis or person. But diversity requires a distinct substance in
the sense of essence. Thus we cannot say that the Son is diverse from
the Father, although He is another.

Reply to Objection 2: "Difference" implies distinction of form. There
is one form in God, as appears from the text, "Who, when He was in the
form of God" (Phil. 2:6). Therefore the term "difference" does not
properly apply to God, as appears from the authority quoted. Yet,
Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 5) employs the term "difference" in the
divine persons, as meaning that the relative property is signified by
way of form. Hence he says that the hypostases do not differ from each
other in substance, but according to determinate properties. But
"difference" is taken for "distinction," as above stated.

Reply to Objection 3: The term "alien" means what is extraneous and
dissimilar; which is not expressed by the term "other" [alius]; and
therefore we say that the Son is "other" than the Father, but not that
He is anything "alien. "

Reply to Objection 4: The neuter gender is formless; whereas the
masculine is formed and distinct; and so is the feminine. So the common
essence is properly and aptly expressed by the neuter gender, but by
the masculine and feminine is expressed the determined subject in the
common nature. Hence also in human affairs, if we ask, Who is this man?
we answer, Socrates, which is the name of the "suppositum"; whereas, if
we ask, What is he? we reply, A rational and mortal animal. So, because
in God distinction is by the persons, and not by the essence, we say
that the Father is other than the Son, but not something else; while
conversely we say that they are one thing, but not one person.
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Whether the exclusive word "alone" should be added to the essential term in
God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the exclusive word "alone" [solus] is
not to be added to an essential term in God. For, according to the
Philosopher (Elench. ii, 3), "He is alone who is not with another. " But
God is with the angels and the souls of the saints. Therefore we cannot
say that God is alone.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is joined to the essential term in God
can be predicated of every person "per se," and of all the persons
together; for, as we can properly say that God is wise, we can say the
Father is a wise God; and the Trinity is a wise God. But Augustine says
(De Trin. vi, 9): "We must consider the opinion that the Father is not
true God alone. " Therefore God cannot be said to be alone.

Objection 3: Further if this expression "alone" is joined to an
essential term, it would be so joined as regards either the personal
predicate or the essential predicate. But it cannot be the former, as
it is false to say, "God alone is Father," since man also is a father;
nor, again, can it be applied as regards the latter, for, if this
saying were true, "God alone creates," it would follow that the "Father
alone creates," as whatever is said of God can be said of the Father;
and it would be false, as the Son also creates. Therefore this
expression "alone" cannot be joined to an essential term in God.

On the contrary, It is said, "To the King of ages, immortal, invisible,
the only God" (1 Tim. 1:17).

I answer that, This term "alone" can be taken as a categorematical
term, or as a syncategorematical term. A categorematical term is one
which ascribes absolutely its meaning to a given "suppositum"; as, for
instance, "white" to man, as when we say a "white man. " If the term
"alone" is taken in this sense, it cannot in any way be joined to any
term in God; for it would mean solitude in the term to which it is
joined; and it would follow that God was solitary, against what is
above stated [270](A[2]). A syncategorematical term imports the order
of the predicate to the subject; as this expression "every one" or "no
one"; and likewise the term "alone," as excluding every other
"suppositum" from the predicate. Thus, when we say, "Socrates alone
writes," we do not mean that Socrates is solitary, but that he has no
companion in writing, though many others may be with him. In this way
nothing prevents the term "alone" being joined to any essential term in
God, as excluding the predicate from all things but God; as if we said
"God alone is eternal," because nothing but God is eternal.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the angels and the souls of the saints
are always with God, nevertheless, if plurality of persons did not
exist in God, He would be alone or solitary. For solitude is not
removed by association with anything that is extraneous in nature; thus
anyone is said to be alone in a garden, though many plants and animals
are with him in the garden. Likewise, God would be alone or solitary,
though angels and men were with Him, supposing that several persons
were not within Him. Therefore the society of angels and of souls does
not take away absolute solitude from God; much less does it remove
respective solitude, in reference to a predicate.

Reply to Objection 2: This expression "alone," properly speaking, does
not affect the predicate, which is taken formally, for it refers to the
"suppositum," as excluding any other suppositum from the one which it
qualifies. But the adverb "only," being exclusive, can be applied
either to subject or predicate. For we can say, "Only Socrates"---that
is, no one else---"runs: and Socrates runs only"---that is, he does
nothing else. Hence it is not properly said that the Father is God
alone, or the Trinity is God alone, unless some implied meaning be
assumed in the predicate, as, for instance, "The Trinity is God Who
alone is God. " In that sense it can be true to say that the Father is
that God Who alone is God, if the relative be referred to the
predicate, and not to the "suppositum. " So, when Augustine says that
the Father is not God alone, but that the Trinity is God alone, he
speaks expositively, as he might explain the words, "To the King of
ages, invisible, the only God," as applying not to the Father, but to
the Trinity alone.

Reply to Objection 3: In both ways can the term "alone" be joined to an
essential term. For this proposition, "God alone is Father," can mean
two things, because the word "Father" can signify the person of the
Father; and then it is true; for no man is that person: or it can
signify that relation only; and thus it is false, because the relation
of paternity is found also in others, though not in a univocal sense.
Likewise it is true to say God alone creates; nor, does it follow,
"therefore the Father alone creates," because, as logicians say, an
exclusive diction so fixes the term to which it is joined that what is
said exclusively of that term cannot be said exclusively of an
individual contained in that term: for instance, from the premiss, "Man
alone is a mortal rational animal," we cannot conclude, "therefore
Socrates alone is such. "
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Whether an exclusive diction can be joined to the personal term?

Objection 1: It would seem that an exclusive diction can be joined to
the personal term, even though the predicate is common. For our Lord
speaking to the Father, said: "That they may know Thee, the only true
God" (Jn. 17:3). Therefore the Father alone is true God.

Objection 2: Further, He said: "No one knows the Son but the Father"
(Mat. 11:27); which means that the Father alone knows the Son. But to
know the Son is common (to the persons). Therefore the same conclusion
follows.

Objection 3: Further, an exclusive diction does not exclude what enters
into the concept of the term to which it is joined. Hence it does not
exclude the part, nor the universal; for it does not follow that if we
say "Socrates alone is white," that therefore "his hand is not white,"
or that "man is not white. " But one person is in the concept of
another; as the Father is in the concept of the Son; and conversely.
Therefore, when we say, The Father alone is God, we do not exclude the
Son, nor the Holy Ghost; so that such a mode of speaking is true.

Objection 4: Further, the Church sings: "Thou alone art Most High, O
Jesus Christ. "

On the contrary, This proposition "The Father alone is God" includes
two assertions---namely, that the Father is God, and that no other
besides the Father is God. But this second proposition is false, for
the Son is another from the Father, and He is God. Therefore this is
false, The Father alone is God; and the same of the like sayings.

I answer that, When we say, "The Father alone is God," such a
proposition can be taken in several senses. If "alone" means solitude
in the Father, it is false in a categorematical sense; but if taken in
a syncategorematical sense it can again be understood in several ways.
For if it exclude (all others) from the form of the subject, it is
true, the sense being "the Father alone is God"---that is, "He who with
no other is the Father, is God. " In this way Augustine expounds when he
says (De Trin. vi, 6): "We say the Father alone, not because He is
separate from the Son, or from the Holy Ghost, but because they are not
the Father together with Him. " This, however, is not the usual way of
speaking, unless we understand another implication, as though we said
"He who alone is called the Father is God. " But in the strict sense the
exclusion affects the predicate. And thus the proposition is false if
it excludes another in the masculine sense; but true if it excludes it
in the neuter sense; because the Son is another person than the Father,
but not another thing; and the same applies to the Holy Ghost. But
because this diction "alone," properly speaking, refers to the subject,
it tends to exclude another Person rather than other things. Hence such
a way of speaking is not to be taken too literally, but it should be
piously expounded, whenever we find it in an authentic work.

Reply to Objection 1: When we say, "Thee the only true God," we do not
understand it as referring to the person of the Father, but to the
whole Trinity, as Augustine expounds (De Trin. vi, 9). Or, if
understood of the person of the Father, the other persons are not
excluded by reason of the unity of essence; in so far as the word
"only" excludes another thing, as above explained.

The same Reply can be given to OBJ 2. For an essential term applied to
the Father does not exclude the Son or the Holy Ghost, by reason of the
unity of essence. Hence we must understand that in the text quoted the
term "no one" [*Nemo = non-homo, i. e. no man] is not the same as "no
man," which the word itself would seem to signify (for the person of
the Father could not be excepted), but is taken according to the usual
way of speaking in a distributive sense, to mean any rational nature.

Reply to Objection 3: The exclusive diction does not exclude what
enters into the concept of the term to which it is adjoined, if they do
not differ in "suppositum," as part and universal. But the Son differs
in "suppositum" from the Father; and so there is no parity.

Reply to Objection 4: We do not say absolutely that the Son alone is
Most High; but that He alone is Most High "with the Holy Ghost, in the
glory of God the Father. "
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THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE PERSONS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We proceed to inquire concerning the knowledge of the divine persons;
and this involves four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the divine persons can be known by natural reason?

(2) Whether notions are to be attributed to the divine persons?

(3) The number of the notions?

(4) Whether we may lawfully have various contrary opinions of these
notions?
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Whether the trinity of the divine persons can be known by natural reason?

Objection 1: It would seem that the trinity of the divine persons can
be known by natural reason. For philosophers came to the knowledge of
God not otherwise than by natural reason. Now we find that they said
many things about the trinity of persons, for Aristotle says (De Coelo
et Mundo i, 2): "Through this number"---namely, three---"we bring
ourselves to acknowledge the greatness of one God, surpassing all
things created. " And Augustine says (Confess. vii, 9): "I have read in
their works, not in so many words, but enforced by many and various
reasons, that in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God,
and the Word was God," and so on; in which passage the distinction of
persons is laid down. We read, moreover, in a gloss on Rom. 1 and Ex. 8
that the magicians of Pharaoh failed in the third sign---that is, as
regards knowledge of a third person---i. e. of the Holy Ghost ---and
thus it is clear that they knew at least two persons. Likewise
Trismegistus says: "The monad begot a monad, and reflected upon itself
its own heat. " By which words the generation of the Son and procession
of the Holy Ghost seem to be indicated. Therefore knowledge of the
divine persons can be obtained by natural reason.

Objection 2: Further, Richard St. Victor says (De Trin. i, 4): "I
believe without doubt that probable and even necessary arguments can be
found for any explanation of the truth. " So even to prove the Trinity
some have brought forward a reason from the infinite goodness of God,
who communicates Himself infinitely in the procession of the divine
persons; while some are moved by the consideration that "no good thing
can be joyfully possessed without partnership. " Augustine proceeds (De
Trin. x, 4; x, 11,12) to prove the trinity of persons by the procession
of the word and of love in our own mind; and we have followed him in
this ([271]Q[27] , AA[1],3). Therefore the trinity of persons can be
known by natural reason.

Objection 3: Further, it seems to be superfluous to teach what cannot
be known by natural reason. But it ought not to be said that the divine
tradition of the Trinity is superfluous. Therefore the trinity of
persons can be known by natural reason.

On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. i), "Let no man think to reach
the sacred mystery of generation by his own mind. " And Ambrose says (De
Fide ii, 5), "It is impossible to know the secret of generation. The
mind fails, the voice is silent. " But the trinity of the divine persons
is distinguished by origin of generation and procession ([272]Q[30],
A[2]). Since, therefore, man cannot know, and with his understanding
grasp that for which no necessary reason can be given, it follows that
the trinity of persons cannot be known by reason.

I answer that, It is impossible to attain to the knowledge of the
Trinity by natural reason. For, as above explained ([273]Q[12],
AA[4],12), man cannot obtain the knowledge of God by natural reason
except from creatures. Now creatures lead us to the knowledge of God,
as effects do to their cause. Accordingly, by natural reason we can
know of God that only which of necessity belongs to Him as the
principle of things, and we have cited this fundamental principle in
treating of God as above ([274]Q[12], A[12]). Now, the creative power
of God is common to the whole Trinity; and hence it belongs to the
unity of the essence, and not to the distinction of the persons.
Therefore, by natural reason we can know what belongs to the unity of
the essence, but not what belongs to the distinction of the persons.
Whoever, then, tries to prove the trinity of persons by natural reason,
derogates from faith in two ways. Firstly, as regards the dignity of
faith itself, which consists in its being concerned with invisible
things, that exceed human reason; wherefore the Apostle says that
"faith is of things that appear not" (Heb. 11:1), and the same Apostle
says also, "We speak wisdom among the perfect, but not the wisdom of
this world, nor of the princes of this world; but we speak the wisdom
of God in a mystery which is hidden" (1 Cor. 2:6,7). Secondly, as
regards the utility of drawing others to the faith. For when anyone in
the endeavor to prove the faith brings forward reasons which are not
cogent, he falls under the ridicule of the unbelievers: since they
suppose that we stand upon such reasons, and that we believe on such
grounds.

Therefore, we must not attempt to prove what is of faith, except by
authority alone, to those who receive the authority; while as regards
others it suffices to prove that what faith teaches is not impossible.
Hence it is said by Dionysius (Div. Nom. ii): "Whoever wholly resists
the word, is far off from our philosophy; whereas if he regards the
truth of the word"---i. e. "the sacred word, we too follow this rule. "

Reply to Objection 1: The philosophers did not know the mystery of the
trinity of the divine persons by its proper attributes, such as
paternity, filiation, and procession, according to the Apostle's words,
"We speak the wisdom of God which none of the princes of the
world"---i. e. the philosophers---"knew" (1 Cor. 2:6). Nevertheless,
they knew some of the essential attributes appropriated to the persons,
as power to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Ghost;
as will later on appear. So, when Aristotle said, "By this number,"
etc. , we must not take it as if he affirmed a threefold number in God,
but that he wished to say that the ancients used the threefold number
in their sacrifices and prayers on account of some perfection residing
in the number three. In the Platonic books also we find, "In the
beginning was the word," not as meaning the Person begotten in God, but
as meaning the ideal type whereby God made all things, and which is
appropriated to the Son. And although they knew these were appropriated
to the three persons, yet they are said to have failed in the third
sign---that is, in the knowledge of the third person, because they
deviated from the goodness appropriated to the Holy Ghost, in that
knowing God "they did not glorify Him as God" (Rom. 1); or, because the
Platonists asserted the existence of one Primal Being whom they also
declared to be the father of the universe, they consequently maintained
the existence of another substance beneath him, which they called
"mind" or the "paternal intellect," containing the idea of all things,
as Macrobius relates (Som. Scip. iv). They did not, however, assert the
existence of a third separate substance which might correspond to the
Holy Ghost. So also we do not assert that the Father and the Son differ
in substance, which was the error of Origen and Arius, who in this
followed the Platonists. When Trismegistus says, "Monad begot monad,"
etc. , this does not refer to the generation of the Son, or to the
procession of the Holy Ghost, but to the production of the world. For
one God produced one world by reason of His love for Himself.

Reply to Objection 2: Reason may be employed in two ways to establish a
point: firstly, for the purpose of furnishing sufficient proof of some
principle, as in natural science, where sufficient proof can be brought
to show that the movement of the heavens is always of uniform velocity.
Reason is employed in another way, not as furnishing a sufficient proof
of a principle, but as confirming an already established principle, by
showing the congruity of its results, as in astrology the theory of
eccentrics and epicycles is considered as established, because thereby
the sensible appearances of the heavenly movements can be explained;
not, however, as if this proof were sufficient, forasmuch as some other
theory might explain them. In the first way, we can prove that God is
one; and the like. In the second way, reasons avail to prove the
Trinity; as, when assumed to be true, such reasons confirm it. We must
not, however, think that the trinity of persons is adequately proved by
such reasons. This becomes evident when we consider each point; for the
infinite goodness of God is manifested also in creation, because to
produce from nothing is an act of infinite power. For if God
communicates Himself by His infinite goodness, it is not necessary that
an infinite effect should proceed from God: but that according to its
own mode and capacity it should receive the divine goodness. Likewise,
when it is said that joyous possession of good requires partnership,
this holds in the case of one not having perfect goodness: hence it
needs to share some other's good, in order to have the goodness of
complete happiness. Nor is the image in our mind an adequate proof in
the case of God, forasmuch as the intellect is not in God and ourselves
univocally. Hence, Augustine says (Tract. xxvii. in Joan. ) that by
faith we arrive at knowledge, and not conversely.

Reply to Objection 3: There are two reason why the knowledge of the
divine persons was necessary for us. It was necessary for the right
idea of creation. The fact of saying that God made all things by His
Word excludes the error of those who say that God produced things by
necessity. When we say that in Him there is a procession of love, we
show that God produced creatures not because He needed them, nor
because of any other extrinsic reason, but on account of the love of
His own goodness. So Moses, when he had said, "In the beginning God
created heaven and earth," subjoined, "God said, Let there be light,"
to manifest the divine Word; and then said, "God saw the light that it
was good," to show proof of the divine love. The same is also found in
the other works of creation. In another way, and chiefly, that we may
think rightly concerning the salvation of the human race, accomplished
by the Incarnate Son, and by the gift of the Holy Ghost.
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Whether there are notions in God?

Objection 1: It would seem that in God there are no notions. For
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We must not dare to say anything of God
but what is taught to us by the Holy Scripture. " But Holy Scripture
does not say anything concerning notions. Therefore there are none in
God.

Objection 2: Further, all that exists in God concerns the unity of the
essence or the trinity of the persons. But the notions do not concern
the unity of the essence, nor the trinity of the persons; for neither
can what belongs to the essence be predicated of the notions: for
instance, we do not say that paternity is wise or creates; nor can what
belongs to the persons be so predicated; for example, we do not say
that paternity begets, nor that filiation is begotten. Therefore there
do not exist notions in God.

Objection 3: Further, we do not require to presuppose any abstract
notions as principles of knowing things which are devoid of
composition: for they are known of themselves. But the divine persons
are supremely simple. Therefore we are not to suppose any notions in
God.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 5): "We recognize
difference of hypostases [i. e. of persons], in the three properties;
i. e. in the paternal, the filial, and the processional. " Therefore we
must admit properties and notions in God.

I answer that, Prepositivus, considering the simplicity of the persons,
said that in God there were no properties or notions, and wherever
there were mentioned, he propounded the abstract for the concrete. For
as we are accustomed to say, "I beseech your kindness"---i. e. you who
are kind---so when we speak of paternity in God, we mean God the
Father.

But, as shown above ([275]Q[3], A[3], ad 1), the use of concrete and
abstract names in God is not in any way repugnant to the divine
simplicity; forasmuch as we always name a thing as we understand it.
Now, our intellect cannot attain to the absolute simplicity of the
divine essence, considered in itself, and therefore, our human
intellect apprehends and names divine things, according to its own
mode, that is in so far as they are found in sensible objects, whence
its knowledge is derived. In these things we use abstract terms to
signify simple forms; and to signify subsistent things we use concrete
terms. Hence also we signify divine things, as above stated, by
abstract names, to express their simplicity; whereas, to express their
subsistence and completeness, we use concrete names.

But not only must essential names be signified in the abstract and in
the concrete, as when we say Deity and God; or wisdom and wise; but the
same applies to the personal names, so that we may say paternity and
Father.

Two chief motives for this can be cited. The first arises from the
obstinacy of heretics. For since we confess the Father, the Son, and
the Holy Ghost to be one God and three persons, to those who ask:
"Whereby are They one God? and whereby are They three persons? " as we
answer that They are one in essence or deity; so there must also be
some abstract terms whereby we may answer that the persons are
distinguished; and these are the properties or notions signified by an
abstract term, as paternity and filiation. Therefore the divine essence
is signified as "What"; and the person as "Who"; and the property as
"Whereby. "

The second motive is because one person in God is related to two
persons---namely, the person of the Father to the person of the Son and
the person of the Holy Ghost. This is not, however, by one relation;
otherwise it would follow that the Son also and the Holy Ghost would be
related to the Father by one and the same relation. Thus, since
relation alone multiplies the Trinity, it would follow that the Son and
the Holy Ghost would not be two persons. Nor can it be said with
Prepositivus that as God is related in one way to creatures, while
creatures are related to Him in divers ways, so the Father is related
by one relation to the Son and to the Holy Ghost; whereas these two
persons are related to the Father by two relations. For, since the very
specific idea of a relation is that it refers to another, it must be
said that two relations are not specifically different if but one
opposite relation corresponds to them. For the relation of lord and
father must differ according to the difference of filiation and
servitude. Now, all creatures are related to God as His creatures by
one specific relation. But the Son and the Holy Ghost are not related
to the Father by one and the same kind of relation. Hence there is no
parity.

Further, in God there is no need to admit any real relation to the
creature ([276]Q[28], A[1],3); while there is no reason against our
admitting in God, many logical relations. But in the Father there must
be a real relation to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. Hence,
corresponding to the two relations of the Son and of the Holy Ghost,
whereby they are related to the Father, we must understand two
relations in the Father, whereby He is related to the Son and to the
Holy Ghost. Hence, since there is only one Person of the Father, it is
necessary that the relations should be separately signified in the
abstract; and these are what we mean by properties and notions.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the notions are not mentioned in Holy
Scripture, yet the persons are mentioned, comprising the idea of
notions, as the abstract is contained in the concrete.

Reply to Objection 2: In God the notions have their significance not
after the manner of realities, but by way of certain ideas whereby the
persons are known; although in God these notions or relations are real,
as stated above ([277]Q[28], A[1]). Therefore whatever has order to any
essential or personal act, cannot be applied to the notions; forasmuch
as this is against their mode of signification. Hence we cannot say
that paternity begets, or creates, or is wise, or is intelligent. The
essentials, however, which are not ordered to any act, but simply
remove created conditions from God, can be predicated of the notions;
for we can say that paternity is eternal, or immense, or such like. So
also on account of the real identity, substantive terms, whether
personal or essential, can be predicated of the notions; for we can say
that paternity is God, and that paternity is the Father.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the persons are simple, still without
prejudice to their simplicity, the proper ideas of the persons can be
abstractedly signified, as above explained.
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Whether there are five notions?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not five notions. For the
notions proper to the persons are the relations whereby they are
distinguished from each other. But the relations in God are only four
([278]Q[28], A[4]). Therefore the notions are only four in number.

Objection 2: Further, as there is only one essence in God, He is called
one God, and because in Him there are three persons, He is called the
Trine God. Therefore, if in God there are five notions, He may be
called quinary; which cannot be allowed.

Objection 3: Further, if there are five notions for the three persons
in God, there must be in some one person two or more notions, as in the
person of the Father there is innascibility and paternity, and common
spiration. Either these three notions really differ, or not. If they
really differ, it follows that the person of the Father is composed of
several things. But if they differ only logically, it follows that one
of them can be predicated of another, so that we can say that as the
divine goodness is the same as the divine wisdom by reason of the
common reality, so common spiration is paternity; which is not to be
admitted. Therefore there are not five notions.

Objection 4: On the contrary, It seems that there are more; because as
the Father is from no one, and therefrom is derived the notion of
innascibility; so from the Holy Ghost no other person proceeds. And in
this respect there ought to be a sixth notion.

Objection 5: Further, as the Father and the Son are the common origin
of the Holy Ghost, so it is common to the Son and the Holy Ghost to
proceed from the Father. Therefore, as one notion is common to the
Father and the Son, so there ought to be one notion common to the Son
and to the Holy Ghost.

I answer that, A notion is the proper idea whereby we know a divine
Person. Now the divine persons are multiplied by reason of their
origin: and origin includes the idea of someone from whom another
comes, and of someone that comes from another, and by these two modes a
person can be known. Therefore the Person of the Father cannot be known
by the fact that He is from another; but by the fact that He is from no
one; and thus the notion that belongs to Him is called "innascibility. "
As the source of another, He can be known in two ways, because as the
Son is from Him, the Father is known by the notion of "paternity"; and
as the Holy Ghost is from Him, He is known by the notion of "common
spiration. " The Son can be known as begotten by another, and thus He is
known by "filiation"; and also by another person proceeding from Him,
the Holy Ghost, and thus He is known in the same way as the Father is
known, by "common spiration. " The Holy Ghost can be known by the fact
that He is from another, or from others; thus He is known by
"procession"; but not by the fact that another is from Him, as no
divine person proceeds from Him.

Therefore, there are Five notions in God: "innascibility," "paternity,"
"filiation," "common spiration," and "procession. " Of these only four
are relations, for "innascibility" is not a relation, except by
reduction, as will appear later ([279]Q[33], A[4], ad 3). Four only are
properties. For "common spiration" is not a property; because it
belongs to two persons. Three are personal notions---i. e. constituting
persons, "paternity," "filiation," and "procession. " "Common spiration"
and "innascibility" are called notions of Persons, but not personal
notions, as we shall explain further on ([280]Q[40], A[1], ad 1).

Reply to Objection 1: Besides the four relations, another notion must
be admitted, as above explained.

Reply to Objection 2: The divine essence is signified as a reality; and
likewise the persons are signified as realities; whereas the notions
are signified as ideas notifying the persons. Therefore, although God
is one by unity of essence, and trine by trinity of persons,
nevertheless He is not quinary by the five notions.

Reply to Objection 3: Since the real plurality in God is founded only
on relative opposition, the several properties of one Person, as they
are not relatively opposed to each other, do not really differ. Nor
again are they predicated of each other, because they are different
ideas of the persons; as we do not say that the attribute of power is
the attribute of knowledge, although we do say that knowledge is power.

Reply to Objection 4: Since Person implies dignity, as stated above
([281]Q[19], A[3] ) we cannot derive a notion of the Holy Spirit from
the fact that no person is from Him. For this does not belong to His
dignity, as it belongs to the authority of the Father that He is from
no one.

Reply to Objection 5: The Son and the Holy Ghost do not agree in one
special mode of existence derived from the Father; as the Father and
the Son agree in one special mode of producing the Holy Ghost. But the
principle on which a notion is based must be something special; thus no
parity of reasoning exists.
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Whether it is lawful to have various contrary opinions of notions?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to have various
contrary opinions of the notions. For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 3):
"No error is more dangerous than any as regards the Trinity": to which
mystery the notions assuredly belong. But contrary opinions must be in
some way erroneous. Therefore it is not right to have contrary opinions
of the notions.

Objection 2: Further, the persons are known by the notions. But no
contrary opinion concerning the persons is to be tolerated. Therefore
neither can there be about the notions.

On the contrary, The notions are not articles of faith. Therefore
different opinions of the notions are permissible.

I answer that, Anything is of faith in two ways; directly, where any
truth comes to us principally as divinely taught, as the trinity and
unity of God, the Incarnation of the Son, and the like; and concerning
these truths a false opinion of itself involves heresy, especially if
it be held obstinately. A thing is of faith, indirectly, if the denial
of it involves as a consequence something against faith; as for
instance if anyone said that Samuel was not the son of Elcana, for it
follows that the divine Scripture would be false. Concerning such
things anyone may have a false opinion without danger of heresy, before
the matter has been considered or settled as involving consequences
against faith, and particularly if no obstinacy be shown; whereas when
it is manifest, and especially if the Church has decided that
consequences follow against faith, then the error cannot be free from
heresy. For this reason many things are now considered as heretical
which were formerly not so considered, as their consequences are now
more manifest.

So we must decide that anyone may entertain contrary opinions about the
notions, if he does not mean to uphold anything at variance with faith.
If, however, anyone should entertain a false opinion of the notions,
knowing or thinking that consequences against the faith would follow,
he would lapse into heresy.

By what has been said all the objections may be solved.
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OF THE PERSON OF THE FATHER (FOUR ARTICLES)

We now consider the persons singly; and first, the Person of the
Father, concerning Whom there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the Father is the Principle?

(2) Whether the person of the Father is properly signified by this name
"Father"?

(3) Whether "Father" in God is said personally before it is said
essentially?

(4) Whether it belongs to the Father alone to be unbegotten?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether it belongs to the Father to be the principle?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Father cannot be called the
principle of the Son, or of the Holy Ghost. For principle and cause are
the same, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv). But we do not say
that the Father is the cause of the Son. Therefore we must not say that
He is the principle of the Son.

Objection 2: Further, a principle is so called in relation to the thing
principled. So if the Father is the principle of the Son, it follows
that the Son is a person principled, and is therefore created; which
appears false.

Objection 3: Further, the word principle is taken from priority. But in
God there is no "before" and "after," as Athanasius says. Therefore in
speaking of God we ought not to used the term principle.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20), "The Father is the
Principle of the whole Deity. "

I answer that, The word "principle" signifies only that whence another
proceeds: since anything whence something proceeds in any way we call a
principle; and conversely. As the Father then is the one whence another
proceeds, it follows that the Father is a principle.

Reply to Objection 1: The Greeks use the words "cause" and "principle"
indifferently, when speaking of God; whereas the Latin Doctors do not
use the word "cause," but only "principle. " The reason is because
"principle" is a wider term than "cause"; as "cause" is more common
than "element. " For the first term of a thing, as also the first part,
is called the principle, but not the cause. Now the wider a term is,
the more suitable it is to use as regards God ([282]Q[13], A[11]),
because the more special terms are, the more they determine the mode
adapted to the creature. Hence this term "cause" seems to mean
diversity of substance, and dependence of one from another; which is
not implied in the word "principle. " For in all kinds of causes there
is always to be found between the cause and the effect a distance of
perfection or of power: whereas we use the term "principle" even in
things which have no such difference, but have only a certain order to
each other; as when we say that a point is the principle of a line; or
also when we say that the first part of a line is the principle of a
line.

Reply to Objection 2: It is the custom with the Greeks to say that the
Son and the Holy Ghost are principled. This is not, however, the custom
with our Doctors; because, although we attribute to the Father
something of authority by reason of His being the principle, still we
do not attribute any kind of subjection or inferiority to the Son, or
to the Holy Ghost, to avoid any occasion of error. In this way, Hilary
says (De Trin. ix): "By authority of the Giver, the Father is the
greater; nevertheless the Son is not less to Whom oneness of nature is
give. "

Reply to Objection 3: Although this word principle, as regards its
derivation, seems to be taken from priority, still it does not signify
priority, but origin. For what a term signifies, and the reason why it
was imposed, are not the same thing, as stated above ([283]Q[13],
A[8]).
__________________________________________________________________

Whether this name "Father" is properly the name of a divine person?

Objection 1: It would seem that this name "Father" is not properly the
name of a divine person. For the name "Father" signifies relation.
Moreover "person" is an individual substance. Therefore this name
"Father" is not properly a name signifying a Person.

Objection 2: Further, a begetter is more common than father; for every
father begets; but it is not so conversely. But a more common term is
more properly applied to God, as stated above ([284]Q[13], A[11]).
Therefore the more proper name of the divine person is begetter and
genitor than Father.

Objection 3: Further, a metaphorical term cannot be the proper name of
anyone.