No More Learning

Paul, (Tit. 3. 2) "Warn them that they subject
themselves to Princes, and to those that are in Authority, & obey
them. " This obedience is also simple. Lastly, our Saviour himselfe
acknowledges, that men ought to pay such taxes as are by Kings imposed,
where he sayes, "Give to Caesar that which is Caesars;" and payed such
taxes himselfe. And that the Kings word, is sufficient to take any thing
from any subject, when there is need; and that the King is Judge of that
need: For he himselfe, as King of the Jewes, commanded his Disciples to
take the Asse, and Asses Colt to carry him into Jerusalem, saying, (Mat.
21. 2,3) "Go into the Village over against you, and you shall find a
shee Asse tyed, and her Colt with her, unty them, and bring them to me.
And if any man ask you, what you mean by it, Say the Lord hath need
of them: And they will let them go. " They will not ask whether his
necessity be a sufficient title; nor whether he be judge of that
necessity; but acquiesce in the will of the Lord.

To these places may be added also that of Genesis, (Gen. 3. 5) "You
shall be as Gods, knowing Good and Evill. " and verse 11. "Who told thee
that thou wast naked? hast thou eaten of the tree, of which I commanded
thee thou shouldest not eat? " For the Cognisance of Judicature of Good
and Evill, being forbidden by the name of the fruit of the tree of
Knowledge, as a triall of Adams obedience; The Divell to enflame the
Ambition of the woman, to whom that fruit already seemed beautifull,
told her that by tasting it, they should be as Gods, knowing Good and
Evill. Whereupon having both eaten, they did indeed take upon them
Gods office, which is Judicature of Good and Evill; but acquired no new
ability to distinguish between them aright. And whereas it is sayd, that
having eaten, they saw they were naked; no man hath so interpreted that
place, as if they had formerly blind, as saw not their own skins: the
meaning is plain, that it was then they first judged their nakednesse
(wherein it was Gods will to create them) to be uncomely; and by being
ashamed, did tacitely censure God himselfe. And thereupon God saith,
"Hast thou eaten, &c. " as if he should say, doest thou that owest me
obedience, take upon thee to judge of my Commandements? Whereby it is
cleerly, (though Allegorically,) signified, that the Commands of
them that have the right to command, are not by their Subjects to be
censured, nor disputed.




Soveraign Power Ought In All Common-wealths To Be Absolute

So it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from Reason, and
Scripture, that the Soveraign Power, whether placed in One Man, as in
Monarchy, or in one Assembly of men, as in Popular, and Aristocraticall
Common-wealths, is as great, as possibly men can be imagined to make
it. And though of so unlimited a Power, men may fancy many evill
consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is
perpetuall warre of every man against his neighbour, are much worse. The
condition of man in this life shall never be without Inconveniences; but
there happeneth in no Common-wealth any great Inconvenience, but what
proceeds from the Subjects disobedience, and breach of those Covenants,
from which the Common-wealth had its being. And whosoever thinking
Soveraign Power too great, will seek to make it lesse; must subject
himselfe, to the Power, that can limit it; that is to say, to a greater.

The greatest objection is, that of the Practise; when men ask, where,
and when, such Power has by Subjects been acknowledged. But one may
ask them again, when, or where has there been a Kingdome long free from
Sedition and Civill Warre. In those Nations, whose Common-wealths have
been long-lived, and not been destroyed, but by forraign warre, the
Subjects never did dispute of the Soveraign Power. But howsoever, an
argument for the Practise of men, that have not sifted to the bottom,
and with exact reason weighed the causes, and nature of Common-wealths,
and suffer daily those miseries, that proceed from the ignorance
thereof, is invalid. For though in all places of the world, men should
lay the foundation of their houses on the sand, it could not thence be
inferred, that so it ought to be. The skill of making, and maintaining
Common-wealths, consisteth in certain Rules, as doth Arithmetique and
Geometry; not (as Tennis-play) on Practise onely: which Rules, neither
poor men have the leisure, nor men that have had the leisure, have
hitherto had the curiosity, or the method to find out.



CHAPTER XXI. OF THE LIBERTY OF SUBJECTS




Liberty What

Liberty, or FREEDOME, signifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition;
(by Opposition, I mean externall Impediments of motion;) and may
be applyed no lesse to Irrational, and Inanimate creatures, than to
Rationall. For whatsoever is so tyed, or environed, as it cannot move,
but within a certain space, which space is determined by the opposition
of some externall body, we say it hath not Liberty to go further. And
so of all living creatures, whilest they are imprisoned, or restrained,
with walls, or chayns; and of the water whilest it is kept in by banks,
or vessels, that otherwise would spread it selfe into a larger space, we
use to say, they are not at Liberty, to move in such manner, as without
those externall impediments they would. But when the impediment of
motion, is in the constitution of the thing it selfe, we use not to
say, it wants the Liberty; but the Power to move; as when a stone lyeth
still, or a man is fastned to his bed by sicknesse.




What It Is To Be Free

And according to this proper, and generally received meaning of the
word, A FREE-MAN, is "he, that in those things, which by his strength
and wit he is able to do, is not hindred to doe what he has a will
to. " But when the words Free, and Liberty, are applyed to any thing but
Bodies, they are abused; for that which is not subject to Motion, is not
subject to Impediment: And therefore, when 'tis said (for example) The
way is free, no liberty of the way is signified, but of those that walk
in it without stop. And when we say a Guift is free, there is not meant
any liberty of the Guift, but of the Giver, that was not bound by any
law, or Covenant to give it. So when we Speak Freely, it is not the
liberty of voice, or pronunciation, but of the man, whom no law hath
obliged to speak otherwise then he did. Lastly, from the use of the
word Freewill, no liberty can be inferred to the will, desire, or
inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that
he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination
to doe.




Feare And Liberty Consistent

Feare and Liberty are consistent; as when a man throweth his goods into
the Sea for Feare the ship should sink, he doth it neverthelesse very
willingly, and may refuse to doe it if he will: It is therefore the
action, of one that was Free; so a man sometimes pays his debt, only for
Feare of Imprisonment, which because no body hindred him from detaining,
was the action of a man at Liberty. And generally all actions which men
doe in Common-wealths, for Feare of the law, or actions, which the doers
had Liberty to omit.




Liberty And Necessity Consistent

Liberty and Necessity are Consistent: As in the water, that hath not
only Liberty, but a Necessity of descending by the Channel: so likewise
in the Actions which men voluntarily doe; which (because they proceed
from their will) proceed from Liberty; and yet because every act of
mans will, and every desire, and inclination proceedeth from some cause,
which causes in a continuall chaine (whose first link in the hand of
God the first of all causes) proceed from Necessity. So that to him
that could see the connexion of those causes, the Necessity of all
mens voluntary actions, would appeare manifest. And therefore God, that
seeth, and disposeth all things, seeth also that the Liberty of man
in doing what he will, is accompanied with the Necessity of doing that
which God will, & no more, nor lesse. For though men may do many things,
which God does not command, nor is therefore Author of them; yet they
can have no passion, nor appetite to any thing, of which appetite Gods
will is not the cause. And did not his will assure the Necessity of mans
will, and consequently of all that on mans will dependeth, the Liberty
of men would be a contradiction, and impediment to the omnipotence and
Liberty of God. And this shall suffice, (as to the matter in hand) of
that naturall Liberty, which only is properly called Liberty.




Artificiall Bonds, Or Covenants

But as men, for the atteyning of peace, and conservation of themselves
thereby, have made an Artificiall Man, which we call a Common-wealth; so
also have they made Artificiall Chains, called Civill Lawes, which they
themselves, by mutuall covenants, have fastned at one end, to the lips
of that Man, or Assembly, to whom they have given the Soveraigne Power;
and at the other end to their own Ears. These Bonds in their own nature
but weak, may neverthelesse be made to hold, by the danger, though not
by the difficulty of breaking them.




Liberty Of Subjects Consisteth In Liberty From Covenants

In relation to these Bonds only it is, that I am to speak now, of the
Liberty of Subjects. For seeing there is no Common-wealth in the world,
for the regulating of all the actions, and words of men, (as being
a thing impossible:) it followeth necessarily, that in all kinds of
actions, by the laws praetermitted, men have the Liberty, of doing what
their own reasons shall suggest, for the most profitable to themselves.
For if wee take Liberty in the proper sense, for corporall Liberty; that
is to say, freedome from chains, and prison, it were very absurd for men
to clamor as they doe, for the Liberty they so manifestly enjoy. Againe,
if we take Liberty, for an exemption from Lawes, it is no lesse absurd,
for men to demand as they doe, that Liberty, by which all other men may
be masters of their lives. And yet as absurd as it is, this is it they
demand; not knowing that the Lawes are of no power to protect them,
without a Sword in the hands of a man, or men, to cause those laws to
be put in execution. The Liberty of a Subject, lyeth therefore only
in those things, which in regulating their actions, the Soveraign hath
praetermitted; such as is the Liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise
contract with one another; to choose their own aboad, their own diet,
their own trade of life, and institute their children as they themselves
think fit; & the like.




Liberty Of The Subject Consistent With Unlimited Power Of The Soveraign

Neverthelesse we are not to understand, that by such Liberty, the
Soveraign Power of life, and death, is either abolished, or limited. For
it has been already shewn, that nothing the Soveraign Representative
can doe to a Subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called
Injustice, or Injury; because every Subject is Author of every act the
Soveraign doth; so that he never wanteth Right to any thing, otherwise,
than as he himself is the Subject of God, and bound thereby to observe
the laws of Nature. And therefore it may, and doth often happen in
Common-wealths, that a Subject may be put to death, by the command of
the Soveraign Power; and yet neither doe the other wrong: as when Jeptha
caused his daughter to be sacrificed: In which, and the like cases,
he that so dieth, had Liberty to doe the action, for which he is
neverthelesse, without Injury put to death. And the same holdeth also
in a Soveraign Prince, that putteth to death an Innocent Subject. For
though the action be against the law of Nature, as being contrary to
Equitie, (as was the killing of Uriah, by David;) yet it was not an
Injurie to Uriah; but to God. Not to Uriah, because the right to doe
what he pleased, was given him by Uriah himself; And yet to God, because
David was Gods Subject; and prohibited all Iniquitie by the law of
Nature. Which distinction, David himself, when he repented the fact,
evidently confirmed, saying, "To thee only have I sinned. " In the same
manner, the people of Athens, when they banished the most potent of
their Common-wealth for ten years, thought they committed no Injustice;
and yet they never questioned what crime he had done; but what hurt he
would doe: Nay they commanded the banishment of they knew not whom; and
every Citizen bringing his Oystershell into the market place, written
with the name of him he desired should be banished, without actuall
accusing him, sometimes banished an Aristides, for his reputation of
Justice; And sometimes a scurrilous Jester, as Hyperbolus, to make a
Jest of it. And yet a man cannot say, the Soveraign People of Athens
wanted right to banish them; or an Athenian the Libertie to Jest, or to
be Just.




The Liberty Which Writers Praise, Is The Liberty Of Soveraigns;

Not Of Private Men

The Libertie, whereof there is so frequent, and honourable mention, in
the Histories, and Philosophy of the Antient Greeks, and Romans, and in
the writings, and discourse of those that from them have received all
their learning in the Politiques, is not the Libertie of Particular
men; but the Libertie of the Common-wealth: which is the same with
that, which every man then should have, if there were no Civil Laws,
nor Common-wealth at all. And the effects of it also be the same. For as
amongst masterlesse men, there is perpetuall war, of every man against
his neighbour; no inheritance, to transmit to the Son, nor to expect
from the Father; no propriety of Goods, or Lands; no security; but a
full and absolute Libertie in every Particular man: So in States, and
Common-wealths not dependent on one another, every Common-wealth, (not
every man) has an absolute Libertie, to doe what it shall judge (that is
to say, what that Man, or Assemblie that representeth it, shall judge)
most conducing to their benefit. But withall, they live in the condition
of a perpetuall war, and upon the confines of battel, with their
frontiers armed, and canons planted against their neighbours
round about. The Athenians, and Romanes, were free; that is, free
Common-wealths: not that any particular men had the Libertie to resist
their own Representative; but that their Representative had the Libertie
to resist, or invade other people. There is written on the Turrets of
the city of Luca in great characters at this day, the word LIBERTAS; yet
no man can thence inferre, that a particular man has more Libertie,
or Immunitie from the service of the Commonwealth there, than in
Constantinople. Whether a Common-wealth be Monarchicall, or Popular, the
Freedome is still the same.

But it is an easy thing, for men to be deceived, by the specious name
of Libertie; and for want of Judgement to distinguish, mistake that for
their Private Inheritance, and Birth right, which is the right of the
Publique only. And when the same errour is confirmed by the authority of
men in reputation for their writings in this subject, it is no wonder if
it produce sedition, and change of Government. In these westerne
parts of the world, we are made to receive our opinions concerning the
Institution, and Rights of Common-wealths, from Aristotle, Cicero, and
other men, Greeks and Romanes, that living under Popular States, derived
those Rights, not from the Principles of Nature, but transcribed them
into their books, out of the Practice of their own Common-wealths, which
were Popular; as the Grammarians describe the Rules of Language, out of
the Practise of the time; or the Rules of Poetry, out of the Poems of
Homer and Virgil. And because the Athenians were taught, (to keep them
from desire of changing their Government,) that they were Freemen, and
all that lived under Monarchy were slaves; therefore Aristotle puts it
down in his Politiques,(lib. 6. cap. 2) "In democracy, Liberty is to be
supposed: for 'tis commonly held, that no man is Free in any other
Government. " And as Aristotle; so Cicero, and other Writers have
grounded their Civill doctrine, on the opinions of the Romans, who were
taught to hate Monarchy, at first, by them that having deposed their
Soveraign, shared amongst them the Soveraignty of Rome; and afterwards
by their Successors. And by reading of these Greek, and Latine Authors,
men from their childhood have gotten a habit (under a false shew of
Liberty,) of favouring tumults, and of licentious controlling the
actions of their Soveraigns; and again of controlling those controllers,
with the effusion of so much blood; as I think I may truly say, there
was never any thing so deerly bought, as these Western parts have bought
the learning of the Greek and Latine tongues.




Liberty Of The Subject How To Be Measured

To come now to the particulars of the true Liberty of a Subject; that is
to say, what are the things, which though commanded by the Soveraign, he
may neverthelesse, without Injustice, refuse to do; we are to consider,
what Rights we passe away, when we make a Common-wealth; or (which is
all one,) what Liberty we deny our selves, by owning all the Actions
(without exception) of the Man, or Assembly we make our Soveraign. For
in the act of our Submission, consisteth both our Obligation, and
our Liberty; which must therefore be inferred by arguments taken from
thence; there being no Obligation on any man, which ariseth not from
some Act of his own; for all men equally, are by Nature Free. And
because such arguments, must either be drawn from the expresse words, "I
Authorise all his Actions," or from the Intention of him that submitteth
himselfe to his Power, (which Intention is to be understood by the End
for which he so submitteth;) The Obligation, and Liberty of the Subject,
is to be derived, either from those Words, (or others equivalent;) or
else from the End of the Institution of Soveraignty; namely, the Peace
of the Subjects within themselves, and their Defence against a common
Enemy.




Subjects Have Liberty To Defend Their Own Bodies,

Even Against Them That Lawfully Invade Them

First therefore, seeing Soveraignty by Institution, is by Covenant of
every one to every one; and Soveraignty by Acquisition, by Covenants of
the Vanquished to the Victor, or Child to the Parent; It is manifest,
that every Subject has Liberty in all those things, the right whereof
cannot by Covenant be transferred. I have shewn before in the 14.
Chapter, that Covenants, not to defend a mans own body, are voyd.
Therefore,




Are Not Bound To Hurt Themselves;

If the Soveraign command a man (though justly condemned,) to kill,
wound, or mayme himselfe; or not to resist those that assault him; or
to abstain from the use of food, ayre, medicine, or any other thing,
without which he cannot live; yet hath that man the Liberty to disobey.

If a man be interrogated by the Soveraign, or his Authority, concerning
a crime done by himselfe, he is not bound (without assurance of Pardon)
to confesse it; because no man (as I have shewn in the same Chapter) can
be obliged by Covenant to accuse himselfe.

Again, the Consent of a Subject to Soveraign Power, is contained in
these words, "I Authorise, or take upon me, all his actions;" in which
there is no restriction at all, of his own former naturall Liberty:
For by allowing him to Kill Me, I am not bound to Kill my selfe when
he commands me. "'Tis one thing to say 'Kill me, or my fellow, if you
please;' another thing to say, 'I will kill my selfe, or my fellow. '" It
followeth therefore, that

No man is bound by the words themselves, either to kill himselfe, or
any other man; And consequently, that the Obligation a man may sometimes
have, upon the Command of the Soveraign to execute any dangerous, or
dishonourable Office, dependeth not on the Words of our Submission; but
on the Intention; which is to be understood by the End thereof. When
therefore our refusall to obey, frustrates the End for which the
Soveraignty was ordained; then there is no Liberty to refuse: otherwise
there is.




Nor To Warfare, Unless They Voluntarily Undertake It

Upon this ground, a man that is commanded as a Souldier to fight against
the enemy, though his Soveraign have Right enough to punish his refusall
with death, may neverthelesse in many cases refuse, without Injustice;
as when he substituteth a sufficient Souldier in his place: for in this
case he deserteth not the service of the Common-wealth. And there is
allowance to be made for naturall timorousnesse, not onely to women, (of
whom no such dangerous duty is expected,) but also to men of feminine
courage. When Armies fight, there is on one side, or both, a running
away; yet when they do it not out of trechery, but fear, they are not
esteemed to do it unjustly, but dishonourably. For the same reason, to
avoyd battell, is not Injustice, but Cowardise. But he that inrowleth
himselfe a Souldier, or taketh imprest mony, taketh away the excuse of
a timorous nature; and is obliged, not onely to go to the battell,
but also not to run from it, without his Captaines leave. And when the
Defence of the Common-wealth, requireth at once the help of all that
are able to bear Arms, every one is obliged; because otherwise the
Institution of the Common-wealth, which they have not the purpose, or
courage to preserve, was in vain.

To resist the Sword of the Common-wealth, in defence of another man,
guilty, or innocent, no man hath Liberty; because such Liberty, takes
away from the Soveraign, the means of Protecting us; and is therefore
destructive of the very essence of Government. But in case a great many
men together, have already resisted the Soveraign Power Unjustly, or
committed some Capitall crime, for which every one of them expecteth
death, whether have they not the Liberty then to joyn together, and
assist, and defend one another? Certainly they have: For they but defend
their lives, which the guilty man may as well do, as the Innocent. There
was indeed injustice in the first breach of their duty; Their bearing of
Arms subsequent to it, though it be to maintain what they have done, is
no new unjust act. And if it be onely to defend their persons, it is not
unjust at all. But the offer of Pardon taketh from them, to whom it
is offered, the plea of self-defence, and maketh their perseverance in
assisting, or defending the rest, unlawfull.




The Greatest Liberty Of Subjects, Dependeth On The Silence Of The Law


As for other Lyberties, they depend on the silence of the Law. In cases
where the Soveraign has prescribed no rule, there the Subject hath
the liberty to do, or forbeare, according to his own discretion. And
therefore such Liberty is in some places more, and in some lesse; and in
some times more, in other times lesse, according as they that have the
Soveraignty shall think most convenient. As for Example, there was
a time, when in England a man might enter in to his own Land,
(and dispossesse such as wrongfully possessed it) by force. But in
after-times, that Liberty of Forcible entry, was taken away by a Statute
made (by the King) in Parliament. And is some places of the world, men
have the Liberty of many wives: in other places, such Liberty is not
allowed.

If a Subject have a controversie with his Soveraigne, of Debt, or
of right of possession of lands or goods, or concerning any service
required at his hands, or concerning any penalty corporall, or
pecuniary, grounded on a precedent Law; He hath the same Liberty to sue
for his right, as if it were against a Subject; and before such Judges,
as are appointed by the Soveraign. For seeing the Soveraign demandeth
by force of a former Law, and not by vertue of his Power; he declareth
thereby, that he requireth no more, than shall appear to be due by that
Law. The sute therefore is not contrary to the will of the Soveraign;
and consequently the Subject hath the Liberty to demand the hearing of
his Cause; and sentence, according to that Law. But if he demand, or
take any thing by pretence of his Power; there lyeth, in that case, no
action of Law: for all that is done by him in Vertue of his Power, is
done by the Authority of every subject, and consequently, he that brings
an action against the Soveraign, brings it against himselfe.

If a Monarch, or Soveraign Assembly, grant a Liberty to all, or any of
his Subjects; which Grant standing, he is disabled to provide for their
safety, the Grant is voyd; unlesse he directly renounce, or transferre
the Soveraignty to another. For in that he might openly, (if it had been
his will,) and in plain termes, have renounced, or transferred it, and
did not; it is to be understood it was not his will; but that the Grant
proceeded from ignorance of the repugnancy between such a Liberty and
the Soveraign Power; and therefore the Soveraignty is still retayned;
and consequently all those Powers, which are necessary to the exercising
thereof; such as are the Power of Warre, and Peace, of Judicature, of
appointing Officers, and Councellours, of levying Mony, and the rest
named in the 18th Chapter.




In What Cases Subjects Absolved Of Their Obedience To Their Soveraign

The Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign is understood to last as
long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to
protect them. For the right men have by Nature to protect themselves,
when none else can protect them, can by no Covenant be relinquished. The
Soveraignty is the Soule of the Common-wealth; which once departed from
the Body, the members doe no more receive their motion from it. The end
of Obedience is Protection; which, wheresoever a man seeth it, either in
his own, or in anothers sword, Nature applyeth his obedience to it, and
his endeavour to maintaine it. And though Soveraignty, in the intention
of them that make it, be immortall; yet is it in its own nature, not
only subject to violent death, by forreign war; but also through
the ignorance, and passions of men, it hath in it, from the very
institution, many seeds of a naturall mortality, by Intestine Discord.




In Case Of Captivity

If a Subject be taken prisoner in war; or his person, or his means of
life be within the Guards of the enemy, and hath his life and corporall
Libertie given him, on condition to be Subject to the Victor, he hath
Libertie to accept the condition; and having accepted it, is the subject
of him that took him; because he had no other way to preserve himselfe.
The case is the same, if he be deteined on the same termes, in a
forreign country. But if a man be held in prison, or bonds, or is not
trusted with the libertie of his bodie; he cannot be understood to be
bound by Covenant to subjection; and therefore may, if he can, make his
escape by any means whatsoever.




In Case The Soveraign Cast Off The Government From Himself And Heyrs

If a Monarch shall relinquish the Soveraignty, both for himself, and
his heires; His Subjects returne to the absolute Libertie of Nature;
because, though Nature may declare who are his Sons, and who are the
nerest of his Kin; yet it dependeth on his own will, (as hath been said
in the precedent chapter,) who shall be his Heyr. If therefore he will
have no Heyre, there is no Soveraignty, nor Subjection. The case is the
same, if he dye without known Kindred, and without declaration of
his Heyre. For then there can no Heire be known, and consequently no
Subjection be due.




In Case Of Banishment

If the Soveraign Banish his Subject; during the Banishment, he is not
Subject. But he that is sent on a message, or hath leave to travell, is
still Subject; but it is, by Contract between Soveraigns, not by vertue
of the covenant of Subjection. For whosoever entreth into anothers
dominion, is Subject to all the Lawes thereof; unless he have a
privilege by the amity of the Soveraigns, or by speciall licence.




In Case The Soveraign Render Himself Subject To Another

If a Monarch subdued by war, render himself Subject to the Victor; his
Subjects are delivered from their former obligation, and become obliged
to the Victor. But if he be held prisoner, or have not the liberty
of his own Body; he is not understood to have given away the Right of
Soveraigntie; and therefore his Subjects are obliged to yield obedience
to the Magistrates formerly placed, governing not in their own name,
but in his. For, his Right remaining, the question is only of the
Administration; that is to say, of the Magistrates and Officers; which,
if he have not means to name, he is supposed to approve those, which he
himself had formerly appointed.



CHAPTER XXII. OF SYSTEMES SUBJECT, POLITICALL, AND PRIVATE




The Divers Sorts Of Systemes Of People

Having spoken of the Generation, Forme, and Power of a Common-wealth, I
am in order to speak next of the parts thereof. And first of Systemes,
which resemble the similar parts, or Muscles of a Body naturall. By
SYSTEMES; I understand any numbers of men joyned in one Interest, or one
Businesse. Of which, some are Regular, and some Irregular. Regular are
those, where one Man, or Assembly of men, is constituted Representative
of the whole number. All other are Irregular.

Of Regular, some are Absolute, and Independent, subject to none but
their own Representative: such are only Common-wealths; Of which I have
spoken already in the 5. last preceding chapters. Others are Dependent;
that is to say, Subordinate to some Soveraign Power, to which every one,
as also their Representative is Subject.

Of Systemes subordinate, some are Politicall, and some Private.
Politicall (otherwise Called Bodies Politique, and Persons In Law,)
are those, which are made by authority from the Soveraign Power of the
Common-wealth. Private, are those, which are constituted by Subjects
amongst themselves, or by authoritie from a stranger. For no authority
derived from forraign power, within the Dominion of another, is Publique
there, but Private.

And of Private Systemes, some are Lawfull; some Unlawfull: Lawfull, are
those which are allowed by the Common-wealth: all other are Unlawfull.
Irregular Systemes, are those which having no Representative,
consist only in concourse of People; which if not forbidden by the
Common-wealth, nor made on evill designe, (such as are conflux of People
to markets, or shews, or any other harmelesse end,) are Lawfull. But
when the Intention is evill, or (if the number be considerable) unknown,
they are Unlawfull.




In All Bodies Politique The Power Of The Representative Is Limited

In Bodies Politique, the power of the Representative is alwaies Limited:
And that which prescribeth the limits thereof, is the Power Soveraign.
For Power Unlimited, is absolute Soveraignty. And the Soveraign, in
every Commonwealth, is the absolute Representative of all the Subjects;
and therefore no other, can be Representative of any part of them,
but so far forth, as he shall give leave; And to give leave to a Body
Politique of Subjects, to have an absolute Representative to all
intents and purposes, were to abandon the Government of so much of the
Commonwealth, and to divide the Dominion, contrary to their Peace and
Defence, which the Soveraign cannot be understood to doe, by any Grant,
that does not plainly, and directly discharge them of their subjection.
For consequences of words, are not the signes of his will, when other
consequences are signes of the contrary; but rather signes of errour,
and misreckoning; to which all mankind is too prone.

The bounds of that Power, which is given to the Representative of a
Bodie Politique, are to be taken notice of, from two things. One is
their Writt, or Letters from the Soveraign: the other is the Law of the
Common-wealth.




By Letters Patents

For though in the Institution or Acquisition of a Common-wealth,
which is independent, there needs no Writing, because the Power of the
Representative has there no other bounds, but such as are set out by
the unwritten Law of Nature; yet in subordinate bodies, there are such
diversities of Limitation necessary, concerning their businesses, times,
and places, as can neither be remembred without Letters, nor taken
notice of, unlesse such Letters be Patent, that they may be read to
them, and withall sealed, or testified, with the Seales, or other
permanent signes of the Authority Soveraign.




And The Lawes

And because such Limitation is not alwaies easie, or perhaps possible
to be described in writing; the ordinary Lawes, common to all Subjects,
must determine, that the Representative may lawfully do, in all Cases,
where the Letters themselves are silent. And therefore




When The Representative Is One Man, His Unwarranted Acts His Own Onely

In a Body Politique, if the Representative be one man, whatsoever he
does in the Person of the Body, which is not warranted in his Letters,
nor by the Lawes, is his own act, and not the act of the Body, nor of
any other Member thereof besides himselfe: Because further than his
Letters, or the Lawes limit, he representeth no mans person, but his
own. But what he does according to these, is the act of every one: For
of the Act of the Soveraign every one is Author, because he is their
Representative unlimited; and the act of him that recedes not from the
Letters of the Soveraign, is the act of the Soveraign, and therefore
every member of the Body is Author of it.




When It Is An Assembly, It Is The Act Of Them That Assented Onely

But if the Representative be an Assembly, whatsoever that Assembly shall
Decree, not warranted by their Letters, or the Lawes, is the act of the
Assembly, or Body Politique, and the act of every one by whose Vote the
Decree was made; but not the act of any man that being present Voted to
the contrary; nor of any man absent, unlesse he Voted it by procuration.
It is the act of the Assembly, because Voted by the major part; and if
it be a crime, the Assembly may be punished, as farre-forth as it is
capable, as by dissolution, or forfeiture of their Letters (which is to
such artificiall, and fictitious Bodies, capitall,) or (if the
Assembly have a Common stock, wherein none of the Innocent Members have
propriety,) by pecuniary Mulct. For from corporall penalties Nature hath
exempted all Bodies Politique. But they that gave not their Vote, are
therefore Innocent, because the Assembly cannot Represent any man in
things unwarranted by their Letters, and consequently are not involved
in their Votes.

When The Representative Is One Man, If He Borrow Mony, Or Owe It, By
Contract; He Is Lyable Onely, The Members Not If the person of the Body
Politique being in one man, borrow mony of a stranger, that is, of one
that is not of the same Body, (for no Letters need limit borrowing,
seeing it is left to mens own inclinations to limit lending) the debt is
the Representatives. For if he should have Authority from his Letters,
to make the members pay what he borroweth, he should have by consequence
the Soveraignty of them; and therefore the grant were either voyd,
as proceeding from Errour, commonly incident to humane Nature, and an
unsufficient signe of the will of the Granter; or if it be avowed
by him, then is the Representer Soveraign, and falleth not under the
present question, which is onely of Bodies subordinate. No member
therefore is obliged to pay the debt so borrowed, but the Representative
himselfe: because he that lendeth it, being a stranger to the Letters,
and to the qualification of the Body, understandeth those onely for
his debtors, that are engaged; and seeing the Representer can ingage
himselfe, and none else, has him onely for Debtor; who must therefore
pay him, out of the common stock (if there be any), or (if there be
none) out of his own estate.

If he come into debt by Contract, or Mulct, the case is the same.




When It Is An Assembly, They Onely Are Liable That Have Assented

But when the Representative is an Assembly, and the debt to a stranger;
all they, and onely they are responsible for the debt, that gave their
votes to the borrowing of it, or to the Contract that made it due, or to
the fact for which the Mulct was imposed; because every one of those in
voting did engage himselfe for the payment: For he that is author of
the borrowing, is obliged to the payment, even of the whole debt, though
when payd by any one, he be discharged.




If The Debt Be To One Of The Assembly, The Body Onely Is Obliged

But if the debt be to one of the Assembly, the Assembly onely is obliged
to the payment, out of their common stock (if they have any:) For having
liberty of Vote, if he Vote the Mony, shall be borrowed, he Votes it
shall be payd; If he Vote it shall not be borrowed, or be absent, yet
because in lending, he voteth the borrowing, he contradicteth his former
Vote, and is obliged by the later, and becomes both borrower and lender,
and consequently cannot demand payment from any particular man, but
from the common Treasure onely; which fayling he hath no remedy, nor
complaint, but against himselfe, that being privy to the acts of
the Assembly, and their means to pay, and not being enforced, did
neverthelesse through his own folly lend his mony.




Protestation Against The Decrees Of Bodies Politique

Sometimes Lawful; But Against Soveraign Power Never It is manifest by
this, that in Bodies Politique subordinate, and subject to a Soveraign
Power, it is sometimes not onely lawfull, but expedient, for a
particular man to make open protestation against the decrees of the
Representative Assembly, and cause their dissent to be Registred, or to
take witnesse of it; because otherwise they may be obliged to pay debts
contracted, and be responsible for crimes committed by other men: But in
a Soveraign Assembly, that liberty is taken away, both because he that
protesteth there, denies their Soveraignty; and also because whatsoever
is commanded by the Soveraign Power, is as to the Subject (though not
so alwayes in the sight of God) justified by the Command; for of such
command every Subject is the Author.




Bodies Politique For Government Of A Province, Colony, Or Town

The variety of Bodies Politique, is almost infinite; for they are
not onely distinguished by the severall affaires, for which they are
constituted, wherein there is an unspeakable diversitie; but also by the
times, places, and numbers, subject to many limitations. And as to their
affaires, some are ordained for Government; As first, the Government
of a Province may be committed to an Assembly of men, wherein all
resolutions shall depend on the Votes of the major part; and then this
Assembly is a Body Politique, and their power limited by Commission.
This word Province signifies a charge, or care of businesse, which he
whose businesse it is, committeth to another man, to be administred for,
and under him; and therefore when in one Common-wealth there be divers
Countries, that have their Lawes distinct one from another, or are farre
distant in place, the Administration of the Government being committed
to divers persons, those Countries where the Soveraign is not resident,
but governs by Commission, are called Provinces. But of the government
of a Province, by an Assembly residing in the Province it selfe, there
be few examples. The Romans who had the Soveraignty of many Provinces;
yet governed them alwaies by Presidents, and Praetors; and not by
Assemblies, as they governed the City of Rome, and Territories adjacent.
In like manner, when there were Colonies sent from England, to Plant
Virginia, and Sommer-Ilands; though the government of them here, were
committed to Assemblies in London, yet did those Assemblies never
commit the Government under them to any Assembly there; but did to each
Plantation send one Governour; For though every man, where he can be
present by Nature, desires to participate of government; yet where
they cannot be present, they are by Nature also enclined, to commit the
Government of their common Interest rather to a Monarchicall, then a
Popular form of Government: which is also evident in those men that have
great private estates; who when they are unwilling to take the paines of
administring the businesse that belongs to them, choose rather to trust
one Servant, than a Assembly either of their friends or servants.
But howsoever it be in fact, yet we may suppose the Government of a
Province, or Colony committed to an Assembly: and when it is, that which
in this place I have to say, is this; that whatsoever debt is by that
Assembly contracted; or whatsoever unlawfull Act is decreed, is the Act
onely of those that assented, and not of any that dissented, or were
absent, for the reasons before alledged. Also that an Assembly residing
out of the bounds of that Colony whereof they have the government,
cannot execute any power over the persons, or goods of any of the
Colonie, to seize on them for debt, or other duty, in any place
without the Colony it selfe, as having no Jurisdiction, nor Authoritie
elsewhere, but are left to the remedie, which the Law of the place
alloweth them. And though the Assembly have right, to impose a Mulct
upon any of their members, that shall break the Lawes they make; yet
out of the Colonie it selfe, they have no right to execute the same.
And that which is said here, of the Rights of an Assembly, for the
government of a Province, or a Colony, is appliable also to an Assembly
for the Government of a Town, or University, or a College, or a Church,
or for any other Government over the persons of men.

And generally, in all Bodies Politique, if any particular member
conceive himself Injured by the Body it self, the Cognisance of his
cause belongeth to the Soveraign, and those the Soveraign hath ordained
for Judges in such causes, or shall ordaine for that particular cause;
and not to the Body it self. For the whole Body is in this case his
fellow subject, which in a Soveraign Assembly, is otherwise: for there,
if the Soveraign be not Judge, though in his own cause, there can be no
Judge at all.




Bodies Politique For Ordering Of Trade

In a Bodie Politique, for the well ordering of forraigne Traffique, the
most commodious Representative is an Assembly of all the members; that
is to say, such a one, as every one that adventureth his mony, may be
present at all the Deliberations, and Resolutions of the Body, if they
will themselves. For proof whereof, we are to consider the end, for
which men that are Merchants, and may buy and sell, export, and import
their Merchandise, according to their own discretions, doe neverthelesse
bind themselves up in one Corporation. It is true, there be few
Merchants, that with the Merchandise they buy at home, can fraight a
Ship, to export it; or with that they buy abroad, to bring it home; and
have therefore need to joyn together in one Society; where every man
may either participate of the gaine, according to the proportion of his
adventure; or take his own; and sell what he transports, or imports, at
such prices as he thinks fit. But this is no Body Politique, there being
no Common Representative to oblige them to any other Law, than that
which is common to all other subjects. The End of their Incorporating,
is to make their gaine the greater; which is done two wayes; by sole
buying, and sole selling, both at home, and abroad. So that to grant
to a Company of Merchants to be a Corporation, or Body Politique, is to
grant them a double Monopoly, whereof one is to be sole buyers; another
to be sole sellers. For when there is a Company incorporate for any
particular forraign Country, they only export the Commodities vendible
in that Country; which is sole buying at home, and sole selling abroad.
For at home there is but one buyer, and abroad but one that selleth:
both which is gainfull to the Merchant, because thereby they buy at home
at lower, and sell abroad at higher rates: And abroad there is but one
buyer of forraign Merchandise, and but one that sels them at home; both
which againe are gainfull to the adventurers.

Of this double Monopoly one part is disadvantageous to the people at
home, the other to forraigners. For at home by their sole exportation
they set what price they please on the husbandry and handy-works of
the people; and by the sole importation, what price they please on all
forraign commodities the people have need of; both which are ill for the
people. On the contrary, by the sole selling of the native commodities
abroad, and sole buying the forraign commodities upon the place,
they raise the price of those, and abate the price of these, to
the disadvantage of the forraigner: For where but one selleth, the
Merchandise is the dearer; and where but one buyeth the cheaper: Such
Corporations therefore are no other then Monopolies; though they would
be very profitable for a Common-wealth, if being bound up into one body
in forraigne Markets they were at liberty at home, every man to buy, and
sell at what price he could.

The end then of these Bodies of Merchants, being not a Common benefit
to the whole Body, (which have in this case no common stock, but what
is deducted out of the particular adventures, for building, buying,
victualling and manning of Ships,) but the particular gaine of
every adventurer, it is reason that every one be acquainted with the
employment of his own; that is, that every one be of the Assembly, that
shall have the power to order the same; and be acquainted with their
accounts. And therefore the Representative of such a Body must be
an Assembly, where every member of the Body may be present at the
consultations, if he will.
If a Body Politique of Merchants, contract a debt to a stranger by the
act of their Representative Assembly, every Member is lyable by himself
for the whole. For a stranger can take no notice of their private Lawes,
but considereth them as so many particular men, obliged every one to the
whole payment, till payment made by one dischargeth all the rest: But if
the debt be to one of the Company, the creditor is debter for the whole
to himself, and cannot therefore demand his debt, but only from the
common stock, if there be any.

If the Common-wealth impose a Tax upon the Body, it is understood to be
layd upon every member proportionably to his particular adventure in the
Company. For there is in this case no other common stock, but what is
made of their particular adventures.

If a Mulct be layd upon the Body for some unlawfull act, they only are
lyable by whose votes the act was decreed, or by whose assistance it was
executed; for in none of the rest is there any other crime but being
of the Body; which if a crime, (because the Body was ordeyned by the
authority of the Common-wealth,) is not his.

If one of the Members be indebted to the Body, he may be sued by the
Body; but his goods cannot be taken, nor his person imprisoned by the
authority of the Body; but only by Authority of the Common-wealth:
for if they can doe it by their own Authority, they can by their own
Authority give judgement that the debt is due, which is as much as to be
Judge in their own Cause.




A Bodie Politique For Counsel To Be Give To The Soveraign

These Bodies made for the government of Men, or of Traffique, be either
perpetuall, or for a time prescribed by writing. But there be Bodies
also whose times are limited, and that only by the nature of their
businesse. For example, if a Soveraign Monarch, or a Soveraign Assembly,
shall think fit to give command to the towns, and other severall parts
of their territory, to send to him their Deputies, to enforme him of the
condition, and necessities of the Subjects, or to advise with him for
the making of good Lawes, or for any other cause, as with one Person
representing the whole Country, such Deputies, having a place and time
of meeting assigned them, are there, and at that time, a Body Politique,
representing every Subject of that Dominion; but it is onely for such
matters as shall be propounded unto them by that Man, or Assembly, that
by the Soveraign Authority sent for them; and when it shall be declared
that nothing more shall be propounded, nor debated by them, the Body is
dissolved. For if they were the absolute Representative of the people,
then were it the Soveraign Assembly; and so there would be two Soveraign
Assemblies, or two Soveraigns, over the same people; which cannot
consist with their Peace. And therefore where there is once a
Soveraignty, there can be no absolute Representation of the people, but
by it. And for the limits of how farre such a Body shall represent the
whole People, they are set forth in the Writing by which they were sent
for. For the People cannot choose their Deputies to other intent, than
is in the Writing directed to them from their Soveraign expressed.




A Regular Private Body, Lawfull, As A Family

Private Bodies Regular, and Lawfull, are those that are constituted
without Letters, or other written Authority, saving the Lawes common
to all other Subjects. And because they be united in one Person
Representative, they are held for Regular; such as are all Families, in
which the Father, or Master ordereth the whole Family. For he obligeth
his Children, and Servants, as farre as the Law permitteth, though not
further, because none of them are bound to obedience in those actions,
which the Law hath forbidden to be done. In all other actions, during
the time they are under domestique government, they are subject to their
Fathers, and Masters, as to their immediate Soveraigns. For the Father,
and Master being before the Institution of Common-wealth, absolute
Soveraigns in their own Families, they lose afterward no more of their
Authority, than the Law of the Common-wealth taketh from them.




Private Bodies Regular, But Unlawfull

Private Bodies Regular, but Unlawfull, are those that unite themselves
into one person Representative, without any publique Authority at all;
such as are the Corporations of Beggars, Theeves and Gipsies, the better
to order their trade of begging, and stealing; and the Corporations of
men, that by Authority from any forraign Person, unite themselves in
anothers Dominion, for easier propagation of Doctrines, and for making a
party, against the Power of the Common-wealth.




Systemes Irregular, Such As Are Private Leagues

Irregular Systemes, in their nature, but Leagues, or sometimes meer
concourse of people, without union to any particular designe, not by
obligation of one to another, but proceeding onely from a similitude of
wills and inclinations, become Lawfull, or Unlawfull, according to the
lawfulnesse, or unlawfulnesse of every particular mans design therein:
And his designe is to be understood by the occasion.

The Leagues of Subjects, (because Leagues are commonly made for mutuall
defence,) are in a Common-wealth (which is no more than a League of
all the Subjects together) for the most part unnecessary, and savour of
unlawfull designe; and are for that cause Unlawfull, and go commonly by
the name of factions, or Conspiracies. For a League being a connexion of
men by Covenants, if there be no power given to any one Man or Assembly,
(as in the condition of meer Nature) to compell them to performance,
is so long onely valid, as there ariseth no just cause of distrust: and
therefore Leagues between Common-wealths, over whom there is no humane
Power established, to keep them all in awe, are not onely lawfull, but
also profitable for the time they last. But Leagues of the Subjects of
one and the same Common-wealth, where every one may obtain his right
by means of the Soveraign Power, are unnecessary to the maintaining of
Peace and Justice, and (in case the designe of them be evill, or Unknown
to the Common-wealth) unlawfull. For all uniting of strength by private
men, is, if for evill intent, unjust; if for intent unknown, dangerous
to the Publique, and unjustly concealed.




Secret Cabals

If the Soveraign Power be in a great Assembly, and a number of men,
part of the Assembly, without authority, consult a part, to contrive
the guidance of the rest; This is a Faction, or Conspiracy unlawfull,
as being a fraudulent seducing of the Assembly for their particular
interest. But if he, whose private interest is to be debated, and
judged in the Assembly, make as many friends as he can; in him it is
no Injustice; because in this case he is no part of the Assembly. And
though he hire such friends with mony, (unlesse there be an expresse Law
against it,) yet it is not Injustice. For sometimes, (as mens manners
are,) Justice cannot be had without mony; and every man may think his
own cause just, till it be heard, and judged.




Feuds Of Private Families

In all Common-wealths, if a private man entertain more servants, than
the government of his estate, and lawfull employment he has for them
requires, it is Faction, and unlawfull. For having the protection of the
Common-wealth, he needeth not the defence of private force. And whereas
in Nations not throughly civilized, severall numerous Families have
lived in continuall hostility, and invaded one another with private
force; yet it is evident enough, that they have done unjustly; or else
that they had no Common-wealth.




Factions For Government

And as Factions for Kindred, so also Factions for Government of
Religion, as of Papists, Protestants, &c. or of State, as Patricians,
and Plebeians of old time in Rome, and of Aristocraticalls and
Democraticalls of old time in Greece, are unjust, as being contrary to
the peace and safety of the people, and a taking of the Sword out of the
hand of the Soveraign.

Concourse of people, is an Irregular Systeme, the lawfulnesse, or
unlawfulnesse, whereof dependeth on the occasion, and on the number of
them that are assembled. If the occasion be lawfull, and manifest, the
Concourse is lawfull; as the usuall meeting of men at Church, or at a
publique Shew, in usuall numbers: for if the numbers be extraordinarily
great, the occasion is not evident; and consequently he that cannot
render a particular and good account of his being amongst them, is to
be judged conscious of an unlawfull, and tumultuous designe. It may be
lawfull for a thousand men, to joyn in a Petition to be delivered to a
Judge, or Magistrate; yet if a thousand men come to present it, it is
a tumultuous Assembly; because there needs but one or two for that
purpose. But in such cases as these, it is not a set number that makes
the Assembly Unlawfull, but such a number, as the present Officers are
not able to suppresse, and bring to Justice.

When an unusuall number of men, assemble against a man whom they accuse;
the Assembly is an Unlawfull tumult; because they may deliver their
accusation to the Magistrate by a few, or by one man. Such was the case
of St. Paul at Ephesus; where Demetrius, and a great number of other
men, brought two of Pauls companions before the Magistrate, saying with
one Voyce, "Great is Diana of the Ephesians;" which was their way of
demanding Justice against them for teaching the people such doctrine,
as was against their Religion, and Trade. The occasion here, considering
the Lawes of that People, was just; yet was their Assembly Judged
Unlawfull, and the Magistrate reprehended them for it, in these
words,(Acts 19. 40) "If Demetrius and the other work-men can accuse any
man, of any thing, there be Pleas, and Deputies, let them accuse one
another. And if you have any other thing to demand, your case may
be judged in an Assembly Lawfully called. For we are in danger to be
accused for this dayes sedition, because, there is no cause by which any
man can render any reason of this Concourse of People. " Where he calleth
an Assembly, whereof men can give no just account, a Sedition, and such
as they could not answer for. And this is all I shall say concerning
Systemes, and Assemblyes of People, which may be compared (as I said,)
to the Similar parts of mans Body; such as be Lawfull, to the Muscles;
such as are Unlawfull, to Wens, Biles, and Apostemes, engendred by the
unnaturall conflux of evill humours.



CHAPTER XXIII. OF THE PUBLIQUE MINISTERS OF SOVERAIGN POWER


In the last Chapter I have spoken of the Similar parts of a
Common-wealth; In this I shall speak of the parts Organicall, which are
Publique Ministers.




Publique Minister Who

A PUBLIQUE MINISTER, is he, that by the Soveraign, (whether a Monarch,
or an Assembly,) is employed in any affaires, with Authority to
represent in that employment, the Person of the Common-wealth. And
whereas every man, or assembly that hath Soveraignty, representeth
two Persons, or (as the more common phrase is) has two Capacities, one
Naturall, and another Politique, (as a Monarch, hath the person not
onely of the Common-wealth, but also of a man; and a Soveraign Assembly
hath the Person not onely of the Common-wealth, but also of the
Assembly); they that be servants to them in their naturall Capacity,
are not Publique Ministers; but those onely that serve them in the
Administration of the Publique businesse. And therefore neither Ushers,
nor Sergeants, nor other Officers that waite on the Assembly, for
no other purpose, but for the commodity of the men assembled, in an
Aristocracy, or Democracy; nor Stewards, Chamberlains, Cofferers, or any
other Officers of the houshold of a Monarch, are Publique Ministers in a
Monarchy.




Ministers For The Generall Administration

Of Publique Ministers, some have charge committed to them of a general
Administration, either of the whole Dominion, or of a part thereof.
Of the whole, as to a Protector, or Regent, may bee committed by
the Predecessor of an Infant King, during his minority, the whole
Administration of his Kingdome. In which case, every Subject is so far
obliged to obedience, as the Ordinances he shall make, and the commands
he shall give be in the Kings name, and not inconsistent with his
Soveraigne Power. Of a Part, or Province; as when either a Monarch, or
a Soveraign Assembly, shall give the generall charge thereof to a
Governour, Lieutenant, Praefect, or Vice-Roy: And in this case also,
every one of that Province, is obliged to all he shall doe in the name
of the Soveraign, and that not incompatible with the Soveraigns Right.
For such Protectors, Vice-Roys, and Governours, have no other right, but
what depends on the Soveraigns Will; and no Commission that can be given
them, can be interpreted for a Declaration of the will to transferre the
Soveraignty, without expresse and perspicuous words to that purpose. And
this kind of Publique Ministers resembleth the Nerves, and Tendons that
move the severall limbs of a body naturall.




For Speciall Administration, As For Oeconomy

Others have speciall Administration; that is to say, charges of some
speciall businesse, either at home, or abroad: As at home, First, for
the Oeconomy of a Common-wealth, They that have Authority concerning the
Treasure, as Tributes, Impositions, Rents, Fines, or whatsoever publique
revenue, to collect, receive, issue, or take the Accounts thereof,
are Publique Ministers: Ministers, because they serve the Person
Representative, and can doe nothing against his Command, nor without his
Authority: Publique, because they serve him in his Politicall Capacity.

Secondly, they that have Authority concerning the Militia; to have the
custody of Armes, Forts, Ports; to Levy, Pay, or Conduct Souldiers; or
to provide for any necessary thing for the use of war, either by Land or
Sea, are publique Ministers. But a Souldier without Command, though he
fight for the Common-wealth, does not therefore represent the Person of
it; because there is none to represent it to. For every one that hath
command, represents it to them only whom he commandeth.




For Instruction Of The People

They also that have authority to teach, or to enable others to teach
the people their duty to the Soveraign Power, and instruct them in the
knowledge of what is just, and unjust, thereby to render them more apt
to live in godlinesse, and in peace among themselves, and resist the
publique enemy, are Publique Ministers: Ministers, in that they doe it
not by their own Authority, but by anothers; and Publique, because they
doe it (or should doe it) by no Authority, but that of the Soveraign.
The Monarch, or the Soveraign Assembly only hath immediate Authority
from God, to teach and instruct the people; and no man but the
Soveraign, receiveth his power Dei Gratia simply; that is to say, from
the favour of none but God: All other, receive theirs from the favour
and providence of God, and their Soveraigns; as in a Monarchy Dei Gratia
& Regis; or Dei Providentia & Voluntate Regis.




For Judicature

They also to whom Jurisdiction is given, are Publique Ministers. For in
their Seats of Justice they represent the person of the Soveraign; and
their Sentence, is his Sentence; For (as hath been before declared) all
Judicature is essentially annexed to the Soveraignty; and therefore all
other Judges are but Ministers of him, or them that have the Soveraign
Power. And as Controversies are of two sorts, namely of Fact, and of
Law; so are judgements, some of Fact, some of Law: And consequently in
the same controversie, there may be two Judges, one of Fact, another of
Law.

And in both these controversies, there may arise a controversie between
the party Judged, and the Judge; which because they be both Subjects to
the Soveraign, ought in Equity to be Judged by men agreed on by consent
of both; for no man can be Judge in his own cause. But the Soveraign
is already agreed on for Judge by them both, and is therefore either to
heare the Cause, and determine it himself, or appoint for Judge such as
they shall both agree on. And this agreement is then understood to be
made between them divers wayes; as first, if the Defendant be allowed
to except against such of his Judges, whose interest maketh him suspect
them, (for as to the Complaynant he hath already chosen his own Judge,)
those which he excepteth not against, are Judges he himself agrees on.
Secondly, if he appeale to any other Judge, he can appeale no further;
for his appeale is his choice. Thirdly, if he appeale to the Soveraign
himself, and he by himself, or by Delegates which the parties shall
agree on, give Sentence; that Sentence is finall: for the Defendant is
Judged by his own Judges, that is to say, by himself.

These properties of just and rationall Judicature considered, I cannot
forbeare to observe the excellent constitution of the Courts of Justice,
established both for Common, and also for Publique Pleas in England. By
Common Pleas, I meane those, where both the Complaynant and Defendant
are Subjects: and by Publique, (which are also called Pleas of the
Crown) those, where the Complaynant is the Soveraign. For whereas there
were two orders of men, whereof one was Lords, the other Commons; The
Lords had this Priviledge, to have for Judges in all Capitall crimes,
none but Lords; and of them, as many as would be present; which being
ever acknowledged as a Priviledge of favour, their Judges were none but
such as they had themselves desired. And in all controversies, every
Subject (as also in civill controversies the Lords) had for Judges, men
of the Country where the matter in controversie lay; against which he
might make his exceptions, till at last Twelve men without exception
being agreed on, they were Judged by those twelve. So that having
his own Judges, there could be nothing alledged by the party, why the
sentence should not be finall, These publique persons, with Authority
from the Soveraign Power, either to Instruct, or Judge the people,
are such members of the Common-wealth, as may fitly be compared to the
organs of Voice in a Body naturall.




For Execution

Publique Ministers are also all those, that have Authority from the
Soveraign, to procure the Execution of Judgements given; to publish the
Soveraigns Commands; to suppresse Tumults; to apprehend, and imprison
Malefactors; and other acts tending to the conservation of the
Peace. For every act they doe by such Authority, is the act of the
Common-wealth; and their service, answerable to that of the Hands, in a
Bodie naturall.

Publique Ministers abroad, are those that represent the Person of their
own Soveraign, to forraign States. Such are Ambassadors, Messengers,
Agents, and Heralds, sent by publique Authoritie, and on publique
Businesse.

But such as are sent by Authoritie only of some private partie of a
troubled State, though they be received, are neither Publique, nor
Private Ministers of the Common-wealth; because none of their actions
have the Common-wealth for Author. Likewise, an Ambassador sent from a
Prince, to congratulate, condole, or to assist at a solemnity, though
Authority be Publique; yet because the businesse is Private, and
belonging to him in his naturall capacity; is a Private person. Also if
a man be sent into another Country, secretly to explore their counsels,
and strength; though both the Authority, and the Businesse be Publique;
yet because there is none to take notice of any Person in him, but
his own; he is but a Private Minister; but yet a Minister of the
Common-wealth; and may be compared to an Eye in the Body naturall. And
those that are appointed to receive the Petitions or other informations
of the People, and are as it were the publique Eare, are Publique
Ministers, and represent their Soveraign in that office.




Counsellers Without Other Employment Then To Advise

Are Not Publique Ministers

Neither a Counsellor, nor a Councell of State, if we consider it with
no Authority of Judicature or Command, but only of giving Advice to
the Soveraign when it is required, or of offering it when it is not
required, is a Publique Person. For the Advice is addressed to the
Soveraign only, whose person cannot in his own presence, be represented
to him, by another. But a Body of Counsellors, are never without some
other Authority, either of Judicature, or of immediate Administration:
As in a Monarchy, they represent the Monarch, in delivering his Commands
to the Publique Ministers: In a Democracy, the Councell, or Senate
propounds the Result of their deliberations to the people, as a
Councell; but when they appoint Judges, or heare Causes, or give
Audience to Ambassadors, it is in the quality of a Minister of the
People: And in an Aristocracy the Councell of State is the Soveraign
Assembly it self; and gives counsell to none but themselves.



CHAPTER XXIV. OF THE NUTRITION, AND PROCREATION OF A COMMON-WEALTH



The Nourishment Of A Common-wealth Consisteth In The Commodities

Of Sea And Land

The NUTRITION of a Common-wealth consisteth, in the Plenty, and
Distribution of Materials conducing to Life: In Concoction, or
Preparation; and (when concocted) in the Conveyance of it, by convenient
conduits, to the Publique use.

As for the Plenty of Matter, it is a thing limited by Nature, to those
commodities, which from (the two breasts of our common Mother) Land,
and Sea, God usually either freely giveth, or for labour selleth to
man-kind.

For the Matter of this Nutriment, consisting in Animals, Vegetals, and
Minerals, God hath freely layd them before us, in or neer to the face of
the Earth; so as there needeth no more but the labour, and industry
of receiving them. Insomuch as Plenty dependeth (next to Gods favour)
meerly on the labour and industry of men.

This Matter, commonly called Commodities, is partly Native, and partly
Forraign: Native, that which is to be had within the Territory of
the Common-wealth; Forraign, that which is imported from without. And
because there is no Territory under the Dominion of one Common-wealth,
(except it be of very vast extent,) that produceth all things needfull
for the maintenance, and motion of the whole Body; and few that produce
not something more than necessary; the superfluous commodities to be had
within, become no more superfluous, but supply these wants at home, by
importation of that which may be had abroad, either by Exchange, or
by just Warre, or by Labour: for a mans Labour also, is a commodity
exchangeable for benefit, as well as any other thing: And there have
been Common-wealths that having no more Territory, than hath served
them for habitation, have neverthelesse, not onely maintained, but also
encreased their Power, partly by the labour of trading from one place to
another, and partly by selling the Manifactures, whereof the Materials
were brought in from other places.




And The Right Of Distribution Of Them

The Distribution of the Materials of this Nourishment, is the
constitution of Mine, and Thine, and His, that is to say, in one word
Propriety; and belongeth in all kinds of Common-wealth to the Soveraign
Power. For where there is no Common-wealth, there is, (as hath been
already shewn) a perpetuall warre of every man against his neighbour;
And therefore every thing is his that getteth it, and keepeth it by
force; which is neither Propriety nor Community; but Uncertainty. Which
is so evident, that even Cicero, (a passionate defender of Liberty,) in
a publique pleading, attributeth all Propriety to the Law Civil, "Let
the Civill Law," saith he, "be once abandoned, or but negligently
guarded, (not to say oppressed,) and there is nothing, that any man can
be sure to receive from his Ancestor, or leave to his Children. " And
again; "Take away the Civill Law, and no man knows what is his own, and
what another mans. " Seeing therefore the Introduction of Propriety is
an effect of Common-wealth; which can do nothing but by the Person that
Represents it, it is the act onely of the Soveraign; and consisteth in
the Lawes, which none can make that have not the Soveraign Power. And
this they well knew of old, who called that Nomos, (that is to say,
Distribution,) which we call Law; and defined Justice, by distributing
to every man his own.




All Private Estates Of Land Proceed Originally

From The Arbitrary Distribution Of The Soveraign

In this Distribution, the First Law, is for Division of the Land it
selfe: wherein the Soveraign assigneth to every man a portion, according
as he, and not according as any Subject, or any number of them, shall
judge agreeable to Equity, and the Common Good. The Children of Israel,
were a Common-wealth in the Wildernesse; but wanted the commodities
of the Earth, till they were masters of the Land of Promise; which
afterward was divided amongst them, not by their own discretion, but
by the discretion of Eleazar the Priest, and Joshua their Generall: who
when there were twelve Tribes, making them thirteen by subdivision of
the Tribe of Joseph; made neverthelesse but twelve portions of the Land;
and ordained for the Tribe of Levi no land; but assigned them the Tenth
part of the whole fruits; which division was therefore Arbitrary. And
though a People comming into possession of a land by warre, do not
alwaies exterminate the antient Inhabitants, (as did the Jewes,) but
leave to many, or most, or all of them their Estates; yet it is manifest
they hold them afterwards, as of the Victors distribution; as the people
of England held all theirs of William the Conquerour.




Propriety Of A Subject Excludes Not The Dominion Of The Soveraign,

But Onely Of Another Subject

From whence we may collect, that the Propriety which a subject hath in
his lands, consisteth in a right to exclude all other subjects from the
use of them; and not to exclude their Soveraign, be it an Assembly, or
a Monarch. For seeing the Soveraign, that is to say, the Common-wealth
(whose Person he representeth,) is understood to do nothing but in order
to the common Peace and Security, this Distribution of lands, is to be
understood as done in order to the same: And consequently, whatsoever
Distribution he shall make in prejudice thereof, is contrary to the
will of every subject, that committed his Peace, and safety to his
discretion, and conscience; and therefore by the will of every one of
them, is to be reputed voyd. It is true, that a Soveraign Monarch, or
the greater part of a Soveraign Assembly, may ordain the doing of many
things in pursuit of their Passions, contrary to their own consciences,
which is a breach of trust, and of the Law of Nature; but this is not
enough to authorise any subject, either to make warre upon, or so much
as to accuse of Injustice, or any way to speak evill of their Soveraign;
because they have authorised all his actions, and in bestowing the
Soveraign Power, made them their own. But in what cases the Commands
of Soveraigns are contrary to Equity, and the Law of Nature, is to be
considered hereafter in another place.




The Publique Is Not To Be Dieted

In the Distribution of land, the Common-wealth it selfe, may be
conceived to have a portion, and possesse, and improve the same by
their Representative; and that such portion may be made sufficient, to
susteine the whole expence to the common Peace, and defence necessarily
required: Which were very true, if there could be any Representative
conceived free from humane passions, and infirmities. But the nature
of men being as it is, the setting forth of Publique Land, or of any
certaine Revenue for the Common-wealth, is in vaine; and tendeth to the
dissolution of Government, and to the condition of meere Nature, and
War, assoon as ever the Soveraign Power falleth into the hands of a
Monarch, or of an Assembly, that are either too negligent of mony, or
too hazardous in engaging the publique stock, into a long, or costly
war. Common-wealths can endure no Diet: For seeing their expence is
not limited by their own appetite, but by externall Accidents, and the
appetites of their neighbours, the Publique Riches cannot be limited by
other limits, than those which the emergent occasions shall require. And
whereas in England, there were by the Conquerour, divers Lands
reserved to his own use, (besides Forrests, and Chases, either for his
recreation, or for preservation of Woods,) and divers services reserved
on the Land he gave his Subjects; yet it seems they were not reserved
for his Maintenance in his Publique, but in his Naturall capacity: For
he, and his Successors did for all that, lay Arbitrary Taxes on all
Subjects land, when they judged it necessary. Or if those publique
Lands, and Services, were ordained as a sufficient maintenance of the
Common-wealth, it was contrary to the scope of the Institution; being
(as it appeared by those ensuing Taxes) insufficient, and (as it
appeares by the late Revenue of the Crown) Subject to Alienation,
and Diminution. It is therefore in vaine, to assign a portion to the
Common-wealth; which may sell, or give it away; and does sell, and give
it away when tis done by their Representative.




The Places And Matter Of Traffique Depend, As Their Distribution,

On The Soveraign

As the Distribution of Lands at home; so also to assigne in what places,
and for what commodities, the Subject shall traffique abroad, belongeth
to the Soveraign. For if it did belong to private persons to use their
own discretion therein, some of them would bee drawn for gaine, both
to furnish the enemy with means to hurt the Common-wealth, and hurt it
themselves, by importing such things, as pleasing mens appetites, be
neverthelesse noxious, or at least unprofitable to them. And therefore
it belongeth to the Common-wealth, (that is, to the Soveraign only,)
to approve, or disapprove both of the places, and matter of forraign
Traffique.




The Laws Of Transferring Property Belong Also To The Soveraign

Further, seeing it is not enough to the Sustentation of a Common-wealth,
that every man have a propriety in a portion of Land, or in some few
commodities, or a naturall property in some usefull art, and there is no
art in the world, but is necessary either for the being, or well being
almost of every particular man; it is necessary, that men distribute
that which they can spare, and transferre their propriety therein,
mutually one to another, by exchange, and mutuall contract. And
therefore it belongeth to the Common-wealth, (that is to say, to the
Soveraign,) to appoint in what manner, all kinds of contract between
Subjects, (as buying, selling, exchanging, borrowing, lending, letting,
and taking to hire,) are to bee made; and by what words, and signes they
shall be understood for valid. And for the Matter, and Distribution of
the Nourishment, to the severall Members of the Common-wealth, thus much
(considering the modell of the whole worke) is sufficient.




Mony The Bloud Of A Common-wealth

By Concoction, I understand the reducing of all commodities, which are
not presently consumed, but reserved for Nourishment in time to come, to
some thing of equal value, and withall so portably, as not to hinder
the motion of men from place to place; to the end a man may have in
what place soever, such Nourishment as the place affordeth. And this is
nothing else but Gold, and Silver, and Mony. For Gold and Silver, being
(as it happens) almost in all Countries of the world highly valued, is a
commodious measure for the value of all things else between Nations; and
Mony (of what matter soever coyned by the Soveraign of a Common-wealth,)
is a sufficient measure of the value of all things else, between the
Subjects of that Common-wealth. By the means of which measures, all
commodities, Moveable, and Immoveable, are made to accompany a man, to
all places of his resort, within and without the place of his
ordinary residence; and the same passeth from Man to Man, within the
Common-wealth; and goes round about, Nourishing (as it passeth)
every part thereof; In so much as this Concoction, is as it were the
Sanguification of the Common-wealth: For naturall Bloud is in like
manner made of the fruits of the Earth; and circulating, nourisheth by
the way, every Member of the Body of Man.

And because Silver and Gold, have their value from the matter it self;
they have first this priviledge, that the value of them cannot be
altered by the power of one, nor of a few Common-wealths; as being a
common measure of the commodities of all places. But base Mony, may
easily be enhanced, or abased. Secondly, they have the priviledge to
make Common-wealths, move, and stretch out their armes, when need is,
into forraign Countries; and supply, not only private Subjects that
travell, but also whole Armies with provision. But that Coyne, which is
not considerable for the Matter, but for the Stamp of the place, being
unable to endure change of ayr, hath its effect at home only; where
also it is subject to the change of Laws, and thereby to have the value
diminished, to the prejudice many times of those that have it.




The Conduits And Way Of Mony To The Publique Use

The Conduits, and Wayes by which it is conveyed to the Publique use, are
of two sorts; One, that Conveyeth it to the Publique Coffers; The other,
that Issueth the same out againe for publique payments. Of the first
sort, are Collectors, Receivers, and Treasurers; of the second are the
Treasurers againe, and the Officers appointed for payment of severall
publique or private Ministers. And in this also, the Artificiall Man
maintains his resemblance with the Naturall; whose Veins receiving the
Bloud from the severall Parts of the Body, carry it to the Heart; where
being made Vitall, the Heart by the Arteries sends it out again, to
enliven, and enable for motion all the Members of the same.




The Children Of A Common-wealth Colonies

The Procreation, or Children of a Common-wealth, are those we call
Plantations, or Colonies; which are numbers of men sent out from the
Common-wealth, under a Conductor, or Governour, to inhabit a Forraign
Country, either formerly voyd of Inhabitants, or made voyd then, by
warre. And when a Colony is setled, they are either a Common-wealth of
themselves, discharged of their subjection to their Soveraign that sent
them, (as hath been done by many Common-wealths of antient time,) in
which case the Common-wealth from which they went was called their
Metropolis, or Mother, and requires no more of them, then Fathers
require of the Children, whom they emancipate, and make free from their
domestique government, which is Honour, and Friendship; or else they
remain united to their Metropolis, as were the Colonies of the people of
Rome; and then they are no Common-wealths themselves, but Provinces, and
parts of the Common-wealth that sent them. So that the Right of Colonies
(saving Honour, and League with their Metropolis,) dependeth wholly on
their Licence, or Letters, by which their Soveraign authorised them to
Plant.



CHAPTER XXV. OF COUNSELL




Counsell What

How fallacious it is to judge of the nature of things, by the ordinary
and inconstant use of words, appeareth in nothing more, than in the
confusion of Counsels, and Commands, arising from the Imperative manner
of speaking in them both, and in may other occasions besides. For the
words "Doe this," are the words not onely of him that Commandeth; but
also of him that giveth Counsell; and of him that Exhorteth; and yet
there are but few, that see not, that these are very different things;
or that cannot distinguish between them, when they perceive who it
is that speaketh, and to whom the Speech is directed, and upon what
occasion. But finding those phrases in mens writings, and being not
able, or not willing to enter into a consideration of the circumstances,
they mistake sometimes the Precepts of Counsellours, for the Precepts
of them that command; and sometimes the contrary; according as it best
agreeth with the conclusions they would inferre, or the actions
they approve. To avoyd which mistakes, and render to those termes
of Commanding, Counselling, and Exhorting, their proper and distinct
significations, I define them thus.




Differences Between Command And Counsell

COMMAND is, where a man saith, "Doe this," or "Doe this not," without
expecting other reason than the Will of him that sayes it. From this it
followeth manifestly, that he that Commandeth, pretendeth thereby his
own Benefit: For the reason of his Command is his own Will onely, and
the proper object of every mans Will, is some Good to himselfe.

COUNSELL, is where a man saith, "Doe" or "Doe not this," and deduceth
his own reasons from the benefit that arriveth by it to him to whom he
saith it. And from this it is evident, that he that giveth Counsell,
pretendeth onely (whatsoever he intendeth) the good of him, to whom he
giveth it.

Therefore between Counsell and Command, one great difference is, that
Command is directed to a mans own benefit; and Counsell to the benefit
of another man. And from this ariseth another difference, that a man
may be obliged to do what he is Commanded; as when he hath covenanted
to obey: But he cannot be obliged to do as he is Counselled, because the
hurt of not following it, is his own; or if he should covenant to follow
it, then is the Counsell turned into the nature of a Command. A third
difference between them is, that no man can pretend a right to be of
another mans Counsell; because he is not to pretend benefit by it to
himselfe; but to demand right to Counsell another, argues a will to know
his designes, or to gain some other Good to himselfe; which (as I said
before) is of every mans will the proper object.

This also is incident to the nature of Counsell; that whatsoever it be,
he that asketh it, cannot in equity accuse, or punish it: For to ask
Counsell of another, is to permit him to give such Counsell as he shall
think best; And consequently, he that giveth counsell to his Soveraign,
(whether a Monarch, or an Assembly) when he asketh it, cannot in equity
be punished for it, whether the same be conformable to the opinion of
the most, or not, so it be to the Proposition in debate. For if the
sense of the Assembly can be taken notice of, before the Debate be
ended, they should neither ask, nor take any further Counsell; For the
Sense of the Assembly, is the Resolution of the Debate, and End of all
Deliberation. And generally he that demandeth Counsell, is Author of it;
and therefore cannot punish it; and what the Soveraign cannot, no man
else can. But if one Subject giveth Counsell to another, to do any
thing contrary to the Lawes, whether that Counsell proceed from
evill intention, or from ignorance onely, it is punishable by the
Common-wealth; because ignorance of the Law, is no good excuse, where
every man is bound to take notice of the Lawes to which he is subject.




Exhortation And Dehortation What

EXHORTATION, and DEHORTATION, is Counsell, accompanied with signes in
him that giveth it, of vehement desire to have it followed; or to say it
more briefly, Counsell Vehemently Pressed. For he that Exhorteth, doth
not deduce the consequences of what he adviseth to be done, and tye
himselfe therein to the rigour of true reasoning; but encourages him he
Counselleth, to Action: As he that Dehorteth, deterreth him from it. And
therefore they have in their speeches, a regard to the common Passions,
and opinions of men, in deducing their reasons; and make use of
Similitudes, Metaphors, Examples, and other tooles of Oratory, to
perswade their Hearers of the Utility, Honour, or Justice of following
their advise.

From whence may be inferred, First, that Exhortation and Dehortation,
is directed to the Good of him that giveth the Counsell, not of him that
asketh it, which is contrary to the duty of a Counsellour; who (by the
definition of Counsell) ought to regard, not his own benefits, but his
whom he adviseth. And that he directeth his Counsell to his own
benefit, is manifest enough, by the long and vehement urging, or by
the artificial giving thereof; which being not required of him, and
consequently proceeding from his own occasions, is directed principally
to his own benefit, and but accidentarily to the good of him that is
Counselled, or not at all.

Secondly, that the use of Exhortation and Dehortation lyeth onely, where
a man is to speak to a Multitude; because when the Speech is addressed
to one, he may interrupt him, and examine his reasons more rigorously,
than can be done in a Multitude; which are too many to enter into
Dispute, and Dialogue with him that speaketh indifferently to them
all at once. Thirdly, that they that Exhort and Dehort, where they are
required to give Counsell, are corrupt Counsellours, and as it were
bribed by their own interest. For though the Counsell they give be never
so good; yet he that gives it, is no more a good Counsellour, than he
that giveth a Just Sentence for a reward, is a just Judge. But where a
man may lawfully Command, as a Father in his Family, or a Leader in an
Army, his Exhortations and Dehortations, are not onely lawfull, but
also necessary, and laudable: But then they are no more Counsells, but
Commands; which when they are for Execution of soure labour; sometimes
necessity, and alwayes humanity requireth to be sweetned in the
delivery, by encouragement, and in the tune and phrase of Counsell,
rather then in harsher language of Command.

Examples of the difference between Command and Counsell, we may take
from the formes of Speech that expresse them in Holy Scripture. "Have no
other Gods but me; Make to thy selfe no graven Image; Take not Gods name
in vain; Sanctifie the Sabbath; Honour thy Parents; Kill not; Steale
not," &c. are Commands; because the reason for which we are to obey
them, is drawn from the will of God our King, whom we are obliged to
obey. But these words, "Sell all thou hast; give it to the poore; and
follow me," are Counsell; because the reason for which we are to do
so, is drawn from our own benefit; which is this, that we shall have
"Treasure in Heaven. " These words, "Go into the village over against
you, and you shall find an Asse tyed, and her Colt; loose her, and bring
her to me," are a Command: for the reason of their fact is drawn from
the will of their Master: but these words, "Repent, and be Baptized in
the Name of Jesus," are Counsell; because the reason why we should so
do, tendeth not to any benefit of God Almighty, who shall still be King
in what manner soever we rebell; but of our selves, who have no other
means of avoyding the punishment hanging over us for our sins.




Differences Of Fit And Unfit Counsellours

As the difference of Counsell from Command, hath been now deduced from
the nature of Counsell, consisting in a deducing of the benefit, or
hurt that may arise to him that is to be Counselled, by the necessary
or probable consequences of the action he propoundeth; so may also the
differences between apt, and inept counsellours be derived from the
same. For Experience, being but Memory of the consequences of like
actions formerly observed, and Counsell but the Speech whereby that
experience is made known to another; the Vertues, and Defects of
Counsell, are the same with the Vertues, and Defects Intellectuall:
And to the Person of a Common-wealth, his Counsellours serve him in the
place of Memory, and Mentall Discourse. But with this resemblance of the
Common-wealth, to a naturall man, there is one dissimilitude joyned,
of great importance; which is, that a naturall man receiveth his
experience, from the naturall objects of sense, which work upon him
without passion, or interest of their own; whereas they that give
Counsell to the Representative person of a Common-wealth, may have,
and have often their particular ends, and passions, that render their
Counsells alwayes suspected, and many times unfaithfull. And therefore
we may set down for the first condition of a good Counsellour, That His
Ends, And Interest, Be Not Inconsistent With The Ends And Interest Of
Him He Counselleth.

Secondly, Because the office of a Counsellour, when an action comes
into deliberation, is to make manifest the consequences of it, in such
manner, as he that is Counselled may be truly and evidently informed; he
ought to propound his advise, in such forme of speech, as may make
the truth most evidently appear; that is to say, with as firme
ratiocination, as significant and proper language, and as briefly, as
the evidence will permit. And therefore Rash, And Unevident Inferences;
(such as are fetched onely from Examples, or authority of Books, and are
not arguments of what is good, or evill, but witnesses of fact, or
of opinion,) Obscure, Confused, And Ambiguous Expressions, Also All
Metaphoricall Speeches, Tending To The Stirring Up Of Passion, (because
such reasoning, and such expressions, are usefull onely to deceive, or
to lead him we Counsell towards other ends than his own) Are Repugnant
To The Office Of A Counsellour.

Thirdly, Because the Ability of Counselling proceedeth from Experience,
and long study; and no man is presumed to have experience in all those
things that to the Administration of a great Common-wealth are necessary
to be known, No Man Is Presumed To Be A Good Counsellour, But In Such
Businesse, As He Hath Not Onely Been Much Versed In, But Hath Also
Much Meditated On, And Considered. For seeing the businesse of a
Common-wealth is this, to preserve the people at home, and defend them
against forraign Invasion, we shall find, it requires great knowledge
of the disposition of Man-kind, of the Rights of Government, and of the
nature of Equity, Law, Justice, and Honour, not to be attained without
study; And of the Strength, Commodities, Places, both of their own
Country, and their Neighbours; as also of the inclinations, and designes
of all Nations that may any way annoy them. And this is not attained to,
without much experience. Of which things, not onely the whole summe, but
every one of the particulars requires the age, and observation of a man
in years, and of more than ordinary study. The wit required for Counsel,
as I have said before is Judgement. And the differences of men in that
point come from different education, of some to one kind of study, or
businesse, and of others to another. When for the doing of any thing,
there be Infallible rules, (as in Engines, and Edifices, the rules of
Geometry,) all the experience of the world cannot equall his Counsell,
that has learnt, or found out the Rule. And when there is no such Rule,
he that hath most experience in that particular kind of businesse, has
therein the best Judgement, and is the best Counsellour.

Fourthly, to be able to give Counsell to a Common-wealth, in a businesse
that hath reference to another Common-wealth, It Is Necessary To Be
Acquainted With The Intelligences, And Letters That Come From Thence,
And With All The Records Of Treaties, And Other Transactions Of State
Between Them; which none can doe, but such as the Representative
shall think fit. By which we may see, that they who are not called to
Counsell, can have no good Counsell in such cases to obtrude.

Fifthly, Supposing the number of Counsellors equall, a man is better
Counselled by hearing them apart, then in an Assembly; and that for many
causes. First, in hearing them apart, you have the advice of every man;
but in an Assembly may of them deliver their advise with I, or No, or
with their hands, or feet, not moved by their own sense, but by the
eloquence of another, or for feare of displeasing some that have spoken,
or the whole Assembly, by contradiction; or for feare of appearing
duller in apprehension, than those that have applauded the contrary
opinion. Secondly, in an Assembly of many, there cannot choose but be
some whose interests are contrary to that of the Publique; and these
their Interests make passionate, and Passion eloquent, and Eloquence
drawes others into the same advice. For the Passions of men, which
asunder are moderate, as the heat of one brand; in Assembly are like
many brands, that enflame one another, (especially when they blow one
another with Orations) to the setting of the Common-wealth on fire,
under pretence of Counselling it. Thirdly, in hearing every man apart,
one may examine (when there is need) the truth, or probability of
his reasons, and of the grounds of the advise he gives, by frequent
interruptions, and objections; which cannot be done in an Assembly,
where (in every difficult question) a man is rather astonied, and dazled
with the variety of discourse upon it, than informed of the course he
ought to take. Besides, there cannot be an Assembly of many, called
together for advice, wherein there be not some, that have the ambition
to be thought eloquent, and also learned in the Politiques; and give not
their advice with care of the businesse propounded, but of the applause
of their motly orations, made of the divers colored threds, or shreds of
Authors; which is an Impertinence at least, that takes away the time
of serious Consultation, and in the secret way of Counselling apart, is
easily avoided. Fourthly, in Deliberations that ought to be kept secret,
(whereof there be many occasions in Publique Businesse,) the Counsells
of many, and especially in Assemblies, are dangerous; And therefore
great Assemblies are necessitated to commit such affaires to lesser
numbers, and of such persons as are most versed, and in whose fidelity
they have most confidence.

To conclude, who is there that so far approves the taking of Counsell
from a great Assembly of Counsellours, that wisheth for, or would accept
of their pains, when there is a question of marrying his Children,
disposing of his Lands, governing his Household, or managing his
private Estate, especially if there be amongst them such as wish not
his prosperity? A man that doth his businesse by the help of many and
prudent Counsellours, with every one consulting apart in his proper
element, does it best, as he that useth able Seconds at Tennis play,
placed in their proper stations. He does next best, that useth his own
Judgement only; as he that has no Second at all. But he that is carried
up and down to his businesse in a framed Counsell, which cannot move
but by the plurality of consenting opinions, the execution whereof is
commonly (out of envy, or interest) retarded by the part dissenting,
does it worst of all, and like one that is carried to the ball, though
by good Players, yet in a Wheele-barrough, or other frame, heavy of it
self, and retarded also by the inconcurrent judgements, and endeavours
of them that drive it; and so much the more, as they be more that set
their hands to it; and most of all, when there is one, or more amongst
them, that desire to have him lose. And though it be true, that many eys
see more then one; yet it is not to be understood of many Counsellours;
but then only, when the finall Resolution is in one man. Otherwise,
because many eyes see the same thing in divers lines, and are apt to
look asquint towards their private benefit; they that desire not to
misse their marke, though they look about with two eyes, yet they never
ayme but with one; And therefore no great Popular Common-wealth was
ever kept up; but either by a forraign Enemy that united them; or by
the reputation of some one eminent Man amongst them; or by the secret
Counsell of a few; or by the mutuall feare of equall factions; and
not by the open Consultations of the Assembly. And as for very little
Common-wealths, be they Popular, or Monarchicall, there is no humane
wisdome can uphold them, longer then the Jealousy lasteth of their
potent Neighbours.



CHAPTER XXVI. OF CIVILL LAWES




Civill Law what

By CIVILL LAWES, I understand the Lawes, that men are therefore bound to
observe, because they are Members, not of this, or that Common-wealth
in particular, but of a Common-wealth. For the knowledge of particular
Lawes belongeth to them, that professe the study of the Lawes of their
severall Countries; but the knowledge of Civill Law in generall, to any
man. The antient Law of Rome was called their Civil Law, from the word
Civitas, which signifies a Common-wealth; And those Countries, which
having been under the Roman Empire, and governed by that Law, retaine
still such part thereof as they think fit, call that part the Civill
Law, to distinguish it from the rest of their own Civill Lawes. But that
is not it I intend to speak of here; my designe being not to shew what
is Law here, and there; but what is Law; as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero,
and divers others have done, without taking upon them the profession of
the study of the Law.

And first it manifest, that Law in generall, is not Counsell, but
Command; nor a Command of any man to any man; but only of him, whose
Command is addressed to one formerly obliged to obey him. And as for
Civill Law, it addeth only the name of the person Commanding, which is
Persona Civitatis, the Person of the Common-wealth.

Which considered, I define Civill Law in this Manner.