No More Learning

surface-- say to the extent of a degree -- the diameter nnd cir cumference of the earth ; and although I am ignorant of the objects which this surface contains, I have a perfect know ledge of its limits and extent.
The sum of all the possible objects of our cognition seems to us to be a level surface, with an apparent horizon-- that which forms the limit of its extent, and which has been termed by us the idea of unconditioned totality. To reach tins limit by empirical means is impossible, and all attempts to determine it a priori according to a principle, are alike in vain. But all the questions raised by pure reason relate to that which lies beyond this horizon, or, at least, in its boundary line.
The celebrated David Hume was one of those geographers
of human reason who believe that they have given a sufficient
answer to all such questions, by declaring them to lie beyond the horizon of our knowledge --a horizon which, however, Hume was unable to determine. His attention especially was directed to the principle of causality ; and he remarked with perfect justice, that the truth of this principle, and even the objective validity of the conception of a cause, was not commonly based upon clear height, that upon priori cognition. Hence he concluded that this law does not derive its authority from its universality and necessity, but merely from its general appli cability in the course of experience, and kind of subjective necessity thence arising, which he termed habit. From the inability of reason to establish this principle as necessary law for the acquisition of all experience, he inferred the nullity of all the attempts of reason to pass the region of the empirical.
This procedure, of subjecting the facta of reason to exami
nation, and, necessary, to disapproval, may be termed the censura of reason. This Centura must inevitably lead ns to doubts regarding all transcendent employment of principles. But this only the second step in our inquiry. The first step in regard to the subjects of pure reason, and which marks the infancy of that faculty, that of dogmatism. The second, which we have just mentioned, that of scepticism, and gives evidence that our judgment has been improved by experience. But third step necessary --indicative of the maturity and manhood of the judgment, which now lays firm
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foundation upon universal and necessary principles. This is the period of criticism, in which we do not examine the facta of reason, but reason itself, in the whole extent of its powers, and in regard to its capability of a priori cognition ; and thus we determine not merely the empirical and ever-shifting bounds of our knowledge, but its necessary and eternal limits. We demonstrate from indubitable principles, not merely our ignorance in respect to this or that subject, but in regard to all possible questions of a certain class. Thus scepticism is a resting-place for reason, in which it may reflect on its dog matical wanderings, and gain some knowledge of the region in which it happens to be, that it may pursue its way with greater certainty ; but it cannot be its permanent dwelling- place. It must take up its abode only in the region of com plete certitude, whether this relates to the cognition of objects themselves, or to the limits which bound all our cognition.
Raoson is not to be considered as an indefinitely extended plane, of the bounds of which we have only a general know ledge ; it ought rather to be compared to a sphere, the radius of which may be found from the curvature of its surface -- that the nature of priori synthetical propositions -- and, consequently, its circumference and extent. Beyond the sphere of experience there are no objects which can cognize
nay, even questions regarding such supposititious objects relate only to the subjective principles of complete determination of the relations which exist between the understanding-con ceptions which lie within this sphere.
We are actually in possession of a priori synthetical cog nitions, as proved by the" existence of the principles of the understanding, which anticipate experience. If any one cannot comprehend the possibility of these principles, he may have some reason to doubt whether they are really a priori but he cannot on this account declare them to be impossible, and affirm the nullity of the steps which reason may have taken under their guidance. He can only say we perceived their origin and their authenticity, we should be able to determine the extent and limits of reason but, till we can do this, all
regarding the latter are mere random assertions. In this view, the doubt respecting all dogmatical philosophy, which proceeds without the guidance of criticism, well
but we cannot therefore deny to reason the ability
? propositions grounded
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to construct a sound philosophy, when the way has been prepared by a thorough critical investigation. All the con ceptions produced, and all the questions raised, by pure reason, do not lie in the sphere of experience, but in that of leason itself, and hence they must be solved, and shown to be either valid or inadmissible, by that faculty. We have no right to decline the solution of such problems, on the ground that the solution can be discovered only from the nature of things, and under pretence of the limitation of human facul ties, for reason is the sole creator of all these ideas, and is therefore bound either to establish their validity or to expose their illusory nature.
The polemic of scepticism is properly directed against the dogmatist, who erects a system of philosophy without having examined the fundamental objective principles on which it is basod, for the purpose of evidencing the futility of his designs, and thus bringing him to a knowledge of his own powers. But, in itself, scepticism does not give us any certain informa tion in regard to the bounds of our knowledge. All unsuccess ful dogmatical attempts of reason are facta, which it is always useful to submit to Hie censure of the sceptic. But this can not help us to any decision regarding the expectations which reason cherishes of better success in future endeavours ; the
investigations of scepticism cannot, therefore, settle the dispute regarding the rights and powers of human reason.
Hume is perhaps the ablest and most ingenious of nll scep tical philosophers, and his writings have, undoubtedly, ex erted the most powerful influence in awakening reason to ?
? into its own powers. It will, therefore, well repay our labours to consider for a little the course of
out on the path of truth and
Hume was probably awnre, although he never clearly de veloped the notion, that we proceed in judgments of a certain class beyond our conception of the object. I have termed this kind of judgments synthetical. As regards the manner in which I pass beyond my conception by the aid of experience, no doubts can be entertained. Experience is itself a synthesis
of perceptions ; and it employs perceptions to increment the conception, which I obtain by means of another perception
thorough investigation
which he followed, and the errors into which he
reasoning
strayed, although setting certitude.
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But we feel persuaded that we are able to proceed beyoud a Conception, and to extend our cognition a priori. We attempt this in two ways -- either, through the pure un derstanding, in relation to that which may become an object of experience, or, through pure reason, in relation to such properties of things, or of the existence of things, as can never he presented in any experience. This sceptical philosopher did not distinguish these two kinds of judgments, as he ought to have done, but regarded this augmentation of conceptions and, if we may so express ourselves, the spontaneous gene ration of understanding and reason, independently of the impregnation of experience, as altogether impossible. The so-called a priori principles of these faculties he consequently held to be invalid and imaginary, and regarded them as nothing but subjective habits of thought originating in ex- perience, and therefore purely empirical and contingent rules, to which we attribute a spurious necessity and universality. In support of this strange assertion, he referred us to the generally acknowledged principle of the relation between cause and effect. No faculty of the mind can conduct us from the conception of a thing to the existence of something else ; and hence lie believed he could infer that, without experience, we possess no source from which we can augment a conception, and no ground sufficient to justify us in framing a judgment that is to extend our cognition a priori. That the light of the sun, which shines upon a piece of wax, at the same time melts
while hardens clay, no power of the understanding could infer from the conceptions which we previously possessed of these substances much less there any a priori law that could conduct us to such conclusion, which experience alone can certify. On the other hand, we have seen in our discussion of Transcendental Logic, that, although we can never proceed immediately beyond the content of the conception which given us, we can always cognize completely priori -- in rela tion, however, to third term, namely, possible experience --the law of its connection with other things. For example, ob serve that piece of wax melts, can cognize priori that there must have been something (the sun's heat) preceding, which this effect follows according to fixed law although, without the aid of experience, could not cognize priori and in de
terminate manner, either the cause from the effect, or the effect
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firoiu the cause. Hume was therefore wrong in inferring, from the contingency of the determination according to law, the contingency of tht law itself ; and the passing beyond the conception of a thing to possible experience (which is an a priori proceeding, constituting the objective realitv of the conception), he confounded with our synthesis of objects in actual experience, which is always, of course, empirical. Thus, too, he regarded the principle of affinity, which, has its seat in the understanding and indicates a necessary connection, ns a mere rule of association, lying in the imitative faculty of imagination, which can present only contingent, and not ob jective connections.
The sceptical errors of this remarkably acute thinker arose
principally from a defect, which was common to him with the
dogmatists, namely, that he had never made a systematic review of all the different kinds of a priori synthesis performed by the understanding. Had he done so, he would have found, to take one example among many, that the principle of per manence was of this character, and that as well as the principle of causality, anticipates experience. In this way he might have been able to describe the determinate limits of the
priori operations of understanding and reason. But he merely declared the understanding to be limited, instead of showing what its limits were he created general mistrust
the power of our faculties, without giving us any determi nate knowledge of the bounds of our necessary and unavoidable ignorance he examined and condemned some of the princi ples of the understanding, without investigating all its powers with the completeness necessary to criticism. He denies, with truth, certain powers to the understanding, but he goes further, and declares to be utterly inadequate to the a priori
extension of knowledge, although he has not fully examined all the powers which reside in the faculty and thus the fate which always overtakes scepticism meets him too. That to say, his own declarations are doubted, for his objections were based upon facta, which are contingent, and not upon prin ciples, which can alone demonstrate the necessary invalidity of all dogmatical assertions.
As Hume makes no distinction between the well-grounded claims of the understanding and the dialectical pretensions of reason, agniDit which, however, his attacks arc mainly directed.
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reason does not feel itself shut ont from all attempts at the extension of a priori cognition, and hence it refuses, in spite of a few checks iu this or that quarter, to relinquish such efforts. For one naturally arms oue's-self to resist an attack, and be comes more obstinate in the resolve to establish the claims he has advanced. But a complete review of the powers of reason, and the conviction thence arising that we are in possession of a limited field of action, while we must admit the vanity of higher claims, puts an end to all doubt and dispute, and in duces reason to rest satisfied with the undisturbed possession of its limited domain.
To the uncritical dogmatist, who has not surveyed the sphere
of his understanding, nor determined, in accordance with prin
ciples, the limits of possible cognition, who, consequently, is ignorant of his own powers, and believes he will discover theru by the attempts he makes in the field of cognition, these at tacks of scepticism are not only dangerous, but destructive. For if there is one proposition in his chain of reasoning which he cannot prove, or the fallacy in which he cannot evolve in accordance with a principle, suspicion falls on all his str. te- ? nenU, however plausible they may appear.
And thus scepticism, the bane of dogmatical philosophy, conducts us to a sound investigation into the understanding and the reason. When we are thus far advanced, we need fear no farther attacks ; for the limits of our domain are clearly marked out, and we can make no claims nor becom* involved in any disputes regarding the region that lies beyond these limits. Thus the sceptical procedure in philosophy does not present any solution of the problems of reason, but it forms an excellent exercise for its powers, awakening its cir cumspection, and indicating the means whereby it may most fully establish its claims to its legitimate possessions.
CHAPTER FIRST. Section Thim).
The Discipline of Pure Reason in Hypothesis.
This critique of reason has now taught us that all its efforts to extend the bounds of knowledge, by means of pure specu lation, are utterly fruitless. So much the wider field, it may
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? ? ? ? 408 TllAKSOEKDENTAL DOOTBtNE Of METIIOU.
appear, lies open to hypothesis ; as, where we cannot know with certainty, we are at liberty to make guesses, and to form suppositions.
Imagination may be allowed, under the strict surveillance of reason, to invent suppositions ; but, these must be based on something that is perfectly certain --and that is the possi bility of the object. If we are well assured upou this point, it is allowable to have recourse to supposition in regard to the reality of the object ; but this supposition must, unless it is utterly groundless, be connected, as its ground of ex planation, with that which is really given and absolutely cer tain. Such a supposition is termed a hypothesis.
It is beyond our power to form the least conception a prion of the possibility of dynamical connection in phenomena ; and the category of the pure understanding will not enable us to excogitate any such connection, but merely helps us to understand when we meet with in experience. For this reason we cannot, in accordance with the categories, imagine or invent any object or any property of an object not given, or that may not be given in experience, and employ in hypothesis otherwise, we should be basing our chain of rea soning upon mere chimerical fancies, and not upon concep tions of things. Thus, we have no right to assume the ex istence of new powers, not existing in nature, --for example, an understanding with non-sensuous intuition, force of at traction without contact, or some new kind of substances occupying space, and yet without the property of impenetra bility and, consequently, we cannot assume that there any other kind of community among substances than that observ able in experience, any kind of presence than that in space, or any kind of duration than that in time. In one word, the conditions of possible experience are for reason the only con ditions of the possibility of things reason cannot venture to form, independently of these conditions, any conceptions of things, because such conceptions, although not self-contradic tory, are without object and without application.
The conceptions of reason are, as we have already shown, mere ideas, and do not relate to any object in any kind of ex perience. At the same time, they do not indicate imaginary or possible objects. They are purely problematical in their nature, and, as aids to the heuristic exercise of the faculties
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form the basis of the regulative principles for the systematic employment of the understanding in the field of experience. If we leave this ground of experience, they become mere fictions of thought, the possibility of which is quite indemon strable ; and they cannot consequently be employed, as hypo theses, in the explanation of real phenomena. It is quite admissible to cogitate the soul as simple, for the purpose of enabling ourselves to employ the idea of a perfect and neces sary unity of all the faculties of the mind as the principle of ail our inquiries into its internal phsenomena, although we cannot cognize this unity in concrete But to assume that the
soul is a simple substance (a transcendental conception) would be enouncing a proposition which is not only indemonstrable --as many physical hypotheses are, but a proposition which is purely arbitrary, and in the highest degree rash. The simple is never presented in experience ; and, if by substance
is here meant the permanent object of sensuous intuition, the possibility of a simple phenomenon is perfectly inconceivable. Reason affords no good grounds for admitting the existence of intelligible beings, or of intelligible properties of sensuous things, although --as we have no conception either of their possibility or of their impossibility--it will always be out of our power to affirm dogmatically that they do not exist.
In the explanation of given phsenomena, no other things and no other grounds of explanation can be employed, than those which stand in connection with the given phsenomena according to the known laws of experience. A transcendental hypothesis, in which a mere idea of reason is employd to ex plain the phsenomena of nature, would not give us any better insight into a phenomenon, as we should be trying to ex plain what we do not sufficiently understand from known em pirical principles, by what we do not understand at all. The- principle of such a hypothesis might conduce to the satisfac tion of reason, but it would not assist the understanding in its application to objects. Order and conformity to aims in the sphere of nature must be themselves explained upon natural grounds and according to natural laws ; and the wild est hypotheses, if they are only physical, are here more ad missible than a hyperphysical hypothesis, such as that of a divine author. For such a hypothesis would introduce the principle of ignaea ratio, w? iich requires us to giv<< up the
? ? ? ? 470 TBANSCENDEHTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD.
search for causes that might be discovered in the course of experience, and to rest satisfied with a mere idea. As regards the absolute totality of the grounds of explanation in the series of these causes, this can be no hindrance to the understanding in the case of phenomena ; because, as they are to us nothing more than phsenomena, we have no right to look for anything like completeness in the synthesis of the series of their con ditions.
Transcendental hypotheses are therefore inadmissible ; and we
cannot use the liberty of employing, in the absence of physical,
hyperphysical grounds of explanation. And this for two reasons ; first, because such hypotheses do not advance reason, but rather stop it in its progress ; secondly, because this licence would render fruitless all its exertions in its own proper sphere, which ia that of experience. For, when the explanation of natural phsenomena happens to be difficult, we have constantly at hand a transcendental ground of explanation, which lifts us above the necessity of investigating nature ; and our in quiries are brought to a close, not because we have obtained all the requisite knowledge, but because we abut upon a principle, which is incomprehensible, and which, indeed, is so far back in the track of thought, as to contain the conception of the absolutely primal being.
The next requisite for the admissibility of a hypothesis is its sufficiency. That must determine priori the conse
quences which are given in experience, and which are supposed to follow from the hypothesis itself. If we require to employ
auxiliary hypotheses, the suspicion naturally arises that they are mere fictions because the necessity for each of them requires the same justification as in the case of the original hypothesis, and thus their testimony invalid. If we suppose the existence of an infinitely perfect cause, we possess suffi cient grounds for the explanation of the conformity to aims, the order and the greatness which we observe the universe but we find ourselves obliged, when we observe the evil in the world and the exceptions to these laws, to employ new hypo theses in support of the original one. We employ the idea of the simple nature of the human soul as the foundation of all the theories we may form of its phenomena but when we meet with difficulties in our way, when we observe in the soul phsenomena similar to the changes which take place
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matter, we require to call in new auxiliary hypotheses. These may, inched, not be false, but we do not kuow them to be true, because the only witness to their certitude is the hypothesis which they themselves have been called in to explain.
We are not discussing the above-mentioned assertions re
garding the immaterial unity of the soul and the existence of
a Supreme Being, as dogmata, which certain philosophers pro
fess to demonstrate a priori, but purely as hypotheses. In the
former case, the dogmatist must take care that his arguments
possess the apodeictic certainty of a demonstration. For thf
assertion that the reality of such ideas is probable, is as absurd
as a proof of the probability of a proposition in geometry. Pure abstract reason, apart from all experience, can either cog
nize a proposition entirely a priori, and as necessary, or it can cognize nothing at all ; and hence the judgments it enounces are never mere opinions, they are either apodeictic certainties, or declarations that nothing can be known on the subject. Opinions and probable judgments on the nature of things can only be employed to explain given phenomena, or they may relate to the effect, in accordance with empirical laws, of an actually existing cause. In other words, we must restrict the sphere of opinion to the world of experience and nature. Beyond this region opinion is mere invention ; unless we are groping about for the truth on a path not yet fully known, and have some hopes of stumbling upon it by chance.
But, although hypotheses are inadmissible in answers to the questions of pure speculative reason, they may be em ployed in the defence of these answers. That is to say, hypo theses are admissible in polemic, but not in the sphere of dogmatism. By the defenee of statements of this character, I do not mean an attempt at discovering new grounds for their support, but merely the refutation of the arguments of opponents. All a priori synthetical propositions possess the peculiarity, that, although the philosopher who maintains the reality of the ideas contained in the proposition, is not in pos session of sufficient knowledge to establish the certainty of his statements, his opponent is as little able to prove the truth of the opposite. This equality of fortune does not Allow the one party to be superior to the other in the sphere of specu lative cognition ; and it is this sphere accordingly that is the proper arena of these endless speculative conflicts. But we
? ? ? ? 472 rBAKSCENDENTAl DOCTB1NE OF METHOD.
shall afterwards show that, in relation to its practical exercise, Reason has the right of admitting what, in the field of pure speculation, she would not be justified in supposing, except upon perfectly sufficient grounds ; because all such supposi
tions destroy the necessary completeness of speculation --a condition which the practical reason, however, does not con sider to be requisite. Iu this sphere, therefore, Reason is mis tress of a possession, her title to which she does not require to prove --which, in fact, she could not do. The burden of proof accordingly rests upon the opponent. But as he has just as little knowledge regarding the subject discussed, and is as little able to prove the non-existence of the object of mi idea, as the philosopher on the other side is to demonstrate its reality, it is evident that there is an advantage on the side of the philosopher who maintains his proposition as a practi cally necessary supposition (melior est conditio possidentis). For he is at liberty to employ, in self-defence, the same wea pons as his opponent makes use of in attacking him ; that
lie has right to use hypotheses not for the purpose of sup porting the arguments favour of his own propositions, but to show that his opponent knows no more than himself re garding the subject under discussion, and cauuot boast of any
speculative advantage.
Hypotheses are, therefore, admissible the sphere of pure
reason, only as weapons for self-defence, and not as supports to dogmatical assertions. But the opposing party we must always seek for in ourselves. For speculative reason the
sphere of transcendentalism, dialectical initsownnalure. The difficulties and objections we have to fear lie in ourselves. They are like old but never superannuated claims and we must seek them out, and settle them once and for ever, we are to expect permanent peace. External tranquillity hollow and unreal. The root of these contradictions, which lies the nature of human reason, must be destroyed and this can only be done, giving in the first instance, freedom to
? that may send out shoots, and our duty, therefore, to try to discover new objections, to put weapons the hands of
grow, nay, by nourishing thus betray its own existence.
our opponent, and to grant him the most favourable position in the arena that he can wish. We have nothing to fear from these concessions on the contrary, we may rather hope thai
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? THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE SEASON. 473
we shall thus make ourselves master of a possession which no one will ever venture to dispute.
The thinker requires, to be fully equipped, the hypotheses of pure reason, which, although but leaden weapons, (for they have not been steeled in the armoury of experience), are as useful as any that can be employed by his opponents. If, ac cordingly, we have assumed, from a non-speculative point of view, the immaterial nature of the soul, and are met by the ob jection that experience seems to prove that the growth and decay of our mental faculties are mere modifications of the sensuous organism, --we can weaken the force of this objection, by the assumption that the body is nothing but the fundamental phe nomenon, to which, as a necessary condition, all sensibility, and consequently all thought, relates in the present state of our existence ; and that the separation of soul and body forms the conclusion of the sensuous exercise of our power of cog nition, and the beginning of the intellectual. The body
would, in this view of the question, be regarded, not as the cause of thought, but merely as its restrictive condition, as promotive of the sensuoas and animal, but as a hindrance to the pure and spiritual life ; and the dependence of the animal life on the constitution of the body, would not prove that the whole life of man was also dependent on the state of the organism. We might go still farther, and discover new objections, or carry out to their extreme consequences those which have already been adduced.
Generation, in the human race as well as among the ir rational animals, depends on so many accidents --of occasion, of proper sustenance, of the laws enacted by the government of a country, of vice even, that it is difficult to believe in the eternal existence of a being, whose life has begun under cir cumstances so mean and trivial, and so entirely dependent upon our own control. As regards the continuance of the ex istence of the whole race, we need have no difficulties, for accident in single cases is subject to geueral laws ; but, in the case of each individual, it would seem as if we could hardly ex
pect so wonderful an effect from causes so insignificant. But, in answer to these objections, we may adduce the transcendental hypothesis, that all life is properly intelligible, and not subject to changes of time, aud that it neither began in birth, nor will end iu death. We may assume that thi>> life is nothing mon
? ? ? ? 474 TRANSCEND EST AO. DOCTKINB OF METHOD.
than a sensuous representation of pure spiritual life ; that tlie whole world of sense is bnt an image, hovering before the faculty of cognition which we exercise in this sphere, and with no more objective reality than a dream ; and that if we could intuite ourselves and other things as they really are, we should see ourselves in a world of spiritual natures, our connection with which did not begin at our birth, and will not cease with the destruction of the body. And so on.
We cannot be said to know what has been above asserted, nor do we seriously maintain the truth of these assertions ; and the notions therein indicated are not even ideas of reason, they are purely fictitious conceptions. But this hypothetical procedure is in perfect conformity with the laws of reason. Our opponent mistakes the absence of empirical conditions for a proof of the complete impossibility of all that we have as- erted ; and we have to show him that he has not exhausted the whole sphere of possibility, and that he can as little compass that sphere by the laws of experience and nature, as we can . ay a secure foundation for the operations of reason beyond the region of experience.
Such hypothetical defences against the pretensions of an opponent must not be regarded as de clarations of opinion. The philosopher abandons them, so soon as the opposite party renounces its dogmatical conceit. To maintain a simply negative position in relation to propo sitions which rest on an insecure foundation, well befits the moderation of a true philosopher ; but to uphold the objections urged against an opponent as proofs of the opposite statement, is a proceeding just as unwarrantable and arrogant as it is to attack the position of a philosopher who advances affirmative propositions regarding such a subject.
It is evident, therefore, that hypotheses, in the speculative sphere, are valid, not as independent propositions, but only relatively to opposite transcendent assumptions. For, to make the principles of possible experience conditions of the possi bility of things in general is just as transcendent a procedure as to maintain the objective reality of ideas which can be ap plied to no objects except such as lie without the limits of possible experience. The judgments enounced by pure reason must be necessary, or they must not be enounced at all. Reason cannot trouble herself with opinions. But the hy potheses we have been discussing ate merely problematical
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475
judgments, which can neither be confuted nor proved ; while,
therefore, they are not personal opinions, they are indispensable as answers to objections which are liable to be raised. But wo mast take care to confine them to this function, and guard against any assumption on their part of absolute validity, a proceeding which would involve reason in inextricable diffi culties and contradictions.
CHAPTER FIRST.
Section Fourth.
The Discipline of Pure Reason in relation to Proofs.
It is a peculiarity which distinguishes the proofs of tran scendental synthetical propositions from those of all other a priori synthetical cognitions, that reason, in the case of the former, does not apply its conceptions directly to an object, but is first obliged to prove, a priori, the objective validity of these conceptions and the possibility of their syntheses. This is not merely a prudential rule, it is essential to the very possi bility of the proof of a transcendental proposition. If I am required to pass, a priori, beyond the conception of an object, I find that it is utterly impossible without the guidance of something which is not contained in the conception. In mathematics, it is a priori intuition that guides my synthesis ; and, in this case, all our conclusions may be drawn imme diately from pure intuition. In transcendental cognition, so long as we are dealing only with conceptions of the under standing, we are guided by possible experience. That is to say, a proof in the sphere of transcendental cognition does not show that the given conception (that of an event, for ex ample,) leads directly to another conception (that of a cause) --
for this would be a salt us which nothing can justify ; but it shows that experience itself, and consequently the object of experience, is impossible without the connection indicated by these conceptions. It follows that such a proof must demon strate \he possibility of arriving, synthetically and a priori, at a certain knowledge of things, which was not contained in our conceptions of these things. Unless we pay particular attention to this requirement, our proofs, instead of pursuing
? ? ? ? 4/6" TBJlSSCENDENTAI, doctbihb of method.
the straight path indicated by reason, follow the tortuous road of mere subjective association. The illusory conviction, which rests upon subjective causes oC^tssociation, and which is con sidered as resulting from the perception of a real and objective natural affinity, is always open to doubt and suspicion. For this reason, all the attempts which have been made to prove the principle of sufficient reason, have, according to the uni versal admission of philosophers, been quite unsuccessful ; and, before the appearance of transcendental criticism, it was considered better, as this principle could not be abandoned, to appeal boldly to the common sense of mankind (a proceed- ing which always proves that the problem, which reason ought to solve, is one in which philosophers find great diffi culties), rather than attempt to discover new dogmatical proofs.
But, if the proposition to be proved is a proposition of pure reason, and if I aim at passing beyond my empirical concep tions by the aid of mere ideas, it is necessary that the proof should first show that such a step in synthesis is possible (which it is not), before it proceeds to prove the truth of the proposition itself. The so-called proof of the simple nature of the soul from the unity of apperception, is a very plausible one. But it contains no answer to the objection, that, as the notion of absolute simplicity is not a conception which is directly applicable to a perception, but is an idea which must be inferred -- if at all -- from observation, it is by no means evident, how the mere fact of consciousness, which is contained in all thought, although in so far a simple representation, can conduct me to the consciousness and cognition of a thing which is purely a thinking substance. When I represent to my mind the power of my body as in motion, my body in this thought is so far absolute unity, and my representation of it is a simple one ; and hence I can indicate this representation by the motion of a point, because I have made abstraction of the size or volume of the body. But I cannot hence infer that, given merely the moving power of a body, the body may be cogitated as simple substance, merely because the representa
tion in my mind takes no account of its content in space, and is consequently simple. The simple, in abstraction, is very different from the objectively simple ; and hence the Ego, which is simple in the first sense, "nay, in the second aense, n>>
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477
indicating the soul itself, be a very complex conception, with a very various content. Thus it is evident, that in all such arguments, there lurks a paralogism. We guess (for without some such surmise our suspicion would not be excited in refer ence to a proof of this character,) at the presence of the paralogism, by keeping ever before us a criterion of the pos sibility of those synthetical propositions which aim at proving more than experience can teach us. This criterion is obtained from the observation that such proofs do not lead us directly from the subject of the proposition to be proved to the required predicate, but find it necessary to presuppose the possibility of extending our cognition a priori by means of ideas. We must, accordingly, always use the greatest caution ; we require,
before attempting any proof, to consider how it is possible to extend the sphere of cognition by the operations of pure reason, and from what source we are to derive knowledge, which is not obtained from the analysis of conceptions, nor
relates, by anticipation, to possible experience. We shall thus spare ourselves much severe and fruitless labour, by 'iot expecting from reason what is beyond its power, or rather by subjecting it to discipline, and teaching it to moderate its vehement desires for the extension of the sphere of cognition.
The first rule for our guidance therefore, not to attempt transcendental proof, before we have considered from what
source we are to derive the principles upon which the proof
to be based, and what right we have to expect that our con clusions from these principles will be veracious. If they are principles of the understanding, vain to expect that we should attain their means to ideas of pure reason for these principles are valid only regard to objects of possible experience. If they are principles of pure reason, our labour
alike in vain. For the principles of reason, employed as
objective, are without exception dialectical, and possess no
validity or truth, except as regulative principles of the syste- . jiatic employment of reason in experience. But when such delusive proofs are presented to us, our duty to meet
them with the non liquet of matured judgment and, although we are unable to expose the particular sophism upon which the proof based, we nave right to demand deduc tion of the principles employed in and, these principles have their origin in pure reason alone, such deduction
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And thus it is unnecessary that we should trouble ourselves with the exposure and confutation of every
sophistical illusion ; we may, at once, bring all dialectic, which is inexhaustible in the production of fallacies, before ihe bar of critical reason, which tests the principles upon which all dialectical procedure is based. The second peculi arity of transcendental proof that transcendental propo sition cannot rest upon more than single proof. If am drawing conclusions, not from conceptions, but from intuition
478
DOCTBINB Of MEtHOD.
absolutely impossible.
to conception, be pure intuition, as in mathematics, or empirical, as in natural science, the intuition
which forms the basis of my inferences, presents me with ma
terials for many synthetical propositions, which can connect various modes, while, as allowable to proceed from dif ferent points in the intention, can arrive different paths
at the same proposition.
But every transcendental proposition sets out from con
ception, and posits the synthetical condition of the possibility of an object according to this conception. There must, there fore, be but one ground of proof, because the conception alone which determines the object and thus the proof cannot contain anything more than the determination of the object according to the conception. In our Transcendental Analytic, for example, we inferred the principle, Every event has cause, from the only condition of the objective possibility of our conception of an event. 'This that an event cannot be
experience, unless stands under this dynamical law. This the only possible ground of proof for our conception of an
event possesses objective validity, that is, true conception, only because the law of causality determines an object to which can refer. Other arguments in support of this principle have been attempted--such as that from the contingent nature of phenomenon but when this argument considered, we
sition, Every thinking being simple, keep to the conception of the Ego, which which all thought has relation. The same
corresponding
? can discover no criterion of coutingeucy, except the fact of an event--of something happening, that to say, the existence which preceded by the non-existence of an object, and thus we fall back on the very thing to be proved.
If the propo to be proved, we simple, and to the case with
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the transcendental proof of the existence of a Deity, which ia based solely upon the harmony and reciprocal fitness of the conceptions of an ena realissimum and a necessary being, and cannot be attempted in any other manner.
This caution serves to simplify very much the criticism of all propositions of reason. When reason employs conceptions alone, only one proof of its thesis is possible, if any. When, therefore, the dogmatist advances with ten arguments in favour of a proposition, we may be sure that not one of them is con clusive. For if he possessed one which proved the proposi tion he brings forward to demonstration --as must always be the case with the propositions of pure reason -- what need is there for any more ? His intention can only be similar to that of the advocate, who had different arguments for different judges ; thus availing himself of the weakness of those who examine his arguments, who, without going into any profound investigation, adopt the view of the case which seems most
probable at first sight, and decide according to it.
The third rule for the guidance of pure reason in the conduct of a proof is, that all transcendental proofs must never be apagogic or indirect, but always ostensive or direct. The direct or ostensive proof not only establishes the truth of the proposition to be proved, but exposes the grounds of its truth ;
the apagogic, on the other hand, may assure us of the truth of the proposition, but it cannot enable us to comprehend the grounds of its possibility. The latter accordingly, rather an auxiliary to an argument, than strictly philosophical and rational mode of procedure. In one respect, however, they have an advantage over direct proofs, from the fact, that the mode of arguing contradiction, which they employ, renders our understanding of the question more clear, and approxi
mates the proof to the certainty of an intuitional demonstra tion.
The true reason why indirect proofs are employed in dif ferent sciences, this. When the grounds upon which we seek to base cognition are too various or too profound, we try whether or not we may not discover the truth of our cog nition from its consequences. The modutponeru of reasoning from the truth of its inferences to the truth of proposition, would be admissible all the inferences that can be drawu from are k. iown to be true for in this case there can be
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only one possible ground for these inferences, and that is the
true one. But this is a quite impracticable procedure, as it surpasses Ail our powers to discover all the possible inferences that can be drawn from a proposition. But this mode of reasoning is employed, under favour, when we wish to prove the truth of a hypothesis ; in whieh cnse we admit the truth of the conclusion --which is supported by analogy --that, if all the inferences we have drawn and examined agree with the proposition assumed, all other possible inferences will also
lgree with it. But, in this way, an hypothesis can never be established as a demonstrated truth. The modus tollens of reasoning from known inferences to the unknown proposition, is not only a rigorous, but a very easy mode of proof. For, if it can be shown that but one inference from a proposition is false, then the proposition must itself be false. Instead, then, of examining, in an ostensive argument, the whole series of the grounds on which the truth of a proposition rests, we need only take the opposite of this proposition, and if one inference from it be false, then must the opposite be itself false ; and, consequently, the proposition which we wished to prove, must be true.
The apagogic method of proof is admissible only in those sciences where it is impossible to mistake a subjective re presentation for an objective cognition. Where this is pos sible, it is plain that the opposite of a given proposition may contradict merely the subjective conditions of thought, and not the objective cognition ; or it may happen that both propose tions contradict each other only under a subjective condition, which is incorrectly considered to be objective, and, as the condition is itself false, both propositions may be false, and it will, consequently, be impossible to conclude the truth of the
one from the falseness of the other.
In mathematics such subreptions are impossible ; and it is
in this science, accordingly, that the indirect mode of proof has its true place. In the science of nature, where all asser tion is based upon empirical intuition, such subreptions may
be guarded against by the repeated comparison of observa tions ; but this mode of proof is of little value in this sphere of knowledge. But the transcendental efforts of pure reason are all made in the sphere of the subjective, which is the roa. medium of all dialectical illusion ; and thus reason endeavours.
? ? ? ? THE DISCIPLINE OF FPB1 BEA8OS. 481
in its premisses, to impose upon ns subjective representations for objective cognitions. In the transcendental sphere of pure reason, then, and in the case of synthetical propositions, it is inadmissible to support a statement by disproving the counter- statement. For only two cases are possible ; either, the counter-statement is nothing but the enouncement of the inconsistency of the opposite opinion with the subjective con ditions of reason, which does not affect the real case (for example, we cannot comprehend the unconditioned necessity of the existence of a being, and hence every speculative proof of the existence of such a being must be opposed on subjective grounds, while the possibility of this being in itself cannot with justice be denied) ; or, both propositions, being dia lectical in their nature, are based upon an impossible con ception. In this latter case the rule applies --non entis nulla sunt predieata ; that is to say, what we affirm and what we deny, respecting such an object, are equally untrue, and the apagogic mode of arriving at the truth is in this case impos sible. If, for example, we presuppose that the world of sense is given in itself in its totality, it is false, either that is infinite, or that it is finite and limited in space. Both are false, because the hypothesis is false. For the notion of phenomena (as mere representations) which are given in themselves (as objects) i>> self- contradictory ; and the infinitude of this imaginary whole would, indeed, be unconditioned, but would be inconsistent (as every thing in the pheno menal world is conditioned) with the unconditioned deter mination and finitude of quantities which is presupposed in our conception.
The apagogic mode of proof is the true source of those illu sions which have always had so strong an attraction for the admirers of dogmatical philosophy. It may be compared to a champion, who maintains the honour and claims of the party he has adopted, by offering battle to all who doubt the validity of these claims and the purity of that honour ; while nothing can be proved in this way, except the respective strength oi the combatants, and the advantage, in this respect, is always on the side of the attacking party. Spectators, observing that each party is alternately conqueror and conquered, are led to
regard the subject of dispute as beycnc' the power of man to II
? ? ? ? 4b2 THANBCENDENTAL DOCTBINE OF METHOD.
decide upon. But such au opinion cannot be justified ; and it is sufficient to apply to these reasoners the remark :--
Non defensoribui istis Tempus eget.
Each must try to establish his assertions by a transcendental deduction of the grounds of proof employed in his argument, and thus enable us to see in what way the claims of reason may be supported. If an opponent bases his assertions upon subjective grounds, he may be refuted with ease ; not, how
ever to the advantage of the dogmatist, who likewise depends upon subjective sources of cognition, and is in like manner driven into a corner by his opponent. But, if parties employ the direct method of procedure, they will soon discover the difficulty, nay, the impossibility of proving their assertions, and will be forced to appeal to prescription and precedence ; or they will, by the help of criticism, discover with ease the dogmatical illusions by which they had been mocked, and compel reason to renounce its exaggerated pretensions to speculative insight, and to confine itself within the Limits of its ptoper sphere--that of practical principles.
TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. CHAPTER SECOND.
The Canon of Pcee Reason.
It is a humiliating consideration for human reason, that it
is incompetent to discover truth by means of pure speculation, but, on the contrary, stands in need of discipline to check its deviations from the straight path, and to expose the illusions which it originates. But, on the other hand, this consider ation ought to elevate and to give it confidence, for this disci pline is exercised by itself alone, and it is subject to the censure of no other power. The bounds, moreover, which it is forced to set to its speculative exercise, form likewise a check upon the fallacious pretensions of opponents ; and thus what remains of its possessions, after these exaggerate I claims have been disallowed, is secure from attack or usurpa tion. The greatest, and perhaps the only, use of all philo sophy of pure reason accordingly, of purely negativ*
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483
character. It is not an organon for the extension, but a dis cipline for the determination of the limits of its exercise ; and without laying claim to the discovery of new truth, it has the modest merit of guarding against error.
At the same time, there must be some source of positive cognitions which belong to the domain of pure reason, and which become the causes of error only, from our mistaking their true character, while they form the goal towards which reason continually strives. How else can we account for the inextinguishable desire in the human mind to find a firm foot ing in some region beyond the limits of the world of experi ence ? --It hopes to attain to the possession of a knowledge in which it has the deepest interest. It enters upon the path of pure speculation ; but in vain. We have some reason, however, to expect that, in the only other way that lies open to --the path of practical reason, -- may meet with better success.
understand canon list of the a priori principles ot the proper employment of certain faculties of cognition. Thus general logic, in its analytical department, formal canon for the faculties of understanding and reason. In the same way, Transcendental Analytic was seen to be canon of the pure understanding for alone competent to enounce true a
priori synthetical cognitions. But, when no proper employ ment of faculty of cognition possible, no canon can exist. But the synthetical cognition of pure speculative reason as has been shown, completely impossible. There cannot, there fore, exist any canon for the speculative exercise of this faculty -- for its speculative exercise entirely dialectical and conse quently, transcendental logic, in this respect, merely dis cipline, and not canon. then, there any proper mode of employing the faculty of pure reason, --in which case there must be canon for this faculty, --this canon will relate, not to the speculative, but to the practical use reason. This canon we now proceed to investigate.
THE CANON OF PURE REASON. Section Fibst.
Of the Ultimate End the Pure Uce of Reason.
There exists in the faculty of reason natural desire so veiuure beyond the field of experience, to attempt to reach the
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utmost bounds of all cognition by the help of ideas alone, and not to rest satisfied, until it has fulfilled its course and raised the sum of its cognitions into a self-subsistent systematic whole. Is the motive for this endeavour to be found in ita speculative, or in its practical interests alone ?
Setting aside, at present, the results of the labours of pure reason in its speculative exercise, I shall merely inquire re- garding the problems, the solution of which forms its ultimate aim--whether reached or not, and in relation to which all other aims are but partial and intermediate. These highest aims must, from the nature of reason, possess complete unity ; otherwise the highest interest of humanity could not be suc cessfully promoted.
The transcendental speculation of reason relates to three things : the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God. The speculative interest which reason has in those questions is very small ; and, for its sake alone, we should not undertake the labour of transcendental investigation --a labour full of toil and ceaseless struggle. We should be loth to undertake this labour, because the dis coveries we might make would not be of the smallest use in the sphere of concrete or physical investigation. We may find out that the will is free, but this knowledge only relates to the intelligible cause of our volition. As regards the phsenomena or expressions of this will, that our actions, we are bound, in obedience to an inviolable maxim, without which reason cannot be employed in the sphere of experience, to explain these the same way as we explain all the other phenomena of nature, that to say, according to its un changeable laws. We may have discovered the spirituality and immortality of the soul, but we cannot employ this know ledge to explain the pheuomena of this life, nor the peculiar nature of the future because our conception of an incorporeal uature purely negative and does not add anything to our knowledge, and the only inferences to be drawn from are jmrely fictitious. If, again, we prove the existence of supreme intelligence, we should be able from to make the conformity to timi existing in the arrangement of the world comprehen sible but we should not be justified in deducing from anv
particular arrangement or disposition, or, inferring any, where
? not perceived. For
necessary rule of the specula
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tire use of reason, that we must not overlook natural causes, or refuse to listen to the teaching of experience, for the sake of deducing what we know and perceive from something that transcends all our knowledge. In one word, these three pro positions are, for the speculative reason, always transcendent, and cannot be employed as immanent principles in relation to the objects of experience ; they are, consequently, of no use to us in this sphere, being but the valueless results of the severs but unprofitable efforts of reason.
If, then, the actual cognition of these three cardinal propo sitions is perfectly useless, while Reason uses her utmost en deavours to induce ns to admit them, it is plain that their real value and importance relate to our practical, and not to our speculative interest.
? I term all that is possible through free-will, practical. But if the conditions of the exercise of free volition are empirical, reason can have only a regulative, and not a constitutive, influ ence upon and serviceable merely for the introduction of unity into its empirical laws. In the moral philosophy of prudence, for example, the sole business of reason to bring about union of all the ends, which are aimed at by our inclinations, into one ultimate end -- that of happiness, and to show the agreement which should exist among the means of attaining that end. In this sphere, accordingly, reason cannot present to us any other than pragmatical laws of free action, for oar guidance towards the aims set up by the senses, and
incompetent to give us laws which are pure and determined completely priori. On the other hand, pure practical laws, the ends of which have been given reason entirely priori, and which are not empirically conditioned, but are, on the contrary, absolutely imperative in their nature, would be pro ducts of pure reason. Such are the moral laws and these alone belong to the sphere of the practical exercise of reason, and admit of canon.
All the powers of reason, in the sphere of what may be termed pure philosophy, are, in fact, directed to the three above-mentioned These again have still higher end--the answer to the question, what we ought to do,
the will free, there God, and future world. Now, as this problem relates to our conduct, in reference to the highest aim of humanity, evident that the ultimate inten-
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tion of nature, in the constitution of our reason, has been directed to the moral alone.
We must take care, however, in turning our attention to an object which is foreign* to the sphere of transcendental philoso phy, not to injure the unity of our system by digressions, nor, on the other hand, to fail in clearness, by saying too little on the new subject of discussion. I hope to avoid both extremes, by keeping as close as possible to the transcendental, and ex
cluding all psychological, that empirical elements.
have to remark, in the first place, that at present treat of the conception of freedom in the practical sense only, and set aside the corresponding transcendental conception, which cannot be employed as ground of explanation in the phe-
nomenal world, but itself problem for pure reason.
will purely animal (zrbitrium brutum), when determined
sensuous impulses or instincts only, that is, when de
termined in pathological manner. will, which can be de
termined independently of sensuous impulses, consequently by motives presented reason alone, called free will (or- bitrium liberum) and everything which connected with this free will, either as principle or consequence, termed
practical.