No More Learning

Acco, the chief
of the revolt, was condemned to death, and executed according to the old
Roman custom. Some others, fearing the same fate, took flight. They were
forbidden fire and water (that is, they were condemned to exile). Cæsar
sent two legions to winter quarters on the frontier of the Treviri, two
among the Lingones, and the six others among the Senones, at Agedincum
(_Sens_). After providing for the provisionment of the army, he
proceeded into Italy. [459]




CHAPTER X.

(Year of Rome 702. )

(BOOK VII. OF THE “COMMENTARIES. ”)

REVOLT OF GAUL--CAPTURE OF VELLAUNODUNUM, GENABUM, AND
NOVIODUNUM--SIEGES OF AVARICUM AND GERGOVIA--CAMPAIGN OF LABIENUS
AGAINST THE PARISII--SIEGE OF ALESIA.


[Sidenote: Revolt of Gaul. ]

I. The Roman arms had in six years subjugated, one after another, the
principal states of Gaul. Belgium, Aquitaine, and the countries on the
sea-coast, had been the theatre of the most desperate struggles. The
inhabitants of the isle of Britain, like the Germans, had become prudent
by the defeats they had suffered. Cæsar had just taken a signal
vengeance upon the revolted Eburones, and thought that he might without
danger leave his army and proceed into Italy, to hold the assemblies.
During his abode in this part of his command, the murder of P. Clodius
took place (the 13th of the Calends of February, 30th of December, 701),
which caused a great agitation, and gave rise to the Senatus-consultus,
which ordered all the youths of Italy to take the military oath; Cæsar
took advantage of it to make levies also in the Province. The rumours of
what was taking place at Rome soon passed the Alps, to revive the
resentments and hopes of the Gauls; they believed that the domestic
troubles would detain Cæsar in Italy, and would give rise to a
favourable opportunity for a new insurrection.

The principal chiefs meet in secluded spots; mutually excite each other
by the recital of their grievances, and by the remembrance of the death
of Acco; promise great rewards to those who, at the peril of their
lives, will commence the war; but decide that, before all, the return of
Cæsar to his army must be rendered impossible, a project the execution
of which was so much the easier, since the legions would not dare to
leave their winter quarters in the absence of their general, and since
the general himself could not join them without a sufficient escort.

The Carnutes are the first to offer to take arms: as the necessity of
acting secretly did not allow them to exchange hostages, they exact as
security an oath of alliance. This oath is taken by all the ensigns in a
meeting in which the moment for the rising is fixed.

On the day appointed, the Carnutes, led by two resolute men, Cotuatus
and Conetodunus, rush to Genabum (_Gien_), plunder and slaughter the
Roman merchants, amongst others the knight C. Fusius Cita, charged by
Cæsar with the victualling department. These news reached every state in
Gaul with an extreme celerity, according to the custom of the Gauls of
communicating remarkable events by cries transmitted from neighbour to
neighbour across the country. [460] Thus what had happened at Genabum at
sunrise, was known by the Arverni before the end of the first watch
(towards eight o’clock at night), at a distance of 160 miles.

Vercingetorix, a young Arvernan who possessed great influence in his
country,[461] and whose father, Celtillus, for a time chief of all Gaul,
had been put to death by his countrymen for having aspired to the
royalty, calls his clients together, and excites their zeal. Expelled
from Gergovia by those who were unwilling to tempt fortune with him, he
raises the country, and, with the help of a numerous band, retakes the
town, and causes himself to be proclaimed king. Soon he seduces the
Senones, the Parisii, the Pictones, the Cadurci, the Turones, the
Aulerci, the Lemovices of Armorica, the Andes, and the other peoples who
dwell on the shores of the ocean. The commandment is given to him by
unanimous consent. He exacts hostages from those peoples, orders a
prompt levy of soldiers, fixes the number of men and arms which each
country is to furnish in a given time, and occupies himself especially
with the raising of the cavalry. Active, daring, severe, and inflexible
even to cruelty, he subjects to the most atrocious tortures those who
hesitate, and by these means of terror soon forms an army.

He sent a part of it to the Ruteni, under the command of Cadurcus
Lucterius, a man full of daring; and to draw the Bituriges into the
insurrection, he invaded their territory. By acting thus, he threatened
the Province, and protected his rear whilst he moved towards the north,
where the Roman occupation was concentrated. On his approach, the
Bituriges solicited the help of the Ædui, their allies. The last, by the
advice of Cæsar’s lieutenants, who had remained with the army, sent them
a body of cavalry and infantry to support them against Vercingetorix;
but, when they reached the Loire, which separated the territory of the
two peoples, these auxiliary troops halted for some days, and then
returned, without having dared to cross the river, pretending that they
had been betrayed by the Bituriges. Immediately after their departure,
the latter joined the Arverni. [462]


[Sidenote: Cæsar begins the Campaign. ]

II. Cæsar heard of these events in Italy, and, reassured on the troubles
in Rome, which had been appeased by the firmness of Pompey, he took his
departure from Transalpine Gaul. When he arrived on the other side of
the Alps (perhaps on the banks of the Rhone), he was struck with the
difficulties which lay in the way of his joining the army. If he sent
for the legions into the Roman province, they would be compelled, on
their way, to fight without him; if, on the other hand, he would go to
them, he was obliged to pass through populations to whom,
notwithstanding their apparent tranquillity, it would have been
imprudent to trust his person.

While Cæsar found so great difficulties before him, Lucterius,[463] who
had been sent by Vercingetorix to the Ruteni, brings them over to the
alliance with the Arverni, advances towards the Nitiobriges and the
Gabali, from whom he receives hostages, and, at the head of a numerous
army, threatens the Province in the direction of Narbonne. These events
made Cæsar resolve to proceed to that town. His arrival put an end to
people’s fears. He placed garrisons among the peoples who bordered on
the territory of the enemy, the Ruteni of the left bank of the Tarn
(_Ruteni provinciales_), the Volcæ Arecomici, the Tolosates, and near
Narbonne. At the same time, he ordered a part of the troops of the
province, and the re-enforcements which he had brought from Italy, to
unite on the territory of the Helvi, which bordered upon that of the
Arverni. [464] Intimidated by these dispositions, Lucterius did not
venture to engage himself in the midst of these garrisons, and retired.

This first danger averted, it was important for Cæsar to prevent
Vercingetorix from raising other peoples, who might perhaps be inclined
to follow the example of the Bituriges. By invading the country of the
Arverni, Cæsar might hope to draw the Gaulish chief into his own
country, and thus remove him from those where the legions were
wintering. He proceeded, therefore, to the country of the Helvi, where
he joined the troops who had just concentrated there. The mountains of
the Cévennes, which separated this people from the Arverni, were covered
with six feet of snow; the soldiers opened a passage by dint of labour.
Advancing by Aps and Saint-Cirgues, between the sources of the Loire and
the Allier (_see Plate 19_), Cæsar debouched on Le Puy and Brioude. The
Arverni, at this season, the most rigorous of the year, believed
themselves defended by the Cévennes, as by an insurmountable wall: he
fell upon them unexpectedly, and, in order to spread still greater
terror, he caused the cavalry to scour the country far around.

Quickly informed of this march, Vercingetorix, at the prayer of the
Arverni, who implored his succour, abandoned the country of the
Bituriges. Cæsar had foreseen this; so he only remains two days amongst
the Arverni, and, quitting them under the pretext of increasing his
forces, he leaves the command to young Brutus, whom he enjoins to throw
out his reconnoitring parties to as great a distance as possible, and
promises to return at the end of three days. Having by this diversion
drawn Vercingetorix southward, he proceeds in great haste to Vienne,
arrives there unexpectedly, takes the newly-raised cavalry which he had
sent thither, marches night and day, crosses the country of the Ædui,
and directs his march towards the Lingones, where two legions were in
winter quarters. By this extreme rapidity he seeks to prevent any evil
design on the part of the Ædui. Scarcely has he arrived amongst the
Lingones, when he sends orders to the other legions, two of which were
on the frontiers of the Treviri, and the six others in the country of
the Senones, to concentrate the whole army at Agedincum (_Sens_) before
his march is known to the Arverni. As soon as Vercingetorix was informed
of this movement, he returned with his army to the country of the
Bituriges, and thence started to lay siege to Gorgobina
(_Saint-Parize-le-Châtel_), an _oppidum_ of the Boii, who had settled,
after the defeat of the Helvetii, near the confluence of the Allier and
the Loire. [465]


[Sidenote: Taking of Vellaunodunum, Genabum, and Noviodunum. ]

III. Although Cæsar had succeeded in uniting his troops, and in placing
himself at their head, he found it still difficult to fix upon a
determined plan. If he opened the campaign too early, the army might run
short of provisions through the difficulty of transport. If, on the
other hand, during the rest of the winter,[466] his army, remaining
inactive, allowed Vercingetorix to take Gorgobina, a place tributary to
the Ædui, the example might discourage his allies and lead to the
defection of the whole of Gaul. Rather than undergo such an affront, he
resolved to brave all obstacles. He engaged the Ædui, therefore, to
furnish provisions, announced his speedy arrival to the Boii,
recommended them to remain faithful, and to offer an energetic
resistance; and then, leaving at Agedincum two legions and the baggage
of the whole army, he marched with the eight others towards the
territory of the Boii. On the second day[467] he arrived at
Vellaunodunum (_Triguères_), a town of the Senones, and prepared to lay
siege to it, in order to protect his rear and secure his supply of
provisions. (_See Plate 19. _) The countervallation was finished in two
days. On the third, the town offered to surrender: the capitulation was
only accepted on condition of delivering up the arms, the beasts of
burden, and 600 hostages. Cæsar left C. Trebonius, his lieutenant, to
see the convention executed, and marched in haste towards Genabum
(_Gien_), a town of the Carnutes. [468] He arrived there in two days,
and sufficiently early to surprise the inhabitants, who, thinking that
the siege of Vellaunodunum would last longer, had not yet assembled
sufficient troops for the defence of the place. The Roman army took its
position before the _oppidum_; but the approach of night made it
necessary to postpone the attack until the following morning. However,
as Genabum had a bridge on the Loire adjoining to the town, Cæsar kept
two legions under arms to watch it, in the fear that the besieged might
escape during the night. And, in fact, towards midnight they silently
issued from Genabum and began to pass the river. Cæsar, informed by his
scouts, set fire to the gates, introduced the legions he had kept in
reserve, and took possession of the place. The fugitives, who were
closely crowded together at the issues of the town, and at the entrance
of the bridge, which were too narrow to allow them to pass, fell nearly
all into the hands of the Romans. Genabum was plundered and burnt, and
the spoil abandoned to the soldiers. Then the army passed the Loire,
arrived on the territory of the Bituriges, and continued its march.

The town of Noviodunum (_Sancerre_), belonging to this latter people,
lay in Cæsar’s route; he undertook to lay siege to it. The inhabitants
were already hastening to make their submission, and a part of the
hostages had been delivered, when they saw in the distance the cavalry
of Vercingetorix, who, warned of the approach of the Romans, had raised
the siege of Gorgobina, and marched to meet them. At this sight, the
besieged, mustering courage again, seize their arms, shut their gates,
and man the wall. The Roman cavalry was immediately sent to meet the
enemy; staggered at the first shock, it was on the point of giving way;
but soon, supported by about 400 German cavalry, in Cæsar’s pay since
the commencement of the campaign, they entirely routed the Gauls. This
defeat having again spread terror in the town, the inhabitants delivered
up the instigators of the revolt, and surrendered. Cæsar marched thence,
through the fertile territory of the Biturges, towards Avaricum
(_Bourges_), the largest and strongest _oppidum_ of that people. The
taking of this town, he considered, would render him master of the whole
country. [469]


[Sidenote: Siege of Avaricum. ]

IV. Vercingetorix, after having experienced so many reverses
successively at Vellaunodunum, at Genabum, and at Noviodunum, convokes a
council, in which he explains the necessity of adopting a new system of
warfare. Above all, according to him, they must take advantage of the
season, and of the numerous Gaulish cavalry, to cut off the Romans from
provisions and forage, sacrifice private interest to the common welfare,
set fire to the habitations, burgs, and _oppida_ which they could not
defend, so as to spread desolation from the territory of the Boii as far
as the enemy could extend his incursions. If that be an extreme
sacrifice, it is nothing in comparison with death and slavery.

This advice having been unanimously approved, the Bituriges, in one
single day, set fire to more than twenty towns; the neighbouring
countries follow their example. The hope of a speedy victory made them
support this painful sight with resignation. They deliberated whether
Avaricum should not undergo the same fate; the Bituriges implored them
to spare one of the most beautiful towns in Gaul, the ornament and
bulwark of their country; “the defence of it will be easy,” they added,
“on account of its almost inaccessible position. ” Vercingetorix, at
first of a contrary opinion, ended by giving way to this general feeling
of compassion, entrusted the place to men capable of defending it, and,
following Cæsar by short marches, pitched his camp in a spot defended by
woods and marshes, sixteen miles from Avaricum[470] (two kilomètres to
the north of _Dun-le-Roy_, at the confluence of the Auron and the
Taisseau).

Avaricum was situated, as Bourges is at present, at the extremity of a
piece of ground surrounded, to the north and west, by several marshy
streams: the Yèvre, the Yévrette, and the Auron. (_See Plate 20. _) The
Gaulish town, adorned with public places, and enclosing 40,000 souls,
exceeded, no doubt, in extent the Gallo-Roman circuit. The aspect of the
locality is certainly no longer the same: the marshes have been dried,
and the courses of water reduced within regular limits; the ruins
accumulated so many centuries ago have raised the level of the ground on
many points. To the south of Bourges, at a distance of 700 mètres, the
ground forms a neck, which, in the time of Cæsar’s wars, was narrower
than at present; it inclined more towards the place, and presented, at
80 mètres from the walls, a sudden depression, resembling a vast fosse.
(_See the section along C D. _) The slopes, then, abrupt towards the
Yévrette and the Auron, defined more clearly the only and very narrow
avenue (_unum et perangustum aditum_) which gave access to the
town. [471]

Cæsar established his camp behind this tongue of land, to the south, and
at 700 mètres from Avaricum, between the Auron and the Yévrette. As the
nature of the locality prevented all countervallation, he took his
dispositions for a regular siege. The place was only open to attack
towards that part of the enclosure which faced the avenue, on a width of
from 300 to 400 Roman feet (about 100 mètres). In this place the summit
of the walls commanded by about 80 feet (twenty-four mètres) the ground
situated in advance. [472] Cæsar commanded a terrace to be commenced,
covered galleries to be pushed towards the _oppidum_, and two towers to
be constructed.

During the execution of these works, trusty messengers informed
Vercingetorix every moment of what was going on in Avaricum, and carried
back his orders. The besiegers were watched when they went to forage,
and, notwithstanding their precaution to choose every day different
hours and roads, they could not move any distance from the camp without
being attacked.

The Romans incessantly demanded provisions from the Ædui and the Boii;
but the first showed little haste to send them, and the latter, poor and
weak, had exhausted their resources; moreover, their country had just
been laid waste by fire. Although, during several days, the troops,
deprived of corn, lived only on cattle which had been brought from afar,
yet they uttered no complaint unworthy of the Roman name and of their
preceding victories. When, visiting the works, Cæsar addressed by turn
each of the legions, and offered to the soldiers to raise the siege if
they felt their privations too rigorous, they unanimously called upon
him to persevere: “they had learned,” they said, “after so many years
that they served under his command, never to suffer anything that was
humiliating, and to leave nothing unfinished. ” They renewed this protest
to the centurions and to the tribunes.

The towers already approached the walls, when prisoners informed Cæsar
that Vercingetorix, from want of forage, had quitted his camp, leaving
in it the mass of his army, and had advanced nearer to Avaricum with his
cavalry and light infantry, with the intention of laying an ambush on
the spot where he expected that the Romans would go to forage the
following day. [473] Upon this information, Cæsar, seeking to take
advantage of the absence of Vercingetorix, started silently in the
middle of the night, and came in the morning near the camp of the
enemies. As soon as they were acquainted with his march, they hid their
baggage and wagons in the forests, and drew up their troops on an open
height. Cæsar immediately ordered his soldiers to lay down their bundles
in one spot, and to keep their arms ready for combat.

The hill occupied by the Gauls rose with an easy slope above a marsh
which, surrounding it on nearly all sides, rendered it difficult of
access, although it was only fifty feet broad. They had broken the
bridges, and, full of confidence in their position, drawn up according
to tribes, and guarding all the fords and passages, they were ready to
fall upon the Romans, if the latter attempted to overcome this obstacle.
With the two armies thus in presence and so near to each other, one
would have believed them, by their attitude, animated with the same
courage, and offering the combat under equal conditions; but, when we
consider the defensive strength of the position of the Gauls, we are
soon convinced that the firmness of the latter was only one of
ostentation. The Romans, indignant at being thus braved, demanded the
order to fight; but Cæsar represented to them that the victory would
cost the lives of too many brave men, and that the more they were bent
upon daring everything for his glory, the more blamable would it be in
him to sacrifice them. These words calmed their impatience, and the same
day he led them back to the siege operations.

Vercingetorix, on his return to his army, was accused of treason, for
having placed his camp nearer to that of the Romans, taken away with him
all the cavalry, left his infantry without a head, and facilitated, by
his departure, the sudden and so well-calculated arrival of the enemy.
“All these incidents,” they said, “could not be the effect of chance;
evidently Vercingetorix preferred owing the empire of Gaul to Cæsar than
to his fellow-citizens. ” As the improvised chief of a popular movement,
Vercingetorix had to expect one of those fickle demonstrations of the
multitude, who are rendered fanatical by successes, and unjust by
reverses. But, strong in his patriotism and in his conduct, he justified
easily to his followers the dispositions he had taken. “The scarcity of
forage only has decided him, at their entreaties, to change the position
of his camp; he has chosen a new position, which is impregnable; he has
employed the cavalry, which is useless in a marshy place, to advantage.
He has transferred the command to nobody, for fear that a new chief, to
please bands without discipline, incapable of supporting the fatigues of
war, might let himself be persuaded to give battle. Whether it were
chance or treason which had brought the Romans before them, they ought
to thank Fortune for it, since they had retired with disgrace. He has no
desire to obtain the supreme authority from Cæsar at the price of a
guilty defection: victory will soon give it him. It is now no longer
doubtful. As to himself, he is ready to lay down an authority which
would be only a vain honour, and not a means of delivery;” and, to prove
the sincerity of his hopes, he brought forward slaves who had been made
prisoners, whom he represents as legionaries, and who, at his
instigation, declare that in three days the Romans will be obliged by
want of provisions to raise the siege. His discourse is received by the
acclamations of the army, and all signify their applause by the clang of
their arms, according to the Gaulish manner. It is agreed to send 10,000
men to Avaricum, taken among the different contingents, so that the
Bituriges alone should not have the glory of saving a town upon which
depended in a great measure the fate of the war.

The Gauls, endowed with the genius of imitation, struggled by all means
possible against the wonderful perseverance of the Roman soldiers. They
turned away the rams with pointed heads (_falces_)[474] by means of
nooses, and, when they had once caught hold of them, they dragged them
up by means of machines. [475] Accustomed to work in the iron mines, and
to the construction of subterranean galleries, they skilfully
countermined the terrace, and also provided their walls with towers of
several stories, covered with leather. Day and night they made sallies,
and set fire to the works of the besiegers. As the daily increase of the
terrace heightened the level of the towers, the besieged raised theirs
to the same height by means of scaffoldings; they stopped the progress
of the subterranean galleries, prevented them from being advanced to the
walls by trying to break them open with pointed stakes hardened in the
fire (_apertos cuniculos prœusta ac prœacuta materia . . .
morabantur_),[476] and by throwing molten pitch and blocks of stone.

The Gauls constructed their walls in this manner: beams were placed
horizontally on the ground, in a direction perpendicular to the line of
the enclosure,[477] at intervals of two feet from each other; they were
bound together on the side of the town; by cross-beams, usually of forty
feet in length, firmly fixed in the ground, and the whole covered with a
great quantity of earth, except on the exterior side, where the
intervals were furnished with large blocks of rock, and formed a facing.
After this first layer had been well fixed and rendered compact, they
raised upon it a second, absolutely similar, taking care that the beams
were not exactly above each other, but corresponded with the intervals
filled in with stones, in which they were, as it were, enchased. The
work was thus continued until the wall had attained the required height.
These successive layers, in which the beams and stones alternated
regularly, offered, by their very variety, an agreeable appearance to
the eye. This construction had great advantages for the defence of
places: the stone preserved it from fire, and the wood from the ram;
held together by the cross-beams, the beams could be neither torn down
nor driven in. (_See Plate 20. _)

Notwithstanding the obstinacy of the defence, and the cold and continual
rains, the Roman soldiers surmounted all obstacles, and raised in
twenty-five days a terrace 330 feet wide by 80 feet high. It already
nearly touched the town wall, when, towards the third watch (midnight),
clouds of smoke were seen issuing from it. It was the moment when Cæsar,
according to his custom, was inspecting the works, and encouraging the
soldiers at their labour; the Gauls had set the terrace on fire from the
gallery of a mine. At the same instant cries arose from the whole extent
of the rampart, and the besieged, rushing out by two gates, made a sally
on the two sides where the towers were; from the top of the walls some
threw dry wood and torches on the terrace, others pitch and various
inflammable materials; nobody knew whither to run nor where to give
help. As two legions, however, generally passed the night under arms in
front of the camp, whilst the others relieved each other alternately for
the work, they were soon able to face the enemy; meanwhile some drew
back the towers, and others cut the terrace to intercept the fire; the
whole army, in fact, hurried to put out the latter.

When day broke, they were still fighting on every point; the besieged
had the more hope of conquering, as the penthouses which protected the
approaches to the towers were burnt (_deustos pluteos turrium_),[478]
and as then the Romans, compelled to march without cover, could with
difficulty arrive at the burning works. Persuaded that the salvation of
Gaul depended on this critical moment, they replaced incessantly the
troops which were weary. Then happened a fact worthy of notice: before
the gate of the _oppidum_ there was a Gaul who threw balls of grease and
pitch into the fire opposite a Roman tower; a dart shot from a
_scorpion_[479] struck him in the right side and killed him. The next
man immediately takes his place, and perishes in the same manner; a
third succeeds him, then a fourth, and the post is only abandoned after
the extinction of the fire and the retreat of the assailants.

After so many fruitless efforts, the Gauls resolved next day to obey the
order of Vercingetorix, and evacuate the place. His camp not being far
off, they hoped, by favour of the night, to escape without great loss,
reckoning on a continuous marsh to protect their flight. But the women,
in despair, struggle to retain them, and, seeing that their
supplications had no effect, to such an extent does fear extinguish
pity, they give warning to the Romans by their cries, and thus compel
the Gauls to renounce their intended flight.

The day following Cæsar caused a tower to be advanced, and the works to
be prosecuted with vigour; an abundant rain, and the negligence of the
enemy in guarding the wall, engaged him to attempt an assault. He
thereupon ordered the work to be slackened without entirely stopping it,
in order not to awaken suspicions, assembled his legions under arms,
sheltered behind the covered galleries (_vineas_), and informed them
that they were going to reap the fruit of so many fatigues. He promised
rewards to those who should be first to scale the wall of the town, and
gave the signal. The Romans at once rushed forward from every side, and
reached the top of the ramparts.

The enemies, terrified by this unexpected attack, and thrown down from
the tops of the walls and towers, sought refuge in the public places,
and formed in wedges, so as to offer a resistance on all sides; but when
they saw that the Romans, instead of descending into the town, went
round it on the ramparts, they were afraid of being shut in, and threw
down their arms and fled towards the other extremity of the _oppidum_
(where are at present the faubourgs Taillegrain and Saint-Privé). (_See
Plate 20. _) Most of them were killed near the gates, the narrow passage
of which they blocked up; the others by the cavalry outside the town. No
one among the Roman soldiers thought of plunder. Irritated by the
remembrance of the massacre of Genabum, and by the fatigues of the
siege, they spared neither old men, women, nor children. Of about 40,000
combatants, scarcely 800 fugitives were able to join Vercingetorix. He,
fearing that their presence, if they came in a body, might excite a
mutiny, had, in the middle of the night, sent trusty men and the
principal chiefs a long way out, to distribute them in fractions among
the camps belonging to the different tribes.

The next day Vercingetorix sought, in a general assembly, to revive the
courage of his countrymen, by ascribing the success of the Romans to
their superiority in the art of sieges, which was unknown to the Gauls.
He told them that this reverse ought not to dishearten them; that his
advice, they well knew, had never been to defend Avaricum; that a signal
revenge would soon console them; that, through his care, the countries
separated from the common cause would enter into his alliance, animate
Gaul with the one thought, and cement a union capable of resisting the
whole world. Then this fearless defender of the national independence
shows his genius in taking advantage even of a misfortune to subject his
ill-disciplined troops to the rough labours of war, and succeeds in
convincing them of the necessity of retrenching their camp in the manner
of the Romans, so as to protect it from surprise.

The constancy of Vercingetorix, after so great a reverse, and the
foresight which he had shown in recommending, from the beginning of the
war, to burn, and afterwards to abandon Avaricum, increased his
influence. So the Gauls, for the first time, fortified their camp, and
their courage was so much confirmed, that they were ready to undergo all
trials.

Vercingetorix, true to his engagements, exerted himself to the utmost to
gain over to his cause the other states of Gaul, and to seduce the
chiefs by presents and promises; and, for this purpose, he sent to them
zealous and intelligent agents. He caused the men who had fled from
Avaricum to be clothed and armed anew, and, in order to repair his
losses, he required from the divers states a contingent at a stated
period, and archers, who were very numerous in Gaul. At the same time
Teutomatus, son of Ollovico, King of the Nitiobriges, whose father had
received from the Senate the title of friend, came to join him with a
numerous corps of cavalry, raised in his own country and in Aquitaine.
Cæsar remained some time in Avaricum, where he found great store of
provisions, and where the army recovered from its fatigues. [480]


[Sidenote: Arrival of Cæsar at Decetia, and March towards Auvergne. ]

V. The winter was drawing to a close, and the season was propitious for
the continuation of military operations. As Cæsar prepared to march
against the enemy, either in order to draw him from the woods and
marshes, or to shut him up in them, the _principes_ of the Ædui came to
request him to put an end to dissensions among them which threatened to
degenerate into civil war. “The situation was most critical. In fact,
according to ancient customs, the supreme authority was only granted to
a single magistrate, named for a year. At that moment, however, there
were two, each claiming to have been legally elected. The first was
Convictolitavis, a young man of illustrious birth; the second, Cotus,
sprung from a very ancient family, powerful also by his personal
influence, his alliances, and whose brother, Valetiacus, had the year
before filled the same office. The country was in arms, the Senate
divided like the people, each of the pretenders at the head of his
clients. The authority of Cæsar alone could prevent civil war. ”

The Roman general considered it essential to prevent troubles from
arising in an important state, closely attached to the Republic, and
where the weakest party would not fail to call in the aid of
Vercingetorix. Consequently, notwithstanding the inconvenience of
suspending the military operations and moving from the enemy, he
resolved to repair to the Ædui, whose first magistrate, according to the
laws, could not leave the territory. Having thus aimed at proving to
them the respect which he entertained for their institutions, he arrived
at Decetia (_Decize, in the Nivernais_), where he called before him the
Senate and the two pretenders. [481] Nearly the whole nation came
thither. Cæsar, having acquired the conviction that the nomination of
Cotus was the result of an intrigue of the minority, obliged him to
resign, and maintained Convictolitavis, who had been chosen by the
priests, according to the legal forms and customs of the country.

After this decision, he engaged the Ædui to forget their quarrels, and
to devote themselves entirely to the war; Gaul once subjected, he would
recompense them for their sacrifices. He exacted from them all their
cavalry and 10,000 infantry, intending to distribute them in such a
manner as to ensure the regularity of the victualling department. He
next divided his army into two bodies.
Labienus, detached with two
legions and part of the cavalry, had instructions to take at Sens the
two other legions which Cæsar had left there, and to repair, at the head
of those four legions, to the country of the Parisii, who had been drawn
by Vercingetorix into the revolt.

On his part, Cæsar resolved, with the six other legions and the rest of
the cavalry, to invade the country of the Arverni themselves, the focus
of the insurrection. He started from Decetia, and directed his march
upon Gergovia, the principal _oppidum_ of that people.

After the capture of Avaricum, Vercingetorix, suspecting Cæsar’s
ulterior designs, had moved towards the Allier, which the Romans were
obliged to pass in order to reach Gergovia; and, on the news of their
march, he had caused all the bridges to be destroyed.

Cæsar, having arrived on the banks of the Allier, towards Moulins (_see
Plate 19_), followed its downward course, on the right bank.
Vercingetorix, on his part, marched along the opposite bank. The two
armies were within sight of each other, the camps nearly opposite, and
the Gaulish scouts, who watched the left bank, prevented the Romans from
establishing a bridge. The position of the latter was difficult, for the
Allier, which is fordable in the autumn only, might delay their passage
a long time. [482] In order to surmount this obstacle, Cæsar had recourse
to a stratagem: he fixed his camp in a place covered with wood, opposite
the remains of one of the bridges which Vercingetorix had caused to be
destroyed (probably at Varennes). There he remained hidden the following
day with two legions, and made the rest of the troops, as well as the
baggage, proceed in the usual order. But, that they might present to the
enemy the appearance of six legions, he had divided into six corps the
forty cohorts or four legions which he sent forward. [483] They received
the order to march as long as possible, in order to attract
Vercingetorix, and, at the time Cæsar presumed that they had arrived at
their camp, he caused the bridge to be rebuilt on the old piles, the
lower part of which remained untouched. The work being soon completed,
the legions which remained with him passed the river, and, after having
chosen a favourable position, he recalled the mass of his army, which
rejoined him during the night. [484] When Vercingetorix was informed of
this manœuvre, fearing lest he should be compelled to fight against
his will, he took the start and marched in great haste to occupy the
_oppidum_ of the Arverni.

From the place he occupied, which we believe to have been Varennes,[485]
Cæsar reached Gergovia in five days; on the very day of his arrival,
after a slight skirmish of cavalry, he reconnoitred the position of the
town. As it was built on a very high mountain of difficult access, he
considered it impossible to take it by assault; he therefore resolved to
blockade it, and not to begin investing it until he had assured his
provisions. (_See Plate 21. _)


[Sidenote: Blockade of Gergovia. ]

VI. The _oppidum_ of the Arverni was situated at a distance of six
kilomètres to the south of Clermont-Ferrand, on the mountain which has
preserved the name of Gergovia. Its summit, elevated about 740 mètres
above the level of the sea, and 380 above the plain, forms a plateau of
1,500 mètres in length by more than 500 mètres in breadth. The northern
and eastern slopes present such abrupt declivities that they defy the
escalade. The southern slope presents a very different character: it may
be compared to an immense staircase, the steps of which would be vast
terraces with very little inclination, and a breadth which in some
places extends to as much as 150 mètres.

On the western side, the mountain of Gergovia is attached by a narrow
defile of 120 mètres in width, called the _Goules_ (_see Plate 21, C_),
to the heights of Risolles, an irregular mass, the plateau of which is
at a mean depth of about 30 mètres beneath that of Gergovia. To the west
are the detached mountains of Montrognon and Le Puy-Giroux. This latter
is separated from that of Risolles by a rather deep gorge, in which the
village of Opme is built. Opposite the southern slope of Gergovia, at
the very foot of the mountain, rises a very steep hill, called the Roche
Blanche. Its culminating point is at about 108 mètres below the plateau.
Two brooks, the Auzon and the Artières,[486] tributaries of the Allier,
flow, one to the south, the other to the north of Gergovia. Lastly, a
low tract of ground, situated to the east, indicates the site of the
ancient marsh of Sarlièves, which has been dry since the seventeenth
century.

Cæsar established his camp near the Auzon, on the undulations of the
ground which extend to the north-west of the village of Orcet, and as
far as the ancient marsh of Sarlièves. These undulations form a natural
_glacis_ towards the plain, above which they rise about thirty mètres;
on the side of the stream of the Auzon they terminate in almost
imperceptible slopes. The camp occupied a part of the table-land and of
the northern slope. [487] (_See Plate 21. _)

Vercingetorix had arranged the contingents of each country separately,
at small intervals, on the southern slopes of the mountain of Gergovia
and the mountain mass of Risolles which look towards the Auzun; they
covered all the heights attached to the principal mountain, and
presented, in the space which the eye could embrace, a formidable
aspect. [488] His principal camps were situated between the outer wall of
the _oppidum_ and a wall of large stones, six feet high, which ran along
the bend of the hill.

Every day, at sunrise, the chiefs who composed the council of
Vercingetorix repaired to him in order to make their reports or to
receive his orders. Every day, also, he tried in slight engagements[489]
the courage of his cavalry mixed with archers. The Gauls occupied, as an
advanced post, but by a weak garrison, La Roche-Blanche, which, scarped
on three sides, presented an extremely strong position; Cæsar judged
that, by taking possession of this hill, he would deprive the Gauls
almost entirely of forage and water, for they could no longer descend to
the Auzon, the only considerable stream in the neighbourhood. He started
from the camp in the silence of the night, drove away this post before
it could be succoured from the town, took the position, and placed two
legions upon it. The Roche-Blanche became his smaller camp;[490] it was
joined to the larger one by a double ditch of twelve feet, which
allowed the troops to communicate in safety, even singly, without fear
of being surprised by the enemy. (_See Plate 22. _)

During this time, the Æduan Convictolitavis, who, as we have seen, owed
the supreme magistracy to Cæsar, seduced by the money of the Arverni,
resolved to abandon the party of the Romans, and entered into
communication with several young men, at whose head was Litavicus and
his brothers, descended from an illustrious family. He shares with them
the price of his treason; exhorts them to remember that, born free, they
are made to command in their country; proves to them that the
lukewarmness of the Ædui alone delayed the general insurrection; and
that they ought to value above everything the independence of their
country. Seduced by such discourses and by the bait of gold, those young
men occupy themselves only with the means of executing their project;
yet, mistrusting the inclination of the people to be drawn into war,
they decide that Litavicus shall take the command of the 10,000 men who
were to join the Roman army, and induce them to revolt on the road,
whilst his brothers go before them to Cæsar.

Litavicus began his march. At thirty miles from Gergovia (probably at
Serbannes), he halts his troops, assembles them, and, spreading the
report that Cæsar has caused the Æduan nobility and knights who were in
his pay to be massacred, among others Eporedorix and Viridomarus, he
easily persuades them to go and join the Arverni at Gergovia, instead of
proceeding to the Roman camp. But, before taking this determination, he
gives up to plunder the convoy of provisions which marched under his
guard, causes the Romans who conducted it to be put to death with
tortures, and then sends messengers to raise the whole country of the
Ædui, by means of the same imposture. Eporedorix and Viridomarus, whose
death he had falsely announced, were with Cæsar, who, by special favour,
had raised Viridomarus from a very low to a high dignity. The former,
informed of the design of Litavicus, came in the middle of the night to
acquaint the proconsul with it, imploring him not to allow the folly of
a few young men to detach his country from the Roman alliance. It would
be too late when so many thousands of men had embraced the contrary
party.

Cæsar, more affected by this news as he had always favoured the Ædui,
takes immediately four legions, without baggage, and all the cavalry; he
waits not even to contract the compass of the two camps, for everything
depends upon celerity. His lieutenant, C. Fabius, is left to guard them,
with two legions. He orders the brothers of Litavicus to be placed under
arrest, and learns that they have just passed over to the enemy. His
soldiers, encouraged to support the fatigues of the march, follow him
with ardour, and at about twenty-five miles from Gergovia (near Randan,
on the road which Litavicus had to follow to join Vercingetorix) they
meet the Ædui. The cavalry, sent in advance, have orders to stop them
without using their arms. Eporedorix and Viridomarus, who had been
reported as dead, step forth from the ranks, speak to their
fellow-citizens, and are recognised. As soon as the deception practised
by Litavicus is discovered, the Ædui throw down their arms, ask for
pardon, and obtain it. Litavicus flies to Gergovia, with his clients,
who, in Gaul, never abandoned their patrons, not even in their worst
fortunes.

Cæsar sent to the Ædui to represent to them how generously he had acted
towards men whom the laws of war authorised him to put to death; and,
after having given his army three hours’ rest during the night, he
returned to his quarters before Gergovia. Half-way, horsemen came to
inform him of the perilous position of Fabius. The camps had been
attacked by troops which were unceasingly renewed. The Romans were
exhausted by unceasing labour, for the great extent of the enclosure
obliged them to remain continually on the _vallum_. The arrows and
missiles of all sorts thrown by the barbarians had wounded a great
number; but, on the other hand, the machines had been of great help in
supporting the defence. After the retreat of the enemies, Fabius,
expecting to be again attacked next day, had hastened to block up the
gates of the great camp, with the exception of two, and to add a
palisade to the _vallum_. On receiving this information, Cæsar hurried
his march, and, seconded by the ardour of his soldiers, arrived at the
camp before sunrise (having thus performed fifty miles, or seventy-four
kilomètres, in twenty-four hours). [491]

While these events were taking place at Gergovia, the Ædui, also
deceived by the news which Litavicus had spread, fall upon the Roman
citizens, plunder their goods, kill some, and drag others to prison. It
is Convictolitavis, also, who prompts these violences. The military
tribune M. Aristius, who was on his way to join his legion, as well as
the foreign merchants who resided in the country, are compelled to leave
Cabillonum (_Châlon-sur-Sâone_). An escort is promised to protect them;
but they have hardly started when they are attacked and stripped. They
defend themselves, and their resistance, which lasts during twenty-four
hours, calls a greater multitude to arms. However, as soon as the Ædui
hear of the new submission of their troops, they exert themselves to the
utmost to obtain their pardon; they have recourse to Aristius, throw the
blame of the outbreak upon a few, order the plundered goods to be
collected, and confiscate those of Litavicus and his brothers. They send
deputies to Cæsar to excuse themselves. Their object, in acting thus,
was to obtain the free disposal of their troops, for the consciousness
of their treason and the fear of punishment made them, at the same time,
conspire in secret with the neighbouring states.

Although informed of these secret plots, Cæsar received their deputies
with kindness, declaring that he did not hold the nation responsible for
the fault of some individuals, and that his feelings towards the Ædui
were not changed. Nevertheless, as he foresaw a general insurrection of
Gaul, which would surround him on all sides, he entertained serious
thoughts of abandoning Gergovia, and again effecting the concentration
of his whole army; but it was of importance that his retreat, caused by
the sole fear of a general defection, should not appear to be a flight.

In the midst of these cares, the besieged offered him a favourable
chance, of which he sought to take advantage. As he was visiting the
little camp to inspect the works, he perceived that a hill (no doubt the
hill marked _A_, which forms part of the mountain mass of Rissoles, _see
Plate 21_), which was almost hidden from sight by the masses of enemies
on the previous days, was clear of troops. Astonished at this change, he
inquired the cause of the deserters, who came every day in crowds to
surrender to him. All agreed in saying, as his scouts had already
reported to him, that the mountain ridge to which this hill belonged
(the top of the heights of Risolles) was almost flat, was connected with
the town, and gave access to it by a narrow and wooded defile. (_See
Plates 21 and 22. _) This point caused particular anxiety to the enemy;
for if the Romans, already masters of La Roche-Blanche, gained
possession of the mountain mass of Risolles, the Gauls would be almost
entirely invested, and could neither escape nor go to forage. This was
the reason why Vercingetorix had decided upon fortifying these heights,
and had called thither all his troops. [492]

In accordance with this information, Cæsar sends in this direction,
towards the middle of the night, several detachments of cavalry, with
orders to scour with great noise the country in every direction at the
foot of the heights of Risolles. At break of day, he sends out of the
great camp many horses and mules without pack-saddles, and causes the
muleteers to mount them, who put on helmets, so as to assume the
appearance of mounted troopers. He enjoins them to wind round the hills,
and a few cavalry who are joined with them have orders to spread wide
over the country, so as to increase the illusion. Finally, they are all,
by a long circuit, to move towards the spots which have just been
mentioned. These movements were perceived from the town, which
overlooked the camp, but at too great a distance to distinguish objects
accurately. Cæsar sends towards the same mountain mass one legion, who,
after having marched for a short distance, halt in a hollow, and pretend
to hide in the woods (towards Chanonat), so as to feign a surprise. The
suspicions of the Gauls increase; they take all their forces to the spot
threatened. Cæsar, seeing the enemy’s camp deserted, orders the military
ensigns (plumes, shields, &c. ) to be covered, the standards to be
lowered, and the troops to pass in small detachments from the great to
the little camp, behind the epaulment of the double fosse of
communication, so that they cannot be perceived from the _oppidum_. [493]
He communicates his intentions to the lieutenants placed at the heads of
the legions, recommends them to take care to prevent the soldiers from
allowing themselves to be carried away by the ardour of the combat or
the hope of plunder, and draws their attention to the difficulties of
the ground. “Celerity alone,” he says, “can enable us to overcome them;
in fact, it is to be an attack by surprise, and not a fight. ” Having
communicated these directions, he gives the signal, and, at the same
time, sends the Ædui out of the great camp, with orders to climb the
eastern slopes of the mountain of Gergovia, to effect a diversion to the
right. (_See Plate 21. _)

The distance from the wall of the _oppidum_ to the foot of the mountain,
where the ground is almost flat, was 1,200 paces (1,780 mètres) in the
most direct line; but the way was longer, on account of the circuits it
was necessary to make to break the steepness. [494] Towards the middle of
the southern slope, in the direction of its length, the Gauls, taking
advantage of the character of the ground, had, as we have said, built a
wall of large stones, six feet high, a serious obstacle in case of
attack. The lower part of the slopes had remained free; but the upper
part, up to the wall of the _oppidum_, was occupied with camps placed
very near together. When the signal is given, the Romans reach rapidly
the wall, scale it, and take three camps with such promptitude, that
Teutomatus, king of the Nitiobriges, surprised in his tent where he was
taking his repose in the middle of the day, fled half naked; his horse
was wounded, and he escaped with difficulty from the hands of the
assailants.

Cæsar, satisfied with this success, ordered the retreat to be sounded,
and made the tenth legion, which accompanied him, halt (from an
examination of the ground, the spot where Cæsar stood is the knoll which
rises to the west of the village of Merdogne). (_See Plate 21_, first
position of the tenth legion. ) But the soldiers of the other legions,
separated from him by a rather wide ravine, did not hear the trumpet.
Although the tribunes and the lieutenants did all they could to restrain
them, excited by the hope of an easy victory, and by the recollection of
their past successes, they thought nothing was insurmountable to their
courage, and persisted in the pursuit of the enemy up to the walls and
gates of the _oppidum_.

Then an immense cry arises in the town. The inhabitants of the most
remote quarters believe that it is invaded, and rush out of the walls.
The matrons throw from the top of the walls their precious objects to
the Romans, and, with breasts bare and hands extended in supplication,
implore them not to massacre the women and children, as at Avaricum.
Several even, letting themselves down from the walls, surrender to the
soldiers. L. Fabius, centurion of the 8th legion, excited by the rewards
given at Avaricum, had sworn to be the first to mount to the assault; he
is lifted up by three soldiers of his company, reaches the top of the
wall, and, in his turn, helps them to mount one after the other.

Meanwhile the Gauls, who, as we have seen, had proceeded to the west of
Gergovia to raise retrenchments, hear the cries from the town; repeated
messages announce the capture of the _oppidum_. They immediately hurry
towards it, sending their cavalry before them. As they arrive, each man
takes his stand under the wall and joins the combatants, and their
number increases every moment; while the same women who just before
implored the pity of the besiegers, now excite against them the
defenders of Gergovia, displaying their dishevelled hair and showing
their children. The place as well as the numbers rendered the struggle
unequal; the Romans, fatigued with their run and the length of the
combat, resisted with difficulty troops which were still fresh.

This critical state of things inspired Cæsar with alarm; he ordered T.
Sextius, who had been left to guard the little camp, to bring out the
cohorts quickly, and take a position at the foot of the mountain of
Gergovia, on the right of the Gauls, so as to support the Romans if they
were repulsed, and check the enemy’s pursuit. He himself, drawing the
10th legion a little back[495] from the place where he had posted it,
awaited the issue of the engagement. (_See Plate 21_, second position of
the 10th legion. )

When the struggle was most obstinate, suddenly the Ædui, who had been
sent to divert the attention of the enemy by an attack from another
side, appeared on the right flank of the Romans. The resemblance of
their arms to those of the Gauls caused a great alarm; and although they
had their right shoulders bare (_dextris humeris exsertis_), the
ordinary mark of the allied troops, it was taken for a stratagem of the
enemy. At the same moment, the centurion L. Fabius, and those who had
followed him, are surrounded and thrown down from the top of the wall.
M. Petronius, centurion of the same legion, overwhelmed by numbers in
his attempt to burst the gates, sacrifices himself for the safety of his
soldiers, and meets his death in order to give them time to join their
ensigns. Pressed on all sides, the Romans are driven back from the
heights, after having lost forty-six centurions; nevertheless, the 10th
legion, placed in reserve on more level ground (_see Plate 21_, third
position), arrests the enemies, who are too eager in their pursuit. It
is supported by the cohorts of the 13th, who had just taken position on
a commanding post (_Le Puy-de-Marmant_), under the command of the
lieutenant T. Sextius. As soon as the Romans had reached the plain, they
rallied, and formed front against the enemy. But Vercingetorix, once
arrived at the foot of the mountain, ventured no further, but led back
his troops within the retrenchments. This day cost Cæsar nearly 700
men. [496]

Next day, Cæsar assembled his troops, and reprimanded them for their
rashness and for their thirst for plunder. He reproached them with
having “wished to judge for themselves of the object to be attained, and
of the means of attack, and not listening either to the signal of
retreat or to the exhortations of the tribunes and lieutenants. He
pointed out to them all the importance of the difficulties caused by the
inequalities of the ground; and reminded them of his conduct at
Avaricum, where, in presence of an enemy without chief and without
cavalry, he had renounced a certain victory rather than expose himself
to loss, though slight, in a disadvantageous position. Much as he
admired their bravery, which had been checked neither by the
retrenchments, nor by the steepness of the ground, nor by the walls, he
blamed no less their disobedience and their presumption in believing
themselves capable of judging of the chances of success and calculating
the issue of the undertaking better than their general. He demanded of
the soldiers submission and discipline, no less than firmness and
bravery; and, to revive their courage, he added that their want of
success was to be attributed to the difficulties of the ground much more
than to the valour of the enemy. ”[497]


[Sidenote: Observations. ]

VII. In the foregoing account, which is taken almost literally from the
“Commentaries,” Cæsar skilfully disguises a defeat. It is evident that
he hoped to take Gergovia by a sudden assault, before the Gauls, drawn
by a false attack to the west of the town, had time to come back to its
defence. Deceived in his expectation, he ordered the retreat to be
sounded, but too late to be executed in good order. Cæsar does not
appear to be sincere when he declares that he had attained his object
the moment his soldiers reached the foot of the wall. This could not
have been the case, for what use could it be to him to take camps almost
without troops in them, if the consequence was not to be the surrender
of the town itself? The defeat appears to have been complete, and,
according to some, Cæsar was for a moment a prisoner in the hands of the
Gauls; according to others, he had only lost his sword. Servius, indeed,
relates the following rather incomprehensible anecdote: when Cæsar was
taken away prisoner by the Gauls, one of them began to cry out _Cæsar_,
which signifies in Gaulish _let him go_, and thus he escaped. [498]
Plutarch gives another version: “The Arverni,” he says, “still show a
sword hung up in one of their temples, which they pretend to be a spoil
taken from Cæsar. He saw it there himself subsequently, and only laughed
at it. His friends engaged him to take it away, but he refused,
pretending that it had become a sacred object. ”[499] This tradition
proves that he was sufficiently great to bear the recollection of a
defeat, in which he was very different from Cicero, whom we have seen
stealthily taking away from the Capitol the brass plate on which was
engraved the law of his banishment.


[Sidenote: Cæsar leaves Gergovia in order to join Labienus. ]

VIII. Cæsar, after the check he had suffered before Gergovia, persisted
all the more in his intentions of departure; but, not to have the
appearance of flight, he drew out his legions, and placed them in order
of battle on an advantageous ground. Vercingetorix did not allow himself
to be drawn into the plain; the cavalry only fought, and the combat was
favourable to the Romans, who afterwards returned to their camp. The
next day the same manœvre was repeated with the same success.
Thinking that he had done enough to abate the boasting of the Gauls, as
well as to strengthen the courage of his men, Cæsar left Gergovia, and
took his way towards the country of the Ædui.

His withdrawal did not draw out the enemies in pursuit; and he arrived
on the third day (that is, his second day’s march, reckoning from the
assault on Gergovia) on the banks of the Allier, rebuilt one of the
bridges, no doubt that of Vichy, and crossed the river in haste, in
order to place it between him and Vercingetorix.

There Viridomarus and Eporedorix urged upon him the necessity of their
presence among the Ædui, in order to maintain the country in obedience,
and to be beforehand with Litavicus, who had gone thither with all the
cavalry to excite a revolt. Notwithstanding the numerous proofs of their
perfidy, and the suspicion that the departure of those two chiefs would
hasten the revolt, he did not think proper to detain them, as he wished
to avoid even the appearance of violence or of fear. He confined himself
to reminding them of the services which he had rendered to their
country, and of the state of dependence and abasement from which he had
drawn them, to raise them to a high degree of power and prosperity, and
then dismissed them; and they proceeded to Noviodunum (_Nevers_). This
town of the Ædui was situated on the banks of the Loire, in a favourable
position. It contained all the hostages of Gaul, the stores, the public
treasury, nearly all the baggage of the general and the army, and,
lastly, a considerable number of horses bought in Italy and Spain.
Eporedorix and Viridomarus heard there, on their arrival, of the revolt
of the country, of the reception of Litavicus in the important town of
Bibracte by Convictolitavis and a great part of the Senate, as well as
of the steps taken to draw their fellow-citizens into the cause of
Vercingetorix. The occasion appears favourable to them: they massacre
the guards of the dépôt of Noviodunum and the Roman merchants, share
amongst themselves the horses and the money, burn the town, send the
hostages to Bibracte, load boats with all the grain they can take away,
and destroy the rest by water and fire; then they collect troops in the
neighbourhood, place posts along the Loire, spread their cavalry
everywhere in order to intimidate the Romans, to cut off their supply of
provisions, and to compel them through famine to retire into the
Narbonnese--a hope which was so much the better founded, as the Loire,
swollen by the melting of the snow, appeared to be nowhere fordable.

Cæsar was informed of these events during his march from the Allier
towards the Loire. His position had never been more critical. Suffering
under a severe defeat, separated from Labienus by a distance of more
than eighty leagues, and by countries in revolt, he was surrounded on
all sides by the insurrection: he had on his rear the Arverni, elated
with their recent success at Gergovia; on his left the Bituriges,
irritated by the sack of Avaricum; before him the Ædui, ready to dispute
the passage of the Loire. Was he to persevere in his design, or
retrograde towards the Province? He could not resolve on this latter
course, for not only would this retreat have been disgraceful, and the
passage of the Cévennes full of difficulties, but, above all, he felt
the greatest anxiety for Labienus and the legions which he had entrusted
to him. He therefore persevered in his first resolutions; and in order
to be able, in case of need, to build a bridge across the Loire before
the forces of the enemies were increased, he proceeded towards that
river by forced marches day and night, and arrived unexpectedly at
Bourbon-Lancy. [500] The cavalry soon discovered a ford which necessity
made them consider practicable, although the soldiers had only above
water their shoulders and their arms to carry their weapons. The cavalry
was placed up the stream, in order to break the current, and the army
passed without accident before the enemy had time to recover from his
first surprise. Cæsar found the country covered with the harvest and
with cattle, with which the army was largely provisioned, and he marched
towards the land of the Senones. [501]


[Sidenote: Expedition of Labienus against the Parisii. ]

IX. Whilst the centre of Gaul was the scene of these events, Labienus
had marched with four legions towards Lutetia, a town situated on an
island in the Seine, the _oppidum_ of the Parisii. After leaving his
baggage at Agedincum (_Sens_)[502] under the guard of the troops
recently arrived from Italy to fill up the voids, he followed the left
bank of the Yonne and of the Seine, wishing to avoid all important
streams and considerable towns. [503] At the news of his approach, the
enemy assembled in great numbers from the neighbouring countries. The
command was entrusted to Aulercus Camulogenus, who was elevated to this
honour, notwithstanding his great age, on account of his rare ability in
the art of war. This chief, having remarked that a very extensive marsh
sloped towards the Seine, and rendered impracticable all that part of
the country which is watered by the Essonne, established his troops
along the side of this marsh, in order to defend the passage. (_See
Plate 23. _)

When Labienus arrived on the opposite bank, he ordered covered galleries
to be pushed forward, and sought, by means of hurdles and earth, to
establish a road across the marsh; but, meeting with too many
difficulties, he formed the project of surprising the passage of the
Seine at Melodunum (_Melun_), and, when once on the right bank, of
advancing towards Lutetia by stealing a march upon the enemy. He
therefore left his camp in silence, at the third watch (midnight), and,
retracing his steps, arrived at Melun, an _oppidum_ of the Senones,
situated, like Lutetia, on an island in the Seine. He seized about fifty
boats, joined them together, filled them with soldiers, and entered into
the place without striking a blow. Terrified at this sudden attack, the
inhabitants, a great part of whom had answered to the appeal of
Camulogenus, offered no resistance. A few days before, they had cut the
bridge which united the island with the right bank; Labienus restored
it, led his troops over it, and proceeded towards Lutetia, where he
arrived before Camulogenus. He took a position near the place where
Saint-Germain-l’Auxerrois now stands. Camulogenus, informed by those who
had fled from Melun, quits his position on the Essonne, returns to
Lutetia, gives orders to burn it and to cut the bridges, and establishes
his camp on the left bank of the Seine, in front of the _oppidum_, that
is, on the present site of the Hotel de Cluny.

It was already rumoured that Cæsar had raised the siege of Gergovia; the
news of the defection of the Ædui, and of the progress of the
insurrection, had begun already to spread. The Gauls repeated
incessantly that Cæsar, arrested in his march by the Loire, had been
compelled, by want of provisions, to retire towards the Roman province.
The Bellovaci, whose fidelity was doubtful, had no sooner heard of the
revolt of the Ædui, than they collected troops and prepared openly for
war.

At the news of so many unfavourable events, Labienus felt all the
difficulties of his situation. Placed on the right bank of the Seine, he
was threatened on one side by the Bellovaci, who had only to cross the
Oise to fall upon him; on the other by Camulogenus, at the head of a
well-trained army, ready to give battle; lastly, a large river, which he
had crossed at Melun, separated him from Sens, where he had his dépôts
and baggage. To escape from this perilous position, he thought it
advisable to change his plans: he renounced all offensive movements, and
resolved to return to his point of departure by an act of daring.
Fearing that, if he went by the road on which he had advanced, he should
not be able to cross the Seine at Melun, because his boats would not
have re-mounted the river without difficulty, he decided on surprising
the passage of the Seine below Paris, and returning to Sens by the left
bank, marching over the body of the Gaulish army. Towards evening he
convoked a council, and urged on his officers the punctual execution of
his orders. He entrusted the boats he had brought from Melun to the
Roman knights, with orders to descend the river at the end of the first
watch (ten o’clock), to advance in silence for the space of four miles
(six kilomètres), which would bring them as far down as the village of
Point-du-Joir, and to wait for him. The five cohorts which had least
experience were left in charge of the camp, and the five others of the
same legion received orders to re-ascend on the right bank of the river
in the middle of the night, with all their baggage, and attract by their
tumult the attention of the enemy. Boats were sent in the same
direction, which were rowed with great noise. He himself, a little
after, left in silence with the three remaining legions, and, proceeding
down the river, repaired to the spot where the first boats waited for
him.

When he arrived there, a violent storm enabled him to carry by surprise
the Gaulish posts placed along the whole bank.