No More Learning

He who is a thorough teacher takes things seriously
—and even himself-only in relation to his pupils.
66
)
64.
Knowledge for its own sake”_that is the last
snare laid by morality: we are thereby completely
entangled in morals once more.
65.
The charm of knowledge would be small, were it
not that so much shame has to be overcome on
the way to it.
65A.
We are most dishonourable towards our God: he
is not permitted to sin.
66.
The tendency of a person to allow himself to be
degraded, robbed, deceived, and exploited might
be the diffidence of a God amongst men.
a
67.
Love to one only is a barbarity, for it is exercised
at the expense of all others. Love to God also!


## p. 86 (#108) #############################################

86
BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL.
68.
"I did that," says my memory.
“ I could not
have done that," says my pride, and remains in-
exorable. Eventually—the memory yields.
69.
One has regarded life carelessly, if one has failed
to see the hand that-kills with leniency.
70.
If a man has character, he has also his typical
experience, which always recurs.
71.
The Sage as Astronomer. —So long as thou feelest
the stars as an “above thee,” thou lackest the eye
of the discerning one.
72.
It is not the strength, but the duration of great
sentiments that makes great men.
73.
He who attains his ideal, precisely thereby
surpasses it.
73A.
Many a peacock hides his tail from every eye-
and calls it his pride.
74.
A man of genius is unbearable, unless he possess
at least two things besides : gratitude and purity.


## p. 87 (#109) #############################################

APOPHTHEGMS AND INTERLUDES.
87
75.
The degree and nature of a man's sensuality
extends to the highest altitudes of his spirit.
76.
Under peaceful conditions the militant man
attacks himself,
77.
With his principles a man seeks either to domi-
nate, or justify, or honour, or reproach, or conceal
his habits : two men with the same principles
probably seek fundamentally different ends there-
with.
78.
He who despises himself, nevertheless esteems
himself thereby, as a despiser.
79.
A soul which knows that it is loved, but does not
itself love, betrays its sediment: its dregs come up.
80
A thing that is explained ceases to concern us. -
What did the God mean who gave the advice,
“Know thyself! ” Did it perhaps imply : “Cease
to be concerned about thyself! become objective ! "
-And Socrates ? -And the “ scientific man"?
6
81.
It is terrible to die of thirst at sea.
Is it necessary
that you should so salt your
truth that it will no
longer~-quench thirst ?


## p. 88 (#110) #############################################

88
BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL.
66
82.
Sympathy for all ”—would be harshness and
tyranny for thee, my good neighbour !
-
83
Instinct. -When the house is on fire one forgets
even the dinner. —Yes, but one recovers it from
amongst the ashes.
84.
Woman learns how to hate in proportion as she-
forgets how to charm.
85.
The same emotions are in man and woman, but
in different tempo; on that account man and woman
never cease to misunderstand each other.
86.
In the background of all their personal vanity,
women themselves have still their impersonal
scorn-for “woman. "
87.
Fettered Heart, Free Spirit. -When one firmly
fetters one's heart and keeps it prisoner, one can
allow one's spirit many liberties : I said this once
before. But people do not believe it when I say
so, unless they know it already.
4
88.
One begins to distrust very clever persons when
they become embarrassed.


## p. 89 (#111) #############################################

APOPHTHEGMS AND INTERLUDES.
89
89.
Dreadful experiences raise the question whether
he who experiences them is not something dreadful
also.
90.
Heavy, melancholy men turn lighter, and come
temporarily to their surface, precisely by that
which makes others heavy-by hatred and love.
91.
So cold, so icy, that one burns one's finger at
the touch of him! Every hand that lays hold of
him shrinks back ! -And for that very reason
many think him red-hot.
92.
Who has not, at one time or another-sacrificed
himself for the sake of his good name?
93.
In affability there is no hatred of men, but
precisely on that account a great deal too much
contempt of men.
94.
The maturity of man—that means, to have
reacquired the seriousness that one had as a child
at play.
95.
To be ashamed of one's immorality is a step on
the ladder at the end of which one is ashamed also
of one's morality.


## p. 90 (#112) #############################################

90
BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL.
96.
One should part from life as Ulysses parted
from Nausicaa-blessing it rather than in love
with it.
97
What? A great man? I always see merely
the play-actor of his own ideal,
98.
When one trains one's conscience, it kisses one
while it bites.
99.
The Disappointed One Speaks. -"I listened for
the echo and I heard only praise. ”
100.
We all feign to ourselves that we are simpler
than we are; we thus relax ourselves away from
our fellows.
IOI.
A discerning one might easily regard himself at
present as the animalisation of God.
102.
Discovering reciprocal love should really dis-
enchant the lover with regard to the beloved.
“What! She is modest enough to love even you?
Or stupid enough? Or-or-
103
The Danger in Happiness. -"Everything now
turns out best for me, I now love every fate :—who
would like to be my fate ? "


## p. 91 (#113) #############################################

APOPHTHEGMS AND INTERLUDES.
91
104.
Not their love of humanity, but the impotence of
their love, prevents the Christians of to-day-
burning us.
105.
The pia fraus is still more repugnant to the taste
(the “piety ") of the free spirit (the “pious man of
knowledge ") than the impia fraus. Hence the
”
profound lack of judgment, in comparison with the
church, characteristic of the type “free spirit”-as
its non-freedom.
106.
By means of music the very passions enjoy
themselves.
107.
A sign of strong character, when once the
resolution has been taken, to shut the ear even to
the best counter-arguments. Occasionally, there-
fore, a will to stupidity.
108.
There is no such thing as moral phenomena, but
only a moral interpretation of phenomena.
109.
The criminal is often enough not equal to his
deed : he extenuates and maligns it.
IIO.
The advocates of a criminal are seldom artists
enough to turn the beautiful terribleness of the
deed to the advantage of the doer.


## p. 92 (#114) #############################################

92
BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL.
III.
Our vanity is most difficult to wound just when
our pride has been wounded.
112.
To him who feels himself preordained to con-
templation and not to belief, all believers are too
noisy and obtrusive; he guards against them.
113.
“You want to prepossess him in your favour?
Then you must be embarrassed before him. ”
114.
The immense expectation with regard to sexual
love, and the coyness in this expectation, spoils all
the perspectives of women at the outset.
115.
Where there is neither love nor hatred in the
game, woman's play is mediocre.
116.
The great epochs of our life are at the points
when we gain courage to rebaptize our badness as
the best in us.
117
The will to overcome an emotion, is ultimately
only the will of another, or of several other,
emotions.
118.
There is an innocence of admiration: it is


## p. 93 (#115) #############################################

APOPHTHEGMS AND INTERLUDES.
93
possessed by him to whom it has not yet occurred
that he himself may be admired some day.
119.
Our loathing of dirt may be so great as to
prevent us cleaning ourselves—"justifying” our-
selves.
I 20.
Sensuality often forces the growth of love too
much, so that its root remains weak, and is easily
torn up
I21.
It is a curious thing that God learned Greek when
a
he wished to turn author—and that he did not learn
it better.
I 22.
To rejoice on account of praise is in many cases
merely politeness of heart—and the very opposite
of vanity of spirit.
123.
Even concubinage has been corrupted by
marriage.
I 24.
He who exults at the stake, does not triumph
over pain, but because of the fact that he does not
feel pain where he expected it. A parable.
125.
When we have to change an opinion about any
one, we charge heavily to his account the incon-
venience he thereby causes us.


## p. 94 (#116) #############################################

94
BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL.
1 26.
A nation is a detour of nature to arrive at six or
seven great men. -Yes, and then to get round them.
127.
In the eyes of all true women science is hostile to
the sense of shame. They feel as if one wished to
peep under their skin with it- or worse still! under
their dress and finery.
128.
The more abstract the truth you wish to teach,
the more must you allure the senses to it.
129.
The devil has the most extensive perspectives for
God; on that account he keeps so. far
away from
him :—the devil, in effect, as the oldest friend of
knowledge.
130.
What a person is begins to betray itself when
his talent decreases, when he ceases to show what
he can do. Talent is also an adornment; an
adornment is also a concealment.
131.
The sexes deceive themselves about each other :
the reason is that in reality they honour and love
only themselves (or their own ideal, to express it
more agreeably). Thus man wishes woman to be
peaceable: but in fact woman is essentially unpeace-
able, like the cat, however well she may have
assumed the peaceable demeanour.


## p. 95 (#117) #############################################

APOPHTHEGMS AND INTERLUDES.
95
132.
One is punished best for one's virtues.
133.
He who cannot find the way to his ideal, lives
more frivolously and shamelessly than the man
without an ideal.
134.
From the senses originate all trustworthiness, all
good conscience, all evidence of truth.
135.
Pharisaism is not a deterioration of the good man;
a considerable part of it is rather an essential condi-
tion of being good.
136.
The one seeks an accoucheur for his thoughts, the
other seeks some one whom he can assist: a good
conversation thus originates.
.
137.
In intercourse with scholars and artists one
readily makes mistakes of opposite kinds : in a
remarkable scholar one not infrequently finds a
mediocre man; and often even in a mediocre artist,
one finds a very remarkable man.
138.
We do the same when awake as when dreaming:
we only invent and imagine him with whom we
have intercourse—and forget it immediately.


## p. 96 (#118) #############################################

96
BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL.
139.
In revenge and in love woman is more barbarous
than man.
140.
Advice as a Riddle. -—“If the band is not to break,
bite it first-secure to make ! "
141.
The belly is the reason why man does not so
readily take himself for a God.
142.
The chastest utterance I ever heard : “ Dans le
véritable amour c'est l'âme qui enveloppe le corps. "
143.
Our vanity would like what we do best to pass
precisely for what is most difficult to us. —Con-
cerning the origin of many systems of morals.
144.
When a woman has scholarly inclinations there
is generally something wrong with her sexual
nature. Barrenness itself conduces to a certain
virility of taste ; man, indeed, if I may say so, is
“ the barren animal. ”
145.
Comparing man and woman generally, one may
say that woman would not have the genius for
adornment, if she had not the instinct for the
secondary rôle.


## p. 97 (#119) #############################################

APOPHTHEGMS AND INTERLUDES.
97
146.
He who fights with monsters should be careful
lest he thereby become a monster. And if thou
gaze long into an abyss, the abyss will also gaze
into thee.
147.
From old Florentine novels—moreover, from life:
Buona femmina e mala femmina vuol bastone. -
Sacchetti, Nov. 86.
148.
To seduce their neighbour to a favourable opinion,
and afterwards to believe implicitly in this opinion
of their neighbour-who can do this conjuring trick
so well as women?
149.
That which an age considers evil is usually an
unseasonable echo of what was formerly considered
good-the atavism of an old ideal.
150.
Around the hero everything becomes a tragedy ;
around the demigod everything becomes a satyr-
play; and around God everything becomes—what?
perhaps a “world”?
151.
It is not enough to possess a talent: one must
also have your permission to possess it ;-eh, my
friends ?
152.
“Where there is the tree of knowledge, there is
always Paradise :" so say the most ancient and the
most modern serpents.
G


## p. 98 (#120) #############################################

98
BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL.
153.
What is done out of love always takes place
beyond good and evil.
154.
Objection, evasion, joyous distrust, and love of
irony are signs of health ; everything absolute
belongs to pathology.
155.
The sense of the tragic increases and declines
with sensuousness.
156.
Insanity in individuals is something rare-but in
groups, parties, nations, and epochs it is the rule.
:
157.
The thought of suicide is a great consolation:
by means of it one gets successfully through many
a bad night.
158.
Not only our reason, but also our conscience,
truckles to our strongest impulse-the tyrant in us.
159.
One must repay good and ill; but why just to
the person who did us good or ill?
160.
One no longer loves one's knowledge sufficiently
after one has communicated it.


## p. 99 (#121) #############################################

APOPHTHEGMS AND INTERLUDES.
99
161.
Poets act shamelessly towards their experiences :
they exploit them.
162.
“Our fellow-creature is not our neighbour, but
our neighbour's neighbour :”— so thinks every
-
nation.
163.
Love brings to light the noble and hidden
"qualities of a lover-his rare and exceptional traits:
it is thus liable to be deceptive as to his normal
character.
164
Jesus said to his Jews: “The law was for
"
servants ;-love God as I love him, as his Son!
What have we Sons of God to do with morals ! ”
165.
In Sight of every Party. -A shepherd has always
need of a bell-wether-or he has himself to be a
wether occasionally.
166.
One may indeed lie with the mouth; but with
the accompanying grimace one nevertheless tells
the truth.
167.
To vigorous men intimacy is a matter of shame
-and something precious.
168.
Christianity gave Eros poison to drink; he did
not die of it, certainly, but degenerated to Vice.


## p. 100 (#122) ############################################

100
BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL.
169.
To talk much about oneself may also be a means
of concealing oneself.
170.
In praise there is more obtrusiveness than in
blame.
171.
Pity has an almost ludicrous effect on a man of
knowledge, like tender hands on a Cyclops.
172.
One occasionally embraces some one or other, out
of love to mankind (because one cannot embrace
all); but this is what one must never confess to the
individual.
173.
One does not hate as long as one disesteems,
but only when one esteems equal or superior.
174.
Ye Utilitarians-ye, too, love the utile only as a
vehicle for your inclinations,—ye, too, really find the
noise of its wheels insupportable !
175.
One loves ultimately one's desires, not the thing
desired.
176.
The vanity of others is only counter to our taste
when it is counter to our vanity.


## p. 101 (#123) ############################################

APOPHTHEGMS AND INTERLUDES.
1ΟΙ
177.
With regard to what “truthfulness" is, perhaps
nobody has ever been sufficiently truthful.
178.
One does not believe in the follies of clever men :
what a forfeiture of the rights of man!
179.
The consequences of our actions seize us by the
forelock, very indifferent to the fact that we have
meanwhile “reformed. ”
180.
There is an innocence in lying which is the sign
of good faith in a cause.
181.
It is inhuman to bless when one is being cursed.
182.
The familiarity of superiors embitters one, be-
cause it may not be returned.
183.
“I am affected, not because you have deceived
me, but because I can no longer believe in you. "
184.
There is a haughtiness of kindness which has the
appearance of wickedness.
185.
“I dislike him. ”_Why ? _“I am not a match
for him. ”—Did any one ever answer so?


## p. 102 (#124) ############################################

i


## p. 103 (#125) ############################################

FIFTH CHAPTER.
THE NATURAL HISTORY OF MORALS.
186.
а
THE moral sentiment in Europe at present is
perhaps as subtle, belated, diverse, sensitive, and
refined, as the “Science of Morals” belonging
thereto is recent, initial, awkward, and coarse-
fingered an interesting contrast, which sometimes
becomes incarnate and obvious in the very person
of a moralist. Indeed, the expression, “Science of
Morals” is, in respect to what is designated thereby,
far too presumptuous and counter to good taste,
—which is always a foretaste of more modest ex-
pressions. One ought to avow with the utmost
fairness what is still necessary here for a long time,
what is alone proper for the present: namely, the
collection of material, the comprehensive survey
and classification of an immense domain of deli-
cate sentiments of worth, and distinctions of worth,
which live, grow, propagate, and perish—and per-
haps attempts to give a clear idea of the recurring
and more common forms of these living crystallisa-
tions-as preparation for a theory of types of
morality. To be sure, people have not hitherto
been so modest. All the philosophers, with a


## p. 104 (#126) ############################################

104
BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL.
pedantic and ridiculous seriousness, demanded of
themselves something very much higher, more pre-
tentious, and ceremonious, when they concerned
themselves with morality as a science : they wanted
to give a basis to morality—and every philosopher
hitherto has believed that he has given it a basis;
morality itself, however, has been regarded as
something "given. " How far from their awkward
pride was the seemingly insignificant problem-left
in dust and decay-of a description of forms of
morality, notwithstanding that the finest hands and
senses could hardly be fine enough for it! It was
precisely owing to moral philosophers knowing the
moral facts imperfectly, in an arbitrary epitome, or
an accidental abridgment—perhaps as the morality
of their environment, their position, their church,
their Zeitgeist, their climate and zone—it was pre-
cisely because they were badly instructed with
regard to nations, eras, and past ages, and were by
no means eager to know about these matters, that
they did not even come in sight of the real problems
of morals-problems which only disclose themselves
by a comparison of many kinds of morality. In
every “Science of Morals" hitherto, strange as it
may sound, the problem of morality itself has been
omitted; there has been no suspicion that there
was anything problematic there! That which
philosophers called "giving a basis to morality,"
and endeavoured to realise, has, wien seen in a
right light, proved merely a learned forın of good
faith in prevailing morality, a new means of its ex-
pression, consequently just a matter-of-fact within
the sphere of a definite morality, yea, in its ultimate


## p. 105 (#127) ############################################

THE NATURAL HISTORY OF MORALS.
105
a
motive, a sort of denial that it is lawful for this
morality to be called in question-and in any case
the reverse of the testing, analysing, doubting, and
vivisecting of this very faith. Hear, for instance,
with what innocence—almost worthy of honour-
Schopenhauer represents his own task, and draw
your conclusions concerning the scientificalness of
Science” whose latest master still talks in the
strain of children and old wives : “The principle,"
he says (page 136 of the Grundprobleme der
Ethik *), “the axiom about the purport of which
all moralists are practically agreed: neminem læde,
immo omnes quantum potes juva-is really the pro-
position which all moral teachers strive to establish,
the real basis of ethics which has been sought,
like the philosopher's stone, for centuries. ”—The
difficulty of establishing the proposition referred
to may indeed be great-it is well known that
Schopenhauer also was unsuccessful in his efforts ;
and whoever has thoroughly realised how absurdly
false and sentimental this proposition is, in a world
whose essence is Will to Power, may be reminded
that Schopenhauer, although a pessimist, actually,
played the flute . . . daily after dinner : one may
read about the matter in his biography. A ques-
tion by the way: a pessimist, a repudiator of God
and of the world, who makes a halt at morality-
who assents to morality, and plays the flute to
lade-neminem morals, what? Is that really-a
pessimist?
*
Pages 54-55 of Schopenhauer's Basis of Morality, trans-
lated by Arthur B. Bullock, M. A. (1903).


## p. 106 (#128) ############################################

106
BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL
187.
Apart from the value of such assertions as “there
is a categorical imperative in us," one can always
ask: What does such an assertion indicate about
him who makes it? There are systems of morals
which are meant to justify their author in the eyes
of other people ; other systems of morals are meant
to tranquillise him, and make him self-satisfied ;
with other systems he wants to crucify and humble
himself; with others he wishes to take revenge ;
with others to conceal himself; with others to
glorify himself and gain superiority and distinction;
—this system of morals helps its author to forget,
that system makes him, or something of him, for-
gotten; many a moralist would like to exercise
power and creative arbitrariness over mankind;
many another, perhaps, Kant especially, gives us to
understand by his morals that “what is estimable
in me, is that I know how to obey—and with you
it shall not be otherwise than with me! ” In short,
systems of morals are only a sign-language of the
emotions.
188.
In contrast to laisser-aller, every system of morals
is a sort of tyranny against "nature" and also
against "reason "; that is, however, no objection,
unless one should again decree by some system of
morals, that all kinds of tyranny and unreasonable-
ness are unlawful. What is essential and invalu-
able in every system of morals, is that it is a long
constraint. In order to understand Stoicism, or
Port-Royal, or Puritanism, one should remember


## p. 107 (#129) ############################################

THE NATURAL HISTORY OF MORALS.
107
the constraint under which every language has
attained to strength and freedom-the metrical
constraint, the tyranny of rhyme and rhythm. How
much trouble have the poets and orators of every
nation given themselves not excepting some of
the prose writers of to-day, in whose ear dwells an
inexorable conscientiousness" for the sake of a
folly," as utilitarian bunglers say, and thereby deem
themselves wise-“from submission to arbitrary
laws," as the anarchists say, and thereby fancy
themselves “free,” even free-spirited. The singular
fact remains, however, that everything of the nature
of freedom, elegance, boldness, dance, and masterly
certainty, which exists or has existed, whether it be
in thought itself, or in administration, or in speaking
and persuading, in art just as in conduct, has only
developed by means of the tyranny of such arbi-
trary law ; and in all seriousness, it is not at all
improbable that precisely this is "nature” and
.
"natural"--and not laisser-aller! j Every artist
knows how different from the state of letting him-
self go, is his “most natural” condition, the free
arranging, locating, disposing, and constructing in
the moments of "inspiration"-and how strictly
and delicately he then obeys a thousand laws,
which, by their very rigidness and precision, defy
all formulation by means of ideas (even the most
stable idea has, in comparison therewith, some-
thing floating, manifold, and ambiguous in it).
The essential thing “in heaven and in earth” is,
apparently (to repeat it once more), that there
should be long obedience in the same direction;
there thereby results, and has always resulted in


## p. 108 (#130) ############################################

108
BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL.
-
the long run, something which has made life worth
living; for instance, virtue, art, music, dancing,
reason, spirituality - anything whatever that is
transfiguring, refined, foolish, or divine. The long
bondage of the spirit, the distrustful constraint in
the communicability of ideas, the discipline which
the thinker imposed on himself to think in accord-
ance with the rules of a church or a court, or con-
formable to Aristotelian premises, the persistent
spiritual will to interpret everything that happened
according to a Christian scheme, and in every oc-
currence to rediscover and justify the Christian God:
-all this violence, arbitrariness, severity, dreadful-
ness, and unreasonableness, has proved itself the
disciplinary means whereby the European spirit has
attained its strength, its remorseless curiosity and
subtle mobility; granted also that much irrecover-
able strength and spirit had to be stifled, suffocated,
and spoilt in the process (for here, as everywhere,
nature” shows herself as she is, in all her extrava-
gant and indifferent magnificence, which is shock-
ing, but nevertheless noble). That for centuries
European thinkers only thought in order to prove
something-nowadays, on the contrary, we are
suspicious of every thinker who “ wishes to prove
something "—that it was always settled beforehand
what was to be the result of their strictest thinking,
as it was perhaps in the Asiatic astrology of former
times, or as it is still at the present day in the
innocent, Christian-moral explanation of immediate
personal events “for the glory of God," or "for the
good of the soul” :--this tyranny, this arbitrariness,
this severe and magnificent stupidity, has educated


## p. 109 (#131) ############################################

THE NATURAL HISTORY OF MORALS.
109
«
the spirit ; slavery, both in the coarser and the finer
sense, is apparently an indispensable means even
of spiritual education and discipline. One may
look at every system of morals in this light : it is
nature " therein which teaches to hate the laisser-
aller, the too great freedom, and implants the need
for limited horizons, for immediate duties - it
teaches the narrowing of perspectives, and thus, in a
certain sense, that stupidity is a condition of life
and development.
“ Thou must obey some one,
and for a long time; otherwise thou wilt come to
grief, and lose all respect for thyself"—this seems to
me to be the moral imperative of nature, which is
certainly neither "categorical," as old Kant wished
(consequently the “otherwise"), nor does it address
itself to the individual (what does nature care for
the individual ! ), but to nations, races, ages, and
ranks, above all, however, to the animal “man ”
generally, to mankind.
189.
Industrious races find it a great hardship to be
idle : it was a master stroke of English instinct to
hallow and begloom Sunday to such an extent that
the Englishman unconsciously hankers for his week-
and work-day again :—as a kind of cleverly devised,
cleverly intercalated fast, such as is also frequently
found in the ancient world (although, as is appro-
priate in southern nations, not precisely with respect
to work). Many kinds of fasts are necessary; and
wherever powerful impulses and habits prevail, legis-
lators have to see that intercalary days are appointed,
on which such impulses are fettered, and learn to


## p. 110 (#132) ############################################

IIO
BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL.
hunger anew. Viewed from a higher standpoint,
whole generations and epochs, when they show
themselves infected with any moral fanaticism,
seem like those intercalated periods of restraint and
fasting, during which an impulse learns to humble
and submit itself-at the same time also to purify
and sharpen itself; certain philosophical sects like-
wise admit of a similar interpretation (for instance,
the Stoa, in the midst of Hellenic culture, with the
atmosphere rank and overcharged with Aphro-
disiacal odours). -Here also is a hint for the ex-
planation of the paradox, why it was precisely in
the most Christian period of European history, and
in general only under the pressure of Christian
sentiments, that the sexual impulse sublimated
into love (amour-passion).
190.
There is something in the morality of Plato which
does not really belong to Plato, but which only
appears in his philosophy, one might say, in spite
of him : namely, Socratism, for which he himself
was too noble. “No one desires to injure himself,
hence all evil is done unwittingly. The evil man
inflicts injury on himself; he would not do so, how-
ever, if he knew that evil is evil. The evil man,
therefore, is only evil through error; if one free
him from error one will necessarily make him-
good. ”—This mode of reasoning savours of the
populace, who perceive only the unpleasant con-
sequences of evil-doing, and practically judge that
“it is stupid to do wrong"; while they accept
“good” as identical with “useful and pleasant,”
"


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THE NATURAL HISTORY OF MORALS.
III
without further thought. As regards every system
of utilitarianism, one may at once assume that it
has the same origin, and follow the scent : one
will seldom err. –Plato did all he could to interpret
something refined and noble into the tenets of his
teacher, and above all to interpret himself into them
-he, the most daring of all interpreters, who lifted
the entire Socrates out of the street, as a popular
theme and song, to exhibit him in endless and im-
possible modifications-namely, in all his own dis-
guises and multiplicities. In jest, and in Homeric
language as well, what is the Platonic Socrates, if
not-
πρόσθε Πλάτων όπιθεν τε Πλάτων μέσση τε Χίμαιρα.
9
191.
The old theological problem of "Faith” and
Knowledge," or more plainly, of instinct and
reason—the question whether, in respect to the
valuation of things, instinct deserves more authority
than rationality, which wants to appreciate and act
according to motives, according to a “Why," that is
to say, in conformity to purpose and utility—it is
always the old moral problem that first appeared in
the person of Socrates, and had divided men's minds
long before Christianity. Socrates himself, follow-
ing, of course, the taste of his talent that of a
surpassing dialectician–took first the side of reason;
and, in fact, what did he do all his life but laugh at
the awkward incapacity of the noble Athenians,
who were men of instinct, like all noble men, and
could never give satisfactory answers concerning
the motives of their actions? In the end, however,


## p. 112 (#134) ############################################

I 12
BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL.
though silently and secretly, he laughed also at him-
self: with his finer conscience and introspection,
he found in himself the same difficulty and incapa-
city. "But why”-he said to himself—"should
one on that account separate oneself from the in-
stincts! One must set them right, and the reason
also—one must follow the instincts, but at the same
time persuade the reason to support them with good
arguments. " This was the real falseness of that
great and mysterious ironist ; he brought his con-
science up to the point that he was satisfied with a
kind of self-outwitting: in fact, he perceived the
irrationality in the moral judgment. —Plato, more
innocent in such matters, and without the crafti-
ness of the plebeian, wished to prove to himself, at
the expenditure of all his strength-the greatest
strength a philosopher had ever expended—that
reason and instinct lead spontaneously to one goal,
to the good, to “God”; and since Plato, all theo-
logians and philosophers have followed the same
path—which means that in matters of morality,
instinct (or as Christians call it, “Faith," or as I call
it, “the herd ") has hitherto triumphed. Unless
one should make an exception in the case of
Descartes, the father of rationalism (and con-
sequently the grandfather of the Revolution), who
recognised only the authority of reason : but reason
is only a tool, and Descartes was superficial.