However, there are some further passages which render such an
interpretation
untenable.
Buddhist-Omniscience
Varuija, known as "chief of the gods of the natural and moral order," is
I Be$1 t(f(t(nces are fOllnd in Ram Jec: SIDlh, The Corr? pt o/Omrriscknce ill AII- d",t Hindu Thought.
? ? 28
? BUDDHIST OM? ISCIENCE
supplicated saying: "According 10 his wisdom Varuna knoweth aiL" ? In another passage we find: "Prajapati! thou only comprehendest all these created things, and none beside thee. " With the development of the Upanifads we are on firmer ground, for here the Sanskrit word for "omniscience" does appear. 2 The generallendency of Ihe Upanifads is to equate omniscience with knowledge of the (ltman or soul, though there is still ascription of omniscience to the god Visnu, for example. The movement from the Vedas to the Upanifods thus presents a change in the concept of omnsi cience. What used to be reserved for the gods is now accessible to certain people as well, those who seek the IUmon. Yet knowledge of the lJtman is not what we normally take Ihe word "omnis- cience" 10 mean. This indicates that omniscience has several difef renl meanings within Indian philosophy and religion, of which the literal or common meaning, of knowing everything, is perhaps the least in- teresling. We may compare "omniscience" to "omnivorous," in- dicating that the latter certainly does not mean that one has already ealen everything, but rather that one is prepared to eat anything that is edible, which excludes a large number of things. Analogously, omnis- cience may be regarded as a potential rather than a/air accompli, the ability 10 know everything that is knowable, without having already
known it all. And the limitalion of this kind of omniscience to that which is knowable is an important distinction, since it would exclude all future evenls at least, as well as a large proportion of past events. This kind of omniscience we may call a figuralive or metaphorical om- niicience, as opposed to the more common literal omniscience. The kind of omniscience that is referred to in the Upani? ods as synonymous with knowledge of the l1tmon may be designated a spiritual omnis- cience, since in knowing the lJrman as identical wilh the fundamental nalUre of reality, one knows an underlying fealure of all seemingly separate phenomena. These various different kinds of omniscience ap- pear within the Buddhist tradition as well.
Omniscience in PlJli sources
Conlemporaneous with the development of the Upanj? ads there ap-
pear in India several differenl religious teachers who deny the efficacy
, The word in Sanskrit is SQf'VQjifo, son;a munin, "all, Or everythin," andjifo the re,ular verbal root, co,natc wilh QUr English "to know. "
? ? 29
? NAUGHTON
of the Vedas entirely. The most important o f these figures for our pur- poses are Stkyamuni Buddha and Mahlvlra, who founded the religious traditions of Buddhism and Jainism. Jaina religious eschatology main- tained that the soul had an innate capacity for knowledge, which was obscured by layers of karma, or accumulated sinful actions. Through religious practice, largely consisting of austerities, these layers could be burned off, and once they were all gone, the soul would be liberated. Having removed all obstacles to the 501. 11'5 coanition, it would naturally follOw that the soul would be omniscient. The Jains called this knowledge of the liberated soul keva/o-jriilna, and their insistence upon the reality of this attainment forms one of the hallmarks of Jaina doc- trine. l This is consistent both with Jaina sources themselves and with reports of Jaina doctrines in the PaJi scriptures. We find Abhaya the
LicchavJ saying in the Angutlora Nikilya: "Sir, NUha's son, the Unclothed, claims to be ali-knowing, all-seeing, and to have all--com- prising knowledge and vision. He says, 'Whether I walk or stand or sleep or wake, my knowledge and vision are always and without a break present before me. ' . . Similarly in the Majjhimo Nik/lyo: "When this had been said, monks, these Jains spoke to me thus; 'Your reverence, Nltaputta the Jain is ali-knowing, all? seeing; he claims all?
embracing knowledae? and-vision, saying; "Whether I am walkina or standing still or asleep or awake, knowledge-and. vision is permanently and continuously before me. " , " Finally, the CD{o-Sakuludilyi? Sutto contains the followina less than complimentary passage in which UdAyin addresses Silkyamuni:
"Some time ago, revered sir. one who was ail-knowing. all- seeing, claiming aJl--embracing knowledge-and-vision, said: 'Whether I am walking or standing still or asleep or awake, knowledge-and? vision is constantly and perpetually before me. ' He, on being asked a question by me concerning the
past, shelved the question by (asking) another, answered off the point and evinced temper and iII? will and sulkiness . . . [Buddha inquires:) 'BUI who was this, Udlyin, that all? know?
, P. S. Jaini, Tht: Jllinll Pilth 0/ PurjfiClllioll, p. 260: "Absoillte omniscience is in thrir I. adition Ihe fllndJlJT1entll criterion for liberation. " Also, K. N. Jayatilleite, &,1), Buddhl. sl Tht:Ory 0/ Knowlt:dlt, p. 204, quoting Jacobi', Ja/rlll SQINIS. says that omnis? cience WIU "one of the fundamental dogma! of the J. ins. "
? ? 30
? BUDDHIST OMNISCIENCE
ing, all-seeing, claiming all-embracing knowledge-and-vi- sion . . . on being asked a question by you . . . evinced temper and ill-will and sulkiness? ' [Udlyin replies:) 'Revered sir, it was Nltapuua the Jain. "
There are other similar passages in the pali SUIlOS, bul to ensure that the Buddhists are not misrepresenting this position of the Jainas, we may tum to their own sources, where we find: "the Jaina view of omnis? cience . . . may be now defined as an immediate and direct knowledge of all the objects of the universe, past, present and future, subtle and remote, far and near, by a single ever-lasting act of knowledge requir- inl no assistance from the senses and even mind. "? Jaini also discusses the nature of Jaina omniscience in this way: "Such knowledge is com- pared to a mirror in which everyone of the innumerable existents, in all its qualities and modes, is simuhaneousiy reHected. These 'knowables' are cognized without any volition whatsoever on the pan of the arhat. Furthermore, no activity of the senses or mind is involved; there is only direct perception by the souL'" So this Jaina omniscience would seem to be a literal kind of omniscience, which outside of the Jaina tradition is usually reserved for deities. It is an automatic kind of knowledge, re- quiring "no volition" and "no activity of the senses or mind. " In fact, "omniscient cognition and sensory cognition are held to be mutually antithetical. "6 This follows from tbe Jaina conception of the soul, which is an innately knowing entity. Having removed all obscurations, this innate feature of the soul will manifest itself completely, without any possible hindrance or limitation. So crucial is this doctrine of om- niscience to the Jaina tradition that it is used to validate all other Jaina teachings. Jaini writes that "the authority of the Jaina teachings rests ultimately on the fact that they were preached by an omniscient be- ing,"7 which seems very similar to th? idea of revelation as a source for religious teaching.
The Buddhist tradition from its inception has also made use of the concept of omniscience, but in a very different manner. In the tradi- tional account of Slkyamuni's enlightenment, the content of his
, Ram Jee Singh, TM laina Conup' 0/ Omnisc? nu, p. 18. , Jlini. op. cit. , p. 266.
, ibid. , pp. 34-35.
? Ibid. ? p. 89.
? ? ? JI
? NAUGHTON
realization is said to consist of three kinds of knowledge: of his own previous existences, clairvoyance which sees the transmigration of be- ings in accordance with their karma, and destruction of the l1Jravas, which are said to consist of sensual desire, desire for existence, and ig- norance. Having attained enlightenment, Siikyamuni decided to teach others how to achieve the same realization after being requested by BramM, one of the main deities in the Hindu pantheon. Learning that hi. own former teachers were dead, he decided to give his first teaching to the group of five monks with whom he had previously engaged in various ascetic practices. While on his way to meet them, he encountered an ascetic named Upaka. Upaka noticed that Siikyamuni didn't look like an ordinary fellow, so he asked him,
"'Who is your teacher, or who. >e dhamma do you profess? ' When this had been said, I, monks, addressed Upaka, the
Naked Ascetic, in verses:
'Victorious over all, omniscient am I. ' "I
Thai is to say, on the basis of the previously mentioned three kinds of knowledge, Siikyamuni here claims omniscience for himself. This is ob- viously not meant as a il teral omniscience, bul as a more spiritual kind such as in the Upani? ads. What is most remarkable about Ihis passage, though, is Upaka's reaction to Sakyamuni's grand pronouncement: "Thereupon Upaka said, 'Would that it might be so, friend,' shook his head, and went off on a by-path. "9 That is to say, Upaka exhibits a thoroughly skeptical attitude to Sak:yamuni's claim to omniscience, and goes offunconvinced. This reaction seems a very natural one to us, and the fact that it portrays Sakyamuni in such an uncomplimentary way directly after his enlightenment is probably good evidence for its authenticity. No later redactor would be likely to make up such a story. Even Ihough Upaka recognizes that something about Sakyamuni is special, he does not become "the first Buddhist. " The connection be- tween the three kinds of knowledge and omniscience is also mentioned in the Tevijaj -VacchagoUa Sutta, where Siikyamuni meets the wanderer Vacchagotta, who says that he has heard Sakyamuni
, L B. Horner, trans. , TheMiddle Length Sayings, Vol. J, p. 214. Also E. Thomas ne Life oj Buddha as Legend and Hislo,y. p. 83.
, Thomas, p. 83. Also Horner, p. 21S.
? 32
? BUDDHIST OMNISCIENCE
d e s c r i b e d a s o m n i s c i e n t , i n t h e m a n n e r o f t h e J a i n a s a i n t s . R e s p o n d i n g t o this report, SAkyamuni replies that he has three knowledges: he can retail his past lives, he is clairvoyant, and he has become liberated by destroying the "cankers. " These of course are the same three that con- stituted his enlightenment. Responding to Abhaya the licchavi's state- ment above, Ananda makes no mention of omniscience, but simply tells him about the basic Buddhist triad ofiTla, samltdhi, andprajillt as constituting the Buddhist path to nirvlt{la. On another occasion, when Sakyamuni is addressing Sandaka, he parodies the Jaina idea in this way:
"As to this, Sandaka, some teacher, all-knowing, all-seeing, claims all-embracing knowledge? and-vision, saying: 'Wheth- er I am walking or standing still or asleep or awake, knowl- edge? and-vision is constantly and perpetually before me. ' He enters an empty place, and he does not obtain almsfood, and a dog bites him, and he encounters a fierce elephant, and he encounters a fierce horse, and he encounters a fierce bullock, and he asks a woman and a man their name and clan, and he asks the name of a villa,e or a market town and the way . . . Whereupon, Sandaka, an intelligent person . . . goes away uninterested. "l"
That i s to say, someone who was truly omniscient would not act in such a way, and if he claims to be omniscient yet acts in the manner de- scribed above, it is difficult to take his claim seriously. In general, we find that Sakyamuni seems to be uninterested in claims of omniscience, partly because they are notoriously difficult to verify, but largely because they are not helpful for one who seeks liberation. Continuing his talk to Sandaka quoted above, SAkyamuni distinguishes four types of unsatisfactory bases for religious teaching. The first is the example jU&1 given, of a teacher who claim? to be omniscient. Second is a teacher who follows tradition. Third is a teacher who follows reason, and last is a teacher who is stupid and confused. Although the context suggests thai the first type was primarily directed at the Jainas, the principle itself is e"'pressed without reference to any specific figure, and we know from other sources that MahAvira was not alone in claiming
? ? " I. B. Homer, Irans. . Thf' Middlf' Ult&,It Sliyings, Vol. 2, p. 199.
33
? II Jayatitleke, p. 391
the attitude of the Buddha as often rellresemed in the Niklyas. "
,
nOles that "this verS( is not found in the NiklyilS but il reflects
NAUGHTON
to possess omniscience. At one point in the Mahll-ParinibbDna-Sulta, SAripulta addresses the Buddha thus: "Lord! such faith have I in the Exalted One, that melhinks there never has been, nor will there be, nor is there now any other, whether wanderer or brahmin, who is greater and wiser than Ihe Exalted One, that is to say, as regards the higher wisdom. " This is quite a natural expression of Saripulta's admiration for Sakyamuni, but Sakyamuni takes him to task for it, inquiring whether or nOI Sariputla has personally known the minds of all other sages 01" the past, present, and future. Saripulta has to admit that he has not, that he has in facl been speaking beyond his own experience. For Sariputta to meaningfully praise Sakyamuni as being omniscient would necessitate that Saripuua also be omniscient to verify Sakya- muni's realization. For S! lkyamuni one of the root causes of human confusion and suffering is that people tend to speak beyond their own experience, and it is for this reason that he rebukes S! lriputta for speaking in such a way. This rational and critical attitude of Sakya- muni is what many peopie find attractive in the pali scriptures. It is certainly a far cry from such statements as Tenullian's famous "I believe because it is absurd. " Sakyamuni considers that faith which is not based on sound reasoning and personal experience is a hindrance to spiritual realization. This anti-dogmatic altitude is exemplified in the famous goldsmith quote: "Just as wise men (test a claim to be gold) by burning, cutting and rubbing (on a touchstone), my statements, 0 monks, should be accepted after examination and not OUI of respect for me. '? I) Thatlhis altitude is still illustrative of the best of the Bud- dhist tradition is demonstrated in a recent quote from the Dalai Lama: "If there's good, strong evidence from science that such and such is Ihe case, and this is contrary 10 Buddhism, then we will change. ")!
It would be nice if we could leave the pali literature at this point, and simply report that Sakyamuni di? played a consistently critical att. ilude towards claims of omniscience, whether they were made about other leachers or addressed to himself, preferring to limit his own claims to the three kinds of knowledge we have mentioned.
However, there are some further passages which render such an interpretation untenable.
? ? " In the New York Times, OcroiH:r 8, L989, Section 4, p. 6 . 34
? BUDDHIST OMNISCIENCE
Chief among these is a passage in the Kal)lJ. akatthala Sutta, which is worth quoting in extenso:
"Then King Pasenadi spoke thus to the Lord: 'I have heard this about you, revered sir: "The recluse Gotama speaks thus: There is neither a recluse nor a brahmin who, all-knowing, all-seeing, can claim a11-embracing knowledge-and-vision- this situation does not exist. " Revered sir, those who speak thus . . . I hope that these, revered sir, speak what was spoken by the Lord, that they do not misrepresenl the Lord by what is not fact, that they explain dhamma according to dhamma, and that no reasoned thesis gives occasion for contempt? '
'Those, sire, who speak thus . . . do not speak as I spoke bUI are misrepresenting me with what is not true, with what is not fact. '. . .
Then King Pasenadi spoke thus 10 the Lord: 'Could it be, revered sir. that people might have transferred to quite another topic something (originally) said by the Lord in reference to something else? In regard to what, revered sir, does the Lord claim to have spoken Ihe words? '
'I, sire, claim to have spoken the words thus: There is neither a recluse not a brahman who at one and Ihe same time can know all, can see all-this situation does nOI exist. ' "
Here Sakyamuni makes a distinction between two different kinds of omniscience: one which is realized "constantly and perpetually," and the other which is more like a potential than a fully realized condition. In our typology, this is a figurative or metaphorical omniscience, as the potential to know anything that can be known, without having actualiz- ed that potential. Given the principle staled above, that Slkyamuni criticized all statements which go beyond personal experience, we are left with the conclusion that Slkyamuni in this passage was claiming the more limited form of omniscience for himself, albeit indirectly_ The classic formulation of this kind of omniscience is to be found in Ihe Milinda-pafiha, in which there are eight separate references to Bud- dha's omniscience. 11 King Milinda asks: " 'Revered Nlgasena, was the
" See Kawasaki ShinjO, "Omniscience in Pili TeXIS" (in Japanese) in Buddhism and Its Rela/ion 10 Ollrer Religions, pp. 117-203, for a full discussion of all these
? ? passages.
"
? NAUGHTON
Buddha omniscient? ' [Nagasena replies] 'Yes, sire, the Lord was omnis- cient, but knowledge-and-vision was not constantly and continuously present to the Lord. The Lord's omniscient knowledge was dependent on the adverting (of his mind); when he adverted it he knew whatever it pleased (him to know). ' " Here Sakyamuni's supposed omniscience is quite clearly defined as a potential capacity, dependent upon his inten- tion or mental "adverting. "14 Nilgasena goes on to compare Sakya- muni's purified knowledge with a sharp arrow "fitted to a sturdy bow and shot by a strong man" which will easily penetrate any clothes made of linen, silk, or wool which are in its path.
"As, sire, a man could put into one hand anything that had been in the other, could utter a speech through his open mouth, could swallow food that was in his mouth, opening his eyes could close them, or closing his eyes could open them, and could stretch out his bent arms or bend in his outstretched arms, sooner than this, sire, more quickly the Lord's omniscient knowledge (could function), more quickly
the adverting (of his mind); when he had adverted ii, he knew whatcvcr it plcascd (him to know). "
S. 1kyamuni's knowledge is of the same kind as ordinary knowledge, but simply heightened to the nth degtee. If I want to think of my name, this requires very little effort on my part, due to extensive practice and familiarity. For Sakyamuni, all possible objects of knowledge are similarly familiar, and his mental training has honed his intellect to such a degree that no obstacles remain. Here again, we note that this concerns possible objects of knowledge, and not things which are unknowable by their very natures.
The Milinda-pafiha is a fairly late text, and one can easily discern some Mahayana tendencie. ? in il? pag? , bill in rhi? case it simply works out the implications of the Ka/J/Jakotthalo SullO'S statement given above. While we have no sure way of dating the pali literature or separating it into difef rent strata, based on the doctrinal development we have noted, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the composition
" ThepatiwordusediSllWljjunu,whkhmayalsobetranslatedas"oon? ntralion. " JaJni uses "reflection" in Iranslatinglhis same ? ge.
? 16
? BUDDHIST OMNISCIENCE
of the KaMakatthala Sutta occurred at a later period than that of the other sources cited above. It is very possible that Sakyamuni's disinterested attitude towards the issue of omniscience reflects his real feelings, and that later statements attributed to him where he appears to claim some form of omniscience for himself were interpolations created by disciples who felt uncomfonable comparing their teacher
with MahavIra, who had claimed a literal kind of omniscience all along. It seems that the idea of omniscience would never have become an issue in the Buddhi3t tradition (al leut not al thi$ early $lage) if there had not been other forces at work, competing with Buddhist teachings. Under pressure from rival sects, loyal Buddhisu desired that the figure of their own founder not be regarded as inferior, and so they naturally wished to praise him as extravagantly as possible, after the manner of sariputta above. However, they were stuck with a pre-ex- isting textual tradition wherein Sakyamuni displays a critical attitude towards claims of omniscience made by his contemporaries, and so the compiler(s) of the Ka'JJl akaUhala Sutta had to reinterpret the idea of omniscience itself in order to apply it to their revered founder. As we shall see, in so doing they initiated a controversy which was to continue for as long as there were Buddhists In India.
Transitional stages
At about the same time as the composition of the Milinda-paiiha or shortly thereafter, the Buddhist tradition began to produce a new set of scriptures known collectively as the Prajiii1J]Qramiti1 literature. These scriptures mark the inception of the movement that came to be known as Mahayana Buddhism, which spread from India through Tibet. central Asia, and China into Japan. The Prajiii1p1Jramiti1 SQtras themselves come in various lengths, of which the version in 8000 lines is
generally regarded as the oldest, dating from around the beginning of the Christian era. This scripture continues to use the same word, sarva- jiia, to designate the Buddha's omniscience, but the sense of this word has changed dramatically. For example:
"When one trains oneself on those stages, one trains oneself in Buddhahood, or the state of aU-knowledge; and thereby in the immeasurable and incalculable Buddha-dhar- mas. Thereby one trains oneself neither for the increase of
37
? NAUGHTON
form, feeling, etc. , nor yet for their decrease; neither to ap- propriate fonn, etc. , nor to let them go. Nor does one train oneself to get hold of any other dharma, even of all- knowledge, nor to produce one, or make one disappear. When he trains thus, a Bodhisattva trains in all-knowledge, and he shall go forth to all-knowledge. "
"It is because the Lord has trained himself in just this perfection of wisdom that the Tath4gata has acquired and known full enlightenment or all-knowledge . . . this all- knowledge of the Tath4gata has come forth from the perfec- tion of wisdom. "
"The perfection of wisdom, 0 Lord,is the accomplish- ment of the cognition of the all-knowing. The perfection of wisdom is the state of all-knowledge. "
"Perfect wisdom is the source of the all-knowledge of the Buddhas. "
"All-knowledge is immeasurable and unlimited. What is immeasurable and unlimited, that is not form, or any other skandha. That is not attainment, or reunion, or getting there; not the path or its fruit; not cognition, or consciousness; not genesis,or destruction,or production, or passing away, or stopping, or development,or annihilation. It has not been made by anything, it has not come from anywhere, it does not go to anywhere,it does not stand in any place or spot. On the contrary, it comes to be styled 'immeasurable, unlimited. '
From the immeasurableness of space is the immeasurableness of all-knowledge. But what is immeasurableness that does not lend itself to being fully known by anything, be it form, or any skandha,or any of the six perfections. Because form is all-knowledge, and so are the other skandhas. and the six perfections. . .
I give such an extensive variety of quotes to demonstrate the problems faced by commentators on the PP scriptures. What is stated plainly in one place is contradicted in another, and any feeling of "Ah, now I understand," does not last for very long. The frustrating obscurity of this text leads one to have sympathy for Poussin,who denounced "In- dian 'philosophumeno' concocted by ascetics . . . men exhausted by a
38
? BUDDHIST OMNISCIENCE
severe diet and often stupefied by me practice of ecstasy. "" Conze himself, who probably was more familiar than any Westerner (and most Orientals) with this literature, says, "The PrajiUlpAramitl sutras in turn fascinate and exasperate the student, in turn raise him to the very heigh! s of elation, and then again reduce him to a condition of
baffled helplessness. "l. However, we may venture 10 make a few ten- lative observations, keeping in mind that whoever wrOle the Pra- jflflpiJramiUJ scriptures would probably never agree with anything we trllO say aboul them. The first point is linguisti(:, and is simply that the word here Iranslated as "a1I? knowledge" is indeed. sorvajflalfl, an abstract form of the same word used in the Pili literature for the omnis- cience of Buddha and MahAvTra. The Buddha here retains his faculty of omniscience, but bOlh Buddha and omniscience are very different from what we found in the pali sources. Furthermore, this seems to be omniscience in the secondary sense noled above, thai is nOI a complele permanenl knowledge of everythin&, but a knowledge of "perfect wisdom," which is generally understood to imply a realization of emp- tiness. This Iypc of omniscience is thus not very different from the spiritual or UpQni? Qdic type, where it is regarded as the culmination of illlensive meditative analysis. The mere term "pcrfeel wisdom," considered in isolation, is not a bad gloss of the literal meaning of om- niscience, but in a Buddhist context, and particularly in the Pra- jflfJpltramitlt scriptures, both these terms have very specific technical senses, which Ihe later commcntalOr5 develop.
The other important version of the PrajflltpiJramiUJ scriptures is the version in 25,000 lines, which is essentially an expanded version of the earlier one. Conze dates the only surviving complete Sanskrit version oflhis text to the 51h century, and considers il as a rceasl version of an earlier original. It has been reorganized with a view to bringing its con- teDIS more in line with the sequence of the AbhisamayltIQ1pkltra. It is in this text that we first encounter the three different kinds of omnis? citnces which are explained by the Abhisamayltla1pkflra. Sarvajflallt is demoted from its position as Ihe realization of the Buddha to that of
HTnayana practitioners, while the Buddha's omniscience is designated by a new lenn, sa? {jkltrajflatlt, or overall omniscience. This is a rather
" Quoted in l. M. Joshi, Disurn/", the BuddhQ. p. 1.
" Conu "On Omniscience Ind the Goal" in Middle WQY. Vol. 22, No. 3. p. 63.
? "
? NAUGHTON
clumsy attempt to exalt the Buddha while denigrating HInaylna, and the awkward English of "overall omniscience" as opposed to simply "omniscience" ? sounds just as strange in Sanskrit. Between these twO is the bodhisattva, whose realization is called milrgajr'iatil. However the usage of these terms is not fully consistent in this tex! . In this text as well, omniscience ( o r overall omni? ience) i s generally synonymous with enlightenment or Buddhahood.
The best known commentator on the Prajr'itJptJramiltJ Salras is un- doubtedly Naglrjuna, the founder of the Madhyamaka philosophical school, whose writings on emptiness express the direct or explicit mean-
ing of the Prajr'iilpdramitil texts. Nlgarjuna himself uses the term "om- niscient" only once, to my knowledge, in his salutation verse at the beginning of his RatnilvalT, but without any attempt to define its mean- ing. Thus we have no clear idea of what "omniscience" means at this period in Buddhist history, although we can be fairly sure that it means neither what it meant before, for Nlgasena and his predecessors, nor does it mean what it later comes to mean within Mahayana. The word itself remains the same, but its meaning is undergoing a transforma-
tion.
We should mention here that there is another work attributed to
Nagarjuna and extant only in Chinese, the MahtJprajfltJpdramit6padeSa- sii5lra (MPPS). There is mention of both sarvajiia and sarviikilrajiia in this work, but following Hikata we may presume that the presence of
the latter, as well as any distinction between these two terms, is prob- ably more properly attributed to Kum! rajlva rather than N! garjuna. Yet even in this text, although both terms are used, there is no clear distinction between them, with Buddha acclaimed as omniscient (sarva-
jiia andlor sarv6ktJrajfia). while such an attainment is denied to HInaylna practitioners. This text is probably earlier than the Pm-
jr. tJptJramitil Satra in 25,()()() Lines mentioned above. Omniscience/or Vasubandhu
Following this transitional phase, we next come to that landmark of Buddhist literature, the Abhidharma-kosa. Composed around the mid- dle of the 4th century, this work represents the culmination of earlier Buddhist practices into a sophisticated philosophical system. Dating from after the start of the Mahayana, the Kosa is one of the last great
? ? ? ? BUDDHIST OMNISCIENCE
works of early Buddhism to be composed in India. Its author Vasuban- dhu has the distinction17 of being one of the only Buddhist authors to achieve renown in both branches of Buddhist philosophy, the earlier Hfnayana as well as the later Mahayana. Within the KoSa itself, however, we find only scant references to the concept of omniscience, which here retains its early form as sarvajna. The discussions of omnis- cience occur within the framework of sectarian disputations among the several groups (traditionally given as eighteen) which had arisen by this time, ? ch with their own special ways of interpreting Buddhist doc- trine.
We start with an objection from a Vl1tsrputrTya standpoint. This sect held that there must be an underlyinz basis of continuity 10 the person, which they called the pudgafa. This was regarded by most other sects as virtually identical to the lUman, and the Vl1tsrputrrya assertion of the pudgoJa was the object of repeated scorn and ridicule. In this context the Vl1tsfputrTya claimed that the pudgafa must have more than a momen- tary existence in order for Buddha to know everything. A mere series of mental instants cannot possibly have such knowledge. Vasubandhu replied that Buddha's omniscience is to be considered as a potential
ralher than an actualized state, dependent upon his attention or voli- tion. Vasubandhu cited the example of a fire, which cannot burn C\? erything at once, but has the ability to burn everything sequentially. Since Buddha has the ability to know everything, he is acknowledged to be omniscient. Thus Buddha's knowledge was regarded as having the same essential structure as the knowledge of ordinary people.
In opposition to this was Ihe position of the Mahl1sI1'f/ghikas, who held that Buddha's knowledge was qualitalively different from that of ordinary people. In the view typical of other Hlnayana schools, con- sciousness existed moment by moment, Hickering on and off like a movie. By the time a second momeDI arises, the first moment is com- pletely gone. However, this made it difficult to establish causality operating over any space of time_ The Sorviistivadins, whose views Vasubandhu generally upholds in the KOSO,IS asserted the existence of
" Shared with Wittgenstein, whose own philosophical career embraces IWO distinct ,,,,,,, .
\I AI least in the verJeS. In the commentary he often seem? 10 ? ide more with the ScUlrlInlilcll$. as noted in S . Anacker. Seven Worlcs of Vasubandh. . , p. 11.
? 41
? NAUOHTON
more than one moment; indeed, they claimed that both past and future existed just as much as the present. Their view was, as outlined above, similar to that of the Milinda-paflha, where Buddha's omniscience,
functioning in much the same way a s ordinary knowledge, is dependent upon volition for its activity. It is not automatic. The MahlJslJrrtghikas and others claimed that Buddha's omniscience was automatic. It was not dependent upon volition or any other factor, but was simply a result of his extreme mental purily_ This assertion seems quite similar to that of the early Jainas mentioned above. The Sarvastivadjns main- tained that Buddha's omniscience occurred over a period of two in- stants, one to cognize all phenomena and the other to render that cog- nition accessible. MahiJsaf! lghikas (ejected this, and said that since consciousness itself is self-luminous, there is no need of a second mo- ment. This position was to become standard in later Mahayana discus- sions of this topic, and of the nature of the mind in general.
As mentioned above, Vasubandhu's career as a Buddhist philoso- pher spans the division between Hlnayana and Mahayana, and so we find further discussions of omniscience in his later works. Of particular interest in this connection is the Mahayana Satriilamkl1ra (MSA), which along with the Abhisamayalarrtkara (AA) belongs to what are known as the "five texts of Maitreya. " But when we examine the MSA,
we find that its use of omniscience is quite difef rent from that of the AA. , which by itself would cast some serious doubt on the traditional ascription of these two texts to the same author. Let us proceed to the relevant textual citations. For the sake of analysis, we may divide them into two groups, first those that mention sarvajria (sj), and second those that mention sarviiklJrajrio (saj). First we find Vasubandhu's commentary on MSA I.
I Be$1 t(f(t(nces are fOllnd in Ram Jec: SIDlh, The Corr? pt o/Omrriscknce ill AII- d",t Hindu Thought.
? ? 28
? BUDDHIST OM? ISCIENCE
supplicated saying: "According 10 his wisdom Varuna knoweth aiL" ? In another passage we find: "Prajapati! thou only comprehendest all these created things, and none beside thee. " With the development of the Upanifads we are on firmer ground, for here the Sanskrit word for "omniscience" does appear. 2 The generallendency of Ihe Upanifads is to equate omniscience with knowledge of the (ltman or soul, though there is still ascription of omniscience to the god Visnu, for example. The movement from the Vedas to the Upanifods thus presents a change in the concept of omnsi cience. What used to be reserved for the gods is now accessible to certain people as well, those who seek the IUmon. Yet knowledge of the lJtman is not what we normally take Ihe word "omnis- cience" 10 mean. This indicates that omniscience has several difef renl meanings within Indian philosophy and religion, of which the literal or common meaning, of knowing everything, is perhaps the least in- teresling. We may compare "omniscience" to "omnivorous," in- dicating that the latter certainly does not mean that one has already ealen everything, but rather that one is prepared to eat anything that is edible, which excludes a large number of things. Analogously, omnis- cience may be regarded as a potential rather than a/air accompli, the ability 10 know everything that is knowable, without having already
known it all. And the limitalion of this kind of omniscience to that which is knowable is an important distinction, since it would exclude all future evenls at least, as well as a large proportion of past events. This kind of omniscience we may call a figuralive or metaphorical om- niicience, as opposed to the more common literal omniscience. The kind of omniscience that is referred to in the Upani? ods as synonymous with knowledge of the l1tmon may be designated a spiritual omnis- cience, since in knowing the lJrman as identical wilh the fundamental nalUre of reality, one knows an underlying fealure of all seemingly separate phenomena. These various different kinds of omniscience ap- pear within the Buddhist tradition as well.
Omniscience in PlJli sources
Conlemporaneous with the development of the Upanj? ads there ap-
pear in India several differenl religious teachers who deny the efficacy
, The word in Sanskrit is SQf'VQjifo, son;a munin, "all, Or everythin," andjifo the re,ular verbal root, co,natc wilh QUr English "to know. "
? ? 29
? NAUGHTON
of the Vedas entirely. The most important o f these figures for our pur- poses are Stkyamuni Buddha and Mahlvlra, who founded the religious traditions of Buddhism and Jainism. Jaina religious eschatology main- tained that the soul had an innate capacity for knowledge, which was obscured by layers of karma, or accumulated sinful actions. Through religious practice, largely consisting of austerities, these layers could be burned off, and once they were all gone, the soul would be liberated. Having removed all obstacles to the 501. 11'5 coanition, it would naturally follOw that the soul would be omniscient. The Jains called this knowledge of the liberated soul keva/o-jriilna, and their insistence upon the reality of this attainment forms one of the hallmarks of Jaina doc- trine. l This is consistent both with Jaina sources themselves and with reports of Jaina doctrines in the PaJi scriptures. We find Abhaya the
LicchavJ saying in the Angutlora Nikilya: "Sir, NUha's son, the Unclothed, claims to be ali-knowing, all-seeing, and to have all--com- prising knowledge and vision. He says, 'Whether I walk or stand or sleep or wake, my knowledge and vision are always and without a break present before me. ' . . Similarly in the Majjhimo Nik/lyo: "When this had been said, monks, these Jains spoke to me thus; 'Your reverence, Nltaputta the Jain is ali-knowing, all? seeing; he claims all?
embracing knowledae? and-vision, saying; "Whether I am walkina or standing still or asleep or awake, knowledge-and. vision is permanently and continuously before me. " , " Finally, the CD{o-Sakuludilyi? Sutto contains the followina less than complimentary passage in which UdAyin addresses Silkyamuni:
"Some time ago, revered sir. one who was ail-knowing. all- seeing, claiming aJl--embracing knowledge-and-vision, said: 'Whether I am walking or standing still or asleep or awake, knowledge-and? vision is constantly and perpetually before me. ' He, on being asked a question by me concerning the
past, shelved the question by (asking) another, answered off the point and evinced temper and iII? will and sulkiness . . . [Buddha inquires:) 'BUI who was this, Udlyin, that all? know?
, P. S. Jaini, Tht: Jllinll Pilth 0/ PurjfiClllioll, p. 260: "Absoillte omniscience is in thrir I. adition Ihe fllndJlJT1entll criterion for liberation. " Also, K. N. Jayatilleite, &,1), Buddhl. sl Tht:Ory 0/ Knowlt:dlt, p. 204, quoting Jacobi', Ja/rlll SQINIS. says that omnis? cience WIU "one of the fundamental dogma! of the J. ins. "
? ? 30
? BUDDHIST OMNISCIENCE
ing, all-seeing, claiming all-embracing knowledge-and-vi- sion . . . on being asked a question by you . . . evinced temper and ill-will and sulkiness? ' [Udlyin replies:) 'Revered sir, it was Nltapuua the Jain. "
There are other similar passages in the pali SUIlOS, bul to ensure that the Buddhists are not misrepresenting this position of the Jainas, we may tum to their own sources, where we find: "the Jaina view of omnis? cience . . . may be now defined as an immediate and direct knowledge of all the objects of the universe, past, present and future, subtle and remote, far and near, by a single ever-lasting act of knowledge requir- inl no assistance from the senses and even mind. "? Jaini also discusses the nature of Jaina omniscience in this way: "Such knowledge is com- pared to a mirror in which everyone of the innumerable existents, in all its qualities and modes, is simuhaneousiy reHected. These 'knowables' are cognized without any volition whatsoever on the pan of the arhat. Furthermore, no activity of the senses or mind is involved; there is only direct perception by the souL'" So this Jaina omniscience would seem to be a literal kind of omniscience, which outside of the Jaina tradition is usually reserved for deities. It is an automatic kind of knowledge, re- quiring "no volition" and "no activity of the senses or mind. " In fact, "omniscient cognition and sensory cognition are held to be mutually antithetical. "6 This follows from tbe Jaina conception of the soul, which is an innately knowing entity. Having removed all obscurations, this innate feature of the soul will manifest itself completely, without any possible hindrance or limitation. So crucial is this doctrine of om- niscience to the Jaina tradition that it is used to validate all other Jaina teachings. Jaini writes that "the authority of the Jaina teachings rests ultimately on the fact that they were preached by an omniscient be- ing,"7 which seems very similar to th? idea of revelation as a source for religious teaching.
The Buddhist tradition from its inception has also made use of the concept of omniscience, but in a very different manner. In the tradi- tional account of Slkyamuni's enlightenment, the content of his
, Ram Jee Singh, TM laina Conup' 0/ Omnisc? nu, p. 18. , Jlini. op. cit. , p. 266.
, ibid. , pp. 34-35.
? Ibid. ? p. 89.
? ? ? JI
? NAUGHTON
realization is said to consist of three kinds of knowledge: of his own previous existences, clairvoyance which sees the transmigration of be- ings in accordance with their karma, and destruction of the l1Jravas, which are said to consist of sensual desire, desire for existence, and ig- norance. Having attained enlightenment, Siikyamuni decided to teach others how to achieve the same realization after being requested by BramM, one of the main deities in the Hindu pantheon. Learning that hi. own former teachers were dead, he decided to give his first teaching to the group of five monks with whom he had previously engaged in various ascetic practices. While on his way to meet them, he encountered an ascetic named Upaka. Upaka noticed that Siikyamuni didn't look like an ordinary fellow, so he asked him,
"'Who is your teacher, or who. >e dhamma do you profess? ' When this had been said, I, monks, addressed Upaka, the
Naked Ascetic, in verses:
'Victorious over all, omniscient am I. ' "I
Thai is to say, on the basis of the previously mentioned three kinds of knowledge, Siikyamuni here claims omniscience for himself. This is ob- viously not meant as a il teral omniscience, bul as a more spiritual kind such as in the Upani? ads. What is most remarkable about Ihis passage, though, is Upaka's reaction to Sakyamuni's grand pronouncement: "Thereupon Upaka said, 'Would that it might be so, friend,' shook his head, and went off on a by-path. "9 That is to say, Upaka exhibits a thoroughly skeptical attitude to Sak:yamuni's claim to omniscience, and goes offunconvinced. This reaction seems a very natural one to us, and the fact that it portrays Sakyamuni in such an uncomplimentary way directly after his enlightenment is probably good evidence for its authenticity. No later redactor would be likely to make up such a story. Even Ihough Upaka recognizes that something about Sakyamuni is special, he does not become "the first Buddhist. " The connection be- tween the three kinds of knowledge and omniscience is also mentioned in the Tevijaj -VacchagoUa Sutta, where Siikyamuni meets the wanderer Vacchagotta, who says that he has heard Sakyamuni
, L B. Horner, trans. , TheMiddle Length Sayings, Vol. J, p. 214. Also E. Thomas ne Life oj Buddha as Legend and Hislo,y. p. 83.
, Thomas, p. 83. Also Horner, p. 21S.
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? BUDDHIST OMNISCIENCE
d e s c r i b e d a s o m n i s c i e n t , i n t h e m a n n e r o f t h e J a i n a s a i n t s . R e s p o n d i n g t o this report, SAkyamuni replies that he has three knowledges: he can retail his past lives, he is clairvoyant, and he has become liberated by destroying the "cankers. " These of course are the same three that con- stituted his enlightenment. Responding to Abhaya the licchavi's state- ment above, Ananda makes no mention of omniscience, but simply tells him about the basic Buddhist triad ofiTla, samltdhi, andprajillt as constituting the Buddhist path to nirvlt{la. On another occasion, when Sakyamuni is addressing Sandaka, he parodies the Jaina idea in this way:
"As to this, Sandaka, some teacher, all-knowing, all-seeing, claims all-embracing knowledge? and-vision, saying: 'Wheth- er I am walking or standing still or asleep or awake, knowl- edge? and-vision is constantly and perpetually before me. ' He enters an empty place, and he does not obtain almsfood, and a dog bites him, and he encounters a fierce elephant, and he encounters a fierce horse, and he encounters a fierce bullock, and he asks a woman and a man their name and clan, and he asks the name of a villa,e or a market town and the way . . . Whereupon, Sandaka, an intelligent person . . . goes away uninterested. "l"
That i s to say, someone who was truly omniscient would not act in such a way, and if he claims to be omniscient yet acts in the manner de- scribed above, it is difficult to take his claim seriously. In general, we find that Sakyamuni seems to be uninterested in claims of omniscience, partly because they are notoriously difficult to verify, but largely because they are not helpful for one who seeks liberation. Continuing his talk to Sandaka quoted above, SAkyamuni distinguishes four types of unsatisfactory bases for religious teaching. The first is the example jU&1 given, of a teacher who claim? to be omniscient. Second is a teacher who follows tradition. Third is a teacher who follows reason, and last is a teacher who is stupid and confused. Although the context suggests thai the first type was primarily directed at the Jainas, the principle itself is e"'pressed without reference to any specific figure, and we know from other sources that MahAvira was not alone in claiming
? ? " I. B. Homer, Irans. . Thf' Middlf' Ult&,It Sliyings, Vol. 2, p. 199.
33
? II Jayatitleke, p. 391
the attitude of the Buddha as often rellresemed in the Niklyas. "
,
nOles that "this verS( is not found in the NiklyilS but il reflects
NAUGHTON
to possess omniscience. At one point in the Mahll-ParinibbDna-Sulta, SAripulta addresses the Buddha thus: "Lord! such faith have I in the Exalted One, that melhinks there never has been, nor will there be, nor is there now any other, whether wanderer or brahmin, who is greater and wiser than Ihe Exalted One, that is to say, as regards the higher wisdom. " This is quite a natural expression of Saripulta's admiration for Sakyamuni, but Sakyamuni takes him to task for it, inquiring whether or nOI Sariputla has personally known the minds of all other sages 01" the past, present, and future. Saripulta has to admit that he has not, that he has in facl been speaking beyond his own experience. For Sariputta to meaningfully praise Sakyamuni as being omniscient would necessitate that Saripuua also be omniscient to verify Sakya- muni's realization. For S! lkyamuni one of the root causes of human confusion and suffering is that people tend to speak beyond their own experience, and it is for this reason that he rebukes S! lriputta for speaking in such a way. This rational and critical attitude of Sakya- muni is what many peopie find attractive in the pali scriptures. It is certainly a far cry from such statements as Tenullian's famous "I believe because it is absurd. " Sakyamuni considers that faith which is not based on sound reasoning and personal experience is a hindrance to spiritual realization. This anti-dogmatic altitude is exemplified in the famous goldsmith quote: "Just as wise men (test a claim to be gold) by burning, cutting and rubbing (on a touchstone), my statements, 0 monks, should be accepted after examination and not OUI of respect for me. '? I) Thatlhis altitude is still illustrative of the best of the Bud- dhist tradition is demonstrated in a recent quote from the Dalai Lama: "If there's good, strong evidence from science that such and such is Ihe case, and this is contrary 10 Buddhism, then we will change. ")!
It would be nice if we could leave the pali literature at this point, and simply report that Sakyamuni di? played a consistently critical att. ilude towards claims of omniscience, whether they were made about other leachers or addressed to himself, preferring to limit his own claims to the three kinds of knowledge we have mentioned.
However, there are some further passages which render such an interpretation untenable.
? ? " In the New York Times, OcroiH:r 8, L989, Section 4, p. 6 . 34
? BUDDHIST OMNISCIENCE
Chief among these is a passage in the Kal)lJ. akatthala Sutta, which is worth quoting in extenso:
"Then King Pasenadi spoke thus to the Lord: 'I have heard this about you, revered sir: "The recluse Gotama speaks thus: There is neither a recluse nor a brahmin who, all-knowing, all-seeing, can claim a11-embracing knowledge-and-vision- this situation does not exist. " Revered sir, those who speak thus . . . I hope that these, revered sir, speak what was spoken by the Lord, that they do not misrepresenl the Lord by what is not fact, that they explain dhamma according to dhamma, and that no reasoned thesis gives occasion for contempt? '
'Those, sire, who speak thus . . . do not speak as I spoke bUI are misrepresenting me with what is not true, with what is not fact. '. . .
Then King Pasenadi spoke thus 10 the Lord: 'Could it be, revered sir. that people might have transferred to quite another topic something (originally) said by the Lord in reference to something else? In regard to what, revered sir, does the Lord claim to have spoken Ihe words? '
'I, sire, claim to have spoken the words thus: There is neither a recluse not a brahman who at one and Ihe same time can know all, can see all-this situation does nOI exist. ' "
Here Sakyamuni makes a distinction between two different kinds of omniscience: one which is realized "constantly and perpetually," and the other which is more like a potential than a fully realized condition. In our typology, this is a figurative or metaphorical omniscience, as the potential to know anything that can be known, without having actualiz- ed that potential. Given the principle staled above, that Slkyamuni criticized all statements which go beyond personal experience, we are left with the conclusion that Slkyamuni in this passage was claiming the more limited form of omniscience for himself, albeit indirectly_ The classic formulation of this kind of omniscience is to be found in Ihe Milinda-pafiha, in which there are eight separate references to Bud- dha's omniscience. 11 King Milinda asks: " 'Revered Nlgasena, was the
" See Kawasaki ShinjO, "Omniscience in Pili TeXIS" (in Japanese) in Buddhism and Its Rela/ion 10 Ollrer Religions, pp. 117-203, for a full discussion of all these
? ? passages.
"
? NAUGHTON
Buddha omniscient? ' [Nagasena replies] 'Yes, sire, the Lord was omnis- cient, but knowledge-and-vision was not constantly and continuously present to the Lord. The Lord's omniscient knowledge was dependent on the adverting (of his mind); when he adverted it he knew whatever it pleased (him to know). ' " Here Sakyamuni's supposed omniscience is quite clearly defined as a potential capacity, dependent upon his inten- tion or mental "adverting. "14 Nilgasena goes on to compare Sakya- muni's purified knowledge with a sharp arrow "fitted to a sturdy bow and shot by a strong man" which will easily penetrate any clothes made of linen, silk, or wool which are in its path.
"As, sire, a man could put into one hand anything that had been in the other, could utter a speech through his open mouth, could swallow food that was in his mouth, opening his eyes could close them, or closing his eyes could open them, and could stretch out his bent arms or bend in his outstretched arms, sooner than this, sire, more quickly the Lord's omniscient knowledge (could function), more quickly
the adverting (of his mind); when he had adverted ii, he knew whatcvcr it plcascd (him to know). "
S. 1kyamuni's knowledge is of the same kind as ordinary knowledge, but simply heightened to the nth degtee. If I want to think of my name, this requires very little effort on my part, due to extensive practice and familiarity. For Sakyamuni, all possible objects of knowledge are similarly familiar, and his mental training has honed his intellect to such a degree that no obstacles remain. Here again, we note that this concerns possible objects of knowledge, and not things which are unknowable by their very natures.
The Milinda-pafiha is a fairly late text, and one can easily discern some Mahayana tendencie. ? in il? pag? , bill in rhi? case it simply works out the implications of the Ka/J/Jakotthalo SullO'S statement given above. While we have no sure way of dating the pali literature or separating it into difef rent strata, based on the doctrinal development we have noted, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the composition
" ThepatiwordusediSllWljjunu,whkhmayalsobetranslatedas"oon? ntralion. " JaJni uses "reflection" in Iranslatinglhis same ? ge.
? 16
? BUDDHIST OMNISCIENCE
of the KaMakatthala Sutta occurred at a later period than that of the other sources cited above. It is very possible that Sakyamuni's disinterested attitude towards the issue of omniscience reflects his real feelings, and that later statements attributed to him where he appears to claim some form of omniscience for himself were interpolations created by disciples who felt uncomfonable comparing their teacher
with MahavIra, who had claimed a literal kind of omniscience all along. It seems that the idea of omniscience would never have become an issue in the Buddhi3t tradition (al leut not al thi$ early $lage) if there had not been other forces at work, competing with Buddhist teachings. Under pressure from rival sects, loyal Buddhisu desired that the figure of their own founder not be regarded as inferior, and so they naturally wished to praise him as extravagantly as possible, after the manner of sariputta above. However, they were stuck with a pre-ex- isting textual tradition wherein Sakyamuni displays a critical attitude towards claims of omniscience made by his contemporaries, and so the compiler(s) of the Ka'JJl akaUhala Sutta had to reinterpret the idea of omniscience itself in order to apply it to their revered founder. As we shall see, in so doing they initiated a controversy which was to continue for as long as there were Buddhists In India.
Transitional stages
At about the same time as the composition of the Milinda-paiiha or shortly thereafter, the Buddhist tradition began to produce a new set of scriptures known collectively as the Prajiii1J]Qramiti1 literature. These scriptures mark the inception of the movement that came to be known as Mahayana Buddhism, which spread from India through Tibet. central Asia, and China into Japan. The Prajiii1p1Jramiti1 SQtras themselves come in various lengths, of which the version in 8000 lines is
generally regarded as the oldest, dating from around the beginning of the Christian era. This scripture continues to use the same word, sarva- jiia, to designate the Buddha's omniscience, but the sense of this word has changed dramatically. For example:
"When one trains oneself on those stages, one trains oneself in Buddhahood, or the state of aU-knowledge; and thereby in the immeasurable and incalculable Buddha-dhar- mas. Thereby one trains oneself neither for the increase of
37
? NAUGHTON
form, feeling, etc. , nor yet for their decrease; neither to ap- propriate fonn, etc. , nor to let them go. Nor does one train oneself to get hold of any other dharma, even of all- knowledge, nor to produce one, or make one disappear. When he trains thus, a Bodhisattva trains in all-knowledge, and he shall go forth to all-knowledge. "
"It is because the Lord has trained himself in just this perfection of wisdom that the Tath4gata has acquired and known full enlightenment or all-knowledge . . . this all- knowledge of the Tath4gata has come forth from the perfec- tion of wisdom. "
"The perfection of wisdom, 0 Lord,is the accomplish- ment of the cognition of the all-knowing. The perfection of wisdom is the state of all-knowledge. "
"Perfect wisdom is the source of the all-knowledge of the Buddhas. "
"All-knowledge is immeasurable and unlimited. What is immeasurable and unlimited, that is not form, or any other skandha. That is not attainment, or reunion, or getting there; not the path or its fruit; not cognition, or consciousness; not genesis,or destruction,or production, or passing away, or stopping, or development,or annihilation. It has not been made by anything, it has not come from anywhere, it does not go to anywhere,it does not stand in any place or spot. On the contrary, it comes to be styled 'immeasurable, unlimited. '
From the immeasurableness of space is the immeasurableness of all-knowledge. But what is immeasurableness that does not lend itself to being fully known by anything, be it form, or any skandha,or any of the six perfections. Because form is all-knowledge, and so are the other skandhas. and the six perfections. . .
I give such an extensive variety of quotes to demonstrate the problems faced by commentators on the PP scriptures. What is stated plainly in one place is contradicted in another, and any feeling of "Ah, now I understand," does not last for very long. The frustrating obscurity of this text leads one to have sympathy for Poussin,who denounced "In- dian 'philosophumeno' concocted by ascetics . . . men exhausted by a
38
? BUDDHIST OMNISCIENCE
severe diet and often stupefied by me practice of ecstasy. "" Conze himself, who probably was more familiar than any Westerner (and most Orientals) with this literature, says, "The PrajiUlpAramitl sutras in turn fascinate and exasperate the student, in turn raise him to the very heigh! s of elation, and then again reduce him to a condition of
baffled helplessness. "l. However, we may venture 10 make a few ten- lative observations, keeping in mind that whoever wrOle the Pra- jflflpiJramiUJ scriptures would probably never agree with anything we trllO say aboul them. The first point is linguisti(:, and is simply that the word here Iranslated as "a1I? knowledge" is indeed. sorvajflalfl, an abstract form of the same word used in the Pili literature for the omnis- cience of Buddha and MahAvTra. The Buddha here retains his faculty of omniscience, but bOlh Buddha and omniscience are very different from what we found in the pali sources. Furthermore, this seems to be omniscience in the secondary sense noled above, thai is nOI a complele permanenl knowledge of everythin&, but a knowledge of "perfect wisdom," which is generally understood to imply a realization of emp- tiness. This Iypc of omniscience is thus not very different from the spiritual or UpQni? Qdic type, where it is regarded as the culmination of illlensive meditative analysis. The mere term "pcrfeel wisdom," considered in isolation, is not a bad gloss of the literal meaning of om- niscience, but in a Buddhist context, and particularly in the Pra- jflfJpltramitlt scriptures, both these terms have very specific technical senses, which Ihe later commcntalOr5 develop.
The other important version of the PrajflltpiJramiUJ scriptures is the version in 25,000 lines, which is essentially an expanded version of the earlier one. Conze dates the only surviving complete Sanskrit version oflhis text to the 51h century, and considers il as a rceasl version of an earlier original. It has been reorganized with a view to bringing its con- teDIS more in line with the sequence of the AbhisamayltIQ1pkltra. It is in this text that we first encounter the three different kinds of omnis? citnces which are explained by the Abhisamayltla1pkflra. Sarvajflallt is demoted from its position as Ihe realization of the Buddha to that of
HTnayana practitioners, while the Buddha's omniscience is designated by a new lenn, sa? {jkltrajflatlt, or overall omniscience. This is a rather
" Quoted in l. M. Joshi, Disurn/", the BuddhQ. p. 1.
" Conu "On Omniscience Ind the Goal" in Middle WQY. Vol. 22, No. 3. p. 63.
? "
? NAUGHTON
clumsy attempt to exalt the Buddha while denigrating HInaylna, and the awkward English of "overall omniscience" as opposed to simply "omniscience" ? sounds just as strange in Sanskrit. Between these twO is the bodhisattva, whose realization is called milrgajr'iatil. However the usage of these terms is not fully consistent in this tex! . In this text as well, omniscience ( o r overall omni? ience) i s generally synonymous with enlightenment or Buddhahood.
The best known commentator on the Prajr'itJptJramiltJ Salras is un- doubtedly Naglrjuna, the founder of the Madhyamaka philosophical school, whose writings on emptiness express the direct or explicit mean-
ing of the Prajr'iilpdramitil texts. Nlgarjuna himself uses the term "om- niscient" only once, to my knowledge, in his salutation verse at the beginning of his RatnilvalT, but without any attempt to define its mean- ing. Thus we have no clear idea of what "omniscience" means at this period in Buddhist history, although we can be fairly sure that it means neither what it meant before, for Nlgasena and his predecessors, nor does it mean what it later comes to mean within Mahayana. The word itself remains the same, but its meaning is undergoing a transforma-
tion.
We should mention here that there is another work attributed to
Nagarjuna and extant only in Chinese, the MahtJprajfltJpdramit6padeSa- sii5lra (MPPS). There is mention of both sarvajiia and sarviikilrajiia in this work, but following Hikata we may presume that the presence of
the latter, as well as any distinction between these two terms, is prob- ably more properly attributed to Kum! rajlva rather than N! garjuna. Yet even in this text, although both terms are used, there is no clear distinction between them, with Buddha acclaimed as omniscient (sarva-
jiia andlor sarv6ktJrajfia). while such an attainment is denied to HInaylna practitioners. This text is probably earlier than the Pm-
jr. tJptJramitil Satra in 25,()()() Lines mentioned above. Omniscience/or Vasubandhu
Following this transitional phase, we next come to that landmark of Buddhist literature, the Abhidharma-kosa. Composed around the mid- dle of the 4th century, this work represents the culmination of earlier Buddhist practices into a sophisticated philosophical system. Dating from after the start of the Mahayana, the Kosa is one of the last great
? ? ? ? BUDDHIST OMNISCIENCE
works of early Buddhism to be composed in India. Its author Vasuban- dhu has the distinction17 of being one of the only Buddhist authors to achieve renown in both branches of Buddhist philosophy, the earlier Hfnayana as well as the later Mahayana. Within the KoSa itself, however, we find only scant references to the concept of omniscience, which here retains its early form as sarvajna. The discussions of omnis- cience occur within the framework of sectarian disputations among the several groups (traditionally given as eighteen) which had arisen by this time, ? ch with their own special ways of interpreting Buddhist doc- trine.
We start with an objection from a Vl1tsrputrTya standpoint. This sect held that there must be an underlyinz basis of continuity 10 the person, which they called the pudgafa. This was regarded by most other sects as virtually identical to the lUman, and the Vl1tsrputrrya assertion of the pudgoJa was the object of repeated scorn and ridicule. In this context the Vl1tsfputrTya claimed that the pudgafa must have more than a momen- tary existence in order for Buddha to know everything. A mere series of mental instants cannot possibly have such knowledge. Vasubandhu replied that Buddha's omniscience is to be considered as a potential
ralher than an actualized state, dependent upon his attention or voli- tion. Vasubandhu cited the example of a fire, which cannot burn C\? erything at once, but has the ability to burn everything sequentially. Since Buddha has the ability to know everything, he is acknowledged to be omniscient. Thus Buddha's knowledge was regarded as having the same essential structure as the knowledge of ordinary people.
In opposition to this was Ihe position of the Mahl1sI1'f/ghikas, who held that Buddha's knowledge was qualitalively different from that of ordinary people. In the view typical of other Hlnayana schools, con- sciousness existed moment by moment, Hickering on and off like a movie. By the time a second momeDI arises, the first moment is com- pletely gone. However, this made it difficult to establish causality operating over any space of time_ The Sorviistivadins, whose views Vasubandhu generally upholds in the KOSO,IS asserted the existence of
" Shared with Wittgenstein, whose own philosophical career embraces IWO distinct ,,,,,,, .
\I AI least in the verJeS. In the commentary he often seem? 10 ? ide more with the ScUlrlInlilcll$. as noted in S . Anacker. Seven Worlcs of Vasubandh. . , p. 11.
? 41
? NAUOHTON
more than one moment; indeed, they claimed that both past and future existed just as much as the present. Their view was, as outlined above, similar to that of the Milinda-paflha, where Buddha's omniscience,
functioning in much the same way a s ordinary knowledge, is dependent upon volition for its activity. It is not automatic. The MahlJslJrrtghikas and others claimed that Buddha's omniscience was automatic. It was not dependent upon volition or any other factor, but was simply a result of his extreme mental purily_ This assertion seems quite similar to that of the early Jainas mentioned above. The Sarvastivadjns main- tained that Buddha's omniscience occurred over a period of two in- stants, one to cognize all phenomena and the other to render that cog- nition accessible. MahiJsaf! lghikas (ejected this, and said that since consciousness itself is self-luminous, there is no need of a second mo- ment. This position was to become standard in later Mahayana discus- sions of this topic, and of the nature of the mind in general.
As mentioned above, Vasubandhu's career as a Buddhist philoso- pher spans the division between Hlnayana and Mahayana, and so we find further discussions of omniscience in his later works. Of particular interest in this connection is the Mahayana Satriilamkl1ra (MSA), which along with the Abhisamayalarrtkara (AA) belongs to what are known as the "five texts of Maitreya. " But when we examine the MSA,
we find that its use of omniscience is quite difef rent from that of the AA. , which by itself would cast some serious doubt on the traditional ascription of these two texts to the same author. Let us proceed to the relevant textual citations. For the sake of analysis, we may divide them into two groups, first those that mention sarvajria (sj), and second those that mention sarviiklJrajrio (saj). First we find Vasubandhu's commentary on MSA I.
